

Senior Service College Fellowship Civilian Research Project

REINFORCING SUCCESS: AMERICA'S ASSISTANCE TO INDONESIA SINCE 9/11

BY

COLONEL JOHN E. MARAIA
United States Army

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:

Approved for Public Release.
Distribution is Unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 2011

This SSCFP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements imposed on Senior Service College Fellows. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.



U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGEForm Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. **PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 24-05-2011		2. REPORT TYPE Civilian Research Paper		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Reinforcing Success: America's Assistance to Indonesia Since 9/11				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Colonel John E. Maraia				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) United States Institute of Peace 2301 Constitution Ave., NW Washington, DC 20037				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College 122 Forbes Ave. Carlisle, PA 17013				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution Statement A: Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT In the aftermath of 9/11, observers were concerned about Indonesia. A strategically significant archipelago, its importance is magnified because it is home to the world's largest Muslim population. In 2001, Indonesia was grappling with the effects of the 1997 Asian economic crisis while navigating the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Islamic extremists sought to take advantage of the country's economic and political turmoil before the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks. Despite those challenges, Indonesia has achieved a measure of success against the extremists while continuing its economic recovery and democratic transition. Indonesia has achieved its success with quiet and discreet assistance from the US in contrast with larger and more lethal efforts elsewhere. This approach is a useful guide as the US seeks to collaborate with other partners to deal with similar challenges. This paper will highlight Indonesia's importance to the United States and the challenges it faced on 9/11, the steps Indonesia took to counter its extremist threat and America's discreet supporting role, lingering concerns, and the additional measures that Washington and Jakarta can take to reinforce their success. Finally, I'll discuss Indonesia as an example for those countries currently experiencing the "Arab Spring."					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Jemaah Islamiyah, Terrorism, Counterterrorism, Islamic Extremism					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT Unclassified	b. ABSTRACT Unclassified	c. THIS PAGE Unclassified			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)
			Unlimited	42	

USAWC CIVILIAN RESEARCH PROJECT

REINFORCING SUCCESS: AMERICA'S ASSISTANCE TO INDONESIA SINCE 9/11

by

Colonel John E. Maraia
United States Army

Dr. Chantal de Jonge Oudraat
Project Adviser

This CRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Senior Service College fellowship.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Colonel John E. Maraia
TITLE: Reinforcing Success: America's Assistance to Indonesia Since 9/11
FORMAT: Civilian Research Project
DATE: 24 May 2011 WORD COUNT: 11,841 PAGES: 42
KEY TERMS: Jemaah Islamiyah, Terrorism, Counterterrorism, Islamic Extremism
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

In the aftermath of 9/11, observers were concerned about Indonesia. A strategically significant archipelago, its importance is magnified because it is home to the world's largest Muslim population. In 2001, Indonesia was grappling with the effects of the 1997 Asian economic crisis while navigating the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Islamic extremists sought to take advantage of the country's economic and political turmoil before the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks. Despite those challenges, Indonesia has achieved a measure of success against the extremists while continuing its economic recovery and democratic transition. Indonesia has achieved its success with quiet and discreet assistance from the US in contrast with larger and more lethal efforts elsewhere. This approach is a useful guide as the US seeks to collaborate with other partners to deal with similar challenges. This paper will highlight Indonesia's importance to the United States and the challenges it faced on 9/11, the steps Indonesia took to counter its extremist threat and America's discreet supporting role, lingering concerns, and the additional measures that Washington and Jakarta can take to reinforce their success. Finally, I'll discuss Indonesia as an example for those countries currently experiencing the "Arab Spring."

REINFORCING SUCCESS: AMERICA'S ASSISTANCE TO INDONESIA SINCE 9/11

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, observers inside and outside of government were concerned about Indonesia. A strategically significant archipelago, Indonesia filters military and commercial maritime traffic between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Its geographic importance is magnified by the fact that it is home to the world's largest Muslim population. In 2001, Indonesia was still grappling with the effects of the 1997 Asian economic crisis while navigating the transition from decades of authoritarianism to democracy. Well before Al-Qaida attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon Islamic extremists had sought to take advantage of the turbulence created by the country's economic and political turmoil. Despite these challenges, Indonesia has achieved a measure of success against the extremists within its borders while making great strides with its economic recovery and democratic transition.

Though imperfect, the example of Indonesia's pluralist democracy represents an important and viable alternative to the intolerant vision advanced by religious extremists. Significantly, Indonesia has achieved its success with quiet and discreet assistance from the United States, in contrast with America's larger and more lethal efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and the Philippines. This indirect approach of advice and assistance is a useful guide as the US seeks to collaborate with other partners in dealing with the shared challenge of terrorism. This paper seeks to highlight Indonesia's importance to the United States and the challenges it faced on 9/11, the steps Indonesia has taken to counter its extremist threat and the discreet supporting role played by the United States, lingering concerns, and the additional measures that the United States and Indonesia can take in order to reinforce their success. Finally, I'll discuss Indonesia as an example for Tunisia, Egypt and others currently experiencing the "Arab Spring."

Introduction:

As the dust was settling at the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, American officials cast their eyes around the globe to discern where

similar threats existed or where they might be emerging. Initially, their gaze settled on Afghanistan, where U.S. forces embarked on a campaign to eject the Taliban regime from power and to defeat the Al-Qaida forces that they harbored. Within months, U.S. forces would also deploy to the Philippines to assist in the fight against the Abu Sayyaf Group and other Islamic extremists active on Basilan Island and the country's southern reaches. By the late fall of 2002, U.S. forces would be operating in and around the Horn of Africa and by March 2003 they would be invading Iraq to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein.

Their concerns, however, weren't limited to issues arising in those locations. Indonesia emerged as a uniquely important country in the effort to combat Islamic extremism worldwide. As early as 2002, Australian Foreign Policy expert Owen Harries described Indonesia as "set to become both a major breeding ground for anti-Western terrorism, and an agent that will, either deliberately or inadvertently, destabilize the whole of Southeast Asia."¹ Policy makers were initially worried that the extremists would exploit Indonesia's tumultuous economic and political situation in order to launch additional attacks and to radicalize the country's overwhelmingly moderate Muslims. However, given Indonesians' sensitivity to foreign influence, U.S. efforts needed to be more subtle than those in Central Asia, the Middle East or even the Philippines.

I. The Setting: Indonesia's significance to US Foreign Policy and the Challenges it faced on 9/11.

Indonesia's significance is a function of its geography, its economy, its political system, its population and its demography. The Indonesian Archipelago sits astride the equator; its islands stretching 3250 miles from Banda Aceh on Sumatra to Merauke in Papua. It straddles critical Sea Lines of Communication that link America's economic partners in northeast Asia to the oil fields of the Middle East. These passages traverse three choke points in Indonesian waters: the Lombok Strait, the Sunda Strait and, most importantly, the Strait of Malacca. China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan import 80% of their oil through the Strait of Malacca and China receives 30% of its iron ore through the Strait as well.²



Indonesia is also credited with the world's 18th Largest Economy in terms of Gross Domestic Product. In recognition of its growing economic power, Indonesia recently became the only Southeast Asian member of the G-20, a significant feat considering the country's economic situation after the Asian monetary crisis of 1997.³ That upheaval dealt a severe blow to Indonesia's economy and was a major factor in the overthrow of the Suharto regime. Its currency, the Rupiah, normally traded at about 2000-3000 Rupiah to the Dollar. However, in the course of one night, it depreciated in value by 35%. Eventually, it reached a low of 16,800 Rupiah per dollar.⁴ That year, Indonesia experienced negative GDP growth of 13.1% and unemployment rose to 15%-20%.⁵ Massive street protests led to President Suharto's ouster in May of 1998 followed by the naming of his Vice President Jusuf Habibie to the Presidency and set in motion a lengthy period of political turmoil.

A year later, after national elections, the parliament, known as the People's Consultative Assembly, elected Abdurrahman Wahid as President, and Megawati Sukarnoputri as Vice President, for 5-year terms. Wahid would not serve out his term. In July 2001, under pressure from the Assembly over allegations of corruption and incompetence, Wahid relinquished authority to Megawati.

Indonesia emerged from Suharto's authoritarianism as a vibrant democracy; the third largest in the world after India and the United States. As could be expected, its transition was not entirely smooth. In contrast with Suharto's 32 year reign, Indonesia's nascent democracy saw four presidents in the six years after his fall. In September 2004, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, a retired Army General, was elected to succeed Megawati Sukarnoputri in Indonesia's first direct presidential election. He was re-elected in 2009. Though turbulent, this series of elections reflects a system that is responsive to the political will of Indonesia's citizens.

The economic crisis, the fall of Suharto, and the subsequent shock to the Indonesian government's foundation loosened the authorities' grip on security; unleashing dormant separatist and sectarian sentiments in the years immediately before and after the turn of the century. On Christmas Eve, 1998, violence between Muslims and Christians broke out in Poso, Central Sulawesi, after an argument between a Christian and his Muslim friend culminated in a stabbing.⁶ The resultant cycle of sectarian bloodshed continued periodically until 2005 and led to 1000 - 2000 deaths and over 86,000 displaced persons.⁷ The conflict eventually spread beyond Poso and drew in outside actors, such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and the Indonesian military (TNI: after its acronym in Bahasa Indonesia - Tentara National Indonesia).

Muslim-Christian fighting in the Moluccas began in January 1999 in the capital of Ambon, sparked by a reported traffic dispute.⁸ Similar to the incident in Poso, fighting eventually spread throughout the province, leading to more than 10,000 deaths and over 500,000 internally displaced persons.⁹ These and similar crises, coupled with the specter of East Timor's UN-brokered independence in September of 1999, led some observers to fear the possible "Balkanization" of the country.¹⁰

In the midst of the turbulence in the president's office, Indonesia enacted a range of political and, particularly, military reforms. Since the 1960's, the Indonesian Military adhered to a "Dual Function" doctrine that called for a role in both political and security affairs. The military's active role in politics and civil government were in keeping with

that doctrine. In 1998, the military filled a quota of 75 seats in the national parliament. Meanwhile, 6899 officers were seconded to civilian posts in the bureaucracy.¹¹

In November 1998, then-President Habibie's government ratified reforms that removed active duty military officers from their positions in the civilian bureaucracy. Additionally, they reduced the military's seats in parliament to 38; setting in motion a process that would eventually remove military officers from parliament in 2004. Finally, they separated the Police of the Republic of Indonesia (POLRI) from the armed forces, a relationship that had existed since 1962.¹²

Concurrently, Indonesia went through a process of decentralization; transferring authority away from Jakarta and Java. Many observers feared the devolution of power would provide additional momentum towards national disintegration. However, with the exception of East Timor, and to a lesser degree West Papua, that has not been the case. To date the resource-rich provinces have opted to remain under Jakarta's leadership rather than secede.¹³ However, decentralization may have reduced the efficiency of the central government to deal with issues of national importance as coordination measures continue to evolve.

According to the most recent census data, Indonesia is the fourth most heavily populated country on the planet, with over 242 million people and contains the world's largest Muslim population, exceeding 202 million people.¹⁴ Scholars and observers generally agree that Indonesians follow a moderate and tolerant form of Islam. Indonesian culture absorbs external influences and molds them to fit its essentially tolerant culture.¹⁵ Over millennia, it has accepted Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam and Christianity within the archipelago. However, the country has also long played host to a stream of Islamic extremism found on its fringes. Darul Islam (DI - Abode of Islam) was born in West Java in 1947 in the wake of Indonesia's independence. Formed in opposition to the state's secular nature, Darul Islam's founder, S.M. Kartosoewirjo, revolted against the Republic in 1948 and declared the creation of the Negara Islam Indonesia (NII – Indonesian Islamic State). The rebellion, which would eventually

spread to Central Java, Aceh, South Sulawesi and South Kalimantan, is estimated to have resulted in more than 15000 dead by the early 1960's.¹⁶

Although the organization nearly collapsed after Kartosoewirjo's capture and execution in 1962, it re-emerged in the late '60's. It has remained in existence to this day, though its level of activity has varied over time. In fact, elements of Darul Islam were linked to Indonesian military intelligence unit in the 1970's when the government ostensibly exploited DI to assist it in opposing communism. Darul Islam's justification for the relationship was to consolidate their network within the government. The regime turned on DI again in the months before the 1977 election claiming that they had uncovered a coup plot by DI's Komando Jihad (Jihad Command).¹⁷

Darul Islam's members would persist through the 1980's, periodically splitting into factions over disagreements on ideology or policy. One such split, in 1993, led to the founding of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI – Islamic Congregation) by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, two radical clerics. While Darul Islam remains focused on the replacement of the secular state of Indonesia with an Islamic government, Jemaah Islamiyah's goal is more expansive: the establishment of a region-wide Islamic caliphate. Although JI has eclipsed Darul Islam in the last decade, DI is still active; it has taken advantage of JI training programs in the Southern Philippines, it is a source of recruits for JI and other extremist organizations and it remains a source of inspiration for those bent on replacing the Republic of Indonesia with an Islamic state.¹⁸

Sungkar and Ba'asyir fled Suharto's regime and took up residence on the Malaysia side of the Malacca Strait in the mid-1980's. While there, they attracted a number of Indonesians returning to Southeast Asia after fighting with the Afghan mujahidin. What we now know as Jemaah Islamiyah emerged from the volatile mix of the fiery clerics and up to 800 veterans of Afghanistan's wars.

As stated previously, Jemaah Islamiyah's goal is the founding of Daulah Islamiyah (Islamic State) in Southeast Asia spanning Southern Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore,

Indonesia, Brunei and the Southern Philippines. JI's *General Guide for the Struggle of Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyah* emphasizes the establishment of a regional Islamic republic as a "stepping stone towards the restoration of the global Islamic Caliphate (Global Islamic Governance)."¹⁹

JI was affiliated with Al-Qaida at a relatively early stage. Sungkar met with Osama bin Laden in the early 1990's when he traveled to the Afghan/Pakistan border region.²⁰ Some of JI's most prominent members have had ties to Al-Qaida. Riduan Isamuddin (AKA Hambali), a member of both organizations, was the key link between them.²¹ The organization had cells throughout the region and had established links with other terrorist groups in the area. One of its most noteworthy relationships was with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), found in the southern Philippines. A significant number of JI personnel trained at MILF camps in Mindanao, bolstering relationships between those two groups and leading to ties between JI, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and others.

Indonesia's Islamic extremists employ overt organizations to compliment their covert efforts. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir founded the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI – Indonesian Mujahidin Council) in 2000. MMI seeks to strengthen the case for *sharia* law throughout Indonesia through legitimate political and public information campaigns. However, as Zachary Abuza points out, while "ostensibly it is a civil society organization trying to implement *sharia* peacefully" it is in fact an "umbrella organization and coordinating body for many militant and hard-line Islamic organizations."²² In addition to its legitimate activities, such as recovering the bodies of the victims of the 2004 tsunami, it also is a conduit for financial aid to radical groups and for recruits to JI and "tacitly took leadership over (armed militias such as) Laskar Jihad, Laskar Mujahedeen and Laskar Jundullah."²³

II. Indonesia's Balance Sheet against Islamic extremists

Nine months before the 9/11 attacks on the United States, Jemaah Islamiyah executed an ambitious series of attacks throughout Indonesia. On Christmas Eve 2000, Jemaah

Islamiyah operatives delivered bombs to 38 churches or Christian clergy in eleven cities spanning the country. The bombers targeted five cities on Java; four on Sumatra; and one each on Batam (near Singapore) and Lombok (east of Bali). The bombs, configured to detonate simultaneously, exploded between 8:30 and 10:00 PM, killing nineteen people and wounded 120 others.²⁴

In the wake of the Christmas Eve bombings, Jemaah Islamiyah continued to evolve and develop its operational capabilities in Indonesia. Since 2000, U.S. and Indonesian authorities attribute JI and its affiliates with seven attacks in Indonesia. On 12 October 2002, JI killed 202 people, mostly western tourists, with the bombing of nightspots in Bali. A car bombing at the JW Marriot Hotel in Jakarta killed 12 and wounded 149 in August 2003. In September of the following year, another car bomb killed ten and left more than 100 wounded at the Australian Embassy in Jakarta. JI bombs struck Bali again in October 2005, killing 32 people, mostly Indonesians, and injuring 101. In 2009, simultaneous bombings at the Jakarta's Ritz Carlton and JW Marriot hotels killed eight and wounded 50 others.

The Government of Indonesia began a concerted effort against the terrorist threat following the October 2002 Bali Bombing and the subsequent attacks in Jakarta which increasingly killed and maimed Indonesians more than the previously targeted westerners. Similar to Al-Qaida in Iraq, JI overplayed its hand in Indonesia. The killings of innocent Indonesians alienated the public and enabled the Government of Indonesia to take a much stronger stand against the extremists.

Indonesia's leaders were already sensitive to the Republic's fragility as a nation populated with diverse religious and ethnic groups, some of whom harbored long standing mutual animosities. The attacks put the legitimacy of the government in jeopardy, highlighting the difficulties the government faced in maintaining security for all of the citizens of its far-flung archipelago. Controversy over the attacks threatened to drive a wedge between the Muslim community's moderate and fundamentalist wings

and similarly between Indonesia's Muslims and the millions of its practicing Christians, Buddhists and Hindu's.

With the realization that Jemaah Islamiyah and its cohorts threatened the interests of Indonesia as well as the west, Jakarta and Washington came to a shared understanding of the threat. This enabled Indonesia to take a much stronger stand against terrorist acts and to further strengthen their position through cooperation with U.S. authorities.²⁵ Despite the increasingly negative view of the United States held by most Indonesians as a result of the war on terror, and later the invasion of Iraq, the Government of Indonesia quietly bolstered its cooperation with the U.S. However, Jakarta made official statements cautioning Washington on its use of force in Afghanistan and later opposing the invasion of Iraq. Those pronouncements strengthened Jakarta's position domestically and were essential in eventually winning domestic support for stronger counter-terrorism measures.²⁶

Since focusing its attention on the problem, the Government of Indonesia has recorded a consistent and steady record of success in its counterterrorism efforts. The National Police have captured or killed over 500 terrorists since 2002. The vast majority of these tactical successes are attributable to POLRI's Special Detachment 88 (Densus, or Det 88) an organization that was equipped and trained with the assistance of the US and Australian governments

Some of the Indonesia's most significant successes include:

- The killing of Dr. Azahari bin Husin, a bomber, in East Java in November 2005
- The killing of Noordin Top, primarily a JI recruiter, in Jakarta in September 2009
- The successful raid on a terrorist training camp in Aceh in February 2010 by Det 88. The operation resulted in the deaths of three terrorists and the arrest of 21 others for allegedly training for Mumbai-style attacks on Jakarta and elsewhere.²⁷ The authorities subsequently apprehended over 100 suspects based on information found at the camp.

- The killing of Dulmatin, a Bali bomber, in March 2010 after several of his co-conspirators had already been arrested, tried, convicted and executed.
- The arrest of Abu Bakar Bashir, Jemaah Islamiyah's spiritual leader, in August 2010. This was the third time they had arrested Bashir since 9/11. The most recent arrest reflects Jakarta's growing confidence that they can successfully prosecute him, as the government's case against him is much stronger than it had been previously.²⁸

In addition to aggressive law enforcement operations such as those listed above, Jakarta made several political/diplomatic moves that bolstered their collective counterterrorism effort and undercut the extremists. In particular, the government forged a peace agreement with the Free Aceh Movement (GAM – Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) to bring an end to their 29-year separatist insurgency. Jakarta also achieved a negotiated end to the sectarian hostilities in the Moluccas and Sulawesi.

However, Indonesia's deradicalization efforts have produced mixed results. Since the 2002 Bali bombing, Indonesian security forces have arrested scores of militants and 240 have completed their sentences. Some of those released have returned to their extremist ways. For instance, over a dozen of the 100 militants arrested in 2010 were repeat offenders.²⁹

Indonesian authorities rely on former militants to change the minds of young militants by focusing on those already apprehended and behind bars. The program aims at "neutralizing the ideological foundations of militant Islam" and is founded on two principles: first is "the belief that radicals will only listen to other radicals; second is the belief that "through kindness" the authorities can change the jihadist assumption that government officials are by definition anti-Islamic."³⁰

Successes include the case of Nasir Abbas, a former al-Qaida-linked militant who helped train the Bali bombers. After his release from prison in 2004, he assisted the police in tracking and arresting several of his former comrades. He has also entered

prisons on several occasions to take part in religious debates with inmates in order to dissuade them from violent jihad.³¹

Abdullah Sunata, however, figures prominently on the list of failures. Sunata took part in the prison de-radicalization program and officials considered him reformed. In recognition of his good behavior, his sentence was reduced and he was released from prison in 2009. He was arrested again in June 2010 after setting up Lintas Tanzim, an umbrella organization which planned to attack Indonesia's president, western embassies and the POLRI headquarters.³²

III. The U.S. Government's Role

Indonesia deserves all of the credit for these successes. Indonesian officials have accepted the political risks, collected the evidence, analyzed the intelligence and executed the raids which have taken a considerable toll on the terrorists within their borders. However, the U.S. has played an important but unobtrusive role in support.

In particular, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) long recognized Indonesia's geostrategic importance as the choke point between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. PACOM sought productive relations with Jakarta and maintained a consistent presence to safeguard the Sea Lines of Communication and ensure regional stability. Indonesia, with its huge Muslim population, took on additional significance in the eyes of PACOM after the 9/11 attacks.

Washington leaders initially leaned toward a more forceful and direct approach to Indonesia. However, PACOM's Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) and the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta had a more developed understanding of Indonesian sensitivities. They knew that Indonesia would not accept a large number of U.S. personnel conducting counterterrorism operations in the country, even in support of Indonesian security forces. They ultimately guided Washington toward a discreet and indirect whole-of-government approach to support Indonesia's efforts. This approach deliberately eschewed a large commitment of U.S. personnel to directly confront Indonesian extremists and reflected Indonesia's level of tolerance for external

assistance³³ The Department of Defense (DoD) played a supporting role among its Interagency (IA) partners in America's collective assistance to Indonesia and, most importantly, within U.S. Embassy Jakarta's Country Team. DoD's primary interagency partners were The Department of State (DoS), the Department of Justice (DoJ) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

The Department of State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security, in collaboration with Indonesian officials and the U.S. Country Team, developed and implemented a plan to train and equip Detachment 88 and other POLRI officers. The Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program trains security and law enforcement personnel on terrorism-specific police procedures. ATA efforts are generally focused on assisting partner nations in protecting national borders, critical infrastructure and national leadership as well as responding to and resolving terrorist incidents and crisis management of terrorist incidents with potential national-level implications.³⁴

The program included construction of permanent training facilities such as classrooms, computer labs, and small-arms & demolition ranges as well as marksmanship instruction and tactical training for Detachment 88. Indonesian officers took part in workshops designed to counter suicide bombers in response to the JW Marriot and Ritz-Carlton attacks. Under ATA, the U.S. also provided cyber training to Indonesian officials and their counterparts from Malaysia and the Philippines to analyze extremist use of the internet as a means of radicalization in the tri-border region that they shared.³⁵ Finally, Indonesian police officers received investigative training emphasizing the importance of forensic evidence to locate and apprehend terrorists. Armed with enhanced analytical skills, Indonesian investigators were instrumental in the arrests of suspects in several of the high-profile bombings.³⁶ DoD plays a supporting role in this effort; providing periodic tactical training, while the bulk of the instruction has been supplied by Diplomatic Security personnel and contractors in addition to sizable assistance from the Government of Australia.

The U.S Department of Justice has primarily assisted the Government of Indonesia through the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) and the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (OPDAT). The programs are focused on enhancing partner nation investigation and prosecution capacity respectively.

ICITAP assists foreign governments to develop professional law enforcement institutions. ICITAP deals with a wide range of law enforcement subjects that support American & Indonesian efforts to counter Islamic extremism including Terrorism and Transnational Crime, Specialized and Tactical Skills, Marine and Border Security, Criminal Investigations, Forensics, Basic Police Services, Community Policing, Corrections and Information Systems.

In Indonesia and throughout the region, ICITAP focuses on building indigenous law enforcement analytical capacity to support the investigation and prosecution of terrorism and transnational crime cases. The Indonesian program began in 2000 as a means for the U.S. to facilitate POLRIs transition from a military to a civilian law enforcement agency after its separation from the armed forces. The program eventually grew to cover topics such as maritime and border security, crisis response and police professionalization.³⁷

In 2004, Washington expanded ICITAP's program to include forensics. After an initial assessment of the National Police Forensic System's facility in Surabaya, ICITAP assisted in developing a DNA laboratory that met internationally recognized procedural standards. Under the forensics program, the U.S. has donated equipment and provided technical assistance and training to more than 2,000 police officers and laboratory technicians.³⁸

The Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (OPDAT) assists Indonesia's Department of Justice in its efforts to combat terrorism, human trafficking, money laundering and terrorist finance. OPDAT assisted Indonesian

legislative staffers and Jakarta's Financial Intelligence Unit to draft a new terrorism financing law and trained police, judges and prosecutors on investigating and prosecuting terrorism finance cases. Additionally, eleven Indonesian prosecutors from the Terrorism and Transnational Crimes Task Force traveled to the U.S. where they observed court proceedings and met with the U.S. Marshals Service to discuss courtroom security and witness protection. OPDAT support has contributed to the significant success of this task force charged with prosecuting cases related to terrorism, money laundering, cyber crimes and human trafficking; including the prosecution of 64 terrorists and more than 90 human trafficking cases.³⁹

The United States Agency for International Development's (USAID) contribution has focused on the areas of Conflict Mitigation & Reconciliation and Rule of Law, Human Rights & Good Governance and education. In Fiscal Year 2009 alone, USAID provided grants totaling \$5 million for conflict mitigation and reconciliation activities in Central Sulawesi and Aceh. Activities in Sulawesi focused on ensuring community-wide decision making and conflict prevention. USAID directed its assistance in Aceh at reinforcing the peace process by training thousands of people in conflict resolution skills.⁴⁰ Additionally, USAID raised the incomes for over 12,000 Acehnese through its jobs creation program for ex-combatants.⁴¹

The foundation of the collective U.S. government assistance program to Indonesia is its support to education. USAID's efforts to improve education have the residual goal of countering extremist influence among Indonesia's youth. Under a George W. Bush Presidential initiative, Washington committed to providing \$157 million over five years to improve education in Indonesia. President Obama has since committed an additional \$10 million to specifically fund higher education in Indonesia. In April 2010, the United States, Australia and Indonesia began a joint effort to rebuild approximately 40 earthquake damaged schools in West Sumatra that will allow about 6,500 children to return to formal education. USAID is also working with more than 40 teacher-training colleges to professionally develop teachers in support of the nationwide reform effort to raise instructor quality.⁴²

DoD's contribution fits within the U.S. Government's collective assistance to Indonesia. It followed three primary tracks that met the needs of both the US and Indonesian governments; maritime security, aircraft maintenance and education & training.⁴³ These tracks supported the U.S. focus on counterterrorism and regional security while concurrently addressing Indonesian concerns with border security, disaster relief and professionalization of their military. Cooperation on these tangible assistance programs also enhanced communication and trust between American and Indonesian officials after years of limited engagement. These factors were critical to American-Indonesian cooperation on counterterrorism and wider policy issues.

Maritime security was an opportune venue for collaboration between Indonesia and its regional neighbors, as all shared concerns with their inherently porous maritime borders. Recognizing the similarities between issues such as piracy, narcotics, human trafficking and terrorism, the U.S. advocated for a Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI). This initiative eventually evolved into ASEAN's Regional Maritime Security Cooperation effort where Southeast Asian partners, including Indonesia, deal with shared concerns related to security and national sovereignty. Regional Maritime Security encompassed a wide range of government and private sector players and issues including international law, territorial waters, regional political relations, military and law enforcement concerns, commercial shipping and insurance.⁴⁴

Focusing on counter-piracy, counter-narcotics, human smuggling and maritime law enforcement capacities had the intended collateral effect of improving Indonesia's counterterrorism capacity as well. The skills and capabilities required to investigate, interdict, apprehend and prosecute pirates, smugglers and human traffickers were the same as those required to deal with terrorists crossing Indonesia's internal and external borders. Stemming the flow of people, guns and narcotics entering Indonesia illegally was critical to severing the link between the terrorists and the resources and funds that sustain them. Additionally, the collaborative effort by Washington and Jakarta, emphasizing local solutions to local security problems, was more palatable to Indonesia

than strictly bilateral counterterrorism cooperation. Dealing with transnational issues common to both parties avoided antagonizing Indonesian political sensitivity to counterterrorism efforts focused solely on Muslim extremists. Finally, the Maritime Security effort created infrastructure and lines of communication between Indonesia and its neighbors that will enhance regional cooperation on common security problems over the long-term.

The second track for DoDs assistance was in the field of aircraft maintenance, which was a critical need for the Indonesian Air Force and particularly its C130 cargo aircraft fleet. Those aircraft are vital to the Indonesian military's ability to move men and materiel around the country. They are essential for meeting normal security requirements and to rapidly respond to emergencies such as the archipelago's frequent humanitarian disasters or to bring security forces to bear against terrorist threats. After a series of deadly crashes attributed to maintenance problems and parts shortages, the U.S. and Indonesia initiated a fleet maintenance program to address safety concerns and to bolster its operational reliability.

Finally, the US bolstered the education and training of Indonesian military personnel through increases in its International Military Education and Training (IMET) account. Indonesia's participation in IMET and other training programs had long been limited due to US political and legal constraints stemming from legitimate human rights concerns. Attendance at U.S. training courses and war colleges promotes healthy civil-military relations by introducing Indonesians personnel (and all international students) to their American peers; exposing them to a professional military subordinate to civilian authority. The course work and training programs equip the graduates with advanced skills that they can then bring back to their units to increase their operational capabilities and effectiveness. Increasing Indonesia's access to education and training opportunities, within the constraints of the Human Rights-focused Leahy Law, bolstered military professionalism and strengthened the linkages between US and Indonesian military leaders. This fostered trust between current and future military leaders of both nations and enhanced Indonesia's ability to deal with the current extremist threat.

Additionally, the U.S. response to the unforeseen calamity of the Indian Ocean Tsunami of December 2004 was swift and sizable. The bulk of American assistance was provided by PACOM, the Defense Department and USAID. At the height of the military's effort, 16,000 personnel, 26 ships, 58 helicopters and 43 fixed wing aircraft were dispatched to the area in support of the relief effort. Indonesia, which sustained the bulk of the damage, received the bulk of the support. The United States took the significant step of committing the USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN Carrier Strike Group and the U.S. hospital ship MERCY to relief efforts in and around Sumatra for several weeks.

By December 2007, three years after the disaster, the U.S. had provided \$405.7 Million for reconstruction to Indonesia; almost 70% of the total funds provided by Congress in May 2005 for the Tsunami Relief and Reconstruction Fund.⁴⁵ In the words of Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "the U.S. response to this natural disaster saved thousands, and probably tens of thousands of lives, particularly in Indonesia, and provided desperately needed hope to hundreds of thousands of others."⁴⁶ America's efforts prevented even greater loss of life and demonstrated good will to the Indonesian people and support for its government.

The United States has appropriately acknowledged the growing importance of Indonesia beyond the realm of counterterrorism in its strategic documents and its bilateral relationship. The May 2010 National Security Strategy describes Indonesia as one of the globe's "Emerging Centers of Influence." "Indonesia—as the world's fourth most populous country, a member of the G-20, and a democracy—will become an increasingly important partner on regional and transnational issues such as climate change, counterterrorism, maritime security, peacekeeping, and disaster relief. With tolerance, resilience, and multiculturalism as core values, and a flourishing civil society, Indonesia is uniquely positioned to help address challenges facing the developing world."⁴⁷ The National Military Strategy, released in February 2011, announced that the U.S. will "invest new attention and resources in Southeast and South Asia" and signaled America's intent to "expand (its) military security cooperation, exchanges, and exercises

with ...Indonesia ... to address domestic and common foreign threats to their nation's integrity and security.”⁴⁸

In keeping with Indonesia's increased significance, Presidents Obama and Yudhyono formally launched the US-Indonesian Comprehensive Partnership, encompassing a wide range of new initiatives and ongoing programs, in November 2010 during President Obama's long awaited state visit to Jakarta. A joint commission, co-chaired by the U.S. Secretary of State and the Indonesian Foreign Minister will guide the partnership with a Plan of Action for key areas for cooperation: political & security, economic & development (including climate change) and socio-cultural (including education, science and technology).

- The political and security component focuses on regional cooperation and security cooperation. Indonesia and ASEAN strongly supports U.S. entry into the East Asian Summit (EAS), a regional security forum. President Obama plans to attend the 2011 EAS meeting hosted by Indonesia. The Defense Framework Arrangement, signed in June 2010, enhances military-to-military cooperation particularly in the areas of counterterrorism, maritime security, peacekeeping, natural disaster response, and humanitarian assistance.

As part of the security component, the United States (through USAID) is also partnering with Indonesia at the national and local level to prepare for, respond to, and mitigate the effects of natural disasters. Programs include \$2 million in humanitarian assistance to help address the effects of the earthquake and tsunami in the Mentawai Islands and to deal with volcanic eruptions on Java's Mt. Merapi. Assistance has ranged from the distribution of emergency relief supplies to collaboration on the construction of seismic monitoring networks to forecast future eruptions. Since 2008 alone, USAID has provided approximately \$5 million to reduce disaster risks and mitigate disaster effects by strengthening infrastructure, improving zoning to avoid construction in disaster prone areas, increasing public awareness, and improving construction practices.⁴⁹

- The economic and development component focuses on trade and investment, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, environment and climate change and public health issues. Bilateral trade in goods and services totaled nearly \$20 billion in 2009, with Indonesia enjoying a \$6.8 billion trade surplus with the United States. Additionally, U.S. companies have invested \$16 billion in the energy, mining, and manufacturing sectors.

Under the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), both countries have worked to reduce or eliminate trade barriers. As part of an effort to continue to promote free enterprise, the U.S. recently designated Indonesia as one of two pilot countries for the Global Entrepreneurship Program and Jakarta will host a regional entrepreneurship summit in 2011 concurrent with a State Department-led entrepreneurship trade mission.⁵⁰ Additionally, since 2006, the Indonesian Government and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) have collaborated on a \$55 million program to promote good governance and improve the delivery of public health services.

In the field of Environment and Climate Change, the U.S. has committed \$136 million over three years to work with government counterparts and civil society to facilitate and accelerate Indonesia's sustainable development through a balanced approach to environmental protection and socio-economic improvement. In June 2010, President Obama announced that the U.S., in conjunction with Norway, will support the establishment of an Indonesia Climate Change Center.⁵¹

The US is supporting Indonesia's Health sector with financial and technical assistance as well. During Fiscal year 2010, USAID provided \$52 million in development aid to health programs. Additionally, Indonesia is the third largest grant recipient from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria; the U.S. remains the largest single contributor to that fund. A network of Indonesian

partners is also working with the U.S. National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases on a long-term collaboration on clinical research and training.

- The socio-cultural component focuses on cultural exchanges, civil society, science & technology and education. It encompasses interfaith cooperation and a plan for Indonesians to engage U.S. religious groups in interfaith service projects. Additionally, Washington and Jakarta agreed to reestablish the Peace Corps program in Indonesia after a 45-year hiatus.

In order to nurture Indonesian civil society (a critical component of its democracy) and reinforce Indonesia's role on the world stage, the U.S. has initiated a \$15 Million effort to assist Indonesian civil society organizations to share their experiences beyond Indonesia's shores. The program's goals are to facilitate cooperation among Indonesian, U.S., and regional civil society organizations in five critical areas: (1) elections and political participation, (2) independent media and freedom of information, (3) peace-building and conflict resolution, (4) transparency and accountability, and (5) human rights monitoring and advocacy. The effort is recognition that Indonesia's lively yet stable multi-party democracy stands as an example for other countries that are working through the various stages of democratic development.⁵²

The US and Indonesia signed a Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement on March 29, 2010 and it is nearing implementation. On behalf of President Obama, former president of the U.S. National Academies of Science Dr. Bruce Alberts visited Indonesia and launched the Frontiers of Science exchange program to bring together American and Indonesian scientists to share experiences and information with the hope that those relationships will lead to joint research and information-sharing. Thus far, the U.S. Government has contributed \$250,000.

Last year also saw a joint research voyage of the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Agency's *Okeanos Explorer* and Indonesia's *Baruna Jaya*. That

collaboration, marking the beginning of a marine science partnership, yielded the discovery of new species of coral and ocean fauna. Finally, the new Fulbright Indonesia Research, Science and Technology (FIRST) scholarship program will foster partnerships with Indonesia to support science and technology educational exchange. USAID has committed \$20 million to continue to develop university partnerships involving joint research in fields such as health, biodiversity conservation, energy, climate and agriculture to boost Indonesian innovation.⁵³

As stated earlier, perhaps the single most important commitment from the U.S. is in the field of education, where collaboration has the potential to improve the lives of Americans and Indonesians for generations to come. The Comprehensive Partnership reaffirms that commitment. Under both President Bush and President Obama, the U.S. has committed to invest \$165 million in higher education collaboration over five years. The enterprise, involving both the public and private sector, comprises expanded educational exchanges, including the new Fulbright program (referenced above), the Community College Initiative, English language teaching, and student advising. It also contains university partnerships designed to exchange ideas on social issues, scientific research and economic development.

Four of 25 planned university partnerships have already been awarded by USAID:

- UCLA will partner with Universitas Udayana in Bali to strengthen research on marine biodiversity
- Columbia University will partner with Universitas Indonesia to establish a center on child protection
- Texas A&M will partner with three Indonesian universities in a tropical plant curriculum project
- Harvard University's School of Public Health will partner with several Indonesian institutions to enhance training in public health and applied research.⁵⁴

IV. Lingering Concerns

In spite of Indonesia's success, there remains cause for concern. In particular, there is unease over growing religious intolerance, an increased counterterrorism role for the military and lingering human rights issues.

As noted earlier, Indonesian society has a long established reputation for religious tolerance which includes constitutional guarantees on religious freedoms. However, that reputation is being tested by the actions of a violent minority. For example, church congregations in the Javanese communities of Bekasi and Bogor have faced often violent pressure to relocate their churches and cease their Sunday worship services. Last September, a Bekasi priest and a parishioner were stabbed and beaten. In Bogor, the mayor revoked the Church's operating permit in an attempt to diffuse local tensions.⁵⁵

The Brussels-based International Crisis Group cited several causes for rising Christian-Muslim tensions in November 2010:

- Government failure to prevent intimidation against religious minorities
- Growth of Islamic vigilante organizations.
- Aggressive evangelical Christian proselytizing in traditional Muslim strongholds.
- Devolution of powers to local authorities on issues such as religious affairs which are supposed to fall under the authority of central government.
- Reluctance to prosecute "hate speech" due in part to confusion over acceptable limits on freedom of expression.
- Lack of a serious effort to promote tolerance as a national value.⁵⁶

Radicalization and intolerance isn't solely an issue between Christians and Muslims, though. Mainstream Muslims have increasingly persecuted members of the Ahmadiyah Islamic sect in recent months. Founded in India in 1889, Ahmadi's believe that their founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, was a prophet and messiah. Such a belief is blasphemy to orthodox Muslims. Last February, three Ahmadi's were beaten to death in West Java by an angry mob as police did little or nothing to protect them.⁵⁷

Endy Bayuni, former Jakarta Post editor and visiting fellow at the East-West Center in Washington, recently wrote that while Indonesia has blasphemy laws on the books, most of the accused rarely make it to court. As in the case above, they are often dealt with by angry mobs intent on meting out their interpretation of justice.⁵⁸ Despite the constitutional guarantee on religious freedom, the Religious Affairs Minister has openly called for the sect to disband to prevent future bloodshed.⁵⁹ Abu Bakar Bashir has added to tensions by describing the Yudhoyono government as “poisonous” for failing to outlaw Ahmadiyah.⁶⁰

Recently, a series of parcel bombs targeting religious minorities and Muslim moderates may signal a violent escalation of the debate on religious freedom. Circumstantial evidence and targeting suggests religious extremists are behind the bombings. Although Indonesian authorities have been slow to act against those inciting violence, several moderate Muslim leaders have spoken out in defense of religious freedom.⁶¹

Local and international observers have long criticized Indonesia’s military on human rights grounds. These issues have begun to take on new relevance to Jakarta’s counter-terrorism campaign. Since 2000, when the police were detached from the Ministry of Defense, Indonesia has dealt with terrorism as a law enforcement problem. Police officers, particularly Detachment 88, struck terrorist targets and those militants who were apprehended were tried in civilian courtrooms. Mardigu Wowiek Prasanto, an Indonesian analyst, attributes much of Jakarta’s success to its treatment of terrorism as a law enforcement issue. He notes that militants “received open trials, widely covered in the media. This helped convince a skeptical public that the threat was homegrown.”⁶²

However, Human Rights groups have leveled accusations against POLRI and Detachment 88. Police officers in Central Sulawesi fired into a crowd protesting the death of local man in police custody; killing five and wounding 34 others.⁶³ Similarly, Human Rights Watch has accused Detachment 88 personnel of torturing Moluccan separatists in Ambon. In fact, the United States suspended assistance to the Ambon element of the Detachment in 2008 citing human rights concerns.⁶⁴

While the allegations above are related to separatists, Indonesia's National Human Rights Commission has also accused Detachment 88 of abusing terrorism suspects. Based on an investigation conducted last fall, the commission recently accused the Detachment of torture and murder in North Sumatra, Greater Jakarta and central and eastern Java.⁶⁵

The 2010 establishment of the National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT - Badan Nasional Penang-gulangan Terorisme) has raised concerns about the military's involvement in counter-terrorism operations and the potential for human rights abuses. The BNPT, a non-ministerial body under the Coordinating Minister for Security, Political and Legal Affairs, is charged with national counterterrorism policy formation and tactical execution through joint police and military Task Forces. Much of the criticism of the BNPT is focused on its lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities for member units. Observers fear that vague regulations could lead to legal and human rights violations by BNPT members.⁶⁶ However Ansyad Mbai, the chief of the BNPT, has emphasized that the military is needed in the fight against extremism in certain circumstances to provide intelligence and back-up support to the police.⁶⁷

Equally concerning to human rights groups is the inclusion of Kopassus, the Indonesian Army's Special Forces unit, in the BNPT. Local and international rights groups have documented abuses by Kopassus personnel in Aceh, East Timor, Papua and Jakarta. In 1999, in the wake of violence in East Timor, the United States banned security assistance to Kopassus. When military assistance resumed in July 2010, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates described the restoration as a "gradual process enabled by the ongoing professionalization of the TNI (Tentara National Indonesia – Indonesia's National Forces)" and defense ministry "actions to address human rights issues." Under the current process, members of Kopassus will be individually vetted before being cleared to take part in U.S. military training. Recent allegations of Kopassus "target lists" of Papuan civilians and churches as well as video's of Indonesian soldiers (though not from Kopassus) abusing Papuan detainees have raised the suspicions of human

rights activists.⁶⁸ While the Indonesian military has already tried and convicted the three soldiers who abused the detainees, their sentences of between eight and ten months of imprisonment have not mollified critics.⁶⁹

V. Additional Measures to Reinforce Success

The 10 years since 9/11 have seen Indonesia achieve a great deal of success in its efforts against Islamic Extremism and in its broader political and economic efforts. However, as many observers have noted, there will be no victory parades at the end of this war; the U.S. and Indonesia will never be able to declare victory against the extremists. Instead, the United States should work to reinforce Indonesia's success and broaden their bilateral relationship. There are additional holistic measures that the U.S. can take to support Indonesia's struggle against extremists and bolster its standing in the eyes of the world.

- The U.S. should assist Jakarta to focus on counter-radicalization before individuals become radicalized. This will require promotion of a tolerant, inclusive and optimistic narrative to counter that of the Islamic extremists. Additionally, it requires Jakarta to address local sectarian grievances before they can be exploited by the extremists.⁷⁰
- The U.S. should assist the Indonesian government to employ soft-power as a tool to reduce Islamic radicalism and to compliment their hard power campaign to capture/kill violent extremists. Observers site Islamic education as a weapon in reducing dangerous misconceptions about Islam and as defense against extremist ideologies. In their recent paper, *Police Power, Soft Power and Extremist Sub-culture in Indonesia*, Mark Woodward, Ali Amin and Inayay Rohmaniyah note that:

Extremists rely on simplistic religious 'proofs' for their political positions. Muslims with more than a rudimentary understanding of the Qur'an and Hadith (traditions concerning the Prophet Muhammad and his companions) recognize the simplicity and

banality of these 'proofs.' This is not conjecture; former NII (Negara Islam Indonesia – Indonesian Islamic State) recruiters have told us that people with little religious education are the easiest targets and those from pesantren (The Indonesian equivalent of Madrasas - traditional Islamic boarding schools) the most difficult.⁷¹

Therefore, supporting quality religious education with an alternative message to counter the ranting of the extremists is akin to supporting an inoculation program to shore up the followers' defenses against those who twist Islamic teachings to support their political ends.

The International Crisis Group notes that “every time the older generation seems on the verge of passing into irrelevance, a new generation of young militants, inspired by Darul Islam's history and the mystique of an Islamic state, emerges to give the movement a new lease on life.” While it may be virtually impossible to eliminate that mystique, the group identifies some measures to help contain its harmful effects:⁷²

- Resolve ethnic conflicts, such as those that flared in Sulawesi and Ambon, to remove some of the latent tinder that, when ignited, can then be exploited by violent extremists with far-reaching political objectives.
- Jakarta must support the spirit and letter of its constitution and promote religious tolerance of minority religions and minority Islamic sects such as Ahmadiya and prosecute those who infringe on their constitutionally protected right to practice their religion to prevent the recurrence of sectarian violence such as that suffered by the people of Sulawesi and the Moluccas.
- Recognize that prison terms do not deaden the commitment of Darul Islam/Jemaah Islamiyah militants. The potential for recidivist militants means that Indonesian authorities must pay much more attention to the activities of imprisoned extremists, the relationships they forge behind bars, their children's development and political/extremist involvement while they are

incarcerated, and the activities of Islamic extremists after they are released. The authorities need to ensure that prisons are places of rehabilitation, not centers for enhanced radicalization, so that released prisoners have a reasonable chance to live peacefully in society.⁷³ Similarly, the state should provide financial aid and counseling for the families of incarcerated terrorists with an eye towards severing the generational links to terrorism.⁷⁴

Observers recommend several areas of improvement including more structured de-radicalization curriculum, psychological assessments for extremist inmates and specific attention to the susceptibility of prison guards to bribes.⁷⁵ Noor Huda Ismail, of Jakarta's Institute for International Peacebuilding, is assisting the de-radicalization effort, but he "prefers to call the program one of disengagement, rather than de-radicalization."⁷⁶ Their approach is focused on nonviolent conflict resolution and isn't focused specifically on terrorism. It remains to be seen if "disengagement" will curb recidivism by extremists.

Borrowing from John Hughes, the author of Islamic Extremism and the War of Ideas: Lessons from Indonesia, Washington and Jakarta's public diplomacy efforts should direct the content of television programming towards Indonesia's women because, as in most male-dominated societies, they spend more time home, in front of the TV. Washington and Jakarta should work with Indonesia's moderate Muslim voices that already carry reasonable messages to the faithful. Similarly, they should work within Indonesia's unique Muslim framework and culture to support women's issues.⁷⁷

- The United States should encourage its Indonesian counterparts to play an active role in international affairs, where Indonesia can lead by its own example as a nation that has evolved into a vibrant democracy while rebuilding its economy in the midst of a serious extremist threat. The U.S. government will need to employ skillful Public

Diplomacy in order to shine a favorable spotlight on Indonesia without stigmatizing it among its neighbors and the wider Muslim world.

- The U.S. should support Indonesian participation, and leadership if appropriate, in regional and global forums. As the chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for 2011, Indonesia has an opportunity to demonstrate its ability to lead its neighbors. As Ernest Bower, of the Washington's Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) points out, "Indonesia's global impact will only be effective if it can lead within Southeast Asia. Recent trends indicate increasing nationalist sentiment among ASEAN countries, including Indonesia. Leadership is required to change the tone and direction toward a unified identity for the region."⁷⁸

Like many of its neighbors, Chinese aggressiveness on territorial claims in the East and South China Sea has made Indonesians anxious. Ultimately, the countries of Southeast Asia hope to cultivate positive and complimentary relationships with both China and the U.S. The ASEAN Chairmanship gives Indonesia an opportunity to guide the region's efforts to forge closer economic ties with China while ensuring America's active role in the region.⁷⁹

Unfortunately, both the U.S. and Indonesia missed an opportunity to solidify their roles and relationship last September at the 2nd ASEAN-US Leaders' Meeting. The U.S. missed a chance to showcase the importance of the region (and Indonesia) by holding the conference in New York City and not in the nation's capital. Similarly, Indonesia's President Yudhoyono squandered an opportunity to demonstrate his leadership of ASEAN in front of an American (and international) audience when he opted to send his Vice President to New York as his representative. Observers attributed President Yudhoyono's decision as a message to communicate his dissatisfaction with President Obama's cancellation of three visits to Indonesia prior to his trip in November 2010. President Obama

has since indicated that he will return to Indonesia in 2011 to attend both the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the third U.S. - ASEAN Leaders' Meeting.

- Similarly, the U.S. should promote Indonesia's budding relationship with India, a country with which it has much in common. They share historic ties stemming from the spread of Hinduism to Sumatra and Java beginning in the first millennium of the Common Era. India is the world's largest democracy and Indonesia is its third largest. India has the world's third largest Muslim population, following only Indonesia and Pakistan.⁸⁰ Both countries are similarly linked by their common interest in the nature of China's rise and its impact on the Indian Ocean region that they share. Finally, constructive relations between them could have a positive effect on India's views of Pakistan and its potential as a Muslim democracy.

- The U.S. should assist Indonesia in building its Peacekeeping capacity. One of the top 20 contributors to Peacekeeping Operations, Indonesian personnel are currently taking part in three Peacekeeping missions; with a 1400-man battalion in Lebanon, 188 military and police personnel in Congo and a dozen police officers in Darfur. Additionally, Jakarta has recently joined the International Monitoring Team supporting the Mindanao peace process in the southern Philippines. With that in mind, the U.S. should recognize Indonesia's leadership in the field and should back its desire to be a training hub for regional peacekeepers. Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Alain Le Roy has welcomed Indonesia's initiative and has also urged Indonesia to include police women among its contingents due to the large number displaced people in the UN mission areas.⁸¹

U.S. military assistance should focus on reinforcing and strengthening the peacekeeping capacities outlined above and further developing its Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief capabilities. PKO-related training events and joint exercise will improve the Indonesian military's effectiveness and ability to work

with international partners in the conduct of peacekeeping missions while concurrently enhancing its professionalism and ability to mount sound contingency operations and counter-terrorism missions in support of POLRI. Peacekeeping training should continue to include a human rights component and should address their responsibility to protect civilians.

In keeping with its established peacekeeping reputation, the U.S. should encourage Indonesian participation in coalition efforts in Afghanistan, where its peacekeeping experience could be particularly useful. Malaysia has already set a precedent for Southeast Asian nations by providing 30 personnel as the medical component of New Zealand's Provincial Reconstruction Team. Indonesia could provide a similar non-lethal contingent. Such a commitment would provide both a tangible contribution to the wellbeing of the Afghan people and additional exposure to co-religionist military personnel from one of the world's largest democracies.

- The U.S. should assist Indonesia to further professionalize its military. Indonesia must work to address lingering Human Rights concerns directed at their security forces. While there has been progress, concerns linger. The U.S. must work with Indonesia's military leaders to assist them in understanding the operational implications of human rights violations. Whether the violations are real or perceived, they negatively impact the legitimacy of their military actions in the eyes of Indonesians and outside observers. Of equal importance is how the military and security forces address alleged human rights violations once they've been discovered. U.S. should hold the TNI & POLRI accountable for conducting credible investigations and dispensing reasonable punishments when warranted. For example the 10 month sentences handed down to soldiers for their abuse of Papuan detainees was widely seen as inadequate by human rights advocates, in Jakarta and abroad, and at the Pentagon.

- The U.S. should maintain pressure on the Indonesian military and police to respect human rights. At the same time U.S. laws limiting military to military contacts based on human rights concerns (such as the Leahy Law) should focus on the violations of individuals rather than on their units of assignment at the time of the violations. This will focus sanctions on the actual perpetrators instead of units from which they may have long since departed.

U.S. officials should urge their Indonesian counterparts to clearly define the counterterrorism roles and responsibilities of its National Counter Terrorism Agency and ensure mutual understanding of those roles and responsibilities within its units and the national leadership.

Given Indonesia's propensity for volcanic activity and natural disasters, there is significant need for robust humanitarian assistance capacity within the armed forces. Indonesia's military has long-standing Civic Action programs. The U.S. should augment Indonesia's programs with unique U.S. capabilities where feasible. However, any joint actions on humanitarian assistance should emphasize a holistic approach, tying Indonesian military efforts to its civilian agencies and local non-governmental organizations and it should take into account Indonesia's resource constraints and its ability to sustain the program over time.

- Encourage more "People to People" engagement between American's and Indonesians as a recent CNAS Report recommended. This will facilitate professional and civil society exchanges in addition to the education exchanges outlined above.⁸²

VI. Indonesia and The Arab Spring

Many observers have cited Indonesia's transition from authoritarianism to democracy as a possible model for those Middle Eastern countries, particularly Egypt, that have recently deposed their leaders as part of the "Arab Spring." President Barak Obama has compared Egypt to Indonesia and Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has identified Indonesia as the proper model for the Egyptians.

Yang Razzali Kassim noted in a recent commentary for S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) that if Egypt follows Indonesia's path, it would espouse a non-theocratic state governed by a parliamentary system with a civilian president. Kassim cautions that Indonesia's transition also demonstrates that political restructuring into a democracy must be approached with patience. Loosening the system of government gradually over time is more prudent than rapid democratization and devolution of power that could unleash violent sectarian tensions such as those that ravaged the Moluccas and Central Sulawesi. While Egyptians will have to chart their own political future, Indonesia's experience illustrates that a "Muslim-majority state can be democratic, inclusive and economically viable."⁸³

Indonesia's success, and America's indirect approach in support, is an example for other nations facing similar challenges. This is true of its counterterrorism efforts as well as its ongoing development and democratization. However, it would be naïve to attempt to try to apply an exactly duplicate strategy.

During a recent television interview, Charlie Rose highlighted President Yudhyono's speech at Harvard in 2009 where he acknowledged that Indonesia can serve as a bridge between the Muslim world and the West; that it can help to project moderate Islam through the Muslim world and serve as an example that Islam, Democracy and Modernization are compatible.

When questioned on the role Indonesia could play in the midst of the "Arab Spring," President Yudhyono, emphasized that Indonesia was not "in the business of exporting

their experience in democratizing, however, they were willing to share their experience in carrying out large transformations.” Based on Indonesia’s experience, he advised reformers in Tunisia, Egypt and beyond that they must:

- believe in democracy
- establish limits on power, including term terms
- have a consensus that they are willing to change their political system
- be resilient because reform is a difficult process with frequent setbacks.⁸⁴

The United States should engage Indonesia and assist in crafting strategies to help to shepherd “Arab Spring” movements to democracy. As Joshua Kurlantzick of the Council on Foreign Relations notes,

Though Indonesian leaders themselves are hesitant to lecture other countries, their model could offer lessons for nations from Pakistan to Morocco. It has managed to create a stable political system without using its military to guarantee secular rule, as does Turkey. The militant Islamic groups that once seemed to threaten the country's future have been crushed or co-opted. And it has adopted modern anti-terrorism techniques that appear to be working. In its success, Indonesia also offers the United States, constantly seeking ways to help build stable societies in the Arab-Muslim world, a model for cooperation and moderation.⁸⁵

Indonesia is proof that Islamic democracies can deal with extremists without reverting to authoritarianism. That lesson is valuable to nations such as Egypt that are emerging from years of strongman-rule. Indonesia also demonstrates that properly trained, organized and equipped police organizations can effectively combat terrorists. They have dealt with the terrorists on their own initiative and haven’t simply followed America’s lead. In fact, observers such as John Hughes contend that a “positive factor in the campaign is that the Indonesians have tackled their terrorism problem without a large American footprint in place...there has been no requirement, or wish for, American troops on the ground.”⁸⁶

VII. Conclusion

Indonesia's concurrent actions on economic reform, democratization and counterterrorism, coupled with discreet assistance from the U.S., should not be taken as a rigid model to be readily duplicated everywhere. The tolerant brand of Islam practiced in Indonesia differs from that found elsewhere; particularly in the Middle East and South Asia. This tolerance probably makes Indonesians more receptive to U.S. assistance and more skeptical of extremist ideologies. Ultimately, Indonesia absorbed and molded U.S. advice and assistance in much the same way as its culture absorbed and molded outside influences, including Islam, into a form that it could accept.

However, American and Indonesian collaboration does represent an approach and a mindset that has utility beyond Southeast Asia. Washington's indirect approach, particularly in the field of counterterrorism assistance, provided support while Jakarta retained direction and ownership of the effort. The U.S. Government, following the lead of Pacific Command and the Embassy Country Team, opted to work by, with and through the Government of Indonesia to address the shared threat of Islamic extremism.

Ultimately, the indirect and discreet approach proved appropriate and sustainable. The nuanced strategy allowed the U.S. to stay out of the spotlight, reflected Indonesia's ownership of the effort and ensured that Indonesians received the credit for the results that they produced.

Endnotes:

¹ Owen Harries, "Facing Reality in Indonesia," *The National Interest*, November 27, 2002, accessed April 18, 2011, <http://nationalinterest.org/article/facing-reality-in-indonesia-2181>.

² Joyce Dela Pena, "Maritime Crime in the Strait of Malacca: Balancing Regional and Extra-Regional Concerns," *Stanford Journal of International Relations* 10, (2009): 2.

³ "CIA World Factbook: Indonesia," Central Intelligence Agency, last modified February 14, 2011, accessed December 6, 2010, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html>.

⁴ "What is the Indonesia Rupiah (IDR)?," accessed September 12, 2010, <http://www.gocurrency.com/countries/indonesia.htm>.

-
- ⁵ "Background Note – Indonesia," U.S. Department of State, accessed December 8, 2010, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2748.htm#econ>.
- ⁶ James Veitch, "Human Tragedy in Sulawesi: 1998-2002," in *A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia*, ed. Andrew T.H. Tan (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2007), 125.
- ⁷ Veitch, "Human Tragedy in Sulawesi," 140.
- ⁸ "Armed Conflicts Report, Indonesia—Molucca," Ploughshares, last modified January 2007, accessed December 8, 2010, <http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/ACRText/ACR-IndonesiaMolucca.html>.
- ⁹ Badrus Sholeh, "Jihad in Maluku," in *A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia*, ed. Andrew T.H. Tan (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2007), 146.
- ¹⁰ Aguswandi, "An Indonesian Future: Overcoming the Challenges of an Islamic Democracy," *Harvard International Review*, February 1, 2010, accessed December 6, 2010, <http://hir.harvard.edu/big-ideas/an-indonesian-future?page=0,0>.
- ¹¹ Ikrar Nusa Bhakti et al., "Tentara Yang Gelisah: Hasil Penelitian Yipika tentang Posisi ABRI dalam Gerakan Reformasi," in *The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, Nationalism, and Institutional Resistance*, ed. Marcus Mietzner (Washington: East-West Center Washington, 2006), 72.
- ¹² Marcus Mietzner, *The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, Nationalism, and Institutional Resistance* (Washington: East-West Center Washington, 2006), 12.
- ¹³ Shawn Crispin, "Behold Indonesia's democratic beacon," *Asia Times*, October 19, 2006, accessed December 10, 2010, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/HJ19Ae02.html.
- ¹⁴ Tracy Miller, ed., "Mapping the Global Muslim Population: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World's Muslim Population," *The Pew Forum on Region & Public Life, Pew Research Center*, (October 2009): accessed November 2, 2010, <http://pewforum.org/uploadedfiles/Topics/Demographics/Muslimpopulation.pdf>.
- ¹⁵ US Army Pacific Command personnel, interviewed by US Army Colonel John Maraia, January 12, 2011, roundtable discussion, Fort Shafter, HI.
- ¹⁶ Greg Fealy, "Militant Java-based Islamist movements," in *A handbook of terrorism and insurgency in Southeast Asia*, ed. Andrew T.H. Tan (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2007) 67-68.
- ¹⁷ Fealy, "Militant Java-based Islamist movements," 68.
- ¹⁸ Sidney Jones, "Darul Islam's Ongoing Appeal – International Crisis Group," *Tempo Magazine*, August 18, 2010, accessed December 13, 2010, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/jones-darul-islams-ongoing-appeal.aspx>.
- ¹⁹ Elena Pavlova, "Jemaah Islamiah according to PUPJI," in *A handbook of terrorism and insurgency in Southeast Asia*, ed. Andrew T.H. Tan (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2007) 82.
- ²⁰ Zachary Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 126.
- ²¹ Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror*, 129.
- ²² Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror*, 141.
- ²³ Maria A. Ressa, *Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al-Qaeda's Newest Center of Operations in Southeast Asia* (New York: Free Press, 2003), 95.
- ²⁴ International Crisis Group, *Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates* (Jakarta: International Crisis Group, 2002), 5.
- ²⁵ Congressional Research Service, *Terrorism in Southeast Asia*, (Washington: CRS, 2005), 15.
- ²⁶ Neal Imperial, *Securitization and the Challenge of ASEAN Counter-terrorism Cooperation* (Hong Kong: Center of Asian Studies, 2005), 29.
- ²⁷ Associated Press, "Indonesia Foils Terrorist Coup Plot: Police say al Qaeda-Linked Group Intended to Assassinate Leaders, Massacre Foreigners, Establish Islamic State," *CBS News World*, May 14, 2010, accessed January 24, 2011, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/05/14/world/main6482961.shtml>.
- ²⁸ US Army Pacific Command personnel and SOCPAC Staff, interviewed by US Army Colonel John Maraia, January, 11, 2011, roundtable discussion, Camp Smith, HI.
- ²⁹ V. Arianti, "Jihadi Recidivism: The Case of Indonesia," *RSIS Commentaries* (Singapore: Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2011) 1.
- ³⁰ Kirsten E. Schulze, "Indonesia's Approach to Jihadist Deradicalization," *CTC Sentinel* 1 (2008): 8.

-
- ³¹ Robin McDowell, "Indonesia's Deradicalization Program Under Fire," *The Boston Globe*, June 24, 2010, accessed February 16, 2011, http://www.boston.com/news/world/asia/articles/2010/06/24/indonesias_deradicalization_program_under_fire/?page=1.
- ³² Arianti, "Jihadi Recidivism: The Case of Indonesia," 2.
- ³³ Ambassador (Retired) Edward Marks, interviewed by US Army Colonel John Maraia, January 21, 2011, Telephone Interview, Washington, DC.
- ³⁴ "Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program," U.S. Department of State, accessed February 17, 2011, <http://www.state.gov/m/ds/terrorism/c8583.htm>.
- ³⁵ Bureau of Diplomatic Security, *Office of Antiterrorism Assistance: Fiscal Year 2009 in Review* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2009).
- ³⁶ "Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, Appendix D," U.S. Department of State, accessed January 17, 2011, http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/report/2004/pgt_2003/pgt_2003_31747pf.htm.
- ³⁷ "International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program: Asia and Pacific," U.S. Department of Justice, <http://www.justice.gov/criminal/icitap/programs/asia-pacific.html>.
- ³⁸ "International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program: Forensic Services," U.S. Department of Justice <http://www.justice.gov/criminal/icitap/programs/forensics.html>.
- ³⁹ "Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training: Across the Board," U.S. Department of Justice, accessed March 2, 2011, <http://www.justice.gov/criminal/opdat/acheive/across-board.html>.
- ⁴⁰ United States Agency for International Development, *Indonesia – U.S. Foreign Assistance Performance Publication FY 2009* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2009), 2.
- ⁴¹ "Indonesia – U.S. Foreign Assistance Performance Publication FY 2009," 5.
- ⁴² Erica M. Marrero, "New Projects Aim to Improve Education in Indonesia," *Bureau of International Information Programs* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2010), <http://www.america.gov/st/educ-english/2010/June/20100615140424MEorerraM0.4510723.html>.
- ⁴³ US Pacific Command, US Army Pacific, and Special Operations Command-Pacific personnel, interviewed by US Army Colonel John Maraia, January 11, 2011, roundtable discussion, Camp Smith, HI
- ⁴⁴ Ambassador (Retired) Edward Marks, interviewed by US Army Colonel John Maraia, January 21, 2011, Telephone Interview, Washington DC
- ⁴⁵ United States Agency for International Development, *Tsunami Reconstruction, Three Years Later, USAID Fact Sheet* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2008).
- ⁴⁶ Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *Hearing on Tsunami Response: Lessons Learned, Testimony of Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz*, Washington, DC, Thursday, February 10, 2005, <http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=53>.
- ⁴⁷ The White House, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: The White House, 2010), 44.
- ⁴⁸ Council on Foreign Relations, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2011* (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 2011) 14.
- ⁴⁹ White House, *Fact Sheet: US-Indonesia Disaster Assistance* (Washington, DC: White House, 2010).
- ⁵⁰ White House, *Fact Sheets: The United States and Indonesia - Building a 21st Century Partnership* (Washington, DC: White House, 2010).
- ⁵¹ White House, *Fact Sheet: Climate Change and Clean Energy* (Washington, DC: White House, 2010).
- ⁵² White House, *Fact Sheet: The IKAT-U.S. Partnership -- Civil Societies Innovating Together* (Washington, DC: White House, 2010).
- ⁵³ White House, *Fact Sheets: The United States and Indonesia - Building a 21st Century Partnership* (Washington, DC: White House, 2010).
- ⁵⁴ Ibid.
- ⁵⁵ Council for Asian Transnational Threat Research, "Religious Radicalism Grows in Indonesia," *Asian Conflicts Reports* 14 (2010): 6.
- ⁵⁶ International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: "Christianization" and Intolerance*, Policy Briefing, Asia Briefing No. 114, (Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2010), 5.

-
- ⁵⁷ "Murder in God's Name: Religious Persecution in Indonesia," *The Economist*, February 8, 2011, accessed February 10, 2011, http://www.economist.com/blogs/asiaview/2011/02/religious_persecution_indonesia.
- ⁵⁸ Endy Bayuni, *Bloody Blasphemy; Antagonizing Religious Minorities in Indonesia and Pakistan*, Asia Pacific Bulletin, No. 97 (Washington, DC: EAST-WEST Center, 2011), 1.
- ⁵⁹ Council for Asian Transnational Threat Research, "Religious Radicalism Grows in Indonesia," 6.
- ⁶⁰ "Weapons Training and Act of Worship: Bashir," *The Australian*, February 25, 2011, 11.
- ⁶¹ Economist Intelligence Unit, "Indonesia Politics: extremist Threat," *The Economist*, March 24, 2011.
- ⁶² Binsar Bakkara, "Indonesia's Changing Face of Terrorism," *Associated Press*, November 1, 2010.
- ⁶³ "Cop Killers; Indonesia's police are brutal and corrupt – and apparently untouchable," *The Economist*, November 5, 2010.
- ⁶⁴ Elaine Pearson, "Australia: Press Indonesian Security Forces on Accountability (Letter to Prime Minister Julia Gillard)," *Human Rights Watch*, October 27, 2010, accessed March 24, 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/10/27/australia-press-indonesian-security-forces-accountability>.
- ⁶⁵ Palupi Annisa Auliani, "Rights body slams anti-terror police for violations," *Republika, BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific*, January 27, 2011,
- ⁶⁶ Fatima Astuti, "In Focus, Indonesia's National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT)," *CTTA: Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis 2* (2010): 2.
- ⁶⁷ Lynn Lee, "New ways needed to stem terror threat," *The Straits Times* (Singapore), March 24, 2011.
- ⁶⁸ The Jamestown Foundation, "Indonesia's Controversial Special Forces Regain U.S. Support in Counterterrorism Struggle," *Terrorism Monitor 3* (2010): 2.
- ⁶⁹ Human Rights Watch, *Indonesia: Hold Abusers from Military Accountable*, (New York: HRW Asia, 2011), 1.
- ⁷⁰ Peter Neumann, Maajid Nawaz and Matthew Levitt, "Combating Violent Extremism: The Counter-radicalization Debate in 2011," *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, accessed January 7, 2011, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC07.php?pf=1&CID=3288>.
- ⁷¹ Mark Woodward, Ali Amin and Inayay Rohmaniyah, "Police Power, Soft Power and Extremist Sub-culture in Indonesia," *COMOPS Journal*, March 28, 2010, accessed March 30, 2011, <http://comops.org/journal/2010/03/28/police-power-soft-power-and-extremist-sub-culture-in-indonesia>.
- ⁷² International Crisis Group, *Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing* (Jakarta: International Crisis Group, 2005), i.
- ⁷³ International Crisis Group, *Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing*, 31.
- ⁷⁴ Nur Azlin Yasin, "Counter Ideology: Battle for Hearts and Minds in Indonesia," *RSIS Commentaries* (Singapore: Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2010), 2.
- ⁷⁵ Arianti, "Jihadi Recidivism: The Case of Indonesia," *RSIS Commentaries*, 2.
- ⁷⁶ Sara Schonhardt, "Indonesia: Unlearning Jihad," *Global Post*, July 5, 2011, accessed February 16, 2011, <http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/indonesia/100702/indonesia-unlearning-jihad?page=0,1>.
- ⁷⁷ John Hughes, *Islamic Extremism and the War of Ideas* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2010), 92.
- ⁷⁸ Ernest Z. Bower, "Indonesia steps onto the world stage," *East Asia Forum*, January 28, 2011, accessed February 2, 2011, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/02/03/indonesia-steps-onto-the-world-stage>.
- ⁷⁹ Jessica Brown, "ASEAN leadership will help Indonesia chart course between China and United States," *Opinion Asia*, February 11, 2011, accessed February 28, 2011, <http://opinionasia.com/node/869>.
- ⁸⁰ The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World's Muslim Population* (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2009).
- ⁸¹ "UN welcomes RI's wish to become hub of peacekeeping centers," *ANTARA News*, March 24 2011.
- ⁸² Abraham M. Denmark, Rizal Sukma and Christine Parthemore, *Crafting a Strategic Vision: A New Era of U.S.-Indonesia Relations*, (Washington, DC: Center for New American Security, 2010).
- ⁸³ Yang Razali Kassim, "Post-Mubarak Egypt: Is Indonesia the Model," *RSIS Commentaries* (Singapore: Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2011) 1.
- ⁸⁴ Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, interview by Charlie Rose, *Charlie Rose Show*, 25 April 2011.
- ⁸⁵ Joshua Kurlantzick, "A Muslim Model: What Indonesia Can Teach the World," *The Boston Globe*, September 13, 2009, <http://www.cfr.org/indonesia/muslim-model-indonesia-can-teach-world/p20199>.
- ⁸⁶ John Hughes, *Islamic Extremism and the War of Ideas* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2010), 79.
