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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prepared by ASSI Std Z9-18
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The principal author of this study thanks especially Karin Duggan for graphic assistance; Loretta Ebner for administrative assistance; Gregory Kaminski, Laurie Ann Lakatos, and Rhea Stone for library assistance; and Dana Smith and Anwar Fry for production assistance. A full listing of substantive contributors can be found in Peter M. Swartz and Karin Duggan, *U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts: Introduction and Background: Volume I*, (D0026421.A1, December 2011). A full listing of all volumes in the CNA Navy Strategy series can be found on the inside back cover of this document.

Approved for distribution: December 2011

Dr. W. Eugene Cobble, Jr.
Director, Strategic Initiatives Group

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ADM Vern Clark (CNO Jul 2000-Jul 2005)

- Jun 2002  *Sea Power 21*
  - A “vision”; Included “Global CONOPs”
- Oct 2002  *Naval Power 21…A Naval Vision*
- Apr 2003  *Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations*
- May 2003  *Fleet Response Plan*
  - From “concept” to “plan”

Surface warfare officer

- Served an unusually long 5-year CNO tour
- Served Presidents Clinton, Bush; SECDEFs Cohen, Rumsfeld; SECNAVs Danzig, England
- Saw himself as “the joint guy” & a business manager
  - 1st CNO with an MBA; changed Navy business procedures
  - Had been Director of the Joint Staff (DJS) & of Operations (DJ3) on Joint Staff; TRANSCOM DJ5, DJ8
  - Candidate for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
  - Sensitive to SECDEF, OSD concerns & direction
    - E.g.: Transformation Roadmaps, Fleet Response Plan
- Effected numerous internal Navy reorganizations & realignments
ADM Vern Clark (CNO Jul 2000-Jul 2005)

- Improved relations with USMC (e.g.: NOCJO)
    - Then advocated range of 260-325 ships (2005)
  - In wake of 9/11 attacks, called repeatedly for “Maritime NORAD”
    - His concept was global, however, & multinational

- Signature programs:
  - Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
  - High-speed vessel (HSV) leases
  - Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC)
    - New USN riverine & civil affairs capabilities
  - Optimal manning
  - Fleet readiness for Operation Enduring Freedom & Operation Iraqi Freedom surges
  - Fleet Response Plan
  - Navy Enterprises
  - OPNAV & fleet reorganizations & re-alignments
ADM Vern Clark (CNO Jul 2000-Jul 2005)

- Saw POM as his strategy (as a service chief)
- Initial concern for current readiness, not the future
- No initial interest in promulgating a “glossy pub”
  - “I didn’t come to the job with the idea of publishing another “vision” document...But it became apparent that I needed something to build on my top-five priorities...to mobilize and focus our energies, and to provide a ‘stake in the ground’ for the future.”
  - Interview with Dr. Scott Truver, Mar 2003
- Chose strategy-focused VADM John Morgan to be his last N3/N5 (2004)
  - But did not approve any new Morgan-originated strategy-oriented documents

ADM Vern Clark (CNO Jul 2000-Jul 2005)

- Directed at least 5 OPNAV offices working on USN vision, strategy and concepts simultaneously
  - N00K & CNO Executive Panel (CAPTs Benkert, Clemente)
  - N00Z (CAPT Pandolfe)
  - OPNAV “Deep Blue” (RDMLs Sestak, Stavridis, Crowder, Mahon)
  - N513 (CDR Dolan, CAPTs Dossel, Klepper, Mangold, CDR Nagy)
  - N81 (RDML Sestak (2003-4))
- Headed & at least partially staffed by the most well-educated and experienced leaders of the Navy’s strategic planning community
- Yet on his watch little was done to foster & sustain management & development of that community, which atrophied
Overview

- Signed by CNO ADM Clark & numerous other admirals (Jun 2002 & subsequently)
- NAVWARCOL speech & Transformation Roadmap
- UNCLAS US Naval Institute Proceedings 9-article series; stand-alone 5-article medium-length pamphlet; on web
- Billed as a “vision”
- Principal target: Many, esp. USN officer corps
- Drafted principally in OPNAV N00Z (& N81: CONOPS)
- Threat to USN: Evolving regional challenges and transnational threats
- 8-concept framework: Sea Strike, Sea Shield, Sea Basing, FORCEnet, Sea Warrior, Sea Trial, Sea Enterprise, Global Concept of Operations
- Very influential within OPNAV, NWDC, ONR, etc.
Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPs (2002)  

Signed by:  
- CNO ADM Vern Clark  
  - During 2nd year in office  
- Individual admirals & a general signed amplifying portions

What it was  
- Billed as a Navy “vision” document  
- Subtitle: “Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities”  
- Included a “Concept of Operations” (CONOPs)  
- NWC Current Strategy Forum speech (Jun 2002)  
- Naval Transformation Roadmap (Jun 2002)  
- UNCLAS 9-part US Naval Institute Proceedings series (Oct 02-Jan 04)  
  - 48 pages (incl. 10-page overview article; 4-page CONOPS)  
- Also stand-alone pamphlet (1st 5 parts only): 36 pages  
- Posted on web  
- President NAVWARCOL RADM Rempt “President’s Forum” article, Naval War College Review (Spring 2003)
Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPs (2002)

Why it was written (I)

- To codify, rationalize & publicize CNO ADM Clark’s many key initiatives to grow & change the fleet
- CNO thought timing was right
  - New administration elected and in place
  - 9/11 attacks had occurred
  - 2001 DOD QDR & Nuclear Posture Review completed
  - Initial CNO goals for “current readiness” being achieved
- To link Navy programs & practices to Bush Administration policies & SECDEF Rumsfeld demands for “1-4-2-1” “Transformation” from all DOD components
- To flesh out CNO ADM Clark’s 375-ship goal rationale

Why it was written (II)

- To push OPNAV cross-functional analyses for USN POM development; & fleet creation of new force packages
- To re-energize sea and area control
- To advertise the Navy as a joint player, and as more than just an enabling force
- To bring USN & USMC together by elevating Sea Basing status & visibility, expanding ARG to include organic fire support ships (& thus capable of CLF command)
Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPs (2002)

**Context (I)**

- 2nd year of Bush administration (2001-9)
- Lackluster US economy pulling out of recession
  - Return to U.S. government deficit spending
  - Oil price starting to climb again
- SECDEF Rumsfeld (2000-6)
- CNO ADM Clark (2000-05)
- Failed Al Qaeda attack on USS Sullivans (1999)
- Al Qaeda attack on USS Cole (DDG-67) (2000)
- 9-11 attacks on America & responses (2001)
- Continuing terrorist threat to US homeland
- Numerous post-9/11 US joint ops launched
  - Noble Eagle (homeland defense)
  - Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) (Afghanistan)
    - USN CVBGs provided majority of initial US air support

Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPs (2002)

**Context (II)**

- NATO invoked Article 5 for 1st time, to assist US following Al Qaeda attack (2001)
- Customs & Border Patrol (CBP) Container Security Initiative (CSI) (from Jan 2002)
- USS Greenville collision with Japanese fishing vessel (2001)
- SECDEF prohibited “glossy” publication of Navy & other service posture statements (2001)
Context (III)

- Taiwan elected 1st pro-independence president (2000)
  - Rising cross-Strait tensions
- USN EP-3 collision with PLAN interceptor over South China Sea (Apr 2001)
- President Bush approved arms sales to Taiwan, incl/ diesel submarines, Kidd-class DDGs, P-3 maritime patrol aircraft (Apr 2001)
- 1st PLAN out-of-area global circumnavigation cruise (2002)
- PRC-funded construction of Gwadar port, Pakistan on Indian Ocean began (2002)
- USN port calls to PRC resumed (Nov 2002)

Context (IV)

- OSD push for military “Transformation”
  - VADM (Ret) Art Cebrowski headed new OSD Office of Force Transformation (2001-5)
- Increased role of SECDEF & OSD
- Declining USN force levels; increasing DON annual budgets
- New USN 375-ship Battle Force goal
- USN in 2002: 313 Battle Force ships & declining; 6 new ships authorized
- CNO Clark satisfied with progress made in 1st 2 yrs in increasing current readiness. Turn to future readiness
Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPs (2002)

Context (V)

- Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) concept announced (2001)
  - Evolved from “Streetfighter” concept (1999)
  - Industry developing proposals (2002)
  - For operations in the littorals
  - Strong CNO ADM Clark support
- DOD canceled USN area-wide BMD program (2001)
- MDA created new Aegis BMD midcourse program (2002)
- CNA conference on Naval Forward Presence (2001)
- Continued USN-USMC differences on amphibious ops command & control, especially fire support
  - Last Global War Games until 2008

Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPs (2002)

Context (VI)

- Fleet Forces Command created (2001)
- NAVNETWARCOM created (May 2002)
  - JFCOM lost geographic responsibilities,
  - Atlantic Ocean divided among NORTHCOM, SOUTHCOM, & EUCOM
  - Med combat-credible forward presence hub disappeared
  - Convener: Dr. David Rosenberg
  - Participants included Sea Power 21 & CONOPS contributors
- OPNAV Dir. of Navy Staff elevated to 3 stars (Aug 2001)
- CNO Strategic Actions Group (OPNAV N00Z) created (2002)
Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPs (2002)

Context (VII)

- OPNAV N513 (Strategic Concepts branch) temporarily short-manned following 9/11 Pentagon attack
  - Had successfully argued vs. transfer from Pentagon to Crystal City
  - Branch head CDR Bob Dolan & 4 action officers killed
- USN began JFMCC experiments & exercises
- USN began “Sea Swap” experiments, rotating crews to forward deployed destroyers (2002-6)
- CNO ADM Clark post-9/11 calls for a “Maritime NORAD”
- NWDC placed under new Fleet Forces Command (2001), vice Naval War College
- Naval postgraduate School 2-year Strategic Planning masters’ degree curriculum terminated (summer 2001)

Cited references

- *...From the Sea* (1992)
- *Forward...From the Sea* (1994)
- Did not reference 2\textsuperscript{nd} (1\textsuperscript{st} Bush) *QDR* (2001)
  - But did reference *QDR* “1-4-2-1” force sizing construct
- Placed *Sea Power 21* in USN historical strategic conceptual context
**Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPs (2002)**

- **Context: Other contemporary publications (I)**
  - 2nd (1st Bush) QDR (2001)
    - Added conventional weapons to strategic deterrent
    - “New Triad”
  - DoD *Global Force Posture Review* (underway)
  - Joint Staff *Operational Availability 2003* planning effort (underway in 2002)
  - CJCS *Chairman’s Risk Guidance*

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**Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPs (2002)**

- **Context: Other contemporary publications (II)**
  - SPG, CPG, JSCP, OPLANS & CONPLANS
  - *Naval Power 21* and NOCJO (being drafted)
  - Large family of USMC warfighting concepts (1996-8)
  - MCDP 1 *Warfighting* (1997)
  - CMC Gen Jones *Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare* Marine Corps capstone concept (Nov 2001)

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Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPs (2002)

♦ Context: Other contemporary publications (III)
  ♦ Revised (2nd) USN-USCG *National Fleet* policy statement (Jul 2002)
    ♦ Rebuttals by LtGen Van Riper USMC (Ret) & others
  ♦ Hart-Rudman Commission Reports (1999-2001)

Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPs (2002)

♦ Context: Other contemporary publications (IV)
  ♦ SACEUR/SACLANT *Military Implementation of the Alliance Strategic Concept – The Maritime Dimension* (Jul 2001)
  ♦ CAPT Bernard Cole (Ret), *The Great Wall at Sea* (2001)
Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPs (2002)

♦ Context: Other contemporary publications (V)
  ♦ NIC, Global Trends 2015 (Dec 2000)
  ♦ Daniel Whiteneck & Richard Weitz, Naval Forward Presence and Regional Stability (CNA) (Sep 2001)
  ♦ Friedman, Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization (1999)

How it was written (I)

♦ Conceptual roots in
  ♦ . . . From the Sea, NSPG 2000
  ♦ CNO SSG products, 1996-2001
    ♦ Especially FORCEnet
  ♦ CNO saw a need for a forward-looking vision for future readiness beyond his “Goals” (2002)
    ♦ Current readiness goals well on the way to achievement
How it was written (II)

- Drafted in new CNO Strategic Actions Group (N-00Z) OPNAV office (Spring 2002)
  - Global CONOPS drafted in OPNAV N81 (Spring 2002)
    - Based on operational concepts germinated in OPNAV Deep Blue
- Personalities:
  - ADM Vern Clark, CNO
  - CAPT Frank Pandolfe, 1st N00Z Director (principal author)
  - CDR Steve Richter, N81, (Global CONOPS)
  - RDML Stavridis, OPNAV Deep Blue (ESG concept)
  - Many others subsequently contributed

How it was written (III)

- Timing moved up to meet OSD Naval Transformation Roadmap tasking deadline (Jun 2002)
- CNO then decided to use in NAVWARCOL Current Strategy Forum speech (Jun 2002)
- “Global CONOPS” sometimes a stand-alone & sometimes subsumed under general introduction or under “Sea Strike”
- Extensively socialized through briefings to Navy flag officers & staffs (Spring-Summer 2002)
Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPs (2002)

How it was written (IV)

♦ Series of 9 US Naval Institute Proceedings articles (2002-4)

   □ Overview, including Global CONOPS


Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPs (2002)

How it was written (V)

♦ Series of 9 US Naval Institute Proceedings articles (2002-4) (continued)


VI. OPNAV N8, VADM Mike G. Mullen, “Global Concept of Operations” (Apr 2003)
How it was written (VI)

Series of 9 US Naval Institute *Proceedings* articles (2002-4) (concluded)


IX. VCNO ADM Michael G. Mullen, “Sea Enterprise: Resourcing Tomorrow’s Fleet” (Jan 2004)

President NAVWARCOL RADM Rempt “President’s Forum” article, *Naval War College Review* (Spring 2003)

Outline

- Our vision
- Transformation for a violent era
- Sea Strike: Projecting precise and persistent offensive power
- Sea Shield: Projecting global defensive assurance
- Sea basing: Projecting joint operational independence
- FORCEnet: Enabling 21st century warfare
- Global Concept of Operations
- Achieving our vision
- Sea Trial: The process of innovation
- Sea Warrior: Investing in sailors
- Sea Enterprise: Resourcing tomorrow’s fleet
- Our way ahead
Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPs (2002)

Key ideas (I)

- A “clear vision,” not a strategy; with a “Global CONOPS”
- Evolving regional challenges and transnational threats
- Unified battlespace”
  - Advantages of sea-based forces throughout integrated sea-land-air-space-cyberspace
- Naval forces “fully integrated” in joint force
- Navy more than an “enabler”
- Growing importance of sea & area control
- Transformation; new cross-cutting categories to transcend platform communities & demonstrate change
- Re-label categories for USN force structure decisions

Key ideas (II)

- Tight accordance with “national military strategy,” i.e.: SECDEF Rumsfeld 2001 QDR
- New emphasis on “global joint operations against regional and transnational dangers”
  - Return to focus on global threats
  - No longer just “regional challenges.” De-emphasis of MCOs
- DoD “1-4-2-1 ” force sizing construct
  - Defend the homeland
  - Deter adversaries in 4 critical forward regions
  - Swiftly defeat 2 enemies at the same time in 2 of those regions
  - Win one of those conflicts decisively
Sea Power 21 (2002)

Key ideas (I)
- 3 “fundamental concepts,” “operations, “capabilities”
  - Sea Strike
  - Sea Shield
    - Includes forward-deployed ops for Homeland Defense
  - Sea Basing
    - USN accepts USMC label
    - USN-USMC conceptual (& spelling) differences remain

- Enabler: FORCE Net
- Supporting organizational processes
  - Sea Trial
  - Sea Warrior
    - Especially reductions in crew size
  - Sea Enterprise
    - Call for shared technologies & systems with other services

- Global CONOPs
  - New distributed force packages
Key ideas (II)

4 “capability pillars” descend from 2 earlier frameworks

... From the Sea
- Command Control and Surveillance
- Battlespace Dominance
- Power Projection
- Force Sustainment

NSPG 2000
- Knowledge superiority
- Battlespace control
- Battlespace attack
- Battlespace sustainment

Sea Power 21
- FORCEnet
- Sea shield
- Sea strike
- Sea basing

Key ideas (III)

Also mentioned
- “the continuum of warfare from the maritime domain -- deterring forward in peacetime, responding to crises, and fighting and winning wars”

And a Turner variant: “enduring missions”:
- Sea control
- Power projection
- Strategic deterrence
- Strategic sealift
- Forward presence

Sea Power 21 overview article ended with the words: “anywhere, anytime”
Global CONOPs (2002)

Key ideas

- Implement 2nd QDR (2001) “1-4-2-1” planning construct
- Downgrade importance of forward “hubs”
- Increase global presence
- Widely disperse combat striking power
- Simultaneous responses to crises around the world
- New force packages
- Integrate new SSGNs & BMD ships into force
- USN accepted USMC-backed MPF(F) as important new capability
- 375 ships; 37 tailored independent strike groups

The Global CONOPs (with 375)

Maximum Power Forward

Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPs (2002)

What was new?
- **Sea Power 21**
  - Return to global approaches vice solely a set of regions
  - New vocabulary applied to earlier frameworks
  - Multiple signed articles by multiple flag officer authors
- **Global CONOPS**
  - New force packages: CSGs, ESGs, TBMD SAGs, etc.
  - Integration of new SSGNs into force
  - Downgraded “hubs”
  - No CSG in the Mediterranean
  - More options for the President
  - MPF included in Battle Force
- Littoral combat ships (LCS)
- Possible USMC command of some ESGs

Not addressed (I)
- Specific named regional & transnational threats & challenges
- **Allies** (Mentioned in Sea Power 21, but not in Global CONOPS)
- Relationship to Marine Corps Strategy 21
- Priorities among concepts, force packages presented
- Globalization; world system
- Humanitarian assistance/disaster response ops
- Maritime security operations
- Coastal & riverine operations & capabilities
Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPs (2002)

- Not addressed (II)
  - Piracy
  - Counter-drug operations
  - U.S. Merchant Marine
  - Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
  - Post-hostilities ops
  - Surge capability & operations
  - Protection of or attacks on commerce at sea
  - Blockade operations
  - Convoy operations

Global CONOPS (2002)

- Was it a “CONOPS?”
- What is a “CONOPS” (officially)?

“Concept of operations — A verbal or graphic statement that clearly and concisely expresses what a joint force commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation. Also called commander’s concept or CONOPS.”

Joint Pub 1-02 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (July 2001)
Sea Power 21 (2002)

♦ Subsequent analyses & critiques (I)
♦ CDR (Ret) Terry McKearney, “Comment and Discussion,” US Naval Institute Proceedings (Nov 2002)
♦ ADM (Ret) Stansfield Turner, “Is the U.S. Navy Being Marginalized?” Naval War College Review (Summer 2003)
♦ Peter Dombrowski & Andrew Ross, “Transforming the Navy: Punching a Feather Bed?” Naval War College Review (Summer 2003)

Sea Power 21 (2002)

♦ Subsequent analyses & critiques (II)
♦ Naval Studies Board, Naval Analytical Capabilities: Improving Capabilities-Based Planning (2005)
Sea Power 21 (2002)

Subsequent analyses & critiques (III)

- Amund Lundesgaard, U.S. Navy Strategy and Force Structure after the Cold War (Nov 2011)

Criticisms (I):

- Focus too tactical
  - Should have been focused on “strategy” and/or “operational level of war”
  - Deliberately created to preclude development of a new Navy strategy
- Mere programmatic repackaging & re-labeling
  - Nothing new
- Not visionary or transformational enough
  - Just incremental modernization
  - Not joint enough:
    - “Sea-” prefixes a step backwards
- Not congruent with DOD capabilities-based planning framework
Sea Power 21 (2002)

- Criticisms (II):
  - Not sufficient emphasis on Sea Control as fundamental purpose of the Navy
  - Dividing “sea control” conceptually among Sea Strike/Shield/Basing blurred understanding of the core mission of the Navy (ADM Turner)
  - Making “Sea Basing” a pillar was an unwarranted concession to USMC
  - Litany of programs & programmatic packages overshadowed the vision
  - Scant attention paid to amphibious ships was deliberate and ill-advised

Global CONOPS (2002)

- Criticisms:
  - Merely a justification for 375 ships & the LCS
  - 375 ships an impossible goal; Not enough $ available
  - Too focused on forward presence vice surge posture
  - Constructed from flawed ship & force package counting schemes & comparisons
  - “CSGs” and “ESGs” merely moved a few surface combatants and an SSN from each CVBG to each ARG
  - “CSGs” and “ESGs” were constructs for training & workups only. Forward CCDRs & NCCs typically dispersed their assets in theater. CCDRs & NCCs had no need for ESGs, just separate ARG/MEUS & SAGs
  - Surface Action Groups not particularly visionary; Reminiscent of Battleship SAGs of 1980s
  - Too jargon-laden for comprehension & use
  - Distorted Sea Basing concept by downplaying amphibious
Sea Power 21 (2002)

♦ Sea Power 21 influence (I):
  ♦ Wide within OPNAV & other USN headquarters
    ♦ Reflected in changed organizations & processes
  ♦ Far more influence on internal OPNAV, FFC, NWDC and ONR frameworks than as a statement of Navy vision

Sea Power 21 (2002)

♦ Sea Power 21 influence (II):
  ♦ “Capability Pillars” became the organizing template (2003-2010+) for:
    ♦ OPNAV N81 POM development analysis & internal organization
      ♦ “Sea Shaping” pillar added in 2005
    ♦ CFFC internal staff organization (until 2010)
    ♦ CFFC assignment of numbered fleet commanders and NNWC as “operational agents” (OA) for Fleet warfighting CONOPS, concept development & experimentation (continuing as of 2010)
    ♦ NWDC concept development & experimentation
    ♦ ONR Future Naval Capability (FNC) technology development program aligned with “pillars” (2005 through 2010+e)
Sea Power 21 (2002)

♦ Sea Power 21 influence (III):
  ♦ Resource for flag speeches, testimony
  ♦ Cited in new CNO-CMC naval concepts
  ♦ Ideas & terminology used in annual *Navy Program Guides* (through 2007)
  ♦ Ideas & terminology used in annual *Highlights of the Department of the Navy Budget* (through May 2009)
  ♦ Helped increase DOTMLPF focus on Sea Shield (esp. missile defense), Sea Basing, FORCEnet

Sea Power 21 (2002)

♦ Why did it have the influence it did?
  ♦ Simple, catchy, easy-to-remember construct
  ♦ Relentless repetition in speeches, testimony, articles
  ♦ Interest, power & influence of CNO ADM Clark
  ♦ Continued support by successor ADM Mullen
    ♦ “Sea Power 21 is still germane and operative . . . I’m very supportive of Sea Power 21” (Oct 2005)
    ♦ “Sea Power 21 will remain the framework for our Navy’s ongoing transformation” (Testimony, Mar 2006)
  ♦ Institutionalization of categories into OPNAV organizations & analytic processes
  ♦ As a single-service document, was of limited influence on subsequent bi-service & tri-service efforts
Global CONOPs (2002)

**Global CONOPs influence**

- OPNAVINST 3501.316A finally officially codified policy for composition, capabilities of CSGs, ESGs, SSGs (Sep 2007)
  - Signed by CNO ADM Mullen just before his relief
  - Lasted only 3 years
    - OPNAVINST 3501.316B (Oct 2010) undid many of the changes
- CSG force packages endured in the fleet as of 2010
- ESG force packages abolished (2009)
  - ESGs had not operated as units; Replaced by ARG/MEUs
  - Term “ESG” still used for ARG/MEUs commanded by general/flag officers
- 375-ship, 37-group Navy force goals lasted only a few years

**Why did it have what influence it did? (I)**

- Advocacy & repetition by CNO
- Published as a detailed US Naval Institute *Proceedings* article, but omitted from stand-alone pamphlet
  - Discussed, however, in basic *Sea Power 21* article text
  - Article author was upwardly-mobile flag officer VADM Mullen
- Repeated & expanded upon in NOCJO
- Fleet became comfortable working up CSGs & ESGs
Global CONOPs (2002)

- Why did it have what influence it did? (II)
  - Forward deployment emphasis moderated by *Fleet Response Plan* focus on surge (2003)
  - ESG concept dissipated as fleet ship numbers declined:
    - MEUs deployed separately to Iraq, Afghanistan
    - Surface combatants, submarines and individual amphibious ships deployed separately
    - COCOM/NCC demand for ARG/MEUs, SAGs, not ESGs

Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPS (2002)

- Influence on subsequent capstone documents
  - Reflected heavily and expanded upon in *NOCJO* (2003)
  - “Capability Pillars” used in:
    - *NOCJO*
    - *Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08*
  - *Global CONOPS* reflected and fleshed out in *NOCJO*
Overview

- Signed by SECNAV England, CNO ADM Clark, CMC Gen Jones (Oct 2002)
- Billed as a “vision”
- Principal target audience: USN & USMC leadership
- Very short (6 pp). UNCLAS. Published on the web
- Drafted in new OPNAV “Deep Blue” office
- To counter threats from our nation’s enemies
- Central theme: Navy-Marine Corps team
  - USN-USMC TACAIR integration
- Brought together Sea Power 21, Global CONOPS, (& Marine Corps 21) concepts & initiatives
  - Sea Strike, Sea Shield, Sea Basing, FORCEnet, Sea Warrior, Sea Trial, Sea Enterprise; 25% increase in size of the fleet goal
- Little lasting influence
Naval Power 21...A Naval Vision (2002)

Signed by:

- SECNAV Gordon R. England
- CNO ADM Vern Clark
  - During 3rd year in office
- CMC Gen James L. Jones

What it was

- Billed as a “Vision”
- Short (6 pages).
- UNCLAS.
- Published on the web (Oct 2002)
Naval Power 21...A Naval Vision (2002)

Why it was written

- To assert visibility of new SECNAV England & his agenda of bringing USN & USMC closer together
- To bring USN *Sea Power 21* & *USMC Strategy 21* visions and concepts together in one overarching consensual document, endorsed by SECNAV
- To provide a conceptual basis for USN-USMC TACAIR integration – essentially a cost-saving measure
- Tie DON to Bush Administration & SECDEF Rumsfeld “transformation” agenda
- To call for increasing fleet size by 25%
- In wake of 9/11 attacks, to assert USN role in homeland security is primarily far forward, but also at home
- Principal target: USN & USMC leadership

Context (I)

- Late in 2nd year of Bush (R) administration (2001-9)
- Lackluster US economy pulling out of recession
  - Oil price starting to climb again
  - Return to U.S. government deficit spending
- SECDEF Rumsfeld (2001-6)
  - SECNAV England (2001-06)
  - CNO Clark (2000-05)
Context (II)
- Al Qaeda terrorist attack on USS Cole (DDG-67) (2000)
- 9-11 attacks on America (2001)
  - USN strategy office briefly decimated
- Numerous post-9/11 US joint ops launched
  - Noble Eagle (homeland defense)
  - Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) (Afghanistan)
    - USN CVBGs provided majority of initial US air support
- Continuing terrorist threat to US homeland
- PLAN-USN aircraft collision (2001)

Context (III)
- SECDEF Rumsfeld push for “transformation”
- 2nd (1st Bush) QDR (2001)
  - 310-ship Battle Force goal
  - “1-4-2-1” force sizing construct
  - Decline – but not demise -- of “2 MCO” construct
  - “Capabilities-based planning”
  - “New triad,” to include offensive precision-strike conventional weapons
- USN in 2002: 313 Battle Force ships & declining; 6 new ships authorized
- DON annual budgets rising modestly
- USN began JFMCC experiments (1999)

♦ Context (IV)
  ♦ NOCJO being drafted
  ♦ OEF: Marine general commands USN-USMC TF
  ♦ SECDEF-directed integration of OPNAV & Secretariat
  ♦ Fleet Forces Command created (2001)
  ♦ OPNAV Deep Blue created (2001)
    ♦ For innovative concepts ISO current GWOT combat ops
  ♦ NAVNETWARCOM created (May 2002)


♦ Cited references
  ♦ 2nd (1st Bush administration) DOD Quadrennial Defense Review (2001)
  ♦ CMC Gen Jones, Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare USMC capstone concept (Nov 2001)
  ♦ CMC Gen Jones, Marine Corps Strategy 21 (Nov 2000)
  ♦ Sea Power 21 (2002)
Context: Other contemporary publications (I)

- MCDP 1 Warfighting (Jun 1997)
- MCDP 1-0 Marine Corps Operations (Sep 2001)
- CJCS Chairman’s Risk Guidance

Context: Other contemporary publications (II)

- ADM William Owens, Lifting the Fog of War (2000)
- Brig Gen Deptula USAF, Effects-Based Operations (2001)
  - Rebuttals by LtGen Van Riper USMC (Ret)
- Whiteneck & Weitz, Naval Forward Presence and Regional Stability (CNA) (Sep 2001)

How it was written

- Drafted in new OPNAV N3/N5 Deep Blue shop
- Contributions by OPNAV N513
- Personalities: SECNAV England, RDML Jim Stavridis (Deep Blue), CAPT Will Dossel (N513)

Outline

- The naval vision
- Qualities that matter: What it takes to win
- People: The heart of the team
- Homeland security
- Projecting power and influence: Winning at sea and beyond
- Future naval capabilities: Transformational by design
- Sea enterprise: Capturing business efficiencies
- The future: An expanded naval force
- Organizing the force: A naval operational concept
- Refining the way ahead: Navy and Marine Corps strategies
- Conclusion: Charting the way ahead
Key ideas (I)

- “3/4/8” framework
- 3 “fundamental pillars”
  - We assure access; We fight and win; We are continually transforming to improve
- 4 “fundamental qualities of naval forces”
  - Decisiveness; Sustainability; Responsiveness; Agility
- 7 Seapower 21 “concepts”
  - Sea Strike, Sea Shield, Sea Basing, enabled by FORCEnet
  - Sea Warrior, Sea Trial, Sea Enterprise

Key ideas (II)

- To counter threats from “our nation’s enemies”
- Concept of “continually transforming”
- Focus on Navy-Marine Corps team
  - Call for Navy-Marine Corps strike fighter integration
- Described Marine Corps Strategy 21
- “Homeland Security: We will engage potential adversaries and address threats to our security as far from the United States and our interests as possible . . . Additionally, in partnership with the U.S. Coast Guard and other federal agencies the Navy-Marine Corps team will continue defense at home”
What was new?
- 1st joint USN-USMC capstone document in 8 years
- SECNAV endorsement of *Sea Power 21* framework
- Call for doubling number of strike groups & increasing fleet size by 25%
- Navy role in homeland security seen as primarily far forward but also at home

Not addressed (I)
- Nature of threats, beyond “our nation’s enemies”
- “Global CONOPs” portion of *Sea Power 21*
- Priorities among concepts discussed
- Globalization, world system, world trade issues
- Maritime security operations
- Anti-terrorism, counter-drug, Anti-piracy operations
- Convoys, blockades

- Not addressed (II)
  - Sealift
  - U.S. Merchant Marine
  - Coastal & riverine capabilities and operations
  - U.S. industrial base & shipbuilding industry
  - Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
  - Surge

Subsequent analyses & critiques
Criticisms

- Document too disjointed
- “Never heard of it”
- Neither publicized nor used
- Never gained much traction beyond those directly involved in its development and promulgation

Influence:

- Little, but . . .

Why?

- Overwhelmed by Sea Power 21, Marine Corps 21, & Naval Transformation Roadmaps 2002 & 2003
- No strong SECNAV public push or follow-up effort to build consensus
- 25% increase in fleet size never achieved

- Influence on subsequent capstone documents
  - Minimal
  - Recorded SECNAV push for more USN-USMC integration. Set stage for NOCJO & NOC
  - Cited in NOCJO as “our transformational vision”


- **Overview**
  - Signed by CNO ADM Clark & CMC Gen Hagee (Apr 2003)
  - Billed as an “Operating Concept”
  - Principal target: USN, USMC officer corps
  - Medium-length (23 pages). UNCLAS. Published on web
  - Navy drafters: OPNAV N513 (Strategy Branch) & Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC)
  - Amplified Sea Power 21 & Global CONOPS concepts
  - Elevated *ready-force surge* alongside *forward presence*
  - Near-term, mid-term & long-term (to 2020) visions
  - Capabilities-based approach: To counter conventional & unconventional threats challenging US military superiority
  - Explicit relationships to joint & sister service concepts
  - Tentative USN-USMC Sea Basing consensus
  - Little influence in Navy. More in Marine Corps


- **Signed by:**
  - CNO ADM Vern Clark
    - 3rd year in office
  - CMC Gen Michael W. Hagee

What it was

- Billed as an “operating concept” & a “capstone concept”
- Tasked in Naval Power 21 (Oct 2002)
- Signed April 2003
- UNCLAS. Published on web
- Medium-length: 23 pages
  - Almost triple the length of 1997 Navy Operational Concept (8 pages)

Why it was written

- To lay out vision for near-term and far-term naval capabilities and operations
- To lay out USN-USMC contributions to the joint force (including SOF), implementing “1-4-2-1” defense strategy & Joint Vision 2020
- As USN-USMC input to proposed Joint Operations Concepts
- To achieve USN-USMC consensus on USMC Sea Basing, the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) (MPF(F)) & other USMC-originated concepts
- To expand upon & implement vision of Seapower 21
- Principal target: USN, USMC officer corps

Context (I)
- 3rd year of Bush administration (2001-9)
- Modest US economic growth
  - Oil price climbing
  - Increasing U.S. government deficit spending
- SECDEF Rumsfeld (2001-6)
- SECNAV England (2001-2006)
- CNO ADM Clark (2000-05)
- 9-11 Al Qaeda attack on America
- Continuing terrorist threat to US homeland
- SECDEF Rumsfeld policy of spurring defense “transformation”

Context (II)
- OEF operational experience & lessons learned
  - USN CVBGs provided majority of initial US air support
  - Continued subsequent heavy USN air support
- More post-9/11 joint ops launched
- Planning for, conducting Iraq invasion, occupation
  - Invasion (Mar 20, 2003); Iraq occupied (Apr 2003)
  - OIF appeared to have secured “defeat of Iraq”
    - President Bush “Mission Accomplished” speech on USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) (1 May 2003)
  - Continuing counter-insurgency & stabilization ops unforeseen
- Heavy USN, coalition MSO ops in Arabian Sea
- Desert Shield/Desert Storm strike & MPS experience assimilated
- CVNs as AFSBs routinized

Context (III)
- 1st PLAN out-of-area global circumnavigation cruise (2002)
- PRC-funded construction of Gwadar port, Pakistan on Indian Ocean (from 2002)
- USN port calls to PRC resumed (Nov 2002)
- USJFCOM *Millenium Challenge* 2002 war game
  - Crystalized US military conceptual debates
  - LtGen USMC (Ret) Van Riper critique
- Container Security Initiative (from Jan 2002)
- Declining USN force levels; increasing DON annual budgets
- 375-ship Battle Force USN force goal
- USN in 2003: 297 Battle Force ships & declining; 5 new ships authorized


Context (IV)
- Fleet Forces Command created (2001)
- CNO Clark post-9/11 calls for a “Maritime NORAD”
- MV *Westpac Express* under MSC charter as HSV 4676 (2002); *Swift* HSV2 being leased (2003)
- New littoral Combat Ship (LCS) classes under development
- New “Hybrid Sailor” concept under development, to man LCSs
- USN “Sea Swap” experiments, rotating crews to forward deployed destroyers (2002-6)
  - Convener: Dr. David Rosenberg
  - Participants included NOCJO contributors
Cited references (I)

  - Unilateral, pre-emptive strike; maintenance of US military superiority
- Naval Power 21 (2002)
- Sea Power 21 (2002-3)
- CMC Gen Jones Marine Corps Strategy 21 (Nov 2000)

Cited references (II)

- Naval Transformation Roadmap (2002)
- Family of USMC concepts
  - CMC Gen Jones, Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare Marine Corps capstone concept (Nov 2001)
  - Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS) (1996)
  - Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM) (1997)
- USN-USMC Enhanced Networked Sea Basing concept draft

- **Context: Other contemporary publications (I)**
  - NATO Strategic Concept of the Alliance (1999)
    - Emphasis on crisis management
  - SACEUR/SACLANT Military Implementation of the Alliance Strategic Concept – The Maritime Dimension (Jul 2001)
  - 2nd (1st Bush) QDR (2001)
    - 310-ship BF goal; “1-4-2-1” force sizing construct
  - CJCS Chairman’s Risk Guidance
  - SPG, CPG, JSCP, OPLANS & CONPLANS


- **Context: Other contemporary publications (II)**
  - Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States (2000)
  - Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (2001)
    - Outlined 4 phases of joint operations
  - NIC, Global Trends 2015 (Dec 2000)
  - Large family of USMC warfighting concepts (from 1996)
  - MCDP 1 Warfighting (Jun 1997)
  - MCDP 1-0 Marine Corps Operations (Sep 2001)

♦ Context: Other contemporary publications (III)
  ♦ US Army FM 3-0 Operations (2001)
  ♦ BR 1806, British Maritime Doctrine (2nd ed.) (1999)
  ♦ Kugler & Frost (eds.) The Global Century (2001)
    ♦ CDR Steve Benson chapter on USN & Globalization


♦ Context: Other contemporary publications (IV)
  ♦ OPNAVINST 3000.13B, Personnel Tempo of Operations (Feb 2000)
    ♦ First Annual Report to Congress
  ♦ CAPT Bernard Cole (Ret), The Great Wall at Sea (2001)
  ♦ Friedman, Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization (1999)
  ♦ CAPT Wayne Hughes (Ret) Fleet Tactics & Coastal Combat (1999)

♦ How it was written (I)
  ♦ SECNAV England tasked in *Naval Power 21* (Oct 2001)
  ♦ Initial draft by OPNAV N513 & MCCDC (2002)
    ♦ CAPT Will Dossel, CAPT Tommy Klepper, CDR Tim Groelinger, CDR Paul Nagy (OPNAV N513)
    ♦ Col Art Corbett & staff (MCCDC)
      ♦ Col Corbett had been assigned (as Maj) to N513 (1994-5)
    ♦ N5/N51 oversight: VADM Green/ RDML Wachendorf
    ♦ Contentious USN-USMC issues, esp. seabasing specificity
    ♦ Never got beyond 3-star level


♦ How it was written (II)
  ♦ Effort resurrected by NWDC, MCCDC (2003)
    ♦ NWDC: CAPT Brian Barrington
    ♦ MCCDC: LtCol Mike Raimondo
    ♦ OPNAV N513 & HQMC PP&O contributed to end-game
    ♦ OPNAV oversight: VADM Kevin Green (N3/N5) & RDML Eric Olson (N51) (SEAL officer)
    ♦ SOF role highlighted
**Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (2003)**

**Outline**
- Introduction
- Strategic environment
- Implications for the joint force
- FORCEnet: Enabling an integrated Navy and Marine Corps team
- Naval operations in the near and mid terms
- Naval operations in the far term
- The way ahead
- Conclusion

**Key ideas (I)**
- “How the Navy & Marine Corps will operate across the full range of military operations in the near, mid & far terms through 2020”
- NOCJO meets US “1-4-2-1” national defense strategy requirements
- Navy-Marine Corps Team seeks to do it all
  - Elevated ready-force surge alongside forward presence
  - Near-term, mid-term & long-term (to 2020) visions
  - Meet conventional and unconventional threats
  - Meet nation-state and non-state adversaries
- Priorities not discussed
Key ideas (II)
- Amplified *Sea Power 21* & *Global CONOPS* concepts
  - Expanded discussion of *Sea Strike, Sea Shield, Sea Basing, FORCEnet*
  - Full discussion of *Global CONOPS*
    - Endorsed new *Global CONOPS* force packages
    - Did not refer to *Global CONOPS* by name, however
  - Limited discussion of *Sea Warrior & Sea Trial*
  - No discussion of *Sea Enterprise*
  - Integrated USMC concepts of *Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW), Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS), Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM)* throughout

Key ideas (III)
- Tentative USN-USMC Sea Basing consensus
- Capabilities-based approach, vs. generic threats
  - State & non-state actors
  - Conventional & unconventional threats that challenge US military superiority
- Call for new, revised version of NDP 1, *Naval Warfare* (1994)
- Call for more integrated USN-USMC education, training, doctrine, experimentation, research & development
- Explicit relationships to joint & sister service concepts & operations, including Special Operations Forces (SOF)
Flexible Response

What was new?
- USN–USMC operating concept
- Rigorous look at near-term, mid-term, long-term
- Effort to specifically & comprehensively link to joint & sister service concepts, especially SOF
- Sea Basing elevated
- Surge elevated for 1st time since *The Way Ahead* (1991)

♦ Not addressed

♦ Priorities among the concepts presented
♦ Specific conventional & unconventional threats
♦ Maritime security, anti-piracy operations, blockade, convoys
♦ Coastal & riverine capabilities & operations
♦ Globalization, world system
♦ U.S. Merchant Marine
♦ U.S. industrial base & shipbuilding industry
♦ Non-governmental organizations
♦ Link to force level planning, programming, budgeting

Subsequent analyses & critiques


♦ Criticisms
  ♦ Unnecessary & unused
  ♦ Overwhelming USMC influence
  ♦ Navy should have had it’s own single-service NOC.
  ♦ USN-USMC Sea Basing consensus soon unraveled


♦ Influence
  ♦ Little in Navy, except (small) concept development community
  ♦ More in USMC
  ♦ Helped spawn 2 CN0-CMC-signed concepts
Why this influence?

- Little USN interest in formal long-range concept development in general, & in conformance to joint concept development processes & definitions in particular
- Useful to small USN/USMC concept development groups, however
- Little CNO ADM Clark involvement or follow-through
- No USN fanfare. USMC cited sometimes
- Eclipsed in Navy by wide Sea Power 21 internal & external publicity, and use in USN POM development
- Published only on the web

Influence on subsequent capstone documents

- Minimal
- 2003 NOCJO tasking to update 1994 NDP 1 largely ignored until 2010
- Precedent considered valuable by OPNAV, HQMC, MCCDC. Superseded by NOC 2006

Overview
- Put out by CNO ADM Clark, CFFC ADM Natter (Mar 2003)
- First a “concept”; then a “plan; then a “program”
- To increase & maintain USN surge capability, to meet short-notice demands for significant naval combat forces forward
- To change Navy culture from “deployment-centric” to “readiness-centric;” to enable “presence with a purpose”
- Advertised as tested in Summer Pulse 04
- Principal targets: DOD civilian leadership, USN officers. Later, USN enlisted & families
- Series of short internal USN directives (1 made into glossy); numerous external flag interviews/speeches/articles; web
- Initially conceived in OPNAV, esp. “Deep Blue” office
- Big internal USN influence, esp. waterfront; OSD impressed.
- Institutionalized: 2007; Specific goals evolved; Policy in 2010

Promulgated by:
- CNO ADM Vern Clark
  - 3rd year in office
- COMFLTFORCOM ADM Robert Natter

What it was (I)
- Billed first as a “concept”; then as a “plan”; later -- occasionally -- a “program”
  - Implementing OPNAVINST called it an “operational framework” (2006)
  - 2007 fleet implementing instruction contained a “vision”

What it was (II)

- Published in internal USN directives & external flag officer interviews, speeches & articles & on web
  - CNO concept (Mar 2003)
  - Definitive COMFLTFORCOM ADM Robert Natter message (May 2003)
    - Short: 3 pages
    - Short: 3 pages

What it was (III)

- Flag officer testimony, speeches, articles & interviews, e.g.:

- Institutionalized
  - OPNAVINST 3000.15, Fleet Response Plan (FRP) (Aug 2006)
  - COMUSFLTFORCOMINST 3000.15/ COMPACFLTINST 3000.15, Fleet Response Plan (FRP) (Aug 2007)
    - Also published as booklet (51 pp)

Why it was written (I)

- US Navy concern that forward presence had waned as an effective argument within the US government for a robust US Navy
- To change Navy culture & practices to better link Navy to Bush Administration policies & priorities re: preventive war & anti-terrorism crisis response
- To respond to SECDEF & OSD demand for more, faster surge capability from all DoD components, post-9/11 (2003)
- To argue to SECDEF & OSD that more Navy force structure was usable to the nation – through surging forward on demand -- beyond the fraction that was forward deployed
  - To bolster arguments for follow-on to Nimitz-class CVN (“CVN-21”)
- To satisfy CCDR plans and force requirements

Why it was written (II)

- To change a host of Navy policies, practices & procedures in order to ensure significant surge forces were ready
- To sustain these changes by creating new deliberate processes & changing Navy culture from “deployment-centric” to “readiness-centric”
- To forge a new internal Navy consensus regarding its deployment strategy and policies
- “To give the President more options” & “presence with a purpose”
- Principal targets: DOD civilian & joint leadership, USN planners. Later, USN enlisted & families

♦ Context (I)
  ♦ 3rd year of Bush administration (2001-9)
  ♦ Modest US economic growth
    ♦ Oil price climbing
    ♦ Increasing U.S. government deficit spending
  ♦ Bush administration advocacy of “preventive wars’
    ♦ National Security Strategy of the United States (Sep 2002)
      ♦ “the greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction — and
        the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to
        defend ourselves . . .”
      ♦ “To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the
        United States will, if necessary, act preemptively in exercising
        our inherent right of self-defense”
  ♦ SECDEF Rumsfeld push for military transformation


♦ Context (II)
  ♦ “9-11” Al Qaeda attacks on America (Sep 2001)
  ♦ OEF, OIF, Noble Eagle, Active Endeavor, JTF GITMO, OEF Philippines, CJTF HOA all recently begun & ongoing
    ♦ USN OEF surge (2001)
      ♦ USN CVBGs provided majority of initial US air support
    ♦ USN OIF surge: 7 CVNs, 9 LHA/LHDs (2003)
  ♦ OIF appeared to have secured “defeat of Iraq”
    ♦ President Bush “Mission Accomplished” speech on USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) (1 May 2003)
  ♦ Continuing counter-insurgency & stabilization ops unforeseen
  ♦ 1st PLAN out-of-area global circumnavigation cruise (2002)
  ♦ Turkey refused US military access to ports, air space, en route to OIF (Mar 2003)

Context (III)
- CNO ADM Clark (2000-5)
  - Priority to date: Improved readiness
- USN in 2003: 297 Battle Force ships & declining; 5 new ships authorized
- Increasing annual DON budgets
- 375-ship Battle Force USN force goal
- Navy plans for follow-on to Nimitz-class CVNs
  - Some push-back within Pentagon
- USN forces allocated to CCDRs through CJCS-run Global Naval Force Presence Policy (GNFPP) (since 1991)
- USN began “Sea Swap” experiments, rotating crews to forward deployed destroyers (2002-6)
- RADM John Morgan (senior SECNAV MA) initiative to re-examine “Principles of War” (2003)

Cited references
- Global Naval Force Presence Policy (GNFPP)
- CNO 2003 “Culture of Readiness” message
- Other previous CNO messages
- 2007 CFFC/CPF FRP implementing instruction mis-cited 2006 Naval Operations Concept (as Naval Operating Concept)

♦ Context: Other contemporary publications (I)
  ♦ Dan Goure, “The Tyranny of Forward Presence,” *Naval War College Review* (Summer 2001)
  ♦ *Sea Power 21* (Jun 2002)
    ♦ No mention of surge
  ♦ *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Sep 2002)
    ♦ Advocacy of “preventive wars,” implying surge capabilities


♦ Context: Other contemporary publications (II)
  ♦ 3rd (2nd Bush) QDR (2005, later 2006) impending
  ♦ DoD *Global Defense Posture Review* underway
  ♦ Post-OIF “Navy Reconstitution Plan” briefings
  ♦ Joint Staff *Operational Availability 2003* report
  ♦ CPG, JSCP, OPLANS & CONPLANS

How it was written (I)

- SECDEF & OSD demand for more, faster surge capability from all DOD components, post-9/11 (2001) & Iraq War (2003) surges
  - Joint Staff Operational Availability (OA) 2003 report
    - Focus on service support for CCDR needs
    - Emphasis on increasing strategic speed to implement 2 near-simultaneous MCOs
    - “10-30-30” force sizing construct
      - Seize the initiative within 10 days
      - “Swiftly defeat” one enemy within 30 days
      - Commence “swiftly defeat” operations vs. 2nd enemy in another theater 30 days later
    - Adopted by OSD in Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG)


How it was written (II)

- Catalyst: USD (P&R) Dr. David Chu remark:
  "There is in the Navy and Marine Corps a substantial portion of the structure that is unavailable to the president on short notice, short of heroic measures"

- Enabler: Expanding USN carrier operating cycle (from about 1986)
  - Origin: USN PERSTEMPO policy (6-month maximum deployments, etc.) (1986)
  - GNFPP (1993), 3.0 CVBG TAR minimum rule, IMP maintenance, etc. contributed
  - Gave appearance of increasing “slack time” in carrier schedules; provided increased surge potential

How it was written (III)

- Development methodology
  - Concept incubated in OPNAV (Deep Blue)
  - Later passed to CFFC for plan development & implementation
- Initial OPNAV role
  - VADM Willy Moore (OPNAV N4) originated concept
  - Initial concept papers and briefings drafted in new OPNAV Navy Operations Innovation Group ("Deep Blue")
    - RDML Doug Crowder (Director, 2002-4)
    - CAPT Joe Bouchard

How it was written (IV)

- CNO tasked Commander, Fleet Forces Command (ADM Robert Natter) to further develop concept, plan (Mar 2003)
  - ADM Natter published FRP implementation plan (May 2003)
- Major internal and external relations effort to socialize FRP concepts and procedures (2003-7)
  - Numerous flag officer interviews & articles
- Advertised as tested in Summer Pulse 04
  - Near-simultaneous global forward deployment of 7 CSGs
  - Included 2-CSG Majestic Eagle 2004 exercise of Morocco
- Institutionalized in 2007
  - Comprehensive Fleet Forces Command/ Pacific Fleet instruction

♦ Outline (COMFLTFORCOM May 03 msg)
  ♦ FRP implementation
  ♦ Background
  ♦ Summary of FRP
    ♦ Create a culture of readiness
    ♦ Meet new readiness and surge thresholds
    ♦ Change maintenance, manning and training processes to support surge and deployment
    ♦ Lengthen inter-deployment cycle
  ♦ Key implementation milestones


♦ Key ideas (I)
  ♦ Create USN “culture of readiness” to supplant “culture of deployment”
    ♦ Replace “D-minus” thinking with “R-plus” thinking
  ♦ Focus on output (strategic speed in support of CCDR plans)
  ♦ Increase USN capability to surge combat-ready CSGs & -- later -- other fleet elements, on short notice
  ♦ Elevate priority of USN short-notice surge capability, within the Navy
    ♦ Permanent combat-credible USN forward presence no longer the main peacetime goal

Key ideas (II)

- Capitalize on recently improved fleet readiness
- Change current USN training, maintenance, manning policies & practices
- Redesign and lengthen fleet Inter-Deployment Training Cycle (IDTC) to increase ship, aircraft & personnel short-notice surge availability
  - New phases, timelines, vocabulary, goals
- Not intended to cost more than GNFPP process

Key ideas (III)

- FRP could enable a new “Flexible Deployment Concept”
  - Intermittent planned focused surges & pulses of varied duration to various locations in support of CCDR requirements and specific national priorities
    - Would reduce – but not eliminate– combat-credible forward presence in permanent forward “hubs”
- Could reduce predictability of USN forward operations
- More options for the President, the SECDEF and the CCDRs
- More effective “presence with a purpose”
The FRP goal: An evolving metric

- **2003-5:** “6 & 2”
  - 6 CSGs deployable within 30 days; 2 within 90 days
- **2005-7:** “6 & 1”
  - 6 CSGs deployable within 30 days; 1 within 90 days
- **2007:** “3+3+1”
  - 3 CSGs deployed; 3 deployable within 30 days; 1 in 90 days
- **2007:** “5 +1”
  - USS *John F. Kennedy* decommissioned
- By 2010: “3+2+1”

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Evolution

- Total USN carrier numbers declined from 12 to 11 (2004-2007)
  - Planned to decline temporarily to 10 in 2012
- USN relaxation of PERSTEMPO deployment length rules (2007)
- FRP extended to ESGs (2007)
- By 2007, explicit FRP cycle goals promulgated for numerous USN ship, aircraft, unit types
  - COMUSFLTFORCOMINST 3000.15 (Aug 2007)
Key supporting graphics

- None in basic FRP documents (naval messages, instructions, etc.)
- But ubiquitous in internal Navy briefings on FRP
- Most important were depictions of carrier and other ship scheduling options
  - E.g.: “Before FRP” and “After FRP”
- Actual “After FRP” example provided in following slide, for illustrative purposes

What was new?
- Emphasized surge and strategic speed
- “6 & 2” goal metric & “progressive readiness” concept
- Attempt to change USN culture: “R+” vice “D-” thinking
- Formalized training milestones
- Major OPNAV Deep Blue-orchestrated CHINFO campaign (Summer Pulse 04)
- Implications for changing USN deployment to a “Flexible Deployment Concept” (FDC)

Not addressed
- Most things not directly related to deployment policy & increased surge capability
- Document – while arguing for a basic cultural change within the Navy – was narrowly focused on cultural & administrative changes necessary to improve USN readiness to surge
- Did not purport to be a comprehensive Navy policy or strategy statement
- Only threat & policy driver mentioned was war on terrorism

Subsequent analyses & critiques (I)

- CNA studies
  - K. Smith et al., *Explorations of the Fleet Response Plan* (CNA 2005)
- GAO reports
- RAND report


Subsequent analyses & critiques (II)

- U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* articles
  - CDR Donald H. Braswell, “Carrier Strike Groups Need a Combat Surge Capability,” (Sep 2004)
  - LT B.W. Stone, “A Bridge Too Far” (Feb 2005)
  - LCDR Keith Harrison, “Comment and Discussion” (Mar 2005)
Criticisms (I)

- Admiral Clark had unduly tried to “garrison the fleet”
- By the time the FRP was implemented, US government policies had already changed again regarding efficacy of launching “preventive wars” & the surges that could enable them
  - US military encountered major difficulties in pacifying Iraq following successful surge & invasion; US enthusiasm for more such surge operations waned
- “Culture of readiness” never fully supplanted “culture of deployment”
- Original FRP metric goals were based on questionable baseline data, so had to be progressively scaled back
- Destabilized Sailor home life & reduced retention

Criticisms (II)

- “Flexible Deployment Concept” (FDC) never approved or implemented
- Joint, CCDR, & some Navy staff opposition to FDC as degrading combat-credible forward presence in permanent forward hubs, which they preferred
  - Preferred “Presence is our Purpose” to “Presence with a Purpose”
- By 2010, continued forward operational demands & looming tightened budgets foreseen as potentially constraining – indeed, reversing -- USN FRP implementation
  - Poor USN surface combatant maintenance track records

Criticisms (III)

- Not really transformational
  - Merely tweaked the carrier schedule
  - Centrality of the two forward deployment hubs remained
- Focus on surge and strategic speed meant neglect of extended “Phase 0” and “Phase IV” operations
- Actually reduced air wing training, readiness, cohesion
- Actually increased Navy costs in several areas
  - Looming tightened budgets seen as potentially constraining Navy capability to continue implementing FRP (2010)
- Actually reduced USN responsiveness to CCDR demands, until new PERSTEMPO rules instituted (2007)


Criticisms (IV)

- Not applicable beyond CSGs
- Continued national (GNFPP) forward presence requirements prevented true implementation
  - Navy never asked to surge again for the remainder of the decade
- GNFPP surge response time goals were actually faster than FRP goals (although for fewer ships)
- Even more measures were needed to increase fleet surge responsiveness. FRP itself was not enough
- Fleet maintenance process changes actually driven by shipyard requirements & practices, not the need for surge

Influence (I):
- GW Bush-era SECDEF & OSD were impressed
  - E.g.: Former SECDEF Rumsfeld cited ADM Clark & FRP favorably in his memoir (2011)
- Summer Pulse 2004 exercise may have influenced PRC & Taiwan
- Led to increased DOTMLPF focus on improving USN readiness to surge
- Ironically, helped enable extended forward deployments
- FRP still an on-going, established USN concept of fleet operations as of 2010
  - But staffs discussing “FRP reset” (2010)

Influence (II):
- Great influence within USN
  - In schoolhouses, on the waterfront, in shipyards, & at sea
  - Fleet schedules altered
  - Multiple-CSG exercises scheduled occasionally
    - Summer Pulse 2004
    - Valiant Shield 2006 and 2007
  - Short-notice surges accepted as fact of life; USN culture shifted away from sole fixation on forward naval presence

- **Influence (III):**
  - Continued through CNOs ADM Mullen & ADM Roughead terms (but with changed metrics)
    - FRP extended to ESGs in 2007
  - Influenced 2007 USN PERSTEMPO rules changes
  - Cited in DON FY 09 *Budget Statement* (Feb 2008)
  - CNO ADM Roughead discussed FRP positively in Congressional testimony (Feb 2010)
  - New internal USN consensus on value of surge readiness was indeed forged
  - *Flexible Deployment Concept* yet to be endorsed, implemented as national policy

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- **Why did it have the influence it did? (I)**
  - Responded to an important SECDEF demand quickly & -- by all appearances -- effectively
  - Deployment *readiness* lay within CNO purview to change
    - Deployment *strategy* driven by SECDEF, CCDRs, not Navy, however
  - Heavy CNO ADM Clark endorsement & follow-through
  - Continued public endorsement by succeeding CNOs

- Why did it have the influence it did? (II)
  - FRP fit DoD Operational Availability (OA) 2003 & SPG “10-30-30” increased strategic speed deployment strategy metric
  - Post-9/11 Global War on Terror (GWOT) (later renamed Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)) supplemental defense funding funded many changes enabling FRP
  - Assumption over succeeding years that there might be more “short-notice Iraqs”
    - Increasingly debated, however, following Obama presidential election victory (2008)


- Influence on subsequent capstone documents
  - “Surge” concept discussed in Navy Strategic Plan in support of POM 08 (May 2006)
    - Fleet Response Plan itself not mentioned
    - “Surge” mentioned only in passing in A Cooperative Strategy text itself (2007)
  - “Surge” – but not Fleet Response Plan -- defined and mentioned frequently in Naval Operations Concept (2010)
  - But “surge” seldom mentioned, however, in NDP 1: Naval Warfare (2010)
ADM Michael Mullen (CNO Jul 2005-Sep 2007)

- Apr 2006  *Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (S) & (U)*
- Sep 2006  *Naval Operations Concept (U)*
- Sep 2007  *Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (S)*

Surface warfare officer
- Served under President Bush; SECDEFs Rumsfeld & Gates; SECNAVs England, Winter
- Became CNO following tours as OPNAV N8 and VCNO then NATO Commander, Joint Force Naples & Commander, US Naval Forces Europe
  - Considerable professional growth in each tour
  - Oversaw Balkan, Iraq, Med operations for US, NATO
- As N8 & VCNO, had helped create, implement *Seapower 21*
  - Had signed out three of its defining articles: On “Sea Shield,” “Sea Enterprise,” “Global CONOPS”
ADM Michael Mullen (CNO Jul 2005-Sep 2007)

- Embraced & expanded on VADM John Morgan (OPNAV N3/N5) strategic planning vision for the Navy
  - Kept & supported VADM Morgan as OPNAV N3/N5
- After a year in office, signed out
  - Navy Strategic Plan in support of POM 08 (NSP 08)
  - Naval Operations Concept (NOC) (with CMC)
- Signed out NSP ISO POM 10 in last week as CNO
- Actively started & presided over development of A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower
  - Pushed for USMC & USCG participation & signatures
- New USN Ship Battle Force goal: 313 ships

ADM Michael Mullen (CNO Jul 2005-Sep 2007)

- Signature initiatives:
  - New maritime strategy
  - “1000-Ship Navy”
  - “Global Fleet Stations”
  - Cost control to build 2 Virginia-class SSNs per year
- Unexpectedly named CJCS before Cooperative Strategy drafting completed (2007)
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

Overview
- Signed by CNO ADM Mullen (Apr, May 2006)
- A “strategic plan.” SECRET and UNCLAS versions
- Principal target: USN planners & programmers
- Mid-length (23/42 pp); distributed on UNCLAS, CLAS webs
- Drafted by OPNAV Strategy, Plans & Policy Director (N5SP)
- Effects-based & capabilities-based planning
- Used modified Sea Power 21 “pillars”
- Non-traditional missions not solely sub-sets of MCOs
- Emphasis throughout on programming for GWOT
- Risk is inherent
- “1000-ship navy” initiative
- Influence: Too late to affect POM 08 directly, but set stage for A Cooperative Strategy & NSP ISO POM 10
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

Signed by:
- CNO ADM Michael Mullen
  - During 1st year in office

What it was
- Billed as a “Strategic plan”
- Subtitle: “in support of Program Objective Memorandum 08”
  - Although Navy POM 08 already submitted
- Included a CNO “vision”
- CNO ADM Mullen tasked 29 July 2005
- SECRET version April 2006
  - Medium length (42 pages)
- UNCLAS version May 2006
  - Shorter (23 pages)
- Navy-only. Not tri-service or bi-service
- Announced intent: Publish every 2 years
- Superseded by Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (2007)
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

Why it was written (I)

- To build consensus around emerging new national security & naval concepts within the Navy, especially:
  - Need for naval capabilities beyond conventional conflict
  - Primarily for the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) but also for Homeland Defense – especially Maritime Domain Awareness -- & “1000-Ship Navy”
- To socialize the ideas concomitantly being developed by the Navy for a “new maritime strategy”

Why it was written (II)

- Provide N51-led, top-down strategic & policy guidance – including priorities -- to USN staff elements responsible for building USN POM 08 submission (& PR-09, POM 10 submissions)
- Link higher-level guidance to Navy PPBE process
- Serve as capstone document for a new family of subordinate Navy strategic plans
- Start a repeatable new OPNAV staff process linking strategy to programs more tightly
- Principal target: USN leaders, planners, programmers & budgeters
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

Context (I)
- 2nd term of G.W. Bush administration (2001-9)
- US economic growth slowing
  - US Foreign trade soaring
  - Oil price soaring
  - U.S. government deficit spending high but declining
- SECDEF Rumsfeld (2001-6)
- New CNO ADM Mullen (2005-7)
- New SECNAV Winter (2006-9)
- DPRK withdrew from NPT, restarted nuclear weapons program (2003)
- Iranian nuclear enrichment program discovered
- President announced global partnership w/ India (2005)
- US-Libya rapprochement
  - Gaddafi renounces terror, WMD (2003)

Context (II)
- OEF, OIF, other operations ongoing
  - US government focus on the Army, USMC & ground wars
  - Rising levels of insurgency, sectarian violence in Iraq (2003-6)
  - Increased USN, coalition, Iraqi protection of oil terminals following insurgent small boat attack (2004)
  - Declining US force levels in Iraq (since Nov 2005)
  - Taliban reorganizing & reconstituting in Afghanistan (2004-6)
- Turkish refusal of US military access to ports, air space, en route to OIF (Mar 2003)
- ASG Islamic separatist terrorist attack on Philippine ferry (2004)
- Terrorist attack on USN Iraq oil terminal security force (2004)
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

Context (III)
- New DOD PPBE system introduced (2004)
  - USN Europe base drawdown & Guam increase
- 3rd (2nd Bush) QDR (2006)
  - QDR 2001 “1-4-2-1” Force Planning Construct became 3-part, separate but overlapping mission set (“Michelin Man Strategy”)
  - Homeland Defense
  - War on Terror/Irregular Warfare
  - Conventional Campaigns
- Pacific Ocean concerns, shifts
  - Directed USN to increase Pacific force posture
  - Goal of 11 CVNs: 6 in Pacific. 60% of USN submarines to Pacific
- “Tailored deterrence” strategy
- SECDEF Rumsfeld backing off on pressure for “transformation,” “strategic speed,” “surge,” & “regime change,” in the wake of stalemates in Iraq & Afghanistan

Context (IV)
- Rise in pirate attacks worldwide
- Malacca Strait ISR measures instituted
- Somali pirate Seabourn Spirit cruise ship attack (2005)
- USS Winston Churchill thwarted Somali coast pirate attack (Jan 2006)
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

Context (V)
- Continuing terrorist threat to US homeland
- Increased USN OEF & OIF contributions ashore in Iraq & Afghanistan, to relieve stress on ground forces
  - Exponential rise in USN IA assignments, ISO OIF & OEF
- Heavy USN, coalition MSO ops in Arabian Sea, Caribbean, etc.
- Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) ops ongoing
- USN DDG BMD surveillance & tracking patrols in Sea of Japan (from 2004)

Context (VI)
- 7th Fleet IO tsunami disaster response ops yield favorable US policy outcomes & publicity (2004-5)
- USN-led Pakistan earthquake disaster response ops (2005)
- Continued USN mid-frequency active sonar ASW training vs. quiet diesel submarines
  - Concerns raised globally over effect on marine mammals
  - USN committed to environmental research (Aug 2005)
  - Environmental groups sued to stop training (Oct 2005)
  - Litigation ongoing in US courts; widespread publicity
Context (VII)

- PRC President Hu Jintao speech declaring “New Historical Missions of the PLA” (Dec 2004)
- PLA IRBM buildup across from Taiwan
- PLAN development of anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM)
- PRC-funded construction of Gwadar port, Pakistan on Indian Ocean continued (from 2002)
- PLAN launched 1st new Jin-class SSBN (2004)
- Russians delivered 8 more Kilo SSs & 2 more Sovremenny DDGs to PRC (2005-7)
- Occasional USN port visits to China
- Unprecedented large Russian-PRC land-sea-air East Asian exercise: Peace Mission 2005

Context (VIII)

- Increasing DON annual budgets; declining force levels
- USN Battle Force goal of 313 ships (Feb 2006)
- USN in 2006: 281 Battle Force ships & declining somewhat; only 4 new ships authorized
- USN concluding “Sea Swap” experiments, rotating crews to forward deployed destroyers (2002-6)
- Fleet Response Plan being implemented
  - 7-CSG Summer Pulse 2004 global deployment
- Fleet ASW Command established in Pacific (San Diego) (2004)
- NECC standup (including Riverine Group) (2005)
**Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)**

**Context (IX)**
- 4 Kidd-class DDGs transferred to Taiwan (2005-6)
- High speed vessels being leased, planned by MSC
  - *Westpac Express* (HSV-4676) chartered for USMC (2002)
  - Swift (HSV-2) chartered (2003)
  - *Joint Venture* (HSVX-1) chartered (2003-4)
- New Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) classes under construction
- New “Hybrid Sailor” concept under development to man LCSs
- New San Antonio-class LPDs being built, commissioned
  - Significant, widely publicized cost overruns, delays & construction problems

**Context (X)**
- New USN ASW CONOPS approved (Dec 2004)
- CNO Mullen “1000-ship Navy” concept floated (2005)
- USN FAO program revitalized, strengthened (Nov 2005)
- USN Center for Language, Regional Expertise & Culture (CLREC) created (Feb 2006)
- Increased focus on Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)
  - Plans to overhaul USN strategy
  - Had stimulated “Principles of war” debates (w/ Anthony McIvor)
  - All N3/N5 offices re-designated (2004)
    - N51 became N5SP; N513 became N5SC
Context (XI)
- Navy Global N5s/N39s Conferences began (2005)
  - Driver: RDML Charles Martoglio (N5SP)
- JHU/APL, Lockheed Martin & CNA workshops on USN strategy (2005-8)
  - JHU/APL drivers: Duncan Brown, CAPT (Ret) Steve Richter
  - Lockheed Martin driver: CAPT (Ret) Robby Harris
  - CNA drivers: RADM (Ret) Michael McDevitt, CAPT (Ret) Peter Swartz
- CNO ADM Mullen announced development of a new maritime strategy
- CNO ADM Mullen tasked drafting of “Naval Operating Concept” (6 Jan 06)

Cited references (I)
  - New focus on need for capabilities vs. Traditional but also Irregular, Catastrophic, Disruptive challenges
  - “we will create conditions for a favorable international system”
  - Continued exhortations for transformation
- 3rd (2nd Bush) QDR (2006)
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

♦ Context: Other contemporary publications (I)
  ♦ DoD Nuclear Posture Review (2001)
  ♦ DODDIR 3000.5: Military Support for SSTR Ops (Nov 2005)
  ♦ Security Cooperation Guidance, OPLANS, CONPLANS, CCDR TSC Plans
  ♦ Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Version 2.0 (Aug 2005) and Joint Operating Concepts
  ♦ Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept (2005)

♦ Cited references (II)
  ♦ National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (2006)
  ♦ “CNO Guidance for 2006”
  ♦ Sea Power 21 (2002)
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

Context: Other contemporary publications (II)

- CJCS Chairman’s Risk Guidance
- DOD annual reports Military Power of the PRC (2002+)
- CNO & CMC, FORCEnet Concept (Feb 2005)

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

Context: Other contemporary publications (III)

- Naval Transformation Roadmap 2002 & 2003
- Former UNDERSECNAV Jerry Hultin-sponsored globalization studies
- RADM Morgan, D. McIvor, & SECNAV’s “Action Team,” “Rethinking the Principles of War” US Naval Institute Proceedings (Oct 2003)
- Anthony McIvor (ed.), Rethinking the Principles of War (2005)
## Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

### Context: Other contemporary publications (IV)
- Goldman Sachs, *Dreaming with the BRICs* (2003)
  - Argues for air support of ground forces

### Context: Other contemporary publications (V)
  - Asserted PRC Indian Ocean “string of pearls” basing policy
  - Congressionally mandated (2003)
  - Congressionally mandated (2003)
- CSBA reports on naval transformation, fleet architecture & seabasing (2002-2006)
- CNA studies on PRC military
  - Earlier drafts of this briefing (April 2005-2006)
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

How it was written (I)

  * Thesis: Navy stability, anti-terrorism, and homeland defense missions were no longer merely “lesser included cases” & subsets of Major Combat Operations (MCOs), but critical Navy mission sets in their own right, needing their own dedicated force structure
  * Brainchild of VADM John Morgan (N3/N5 2004-8)
    * Undergrad major in economics (UVA)
    * Focus on strategy, globalization & functioning of global international economic and security system, post-OEF & OIF
  * During tenure of CNO ADM Vern Clark
  * Many workshops, briefings to US Navy, & Navy-affiliated audiences (including COMUSNAVEUR ADM Mullen) (from Nov 2004)
  * Spawned new N81 “sea shaping” analytical pillar for POM development (alongside Sea Power 21 pillars) (2005)
  * Progenitor of NSP, NOC, A Cooperative Strategy
  * But never officially promulgated or endorsed by CNO Clark

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How it was written (II)

* RDML Charles Martoglio (N5SP) "Bear Paw" graphic
How it was written (III)

- Internal Navy pushback vs. “3/1 Strategy” briefs (2004-5)
  - Commander Fleet Forces Command ADM John Nathman a key opponent
  - ADM Nathman also looking to a post-OIF & OEF future, like VADM Morgan
  - But saw increased US competition vs. high end competitors as main future USN challenge, not US leadership in globalization & maintenance of the world system
- Debates over 3/1 strategy content presaged future debates over content of Navy Strategic Plan (NSP), Naval Operations Concept (NOC), and A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (CS 21)

How it was written (IV)

- New CNO ADM Mullen immediately tasked drafting a Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) (Jul 2005)
- Personalities: VADM John Morgan (N3/N5) & RDML Charles Martoglio (N5SP) conceived & drafted
  - LCDR Joe Carrigan & LT Mark Lawrence supported
- National Strategy for Maritime Security signed by President Bush provided concepts (Sep 2005)
- RDML Martoglio vetted portions at 17th International Seapower Symposium (ISS) at Newport, esp. “1000-ship Navy” concept (Sep 2005)
- Differing Navy outlooks debated (US Naval Institute Proceedings (Jan 2006)
  - CFFC ADM John Nathman, “Shaping the Future”
How it was written (V)
- RDML-SEL Phil Cullom (Director, OPNAV Deep Blue) relieved RDML Martoglio as OPNAV N5SP (Mar 2006)
- Consensus-building among Navy senior flag officers
- Push-back from Commander, Fleet Forces Command ADM Nathman & his staff
- End-game:
  - CNO-led flag officer off-site meeting at CNA (Apr 2006)
  - NSP briefed by LCDR Audrey Snyder (N3/N5 SAG)
  - Significant re-writes
  - SECRET version signed by CNO ADM Mullen (Apr 2006)
  - UNCLAS version signed by CNO ADM Mullen (May 2006)

Outline (UNCLAS version)
- Introduction
- Vision
- Objective
- Desired effects
- Assumptions
- Strategic landscape
- Higher-level guidance
- Force Planning & capability development
- Global Navy Concept: Distributed, networked operations
- Directed analytical studies
- Risk guidance
- Family of strategic plans
- Conclusion
Key ideas (I)
- Re-application of 2005 “3/1 Strategy” “Bear Paw” concepts
- Strategy should inform USN investments
- USN plays key roles in GWOT, SSO, & HD
- NSP links higher-level guidance to Navy program planning
- SECDEF has identified GWOT as “the Department’s highest priority”
- Support for the Joint Force, Joint Force commanders, and Joint Force component commanders
- Details on US Coast Guard ops & relationships
- Continued to promote Sea Power 21 principles
  - Laid out Sea Power 21 “pillars” (less “FORCEnet”)
  - Included new “Sea Shaping” pillar (N5SP lead) (2005)
- Effects-based & capabilities-based planning

Key ideas (II)
- The “international system”
- American vision of peaceful, productive movement of international commerce
- Deepened USN “cooperation with maritime forces of our strategic partners as well as emerging partner nations”
- Global Network of Maritime Nations/ “1000 Ship Navy”
- There will be a forthcoming Navy Operating Concept
- Directed drafting of comprehensive family of USN strategic plans
- 1st of a repeatable series of NSPs
Key ideas (III)

3 CNO focus areas, with desired effects

Keyed to 3 QDR 2006 “Michelin man” mission sets

1. Global War on Terror/Irregular Warfare
   - Global Maritime Domain Awareness
   - Theater Security Cooperation
   - Maritime portion of GWOT & additional capabilities to joint GWOT force
   - Navy deterrence of transnational threats

   - Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR)
   - WMD interdiction
   - Navy deterrence of future competitors

3. Conventional Campaigns
   - Project defense from Joint Seabase to support Joint Force
   - Rapidly mass effects
   - Surge capacity for 2 campaigns; sustain 1 to win decisively
   - Deter regional threats through steady-state forward presence

Key ideas (IV)

3 “maritime focus areas” for USN

Text related almost exclusively to GWOT

1. Western Pacific
   - Particularly Southeast Asia

2. Middle East and Southwest Asia

3. Mediterranean
   - NATO ability allows USN ops elsewhere
   - Also briefly mentioned: South America, Gulf of Guinea, Swahili coast, Black Sea region
   - NATO lead in western Africa
Key ideas (V)

Threats to the US:
- “a few hostile or potentially hostile states – some armed with nuclear weapons”
- “terrorists, weapons proliferators, organized crime affiliates, drug traffickers, and cyber outlaws”

4 SECDEF-identified challenges:
- Traditional – Irregular – Catastrophic – Disruptive
- “There are unique capabilities that the Joint Force must develop that fall outside of the rubric of conventional warfighting capabilities”
- Joint interdependence & joint dependence

Key ideas (VI)

- 313-ship Navy force goal
- Call for new small force packages
  - Single amphibious ships acting as joint/coalition seabases
  - SEAL teams, USMC, USCG, USN expeditionary security forces on independently operating surface combatants, SSNs, SSGNs
- “Global Navy Concept: Distributed, Networked Ops”
- Risk Guidance
  - Risk is inherent (details in SECRET version)
- Navy Enterprise Model
What was new?

- Explicit direction to OPNAV to program for needed non-conventional capabilities
- GWOT orientation of CNO focus areas
- Effects-based planning
- “1000-ship Navy”/“global maritime network” concept
  - Built on CNO ADM Clark “Maritime NORAD” concept
- Adding “Sea Shaping” pillar to *Sea Power 21* pillars
- Risk Guidance
- Tasked “Family of Strategic Plans”
- USN operates in “coastal and internal,” “green to brown” water (1st non-NSW mention since 1978)
- Intent to publish every 2 years
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

- Not addressed (in UNCLAS version)
  - Mine warfare
  - Maritime Security Operations
  - Seafarers
  - Blockades, convoys
  - Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
  - Global Fleet Stations
  - Globalization
  - Preventing wars
  - Arctic Ocean; Atlantic Ocean; North, Mid-, Eastern
    Pacific Ocean; US offshore waters
- Little discussion of conventional campaigns, compared to
discussion of GWOT

Navy Strategic Plans

- Were they “strategic plans”? 

- What is a “strategic plan” (officially)?
  “A plan for the overall conduct of a war”

  Joint Pub 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and
  Associated Terms (Oct 2008)
Subsequent analyses & critiques


Criticisms (I)

- Reflected rather than drove Navy program planning
- Came out too late to meaningfully affect POM 08
- Disagreements over Risk Guidance specifics
- Relationship to forthcoming “new maritime strategy” unclear
  - Process seemed backwards
- Not officially circulated widely
- Looked too much like 2005 “3/1” Strategy construct
- Too focused on GWOT; not enough focus on conventional campaigns
- Only one among many OSD, joint, SECNAV, CNO and VCNO front-end guidance documents that strove to influence POM development
Criticisms (II)

- Did not encompass important emerging USN concepts (e.g., Global Fleet Stations)
- Directed family of strategic plans never drafted
- Cited forthcoming *Navy Operating Concept* never written
- Needed more on assurance, dissuasion, deterrence objectives
- CCDR priorities not well reflected

Influence

- Modest for POM-08; some influence on PR-09
- Effort considered valuable precedent, however. Kicked off a series of subsequent similar documents
- Cited in USN FY 08 budget highlights document
- Cited & used in *OPNAV N6/Deputy DON CIO (Navy) Strategy* document (Feb 2007)
- Cited throughout Naval Studies Board study *The Role of Naval Forces in the Global War on Terror* (2007)
- “Navy Strategic Plan series” mentioned as one of many possible sources for potential Navy CONOPS topics, in COMUSFLTFORCOMINST 5401.1A, *Fleet Concept of Operations (CONOPS) Development* (Mar 2009)
- ONR *Naval S&T Strategic Plans* (Jan 2007 & Feb 2009)
Why did it have such influence as it had?
- Issued 6 months too late to influence POM meaningfully
  - (But earlier drafts did have some influence)
- CNO support
- OPNAV consensus to continue effort & do better next time
- Buy-in by other OPNAV flag officers beyond N3/N5
- UNCLAS version allowed for widespread dissemination; SECRET version made for greater credibility within OPNAV

Influence on subsequent capstone documents
- Example proved useful
  - CNO directed drafting of NSP ISO POM 10
  - Similar subsequent documents drafted
- Began to build consensus around expanded “3/1 Strategy” construct ideas among Navy flag officers & staffs, to be revisited in
  - Naval Operations Concept (Sep 2006)
- Same themes re-visited in Naval Operations Concept 2006
  - Same maritime “focus areas”
  - Same message of importance of ability to conduct non-traditional missions
Overview

- Signed by CNO ADM Mullen & CMC Gen Hagee (Sep 2006)
- A “naval operations concept” & “unified vision for the future”
- Principal targets: USN & USMC officers & enlisted
- Medium-length (36 pages) UNCLAS booklet
- Principal USN drafters & overall coordinator: OPNAV Deep Blue, then OPNAV Strategy, Plans & Policy Division (N5SP)
- To counter threats from diverse nations & non-state actors, across the spectrum of operations
  - 13 Mission areas
  - 9 guiding principles
- 9 Methods, 5 strategic objectives
- More influence at HQs than in the fleet
  - Precedent seen as useful
Naval Operations Concept (2006)

Signed by:
- CNO ADM Michael Mullen
  - During 2nd year in office
- CMC Gen Michael W. Hagee

What it was
- Billed as a “Naval Operations Concept” and a “unified vision for the future”
- Navy & Marine Corps
- UNCLAS, pocket-sized booklet for portability
  - Medium-sized: 36 pages
  - Half again as long as previous 2003 NOCJO (23 pages)
  - More than four times the length of 1997 Navy Operational Concept (8 pages)
- Signed Sep 2006
- Superseded 2003 NOCJO
- (Superseded by 2010 NOC)
Naval Operations Concept (2006)

Why it was written (I)
- To continue socialization within USN & USMC of new emerging national security & naval strategic concepts
- To provide internal USN & USMC intellectual stimulus for evolving a new maritime strategy
- To strengthen USN-USMC operational relations
- To widen the focus of the USN and USMC to encompass the entire range of military operations
  - Vice focusing mostly on major regional combat operations

Why it was written (II)
- To elevate visibility of naval missions for the Long War/GWOT & homeland defense
  - E.g.: maritime security operations, security cooperation, counterinsurgency, ballistic missile defense, information ops
- To promote new Global Fleet Stations deployment concept
- To replace NOCJO (2003)
- “Written for a wide audience”
  - Principally “to guide . . . Sailors & Marines”
  - Also to promote public, joint, interagency & multinational understanding of Navy & Marine Corps operations & capabilities
Naval Operations Concept (2006)

♦ Context: (I)
  ♦ 2nd term of G.W. Bush (R) administration (2001-)
  ♦ US economic growth slowing
    ♦ US foreign trade soaring
    ♦ Oil price soaring
    ♦ U.S. government deficit spending high but declining
  ♦ SECDEF Rumsfeld (2001-6)

Naval Operations Concept (2006)

♦ Context: (II)
  ♦ OIF & OEF continuing, intensifying
    ♦ US government focus on heavy Army, USMC engagement in ground wars
    ♦ High levels of insurgency, sectarian violence in Iraq (2003-6)
    ♦ Increased USN, coalition, Iraqi protection of oil terminals following insurgent small boat attack (2004)
    ♦ Decreasing US force levels in Iraq (from Nov 2005)
    ♦ Resurgence of violence in Afghanistan (2006)
  ♦ Operations Noble Eagle, Active Endeavor, JTF GITMO, CJTF HOA, OEF Philippines, PSI ongoing
Naval Operations Concept (2006)

Context: (III)
- Continuing terrorist threat to US homeland
- Iranian nuclear enrichment program discovered (2003)
- DPRK developing nuclear weapons
- DPRK unsuccessful but highly publicized Taepo-dong 2 missile test (Jul 2006)

Naval Operations Concept (2006)

Context: (IV)
- PRC President Hu Jintao speech declaring “New Historical Missions of the PLA” (Dec 2004)
- PLA IRBM buildup across from Taiwan
- PLAN development of anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM)
- PRC-funded construction of Gwadar port, Pakistan on Indian Ocean continued (from 2002)
- PLAN launched 1st new Jin-class SSBN (2004)
- Russians delivered 8 more Kilo SSs & 2 more Sovremenny DDGs to PRC (2005-7)
- Occasional USN port visits to China
- Unprecedented large Russian-PRC land-sea-air East Asian exercise: Peace Mission 2005
Naval Operations Concept (2006)

Context (V)

- 3rd (2nd Bush) QDR (2006)
  - QDR 2001 “1-4-2-1” Force Planning Construct became 3-part separate but overlapping mission set (“Michelin Man Strategy”)
    - Homeland Defense
    - War on Terror/Irregular Warfare
    - Conventional Campaigns
  - Pacific Ocean concerns, shifts
    - Directed USN to increase Pacific force posture
    - Goal of 11 CVNs: 6 in Pacific; 60% of USN submarines to Pacific
  - “Tailored deterrence” strategy
  - Call for conventional Trident SLBM

Naval Operations Concept (2006)

Context (VI)

- Increased DoD attention to integration within US Diplomatic-Information-Military-Economic (DIME) policy, capabilities, ops
- DoD “long war”, Global War on Terror, partnership, MDA & SSTRO concepts predominate & in vogue
- SECDEF Rumsfeld backing off on pressure for “transformation,” “strategic speed,” “surge,” & “regime change,” in the wake of stalemates in Iraq & Afghanistan
Naval Operations Concept (2006)

Context (VII)

- Demands of OEF, OIF tempered “transformation” & global “capabilities-based” defense planning policies
  - Especially by USA & USMC
  - Very high levels of sectarian violence in Iraq
  - Increased search for specific threat-based solutions, e.g.: specific anti-IED, cultural & linguistic capabilities
  - Need to increase “boots on the ground” troop strength, as well as all services’ precision strike & information capabilities
  - Push-back from Gens Dunlap, Deptula, other USAF thinkers
- 1st PACOM Valiant Shield exercise: 3 CVBGs (Jun 2006)
  - PLAN observers invited, attended

Naval Operations Concept (2006)

Context: (VIII)

- Turks refused US military access to ports, air space, en route to OIF (Mar 2003)
- Terrorists launched 2 missiles at USN amphibs visiting Aqaba, Jordan (2005)
- USN BMD surveillance & tracking patrols in Sea of Japan (from 2004)
- 7th Fleet IO tsunami disaster response ops yielded favorable US policy outcomes & publicity (2004-05)
- USN-led Pakistan earthquake disaster response ops (2005)
- Hezbollah land-based anti-ship missile attack on Israeli corvette off Lebanon (Jul 2006)
Naval Operations Concept (2006)

♦ Context: (IX)
  ♦ Heavy USN, coalition MSO ops in Arabian Sea, Caribbean, etc.
  ♦ Stepped-up USN & coalition anti-piracy ops off Somalia
    ♦ Somali pirate *Seabourn Spirit* cruise ship attack (2005)
    ♦ USS *Winston Churchill* thwarted Somali coast pirate attack (Jan 2006)
  ♦ MALSINDO Malacca Strait anti-piracy ops (from 2004)
    ♦ Negative reaction to possible USN anti-piracy initiatives in Strait

Naval Operations Concept (2006)

♦ Context: (X)
  ♦ New DOD Global Force Management (GFM) system for allocating & assigning forces superseded GNFPP (2006)
    ♦ UCP assigned JFCOM as Single Joint Force Provider (SJFP)
  ♦ Continued USN mid-frequency active sonar ASW training vs. quiet diesel submarines
    ♦ Concerns raised globally over effect on marine mammals
    ♦ USN committed to environmental research (Aug 2005)
    ♦ Environmental groups sued to stop training (Oct 2005)
    ♦ Litigation ongoing in US courts; widespread publicity
Naval Operations Concept (2006)

Context: (XI)
- 313-ship Battle Force USN force level goal (Feb 2006)
- USN in 2006: 281 Battle Force ships & declining somewhat; only 4 new ships authorized
- Increasing DON annual budgets
- Fleet Response Plan (FRP) being implemented (from 2003)
- Fleet Force Command (FFC) restyled USFF (2006)
- New USN ASW CONOPS approved (Dec 2004)

Naval Operations Concept (2006)

Context: (XII)
- USN FAO program revitalized, strengthened (Nov 2005)
- CNET created USN Center for Language, Regional Expertise & Culture (CLREC) at Pensacola (Feb 2006)
- Robust USN Individual Augmentee (IA) program
- Cyber attacks on Naval War College computer systems
- New Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) classes under construction
  - New Hybrid Sailor concept under development to man LCSs
- New San Antonio-class LPDs being built, commissioned
  - Significant, widely publicized cost overruns, delays & construction problems
- High speed vessels being leased, planned by MSC
  - Westpac Express (HSV-4676) chartered for USMC (2002)
  - Swift (HSV-2) chartered (2003)
  - Joint Venture (HSVX-1) chartered (2003-4)
Naval Operations Concept (2006)

♦ Context (XIII)
    ♦ Plans to overhaul USN strategy
  ♦ VADM Morgan “3/1 Strategy” draft construct (2005)
    ♦ MSO & HA/DR NOT lesser included cases any more
    ♦ Progenitor of NSPs, NOCs, new maritime strategy
    ♦ Spawned new N81 “sea shaping” analytical pillar for POM development (alongside Sea Power 21 pillars) (2005)
    ♦ Never officially promulgated or endorsed
  ♦ Navy Global N5s/N39s Conferences continue
  ♦ NAVWARCOL, JHU/APL, Lockheed Martin & CNA workshops on USN strategy continue

Cited references
  ♦ …From the Sea (1992)
  ♦ Forward…From the Sea (1994)
  ♦ Sea Power 21 (2002)
  ♦ The 21st Century Marine Corps
  ♦ NOCJO (2002)
    ♦ Focus on need for capabilities vs. Traditional but also Irregular, Catastrophic, Disruptive challenges
  ♦ Navy Operating Concept
    ♦ (Anticipated; but never drafted)
Naval Operations Concept (2006)

Context: Other contemporary publications (I)
- 3rd (2nd Bush) QDR (2006)
- CPG, JSCP, OPLANS & CONPLANS
- DODDIR 3000.5: Military Support for SSTR Ops (Nov 2005)
- CJCS Chairman’s Risk Guidance
- National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (2006)

Naval Operations Concept (2006)

Context: Other contemporary publications (II)
- MCDP 1 Warfighting (1997)
  - Ignored
- CJCS Myers Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (2005)
  - Ignored
- Joint Pub 3-0, Joint Operations (Sep 2006)
  - Deleted term “MOOTW;” introduced 6 phases of jt ops
- Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept (2005)
Naval Operations Concept (2006)

- Context: Other contemporary publications (III)
  - CNO & CMC, FORCEnet Concept (Feb 2005)
  - NWP 3-62M/ MCWP 3-31.7 Seabasing (Aug 2006)
  - Strategic Planning Guidance (Mar 2006), Contingency Planning Guidance, Security Cooperation Guidance
  - OPNAVINST 3000.15, Fleet Response Plan (FRP) (Aug 2006)
  - US Army FM 3-0 Operations (2001)
  - Earlier drafts of this briefing (2005-6)

Naval Operations Concept (2006)

- Context: Other contemporary publications (IV)
  - NATO AJP 3.1 Allied Joint Maritime Operations (Apr 2004)
  - BR 1806, British Maritime Doctrine (3rd ed.) (May 2004)
  - CSBA reports on naval transformation, fleet architecture & seabasing (2002-6)
Naval Operations Concept (2006)

- Context: Other contemporary publications (V)
  - Goldman Sachs, *Dreaming with the BRICs* (2003)
    - Asserted PRC Indian Ocean “string of pearls” basing policy

Naval Operations Concept (2006)

- How it was written (I)
  - USN-USMC Warfighter Talks identified need for “first principles” (VADM Morgan; LtGen Huly) (2005)
    - VADM Morgan had been stimulating “Principles of War” debate
  - New CNO ADM Mullen tasked drafting of “Naval Operating Concept” (6 Jan 06)
    - Wanted to update NOCJO (2003)
    - Wanted naval “guiding principles” and “operational methods”
  - USN starting point: Chart of naval principles, missions, etc.
Naval Operations Concept (2006)

How it was written (II)

- VADM Morgan (OPNAV N3/N5) & LtGen Mattis (CG, MCCDC) oversaw
- OPNAV Deep Blue (RDML-SEL Phil Cullom) initially given Navy responsibility
- But CFFC ADM John Nathman felt it should have been his responsibility
- OPNAV Deep Blue - MCCDC/SIG core team formed
  - Navy: CAPT Mark "Cyrus" Vance, Deputy Director Deep Blue; CDRs Thomas Lator & Thomas Disy
  - USMC: Col Douglas King, LtCol (Ret) John Berry, Maj Kelly Houlgate
- Later, Navy responsibility shifted to OPNAV N51
  - RDML-SEL Cullom & CDR Disy moved to N51

How it was written (III)

- Relationships during drafting
  - Relatively smooth USN-USMC relations
  - USFF participation & OPNAV - USFF friction
- Adapted missions identified in *The Way Ahead* (1991)
  - USMC drafters saw as valuable precedent
- Discussed at CNO-led Navy flag officer off-site conference at CNA (Apr 2006)
- Endgame: During and after Navy-Marine Corps Warfighter talks (Aug 2006)
- Signed & published (Sep 2006)
- Endorsed by new incoming CMC Gen Conway in his initial planning guidance
Naval Operations Concept (2006)

- Outline
  - Introduction
  - Purpose
  - National strategy & the security environment
  - The operating environment and emerging strategic missions
  - Description of the naval challenge
  - Naval missions
  - Guiding naval principles
  - The foundation for naval operations
  - Methods
  - Desired outcomes and effects

Naval Operations Concept (2006)

- Key ideas (I)
  - Navy & Marine Corps operate across the entire spectrum of military operations
  - Call for “more widely distributed forces” for “increased forward presence”: disaggregated but aggregatable
    - Not the message of the Fleet Response Plan (2003)
  - Call for “tailored” and “adaptive force packages” & “alternative non-standard options”
  - International security cooperation
  - “Pre-emption” of non-traditional threats
  - To counter a “diverse array of rising nations, failing states, and non-state actors”
  - Global response to crises where access is difficult
Naval Operations Concept (2006)

Key ideas (II)

Focus areas

3 “longstanding” focus areas of naval operations
- Mediterranean, Arabian Sea, Western Pacific to Bay of Bengal

3 “emerging” focus areas of naval operations
- Gulf of Guinea, East African littoral, Latin American waters
- (did not include Arctic, North Atlantic, North Pacific, or US offshore waters)
- Same areas as in Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

Key ideas (III)

- Traditional – Irregular – Catastrophic -- Disruptive
- Need for Diplomatic – Informational – Military -- Economic (DIME) elements of US power

- Preserve freedom of the seas
- Facilitate & defend commerce
- Facilitate movement across US borders, screening out dangers

Discussed & illustrated 2006 QDR “Michelin man” mission set construct
- Homeland defense
- War on Terror/Irregular Warfare
- Conventional Campaign(s)
Naval Operations Concept (2006)

Key ideas (IV)

13 naval missions
- Forward Naval Presence*
- Crisis Response
- Expeditionary Power Projection*
- Maritime Security Operations
- Sea Control*
- Deterrence*

- VADM Turner’s 4 missions
- Security Cooperation
- Civil-Military Operations
- Counterinsurgency
- Counterterrorism
- Counterproliferation
- Air & Missile Defense
- Information Operations

- Added 9 to Turner list
  - But not “sealift”

Naval Operations Concept (2006)

Key ideas (V)

9 “guiding” and “enduring” naval principles
- Agility
- Coordinated global influence
- Deployability & employability
- Interoperability
- Persistent presence

- Adaptive force packaging
- Precision
- Speed
- Unpredictability for our adversaries & reliability for our friends
Naval Operations Concept (2006)

Key ideas (VI)
- Also 4 “foundations,” 9 “Methods” & 5 “strategic outcomes”
  - “Foundations” include Global Awareness
  - “Methods” include networked, distributed ops, & sea basing
- “The challenge for the Navy and Marine Corps today is to remain capable of traditional naval missions while simultaneously enhancing our ability to conduct non-traditional missions”
  - Same message as in Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)
- Detailed coverage of US Coast Guard ops, relationships
- Written in a mix of present and future tense
- Assumed USN would write its own Navy Operating Concepts document as well

Naval Operations Concept (2006)

Key ideas (VII)
- Very extensive discussion of HA/DR ops, with vignettes, throughout
Naval Operations Concept (2006)

**Naval Operations Concept Construct**

**Commander's Guidance:** Leverage Historic Interdependence, Assess/Consult, Open Discussion/Debate With a Common Goal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Missions</th>
<th>Naval Missions</th>
<th>Enabling Naval Principles</th>
<th>Methods</th>
<th>Strategic Objectives/Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Homeland Defense (HLD)</td>
<td>Forward Naval Presence</td>
<td>Agility</td>
<td>Globally Networked Operations</td>
<td>Help Win the Nation's Wars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War on Terror (WOT)</td>
<td>Crisis Response</td>
<td>Coordinated Global Influence</td>
<td>Distributed Operations</td>
<td>Establish Favorable Security Conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irregular Warfare (IW)</td>
<td>Expeditionary Power Projection</td>
<td>Deployability and Re-deployability</td>
<td>Adaptive Force</td>
<td>Secure Strategic Access &amp; Reach, Global Freedom of Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventional Campaigning</td>
<td>Maritime Security Operations</td>
<td>Interoperability</td>
<td>High-End, High Value, High Intensity</td>
<td>Strengthen Alliances and Partnerships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deterrence</td>
<td>Sea Control</td>
<td>Persistent Presence</td>
<td>Aggregate, Disaggregate, Re-aggregate</td>
<td>Secure US from Attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resilience, Operations</td>
<td>Precision</td>
<td>Task Force Training</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Counterterrorism</td>
<td>Speed</td>
<td>Cultural Awareness</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Counter-proliferation</td>
<td>Unpredictability for Our Adversaries and for Our Allies</td>
<td>Sea Basing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air and Missile Defense</td>
<td>Unpredictability for Our Adversaries and for Our Allies</td>
<td>Building Partner Capacity</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Information Operations</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Foundations of NOC:** Leadership and Professionalism, Mission Type Orders, Global Awareness (Maritime Domain Awareness and Beyond), and Interdependence

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**What was new?**

- “Maritime Security Operations” called out and described as a separate Navy mission area
- Mention of “globalization” as driving force in the world
- Mention of “hybrid form of conflict”
- “Global Fleet Stations” elaborated on as important aspect of Sea Basing
- Illustrative historical & notional vignettes
- Public acknowledgement that internal Navy-Marine Corps discourse “may become passionate,” citing past “volcanic arguments”
Naval Operations Concept (2006)

- Not addressed (I)
  - “Transformation”
  - Specific threatening countries or non-state actors
  - International system
  - Surge capabilities & operations, or Fleet Response Plan
  - Seapower 21 & OPNAV program planning
    “Independent Capability Analysis & Assessment”
    (ICAA) framework and vocabulary

- Not addressed (II)
  - Mine warfare
  - Convoys, blockades
  - Sealift “not listed as a naval mission or capability set,
    only in passing as a beneficiary of sea control
  - U.S. Merchant Marine
  - U.S. industrial base & shipbuilding industry
  - Requirement for USN & USMC to size its forces IAW
  naval missions mentioned only in passing
Subsequent analyses & critiques


Criticisms (I)

- Relationship to new maritime strategy unclear
- Process seemed backwards
- Relationship to *NDP 1* (1994) unclear
- Based on an existing USMC single-service operations concept, while companion USN single-service *Navy Operating Concept* not yet (and never would be) drafted
- Too many lists: Hard to remember, assimilate & use
Naval Operations Concept (2006)

Criticisms (II)

- Not a long-range “concept” in the joint meaning of the term. Too focused on the present and near-term, despite use of future tense throughout
  - Abandoned 2002 “near-term, mid-term, long-term” NOCJO framework
  - The future as described is just an extension of the present
- Minimal influence on joint & Navy operational doctrine
  - No mention in NWP 3-32 Maritime Operations at the Operational Level of War (Oct 2008 & Change 1 Aug 2010)

Influence

- Some in OPNAV; NAVWARCOL seminars & games
- Modest influence at USFF & in fleet
  - CNO-CMC tasking to USFF & CMFC to develop NOC implementation plan ignored
  - But “13 missions” construct repeated in USFF 2008 Annual Plan
- “Naval Operations Concept series” mentioned as one of many possible sources for potential Navy CONOPS topics, in COMUSFLTFORCOMINST 5401.1A, Fleet Concept of Operations (CONOPS) Development (Mar 2009)
- Direction for USN to develop service “NOC- ‘y’ ” ignored
- Marines used it to update their documents, develop new concepts (e.g.: SC MAGTF)
- Cited in OPNAV Instruction 3501.316A, Policy for Composition and Mission Capabilities of Strike Forces, Strike groups, and Other major deployable Elements (Sep 06, 2007)
Naval Operations Concept (2006)

Why did it have such influence as it had?
- Ostensibly for the fleet, but little USFF/fleet buy-in during development
- Linkages between NOC lists and fleet documents not obvious to fleet
- No visible major CNO involvement or follow-through
- Complexity of format hindered utility

Influence on subsequent capstone documents (I)
- Cited in CFFC/CPF *Fleet Response Plan* implementing instruction (but as *Naval Operating Concept*) (2007)
  - Especially idea of new missions beyond the “classic 4”
  - Influenced NWC contributions
Naval Operations Concept (2006)

- Influence on subsequent capstone documents (II)
  - Precedent seen as useful by OPNAV, HQMC, MCCDC, HQ USCG
    - Revised in 2008-10 as Naval Operations Concept (2010).
  - Generated Jun 2007 revision of Marine Corps Operating Concept
  - Cited in CMC operational employment concept The Long War (Jan 2008) & in USMC Vision & Strategy 2025 (Jun 2008)

Naval Operations Concept (2006)

- Influence on other subsequent documents (I)
  - Cited in ONR Naval S&T Strategic Plans (Jan 2007 & Feb 2009)
  - Cited in OPNAVINST 3501.316A Policy for Composition and Mission Capabilities of Strike Forces, Strike Groups, and Other Major Deployable Elements (Sep 2007)
    - Cited incorrectly as Naval Operating Concept 2006
  - Cited as guidance in CFFC Global Fleet Station Concept of Operations (CONOPS) (Mar 2008)
  - Cited in USFF 2008 Annual Plan
Naval Operations Concept (2006)

- Influence on USMC documents
  - NOC generated *Marine Corps Operating Concept 2nd ed.* (Jun 2007)

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (2007)
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (2007)

♦ Overview
- Signed by outgoing CNO ADM Mullen (Sep 2007)
- A “Navy strategic plan;” not tri-service or bi-service
- Long (75 pp) SECRET stand-alone pub. No UNCLAS version
- Drafted in OPNAV Strategic Concepts Branch (N5SC)
- Developed in tandem with A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower
- Designed to translate strategy into programmatic guidance
- Extensive strategic context analysis & risk guidance
- Revised by incoming CNO ADM Roughead within 2 months
- Principal target: DON programmers & budgeters

Signed by:
- CNO ADM Michael Mullen
- Signed during his last week on the job, after 27 months in office
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (2007)

What it was
- Billed as a “Strategic plan”
- Subtitle: “in support of Program Objective Memorandum 10”
- 2nd edition
  - NSP ISO POM 08 (2006) considered useful precedent
  - No “NSP ISO PR 09”
    - Under Bush Administration programming policy, FY 2009 was “Program Review” year vice “POM” year. Required less programmatic detail
- SECRET stand-alone pub (26 Sep 2007)
  - No UNCLAS version
- Lengthy (75 pages)
  - Almost twice the length of NSP ISO POM 08 (SECRET: 42 pages)
- Navy (vice “sea services”) focus
- Tasker: Earlier tasker for NSP ISO POM 08 had tasked biennial follow-on NSPs (2005)
- Superseded by NSP ISO POM 10 (CH 1) (Nov 2007)

Why it was written
- Provide strategic guidance to USN staff elements responsible for development of USN POM 2010, including
  - Extensive strategic context (including classified intelligence); force planning & extensive risk & analytic guidance; CNO ADM Mullen mission areas; & strategic initiatives
- Translate national strategic guidance into USN guidance
- Translate new concurrently drafted maritime strategy into a plan to inform Navy investments
- Continue to build consensus in Navy around new strategic ideas
- Continue, routinize & improve process begun with NSP ISO POM 08
  - NSP the new “1st P” in USN PPBE process
- Principal target: DON leaders, programmers & budgeteers
Context (I)
- Late in 2nd term of Bush administration (2001-9)
- Democrats controlled both houses of Congress (2007)
- New SECDEF Gates (Nov 2006-11)
- Outgoing CNO ADM Mullen (2005-7)
- New CNO ADM Roughead announced
- SECNAV Winter (2006-9)
- US foreign trade soaring
- U.S. economic growth slowing
  - U.S. government deficit spending high but declining
  - House prices falling; sub-prime mortgage financial crisis
- Northwest Passage north of Canada & Alaska opening

Context (II)
- OEF, OIF, PSI, other operations ongoing
  - US government focus on heavy Army, USMC engagement in ground wars
  - OIF US forces “surge” underway (since Jan 2007)
    - US troop increase & changes in ops & tactics (from Feb 2007)
    - Less Iraqi internal violence, coalition casualties (from May 2007)
  - Resurgence of violence in Afghanistan (from 2006)
- Continuing terrorist threat to US homeland
Context (III)

PRC developments
- PRC continued IRBM buildup opposite Taiwan; R & D on anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM)
- PRC-funded construction of Gwadar port, Pakistan on Indian Ocean continued (from 2002)
- Russians delivered 8 more Kilo SSs & 2 more Sovremenny DDGs to PRC (2005-7)
- PLAN introduced new SSN & SSBN classes (2006-7)
- 1st USN-PLAN SAREX held, under MMCA (Sep 2006)
- PLAN submarine approached USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63) off Okinawa (Oct 2006)
- Routine PLAN port visits to US; USN port visits to PRC
- COMPACFLT ADM Roughead visited China (Nov 2006)
- PRC successfully tested ASAT weapon (Jan 2007)
- PLAN commander Wu visited Honolulu, DC (Apr 2007)

Context (IV)

International concerns: Terrorism, North Korean & Iran nuclear weapons & missiles, Venezuela, Russia
- DPRK tested nuclear weapon (2006)
- Iran suspected of developing nuclear weapons
- Russia suspended participation in CFE (2007)
- Russian Navy claimed Arctic seabed resources (Aug 2007)
- Russian aircraft approached USN exercises off Guam (2007)
- Worldwide pirate attacks fell off from 2003 peak
- Russian cyber attack on Estonia (2007)

World food crisis (2007)
- Shortages, rising prices fueled unrest in Africa, Asia, Caribbean
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (2007)

♦ Context (V)
  ♦ SFRC recommended Senate ratify LOS Treaty (Sep 2007)
    ♦ Strongly endorsed by administration, JCS, USN
  ♦ India, US agreed on civil nuclear cooperation (Jul 2007)
  ♦ Panama began widening Panama Canal (Jul 2007)
  ♦ Stepped up USN, coalition anti-piracy ops off Somalia, including USN use of naval gunfire (since 2006)
  ♦ Declining USN force levels: increasing annual DON budgets
  ♦ 313-ship Battle Force USN force level goal (2006)
  ♦ USN in 2007: 279 Battle Force ships; 5 new ships authorized
  ♦ USN BMD surveillance & tracking patrols in Sea of Japan (from 2004)
  ♦ Heavy USN, coalition MSO ops in Arabian Sea, Caribbean, etc.

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (2007)

♦ Context (VI)
  ♦ Fleet Response Plan being implemented (from 2003)
    ♦ 3-CSG exercises: Valiant Shield 2006 & 2007
  ♦ New USN PERSTEMPO program (Jan 2007)
  ♦ High levels of sectarian violence in Iraq being countered by US “surge” & counterinsurgency (COIN) operations
  ♦ Maturing USN OEF & OIF contributions ashore, to relieve stress on ground forces
  ♦ MHQ with MOC concept under development
    ♦ To standardize C2 practices among fleets, globally
  ♦ CNO “Global Maritime Partnerships” (was “1000-Ship Navy”): “GFS;” and T-AH ops initiatives (2007)
  ♦ VADM Morgan was OPNAV N3/N5 (since 2004)
  ♦ USN redeployed Med sub tender to Pacific (2007)
Context (VII)

- Robust USN “Individual Augmentee” (IA) program continues, becomes more formalized
- NECC stood up. Riverine Squadron in Iraq
  - USN conducted 1st riverine combat ops in 34 years (2007)
- Interagency Global Maritime Situational Awareness (GMSA) office established (1 Aug 2007)
- Navy Adaptive Planning Process (NAPP/later NSPP) pilot program under way. (Slight influence on NSP)
- Congress refused to fund Navy nuclear Reliable Replacement Warhead (2007)
- USAF Operation “Rex Redux” (Aug 2007)

Context (VIII)

- New Littoral combat ships (LCS) classes under construction
  - Huge, widely-publicized cost overruns & delays
  - Navy drastically restructured program (2007)
- New San Antonio-class LPDs being built, commissioned
  - Significant, widely-publicized cost overruns, delays & construction problems
- Continued USN mid-frequency active sonar ASW training vs. quiet diesel submarines
- Environmental group litigation ongoing in US courts to stop training; widespread publicity
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (2007)

Cited references (I)
- Naval Operations Concept (2006)
- Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2008

Cited references (II)
  - Focus on need for capabilities vs. Traditional but also Irregular, Catastrophic, Disruptive challenges
  - Directed USN to increase force posture in Pacific
  - 6 CVNs; 60% of submarines to Pacific
- CNO Guidance for 2006
- CNO Guidance for 2007
- Intelligence reports
- CNA & RAND studies
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (2007)

Context: Other contemporary publications (I)
- DODDIR 3000.5: Military Support for SSTR Ops (Nov 2005)
- CPG, JSCP, OPLANS & CONPLANS
- SCG, CCDR TSC Plans
- CNA study “National Security and the Threat of Climate Change” (2007)
- CJCS Chairman’s Risk Guidance
- JT Pub 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States revision (2007)

Context: Other contemporary publications (II)
- VADM Morgan, RDML Martoglio “1000-Ship Navy” (2005)
- CAPT E.A. Smith USN (Ret), Complexity, Networking and Effects-Based Approaches to Operations (2006)
- OPNAV N8 analyses
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (2007)

Context: Other contemporary publications (III)
- CNO ADM Mullen Navy Maritime Domain Awareness Concept (May 2007)
- OPNAVINST 3000.15, Fleet Response Plan (FRP) (Aug 2006)
- OPNAVINST 3000.13C, Personnel Tempo of Operations Program (Jan 2007)
- OPNAVINST 3501.316A, Policy for Composition and Mission Capabilities of Strike Forces, Strike Groups, and Other Major Deployable Elements (Sep 2007)

Context: Other contemporary publications (IV)
- CSBA reports re: naval transformation, fleet architecture, & seabasing (2002-7)
- Earlier drafts of this briefing (2005-7)
How it was written

- Jan 2005 tasker for *NSP ISO POM 08* had directed that process be repeated “at least biennially”
- Personalities: VADM Morgan (N3/N5), RADM Cullom & RDML-SEL Donegan (N5SP) oversaw
- CDR Nagy (N5SC) led OPNAV-wide development team. LCDR Stewart primary N5SC AO (LT Kawamura & Mr. Ballard supporting).
- Heavy OPNAV N81 input (CAPT John Yurchak; CDR Bryan Clark)
  - To ensure “fit” with follow-on OPNAV POM processes
- “New Maritime Strategy” development process ongoing

Outline

- Introduction
  - Purpose & role; Vision; Objectives; Imperatives
- Strategic context
  - Regional focus areas; Global focus areas; Wildcards; Future landscape
- POM-10 guidance
  - Force planning guidance; CNO Navy mission areas; Risk guidance; Analytic guidance; Strategic initiatives
- Conclusion
- Annexes:
  - Risk guidance matrix; Future naval force structure & strategic laydown; Navy shore investment strategy guidance; Navy adaptive planning process; Navy strategic plan timeline
Key ideas
- NSP translates new strategy into programmatic guidance for POM development
- Provide extensive strategic context
- Provide force planning & extensive risk & analytic guidance
- CNO mission areas
- Take strategic initiatives

What was new?
- First use of new Navy Adaptive Planning Process (NAPP)
- Extensive classified assessment of strategic context confronting the Navy
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-10 (2007)

Subsequent analyses & critiques
- None identified

Criticisms
- Reflected rather than drove Navy program planning
- Classification of document precluded wide distribution & understanding of its role in implementing *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*
- No real mechanism established to ensure OPNAV compliance
- Only one among many OSD, joint, SECNAV, CNO and VCNO front-end guidance documents that strove to influence POM development
- Should have been a Navy-Marine Corps Department of the Navy plan, not Navy only
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (2007)

- Written to influence
  - Navy POM 10
  - *Naval Operations Concept (NOC) 2008*
  - Draft SECDEF *Guidance for the Development of the Force (GDF) for 2010-2015*
  - Draft SECDEF *Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) for 2010-2015*
  - 4<sup>th</sup> Quadrennial Defense Review (*QDR*) 2009-2010
    - New incoming administration

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (2007)

- Influence
  - Iterative development process influenced ongoing OPNAV POM 10 processes
  - But CNO ADM Mullen-signed document immediately superseded by new CNO ADM Roughead-signed document
Influence on subsequent capstone documents

- Provided core of *NSP ISO POM 10 (Change 1)*
- Intended to set strategic context for upcoming *Naval Operations Concept (NOC)*

ADM Gary Roughead (CNO Sep 2007-Sep 2011)

- Nov 2007  *Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (Ch 1)*
- May 2009  *Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11*
- Oct 2009  *Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 12*
- May 2010  *Naval Operations Concept*
- Aug 2010  *Naval Doctrine Pub 1: Naval Warfare*
- Oct 2010  *Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 13*
ADM Gary Roughead (CNO Sep 2007-Sep 2011)

- Surface warfare officer (SWO)
  - 3rd SWO CNO in a row
- Appointed CNO when ADM Mullen unexpectedly named CJCS
- Served under Presidents Bush, Obama; SECDEF Gates; SECNAVs Winter, Mabus
- Previously COMPACFLT & COMUSFLTFORCOM
  - Active in drafting of NOC, Navy Strategic Plans, & A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower
  - At Seattle “Conversation with the Country” (Mar 2007)
- Little significant prior OPNAV staff experience

ADM Gary Roughead (CNO Sep 2007-Sep 2011)

- Built upon CNO ADM Mullen initiatives
  - New maritime strategy
    - But put his own views in it
  - 313-ship Battle Force
    - But seen as a “floor”, not a goal
  - Global maritime partnerships
    - But abandonment of “1000-ship navy” terminology
  - Diversity
- Replaced VADM John Morgan as OPNAV N3/N5 with more operationally-oriented VADM Bruce Clingan
- Engaged leading U.S. national security & economics academics on naval strategy, policy concepts – publicly & privately
 ADM Gary Roughead (CNO Sep 2007-Sep 2011)

- Signature initiatives
  - Navy information dominance ops, organizations, programs, careers
  - International partnerships focus
  - NAVWARCOL Title X wargaming revival
  - New DDG-51s w/ enhanced Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) & anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities
  - Truncated DDG-1000 shipbuilding program
  - SSBN(X) development initiation
  - Unmanned systems development
  - Reversed surface ship maintenance decline

“The Trifecta:” The 2006-7 sequence

- “We knew we were doing the process in a backwards way.”
- “Now . . . We want the strategy to lead”
  - VADM John Morgan (OPNAV N3/N5)
    - Interview (15 Nov 2007)
“The Trifecta:” The 2007-10 correction

- “The “ends” would be . . . A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower . . . The “ways” would be the . . . Naval Operations Concept . . . And if there were a means, it would . . . be . . . a classified Navy Strategic Plan”

- RDML-SEL Mark Montgomery (OPNAV N513)
  - DOD Bloggers Roundtable (2 Jun 2010)


**Overview**
- Signed by CNO ADM Roughead, CMC Gen Conway, COMDT COGARD ADM Allen (Oct 2007)
- Principal stated target: American people & US Congress
- Short UNCLAS document (16 pages)
- OPNAV N3/N5SAG: USN drafters & overall coordinators
- Complex, lengthy, open development process
- Promulgated at US Naval War College International Seapower Symposium in Newport (Oct 2007)
- To counter potential threats of major power war, regional conflict, terrorism, lawlessness and natural disasters
- Key ideas: US sea services essential to maintain global world political & economic system; need for cooperation & trust; war prevention as important as war winning; 6 strategic imperatives, 6 core capabilities, 3 implementation priorities
- Influential, esp. overseas; Major USN publicity campaigns

**Signed by:**
- CNO ADM Gary Roughead
  - During 1st month in office
- CMC Gen James T. Conway
- COMDT COGARD ADM Thad Allen

What it was

♦ Billed as a “strategy”
♦ UNCLAS
♦ “Sea Services” (vice USN) focus
♦ Multi-media promulgation
  ♦ Short booklet (16 pages) (Oct 2007)
  ♦ US Naval Institute Proceedings article (Nov 2007)
  ♦ Marine Corps Gazette article (Nov 2007)
  ♦ Naval War College Review article (Winter 2008)
  ♦ CNO testimony (Dec 2007, Feb 2008)
  ♦ Navy Program Guide 2009 chapter (Jun 2009)
  ♦ DVD, CD-ROM, web
  ♦ Brochures, posters
  ♦ Conferences, meetings, speeches, seminars, press releases
  ♦ “Conversations with the Country” & “Executive Seminars”
  ♦ Blogs

Why it was written (I)

♦ To promulgate the strategic “ends” of the Navy & the other sea services, to be used by others within those services to develop and publish “ways” & “means” needed to accomplish those ends.
  ♦ To provide a basis for subsequent arguments that the Navy should grow
♦ To shape subsequent Navy, joint, defense & national security policies, concepts, strategies, doctrines & documents, in both the current administration & the next (“shooting ahead of the duck”)
♦ To tie the US Navy into a perceived new national security – & American public opinion -- environment & policy era, reaching beyond conventional warfighting & current GWOT operations to encompass macro-economics & “soft power” as well as warfighting
Why it was written (II)

- To influence many targets, “especially the American people & US Congress”
- To demonstrate to both current & future Administration national security leadership – & US public & Congress -- that Navy & other sea services were in vanguard of needed national security concept changes
- To highlight to America’s leadership & people the special relationship of the nation’s maritime forces to its position in the globalized international security & economic system, in the face of constant news reporting of ground operations in Iraq & Afghanistan
- To elevate visibility of – and resources devoted to – preventing wars, maintaining the global system, USN humanitarian assistance/disaster response & maritime security operations, & international cooperation

Why it was written (III)

- To win support for the US and US Navy among allies & partners; and to reinforce US international leadership
- To provide a framework within which future USN-PLAN cooperation could occur & expand
- To demonstrate US Navy-Marine Corps-Coast Guard solidarity, and highlight their participation in US government inter-agency processes & operations
- To codify thinking of CNO ADM Mullen and DCNO N3/N5 VADM Morgan, as expressed piecemeal in earlier documents & speeches
- To elevate visibility of Global Fleet Stations and other new distributed fleet deployment options
- To achieve a new internal USN consensus on USN rationale
- To change the Navy

Context (I)

- 2nd G.W. Bush (R) administration term (2001-09) ending
- Democrats controlled both houses of Congress (from 2007)
- Expanding world economy
  - Led by Asian economic expansion
- U.S. foreign trade soaring
- U.S. economic growth slowing
  - U.S. government deficit spending high but declining
  - Oil price still soaring
  - House prices falling (from 2006)
  - Subprime mortgage financial crisis (from Feb 2007)
  - But stock market rising (until Oct 2007)
    - Dow peaked at 14,164 (would fall to 6500 by Feb 2009)
  - Low US inflation rate & falling unemployment rate
- Impending U.S. 2008 presidential election
- Climate change apparent, including in the Arctic
- World food crisis (2007)
  - Shortages, rising prices fueling unrest in Africa, Asia, Caribbean

Context (II)

- New SECDEF Gates (since Nov 2006)
- U.S. defense budgets rising annually in real terms, &
  expected to continue to rise (or plateau)
- Terrorist & insurgent groups worldwide
- Continuing terrorist threat to US homeland
- Continued PRC military growth
  - PLAN introduced new SSN & SSBN classes (2006-7)
- OIF & OEF ongoing
  - US government focus on heavy Army, USMC engagement in
ground wars
  - Escalating Iraqi insurgency & sectarian violence (2004-7)
  - "Revolt of the Generals" (2006)
  - OIF US forces "surge" underway (from Feb 2007)
    - US troop increase & changes in ops & tactics (COIN)
    - Sectarian violence & casualties in Iraq deasing (from May 2007)
  - Resurgence of violence in Afghanistan (from 2006)
Context (III)

- US reporting on military affairs dominated by the ground wars in Afghanistan & Iraq
- Gallup polls showed (since 2000):
  - Very high US public confidence in its military (annually)
  - Polled Americans rated USN as least important & least prestigious of 4 DOD services (2004)
  - Low world-wide approval of US leadership performance
- Increasing public outcries re: USN sonar effects on marine mammal safety
- Well-publicized USN LCS construction overruns & delays
- Heavy USN operational schedule:
  - Combat-credible forward presence in two hubs
  - Combat and combat support in/off/over Iraq and Afghanistan
  - Maritime security operations in Arabian Sea, Mediterranean, western Pacific, Caribbean, elsewhere
  - Humanitarian assistance & disaster response ops
  - Engagement globally with allies & partners

Context (IV)

- Increased DoD attention to integration within US Diplomatic-Information-Military-Economic (DIME) policy, capabilities, ops
- DoD “long war”, Global War on Terror, partnerships, MDA, & SSTRO concepts predominate & in vogue.
- OEF, OIF caused tempering of “transformation” & global “capabilities-based” defense planning policies
  - Especially by USA & USMC
  - Increased search for specific threat-based solutions, e.g.: specific anti-IED, cultural & linguistic capabilities
  - Need to increase “boots on the ground” troop strength, as well as all services’ precision strike & information capabilities
  - Push-back from Dunlap, Deptula, other USAF thinkers
Context (V)

- Turkish refusal of US military access to ports, air space, en route to OIF (Mar 2003)
- New joint Africa Command announced
- Russia suspended participation in CFE (2007)
- Russian Navy claimed Arctic seabed resources (Aug 2007)
- US-ROK agreement to shift command relationships (2007)
- Panama began widening Panama Canal (Jul 2007)
- India, US agreed on civil nuclear cooperation (Jul 2007)
- Northwest Passage north of Canada & Alaska opening
- SFRC hearings on LOS ratification (Sep 2007)
  - Administration, JCS, USN strongly supported ratification

Context (VI)

- Cyber attacks on Estonian govt’ t computer systems (2007)
- Regional powers gaining nuclear weapons
  - DPRK nuclear tests (2006)
  - Iran suspected of developing nuclear weapons
- Worldwide pirate attacks had fallen off from 2003 peak
  - Attacks off Somalia continued to rise, however
    - US-supported Ethiopians supporting Transitional Federal Government routed Islamist militias in Somalia. Islamist insurgency & regional warlordism continued, however
  - Rise in attacks near Nigerian oil resources
- Russian aircraft approached USN exercise off Guam (2007)
Context (VII)

- Routine PLAN port visits to US; USN port visits to PRC
- 1st USN-PLAN SAREX held, under MMCA (Sep 2006)
- PLAN submarine approached USS *Kitty Hawk* (CV-63) off Okinawa (Oct 2006)
- COMPACFLT ADM Roughead visited China (Nov 2006)
- PRC successfully tested ASAT weapon (Jan 2007)
- PLAN commander Wu visited Honolulu, DC (Apr 2007)
- Russians delivered 8 more *Kilo* SSs, 2 more *Sovremenny* DDGs to PRC (2005-7)
- USCG-China Coast Guard (CCG) cooperation
  - Combined North Pacific fisheries enforcement ops
  - CCG shipriders & students on USCG cutters & schools
  - North Pacific Coast Guard Forum membership

Context (VIII)

- Declining USN force levels; increasing DON annual budgets
- USN in 2007: 279 Battle Force ships; 5 new ships authorized
- USN 313-ship Battle Force force level goal (Feb 2006)
- Number of USN carriers fell from 12 to 11
- Fleet Response Plan (FRP) being implemented
  - 3-CSG exercises: *Valiant Shield* 2006 & 2007
- New USN PERSTEMPO Program (Jan 2007)
Context (IX)

- USN fleet homeport balance shifted toward Pacific (2007)
- Robust USN “Individual Augmentee” (IA) program continued, became more formalized
- “MHQ with MOC” concept under development
  - To standardize fleet command and control practices
  - To better integrate naval fleet command into joint command
- Congress refused to fund Navy nuclear Reliable Replacement Warhead (2007)

Context (X)

- USN conducted 1st riverine combat ops in 34 years
- Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) ops on-going
- USN BMD surveillance & tracking patrols in Sea of Japan (from 2004)
- Heavy USN, coalition Maritime Security Ops ongoing in Arabian Sea, Caribbean, Mediterranean, SE Asia, etc.
  - Iran seized, detained RN/RM boat team in Gulf
- USN-led Pakistan earthquake disaster response ops (2005)
- Continued US, coalition anti-piracy ops off Somalia, including occasional USN use of naval gunfire
- Hezbollah land-based anti-ship missile attack on Israeli corvette off Lebanon (Jul 2006)
- USN redeployed Med sub tender to Pacific (2007)

Context (XI)

✦ 7th Fleet reactive IO tsunami disaster response ops success (2004-5) led to proactive USN HA deployments:
 ✦ T-AH & LHD HA ops ongoing in Pacific, LATAM

✦ CNO “Global Maritime Partnerships” (was “1000-Ship Navy”) initiative formalized through State Dept. cable
 ✦ Pacific Partnership & Partnership of the Americas ops ongoing

✦ USN “Global Fleet Stations” concept floated (2006)
 ✦ 2 pilot programs ongoing (Caribbean & Africa Partnership Station) (2007)

✦ USN NRL VXS-1 NP-3D flew 40 geological assessment missions over Afghanistan (2006)

✦ New Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) classes under construction
 ✦ Huge, widely-publicized cost overruns & delays
 ✦ Navy drastically restructured program (2007)

✦ New San Antonio-class LPDs being built, commissioned
 ✦ Significant, widely publicized cost overruns, delays & construction problems


Context (XII)

✦ USN admirals picked for high joint command
 ✦ CJCS, CDR CENTCOM, CDR PACOM, CDR SOCOM, CDR SOUTHCOM. Retired USN admiral is DNI

✦ USN FAO program revitalized, strengthened (Nov 2005)

✦ CNET created USN Center for Language, Regional Expertise & Culture (CLREC) at Pensacola (Feb 2006)

✦ FLTASWCOM &COMINEWARCOM merged to become Naval Mine & ASW Command (2006)

Context (XIII)

- Continued USN mid-frequency active sonar ASW training vs. quiet diesel submarines
- Environmental group litigation ongoing in US courts to stop training; widespread publicity
- USCG moved from DOT to new DHS (2003)
- Increasingly complex & important USN-USCG relationships, especially re: MDA
  - Interagency Global Maritime Situational Awareness (GMSA) office established (1 Aug 2007)
- USAF Operation “Rex Redux” (Aug 2007)
- Close USN-French Navy carrier & aircraft training cooperation


Context (XIV)

- Navy Global N5s/N39s Conferences continued
- VADM Morgan “3/1 Strategy” draft construct (2005)
  - MSO & HA/DR NOT lesser included cases any more
  - RDML Charles Martoglio (N5SP) “Bear Paw” graphic
  - Spawned new N81 “sea shaping” analytical pillar for POM development (alongside Sea Power 21 pillars) (2005)
  - Never officially promulgated or endorsed
Context (XV)

- VADM Morgan “3/1 Strategy” construct (2005)
  - RDML Charles Martoglio (N5SP) “Bear Paw” graphic

Context (XVI): USN-USMC issues

- USMC (& USCG) growing; USN shedding end strength
- Amphibious ship numbers & characteristics
- MPF(F) numbers & characteristics
- JSF variants & numbers
- Sea basing: Concepts and programs
- Marines on non-amphibious ships
- Reduced USMC amphibious competency during OIF era
- Increased USN use of amphibious shipping in non-amphibious assault roles

✧ Cited references
    ✧ Focus on need for capabilities vs. Traditional but also Irregular, Catastrophic, Disruptive challenges


✧ Context: Other contemporary publications (I)
    ✧ Directed USN to increase force posture in Pacific
      ✧ 6 CVNs; 60% of submarines to Pacific
  ✧ Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG)
  ✧ JSCP
  ✧ CNO Guidance for 2007
  ✧ Joint Pub 3-0 Joint Operations (2006)
  ✧ Joint Pub 1 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (2007)

Context: Other contemporary publications (II)

- DODDIR 3000.5: Military Support for SSTR Ops (Nov 2005)
- CJCS Chairman’s Risk Guidance
- Joint Operating Concepts (Dec 2006)
  - Deterrence Operations
  - Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations
  - Major Combat Operations

Context: Other contemporary publications (III)

- Naval Operations Concept (2006)
- CFFC Report: Maritime Headquarters with Maritime Operations Centers: An Enabling Concept for maritime Command and Control (Sep 2007)
- OPNAVINST 3000.15, Fleet Response Plan (FRP) (Aug 2006)
- OPNAVINST 3000.13C, Personnel Tempo of Operations Program (Jan 2007)
- OPNAVINST 3501.316A Policy for Composition and Mission Capabilities of Strike Forces, Strike Groups, and Other Major Deployable Elements (Sep 06, 2007)
Context: Other contemporary publications (IV)

- Coast Guard Pub 1 (2002)
- MCDP 1 Warfighting (1997)
- NWP 3-62M/ MCWP 3-31.7 Seabasing (Aug 2006)
- FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency (2006)
  - Set precedent for public & civilian expert drafting help

Context: Other contemporary publications (V)

- NATO AJP 3.1 Allied Joint Maritime Operations (Apr 2004)
- BR 1806, British Maritime Doctrine (3rd ed.) (May 2004)
- Former Under SECNAV Jerry Hultin-sponsored globalization studies
Context: Other contemporary publications (VI)

- CSIS “Seven Futures” Project
- CAPT E.A. Smith USN (Ret), *Complexity, Networking and Effects-Based Approaches to Operations* (2006)
- Robert D. Kaplan books & articles

Context: Other contemporary publications (VII)

- CSBA reports on naval transformation, fleet architecture, & seabasing (2002-7)
- CNA studies
  - Responding to complex humanitarian disasters (several)
  - *Global Navy Effects* study (2007)
  - *National Security and the Threat of Climate Change* (Apr 2007)
  - *Defining a Maritime Security Warfare Area* (Sep 2007)
- National Academy of Sciences, Naval Studies Board
  - *The Role of Naval Forces in the Global War on Terror* (2007)
- CNO ADM Mullen *Naval Maritime Domain Awareness Concept* (May 2007)
- Earlier drafts of this briefing (2005-7)
How it was written (I)

- VADM John Morgan (N3/N5) conceived & directed
  - Had already formulated several key concepts (2004-6)
  - Created N3/N5 Special Actions Group (SAG): LCDR Audrey Snyder; LCDR Chris Sweeney
- CNO ADM Mullen initiated, fostered & championed
- Unprecedented well-funded, massive, lengthy, complex, open, inclusive set of development efforts
- Widespread, intensive publicity about the process
- “Competition of ideas”
- Always intended to be one of a “family” of documents, to include:
  - “New maritime strategy” (“ends”)
  - Naval Operations Concept (“ways”)
  - Navy Strategic Plan (“means”)

How it was written (II)

- Presaged by elements of:
  - “3/1 Strategy Construct” (2005-6)
  - Naval Strategic Plan in support of POM 08 (2006)
  - Naval Operations Concept (2006)
- CNO ADM Mullen announced new effort at Naval War College Current Strategy Forum in Newport (Jun 2006)
- CNO formally tasked OPNAV N3/N5 (Jul 2006)
  - CNO handwritten note: “This is very high priority and should be given the time and the resources to complete with all due speed”
- Drafted & coordinated within Navy and among 3 services by N3/N5 Special Actions Group (SAG)
How it was written (III)

שמה

At least 5 simultaneous, inter-connected tracks

1. Core track: Tri-service drafting team in Washington; vetting of drafts through layers of senior leadership; service chief signatures
   ♦ Led by OPNAV N3/N5 SAG
   ♦ All other tracks took guidance from and/or fed this track to some degree throughout

2. Naval War College identification and assessment of alternative environments & approaches

3. VADM Morgan briefings to flag officers, & other idea-socialization efforts

4. “Conversations with the country”

5. Contributory conferences, workshops, articles
   ♦ Numerous organizations & individuals

♦ Levels of inter-connectedness among tracks varied


How it was written (IV)

♦ CDR Bryan McGrath (N3/N5 SAG) was principal USN drafter & internal Navy & tri-service coordinator throughout
   ♦ Led N3/N5 SAG reporting directly to VADM Morgan (2006-2007)
   ♦ Briefly subordinate in mid-evolution to CAPT Jamie Foggo
   ♦ Other SAG members: LCDR Audrey Snyder, LT John Ennis, CDR Paul Tortora, CAPT James Taylor, others.

♦ USMC principal drafter: Col Doug King USMC
   ♦ Other USMC drafters: Col Bob Dobson (Ret), LtCol John Berry (Ret), LtCol Kelly Houlgate

♦ USCG principal drafter: CAPT Sam Neill USCG
   ♦ Other USCG drafter: CDR John Caplis USCG
How it was written (V)

- 3 phases of development (Aug 06 - Oct 07)
  - Phase I (Aug 06-Jan 07):
  - Phase II (Mar-Jun 07):
  - Phase III (Jun-Oct 07)
- End-game (Oct 2007)
- Unusually large amount of Navy funding made available throughout for:
  - Naval War College strategy development efforts ($1M)
  - CNA, JHU-APL, other supporting efforts
  - “Conversations with the Country”
  - N3/N5 staff officer travel
  - Publication & dissemination

How it was written (VI)

- Phase I (Aug 06-Jan 07): Major NAVWARCOL effort
  - Deliberate tasking to NAVWARCOL & publicizing of same
  - NAVWARCOL had spawned CAPT Mahan’s strategy works
  - PNWC RADM Jacob Shuford championed
  - CNWS Dean CAPT “Barney” Rubel (Ret) managed & coordinated
  - CNWS Strategic Research Department (SRD) Director Peter Dombrowski led effort
  - Seminal “Strategic Foundations War Game” (Sep-Oct 2006)
  - Scenario analyses, war-gaming, conferences & symposia
  - 5 grand strategy options identified, developed & debated
  - Initial “Conversations with the Country”
  - 13 naval missions identified in Naval Operations Concept (NOC) 2006 helped frame the discussion
Simultaneously, VADM Morgan made series of presentations on new globalized world security and economic environment – and role of the Navy – to senior Navy flag officers in several venues.

Tri-service 3-star Terms of Reference (TOR) signed (Oct 2006)
- Established 3-star tri-service EXCOM: VADM Morgan, LtGen Amos, RDML Nimmich
- Maritime Strategy Task Force (MSTF) established (O5/O6-level)

Phase II (Mar-Jun 2007)
- Vetting & winnowing of grand strategy options by drafters, MSTF, EXCOM, tri-service 3/4-stars
- 1 grand strategy option chosen as central organizing concept
  - “Global System” option: Protection of the existing global system of trade & security
- Other options considered as central organizing concept & discarded (but some elements borrowed):
  - “Primacy:” Focus solely on “Winning combat power forward”
  - “Selective engagement:” Focus on war prevention
  - “Cooperative strategy:” Securing the global commons as a key element in the health of the global system
  - “Offshore balancing:” Forward deployment only in the Gulf; other USN forces to surge from CONUS as required
- More differences within Navy, among Navy flags, than between Navy, USMC, USCG
How it was written (IX)

- Phase III (Jun-Oct 2007)
  - Tri-service drafting
  - Vetting among 4-stars; re-drafting
- ADM Mullen announced as next CJCS; to leave CNO job very soon (Jun 2007)
- “Conversations with the Country” continuing
- Drafting team anticipated & prepared for counter-arguments
- RDML-SEL Dan Cloyd new head of N3/N5 SAG (summer 2007)
  - CDR McGrath continued as Deputy (until Feb 2008)

How it was written (X)

- End-game (Oct 2007)
- Change in CNO leadership (29 Sep 2007)
  - ADM Roughead relieved ADM Mullen as CNO
  - CNO Roughead end-game initiatives
    - Strengthened “hard power,” major combat operations wording
    - Strengthened missile defense, sealift wording
    - Made “enhance awareness” – including maritime domain awareness (MDA) & intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) -- an “implementation priority”
- CNA analyses; re-drafting
- 4-star agreement on ordering of capabilities & imperatives
How it was written (XI)

♦ SECNAV Winter, DON secretariat not briefed until endgame
  ♦ SECNAV criticisms: Saw “soft power” as over-emphasized
  ♦ Simultaneous (& deliberate) SECNAV “Great White Fleet” anniversary focus
    ♦ Stressed need for powerful forward Navy, Marine Corps combat forces for deterrence, warfighting, “hard power”
  ♦ Initiated studies analyzing A Cooperative Strategy’s premises

How it was written (XII)

♦ CNO-CMC-COMDT COGARD signatures (Oct 2007)
♦ CNO-CMC-COMDT public unveiling at 18th International Seapower Symposium (ISS) at Naval War College (Oct 2007)
  ♦ Reiterated at 19th ISS (Oct 2009)
How it was written (XIII)

- The “Conversations with the Country” (Nov 2006-8)
  - Face-to-face, non-electronic public outreach meetings
  - Naval War College as OPNAV N3/N5’s executive agent
    - N3/N5 POC: RDML-SEL Dan Cloyd (head of N3/N5 SAG) (from 2007)
    - NAVWARCOL POC: CAPT (Ret) John Jackson
  - Tri-service participation, incl/ flag officers
  - Two rounds
    - Seeking inputs (Nov 2006-Jun 2007)
    - Sharing the published strategy (Nov 2007-Sep 2008)
  - Small, focused groups: Three formats
    - Larger-scale symposia
    - Smaller-scale executive seminars
    - Campus conversations
    - Plus aggressive local supporting public relations efforts

How it was written (XIV)

- The “Conversations with the Country” (2006-8) (cont.)
  - Subject of much discussion at 18th International Seapower Symposium (ISS) at Newport, led by CNO, CMC, COMDT COGARD (Oct 2007)
  - Concept – & name – later adopted for CJCS ADM Mullen outreach efforts (2010)

How it was written (XV)

♦ Other simultaneous activities
♦ Often claimed to be integral to the strategy development process
♦ Probably more useful in creating a receptive climate for the final product, than in guiding the pens of the drafters
  ♦ New “Navy Adaptive Planning Process” (later “Navy Strategic Planning Process”) ISO POM 12 getting underway
  ♦ Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-10 development ongoing
  ♦ Foreign defense industry, academic, interagency inputs sought
  ♦ Foreign navy inputs sought
    ♦ ISS 2005, US Naval Institute Proceedings solicitation, Navy staff talks, academic engagements abroad
  ♦ JHU/APL conferences (2005-7)
  ♦ Lockheed Martin conferences (2005-7)
    ♦ Origins of this publication
    ♦ Driver: CAPT (Ret) Robby Harris
How it was written (XVI): Semi-official documents

- NAVWARCOL President RADM Jacob Shuford “President’s Forum” articles, Naval War College Review (Autumn 2006, Summer 2007, Winter 2008)

How it was written (XVII): NWC conference output

How it was written (XVIII)

- CNA conferences
  - “Winning Big Wars vs. Shaping & Influence” (Jan 2007)
  - “Implementing the New Maritime Strategy (Jan 2008)

- Drivers: RADM (Ret) Michael McDevitt; CAPT (Ret) Peter Swartz; Michael Gerson

How it was written (XIX): Feeder articles

- Dr. George Baer, “Notes toward New Maritime Strategy,” NWCR (Spring 2007)
- Dr. Geoffrey Till, “New Directions in Maritime Strategy?” NWCR (Autumn 2007)
How it was written (XX): Semi-official documents
- *Orbis* special issue “Global Security and Maritime Strategy” (Fall 2007)

How it was written (XXI): Official testimony
- Statements by ADM Roughead, Gen Conway, & ADM Allen before the House Armed Services Committee (13 Dec 2007)
- Posture Statements by ADM Roughead, Gen Conway, & ADM Allen (Spring 2008)
How it was written (XXII): Foreign inputs sought & received


How it was written (XXIII)

- Formal CHINFO dissemination plan, products & dissemination
  - CHINFO RDML Frank Thorp active oversight
  - Assigned PAO: CDR “Cappy” Surette
- Targets:
  - Congress/ interagency
  - “Thought leaders”
  - Media
  - Internal DOD, DON
  - Direct-to-public (US, International)
Key issues debated & resolved during drafting & signing:

- Nature of the evolving international system
- Preferred end state & grand strategy for US
- Role of USN, USMC, USCG within that grand strategy
- Navy-only vs. two or three sea services
- Inclusion of a required force structure
- Ordering of the 6 “strategic imperatives”
- Identity of the enemy in the “war on terror”
- Calling out of China

How it was written (XXV)

The key issue in the drafting

“This tension between warfighting and everything else was the main feature of the internal debates surrounding the development of the Maritime Strategy”

CDR Bryan McGrath USN (Ret)
Oct 2008
Measuring the effects of the strategy (2007-9)

- OPNAV: CNO conversation tools
  - CNO VTCs with Navy component commanders
  - Focus on measuring effectiveness of naval operations in support of individual "Strategic Imperatives"
    - #5 "Foster & sustain cooperative relationships with more international partners"
    - #6 "Prevent or contain local disruptions before they impact the global system."
  - Discussions dealt more with measures of performance than measures of effects

- Naval War College effort in support of OPNAV N51
  - Strategic Imperative #5
  - Prof. Stephen Downes-Martin developed complex, rigorous measurement methodology, delivered to OPNAV N51

- Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) used analyses of past engagement operations to address #5
  - Identified tactical-operational-strategic drivers; used assessments of operations to determine tactics; delivered to OPNAV N51
  - Drs. Alan Brown, David Zvijac, Alison Vernon

Outline
- Introduction
- Challenges of a new era
- Maritime strategic concept
  - Regionally concentrated, credible combat power
  - Globally distributed, mission-tailored maritime forces
- Implementing the strategy
  - Expanded core capabilities
    - Forward presence; Deterrence; Sea control; Power projection; Maritime security; Humanitarian assistance & disaster response
  - Implementation priorities
    - Improve integration & interoperability; Enhance awareness; Prepare our people
- Conclusion
Key ideas (I)

Core statement:

“As our security and prosperity are inextricably linked with those of others, U.S. maritime forces will be deployed to protect and sustain the peaceful global system comprised of interdependent networks of trade, finance, information, law, people and governance”

Key ideas (II)

Global system & globalization are vital influences

“Major power war, regional conflict, terrorism, lawlessness and natural disasters—all have the potential to threaten U.S. national security and world prosperity”

USN-USMC-USCG cooperation

Formal & informal sea service, joint, interagency, & international cooperation & building of trust

War prevention as important as warfighting

“Maritime forces must contribute to winning wars decisively while enhancing our ability to prevent war, win the long struggle against terrorist networks, positively influence events, and ease the impact of disasters”

“6-6-3” construct

6 key tasks or strategic imperatives
6 expanded core capabilities
3 implementation priorities
Key ideas (III)

- 6 key tasks/strategic imperatives
  - Regionally Concentrated, Credible Combat Power
    (Western Pacific, Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean)
    - Deter major power war
    - Win our nation’s wars
    - Limit regional conflict
  - Globally Distributed, Mission-Tailored Maritime Forces
    (especially Africa, Western Hemisphere)
    - Contribute to homeland defense in depth
    - Foster & sustain cooperative relationships
    - Prevent or contain local disruptions

(Tracked with NSP ISO POM 08 & NOC 2006, except Med omitted)

Key ideas (IV)

- 6 expanded core capabilities
  - Forward Presence
  - Deterrence
  - Sea Control
  - Power projection
  - Maritime security
  - Humanitarian assistance & disaster response

- Added 2 to Zumwalt/Turner “missions of the Navy” canon
  - Re-ordered Turner’s listing
- Subtracted 7 from NOC 2006 list of missions
- No inclusion of strategic sealift as core capability
  - Often added to previous capstone document “missions” lists
Key ideas (V)

3 implementation priorities
- Improve integration and interoperability
  - Marines to be employed as detachments aboard a wider variety of ships and cutters for maritime security missions
  - No geographic boundaries between USN & USCG homeland defense responsibilities
  - Global Maritime Partnerships initiative
- Enhance awareness
  - Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)
  - Expanded Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capability
- Prepare our people
  - “Maritime forces will normally operate in a less concentrated manner than they do today”
  - New responsibilities & expertise for junior officers & commanders

Key ideas (VI)

- Call for “mission-tailored” & “adaptive force packages”
- “We will provide our people . . . With the training, education, and tools necessary to promote peace . . .”
- “As a declaratory strategy, this document challenges the sea services to evolve an expanded range of integrated capabilities to achieve enduring national strategic objectives”
- “Conflicts are increasingly characterized by a hybrid blend of traditional and irregular tactics, de-centralized planning and execution, and non-state actors using both simple and sophisticated technologies in innovative ways.”
- In accompanying explanatory texts:
  - Deliberate invocation of (& comparison to) The Maritime Strategy of 1980s
  - Deliberate slighting of all other USN capstone documents since 1980s for not being styled “strategies”
Key ideas (VII)

To “complement Sea Power 21” & influence next:

- Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) (drafting ongoing in 2007)
- Naval Operations Concept (NOC) (anticipated in 2008; published in 2010)
- The next SECDEF National Defense Strategy (NDS)
- The next CJCS ADM Mullen National Military Strategy (NMS) (2011)
- The next Quadrennial Roles & Missions Review (QRM) (2009)
- The next 4th Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (2009-2010)

- New incoming administration

What was new (I)

- 1st ever capstone document signed by 3 service chiefs
  - 1st USN-USMC-USCG unified maritime strategy since 1980s
  - One of only 4 capstone documents to comprehensively integrate USCG
  - 1st capstone document to cite USN-USCG National Fleet policy
- Complex, open, lengthy development process
  - Included “competition of ideas” phase
  - Extensive, structured flag officer involvement
  - “Conversations with the country” & “executive seminars”
  - Public solicitation of foreign input
  - Unprecedented allocation of Navy $ & manpower for strategy development & socialization ($1M+)
  - Widespread & intensive publicity about the process
  - FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency set precedent (2006)


What was new? (II)

- Emphasis on the global system & globalization
  - 1st use of term global system in a USN capstone document
- Characterizing the world system as “multi-polar”
- Asserted that preventing wars as important to U.S. as winning wars
- Elevation of Maritime Security & Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response to core capabilities
- Emphasis on interagency action & DIME construct
- Navy as enabling force for humanitarian ops too
- Global Maritime Partnership initiative
  - “1000-ship navy” initiative renamed
- Public DOD announcement & endorsement
- Massive & sustained CHINFO-led multi-media internal & external publicity campaign
- Use of blogs for dissemination
What was new? (III)

- Authoritative US government description of an “open, multi-polar world”
  - Noticed by Chinese commentators
- Serious & massive initial attempt to rigorously measure effects
  - ADM Roughhead CNO Guidance 2008: “Develop comprehensive plan that accomplishes each implied task and tracks progress with measures of effectiveness”
  - CNO approved two methodologies to be applied to each of the 6 “strategic imperatives” (Jun 2008)
    - VTC Conversation tool (initiated Sep 2008)
    - Monthly CNO-NCC dialogues on opportunities & impediments
    - Systems Thinking Model
    - Industry-proven methodology adapted by Naval War College (Prof. Downes-Martin)

Not addressed

- Specific threatening countries or non-state actors
- Many (but not all) naval warfare tasks
  - Strike, amphibious, anti-air, anti-surface, electronic, mine warfare, underway replenishment not mentioned
  - TBMD, ISR, MDA, TSC, sealift mentioned. ASW, IO implied.
- Cooperation with US Army & US Air Force by name
- U.S. industrial base & shipbuilding industry
- Arctic Ocean; Atlantic Ocean; North, Mid-, Eastern Pacific Ocean; Mediterranean Sea
- Convoy, blockade, riverine operations & capabilities
- China, Iraq, Afghanistan, “The Long War,” Europe
- “Transformation”
- Seapower 21 framework or vocabulary
  - Even though Seapower 21 remained central to OPNAV Independent Capability Analysis and Assessment (ICAA) program planning process & NWDC concept development

- **Scant mention**
  - No mention of *Fleet Response Plan* (or of importance of *surge*, except in passing)
  - *Strategic sealift* not included as a “core capability”
  - Coast Guard constabulary & law enforcement roles received slight treatment
  - No substantive discussion of seabasing
  - Little on naval coastal warfare
  - Only one very general reference to links to force level planning, programming & budgeting

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### Comparing 2007 to 1970-74

- A *Cooperative Strategy* built on Zumwalt – Turner’s “4 missions”
- Thrust of *A Cooperative Strategy* echoes ADMs Zumwalt & Turner views of 35 years before
  - Zumwalt-Turner: Discussion of *sea control & presence* in reaction to VN War *power projection* focus
  - *A Cooperative Strategy*: Discussion of *sea control & presence* in reaction to 1990s *power projection* focus
  - Turner’s “deterrence” & “warfighting” missions echoed in *A Cooperative Strategy*’s “war prevention” and “war winning” discussion
Was it a “strategy”?

What is “strategy” (officially)?

“A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives”

Joint Pub 1-02 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Oct 2008)

What is “naval strategy” (officially)?

“The use of naval forces (including naval aviation and Marine forces) to achieve naval objectives determined by national strategy, with the overall objective of controlling the seas and denying to an enemy the use of those sea areas important to enemy operations”

NTRP 1-02 Navy Supplement to the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Aug 2006)

Subsequent analyses & critiques (I)

Christopher Castelli, “Navy Weighs Three Maritime Strategy Options, but Others May Emerge,” Inside the Navy (Apr 2007)


Subsequent analyses & critiques (II)

- Also Geoffrey Till, Steve Carmel, CAPT (Ret) Wayne Hughes, RADM (Ret) Bill Pendley articles, *Naval War College Review* (Spring 2008)

Subsequent analyses & critiques (III)

- Jerome Burke et al., *Assessment of Naval Core Capabilities* (IDA, Jan 2009)
  - Study for SECNAV OPPA & USD(I)

Subsequent analyses & critiques (IV)

- Milan Vego, “AirSea Battle Must Not Work Alone” (US Naval Institute *Proceedings* (Jul 2011))


Subsequent analyses & critiques (V)


Criticisms (I)

♦ Not really a “strategy.” More a “strategic concept.”
  ♦ Not equivalent to 1980s’ “Maritime Strategy”
  ♦ Accompanying explanatory narrative inaccurately slighted all USN strategic conceptual efforts since 1980s
    ♦ Especially . . . *From the Sea* (1992)
  ♦ Not useful as “The Navy Story:”
    ♦ Advertised target audiences (US public, Congress) uninterested in strategy, and especially in peacetime ops
    ♦ Strategy too nuanced for Congress & US public
    ♦ Globalization & international seaborne trade do not resonate as themes with the American people, whose traditional comparatively low opinion of the benefits of international economic relationships actually declined after 2007
  ♦ Attributed an (inaccurate) integrated maritime coherence to 3 very separate entities – the Navy, Marine Corps & Coast Guard -- which often do very dissimilar things


Criticisms (II)

  ♦ Especially regarding Navy’s future planning
  ♦ Emphasis on global system, world trade & the global commons as “context” not accompanied by robust enough explanation as to what seriously threatens them
    ♦ Little current/foreseeable threat to global seaborne trade seen
  ♦ Failure to prioritize strategic imperatives, core capabilities, potential threats, US operations
  ♦ Not enough discussion as to exactly how maritime forces prevent wars
  ♦ Unadvisedly favored “soft” over “hard” maritime power
    ♦ Too much concentration on operations short of war
    ♦ Elevation of *MSO* & *HA/DR operations* as “core capabilities” unwarranted
    ♦ No mention of *strike* or *amphibious assault* or *ASW* ops
    ♦ No concomitant elevation of *sealift*, as often in the past

Criticisms (III)

- Not joint enough
  - Not explicit on links to Army, Air Force strategies & operations
  - Ignored USN-USAF strike integration achievements & potential
- Minimal influence on joint operational doctrine
  - No mention in Joint Pub 3-32 *Command & Control for Joint Maritime Operations* (Change 1 May 2008)
- Little on USN role in meeting traditional, disruptive, irregular, catastrophic challenges
- Not enough on Navy roles in winning at irregular warfare, counter-insurgency & the war on terror -- the current primary ongoing operations
- Emphasis on international cooperation creates too much dependence on others, makes it harder to justify US Navy force structure


Criticisms (IV)

- Sea control, sea basing, naval control & protection of shipping given too short shrift
- Not enough on protection of oceanic natural resources
- Development process too long, complex, wasteful of $
- Many of its tenets actually predated the so-called “development” process
  - “Development” processes an elaborate sham; VADM Morgan already knew what he wanted to say (cf: “3-1 Strategy” draft; Morgan-Martoglio article)
- Too many other competing USN capstone documents
- Timing of publication was poor; Presidential election impending
- A vehicle to enhance ADM Mullen’s chances to be considered as a prospective CJCS
Criticisms (V)

- “Conversations with the Country” flawed
  - Few useful insights gleaned
  - Too many audience members from Navy-oriented groups
  - Many “conversations” actually “performances”
  - Not enough audience was reached for effort made
  - Blogging would have been more useful
- Neither the Cooperative Strategy’s 6 “expanded core capabilities” nor its 6 “strategic imperatives” were as useful as Sea Power 21’s “pillars”, as organizing tools for OPNAV N8 program planners and analysts

Criticisms (VI)

- Linkage to force levels, programs, budgets never explicit
  - The strategy did not discuss funding; but should have
  - USN 313-ship force level goal developed prior to strategy
  - Remained officially unchanged more than two years after A Cooperative Strategy was published
  - 2008-2010 USN building programs did not reflect the strategy
  - USN Jul 2008 public arguments for truncating DDG-1000 program had no roots in the strategy
- Subsequent strategy programmatic implementation little in evidence
- Strategy should have -- but did not -- lead to changes in fleet design, balance, & training
  - Some strategy drafters saw this as bad
  - Some strategy opponents saw this as good
- Navy did not use strategy to argue explicitly for increased budget share
Criticisms (VII)

- PRC not identified as a challenge but:
  - PRC capabilities implicitly figured in UNCLAS separate USN program justifications
  - PRC routinely mentioned in SECDEF, CJCS documents
- Advocacy of global maritime partnerships rang hollow beside US Senate refusal to ratify UN Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
- No reference to international law as the foundation for the strategy, especially global maritime partnerships; or of the promotion of international law as a fundamental goal of the strategy

Criticisms (VIII)

- 3 “implementation priorities” did not actually receive “priority”
  - Improve integration and interoperability
  - Enhance awareness
  - Prepare our people
- Navy actually gave priority to other initiatives, e.g.:
  - Ballistic missile defense
  - Operations & programs to counter anti-access capabilities, especially anti-submarine warfare & Air-Sea Battle operational concept
  - Maintaining combat-credible forward presence & operations in 2 hubs
  - F-35C Lightning II aircraft deployment
  - Cyber operations
- Few measures of effectiveness (MOE) pursued, & none for long
  - In any event, tried to measure effectiveness of operations, not influence of the CS 21 document per se
Criticisms (IX)

Whatever might have been its virtues in 2007, by 2010 the world and America’s place in it had so changed as to render it obsolete and in need of replacement.

- The strategy was published just as the US stock market peaked.
- No sooner was it published than global trade – the centerpiece of globalization & the world economic system – temporarily collapsed, & China began to challenge the US for dominance in the Asia-Pacific. Iran & North Korea looked more troublesome.
- Strategy assumed rising or flat US defense budgets. As of 2010, this did not seem to be the case any longer.
- If enabling the fruits of globalization through ensuring peaceful global shipping & providing maritime security is so important to the US Navy, why hasn’t it devoted significantly more resources to eradicating Somali piracy?

Influence (I)

- Immediate, strong, & continuing within US Navy
- Somewhat less influence within US Coast Guard
  - USCG inclusion cited in arguing within DHS for USCG forward operating capabilities, e.g.: new National Security Cutter
  - Contributed to new heavier USCG participation in International Seapower Symposium (ISS) & international regional naval for a
  - Facilitated dialogs between foreign states’ navies & coast guards
  - But not mentioned in US Coast Guard Commandant’s Direction 2011
- Less influence in USMC, e.g.:
  - Not cited in Marine Corps Operating Concepts (3rd ed.) (Jun 2010)
  - Informed subordinate USN command concepts, strategies, plans, briefings, operations, public affairs releases
  - Little resonance in either SECNAV Winter or SECNAV Mabus Department of the Navy secretariats

**Influence (II)**
- Ideas & vocabulary informed USN preparations for 2008-9 QRM review & 2009-10 QDR
- Reinforced an ongoing increased USN DOTMLPF focus on maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster response operations, and on international engagement
- Revived NAVWARCOL *Title X Global War Game ‘08* (Aug 2008) designed to provide strategy implementation insights
  - Subsequent annual Global War Games also linked to the strategy (Jul 2009, Oct 2010)
- Development process sparked reincarnation of old informal “Navy Study Group” as “Navy Strategy Discussion Group” (from 2008)
  - Spearheaded by CAPTs (Ret) Robby Harris (Lockheed Martin); Peter Swartz (CNA) Dick Diamond (Raytheon)
  - Included many authors & contributors to past & current Navy capstone strategy documents


**Influence (III)**
- CJCS ADM Mullen public citation & endorsement (2008)
- Influence on:
  - Joint Staff 2008 *National Military Strategy* authors
  - CSAF Gen Moseley
    - Air Staff (“Checkmate”)-drafted strategy/vision
- Much positive feedback from foreign navies
  - Salience of cooperation & defending world system themes noticed & appreciated
  - German, Canadian other navies sought to emulate USN “Conversations with the Country”
  - Open development process emulated by NATO in developing NATO *Strategic Concept* (2009-10)
Influence (IV)

- Obama Administration 2010-11 documents, especially QDR, National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy echoed CS 21 themes and ideas
  - E.g.: QDR priority objective “Prevent and deter conflict”
  - Some argued that administration adopted CS 21 concepts
  - Some argued that that had been an original CS 21 goal
  - Others argued that CS 21 had adopted think tank/academia concepts that were later brought into Obama administration
  - Others argued that it was CJCS ADM Mullen’s thinking that influenced all three documents
  - CNO ADM Roughead stated that QDR 2010 validated & confirmed tenets of CS 21
    - E.g.: Congressional testimony (Feb 2010)
  - Ideas on international system also reflected in The QDR in Perspective: The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel (Jul 2010)

Influence (V)

- Scarcely cited by USN in public debates on DDG-1000 force levels (2007-8)
- Little immediate resonance on Capitol Hill, among the American people, or in the larger national security affairs expert community
  - But congruent with views of Center for a New American Security (CNAS) analysts
  - Also congruent with views of Dr. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Director of U.S. State Department Policy Planning Staff
- Navy authors in Proceedings & elsewhere used A Cooperative Strategy as basic reference and departure point
- New emphasis on MSO & HADR not reflected in revised Surface Force Readiness Manual (2012)
Why did it have such influence? (I)

- Ideas in the strategy resonated with many political, naval & academic audiences, in US and overseas
- Concepts tracked with current USN ops & DOD & State Dept. initiatives, as well as some national security expert outside opinion
- Well-constructed & well-written document
- Visible & repeated public & internal Navy CNO ADM Mullen endorsement during development
- Visible & repeated CNO ADM Roughead public & internal Navy endorsement following publication, through 2011
- Well-publicized personal involvement by CNOs & senior flag officers in its development
- Widespread publicity before & after publication
  - But CHINFO sometimes garbled the meaning of each “core capability”

Why did it have such influence? (II)

- Development and dissemination processes exceedingly well-funded
- Involvement of many actors in its creation
  - But disappointment among some at lack of real influence
- Complex, multi-actor development process well-orchestrated by VADM Morgan
  - But also tainted for some by close association with VADM Morgan’s reputation & views
- Calculated tie-in to successful USN Maritime Strategy effort of 1980s
- Calculated tie-in to Naval War College reputation as strategy font
- Capitol Hill typically not interested in nuances of military strategy, nor in peacetime operations. Focus usually on requirements for warfighting.
  - Concerns that document did not address Navy force level, cost overrun, ship construction issues
Why did it have such influence? (III)
- USMC & USCG had their own sets of conceptual & doctrinal pubs. New maritime strategy did not fill the same need for them as for USN
- External influence limited by omnipresence of ground campaign issues in OEF & OIF in contemporary US defense policy-making
  - Navy issues remained unknown to many
  - Even when known, did not appear salient to some
- Played no formal role itself in OPNAV POM & budget development process
  - Mediated through *Navy Strategic Plans* (NSPs) & *Guidance* (NSG)
  - Unlike *The Maritime Strategy* of the 1980s
  - No annual “Strategy CPAMs,” where the strategy was discussed & debated by Sponsors and integrators alike, when kicking off each successive annual Navy POM build
- SECNAV Winter antipathy; subsequent appointment of vocal CS 21 critic Robert Work as Under Secretary of the Navy

Influence on subsequent Navy capstone documents
- Formed the conceptual basis for:
  - *Navy Strategic Guidance* (2009)
  - *NDP 1 Naval Warfare* (2010)

Influence on other Navy documents (I)

- Cited in:
  - CNO & other flag officer speeches and testimony
  - ONR Naval S & T Strategic Plans (Feb 2009 & Sep 2011)
  - Navy Arctic Roadmap (Oct 2009)
  - USN Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges (Jan 2010)
  - Navy’s Total Force Vision for the 21st Century (Jan 2010)
  - Naval Aviation Vision (Jan 2010)
  - Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2011 (Feb 2010)
  - NCIS Strategic Vision (Feb 2010)
  - US Navy Climate Change Roadmap (Apr 2010)
  - Commander Submarine Forces, Undersea Warfighting (Jul 2011)

Influence on other Navy documents (II)

- VCNO PLANORDS kicking off OPNAV POM – builds
  - Discussed in VCNO PLANORD for POM-10 as providing context & priorities to guide POM 10 investment decisions (Jan 2008)
  - Ignored in VCNO PLANORD for PR-11 (Jan 2009)
  - Mentioned in passing in VCNO PLANORD for POM-12 (Nov 2009)
  - Ignored in VCNO PLANORD for POM-13 (2010)
- Formed front matter of annual Navy Program Guide (2008-2010+)
- Influenced SECDEF-mandated Navy Campaign Support Plan (CSP)
- Core capabilities listed in OPNAV mission statement
  - OPNAVINST 5450.338, Mission, Functions, and Tasks of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Sep 2009)
Influence on other Navy documents (III)

- Cited in *US Fleet Forces Annual Plan* for 2008 & 2009
- Core capabilities outlined in Commander, US Fleet Forces Commander’s Guidance (2010)
- Discussed in COMNWDC Guide for Navy Concept Generation and Concept Development Program (ver. 1.0, 10 Feb 2010)
- Mentioned as one of many possible sources for potential Navy CONOPS topics, in COMUSFLTFORCOMINST 5401.1A, *Fleet Concept of Operations (CONOPS) Development* (Mar 2009)
- Referenced in USN-USMC-US Army Concept of Employment for Current Seabasing Capabilities (Jun 2010)
- OPNAV Instruction 3501.316B, *Policy for Baseline Composition and Basic Mission Capabilities of Major Afloat Navy and Naval Groups* (Oct 21, 2010)

Influence on other US government documents

- Cited in:
  - CJCS Risk Assessment to Congress (2008)
  - CMC operational employment concept *The Long War* (2008)
  - CMC USMC *Vision & Strategy 2025* (Jun 2008)
  - SECDEF Robert Gates *Foreign Affairs* article (Jan-Feb 2009)
  - *Coast Guard Pub 1* (May 2009)
- Not cited in revised *MCDP 1-0 Marine Corps Operations* (2011)
Overview

- Signed by CNO ADM Roughead (Nov 2007)
- A “Navy strategic plan”
- Navy-only. Not bi-service or tri-service
- Principal target: DON programmers & budgeters
- Long (76 pp) SECRET stand-alone pub
- Modest CNO Roughead personal changes to CNO ADM Mullen NSP ISO POM 10, signed just weeks before
- Cog office: OPNAV N5SC (Strategy & Concepts Branch)
- Emphasis on NSP as the strategic source document for USN POM development
Signed by:

- CNO ADM Gary Roughead
  - Signed within his first two months on the job

What it was

- New CNO ADM Roughhead’s revision of outgoing CNO ADM Mullen’s (26 Sep 2007) NSP
- Billed as a “strategic plan”
- SECRET stand-alone pub (5 Nov 2007)
- Lengthy (76 pages)
  - One page longer than CNO ADM Mullen 26 Sep edition
- Navy (vice “sea services”) focus
- Continued (but revised) biennial series initiated with NSP ISO POM 08
- Supplemented by Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11 (May 2009)
- Superseded by Navy Strategic Plan ISO PR 12 (Oct 2009)
Why it was written

- New CNO ADM Roughead desire to “make it his”
- Provide CNO ADM Roughead’s specific guidance for POM 10 development
- Principal target: DON leaders, programmers & budgeters

Context (I)

- Last years of G.W. Bush administration 2nd term (2001-9)
- US foreign trade soaring
- US economy continuing to weaken
  - U.S. government deficit spending high but decreasing
  - Oil price still soaring
- SECDEF Gates (2006-11)
- SECNAV Winter (2006-9)
- New CNO ADM Roughead (Sep 2007- Sep 2011)
- Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommended ratification of UN Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (31 Oct 2007)
Context (II)

- OEF, OIF, PSI, other operations ongoing
  - OIF US forces “surge” underway
  - Iraq Violence continues to fall off
  - Resurgence of violence in Afghanistan (from 2006)

- US government focus on heavy Army, USMC engagement in ground wars

- Maturing USN OEF & OIF contributions ashore, to relieve stress on ground forces

Context (III)

- International concerns:
  - Terrorism, China, North Korea & Iran nuclear weapons & missiles, Pakistan, Venezuela, Russia
  - North Korea agreed to disable nuclear facilities
  - Pakistani political turmoil
    - President Musharaf re-elected; former PM Bhutto returned; state of emergency declared
  - Cyber attacks on Estonian government computer systems (2007)

- Continuing terrorist threat to US homeland

- World food crisis (2007)
  - Shortages, rising prices fueled unrest in Africa, Asia, Caribbean
Context (IV)

- Stepped-up USN & coalition anti-piracy ops off Somalia
- QRM Review & 4th QDR impending
- New CNO ADM Roughead declared USN 313-ship Battle Force goal to be a “floor”
- Declining USN force levels; increasing DON annual budgets
- USN in 2007: 279 Battle Force ships; 5 new ships authorized
- Fleet Response Plan (FRP) being implemented (from 2003)
- New Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) classes under construction
  - Huge, widely-publicized cost overruns & delays
  - Navy drastically restructured program (2007)
- New San Antonio-class LPDs being built, commissioned
  - Significant, widely-publicized cost overruns, delays & construction problems

Cited references

- Same as for NSP ISO POM 10
- Added ADM Roughead CNO Guidance for 2007-2008 (CNOG)
Context: Other contemporary publications
- Same as for NSP ISO POM 10
- Earlier drafts of this briefing (2005-7)

How it was written
- Personalities: CNO ADM Roughead, VADM Morgan (N3/N5), RDML-SEL Donegan (N5SP) oversaw
- LCDR Stewart (N5SC) (had been primary AO for CNO ADM Mullen NSP ISO POM 10)
  - N5SC assists: CDR Paul Nagy, LT Brian Kawamura, Mr. Philip Ballard
- N81 input to ensure “fit” with follow-on OPNAV POM processes
- New OPNAV “Navy Adaptive Planning Process” (NAPP) getting underway
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (CH 1) (2007)

♦ Outline
  ♦ Introduction
    ♦ Purpose & role; Execution*; Vision//Mission*; Objectives; Imperatives
    ♦ * New CNO Admiral Roughead additions
  ♦ Strategic context
    ♦ Regional focus areas; Global focus areas; Wildcards; Future landscape
  ♦ POM-10 guidance
    ♦ Force planning guidance; CNO Navy mission areas; Risk guidance; Analytic guidance; Strategic initiatives
  ♦ Conclusion
  ♦ Annexes:
    ♦ Risk guidance matrix; Future naval force structure & strategic laydown; Navy shore investment strategy guidance; Navy adaptive planning process; Navy strategic plan timeline

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (Ch 1) (2007)

♦ Key ideas
  ♦ Same as NSP ISO POM 10 (2007)
  ♦ But…
    ♦ New execution guidance
    ♦ More explicit tie-ins to A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower
    ♦ Aligned objectives with CNO Roughhead CNOG for 2007-2008
    ♦ New CNO ADM Roughead specific risk guidance direction
What was new?
- Modest changes to risk guidance
- New CNO ADM Roughead execution guidance

(U) Figure 1: Implementing an Effects-Based Strategy
Subsequent analyses & critiques

- None identified

Criticisms

- Classification of document precluded wide distribution & understanding of its role in implementing *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*
- Largely reflected, rather than drove, Navy program planning
- No real way of tracking OPNAV compliance
- No follow-through to ensure tasked studies ever initiated, completed
- Not linked clearly and tightly enough to *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*
- Should have been a Navy-Marine Corps Department of the Navy plan, not Navy only
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (Ch 1) (2007)

- Influence:
  - Modest
  - "The NSP is the authoritative Navy reference for conduct and development of POM-10"
    VCNO POM-10 PLANORD (Jan 2008)
  - Cited in USFF 2008 Annual Plan
  - Cited in Office of Naval Research Naval S&T Strategic Plan (Feb 2009)
  - Used by OPNAV N81 & ONR in POM 10 development

- Why?
  - Strong & visible new CNO ADM Roughead personal involvement & endorsement
  - No monitoring or enforcement mechanism in place to ensure OPNAV use and compliance


Overview

- Full title: *Navy Strategic Guidance in support of Program Review 2011*
- Signed by CNO ADM Roughead (May 2009)
- “Navy strategic guidance”
  - Vice “Navy strategic plan,” since in support of a Program Review (PR), not a Program Objective Memorandum (POM)
- Principal targets:
  - DON officers & civilians charged with developing PR 11
- Medium-length (33 pages); SECRET
- Navy-only
- Drafted in OPNAV Strategy Branch (N5SC)
- “Forward presence is the linchpin for maritime strategy implementation”

Signed by:

- CNO ADM Gary Roughead
  - During 2nd year of his term
What it was

- Full title: *Navy Strategic Guidance ISO Program Review 2011*
- Billed as “strategic guidance”
- A “strategy-based, threat-informed document that interprets CS-21 and draft NOC-09 principles for use in Navy program development . . . consistent with NSP-10 risk guidance.
- Continued (but revised) 2-year series initiated with *NSP ISO POM 08* (Apr-May 2006)
  - Supplemented & updated 2nd (5 Nov 2007) edition of *NSP ISO POM 10*
- SECRET stand-alone pub; Navy (vice “sea services”) focus
- Moderate length: 33 pp (cf. *NSP ISO POM 10 CH 1*: 76 pp)
- Tasked by: VCNO memo on CY 08/09 Navy strategic planning (Feb 2008)
- Document signed by CNO (8 May 2009)
- (Superseded by *Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 12* (Oct 2009))

Why it was written

- To enable strategy to drive programming better
- To continue to build internal USN consensus on ideas in *A Cooperative Strategy for 1st Century Seapower*
- Why an NSG? Why a PR?
  - NSPs originally planned for 2-year cycles
    - *NSPs ISO POM 08 & POM 10*, but no *NSP/G ISO PR 09*
  - But PR 11 was special
    - Change of Administration (Jan 2009)
    - QRM review & 4th QDR prep on-going
    - NPR anticipated
  - Accordingly, an *NSG ISO PR 11* was tasked
    - To compare *NSP ISO POM 08* to actual POM 08 Budget Estimate Submission (BES) results
- CAPT Vic Addison (OPNAV N5SC) advocated *NSG*

Context (I)
- Drafted during presidential election campaign & last months of G.W. Bush (R) administration 2nd term (2008-2009)
- Document signed during 4th month of new Obama (D) Administration
- Democrats controlled both houses of Congress (2007)
- Holdover SECDEF Gates (2006-11)
- Outgoing SECNAV Winter (2006-9); Acting SECNAV B.J. Penn (Mar-May 2009)
- CNO ADM Roughhead (Sep 2007-Sep 2011)

Context (II)
- U.S. & many other economies in deep financial crisis
  - U.S government budget deficit, unemployment rate soaring
  - Price of oil at all-time high (2008), but then plummeted
  - Dow Jones Industrial Average had peaked at 14,164 in Oct 2007; had dropped to 6500 by Feb 2009.
- Collapse of global trade and output
  - Continued high growth by China, some others
  - US foreign trade plummeting
- Recent world food crisis (2007-8)
  - Shortages, rising prices had fueled unrest globally
- Unprecedented immediate aggressive large-scale US government policy response to economic crisis
  - $787 billion stimulus package signed (Feb 2009)
  - Trillion dollar Federal government annual deficit
**Context (III)**

- OEF, OIF, PSI, Continuing Promise, other operations ongoing
  - Rising Taliban insurgency, major US & coalition force level “surge” in Afghanistan
  - OIF major US “post-surge” troop withdrawals from Iraq (from Oct 2008)
  - Iraqi sectarian violence, insurgency continued to fall off

- US government focus on heavy Army, USMC engagement in ground wars
- Continuing & mature USN OEF & OIF contributions ashore, relieving stress on ground forces

**Context (IV)**

- Issues: Terrorism, China, North Korea & Iran nuclear weapons & missiles, Pakistan, Venezuela, Russia
- Continuing terrorist threat to US homeland
- Interminable international roller-coaster negotiations to disable DPRK nuclear facilities; DPRK bad faith
- Iran threatening stability of Gulf region
  - Iran put 1st domestically-made satellite into orbit (Feb 2009)
- Pakistani political turmoil stabilized
  - Newly elected civilian president (Sep 08)
  - India-Pak trade route reopened thru Kashmir (Oct 08)
  - Intensified Pakistani attacks on Taliban
- Russian military, naval, cyber attacks on Georgia; Revived Navy squadron deployments to NORLANT, Pac, Med, Caribbean & Gulf of Aden (2007-2009)
- Russia, Iran, Qatar in gas cartel discussions (2007-8)
- 3 major submarine cable-cutting incidents (2008)

Context (V)
- PRC increasing military posture opposite Taiwan, esp. IRBMs
- Continued PRC anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) R & D
- PRC-funded Gwadar port, Pakistan on Indian Ocean now operational (2008)
- New PLAN amphibious ship class introduced (2008)
- Less stridently anti-PRC KMT regime elected; improved relations (Mar 2008)
  - Opening of PRC-Taiwan air, sea, mail links (2008)
- PRC launched 1st Venezuelan satellite (Oct 2008)


Context (VI)
- US announced Taiwan arms sales, including Harpoon (Oct 2008)
- PRC protested, suspended port visits, other US military ties (Oct 2008)
- PLAN counter-piracy squadrons to Arabian Sea (from Dec 2008)
  - 1st PLAN operational deployments outside Asia since 2002
  - 3rd Chinese long-range naval expeditions since 1433
- PLAN harassed USN ocean surveillance ships USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS-23) & USNS Victorious (T-AGOS-19) in western Pacific international waters (Mar 2009)
- PLAN 60th anniversary Fleet Review (Apr 2009)
  - PLAN’s “coming out” as a modern navy
- USN CNO ADM Roughead visited PRC (Apr 2009)

Context (VII)
- India successfully tested SLBMs in Bay of Bengal (2008)
- India & US signed 2007 “123 Agreement” facilitating India’s access to civilian nuclear fuel & technology (Oct 2008)
- India launched satellite in moon orbit (Oct 2008)
- USN-Indian Navy Malabar exercise (Oct 2008)
- Major seaborne Pakistani-based Islamist terrorist assault on Mumbai, India (Nov 2008)
- India agreed to buy 8 US P-8I multi-mission maritime aircraft (Dec 2008)

Context (VIII)
- Continued highly-publicized surge in Somali pirate attacks in Gulf of Aden
  - Stepped-up international USN, coalition, NATO, EU, Russian anti-piracy deployments off Somalia (from Dec 2008)
  - CTF 151 established
  - Maersk Alabama USN counter-piracy operation success (Apr 2009)
    - Press coverage very favorable to USN

Context (IX)
- USN fleet balance in favor of Pacific (since 2007)
  - 1st CVN home-ported in Japan (2008)
- PACFLT Mid-Pacific Surface Combatant Operational Deployment Program (since 2008)
- USN force levels modestly increasing; DON annual budgets increasing
- USN in 2009: 285 Battle Force ships; 8 new ships authorized
- CNO ADM Roughead declared USN 313-ship Battle Force goal to be a “floor”
- Congress again refused to fund Navy nuclear Reliable Replacement Warhead (2008)
- Navy beginning to study follow-on SSBN
- Northrop-Grumman X-47B N-UCAS unveiled (Dec 2008)

Context (X)
- Increasing USN BMD deployment requirements: NE Asia (2004); then Persian Gulf (2008)
- Continuing USMC fire support issues
  - USN canceled ERGM development (May 2008); DDG-1000 program (Jul 2008); Joint expeditionary fires Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) (Oct 2008)
- US Supreme Court lifted lower court restrictions on USN active mid-frequency sonar training (Nov 2008)
- USN settled worldwide environmental lawsuits (Dec 2008)
- Fleet Response Plan (FRP) still being implemented, but with increasing strain on fleet
  - Last multi-CSG exercise: Valiant Shield 2007
Context (XI)

- New Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) classes under construction
  - Navy coping with cost overruns & delays
  - 1st LCS commissioned (Nov 2008)

- New San Antonio-class LPDs being built, commissioned
  - Navy coping with cost overruns, delays, construction, operational problems

- Navy Board of Inspection & Survey (INSURV) graded 2 surface combatants unfit for combat, due to poor material readiness (Apr 2008)
  - Widespread adverse publicity

Context (XII)

- Congressionally-mandated Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) under way
  - New DNS VADM Harvey formed QDR Integration Group (QIG) under RDML Burke (Apr 2008)
  - Demise of OPNAV N3/N5 “Deep Blue” (Mar 2008)

- OPNAV Navy Irregular Warfare Office (NIWO) established under N3/N5 (Jul 2008)

- OPNAV N3/N5 re-organization (Dec 2008)
  - Strategy & Concepts branch split (new N511 (Concepts) & N513 (Strategy))

- Unofficial “Navy Study Group” reconvened (from May 2008)

- NAVWARCOL revived Global War Game series (2008)

Cited references
- SECDEF Congressional testimony (Jan 2009)
- DOD FY2010 budget submission (2009)
- Draft CNO Naval Operations Concept 2009 (sic)
  - Finally published in 2010
- Various footnoted CCDR, ONI, press reports

Context: Other contemporary publications (I)
  - Recommended deployment of conventional Trident II SLBMs
  - USN commended re: nuclear mission commitment
  - USN chided for neglect of TLAM-N funding

Context: Other contemporary publications (II)
- CDI, Defense Meltdown: Pentagon Reform for the New President and Congress (Oct 2008)
  - Included Bill Lind recommendations on USN (w/ roots in 1970s)
- National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025 (Nov 2008)
- CDRJFCOM Joint Operating Environment (JOE) (Nov 2008)
- OSD, Military Power of the PRC (Mar 2009)

Context: Other contemporary publications (III)
- Unified Command Plan revision (Dec 2008)
- NSC, Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership & Action Plan (Dec 2008)
- NSPD-66/HSPD-25, Arctic Region Policy (Jan 2009)
- SECDEF Gates Foreign Affairs article (Jan-Feb 2009)
- SECDEF Gates Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report (Jan 2009)
- CJCS Chairman’s Risk Guidance
- CJCS ADM Mullen Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) (Jan 2009)
- CJCS ADM Mullen Joint Pub 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (CH 1) (Mar 2009)
- SECAF Donley & CSAF Gen Schwartz, 2008 Air Force Strategic Plan (Oct 2008)

Context: Other contemporary publications (IV)

- SECNAVINST 2052.1, *Maritime Domain awareness in the Department of the Navy* (Jan 2009)
- Seth Cropsey (Hudson Institute) articles
- CDR (Ret) Bryan McGrath on-line contributions
- Bloggers: “Galrahn” (Raymond Pritchett) et al.
- Earlier drafts of this briefing (2008-9)

How it was written (I)

- Personalities: CNO ADM Roughead, VADM Doug Crowder (N3/N5), RDML Robert Thomas (N5SP), CAPT Vic Addison (N5SC), later CAPT Mark Montgomery (N513)
- Drafted in OPNAV Strategy & Concepts branch (N5SC)
  - Lead drafter: CAPT Vic Addison, with CDR Steve Kelley (helo aviator); Ms. Kristine Schenck (civilian contractor action officer)
  - OPNAV N81 input to ensure “fit” with follow-on OPNAV POM processes
  - Common N51-N81 capability taxonomy developed
- Coordination with OPNAV QDR cell (Mr. Bryan Clark) & OPNAV N80
**Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11 (2009)**

**How it was written (II)**

- Drafting (Sep-Dec 2008)
  - N513/ N81/QDR Integration Group (QIG)
- Key stakeholder coordination (Dec 2008-Jan 2009)
  - N51SP/N81/N8F/QIG
- Flag officer coordination (Jan 2009)
  - RDML and RADM level
  - USFFC and NCCs
- Senior flag officer coordination (Jan 2009)
  - VADM level
  - N3/N5 final approval
- VADM Crowder (N3/N5) forwarded to CNO: 29 Jan 2009
  - (N513 Drafting of NSP ISO POM 12 began: Feb 2009)
- End-game editing by CAPT Mark Montgomery (N513)
  - To ensure conformity w/ OSD guidance from ongoing QDR
- Not signed by CNO, however, until 8 May 2009

**Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11 (2009)**

**How it was written (III)**

- OPNAV “Navy Strategic Planning Process” (NSPP) to inform *NSP ISO POM 12* ongoing simultaneously
- Drafting of *Naval Operations Concept (NOC) 2009* ongoing simultaneously (from Dec 2007)
- Tri-service revision of *NDP 1 Naval Warfare* ongoing simultaneously (from Oct 2008)
- Drafting of *NSP ISO POM 12* ongoing while *NSG ISO PR 11* was awaiting CNO signature
Outline

I. Introduction
- Purpose & overview
- Use of the document; & discussion

II. Strategic Context and Capability Implications
- By geographic COCOM theater
- Strategic drivers, capability guidance, & risk guidance

III. Strategic Concepts
- “Key success factors” identified in Navy Strategic Planning Process (NSPP)
- Proposed operational concepts

IV. Analytic Priorities
- Studies to ensure firm analytic basis for NSP ISO POM 12

Key ideas

- Strategy should inform programming
- Laid out SECDEF and CNO priorities
  - Used as framework the 6 strategic imperatives & 6 core capabilities
- “Forward presence is the linchpin for maritime strategy implementation”
- USN should develop new (listed) concepts for the future, including operational concepts
- USN should conduct new (listed) studies to ensure firm analytic basis for development of NSP ISO POM 12
What was new?
- Keyed to A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower
- Providing NSP-like guidance in a PR year
- Guidance for strategic and operational concept development
  - Sea basing
  - Cyber superiority
  - Global awareness
  - Space superiority
  - Naval expeditionary logistics
  - Maritime ballistic missile defense

Subsequent analyses & critiques
- None identified

Criticisms
- Classification of document precluded wide distribution & understanding of its role in implementing A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower
- Unclear extent to which Navy programmers actually conformed to the guidance
- No mechanism cited to ensure compliance with direction to develop strategic concepts and studies
- Overly influenced in drafting by OPNAV N81 & program analyses, vice strategists & strategy
- Should have been Navy-Marine Corps Department of the Navy guidance, not Navy only

- Influence:
  - Limited, re: PR-11 development
  - Very useful as “dry run” for drafting of NSP ISO POM 12
- Why?
  - Published too late in development cycle to appreciably affect PR-11 development
  - Minimal mention in VCNO PLANORD for PR-11 (Jan 2009)
  - But general agreement that process was useful, if timeliness could be improved

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Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-12 (2009)

Navy Strategic Plan
in support of Program Objective Memorandum 2012

09 October 2009

SECRET/NOFORN

...
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-12 (2009)

概述

- 由CNO ADM Roughead签署（2009年10月）
- "海军战略计划"
- 主要目标：
  - DON官员及文职人员负责制定POM-12
- 长篇（76页）秘密文件
- 海军独有
- 在OPNAV N513（策略部门）起草
- 策略导向
- 在影响POM开发之前发布
- 通过可辩、可重复及可衡量的战略规划过程开发

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-12 (2009)

签署人:

- CNO ADM Gary Roughead
  - 任期内的第二年
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-12 (2009)

What it was

- Billed as a “strategic plan”
- Continued series initiated with *NSP ISO POM 08* (2006)
- SECRET stand-alone pub
- Navy-only (vice “sea services”) focus
- Lengthy (76 pages)
  - Same length as *NSP ISO POM-10* (Ch 1)
- Tasker: VCNO PLANORD (Jan 2008)
- Signed out by CNO ADM Roughead (9 Oct 2009)
- (Superseded by *Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 13* (Oct 2010))

Why it was written

- To ensure Navy programmatic decisions were balanced, well-informed, & aligned with Navy strategic objectives
- To provide CNO strategic guidance to OPNAV on his resource allocation priorities, for OPNAV staff development of POM-12
- Specifically, to provide a benchmark reference for development of POM-12 PLANORD, Front End Assessment (FEA), and Sponsor Program Proposals (SPPs).
- To continue by-now routinized series of *Navy Strategic Plans* to guide Navy POM development
- To continue to build internal USN consensus on ideas in *A Cooperative Strategy for 1st Century Seapower*
- Tasker: VCNO PLANORD for POM-12 (Jan 2008)
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-12 (2009)

Context (I)
- Drafted during 1st 9 months of new Obama (D) Administration
- Democrat control of both houses of Congress (2007)
- SECDEF Gates (since 2006)
  - Pressure to devote more budget $ to current wars, irregular warfare
- Acting SECNAV Penn; then SECNAV Mabus (from Jun 2009)
- CNO ADM Roughead (Sep 2007-Sep 2011)

Context (II)
- U.S. & world economies starting to pull out of deep financial crisis & recession
  - U.S. government budget deficits, unemployment rate soaring
  - Price of oil plummeted, then started to rise somewhat again
  - U.S. foreign trade plummeting
- Recent world food crisis (2007-8)
  - Shortages, rising prices had fueled unrest globally
- World trade & output had plummeted
- Unprecedented immediate aggressive large-scale US gov’t policy response to economic crisis
- Trillion dollar Federal government annual deficit
Context (III)

- OEF, OIF, PSI, Continuing Promise, other operations ongoing
  - Rising Taliban insurgency, major US & coalition force level "surge," OPTEMPO increase in Afghanistan
  - Iraqi sectarian violence, insurgency continued to fall off
- US government focus on heavy Army, USMC engagement in ground wars
- Continuing & mature USN OEF & OIF contributions ashore, relieving stress on ground forces

Context (IV)

- Issues: Terrorism, China, North Korea & Iran nuclear weapons & missiles, Pakistan, Venezuela, Russia
- Continuing terrorist threat to US homeland
- Interminable international roller-coaster negotiations to disable DPRK nuclear facilities
- Iran threatening stability of Gulf region
  - Iran put 1st domestically-made satellite into orbit (Feb 2009)
  - Domestic unrest following presidential election (Jun-Aug 2009)
- Pakistani political turmoil stabilized
  - Newly elected civilian president (Sep 08)
  - India-Pak trade route reopened thru Kashmir (Oct 08)
- Russian military, naval, cyber attacks on Georgia; navy squadron deployments to Pac, Med & Caribbean (2008)
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-12 (2009)

Context (V)
- PRC increasing military posture opposite Taiwan
- Less stridently anti-PRC KMT regime elected; improved relations (2008)
- Opening of PRC-Taiwan air, sea, mail links (2008)
- US announced Taiwan arms sales, including Harpoon (Oct 2008)
- PRC protested, suspended port visits, other US military ties (Oct 2008)

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-12 (2009)

Context (VI)
- Continued PRC anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) R & D
- New PLAN amphibious ship class introduced (2008)
  - PRC launched 1st Venezuelan satellite (Oct 2008)
- PLAN counter-piracy squadrons to Arabian Sea (from Dec 2008)
  - 1st PLAN operational deployments outside Asia since 2002
  - 3rd Chinese long-range naval expeditions since 1433
- PLAN harassed USN ocean surveillance ships USNS *Impeccable* (T-AGOS-23) & USNS *Victorious* (T-AGOS-19) in western Pacific international waters (Mar, May 2009)
- PLAN 60th anniversary Fleet Review (Apr 2009)
  - PLAN’s “coming out” as a modern navy
- USN CNO ADM Roughead visited PRC (Apr 2009)
**Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-12 (2009)**

**Context (VII)**
- India successfully tested SLBMs in Bay of Bengal (2008)
- India, US signed 2007 “123 Agreement” facilitating Indian access to civilian nuclear fuel, technology (Oct 2008)
- India launched satellite in moon orbit (Oct 2008)
- USN-Indian Navy *Malabar* exercise (Oct 2008)
- Major seaborne Pakistani-based Islamist terrorist assault on Mumbai, India (Nov 2008)
- India agreed to buy 8 US P8I multi-mission maritime aircraft (Dec 2008)
- India launched 1st SSN (Jul 2009)
- DPRK renounced 1992 Inter-Korean Basic Agreement (Jan 2009)
  - Incl/ renouncing respect for Yellow Sea Northern Limit Line

**Context: (VIII)**
- Intensified USN & coalition anti-piracy ops off Somalia
  - Somali civil war, insurgencies, Ethiopian occupation, warlordism continued
  - Huge surge in number of pirate attacks in Gulf of Aden (2008)
  - UN Security Council authorized foreign navy entry into Somali waters to repress piracy & armed robbery at sea (Jun 2008)
  - NATO SNMG deployed to Somali, Gulf waters (Oct 08)
  - Somali pirates captured supertanker, held for ransom (Nov 2008)
  - International anti-pirate armada buildup off Somalia (Dec 2008)
    - USN, coalition, NATO, EU, Russian
  - COMUSNAVCENT created anti-Somali piracy CTF 151 (Jan 2009)
  - Kenya agreement to try Somali pirates captured by US naval forces (Jan 2009)
  - 1st CTF 151 USN capture of pirates (Feb 2009)
  - *Maersk Alabama* USN counter-piracy operation success (Apr 2009)
    - Press coverage very favorable to USN
Context (IX)
- Congressionally-mandated 4th Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) under way
- USN force levels modestly increasing; DON annual budgets increasing
- USN in 2009: 285 Battle Force ships; 8 new ships authorized
- CNO ADM Roughead declared USN 313-ship Battle Force goal to be a “floor”
- USN fleet balance in favor of Pacific (since 2007)
  - 1st USN CVN home-ported in Japan (2008)
- PACFLT Mid-Pacific Surface Combatant Operational Deployment Program (since 2008)
- Increasing USN BMD deployment requirements: NE Asia (2004); then Persian Gulf (2008); Eastern Med (2009)
- Expanded national requirement for sea-based BMD: Presidential announcement (Sep 2009)

Context (X)
- Navy Board of Inspection & Survey (INSURV) graded 2 surface combatants unfit for combat, due to poor material readiness (Apr 2008)
  - Widespread adverse publicity
- New Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) classes under construction
  - Navy coping with cost overruns & delays
  - 1st LCS commissioned (Nov 2008)
- New San Antonio-class LPDs being built, commissioned
  - Navy coping with cost overruns, delays, & construction & operational problems
- Congress again refused to fund Navy nuclear Reliable Replacement Warhead (2007 & 2008)
- Follow-on SSBN being studied
- Northrop-Grumman X-47B N-UCAS unveiled (Dec 2008)
Context (XI)

- Fleet Response Plan (FRP) still being implemented, but with increasing strain on fleet
  - Last multi-CSG exercise: Valiant Shield 2007
- Continuing USMC fire support issues
  - USN canceled ERGM development (May 2008); DDG-1000 program (Jul 2008); Joint expeditionary fires Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) (Oct 2008)
- US Supreme Court lifted lower court restrictions on USN active mid-frequency sonar training (Nov 2008)
- USN settled worldwide environmental lawsuits (Dec 2008)
- OPNAV Navy Irregular Warfare Office (NIWO) established under N3/N5 (Jul 2008)
- New OPNAV N3/N5 organization (Dec 2008)
  - Strategy & Concepts branch split (new N511 & N513)
- NAVWARCOL revived Global War Game series (2008)
- Unofficial Navy Study Group ongoing

Cited references

- Ongoing SECDEF Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
- SECDEF Gates Foreign Affairs article (Jan-Feb 2009)
- Numerous footnoted CCDR, CNA, ONI, press references
### Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-12 (2009)

#### Context: Other contemporary publications (I)
- DoN PR-11 *Budget Estimate Submission* (BES)
- Draft *NSG ISO PR 11* awaiting CNO signature while *NSP ISO POM 12* simultaneously being drafted
- *Naval Operations Concept 2010* draft
- *NDP 1 Naval Warfare* draft
- CDRJFCOM *Joint Operating Environment* (JOE) (Nov 2008)
- *Unified Command Plan* revision (Dec 2008)
  - USN commended re: nuclear mission commitment
  - USN chided for neglect of TLAM-N funding

#### Context: Other contemporary publications (II)
- SECDEF *Quadrennial Roles & Missions Review Report* (Jan 2009)
- CJCS *Chairman’s Risk Guidance*
- CJCS ADM Mullen *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* (CCJO) (Jan 2009)
- CJCS ADM Mullen *Joint Pub 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (CH 1) (Mar 2009)
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-12 (2009)

Context: Other contemporary publications (III)

- Col (Ret) Robert Work (CSBA), *The US Navy: Charting a Course for Tomorrow’s Fleet* (Feb 2009)
- Christine Fox, *Carrier Operations: Looking Toward the Future – Learning From the Past* (CNA) (May 2009)

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-12 (2009)

Context: Other contemporary publications (IV)

- Seth Cropsey (Hudson Institute) articles
- CDR (Ret) Bryan McGrath on-line contributions
- Earlier drafts of this briefing
How it was written (I)

Personalities: CNO ADM Roughead, VADM Crowder (N3/N5), RDML Thomas (N5SP), CAPT Montgomery (N513) oversaw

Core writing team

- N513 (lead): CDR Steve Kelley (Helo aviator; Ms Kristine Schenck (civilian contractor action officer)
- N81, N80, Navy QDR Integration Group (QIG)

Robust OPNAV & NCC stakeholder participation

Staffing rounds

- Drafting (Feb-Jul 2009)
- NSG ISO PR 11 awaiting CNO signature (Jan-May 2009)
- OPNAV & Fleet AO/Planner level coordination (Jul 2009)
- Draft capability risk guidance (Jul-Aug 2009)
- 1-star-level coordination (Aug 2009)
- 3-star level coordination (Sep 2009)
- CNO review, changes & signature (Oct 2009)

How it was written (II)

- OPNAV “Navy Strategic Planning Process” (NSPP) to inform NSP ISO POM 12 being developed simultaneously
  - But had marginal impact on NSP ISO POM 12

- Drafting of tri-service Naval Operations Concept (NOC) 2010 ongoing simultaneously (from 2008)

- Tri-service revision of NDP 1 Naval Warfare ongoing simultaneously (from Oct 2008)

- Personal attention of CNO ADM Roughead
  - Made inputs throughout, & made changes at endgame
How it was written (III)
- Built on lessons learned from previous NSP/NSG iterations (especially *NSG ISO PR 11*)
- Highly collaborative development process
  - Included cross-functional Subject Matter Expert (SME) panel day-long workshops
- Based on traceable, defendable and repeatable methodologies aligned with current Navy strategy
- Robust Fleet, NAVWARCOL & CNA participation
- Benefitted from on-going CNO “Futures” process
  - Managed for CNO by QDR Integration Group (QIG)

Outline
- Introduction
- Strategic context
- Capability risk guidance
- Analytic guidance
- Strategic concepts
- Appendices
  - Linking strategy to capabilities
  - Alternative futures planning process
  - Risk guidance matrix
  - Navy strategic planning timeline
Key ideas

- Organized according to typology in *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*
- “Capability Risk Guidance”
  - To provide strategic priorities for POM-12 build
  - Linked to “strategic drivers,” developed from Strategic Context
  - Shaped by known OSD, Joint & CNO priorities
  - 3 categories: Accept, Maintain, Reduce Risk
  - Focus on capabilities vice programs
  - Directed efforts across DOTMLPF spectrum
  - Fiscally informed

What was new?

- First *Navy Strategic Plan* to be truly based throughout on capabilities and strategic imperatives of *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* (2007)
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-12 (2009)

Criticisms
- Classification of document precluded wide distribution & understanding of its role in implementing *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*
- Only one among many OSD, joint, SECNAV, CNO & VCNO front-end guidance documents that strove to influence POM development
- Navy Strategic Planning Process (NSPP) did not impact *NSP ISO POM 12* to the extent N51 had hoped
- Not used enough by OPNAV in developing POM-12
- Should have been a Navy-Marine Corps Department of the Navy plan, not Navy only

Influence:
- Used by OPNAV N8 & other staffs in building POM-12
  - *NSP-12* priorities reflected in POM-12 Front End Assessment (FEA) & Integrated Program Assessment (IPA)
  - Resource sponsor Sponsor Program Proposals (SPPs) referenced *NSP-12*
  - Final POM-12 submission graded against *NSP-12*
- Generated internal staff controversies and debates
- Discussed in COMNWDC *Guide for Navy Concept Generation and Concept Development Program* (Ver. 1.0, 10 Feb 2010)
- A main reference in & influence on *U.S. Navy Climate Change Roadmap* (Apr 2010)
- Cited in OPNAV Instruction 3501.316B, *Policy for Baseline Composition and Basic Mission Capabilities of Major Afloat Navy and Naval Groups* (Oct 21, 2010)
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-12 (2009)

Why did it have such influence as it did?

- Timely release. Published early enough in the cycle to affect POM 12 development
- Benefitted from consensus built into collaborative drafting process
  - Stakeholder participation throughout development process
- Well-known CNO support, attention and direction
- Built on lessons learned from previous NSP iterations
- Aligned with Administration and SECDEF priorities
- Benefited from earlier socialization of CS 21 concepts
- OPNAV N3/N5 ascertained degree to which Sponsor Program Proposals (SPPs) followed NSP guidance
- But had been mentioned only minimally in VCNO PLANORD for POM 12 (Nov 2009)
  - Less than discussion of NSP ISO POM 10 in VCNO PLANORD for POM 10 (Jan 2008)

Influence on subsequent capstone documents

- Used as baseline in developing Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 13 (2010)
Naval Operations Concept (2010)

Overview

- Signed by CNO ADM Roughead, CMC Gen Conway, COMDT COGARD ADM Allen (May 2010)
- Billed as a “naval operations concept”
- Principal target: Sailors, Marines & Coastguardsmen
- Very long (102 PP) UNCLAS book; very long drafting process
- USN-USMC-USCG staff drafting participation
- USN lead drafters & overall coordinators: OPNAV N513
- To counter range of nuclear, conventional, irregular challenges
- Key ideas: Sea as maneuver space; details of 6 core capabilities identified in A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (CS 21) (2007); described “ways” Naval Service will achieve CS 21 “ends”; current operations concept (not an aspirational vision for the future); to inform development of service & joint concepts, plans, experimentation, operations
Naval Operations Concept (2010)

Signed by:
- CNO ADM Gary Roughead
  - During 3rd year of his term
- CMC Gen James Conway
- CMDT COGARD ADM Thad Allen
  - Released on his last day in office

What it was
- Billed as a “Naval Operations Concept”
- Subtitled: “Implementing the Maritime Strategy”
- “The Naval Service:” Navy, Marine Corps & Coast Guard
- Very lengthy UNCLAS book (102 pages)
  - Much longer than all previous NOCs combined:
    * 2006 NOC: 36 pp.
- Mostly a detailed, greatly-expanded treatment of the six “core capabilities” presented in A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (CS 21) in 2007
- Signed May 2010
- Superseded 2006 NOC (which CS 21 had rendered OBE)
Naval Operations Concept (2010)

Why it was written (I)

- To reinforce internal USN consensus re: ideas in *A Cooperative Strategy for 1st Century Seapower (CS 21)*
- To discuss the “ways” to carry out CS 21 “ends”
- At least three major sets of disparate, contending, successive & cumulative pressures on drafters:
  1. Define and articulate “How we fight,” for Sailors, Marines, Coast Guardsmen
     - Initially “How we fight”
     - Then “How we operate”
     - Then “How we operate & fight”
     - Then “How we prevent and prevail”
  2. Address void in USN future concept development, for joint & Navy concept & doctrine development community
  3. Explain linkages between *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* & the Navy’s force goal (the “means”), for Congress & defense policy analysts

Why it was written (II)

- To replace NOC (2006)
- Initially, to inform Navy positions for ongoing QRM review (2008-9); 4th QDR, NPR, BMDR (2009-10)
- Set scene for a revision of *Naval Doctrine Pub 1: Naval Warfare*
- Continue close cooperation among the 3 sea services
  - 1st time USCG included in a NOC
- Address some criticisms of CS 21
  - E.g.: Lack of force structure discussion; ignoring Mediterranean Sea presence; sparse treatment of seabasing concept
Naval Operations Concept (2010)

Why it was written (III)

♦ To describe how US naval forces contributed to enhancing security, preventing conflict, prevailing in war
♦ As a vehicle to align how the Naval Service thinks about -- and describes to others -- who it is, what it believes, where it operates, what it provides to the nation
♦ To “tell the Navy story” to achieve better public appreciation of the relevance of what the Naval Service provides to the nation & the international community
♦ To articulate how the Naval Service was “rebalancing its force structure to address the blue, green & brown water threats potentially posed by very capable state adversaries, as well as the maritime security & irregular littoral challenges posed by state & non-state adversaries”
♦ To remind readers that Naval Service personnel were on the ground in the long war

Naval Operations Concept (2010)

Why it was written (IV)

♦ Central service motivations & messages
  ♦ USN:
    ♦ Navy is not simply for blue water ops
  ♦ USMC:
    ♦ Marine Corps is not a second land army
  ♦ USCG:
    ♦ Coast Guard is a vital operational partner of the other armed services
♦ Promote mutual understanding between Sailors, Marines, Coast Guardsmen & joint, interagency & international partners
♦ Ultimate main target audience: Sailors, Marines, Coastguardsmen
  ♦ Unstated secondary target audience: The Congress
Naval Operations Concept (2010)

Context: (I)
- Drafting completed, document signed during 2nd year of new Obama (D) Administration
  - Successive earlier drafts during 2008 presidential election campaign, last year of G.W. Bush (R) administration 2nd term (2001-09), 1st year of Obama (D) administration (2009-10)
- Democrats controlled both houses of Congress (from 2007)
- US & world slowly pulling out of deep financial crisis & recession (from Jun 2009)
  - Oil prices rising, having plummeted from 2008 all-time peak
  - High US unemployment rate
  - U.S. foreign trade rising again
- Temporary growth fall-off of world seaborne trade (2008-9)
- Unprecedented immediate aggressive large-scale US gov’t policy response to economic crisis
- U.S. government deficit spending highest since World War II
- Rising US defense budgets, but rate of growth slowing
  - Future cuts anticipated

Context: (II)
- SECDEF Gates (since 2006)
  - Pressure to devote more budget $ to current wars, irregular warfare
  - Internal DOD “efficiencies” initiatives to cut Service overhead
- OEF & OIF continuing
  - USMC, US Army still heavily engaged on the ground
  - Rising Taliban insurgency & continuing big increase in US & coalition force levels, operations in Afghanistan (2009-10)
    - Major US, allied “surge” of ground forces to Afghanistan
    - Major increase in tempo of US, allied operations vs. Taliban
  - OIF US “surge” in Iraq turned war around (2007-8)
    - Increased US troop strength; changes in US ops & tactics
    - Plummeting US force levels in Iraq (from Oct 2008)
    - Decreased Iraqi sectarian violence & insurgency
Naval Operations Concept (2010)

Context: (III)
- Increased worldwide approval of US leadership performance
- US Senate put off voting on UN Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) ratification again, despite Senate Foreign Relations Committee Oct 07 vote to ratify (2007-8)
- Continuing terrorist threat to US homeland
- Northwest Passage north of Canada & Alaska opening
- Panama widening Panama Canal (from Jul 2007)

Naval Operations Concept (2010)

Context: (IV)
- Modest resurgence of Russian defense budgets, military deployments, exercises, overflights of USN (2007-9) (largest in 15 yrs)
  - Russian Navy Arctic seabed resources claim (Aug 2007)
  - Russian Navy squadron NORLANT, Pac, Med, Caribbean cruises (2008); Renovation of Tartus, Syria forward base
- Kosovo declared independence from Serbia (Feb 2008)
- Russian ground, air, naval, cyber forces attacked neighboring Georgia (Aug 2008)
- US-Russia New START Treaty, limiting strategic nuclear forces – including SSBNs & SLBMs – signed (Apr 2010)
  - Not yet ratified by US Senate
Naval Operations Concept (2010)

**Context: (V)**
- Buildup of Iranian Revolutionary Guard small fast naval missile combatant force
- COMUSNAVCENT public vow to keep open Strait of Hormuz (2008)
- Iranian ground & naval missile tests & publicity campaign (Jul 2008)
  - Iran put 1st domestically-made satellite into orbit (Feb 2009)
  - Domestic unrest following presidential election (Jun-Aug 2009)
- Pakistani political turmoil & internal unrest
  - Former PM Bhutto assassinated (Dec 07); President General Musharaf not re-elected (Mar 08); resigned (Aug 08); Bhutto widower Zardari elected President (Sep 08)
  - Rise in terrorist bombings within Pakistan

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Naval Operations Concept (2010)

**Context: (VI)**
- Escalating DPRK provocations
  - DPRK declared its nuclear activities (Jun 2008); then agreed to halt them (Oct 2008)
  - US dropped DPRK from list of state sponsors of terrorism
  - New ROK gov’t cooler towards DPRK (2008)
  - DPRK renounced 1992 Inter-Korean Basic Agreement (Jan 2009)
    - Incl/ renouncing respect for Yellow Sea Northern Limit Line
  - DPRK announced resumption of nuclear activities
  - ROKN interception & firing on DPRKN warship crossing Northern Limit Line (Nov 2009)
  - UN sanctions on DPRK allowing inspections at sea of ships suspected of carrying banned weapons (2009)
  - DPRK torpedo sinking of ROKN corvette (Mar 2010)
Naval Operations Concept (2010)

Context: (VII)
- Increased PRC assertiveness in South, East China Seas
- PRC increasing military posture opposite Taiwan
- Continued PRC anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) R & D
- PRC disapproved USN carrier, minesweeper Hong Kong port visits, despite brewing storm, crew family holiday arrangements (Nov 2007)
- PRC-funded Gwadar port, Pakistan on Indian Ocean operational (2008)
- Violent political unrest in Tibet region of PRC (Mar 2008)
- 2 USN CSGs deployed east of Taiwan during Taiwan elections (Mar 2008)
- Independence Party defeated in Taiwan election; less stridently anti-PRC KMT regime elected; greatly improved cross-strait economic, transport relations (from Mar 2008)
- New PLAN amphibious ship class introduced (2008)
- PRC launch of 1st Venezuelan satellite (Oct 2008)

Naval Operations Concept (2010)

Context: (VIII)
- US announced Taiwan arms sales, incl Harpoon (Oct 2008)
- PRC protested, suspended PVSTs, other US military ties (Oct 2008)
- PLAN deployment of counter-piracy squadrons to Arabian Sea -- & cooperation w/ USN -- now routine (from Dec 2008)
- PLAN harassed USN ocean surveillance ships USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS-23) & USNS Victorious (T-AGOS-19) in western Pacific international waters (Mar, May 2009)
- PLAN 60th anniversary Fleet Review (Apr 2009)
  - PLAN’ s “coming out” as a modern navy
- USN CNO ADM Roughead visited PRC (Apr 2009)
- PRC protested US arms sales to Taiwan, cut US military ties (from Jan 2010)
- Continued China Coast Guard-USCG cooperation re: port security, fisheries enforcement, safety at sea, search & rescue
Naval Operations Concept (2010)

Context: (IX)
- India successfully tested SLBMs in Bay of Bengal (2008)
- India launched satellite in moon orbit (Oct 2008)
- Annual USN-Indian Navy *Malabar* exercises
- India-US signed 2007 “123 Agreement” facilitating India’s access to civilian nuclear fuel & technology (Oct 2008)
- Seaborne terrorist assault on Mumbai, India (Nov 2008)
- India agreed to buy 8 US P-8I multi-mission maritime aircraft (Dec 2008)
- India launched 1st SSN (Jul 2009)
- Global weapons innovation & proliferation among state and non-state actors

Naval Operations Concept (2010)

Context: (X)
- DoD “Long War”, Global War on Terror, partnership, MDA, SSTRO, COIN concepts predominate, in vogue.
  - But increasing DoD appreciation for high-end anti-access/area denial challenges beyond current fight (2010)
- Increased DoD attention to integration within US Diplomatic-Information-Military-Economic (DIME) policy, capabilities, ops
- Heavy USN, coalition MSO & HA/DR ops in Arabian Sea, Caribbean, SE Asia, African littoral, Haiti, etc.
- Also Noble Eagle, Active Endeavor, JTF GITMO, CJTF HOA, OEF Philippines, PSI
- Unfulfilled USN DR Bay of Bengal operation in wake of Myanmar cyclone (Jun 2008)
- Communist Cuba turned down unprecedented US humanitarian assistance offer in wake of two hurricanes (Sep 2008)
Naval Operations Concept (2010)

Context: (XI)

- Combatant commanders requesting US naval capabilities in both landward and seaward portions of their littorals
- OEF, OIF demands tempered “transformation” & global “capabilities-based” defense planning policies
  - Especially by USA & USMC
  - Increased search for specific threat-based solutions, e.g.: specific anti-IED, cultural & linguistic capabilities
  - Need to increase “boots on the ground” troop strength, as well as all services’ precision strike & information capabilities
  - US “surge” & new tactics reduced level of sectarian violence in Iraq, allowing continued major US drawdown
  - US “surge” of forces in Afghanistan (2009-10)
- Response to Haiti earthquake highlighted Naval Service disaster response roles (Jan 2010)

Naval Operations Concept (2010)

Context: (XII)

- USN force levels increasing
- DON annual budgets increasing, but future cuts anticipated, as supplemental Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding dries up
- 288 USN Battle Force ships in 2010; 7 new ships authorized
- USN fleet balance in favor of Pacific (since 2007)
  - 1st CVN home-ported in Japan (2008)
- Fleet Response Plan (FRP) still being implemented, but with increasing strain on fleet
  - Last multi-CSG exercise: Valiant Shield 2007
- PACFLT Mid-Pacific Surface Combatant Operational Deployment Program (since 2008)
- Africa Partnership Station (APS) ongoing. Included overt SSN ops. Planning for future GFS deployments
- USN NRL VXS-1 NP-3D flew 40 geological assessment missions over Afghanistan (2006)
Naval Operations Concept (2010)

Context: (XIII)
- Intensified USN & coalition anti-piracy ops off Somalia
  - Somali civil war, insurgencies, Ethiopian occupation, warlordism continued
  - Surge in number of pirate attacks in Gulf of Aden (2008)
  - International anti-pirate armada buildup off Somalia (Dec 2008)
  - Active USN-sponsored anti-piracy coalition CTF 151
  - Pirates shifted op areas, began to deploy mother ships (2009-2010)
- 3 major submarine cable-cutting incidents (2008)

Naval Operations Concept (2010)

Context: (XIV)
- USN redeployed Med sub tender to Pacific (2007)
- 5 USN CSGs deployed forward simultaneously (Spring 2008)
- 4th Fleet re-established (Apr 2008)
- AFRICOM & NAVFORAFRICA established (Oct 2008)
- Mercy, Peleliu humanitarian civil assistance (HCA) deployments; Operation Sea Angel II (2007)
- Increasing USN BMD deployment requirements: NE Asia (2004); then Persian Gulf (2008); Eastern Med (2009)
- Expanded national requirement for sea-based BMD: Presidential announcement (Sep 2009)
- Close USN-French Navy carrier & aircraft training cooperation
- Fleet-wide MOC implementation
- New USN PERSTEMPO Program (Jan 2007)
Naval Operations Concept (2010)

Context: (XV)
- New Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) classes being built, commissioned, deployed
  - Navy coping with cost overruns & delays
  - 1st two LCSs commissioned (Nov 2008 & 2010)
  - 1st LCS deployed (2010)
- New San Antonio-class LPDs being built, commissioned, deployed
  - Navy coping with cost overruns, delays, construction & operational problems
- USN SM-3 shoot-down of errant satellite (Feb 08)
- Follow-on SSBN being developed
- Northrop-Grumman X-47B N-UCAS unveiled (Dec 2008)

Context: (XVI)
- USN Georgia Black Sea HA ops (from Aug 2008)
- USN-USMC differences re: operational command relationships, especially in the Pacific
- USN canceled ERGM development (May 2008); truncated DDG-1000 program (Jul 2008); Cancelled Joint Expeditionary Fires Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) (Oct 2008); canceled MPF(F) (2010)
- USCG MFPU escorted USN SSBN port transits (from 2007)
- NECC elements often operating far from maritime environment, but increasingly integrated into fleet JTFEXs (2008)
- SECDEF-mandated USN-USAF-USMC Air-Sea Battle operational concept development effort (2009-10)
- Degraded USN surface force readiness identified, addressed
  - “Balisle Report” (Feb) 2010 & subsequent corrective actions
Naval Operations Concept (2010)

**Context: (XVII)**

- NSC Deputies Committee approved interagency Global Maritime Partnerships (GMP) program, under OSD(P) oversight with USN core support (2008)
- 1st USN Global Maritime Engagement Synchronization Conference (Feb 2008)
  - Deployment scheduling for FY 2010
  - Proactive vice reactive MSO/HCA ops
- Robust USN “Individual Augmentee” (IA) program continued, became more formalized
- Continued USN presence at highest command levels
  - ADM Mullen as CJCS (2007-11)
  - VADM McRaven as COMJSOC
  - ADM Stavridis as CDRUSSOUTHCOM, then SACEUR/CDRUSEUCOM
  - ADM Olson as CDRUSSOCOM (2007-11)
  - ADM Winnefeld as CDRUSNORTHCOM
  - Continued Navy flag officer “lock” on CDRUSPACOM billet
  - But ADM Fallon resigned as CDRUSCENTCOM (Mar 2008)

Naval Operations Concept (2010)

**Context: (XVIII)**

- VADM John Morgan relieved by VADM Doug Crowder as OPNAV N3/N5 (Aug 2008), then VADM Bruce Clingan (Dec 2009)
  - Morgan retired; had held position since 2004
  - During 2008, focused on “Conversations with the Country” (& overseas) & impending retirement (Jun 2008)
  - N3/N5B RADM Pete Daly acting N3/N5 for much of 2008 (thru Aug)
- OPNAV N3/N5 reorganized (Dec 2008)
  - Strategy & Concepts branches split (new N511 & N513)
- Ongoing total rewrite and update of OPNAVINST 3501.316A Policy for Composition and Mission Capabilities of Strike Forces, Strike Groups, and Other Major Deployable Elements (Sep 06, 2007)
Naval Operations Concept (2010)

Context: (XIX)

- Congressionally-mandated Quadrennial Roles & Missions Review (QRM) & 4th Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) under way during early drafting (2009)
- New OPNAV DNS VADM Harvey formed OPNAV QDR Integration Group (QIG) under RDML Burke (Apr 2008)
  - Demise of OPNAV N3/N5 “Deep Blue” (Mar 2008)
  - OPNAV QIG “joined at the hip” with counterpart USMC effort under BGen Schmidle
    - Exemplary USN-USMC relationship
  - OPNAV QIG later became core of new OPNAV Naval Warfare Integration Group (N00X) (Oct 2009)

Naval Operations Concept (2010)

Context: (XX)

- USN, joint concept generation & development changes
  - Updated mandates to OPNAV/FFC/NWDC/NWC (Jun 2008)
  - New CJCS Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) (Jan 2009)
  - New CDRJFCOM Joint Operations Environment (JOE) (Mar 2010)
- CDRJFCOM Gen Mattis USMC decreed “Effects-Based Operations” and “Operational Net Assessment” concepts no longer to be used in JFCOM operations & products (Aug 2008)
Naval Operations Concept (2010)

Context: (XXI)
- USN Battle Force goal: 313-ship “floor”
- OPNAV NSPP under way, to influence NSPs
- OPNAV Navy Irregular Warfare Office (NIWO) established (Jul 2008)
- Naval War College UNCLAS multinational Title X “Global” War Games (Aug 2008, 2009)
  - Explored possible alternative futures & executions of A Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century
  - Players included NOC 2010 drafters
- US Supreme Court lifted lower court restrictions on USN active mid-frequency sonar training (Nov 2008)
- USN settled worldwide environmental lawsuits (Dec 2008)
- Congress again refused to fund Navy nuclear Reliable Replacement Warhead (2007 & 2008)

Naval Operations Concept (2010)

Context: (XXII)
- Unofficial monthly Washington-area “Navy Strategy Discussion Group” ongoing (since May 2008)
- Views expressed from outside Navy that Navy is too entangled in joint concepts and strategies
  - Former DUSN Seth Cropsey, Hudson Institute
  - CDR Bryan McGrath (Ret), Delex Systems
  - Dr. Dan Goure, Lexington Institute
Naval Operations Concept (2010)

♦ Context: (XXIII)
  ♦ Polled Americans rated USN as least important & least prestigious of 4 DoD services (2004-8)
  ♦ Some bad publicity
    ♦ Public, Congressional, Pentagon angst re: USN surface combatant shipbuilding requirements, oversight
    ♦ Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) construction overruns & delays (from Apr 2007)
    ♦ Zumwalt-class DDG-1000 program truncated (from Jul 2008)
    ♦ USS George Washington (CVN-73) fire (May 2008)
    ♦ USS Houston (SSN-713) radiation leak (through Jul 2008)
    ♦ Popular concerns re: USN sonar & marine mammals
    ♦ LATAM leftist leaders seized on 4th Fleet creation to whip up domestic fears of American imperialism & aggression (2008)
    ♦ Somalia piracy issues made USN appear toothless to some
    ♦ Resignation of COMUSCENTCOM ADM Fallon (Mar 2008)
    ♦ Surface force readiness problems (2008-10)

Naval Operations Concept (2010)

♦ Cited references (I)
  ♦ *National Security Strategy*
  ♦ *National Strategy for Maritime Security (2005)*
  ♦ *Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) Plan (2006)*
  ♦ SECDEF Gates, *National Defense Strategy*
  ♦ *Unified Command Plan (UCP)*
  ♦ *Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF)*
  ♦ *Guidance for Development of the Force (GDF)*
  ♦ *Global Force Management Guidance (GFMG)*
  ♦ *Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)*
Cited references (II)

- *National Military Strategy*
- *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)*
- *Joint Operational Concepts (JOpsC)*
- *Joint Operations Concepts Development Process*
- *Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System*
- DEPCFFC VADM Williams, *Global Fleet Station Concept of Operations (GFS CONOPS)* (2008)
- Numerous other publications cited in tables & footnotes

Cited references (III)

- CJCS ADM Mullen, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO)* (2009)
- CS 21 had greatest influence on *NOC 2010*
Naval Operations Concept (2010)

Context: Other contemporary publications (I)

- NSC, Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership & Action Plan (Dec 2008)
- UN Security Council resolutions on Somali piracy (2008)
- National Intelligence Council (NIC), Global Trends 2025 (Nov 2008)
- NSPD 66/ HSPD 25, Arctic Region Policy (Jan 2009)

Naval Operations Concept (2010)

Context: Other contemporary publications (II)

- OSD, Military Power of the PRC (Mar 2009)
- USDPh Flournoy, DODINST 3000.05, Stability Operations (Sep 2009)
- CJCS ADM Mullen, CJCS Guidance for 2009-10 (Dec 2009)
- SECDEF Gates, Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) report (Feb 2010)
- SECDEF Gates speech to Navy League of the United States “Sea Air Space Symposium” (3 May 2010)
Naval Operations Concept (2010)

Context: Other contemporary publications (III)

- OSD/USTRANSCOM, DOD Mobility & Requirements Study 2016 (Feb 2010)
- CJCS Chairman’s Risk Guidance
- CJCS ADM Mullen, Change 1 to Joint Pub 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (Mar 2009)
- COMUSJFCOM, Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2010 (Feb 2010)

Naval Operations Concept (2010)

Context: Other contemporary publications (IV)

- SECNAVINST 2052.1, Maritime Domain Awareness in the Department of the Navy (Jan 2009)
- OPNAVINST 3000.13C, Personnel Tempo of Operations Program (Jan 2007)
- OPNAVINST 3000.15, Fleet Response Plan (Aug 2007)
- OPNAVINST 3501.316A, Policy for Composition and Mission Capabilities of Strike Forces, Strike Groups, and Other Major Deployable Elements (Sep 06, 2007)
- OPNAVINST 5401.9, Navy Concept Generation and Concept Development Program (Feb 2010)
- NTTP 3-07.15, Navy Component Commander Support to Theater Security Cooperation (Feb 2010)
Naval Operations Concept (2010)

- Context: Other contemporary publications (V)
  - CNO U.S. Navy Language Skills, Regional Expertise and Cultural Awareness (LREC) Strategy (Jan 2008)
  - Navy Ethos (Nov 2008)
  - CNO Guidance for 2010: Executing the Maritime Strategy (Sep 2009)
  - USN Task Force Climate Change, US Navy Arctic Roadmap (Oct 2009)
  - Director, Warfare Integration (OPNAV N8F), Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2011 (Feb 2010)
  - USN Task Force Climate Change, US Navy Climate Change Roadmap (Apr 2010)

- Context: Other contemporary publications (VI)
  - CFFC Report: Maritime Headquarters with Maritime Operations Centers: An Enabling Concept for Maritime Command and Control (Sep 2007)
Naval Operations Concept (2010)

Context: Other contemporary publications (VII)

- USMC operational employment concept *The Long War: Send in the Marines* (Jan 2008)
- USMC *Vision & Strategy 2025* (Jun 2008)
- USMC *Expeditionary Maneuver from the Sea* capstone operational concept (Jun 2008)

Naval Operations Concept (2010)

Context: Other contemporary publications (VIII)

- MCCDC supporting concept papers
  - *Evolving the MAGTF for the 21st Century* (Mar 2009)
  - *Seabasing for the Range of Military Operations* (Mar 2009)
  - Developed within USMC at same time as *NOC 2010*
Naval Operations Concept (2010)

♦ Context: Other contemporary publications (IX)
  ♦ DHS Small Vessel Security Strategy (Apr 2008)
  ♦ COMDT COGARD ADM Allen, Coast Guard Publication 1: U.S. Coast Guard: America’s Maritime Guardian (May 2009)

Naval Operations Concept (2010)

♦ Context: Other contemporary publications (X)
  ♦ USAF Countersea Operations AFDD 2-1.4 (2005)
  ♦ SECAF Donley & CSAF Gen Schwartz, 2008 Air Force Strategic Plan (Oct 2008)
  ♦ COMNWDC & USAF Commander, Lemay Center, AOMSW: Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Air Operations in Maritime Surface Warfare NTTP 3-20.8/ AFTTP(I) 3-2.74 (Nov 2008)
  ♦ Navy-Air Force-Marine Corps Air-Sea Battle operational concept (under development 2009-10)
Naval Operations Concept (2010)

♦ Context: Other contemporary publications (XI)
  ♦ NATO Strategic Concept (under development 2009-10)
  ♦ NATO Maritime Security Operations (MSO) concept (under development 2009-10)
  ♦ NATO Alliance Maritime Strategy (AMS) (under development 2009-10)
  ♦ NATO AJP 3.1 Allied Joint Maritime Operations (Change 1) (Jan 2008)
  ♦ Drafting in progress: Revisions to Chairman’s Risk Assessment (CRA), Unified Command Plan (UCP), National Military Strategy (NMF), Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF)

Naval Operations Concept (2010)

♦ Context: Other contemporary publications (XII)
  ♦ LtCol (Ret) Frank Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars (CETO) (Dec 2007)
  ♦ National Academy of Sciences Naval Studies Board reports
    ♦ U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike (2008)
      ♦ Recommended deployment of conventional Trident II SLBMs
    ♦ The Role of Naval Forces in the Global War on Terror (2007)
  ♦ Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, America’s Strategic Posture (May 2009)
Naval Operations Concept (2010)

Context: Other contemporary publications (XIII)

- Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) reports
  - Charting a Course for Tomorrow’s Fleet (2009)
  - Why AirSea Battle? (Feb 2010)

Naval Operations Concept (2010)

Context: Other contemporary publications (XIV)

- Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) studies
  - W. Eugene Cobble, Henry H. Gaffney & Dmitry Gorenberg, For the Record: All U.S. Forces’ Responses to Situations, 1970-2000 (CNA) (Jun 2003); & updates to same
  - NWDC & USN concept development study (2007)
  - USN humanitarian assistance, engagement ops studies (2008)
  - Deterrence & Influence: The Navy’s Role in Preventing War (Mar 2009)
  - Christine Fox, Carrier Operations: Looking Toward the Future – Learning From the Past (CNA) (May 2009)
  - Daniel Whiteneck, Neil Jenkins, Michael Price, Peter Swartz, Navy at a Tipping Point: Maritime Dominance at Stake? (CNA) (Mar 2010)
Naval Operations Concept (2010)

Context: Other contemporary publications (XV)

- Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey) faculty-led studies

Naval Operations Concept (2010)

Context: Other contemporary publications (XVI)

- Seth Cropsey (Hudson Institute) articles
- CDR (Ret) Bryan McGrath on-line contributions
- Bloggers: “Galrahn” (Raymond Pritchett) et al.
- Earlier drafts of this briefing
Naval Operations Concept (2010)

How it was written (I)
- Lengthy gestation period (2 ½ -years) punctuated by periodic delays
- Delays due to:
  - Evolving document objectives and target audiences
  - Inter-service coordination on many issues needed at many levels
  - Internal service process issues (e.g.: Timing vis-à-vis OPNAV POM development Force Structure Assessment (FSA) (2008))
  - Changing views as to whether to include force level numbers and if so, what they should be (2008-9)
  - Change of presidential administrations & administration concepts and reference documents (2008-10)
    - Especially: Timing of NOC release in relation to Obama administration QDR timing
  - Some specific issues required lengthy staffing:
    - Navy-Marine Corps command & control
    - Battle Force ship numbers, especially amphibious ships
- Most delays on Navy side, not USMC or USCG

How it was written (II)
- New CNO Roughead tasked in CNO Guidance (CNOG), Oct 2007
- Development began Dec 2007; drafting began Feb 2008
- VADM Morgan (OPNAV N3/N5) & LtGen Amos (DC, CD&I/CG, MCCDC) initially conceived & oversaw
- Complex development processes
  - Writing Team, Core Working Group, Extended Working Group; routine OPNAV SITREPs to GO/FOs, Flag VTCs, etc.
  - Flag Maritime Security Conference (MSC) precept developed & adopted
  - Initial discussion series: USMC War Game “Expeditionary Warrior 2008: Seabasing” (as a drafting venue); Flag officer discussions; CNO-CMC-COMDT CG discussions
Naval Operations Concept (2010)

How it was written (III)

- Wide circulation of 10 formal drafts for comment
  - 2008: Drafts 1-5
  - 2009: Drafts 6-8
  - 2010: Drafts 9-11 (11 = publication)
- Dozens of iterative interim drafts
  - E.g.: “ver. 9.4.1.1”

How it was written (IV)

- Navy overseers & coordinators:
  - N3/N5 VADM John Morgan; then N3B/N5B RADM Peter Daly (Jan 2008); then VADM Doug Crowder (Aug 2008); then VADM Bruce Clingan (Dec 2009)
  - N5SP/N51 RDML Kevin Donegan; then RDML Robert Thomas (Jul 2008); then RDML David Woods (Jan 2010)
- Drivers & drafters:
  - USN: RDML-SEL Doug Venlet (N5SC); LCDR Mike Mosbruger, Mr. Philip Ballard; At end-game: Driver & editor: CAPT Mark Montgomery; Coordinator & drafter: CAPT John McLain
  - USMC: Maj Hollis, Maj Maria McMillen (SIG), LtCol (Ret) John Berry, Col (Ret) Bob Dobson. Col (Ret) Doug King
  - USCG: CAPT (Ret) Tim Teriberry; then CDR Mike Balding, LCDR Ben Strickland
Naval Operations Concept (2010)

How it was written (V)

- Successive & additive drafting guidance over time
  - Targeting Sailors, Marines & Coastguardsmen: How to fight
  - Targeting the joint & Navy concept development community: How naval long-range concepts were generated & developed
  - Ultimate resolution: 2-page Annex
  - Targeting Congress: Why USN needed 313 ships
    - Ultimate resolution: Chapter on “Future Force Structure,” describing most naval forces. No numbers.

- Continued CNO ADM Roughead interest, focus, guidance, involvement throughout

How it was written (VI)

- Continuous CFFC & COMPACFLT staff contributions; good OPNAV-FFC-PACFLT staff relationships during drafting, despite some contentious issues
  - FFC staff contributor: CAPT (ret) Chris Melhuish
  - PACFLT staff contributor: CDR (ret) Sue Merdinger

- Then-current draft discussed at Naval War College Global ’08 Title X War Game (4-8 Aug 2008)

  - But little impact on NOC draft
Naval Operations Concept (2010)

How it was written (VII)

- Service chiefs’ decision not to include specific force level goal ship numbers (Apr 2009)
  - To be included instead in separate new USN force structure plan, awaiting completion of ongoing QDR-directed warfighting campaign scenarios development

- CNA analysts “murder board” of current draft (Dec 2009)

- Numerous Navy leadership public comments & interviews on imminence and/or content of the NOC (2007-10)
  - Duly reported in the trade press

Naval Operations Concept (2010)

How it was written (VIII)

- Cross-walking with other capstone documents
  - *Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11* drafted & signed during NOC gestation (Sep 2008-May 2009)
  - *Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 12* drafted & signed during NOC gestation (May-Oct 2009)
  - *Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 13* drafted during NOC endgame (Apr-May 2010)
  - *NDP 1 Naval Warfare* revision drafting ongoing during NOC 2010 gestation (from Oct 2008)
  - *NWP 3-32 Maritime Operations at the Operational Level of War* (Change 1) being drafted (Published Aug 2010)
Naval Operations Concept (2010)

♦ How it was written (IX)

♦ Home stretch: Spring 2010
  - New N3/N5 VADM Bruce Clingan; new N51 RDML David Woods
  - Obama Administration QDR, PPR, BMDR reports, FY 2011 budget request, 30-year shipbuilding plan published
  - NSS, NDS, NMS, GEF, UCP, DPPG, Navy Climate Change Roadmap, NSP ISO POM 13 being drafted concurrently
  - Two-star review (Jan 2010)
  - 3 & 4-star review (Jan 2010)
  - CNA “greybeards” roundtable on NOC content & purpose (Jan 2010)
  - CNO Executive Board (CEB) review (Feb 2010)
  - International reviewers (naval attaches), as directed by CNO

♦ How it was written (X)

♦ End-game: Spring 2010
  - Extensive personal final inserts & rewrites by VADM Clingan (N3/N5)
  - OPNAV N513 developed detailed strategic communications plan for NOC rollout
  - NDP 1 Naval Warfare release delayed, to follow NOC publication
  - Signed & released (May 2010)
    • Document released on signatory COMDT COGARD ADM Allen’s last day in office
Naval Operations Concept (2010)

**Outline**
- Introduction
- The Naval Service
- The overarching concept: The sea as maneuver space
- Forward Presence
- Maritime security
- Humanitarian assistance & disaster response
- Sea control
- Power projection
- Deterrence
- Future force structure
- Relationship of Naval Operations Concept 2010 to joint concept development and experimentation

Naval Operations Concept (2010)

**Key ideas (I)**
- The three U.S. “sea services” – the Naval Service – agree on a fundamental approach to operations
- To counter “a broad range of nuclear, conventional and irregular challenges.”
- “state and non-state adversaries are likely to employ a hybrid of conventional & irregular methods to counter the US’s advantage in conventional military operations”
- Introduced “the sea as maneuver space” as their overarching concept
  - “Mobility and maneuverability constitute the Naval Service’s primary operational attributes”
- Global system & globalization are important influences
  - But less stress than in A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower
Key ideas (II)

  - Provides background, context, summary and “central idea” for each
- Repeated other CS 21 concepts, for emphasis
- Described the “ways” in which the Naval Service will achieve the “ends” outlined in CS 21
- Used *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* ideas and construct, but more focus on USN power projection & overcoming opposing area denial & anti-access capabilities.
- Described a current operations concept; not a vision for the future. (Not “aspirational,” as was NOC 2006)

Key ideas (III)

- To inform development of service and joint concepts, plans, experimentation and operations
- “Surge” operations specifically defined and referred to positively throughout the document
- Introduced “Expeditionary Strike Force” (ESF) force package:
  - 17 amphibious ships ISO one MEB Assault Echelon (AE)
  - 1 or more Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs)
  - (Reminiscent of short-lived Naval Expeditionary Force (NEF) concept of early 1992-4)
- Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) (but not Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESGs)) also described
- Navy “core values” mentioned
What was new?

- CMDT COGARD signature on what was now a tri-service document and concept
  - Previous NOCs were either USN-only or USN-USMC
- Lengthy.
  - Previous NOCs had comprised 8, 23, 36 pages
- Term “Naval Service,” encompassing USN, USMC & USCG
- First mention of convoy operations since 1994
Naval Operations Concept (2010)

- Not addressed
  - Specific threatening countries or non-state actors
  - Specific numbers of ships and aircraft required to carry out CS 21 and NOC 2010
  - The Navy’s (considerable) sealift & prepositioning forces to enable & support U.S. Army power projection
  - U.S. Army (barely mentioned, in passing)
  - U.S. Air Force (not mentioned at all)
  - Sustained operations inland
  - Blockades
  - USMC tactical aircraft as part of naval strike capabilities

Naval Operations Concept (2010)

- Subsequent analyses & critiques
  - DOD Bloggers Roundtable (2 Jun 2010)
  - Milan Vego, “AirSea Battle Must Not Work Alone” (US Naval Institute Proceedings (Jul 2011)
  - Lt Col John Berry USMC (Ret), “Comment & Discussion” (US Naval Institute Proceedings (Sep 2011)
Naval Operations Concept (2010)

Criticisms (I)

- Took way too long to publish following Oct 2007 *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*
  - This allowed unjustified criticism of *A Cooperative Strategy* -- for not discussing “ways” as well as “ends” -- to flourish
  - Not “Navy” enough.
    - Reflected heavy USMC (& USCG) influence on USN thinking, alongside USMC 2007-10 publication of its own single-service family of concept documents
    - Navy should have written it’s own single-service NOC.
  - Conversely, some saw the NOC as not “naval” enough – a listing of elements from three stovepipes rather than a truly integrated concept
  - Should have included “means” -- specific numbers of ships & aircraft required to carry out CS 21 & NOC 2010
  - Should have discussed risks and trade-offs among means

Criticisms (II)

- Too simplistic & obvious
  - “Doctrinal,” not “conceptual,” and therefore superfluous, given simultaneous NWDC revision of *NDP-1*. Should have been visionary and future-oriented, leaving *NDP 1* to deal with “Who we are & how we fight” today
- Not joint enough; not enough on relationships with US Army & US Air Force
  - Army barely mentioned. USN sealift, afloat prepositioning and JLOTS support for the Army not discussed
  - Air Force not mentioned at all, although USAF aerial refueling and ISR support is implied
  - No mention of concurrent ongoing USN-USAF-USMC Air-Sea Battle operational concept development
Naval Operations Concept (2010)

Criticisms (III)

- Did not use *Seapower 21* constructs or vocabulary, despite continued current use in OPNAV and elsewhere.
- Not sufficiently focused on the “current fight.” No mention of sustained operations inland, despite USMC & USN ongoing participation in such ops in OIF & OEF.
- USN does not routinely maintain 3 CVNs “forward deployed,” as NOC states.
  - Deployed: Yes. Forward deployed: No.

Naval Operations Concept (2010)

Criticisms (IV)

- Disagreements on NOC treatment of “sea control”.
- Little actual effect or influence. Not enough follow-through: Little publicity, use in flag officer speeches, etc.
- No real attempt to measure effects or effectiveness.
- Minimal influence on actual Navy operational doctrine.
  - No mention in NWP 3-32 *Maritime Operations at the Operational Level of War* (Change 1 Aug 2010).
Naval Operations Concept (2010)

Influence

- Reinforced ongoing increased USN DOTMLPF focus on maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster response operations, international engagement
- Preliminary drafts influenced many efforts (2008-10)
  - N3IO Cyberspace strategy
  - N11F Navy Integrated Information Framework
  - NCIS Strategic Vision (2010)
  - Chiefs of European navies (CHENs) discussions
- Modest influence in USMC
  - No mention in Marine Corps Operating Concepts (3rd ed.) (Jun 2010), which was being drafted simultaneously

Why did it have the influence it did?

- Good initial name recognition: Development had been well-advertised in the defense trade press
- But little mention in Navy leadership speeches, testimony or elsewhere following publication
- Lived off and reinforced the influence of A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower
- But overshadowed by A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower
- USMC already had a full family of concept & doctrine publications
Naval Operations Concept (2010)

- Influence on subsequent capstone documents
  - Successive early drafts influenced
    - *Navy Strategic Guidance In Support of PR 11* (2009)
    - *Navy Strategic Plan in support of POM 12* (2009)
    - *Naval Doctrine Pub 1* revision (2010)
  - Final document influenced:
    - *Navy Strategic Plan in support of POM 13* (2010)

Naval Operations Concept (2010)

- Influence on other Navy documents
  - Discussed in COMNWDC *Guide for Navy Concept Generation and Concept Development Program* (Ver. 1.0, 10 Feb 2010)
  - Influenced SECDEF-mandated *Navy Campaign Support Plan* (CSP)
  - Cited in OPNAV Instruction 3501.316B, *Policy for Baseline Composition and Basic Mission Capabilities of Major Afloat Navy and Naval Groups* (Oct 21, 2010)
  - Cited in Office of Naval Research *Naval S&T Strategic Plan* (Sep 2011)
  - Cited in revised *MCDP 1-0 Marine Corps Operations* (2011)
Overview

- Signed by CNO ADM Roughead, CMC Gen Conway, COMDT COGARD ADM Allen (Aug 2010)
- Billed as “doctrine.” Principal targets:
  - Sailors, Marines, Coastguardsmen, Naval Service civilians
  - Also senior US government & NGO civilian & military leaders
- Lengthy (54 pp.) UNCLAS book; very long drafting process
- USN-USMC-USCG staff drafting participation
- Navy drafting responsibility & overall coordination: Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC)
- To bridge joint policy & doctrine & detailed service TTP
- Key ideas: Levels of war; Operational art; range of military operations; 6 core capabilities; campaign phases; global maritime partnerships; maritime domain awareness; tied to *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*
NDP 1 Naval Warfare (2010)

Signed by:

- CNO ADM Gary Roughead
  - At end of 3rd year of his term (Aug 2010)
- CMC Gen James Conway
  - Just before the end of his term (Jul 2010)
- CMDT COGARD ADM Thad Allen
  - At the end of his term of office (May 2010)

What it was

- Billed as “doctrine”
- UNCLAS stand-alone pub
- “Sea services” focus: USN, USMC, USCG
- Superseded 1st NDP-1 Naval Warfare (Mar 1994)
  - Also superseded NDP-2, NDP-4, NDP-5, NDP-6
  - Took 16 years to update
  - Lengthy (54 pgs)
    - 1994 edition had had 76 pages; NOC 2010 had 102 pages
  - Same format as 1994 edition
    - But dropped final chapter (“Where We Are Headed: Into the 21st Century”)
- Signed by 3 services chiefs (Mar-Aug 2010)
  - 1994 edition had only been signed by CNO and CMC
**NDP 1 Naval Warfare (2010)**

- Why it was written
  - Other services, allies requests for USN doctrine update
  - To meet need for “how we fight” document aimed at Sailors, Marines, Coastguardsmen
  - To reinforce internal USN consensus re: ideas in *A Cooperative Strategy for 1st Century Seapower*
  - To bring naval doctrine & TTP in line with *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* (2007) & agreed joint campaign phases doctrine
    - Parts of *NDP 1* (1994) out of date
  - To continue close cooperation among the 3 sea services
    - 1st time USCG included in an NDP
  - To promote mutual understanding between Sailors, Marines, Coast Guardsmen & joint, interagency & international partners
  - CNO & CFFC desire to enhance role of NWDC

**NDP 1 Naval Warfare (2010)**

- Context (I)
  - Drafted during presidential election campaign, last year of G.W. Bush (R) administration 2nd term (2001-2009), 1st months of Obama Administration
  - More drafting, document signed in 2nd year of Obama (D) Administration
  - Democrats controlled both houses of Congress (from 2007)
  - SECDEF Gates (from 2006)
    - Pressure to devote more budget $ to current wars, irregular warfare
    - Internal DOD “efficiencies” initiatives to cut Service overhead
  - SECNAV Winter (2006-9); Acting SECNAV Penn; SECNAV Mabus (from Jun 2009)
  - CNO ADM Roughead (Sep 2007-Sep 2011)
Context (II)

- U.S. & world economies in deep financial crisis
  - Oil prices rising, having plummeted from 2008 all-time peak
  - High US unemployment rate
  - US foreign trade rising again
- Fall-off in growth of world seaborne trade (2008-9)
- Unprecedented immediate aggressive large-scale US gov’t policy response to economic crisis
- U.S. government deficit spending highest since World War II
- Rising US defense budgets, but rate of growth slowing
  - Future cuts anticipated
  - Increased world-wide approval of US leadership performance

Context (III)

- Issues: Terrorism, China, North Korea & Iran nuclear weapons & missiles, Pakistan, Venezuela, Russia, piracy, Arctic
- Continuing terrorist threat to US homeland
- Interminable international roller-coaster negotiations to disable DPRK nuclear facilities
- Iran threatening stability of Gulf region
- Pakistani political turmoil stabilized, but increasing domestic terrorism
- 3 major submarine cable-cutting incidents (2008)
NDP 1 Naval Warfare (2010)

♦ Context (IV)
- Russian military, naval, cyber attacks on Georgia; Navy squadron deployments to Pac, Med, Caribbean (2008)
- Russia, Iran, Qatar in gas cartel discussions (2007-8)
- US-Russia New START Treaty, limiting strategic nuclear forces – including SSBNs & SLBMs – signed (Apr 2010)
  - Not yet ratified by US Senate

NDP 1 Naval Warfare (2010)

♦ Context: (V)
- Buildup of Iranian Revolutionary Guard small fast naval missile combatant force
- COMUSNAVCENT public vow to keep open Strait of Hormuz (2008)
- Iranian ground & naval missile tests & publicity campaign (Jul 2008)
  - Iran put 1st domestically-made satellite into orbit (Feb 2009)
  - Domestic unrest following presidential election (Jun-Aug 2009)
- Pakistani political turmoil & internal unrest
  - Former PM Bhutto assassinated (Dec 07); President General Musharaf not re-elected (Mar 08); resigned (Aug 08); Bhutto widower Zardari elected President (Sep 08)
  - India-Pak trade route reopened thru Kashmir (Oct 08)
### NDP 1 Naval Warfare (2010)

#### Context (VI)
- Increased PRC assertiveness in South & East China Seas
- PRC increasing military posture opposite Taiwan
- Cross-strait political tensions low; economic cooperation increasing
- Continued PRC anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) R & D
- US announced Taiwan arms sales, incl/ Harpoon (Oct 2008)
- PRC protested, suspended port visits, other US military ties (Oct 2008)
- PLAN deployment of counter-piracy squadrons to Arabian Sea -- & cooperation w/ USN -- now routine (from Dec 2008)

#### Context (VII)
- PLAN harassed USN ocean surveillance ships USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS-23) & USNS Victorious (T-AGOS-19) in western Pacific international waters (Mar, May 2009)
- PLAN 60th anniversary Fleet Review (Apr 2009)
  - PLAN’s “coming out” as a modern navy
- USN CNO ADM Roughead visited PRC (Apr 2009)
- PRC protested US arms sales to Taiwan, cut US military ties (from Jan 2010)
- Continued China Coast Guard-USCG cooperation re: port security, fisheries enforcement, safety at sea, search & rescue
NDP 1 Naval Warfare (2010)

♦ Context (VIII)
  ♦ India successfully tested SLBMs in Bay of Bengal (2008)
  ♦ India, US signed 2007 “123 Agreement” facilitating Indian access to civilian nuclear fuel & technology (Oct 2008)
  ♦ India launched satellite in moon orbit (Oct 2008)
  ♦ USN-Indian Navy Malabar exercise (Oct 2008)
  ♦ Major seaborne Pakistani-based Islamist terrorist assault on Mumbai, India (Nov 2008)
  ♦ India agreed to buy 8 US P8I multi-mission maritime aircraft (Dec 2008)
  ♦ India launched 1st SSN (Jul 2009)

NDP 1 Naval Warfare (2010)

♦ Context: (IX)
  ♦ Escalating DPRK provocations
    ♦ DPRK declared its nuclear activities (Jun 2008); then agreed to halt them (Oct 2008)
    ♦ US dropped DPRK from list of state sponsors of terrorism
    ♦ New ROK gov’t cooler towards DPRK (2008)
    ♦ DPRK renounced 1992 Inter-Korean Basic Agreement (Jan 2009)
      ♦ Incl/ renouncing respect for Yellow Sea Northern Limit Line
      ♦ ROKN interception & firing on DPRKN warship crossing Northern Limit Line (Nov 2009)
  ♦ UN sanctions on DPRK allowing inspections at sea of ships suspected of carrying banned weapons (2009)
NDP 1 Naval Warfare (2010)

♦ Context (X)

♦ OEF, OIF, PSI, Continuing Promise, other operations ongoing
  ♦ Rising Taliban insurgency; leveling off of US & coalition force levels in Afghanistan
  ♦ “Surge” of US ground forces to Afghanistan completing (2009-10)
  ♦ High US, allied combat OPTEMPO vs. Taliban
  ♦ Plummeting US troop force levels in Iraq (from Oct 2008)
  ♦ Iraqi sectarian violence, insurgency continued to fall off
  ♦ US-Iraq Security Agreement signed (Nov 2008)

♦ US Army, USMC still heavily engaged on the ground

♦ Continuing & mature USN OEF & OIF contributions ashore, relieving stress on ground forces

NDP 1 Naval Warfare (2010)

♦ Context (XI)

♦ Continued highly-publicized surge in Somali pirate attacks in Gulf of Aden
  ♦ Stepped-up international USN, coalition, NATO, EU anti-piracy deployments off Somalia
  ♦ Pirates expanded areas of operations, used mother ships,

♦ Major HA op as part of JTF Unified Response IRT Haiti earthquake (Jan-Mar 2010)
  ♦ USN surged 12-ship CVN/LHA/LHD task force
NDP 1 Naval Warfare (2010)

Context (XII)

- USN force levels increasing
- DON annual budgets increasing, but future cuts anticipated
- 288 USN Battle Force ships in 2010; 7 new ships authorized
- CNO ADM Roughead declared USN 313-ship Battle Force goal to be a “floor”
- USN fleet balance in favor of Pacific (since 2007)
  - 1st USN CVN home-ported in Japan (2008)
- PACFLT Mid-Pacific Surface Combatant Operational Deployment Program (since 2008)
- Increasing USN BMD deployment requirements: NE Asia (2004); then Persian Gulf (2008); Eastern Med (2009)
- Expanded national requirement for sea-based BMD: Presidential announcement (Sep 2009)

Context (XIII)

- New Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) classes being built, commissioned, deployed
  - Navy coping with cost overruns & delays
  - 1st two LCSs commissioned (Nov 2008 & 2010)
  - 1st LCS deployed (2010)
- New San Antonio-class LPDs being built, commissioned, deployed
  - Navy coping with cost overruns, delays, construction & operational problems
- Congress again refused to fund Navy nuclear Reliable Replacement Warhead (2007 & 2008)
- Follow-on SSBN being studied (end of decade)
- Northrop-Grumman X-47B N-UCAS unveiled (Dec 2008)
NDP 1 Naval Warfare (2010)

Context (XIV)

- Fleet Response Plan (FRP) still being implemented, but with increasing strain on fleet
  - Last multi-CSG exercise: Valiant Shield 2007
- Degraded USN surface force readiness identified, addressed
  - "Balisle Report" (Feb) 2010 & subsequent corrective actions
- Continuing USMC fire support & other issues
  - USN canceled ERGM development (May 2008); truncated DDG-1000 program (Jul 2008); Cancelled Joint Expeditionary Fires Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) (Oct 2008); canceled MPF(F) (2010)
- US Supreme Court lifted lower court restrictions on USN active mid-frequency sonar training (Nov 2008)
- USN settled worldwide environmental lawsuits (Dec 2008)

Context (XV)

- OPNAV N3/N5 reorganized (Dec 2008)
  - Strategy & Concepts branch split (new N511 & N513)
- NAVWARCOL revived Global War Games (2008, 2009)
- Ongoing total rewrite and update of OPNAVINST 3501.316A Policy for Composition and Mission Capabilities of Strike Forces, Strike Groups, and Other Major Deployable Elements (Sep 06, 2007)
Context: (XVI)

- Congressionally-mandated Quadrennial Roles & Missions Review (QRM) & 4th Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) under way & completed
- SECDEF-mandated USN-USA-USMC Air-Sea Battle operational concept development effort: (2009-10)
- Unofficial monthly “Navy Study Group” ongoing (since May 2008)
- Views from outside Navy that Navy too entangled in joint concepts and strategies
  - Former DUSN Seth Cropsey, Hudson Institute
  - CDR Bryan McGrath (Ret), Delex Systems
  - Dr. Dan Goure, Lexington Institute

Cited references (I)

- National Security Act of 1947
- Title 10 & Title 14, U.S. Code
- Department of the Navy Core Values (Jan 2008)
- Navy Ethos (Nov 2008)
Cited references (II)

- Joint documents
  - JP 1-02
  - JP 1-1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*
  - JP 2-01.3 *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment*
  - JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*
  - JP 3-03, *Joint Interdiction*
  - JP 3-32 *Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations*
  - JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*
  - *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3122* (series)
  - *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)* (Vols I-III)

Cited references (III)

- *Navy Warfare Publications*
  - NWP 5-01, *Navy Planning*
  - NWP 3-32, *Maritime Operations at the Operational Level of War*

- *Marine Corps Publications*
  - MCDP 5, *Planning*
  - MCWP 5-1 *Marine Corps Planning Process*

NDP 1 Naval Warfare (2010)

- Context: Other contemporary publications (I)
  - Naval Operations Concept (May 2010)
  - President Barack Obama, National Security Strategy (May 2010)
  - NSC, Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership & Action Plan (Dec 2008)
  - NSPD-66/HSPD-25, Arctic Region Policy (Jan 2009)
  - SECDEF Gates Foreign Affairs article (Jan-Feb 2009)
  - SECDEF Quadrennial Roles & Missions Review Report (Feb 2010)

NDP 1 Naval Warfare (2010)

- Context: Other contemporary publications (II)
  - Unified Command Plan revision (Dec 2008)
  - SECDEF TF on DOD Nuclear Weapons Mgmt, Review of the DOD Nuclear Mission (Dec 2008)
    - USN commended re: nuclear mission commitment
    - USN chided for neglect of TLAM-N funding
  - CJCS Chairman’s Risk Guidance
  - CJCS ADM Mullen Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) (Jan 2009)
  - CDRJFCOM Joint Operating Environments (JOE) (Nov 2008; Feb 2010)
  - OSD, Military Power of the PRC (Mar 2009)
NDP 1 Naval Warfare (2010)

♦ Context: Other contemporary publications (III)
  ♦ SECDEF Gates, *Defense Planning and Programming Guidance (DPPG)* (Jul 2010)
  ♦ SECDEF Gates, *Quadrennial Defense Review report (QDR)* (Feb 2010)
  ♦ OSD/USTRANSCOM, *DOD Mobility & Requirements Study 2016* (Feb 2010)

NDP 1 Naval Warfare (2010)

♦ Context: Other contemporary publications (IV)
  ♦ SECNAVINST 2052.1, *Maritime Domain Awareness in the Department of the Navy* (Jan 2009)
  ♦ OPNAVINST 3501.316A, *Policy for Composition and Mission Capabilities of Strike Forces, Strike Groups, and Other Major Deployable Elements* (Sep 2007)
NDP 1 Naval Warfare (2010)

Context: Other contemporary publications (V)

- NTTP 3-07.15, *Navy Component Commander Support to Theater Security Cooperation* (Feb 2010)
- MCCDC concepts & related documents
  - *Evolving the MAGTF for the 21st Century* (Mar 2009)
  - *Seabasing for the Range of Military Operations* (Mar 2009)
  - *Concept for Unified Action through Civil-Military Integration* (May 2009)

NDP 1 Naval Warfare (2010)

Context: Other contemporary publications (VI)

- Revised *Coast Guard Publication 1: U.S. Coast Guard: America’s Maritime Guardian* (May 2009)
- CFFC, CG MCCDC, Commander, Army Capabilities Integration Center, *Concept of Employment for Current Seabasing Capabilities: Integrating Seabasing Capabilities into Exercises and Experiments* (Jun 2010)
NDP 1 Naval Warfare (2010)

Context: Other contemporary publications (VII)

- USAF *Countersea Operations* AFDD 2-1.4 (2005)
- Navy-Air Force-Marine Corps *Air-Sea Battle* operational concept (under development 2009-10)

NDP 1 Naval Warfare (2010)

Context: Other contemporary publications (VIII)

- NATO *Strategic Concept* (under development 2009-10)
- NATO *Maritime Security Operations* (MSO) concept (under development 2009-10)
- NATO *Alliance Maritime Strategy* (AMS) (under development 2009-10)
- NATO AJP 3.1 *Allied Joint Maritime Operations* (Change 1) (Jan 2008)
NDP 1 Naval Warfare (2010)

Context: Other contemporary publications (IX)
  - Incl/ Bill Lind recommendations on USN (w/ roots in 1970s)
- NIC, *Global Trends 2025* (Nov 2008)

NDP 1 Naval Warfare (2010)

Context: Other contemporary publications (X)
- Col Robert Work USMC (Ret) (CSBA), *The US Navy: Charting a Course for Tomorrow’s Fleet* (Feb 2009)
- Christine Fox, *Carrier Operations: Looking Toward the Future – Learning From the Past* (CNA) (May 2009)
NDP 1 Naval Warfare (2010)

♦ Context: Other contemporary publications (XI)
  ♦ Seth Cropsey (Hudson Institute) articles
  ♦ CDR (Ret) Bryan McGrath on-line contributions
  ♦ Bloggers: “Galrahn” (Raymond Pritchett) et al.
  ♦ Earlier drafts of this briefing

NDP 1 Naval Warfare (2010)

♦ How it was written (I)
  ♦ 1st (1994) edition became increasingly outdated over the years
  ♦ But revision delayed due to:
    ♦ USMC-USN differences
    ♦ Low perceived priority by USN leadership
    ♦ Bureaucratic factors: NWDC vice OPNAV responsibility
    ♦ At end-game, OPNAV requirement to delay publication until after Naval Operations Concept (NOC) 2010 published
  ♦ Various aborted NWDC draft revisions (e.g.: 2000, 2005)
    ♦ Little movement beyond NWDC internal efforts
  ♦ USMC balked at revision for years
    ♦ Not unhappy with heavily-USMC-influenced 1994 edition
NDP 1 Naval Warfare (2010)

How it was written (II)

• Tri-service signing of *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* & drafting of new *Naval Operations Concept* (NOC) provided positive climate for updating *NDP 1* (2007-8)
• Breakthrough: USMC pushed for agreed Terms of Reference (TOR); USN agreed (2008)
• USN-USMC-USCG TOR finally signed at two/three-star level (Oct 2008)

How it was written (III)

• Service organizational leads:
  • USN: NWDC
  • USMC: MCCDC
  • USCG: HQCG Office of Counterterrorism & Defense Operations
• Personalities:
  • Oversight: COMNWDC RADM Carpenter; CGMCCDC LtGen Flynn; Asst COMDT COGARD for Plans & Policy RADM Salerno
  • NWDC Doctrine Department head: Mr. Mark Werner
  • MCCDC: Doctrine Division: LtCol (Ret) John Bass
  • Lead NWDC drafter: CAPT Edward Long III USN (Ret)
    • Northrop Grumman Maritime Mission Systems contractor
  • Lead USMC drafter: Maj David Vickers USMC (Ret)
  • MCCDC Multi-Service Doctrine Coordinator
  • Lead USCG drafter: CAPT Dom DiIulio USCG (Ret)
NDP 1 Naval Warfare (2010)

How it was written (IV)
- Initial drafters’ conference convened at NWDC (Dec 2008)
- 1st draft released for service comment (Mar 2009)
- Writers’ Conference at NWDC re-wrote & refined several sections of 1st draft (Jun 2009)
- Final draft released for service comment (Jul 2009)
- Adjudication conference at MCCDC (10 Nov 2009)
- Draft for signature delivered to 3 service headquarters, anticipating Mar 2010 signature & release (Feb 2010)
- Public release held in abeyance until tri-service Naval Operations Concept (NOC) 2010 published (May 2010)

NDP 1 Naval Warfare (2010)

How it was written (V)
- Drafting of Naval Operations Concept (NOC) 2010 ongoing simultaneously (2008-10)
- OPNAV “Navy Strategic Planning Process” (NSPP) to inform NSP ISO POM 12 & NSP ISO POM 13 ongoing simultaneously (2008-10)
- OPNAV N51 in continuous dialog with NWDC to ensure NDP 1 alignment with other documents, especially NOC 2010
  - N51 assigned NOC drafters as OPNAV NDP 1 POCs
    - CAPT Doug Venlet, LCDR Mike Mosbruger
    - Later CAPT John McLain
NDP 1 Naval Warfare (2010)

◊ How it was written (VI)
  ◦ Endgame
    ◦ CMDT COGARD ADM Allen approved, signed _NDP 1_ (May 2010)
      • Just before relief by ADM Papp
    ◦ CMC Gen Conway approved, signed _NDP 1_ (Jul 2010)
      • 3 months before relief by Gen Amos
    ◦ Continued internal OPNAV 3-star/ 4-star coordination
      (Jul-Aug 2010)
    ◦ CNO approved and signed _NDP 1_ (Aug 2010)
    ◦ _NDP 1_ actually published and distributed via Navy Doctrine Library System website (2 Sep 2010)
    ◦ Document officially backdated to Mar 2010

NDP 1 Naval Warfare (2010)

◊ Outline
  ◦ Who we are – The nature of naval service
  ◦ What we do – Employment of naval forces
    ◦ Strategic document alignment
    ◦ Levels of war
    ◦ The national strategic setting
    ◦ The maritime strategy
  ◦ How we fight – The conduct of naval operations
    ◦ Core capabilities of naval forces
    ◦ The application of naval power
    ◦ Operational art
    ◦ Command and control
    ◦ Global maritime partnerships
    ◦ Maritime domain awareness
    ◦ Response options
    ◦ Phases of an operation or campaign
  ◦ Conclusion
Key ideas (I)

- 12 principles of joint operations
- Core values
  - Extensive discussion. 1st such discussion in a capstone document since *Navy Policy Book* (1992)
- Some naval history
- 3 levels of war
  - 6 strategic imperatives
  - 6 core capabilities
- Continued use of the term “The Naval Service” established in the *Naval Operations Concept* (NOC) 2010

Key ideas (II)

- Rigorous attention paid to correct joint and Naval Service terminology
  - Contrary to usual often sloppy Navy practice
  - “Doctrine” defined and explained
  - Document avowedly NOT a “Vision,” “Concept,” “CONOPS,” “strategy,” “policy,” “resource allocation guidance or plan,” etc.
  - “Doctrine” seen as relevant and informing all of these, however
- “Command and control of naval forces reflects our operational environment and culture. . . Naval tactical commanders are expected to take initiative using the operational-level commander’s guidance, which defines what needs to be done but not how to do it . . . Our C2 philosophy is derived from the characteristics and complexity of the maritime domain”
Key ideas (III)

- Sea control, power projection, deterrence & forward presence remain top priorities for the sea services, even as the priority of new core capabilities has been elevated.
- The six core capabilities are used to carry out the six strategic imperatives enunciated in *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* and the *Naval Operations Concept* (NOC) 2010.
- Elaboration on the administrative and operational branches of the US military chain of command.

Key ideas (IV)

- *Global system & globalization* are important influences.
- Trans-national threats identified:
  - Terrorists and extremists; proliferators of weapons of mass destruction; pirates; traffickers in persons, drugs, and conventional weapons; other criminals.
- National threats not identified:
  - Referred to as “those who wish us harm,” “full range of maritime threats,” “rogue governments,” “challenges,” “adversaries,” “enemies,” “opponents,” “aggressors,” “anti-access/area-denial capabilities,” “another great power” (to be deterred).
What was new:

- Notional application of the 6 CS 21 naval core capabilities across the 6-phase joint campaign model continuum
Very few elements of US defense & naval power ignored

- Not addressed
  - Detailed discussion of planning processes
    - Presented in NWP 5-01
  - Blockades
  - Convoys
NDP 1 Naval Warfare (2010)

- Contrast with NDP-1 Naval Warfare (1994)
  - One NDP to take the place of the previous NDPs 1-6
  - COMDT COGARD added as participant, signatory
  - Similar appearance, format & outline
  - Shorter: 54 pp vs. 74 pp.
  - Added new sections on core values, chains of command
  - Deleted pictures, vignettes, “attrition vs. maneuver” styles of warfare discussion, reading list, “Where we are headed” section
    - Document deals solely with the present, not future
  - Added 3 new principles of joint operations, IAW contemporary joint doctrine
  - Term “the Naval Service” replaced “naval services”

NDP 1 Naval Warfare (2010)

- Subsequent analyses & critiques
  - DOD Bloggers Roundtable (2 Jun 2010)
  - Milan Vego, “AirSea Battle Must Not Work Alone” (US Naval Institute Proceedings (Jul 2011)
NDP 1 Naval Warfare (2010)

♥ Criticisms (I)
- Took way too long to publish
- Superfluous, given near-simultaneous OPNAV-led drafting of Naval Operations Concept (NOC) 2010
- Will have no more relevance to fleet operations than its 1994 predecessor did, given Navy’s “doctrine aversion”
- Not enough follow-through: Little publicity, little use in flag officer speeches, etc.
- Should not have dropped “Where we are headed” section from 1994 predecessor
- Allowed document to more closely conform to joint views on what should constitute “doctrine,” but left the Navy without an aspirational “concept” or “vision” statement, given current focus of A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower and the Naval Operations Concept (NOC) 2010

NDP 1 Naval Warfare (2010)

♥ Criticisms (II)
- Disagreements over treatment of relationship between peacetime forward presence and sea control
- No discussion of sea denial operations
- No elaboration on major joint & naval operations
NDP 1 Naval Warfare (2010)

♦ Influence:
  ♦ Basis for US Naval Academy and Naval ROTC NS 301 Naval Warfare courses
  ♦ Not cited in revised MCDP 1-0 Marine Corps Operations (2011)

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-13 (2010)
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-13 (2010)

♦ Overview
- Signed by CNO ADM Roughead (Oct 2010)
- “Navy strategic plan”
- Principal targets:
  ♦ DON officers & civilians charged with developing POM-13
  ♦ Short (19 pages), Navy-only, SECRET document
  ♦ Drafted in OPNAV Strategy Branch (N513)
- To guide the continued implementation of the ideas in *A Cooperative Strategy for 1st Century Seapower* (2007) through development of the Navy’s POM 13 (2013-2020)
- Prioritized “strategic imperatives” from *A Cooperative Strategy* specifically defined to be relevant in the future security environment
- Provided specific “Capability Risk Guidance”

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-13 (2010)

♦ Signed by:
  ♦ CNO ADM Gary Roughead
    ♦ At start of 4th year of his term
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-13 (2010)

What it was
- Billed as a “strategic plan”
- Continued series initiated with NSP ISO POM 08 (2006)
- SECRET stand-alone pub
- Navy-only (vice “sea services”) focus
- Shortest-ever NSP/NSG (only 19 pages)
  - E.g.: NSPs ISO POM 10 & 12 had 76 pp.
  - 8 pages of strategic context (cf. 15 pp in NSP ISO POM 12)
- No explicit tasker
  - By now NSP was an established institution within OPNAV
- Originally planned as Navy Strategic Guidance (NSG) in support of Program Review (PR) 13
  - But OSD altered DoD PPBE system again, changing PRs back to POMs
  - So Navy changed NSG to NSP
- Signed out by CNO ADM Roughead (22 Oct 2010)
- Superseded Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-12 (9 Oct 2009)

Why it was written (I)
- To provide strategic guidance on Navy resource allocation priorities required to execute A Cooperative Strategy for 1st Century Seapower (2007) in the coming decade (2013-2023)
- To increase OPNAV attention on closing gaps in USN capabilities where significant risk has developed over last several years
- To be applied by Navy planners, resource sponsors, and programmers in Navy internal POM-13 development processes
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-13 (2010)

Why it was written (II)

- To link the “strategic imperatives” in A Cooperative Strategy to USN capabilities, providing a strategy-based framework for development of the Navy’s POM 13
- Benchmark reference for OPNAV development of POM-13 Planning Order (PLANORD), Front End Assessment FEA), Sponsor Program Proposals (SPPs), & Strategy-to-Program Assessments.
- Also to be used by a variety of planners for other internal Navy processes

Context (I)

- Drafted during 2nd year of Obama (D) Administration
- Democrats in control of both houses of Congress (from 2007)
  - Mid-year elections approaching
- SECDEF Gates (since 2006)
  - Pressure to devote adequate budget $ to current wars, irregular warfare
  - Internal DOD “efficiencies” initiatives to cut Service overhead
  - Drive to reduce “supplemental” or Overseas Contingency Operations” (OCO) funding; move programs into base budget
- SECNAV Mabus (since Jun 2009 )
- CNO ADM Roughead (Sep 2007-Sep 2011)
Context (II)

- US, world slowly pulling out of deep recession (from Jun 2009)
  - Fall-off in growth of world seaborne trade (2008-9)
  - U.S. foreign trade rising again (2010)
  - Oil prices rising, having plummeted from 2008 all-time peak
  - Word food shortages, rising food prices sparking fears of global unrest (2010)
- Unprecedented US gov’t policy response to economic crisis
- US public revulsion at soaring government deficit spending, high US unemployment rate
  - Trillion dollar Federal government annual deficit
- Rising US defense budgets, but rate of growth slowing
  - Future cuts anticipated
- Increased worldwide approval of US political leadership performance
  - Concerns at possibly faltering economic leadership

Context (III)

- Continuing terrorist threat to US homeland
- OIF, OEF, PSI, Continuing Promise, other ops ongoing
  - Continued Taliban insurgency, US allied combat ops in Afghanistan. US Army, USMC heavily engaged
  - But US ground force troop level "surge" to Afghanistan completed (2009-10)
  - All US combat troops withdrawn from Iraq (Aug 2010)
  - OIF became Operation “New Dawn” (Sep 2010)
  - Iraqi sectarian violence, insurgency continued to fall off
- Continuing & mature USN OEF & OIF contributions ashore, supporting & relieving stress on ground forces
Context (IV)
- Continued highly-publicized surge in Somali pirate attacks in Gulf of Aden
  - Continued international USN, coalition, NATO, EU, Russian, PLAN anti-piracy deployments off Somalia
  - Pirates deployed mother ships, shifted op areas farther to the east and south
- Terrorist suicide bombers attacked Japanese tanker in Strait of Hormuz (Jul 2010)
  - Al Qaeda-linked group claimed responsibility

Context (V)
- Continued strained US-PRC relations
  - PRC doing well economically, despite world economic crisis
  - Continued PRC military posture increase opposite Taiwan
  - Cross-strait political tensions low; economic cooperation increasing
  - Continued PRC anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) R & D
  - PLAN deployment of counter-piracy squadrons to Arabian Sea -- & cooperation w/ USN -- now routine (from Dec 2008)
    - Now included large amphibious ships as well as destroyers & frigates
  - PRC protested US arms sales to Taiwan, cut US military ties (from Jan 2010)
  - 1st PLAN deployment of Peace Ark hospital ship, in IO (Sep 2010)
  - Increased PRC assertiveness in South & East China Seas
    - PRC statements: South China Sea is a “core national interest” (2010)
    - Southeast Asian nations, US push-back, increased cooperation
    - U.S. SECSTATE Clinton asserted US “national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’ s maritime commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea” (Jul 2010)
  - PRC, Japan clash re: PRC fishing in Japan-claimed waters (Sep 2010)
  - 1st US-PRC maritime consultative talks held in over a year (Oct 2010)
Context (VI)

- Heightened DPRK-ROK/US tensions
  - DPRK nuclear facilities development & missile testing
  - ROKN naval forces intercepted DPRKN warship crossing maritime border, damaged it and forced it to return north (Nov 2009)
  - DPRKN submarine torpedoed ROKN corvette with heavy loss of life (Mar 2010)
  - ROK agreed to participate in PSI ops (2010)
- PRC-Japan relations strained over Senkaku Islands claims, economic activities
- PRC-Vietnam relations strained over South China Sea claims, economic activities
- Major HA ops as part of JTF Unified Response IRT Haiti earthquake (Jan-Mar 2010); Pakistani flooding

Context (VII)

- US-Russia New START Treaty, limiting strategic nuclear forces – including SSBNs & SLBMs – signed (Apr 2010)
  - US Senate did not ratify, however, until Dec 2010
- Iran threatening stability of Gulf region
  - Strong US concerns that Iran may be developing nuclear weapons
  - UN sanctions on Iran: Allowed inspections at sea of Iranian vessels suspected of carrying banned weapons (Jun 2010)
  - Continued Revolutionary Guard small missile-equipped naval combatant buildup
- Pakistani political turmoil stabilized somewhat
- USN-Indian relations strong & improving
  - Navy Malabar exercises continued
  - CNA-NMF “Track II” discussions (2009-10)
- USN-Vietnam relations improving
  - Port visits
Context (VIII)

- DON annual budgets increasing, but future cuts anticipated
- USN force levels increasing 288 USN Battle Force ships in 2010; 7 new ships authorized
- USN fleet balance in favor of Pacific
- CNO ADM Roughead continued to declare USN 313-ship Battle Force goal to be a “floor”
- Follow-on SSBN planned
- Increasing USN BMD deployments: NE Asia (2004); then Persian Gulf (2008); Eastern Med (2009)
- Expanded national requirement for sea-based BMD: Presidential announcement (Sep 2009)

Context (IX)

- New USN LCS classes being built, commissioned, deployed
  - Navy coping with cost overruns & delays
  - 1st two LCSs commissioned (Nov 2008 & 2010)
  - 1st LCS deployed (2010)
- New USN San Antonio-class LPDs being built, commissioned, deployed
  - Navy coping with cost overruns, delays, construction & operational problems
- New USN & US Army JHSV under construction
- Fleet Response Plan (FRP) still being implemented, but with increasing strain on fleet
  - 2-CSG CSF operating in Arabian Sea (Oct 2010)
  - Last big multi-CSG exercise: Valiant Shield 2007
- Degraded USN surface force readiness identified, addressed
  - “Balisle Report” (Feb) 2010 & subsequent corrective actions
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-13 (2010)

**Context: (X)**
- SECDEF-mandated USN-USAF-USMC Air-Sea Battle operational concept development effort (ongoing since 2009)
- USMC concerns at losing their amphibious ops skills, due to OIF, OEF focus
- Obama Administration USCG budget cuts
- US Army still focused on Afghanistan, Iraq COIN ops
- Unofficial monthly “Navy Strategy Discussion Group” ongoing (since 2008)

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-13 (2010)

**Cited references (I)**
Cited references (II)
- CNO, CMC, COMDT COGARD, Naval Operations Concept (May 2010)
- Several footnoted source documents, including DIA Joint Strategic Assessment, combatant commander theater security plans & testimony, CNA studies

Context: Other contemporary publications (I)
- SECDEF Gates, National Defense Strategy (Jun 2008)
- SECDEF Gates speech at Navy League Sea-Air-Space Expo (May 2010)
- CJCS Chairman’s Risk Guidance
- CJCS ADM Mullen Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) (Jan 2009)
- CJCS ADM Mullen Joint Pub 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (CH 1) (Mar 2009)
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-13 (2010)

Context: Other contemporary publications (II)

- Drafting in progress: Revisions to Chairman’s Risk Assessment (CRA), Unified Command Plan (UCP), National Military Strategy (NMS), Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), CJCS Guidance; National Security Space Strategy; NATO Maritime Security Operations (MSO) concept, NATO Alliance Maritime Strategy (AMS)
- Director, Warfare Integration (OPNAV N8F), Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2011 (Feb 2010)
- CDRJFCOM Joint Operating Environment (JOE) (Mar 2010)
- USN Task Force Climate Change, U.S. Navy Climate Change Roadmap (Apr 2010)
- CNO, CMC, COMDT COGARD, NDP 1: Naval Warfare (May 2010)

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-13 (2010)

Context: Other contemporary publications (III)

- COMUSFLTFORCOM ADM Harvey, CGMCCDC, Director US Army Capabilities Integration Center, Concept of Employment for Current Seabasing Capabilities (Jun 2010)
- CNO ADM Gary Roughead, “Remarks at University of Chicago Conference on Terrorism & Strategy” (12 Oct 2010)
  - Endorsed a forward naval form of US “offshore balancing” strategy, to promote a “just & sustainable international order”
- Securing the High Ground: Agile Combat Air Power: 2010 Combat Air Force Strategic Plan (Sep 2010)
  - Major cuts in forces planned for RN (close USN partner)
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-13 (2010)

♦ Context: Other contemporary publications (IV)
  ♦ CAPT Victor Addison, OPNAV Concepts Branch head (N511), 4 prize-winning Naval Institute *Proceedings* essays advocating new USN concepts & priorities (Jan-Oct 2010)
  ♦ CAPT Jan van Tol et al., *AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept* (CSBA) (May 2010)

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-13 (2010)

♦ Context: Other contemporary publications (V)
    ♦ Called for larger US defense budget, larger Navy, larger US force structure in Asia-Pacific
  ♦ Lawrence Korb & Laura Conley, *Strong and Sustainable: How to Reduce Military spending While Keeping our Nation Safe* (Sep 2010)
  ♦ Benjamin Friedman & Christopher Preble, *Budgetary Savings from Military Restraint* (Cato) (23 Sep 2010)
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-13 (2010)

♦ Context: Other contemporary publications (VI)
  ♦ Seth Cropsey (Hudson Institute) articles
  ♦ CDR (Ret) Bryan McGrath
    ♦ A Seapower Manifesto: The Value of Preponderant American Seapower (19 Oct 2010)
    ♦ On-line contributions
  ♦ Bloggers: “Galrahn” (Raymond Pritchett) et al.
  ♦ Earlier drafts of this briefing

How it was written (I)
  ♦ Personalities: CNO ADM Roughead, VADM Clingan (N3/N5), RDML Woods (N51), CAPT Montgomery, then CAPT Munsch (N513) oversaw
  ♦ OPNAV-wide core working group: N00X, N51, N80, N81)
  ♦ Principal drafter in N513: CDR Eric Fino (submariner)
  ♦ Used NSP ISO POM 12 as baseline
  ♦ Adapted NSP 12 NSPP-generated “Alternative Futures” for NSP ISO POM 13
  ♦ Staffing rounds
    ♦ Drafting began in January 2010
    ♦ Significant participation by Navy 3-star leadership, in “CNO Futures”, “Small Group,” CEB, 3-4 star symposium fora
  ♦ Personal attention of CNO ADM Roughead
    ♦ Made inputs throughout, & made changes at endgame
    ♦ Signed in Oct 2010
Outline
- Introduction
- Strategic context
- Capability risk guidance

Key ideas (I)
- An overview of the future security environment
- Prioritized “strategic imperatives” from A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007) specifically defined to be relevant in the future security environment
- Not fiscally balanced
Key ideas (II)

- Appreciated current, anticipated constraints on defense budgets
- Adjusted only those Navy mission capabilities where failure to make such an adjustment would incur unacceptable risk-to-mission/risk-to-force, or result in failure to accomplish one or more *Cooperative Strategy* “strategic imperatives”
- No adjustments to be made at expense of USN contributions to winning ongoing wars in Iraq & Afghanistan, or the campaign against Al Qaeda & transnational terrorist organizations

Subsequent analyses & critiques

- DOD Bloggers Roundtable (2 Jun 2010)
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-13 (2010)

♦ Criticisms
  ♦ Classification of document precluded wide distribution & understanding of its role in implementing *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*
  ♦ Only one among many OSD, joint, SECNAV, CNO and VCNO front-end guidance documents that strove to influence POM development
  ♦ Not fiscally balanced
  ♦ Should have been a Navy-Marine Corps Department of the Navy plan, not Navy only
    ♦ Little mention of USMC (even less than USAF)
  ♦ Not enough recommended areas of increased risk
  ♦ Promulgated – admittedly of necessity -- prior to receipt of over-riding OSD guidance
  ♦ Subsequent administration & congressional actions rendered moot much 2010 planning for POM-13

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-13 (2010)

♦ Influence:
  ♦ Referenced (prior to publication) in *U.S. Navy Climate Change Roadmap* (Apr 2010)
  ♦ OPNAV N81 used to draft Front End Assessment (FEA) – the next step in Navy POM development process
  ♦ OPNAV N00X used as baseline for Strategy-to-Program Assessment
  ♦ Influenced SECDEF-mandated *Navy Campaign Support Plan* (CSP)
  ♦ Cited in Office of Naval Research *Naval S&T Strategic Plan* (Sep 2011)
Navy Strategic Planning Process (NSPP) (I)

- OPNAV experimented with an NSPP (2006-2010)
  - Originally “Navy Adaptive Planning Process (NAPP)”
    - Also referred to as “Alternative Futures Planning Process”
  - Contractor-assisted (Decision Strategies International (DSI))
  - Navalized version of DSI proprietary “Adaptive Strategic Planning” (ASP) methodology
- VCNO Strategic Planning memo formally directed establishment of process in CY 08/09 (Feb 2008)
- Goal: Institutionalize within the Navy a repeatable and sustainable strategic planning system to manage future uncertainty and monitor the Navy’s external environment

Navy Strategic Planning Process (NSPP) (II)

- Process steps (intended):
  - Environmental assessment
  - Identify trends and uncertainties
  - Construct four alternative Navy future environments
  - Derive key Navy success factors from the range of alternative futures
  - Determine strategic options: Specific actions for the Navy to take to achieve capabilities inherent in the key success factors
  - Organize these options in an NSP
  - Resource those options
  - Assess and monitor the process and the results
Navy Strategic Planning Process (NSPP) (III)

- Initial advocates: OPNAV N8B (Jo Decker), N3/N5 (VADM Morgan), RDML Metcalf
- Initial implementers: RDML Donegan (N5SP), CAPT John Lockwood USNR, LCDR (later CDR) Steven Kelley
- 4 annual iterations of the (elaborate) process, with wide Navy staff participation
- Draft OPNAVINST on NSPP drafted, circulated within OPNAV (2010) (never signed)
Navy Strategic Planning Process (NSPP) (V)

- Designed to drive USN NSP & subsequent POM development
- Track record:
  - *NSP ISO POM 08* did not mention (2006)
  - CS 21 lead author CDR McGrath used then-NAPP methodology to “stress-test” central themes in the strategy
  - *NSP ISO POM 10* discussed intent & process in depth, but NAPP actually had minimal influence on the document (2007)
  - NWC Global 08 War Game “Implementing the Maritime Strategy” used 4 NSPP-developed alternative futures (2008)
  - *NSG ISO PR 11* (2009)
    - Used Key Success Factors (KSFs) culled from the process, but no mention of NSPP itself

Navy Strategic Planning Process (NSPP) (VI)

- Designed to drive USN NSP & subsequent POM development
- Track record (continued):
    - Planned to be 1st true NSPP-driven NSP, but NSPP had marginal impact
    - Much discussion in the document of “Alternative Futures Planning Process,” identifying future trends & uncertainties
    - Drafters participated in – and helped run -- the process, but no mention of NSPP or its elements in the final document
Navy Strategic Planning Process (NSPP) (VII)

Other NSPP influence:
- Chief of Supply Corps, *The Supply Corps 2040 Strategic Vision Study* (2009-10)
  - Extensive use
  - Adopted as strategy model for Navy Supply Corps officer development
  - Also cited in *Navy Supply Corps Strategic Guidance 2010*
- Used by USN Task Force Energy
- Cited in COMNWDC *Guide for Navy Concept Generation & Concept Development Program* (Ver. 1.0, 10 Feb 2010)
- Mackenzie Eaglen & CDR (Ret) Bryan McGrath used NSPP scenario in Heritage Foundation “Backgrounder,” (May 2011)

NSPP ignored in annual VCNO PLANORDS for POM development
- Initial NSPP effort terminated (late 2010)
- OPNAV N511 planned to scale down, transform, revive NSPP alternative futures effort, to impact development of *Navy Strategic Plan In Support of POM 14 (NSP ISO POM 14)* (late 2010)
Some bottom lines:

- NSPP cost significant contractor dollars & staff officer manpower hours, across OPNAV & the fleet.
- NSPP “alternative futures” product became only one among many inputs to *Navy Strategic Plans/Guidance*.
- *Navy Strategic Plans/Guidance* were themselves only one among several inputs to OPNAV Navy POM development.

2000s: Text & context of each document

- Forthcoming (TBD)
- Meanwhile, texts (of UNCLAS doc’s only) available on web, in journals, & as stand-alone documents.
2000s: Other analyses of each document

- “The United States Navy Since President Ronald Reagan,”
  - Kenneth Hagan & Michael T. McMaster

- *US Navy Strategy and Force Structure After the Cold War*
  - Amund Lundesgaard
  - Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies (2011)

  - CAPT Peter Haynes USN
  - Ph.D. dissertation, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey (2011)
CNA studies on U.S. Navy strategies and their context


