A Misapplied and Overextended Example

Gen J. N. Mattis’s Criticism of Effects-Based Operations

Maj Dag Henriksen, PhD, Royal Norwegian Air Force Academy, US Air Force Research Institute

On 14 August 2008, Gen J. N. Mattis, at that time the commander of US Joint Forces Command, declared that the concept of effects-based operations (EBO) had been “misapplied and overextended to the point that it actually hinders rather than helps joint operations.” The empirical and historical case that the general emphasizes in his explanation of the foundation for this conclusion is Israel’s campaign against Hezbollah in 2006.

This article argues that although many good reasons may exist for criticizing the EBO concept, the particular campaign cited by General Mattis represents an inadequate example from which to draw his conclusion. Israel’s own Winograd Report points out that Israel did not have a clear, identifiable strategy for its military operations and that its planning was neither “conducted on the basis of deep understanding of the theatre of operations” nor based on fundamental “principles of using military power to achieve a political . . . goal.” The absence of a clearly identified military strategy for war or of one’s objectives reduces the relevance of the concept of EBO—or, indeed, of any military concept. In other words, if you do not know where you are going, the means to get there is hardly the key problem. Thus, one risks cherry-picking the variable (in this case EBO) that actually played a subordinate role in the negative outcome for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) during this conflict. Logically, these factors render this particular conflict largely unsuitable as an empirical foundation for harshly criticizing EBO.
A Misapplied and Overextended Example: Gen J. N. Mattis’s Criticism of Effects-Based Operations
Both General Mattis’s “USJFCOM Commander's Guidance for Effects-Based Operations” and his memorandum for US Joint Forces Command (14 August 2008), which includes that guidance, focus on the concept of EBO. In the former, Mattis spends half a page on Israel's 2006 campaign to underline his point that EBO is a flawed concept that in effect impedes the development and conduct of joint operations. Although he mentions other historical examples, the Israeli campaign remains his most prominent one by far. Thus, one can only assume that the general considers it a particularly good illustration of his point.

This article seeks to analyze the empirical foundation of General Mattis’s conclusion regarding EBO as a military concept—not the concept of EBO itself. If that foundation is weak or even misguided, then the conclusion should undergo reassessment. Consequently, a finding that the Israeli campaign in 2006 does not provide sufficient empirical evidence of flaws in EBO justifies challenging General Mattis's assertions regarding that concept. The article, therefore, analyzes the basis of his critique to determine whether or not the latter includes the key issue at hand—the limitations of Israel's strategic thinking in this war.

The Analytical Basis of General Mattis’s Critique

Although General Mattis acknowledges that “there are several factors why the IDF performed poorly during the war”—factors not related solely to EBO—he points out that “various post-conflict assessments have concluded that over reliance on EBO concepts was one of the primary contributing factors for [the Israelis’] defeat.” The “various post-conflict assessments” that Mattis cites in his guidance include (1) Avi Kober's article “The Israel Defense Forces in the Second Lebanon War: Why the Poor Performance?”; (2) Matt M. Matthews's paper We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War; and (3) the Winograd Report. The analytical precision of these three assessments is therefore of great significance regarding the validity of the general's overall conclusion.
Professor Kober's interesting analysis of the war offers nine explanations of why the IDF performed so poorly in the Second Lebanon War: (1) “a late understanding that it was war”; (2) “adherence to post-heroic warfare” and its sensitivity to casualties; (3) “the erosion of the IDF’s fighting standards due to policing missions” of the two intifadas; (4) “false Revolution in Military Affairs–inspired concepts”; (5) “the adoption of the notion of controlling instead of capturing territory”; (6) “a centralized logistical system”; (7) “poor generalship”; (8) “a hesitant and inexperienced political leadership”; and (9) “IDF dominance in decisions on military matters.” One of several important studies of this conflict, his article would prove useful to anyone striving to understand this war; nevertheless, one should note a few points. Although well written and covering a broad spectrum of factors, it undercommunicates the strategic dynamics of the war, including the Israeli-Lebanese dynamic, the domestic dynamics in Lebanon, and—most importantly—the limited strategic thinking in Israel regarding going to war. Kober does point out that Israel was slow to understand that this was a war, that the political leadership in Israel was inexperienced, and that a weak intellectual tradition existed (exists) within the IDF's officer corps; however, the limitations of Israel’s strategic thinking, which should have been the centerpiece, do not play a predominant role in the article. This is not simply one of many mistakes of the war, but the key problem. Logically, the lack of any strategic guidance from the outset concerning what to achieve and how to achieve it greatly influenced the other factors. Furthermore, Kober does not clearly indicate how the concept of EBO stands out as a key problem of the war, instead pointing to a number of reasons for the IDF’s difficulties. His conclusion includes, among other matters, a more general critique of a tendency towards overreliance on airpower, technology, network-centric warfare, and other conceptions dealing with a revolution in military affairs (RMA). As Kober notes, one should remain skeptical of having a force structure, training, and doctrine that reduce one's tactical, operational, and strategic flexibility. But nowhere in this article does one find a basis for isolating the concept of EBO, pulling it out of the context of other variables far more important to the overall
outcome, and putting it on display as “one of the primary contributing factors for [the Israelis’] defeat,” mentioned above.

Based on the number of quotations and footnotes in General Mattis's guidance, the paper written by Matthews, *We Were Caught Unprepared*, appears to have influenced him the most. Published by the US Army Combined Arms Center, this piece—a far weaker and less balanced analysis than Professor Kober's article—takes few prisoners in its contempt for EBO. In his foreword, Col Timothy R. Reese argues that “his [Matthews's] research convincingly argues that the Israeli reliance on poorly understood and controversial Effects-Based Operations (EBO) and Systemic Operational Design (SOD) warfighting theories, and a nearly singular dependence on air power, were root causes of Israeli problems.”

On occasion, the author's language seems normative to the extent that it borders on becoming less serious as an academic analysis: “For six years, the IDF conducted a counterinsurgency campaign against the Palestinians and developed a doctrine rooted in EBO and high-tech wizardry.” As noted by Matthews, General Mattis chooses to quote Israeli major general Amiram Levin, who evidently considers Israel’s new (EBO) doctrine “in complete contradiction to the most important basic principles of operating an army in general . . . and is not based upon, and even ignores, the universal fundamentals of warfare. . . . This is not a concept that is better or worse. It is a completely mistaken concept that could not succeed and should never have been relied upon.”

The general also cites Matthews's analysis: “‘EBO proponents within the IDF came to believe that an enemy could be completely immobilized by precision air attacks against critical military systems’ and that ‘little or no land forces would be required since it would not be necessary to destroy the enemy.’” To some extent, this quotation illustrates the tone of Matthews's paper, a land-centric analysis published by the US Army Combined Arms Center in order to provide—in the author's words—“valid and important lessons for today’s US Army officers.”

The author's study lacks the breadth and balance necessary to give an adequate account of the overarching political and military dynamic
at play, a fact reflected in the titles of its four chapters: “The 2000 Israeli Withdrawal from Lebanon”; “Planning for the Second Lebanon War”; “Opening Moves: 12 July to 16 July”; and “The Ground War: 17 July to 14 August.” This deficiency paves the way for overstating the role of EBO. Whereas Kober pointed out the lack of strategic thinking and guidance as one of several factors that caused the problems of the IDF during the war, Matthews hardly touches upon that matter. In other words, his analysis does not include the fundamental issue of a political and military leadership that neither provided a military strategy for the war nor adequately identified what it wanted to accomplish. Subsequently, there are no discussions about how these pivotal factors interplayed with a number of other matters that this paper chooses to emphasize—a fundamental analytical error that severely reduces the validity of its conclusions.

Moreover, one encounters some confusion as to whether the problem is the concept of EBO or its proponents (an issue that this article addresses later on)—in this case, Gen Dan Halutz, the IDF chief of staff, who appears to be the enfant terrible—and as to where the concept of EBO borders the more general features of various other concepts and improved technology. Do standoff precision weapons, increased reliance on technology, enhanced belief in airpower in general, network-centric warfare, RMA, systemic operational design, and other factors at play in this war necessarily adhere to the logic of EBO? Matthews’s work seems more a general critique of “a past way of thinking” that tends to overfocus on these issues at the expense of ground forces and the need to dominate the battlefield. Although parts of this notion have some appeal, the analysis would have benefited from a more precise and balanced discussion of the concept of EBO, with its inherent strengths and weaknesses. A certain lack of intellectual honesty seems inherent in the way the author chooses to approach this concept—an approach that reduces the analytical precision, which in turn diminishes the validity of its conclusions. Granted, his paper includes interesting passages and valid arguments on a number of points, but its
overall structure renders the piece largely unsuitable as an empirical case study that categorically denounces the concept of EBO.

General Mattis’s use of the Winograd Report as a basis for his assessment of EBO reveals a somewhat selective use of information. As this article shows, the key finding of the report is the limited strategic thinking within the Israeli government and IDF leadership when going to war—not a stinging critique of the concept of EBO. The Winograd Report points out that Israel entered this war without adequately thinking through what it wanted to achieve and without a thorough understanding of the context at hand—a premature and rash decision that “limited Israel’s range of options.” The report concludes that Israel went to war with “serious failings and flaws in the lack of strategic thinking and planning” and with “serious failings and shortcomings in the decision-making processes and staff-work in the political and the military echelons and their interface”; further, it found “serious failings and flaws in the quality of preparedness, decision-making and performance in the IDF high command.”

The Interim Winograd Report is particularly harsh in its evaluation of the three main figures of the war: Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Minister of Defense Amir Peretz, and General Halutz, the IDF chief of staff. Although the report states that many others share responsibility for the mistakes of this war, it points out that “the decision to respond with an immediate, intensive military strike was not based on a detailed, comprehensive and authorized military plan, [or] based on careful study of the complex characteristics of the Lebanon arena.” The report concludes that had the three “acted better—the decisions in the relevant period and the ways they were made, as well as the outcome of the war, would have been significantly better.” It blames the prime minister for having “made up his mind hastily, despite the fact that no detailed military plan was submitted to him and without asking for one” and for not systematically consulting others “despite not having experience in external-political and military affairs.” The report offers even harsher criticism of the minister of defense, who “did not have knowledge or experience in mili-
tary, political or governmental matters. He also did not have good knowledge of the basic principles of using military force to achieve political goals,” leading to a somewhat devastating conclusion: “In all these ways, the Minister of Defense failed in fulfilling his functions. Therefore, his serving as Minister of Defense during the war impaired Israel’s ability to respond well to its challenges.” Additionally, it declares that the chief of staff was unprepared “for the event of the abduction despite recurring alerts” and that, among other things, “he responded impulsively” when the abduction happened. In effect, Israel’s own Winograd Commission labeled its prime minister, defense minister, and IDF chief of staff incompetent in managing the war.

The Limits of Israel’s Strategic Thinking

According to the Winograd Report, the lack of adequate handling of the war left Israel with only two main military options “with its coherent internal logic, and its set of costs and disadvantages”:

The first was a short, painful, strong and unexpected blow on Hezbollah, primarily through standoff fire-power. The second option was to bring about a significant change of the reality in the South of Lebanon with a large ground operation, including a temporary occupation of the South of Lebanon and “cleaning” it of Hezbollah military infrastructure.

In other words, more adequate handling would have increased the number of options, but this was not the case, so the two alternatives represented the only choices. Logically, the final selection depended on what one wanted to attain—something not clear at the time.

Few Israelis—if any—wanted to invade Lebanon and stay there long enough to root out the Hezbollah threat to Israel’s northern border. They did not want to reengage in a painful occupation like the one from 1982 to 2000—at least not on the basis of two abducted soldiers. So even a large ground operation would have had limited strategic ambitions. The Winograd Report is likely right in its assessment that, in reality, the handling of the war left Israel with only two principal military options and that even
the most hard-hitting military option was in effect reduced to “temporary occupation of the South of Lebanon and ‘cleaning’ it of Hezbollah military infrastructure,” mentioned above. In fact, Gen Eyal Ben-Reuven, former battalion commander in the First Lebanon War (1982) and deputy commander of Israel’s Northern Command in 2006, points out that when we withdrew from Lebanon in 2000, we went out from a weak position. We feel that we went out because we did not know what to do. We had casualties every year, and we did not have particularly clear targets and objectives for that, except to keep the border. The hatred of our forces in Lebanon was increasing. We spent 18 years in Lebanon. As the deputy commander of Northern Command in 2006, I understood very well that we could not stay in Lebanon. That is why my planning was to make the operation very short, with a lot of forces, with limited objectives to achieve.22

The same can be said of a limited operation using airpower and standoff firepower. It would surely not root out Hezbollah as a future threat to Israel by targeting its forces in southern Lebanon. Before the war, the Israeli Air Force pointed out that it could not operate effectively against the short-range Katyusha rockets.23 The tactical use of airpower against Hezbollah operatives in southern Lebanon would have been of limited assistance.24

Still, one could probably argue that if Israel sought to reestablish its breached deterrence posture by raising the more general cost to both Hezbollah and the Lebanese community at large, then the relevance of airpower would increase significantly.25 General Ben-Reuven argues along those lines: “If you ask me about the parameters of this war, we killed more than 700 Hezbollah soldiers/terrorists, and we explained to all of them that if you kidnap Israeli soldiers, we become ‘crazy’ and we will fight you with all we’ve got.”26 Similarly, according to General Halutz, “The concept was to react beyond the expectations—a lot beyond, dramatically beyond—to cause [the enemy] damage so that he would not dare to do something like this in the future. I wanted to charge him a price that makes him think 10 times next time before he will dare to violate the status quo.”27 This was not clear when Israel went to war and was hardly agreed upon as its strategy after the war.
Furthermore, the choice of military means and concepts—as well as the particular combination to use—depends on many factors, predominant among them providing political guidance and direction for realizing the objectives and having a military strategy that chisels out the objectives the military should seek to attain. The lack of such direction significantly reduces the war effort’s chance of succeeding, regardless of one’s preferred military concept. By and large, that is what happened in Israel’s war against Hezbollah in 2006.

Gen Giora Eiland, head of Israel’s National Security Council until shortly before the war, argues that establishment of the strategic goal for the operation should have governed Israel’s response:

The strategic goal is the answer to the most important question, What do we want to achieve? The second important question is, What do we have to do in order to achieve the strategic goal? Finally you have to ask yourself, How do we plan to execute the mission in order to achieve the goal? Now, these questions need to be answered in a very clear way at the strategic level and then conveyed to the military level. Sadly, this process was missing in this particular situation.28

In line with the Winograd Report’s conclusions, Eiland maintains that “real, serious, and professional discussions on how to respond to the abductions did not take place in the Israeli government that day.” In reality, says Eiland, the government simply decided to “begin to attack Lebanon or to attack in Lebanon, and [determine] what to do later. Such a decision at the political level makes it almost impossible for the military level to develop a clear and well-coordinated military plan.”29

Similarly, the Winograd Report concludes that “this outcome [failure to win the war] was primarily caused by the fact that, from the very beginning, the war has not been conducted on the basis of deep understanding of the theatre of operations, of the IDF’s readiness and preparedness, and of basic principles of using military power to achieve a political and diplomatic goal.”30 Thus, the key factors pointed out by the Israelis themselves do not immediately seem to include any specific military concept, but an approach to the conflict—on both the political and the military strategic levels—that simply proved inadequate
and largely incompetent. Regarding the extent to which the IDF relied on the EBO concept, General Eiland points out that

EBO was not the problem. All this kind of talk shows a fundamental lack of understanding because the use of concepts—air force versus ground forces or other means—depends on a large number of variables. So it is not a matter of concept; it is a matter of how to choose the right combination of answers depending on terrain, on the enemy, and on a number of other circumstances. In 2006 this was not the main problem—the main problem was the lack of strategic understanding at the political level, which did not provide the answers to the key questions one should have asked and answered: What are the strategic goal(s) for this operation? What is the mission to achieve this goal? And how should this mission be executed in order to achieve the strategic goal(s)? Without this, a sound military plan could not be—and was not—devised by the IDF.³¹

A general Israeli reluctance to reengage militarily on the ground in Lebanon and the perceived quagmire this action would entail constitute one of the key factors shaping this operation. General Ben-Reuven says that a very important shaping factor of the war was the fact that when the IDF pulled out of Lebanon in 2000, “the Israeli society and Israeli politicians did not want to hear the name Lebanon again—they did not want to reengage and go back there.” Thus, when the abduction took place, the desire to call up reservists and invade the southern part of Lebanon with a large ground force was obviously not a first choice.³² Rather, as General Halutz explains, “Ground forces became the last choice. We certainly would not want to retry our Lebanese experience. In fact, the [Israeli] government explained to me in no uncertain terms from the start that they were not interested in a ground campaign in Lebanon.”³³ Both generals note a certain risk aversion as well as a more general perception among politicians and Israeli society at large that casualty numbers were a critical factor that had to be managed and kept to a minimum. Indeed, this factor influenced the political and military approach to the war. The costs of a ground invasion in terms of one’s own casualties had to be compared to the relative cost of the abduction and the potential gains from a limited ground operation.³⁴
From this perspective, Israeli politicians appear to have been more inclined to use airpower. General Ben-Reuven argues that “when Gen Dan Halutz told our prime minister that he had a new concept for conducting the war from the air without ground forces—without casualties or with much fewer casualties—of course, the political echelon liked it very, very much.” General Halutz counters that such a perception simply is not true, claiming that nothing like that was ever communicated to the prime minister or to anyone else. More generally, however, Halutz admits that “airpower has become more important—at least in the Israeli society—because the Israeli society has become more sensitive to casualties. More sensitivity to casualties means that you have to use elements and means that by their nature are less exposed to massive casualties.”

He declares that the notion of Israel’s adopting the US-founded EBO concept is flawed, saying that a close relationship exists between the US Air Force and the Israeli Air Force but that the Israelis have adopted their own approach to war, based on their own unique experiences during the past decades:

*Effects-based operations* is an inadequate term which does not describe properly our approach war or the way I would conduct wars. EBO is not only related to airpower. EBO can be related to land or naval forces as well. Airpower is one of the tools that may serve the theory of EBO, but rather there are EBO elements in the way we approach war. I don’t think that we have adopted EBO—we developed parts of it to the needs of the Israeli theater, to the Middle East theater, but that is all.

Like General Halutz, General Ben-Reuven stresses that the main problem was not EBO:

Unfortunately, we had a trio at the strategic level that simply was not up to the job. We had a prime minister that had too little experience in national security issues, a defense minister that knew nothing about war in general and the Lebanon theater in particular, and a chief of staff that relied too heavily on airpower. I absolutely support the Winograd Report, which points out the need for better decision making at the strategic level and the need for a better and more professional staff that can contribute to this end.
Conclusion

Although one may have many reasons for criticizing the concept of EBO, singling out the Second Lebanon War as a good empirical case study to illustrate the point is misguided. If, as this article has demonstrated, the empirical foundation of those claims lacks substance, that fact should have implications for the future debate on this issue. This article indirectly asked whether serious flaws in the way one approaches war more generally—instead of the EBO concept—represent the key problem of the past two decades. The wars that occurred during that time (Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Israel) appear marked by significant defects in the most basic premise for utilizing force: sound military strategic thinking. In his notable article “The Lost Meaning of Strategy,” Prof. Hew Strachan observes that “the state . . . has an interest in re-appropriating the control and direction of war. That is the purpose of strategy. Strategy is designed to make war useable by the state, so that it can, if need be, use force to fulfil its political objectives.”39 Debating EBO without acknowledging the more general challenges of strategic thinking in the wars portrayed by General Mattis and others as empirical evidence of the flaws of that concept is somewhat intellectually dishonest and analytically misguided. Including the overarching issues of military strategy would prove beneficial to both the EBO debate and—more importantly—the more general discussion about the utility of force.

Notes

1. Gen J. N. Mattis, commander, US Joint Forces Command, to US Joint Forces Command, memorandum, 14 August 2008, 1, http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/usjfcomebo memo.pdf. This article will not enter the debate about what EBO is or should be; rather, it addresses General Mattis’s methodology of assessing the concept—not the concept as such. It therefore considers a general definition of EBO adequate for the reader, specifically the one provided by US Joint Forces Command since, as commander, General Mattis presumably had it in mind at the time he wrote his memorandum: “[EBO is] a process for obtaining a desired strategic outcome or effect on the enemy through the synergistic and cumulative application of the full range of military and non-military capabilities at all levels of conflict.” Lt Col Allen W. Batschelet, “Effects-Based Operations: A New Operational Model?,” strategy


4. Mattis, memorandum, [4].

5. Ibid., 2.


8. Matthews, We Were Caught Unprepared, iii.

9. Ibid., 3.

10. Mattis, memorandum, [4]. See also Matthews, We Were Caught Unprepared, 62.

11. Mattis, memorandum, [4]. See also Matthews, We Were Caught Unprepared, 24.

12. Matthews, We Were Caught Unprepared, 3.


14. Ibid., point 12.


16. Ibid., point 10.

17. Ibid., point 11.

18. Ibid., point 12.

19. Ibid., point 13.

20. Ibid., point 14. The term abduction refers to the incident on 12 July 2006, in which a patrol of two Hummers with seven IDF soldiers was attacked by Hezbollah on the Israeli-Lebanese border. Ehud “Udi” Goldwasser and Eldad Regev were abducted by Hezbollah, while three other soldiers were killed during the abduction. Two soldiers were injured during the attack but managed to escape. This event triggered the so-called Second Lebanon War (2006). See Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, 34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah, and the War in Lebanon (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), chap. 1, 1–15.


22. Gen Eyal Ben-Reuven, interview with the author, Tel Aviv, Israel, 29 June 2010.


24. For information on Hezbollah tactics to avoid Israel’s asymmetric advantage in airpower, precision-guided munitions, and standoff firepower, see Brig Gen Itai Brun [IDF],

25. For further reading on Israel’s strategy on the eve of war, see as a starting point Dag Henriksen, “Deterrence by Default? Israel’s Military Strategy in the 2006 War against Hezbollah,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 35, no. 1 (February 2012): 95–120.


27. Gen Dan Halutz, interview with the author, Tel Aviv, Israel, 24 June 2010.


29. Ibid.


31. Eiland, interview.

32. Ben-Reuven, interview.

33. Halutz, interview.

34. Ben-Reuven, interview; and Halutz, interview.

35. Ben-Reuven, interview.

36. Halutz, interview.

37. Ibid.

38. Ben-Reuven, interview.


---

**Maj Dag Henriksen, PhD, Royal Norwegian Air Force Academy, US Air Force Research Institute**

Major Henriksen (PhD, University of Glasgow, United Kingdom) is senior lecturer in airpower at the Royal Norwegian Air Force Academy. A fighter controller and air battle manager by trade, he served as airspace manager in the combined joint operations center at Headquarters International Security Assistance Force, Kabul, Afghanistan, in 2007. He has written a number of articles and books on airpower and strategy. A graduate of the Norwegian Staff College in 2010, Major Henriksen is currently an exchange officer at the US Air Force Research Institute at Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

---

**Let us know what you think! Leave a comment!**

**Distribution A: Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.**

**Disclaimer**

The views and opinions expressed or implied in the *Journal* are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government.

This article may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If it is reproduced, the *Air and Space Power Journal* requests a courtesy line.

http://www.airpower.au.af.mil