U.S. Force Posture Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region:

An Independent Assessment

Center for Strategic and International Studies

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U.S. Force Posture Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region:

An Independent Assessment

Center for Strategic and International Studies

June 27, 2012

Cover Letter from Dr. John Hamre

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Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am pleased to transmit to you the study that CSIS was asked to undertake to comply with Section 346 of the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act. That Section directed that the Defense Department to commission an independent assessment of U.S. force posture in Asia. CSIS is honored to have been given this task. The very capable team—led by co-directors David Berteau and Michael Green—stand ready to follow up with the Department in any way concerning the issues we discuss in this report, but I also want to share some specific views with you.

America’s national security depends on a stable and peaceful international order, especially in Asia. President Obama recognized this fundamental reality when he spoke of the need to rebalance U.S. forces globally to reflect the importance of a rising Asia. We found a strong consensus on this overall objective within the Department, in the policy community generally, and especially with allies and partner countries. But we also found no durable operational framework guiding the specific efforts toward that goal, and without that framework, we found many discontinuities. Understandably we begin with a history that has placed our forces in specific locations in Asia. But the future will entail new challenges that now need to be addressed. The ongoing deliberations are shaped more by the legacy of the past (for example arguing about where to relocate particular facilities) than by the security imperatives of the next thirty years. The repositioning of forces in the region has strategic consequences that will shape the trajectory of the next three decades. We need but currently lack an operational framework to match that strategic imperative.

This report outlines the broad dimensions of a durable operational framework, but not every detail. That should be the work of the Department in coming months and years. The work, however, cannot wait until all details are worked through before we act. There are too many challenges of an immediate nature that must be addressed. We found that there were important near-term steps
that must be addressed. We found that there were important near-term steps that could be taken that fit well into a future operational framework. Many of those steps are not controversial and could be implemented relatively quickly. All of them need to be judged in the context of a thirty-year vision.

America sustained a remarkably consistent defense policy for fifty years of the Cold War because our national leaders at the outset established a durable consensus on national challenges and strategic objectives. We now need a comparable framework for the next thirty years in Asia. Our goal, of course, is never to have to fight a war. By shaping the security environment through the active engagement of our forces in the region working with allies and partners, we can contribute to a stable, peaceful and prosperous Asia that is good for all nations in the region and good for the world.

Again, let me thank you for giving us an opportunity to undertake this important work. We received active and constructive cooperation from all quarters in the Department these past three months, and on behalf of our study team, we thank you and all the involved staff for supporting this work. The report and its conclusions and recommendations, of course, are ours alone.

Sincerely,

John J. Hamre
President and CEO
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The president signed the Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, or Public Law 112-81) in December 2012, setting in motion the requirement under Section 346 of the NDAA to commission a report on force posture and deployment plans of the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). One week later, on January 5, 2012, the president released at the Department of Defense (DoD) a new Strategic Guidance document that directed a rebalancing toward the Asia Pacific region of military forces and national security efforts across the government. This guidance, and the Fiscal Year 2013 defense budget, marks only the beginning of force posture rebalancing. In March, DoD tasked the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) to undertake that study, with a report due 180 days after enactment, or by the end of June, 2012.

At one level, PACOM force posture is tied to current deployments and activities in the region and to announced plans to modify such deployments. Chief among these are plans for replacing Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma and funding for additional military construction needed to transfer Marines from Okinawa to Guam. These plans are at the center of a logjam between DoD, which would like to implement them, and the Congress, which is reluctant to authorize funding absent better details about cost and long-term master plans. This report tackles those issues and proposes a way to break that logjam.

However, the stakes for the United States in the Asia Pacific region go well beyond the scope of military construction projects. This report focuses on the larger question of how to align U.S. force posture to overall U.S. national interests in the Asia Pacific region. Current U.S. force posture is heavily tilted toward Northeast Asia, to Korea and Japan, where it focuses properly on deterring the threats of major conflicts on the Korean peninsula, off Japan, and in the Taiwan Strait. However, as evidenced by recent Chinese activities in the South China Sea and throughout the Pacific islands, the stakes are growing fastest in South and Southeast Asia. To be successful, U.S. strategic rebalancing needs to do more in those areas, while simultaneously working with major allies in Northeast Asia to shore up deterrence capabilities in the wake of emerging anti-access and area denial (A2AD) threats.

The project team concluded that DoD has not adequately articulated the strategy behind its force posture planning nor aligned the strategy with resources in a way that reflects current budget realities. DoD needs to explain the purposes of force posture adjustments in light of the new security challenges in the Asia Pacific region. In the past, force posture decisions have been benchmarked against plans, including the capabilities required to prevail over potential adversaries. However, the top priority of U.S. strategy in Asia is not to prepare for a conflict with China; rather, it is to shape the environment so that such a conflict is never necessary and perhaps someday inconceivable. It is therefore critical that the United States can achieve and maintain a balanced combination of assurance and dissuasion to shape the environment. This requires a force posture that enables the PACOM commander to undertake actions that include capacity building for partners that face internal and external vulnerabilities, cooperation on common challenges such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and joint and combined training that enhances interoperability and makes for more effective coalitions in crises. Since
winning the peace is the first objective of U.S. strategy in the Asia Pacific region, the report’s leading recommendation highlights measures DoD can take to enhance shaping and reassurance activities. Recommendation One emphasizes the need to:

- Better align engagement strategy under PACOM and across DoD, including improved integration of PACOM with its component commands, between PACOM and Service force providers, and among PACOM, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and key interagency players (e.g., the Department of State).

The U.S. ability to shape the security environment will depend on continued momentum in commitments made to align force posture to the evolving security dynamics in the region. The current impasse between DoD and the Congress is not cost-free in terms of U.S. strategic influence in the region. At the same time, the scope and cost uncertainties associated with some of DoD’s realignment proposals have raised important concerns in the Congress that must be addressed. Recommendations Two and Three emphasize the need to:

- Implement the April 2012 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) agreement to disperse four Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) across the Pacific, but with the following caveats:
  1. Ensure that implementation of the distributed lay down plan is incremental, prioritized, and affordable with reversible milestones reported to the Congress annually;
  2. In the near-term, prioritize improvements in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) that would be mission essential (particularly training, pipeline protection, and some infrastructure improvements), even if fewer Marines move to Guam from Okinawa; and
  3. Proceed with plans to relocate MCAS Futenma to Henoko while continuing to examine alternative courses of action to mitigate risks.

- Implement the U.S.-Korea Strategic Alliance 2015, but with the following caveats:
  1. Track progress toward and adjust schedules for Operational Control (OPCON) transition and Combined Forces Command (CFC) dissolution via demonstrated achievement of scheduled actions and command and control arrangements (including possible mutually agreed to changes in supported-supporting relationships) and major changes in threat and conditions; and
  2. Examine the option of replacing current U.S. ground combat units in Korea with rotations of trained and ready mechanized infantry, full combat artillery and aviation (including previously moved squadrons) brigades (with Eighth Army, 2nd Infantry Division, and the 210 artillery brigade headquarters permanently forward). Part of the review should be on the impact on readiness, overall cost, and more robust capability.

The ability of the United States to work with allies and partners in shaping the environment will depend on the perceptions of those allies and partners and of potential adversaries of the U.S. ability to prevail in the event of conflict. U.S. force posture must demonstrate a readiness and capacity to fight and win, even under more challenging circumstances associated with A2AD and other threats to U.S. military operations in the Western Pacific. The project team identified key
investment areas that would strengthen all force posture options across the range of military operations. Recommendation Four emphasizes the need to:

- Add additional capabilities to PACOM:
  1. Station one or more additional attack submarines (SSNs) in Guam to provide a critical advantage in an A2AD environment;
  2. Deploy a second amphibious ready group (ARG) from the Atlantic to the Pacific to fill lift and maneuver shortfalls for the Marines;
  3. Increase stockpiles of critical ammunition and weapons and replenish and upgrade prepositioned equipment and supplies;
  4. Expand the use of U.S. Marines to develop and refine expeditionary defense capabilities with key allies and partners; and
  5. Focus near-term investments in survivability of deployed forces on providing Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) units for Guam and Kadena Air Base, dispersal of airfields and expanded runway repair capabilities, dispersal of tanker aircraft (rather than funding for hardening related facilities in Guam), and constructing and upgrading a fuel pipeline on Guam.

This report recommends holding the line on current force posture levels with modest increases in investment and re-alignment measures listed above. The fastest way to undercut regional confidence in the U.S. commitment and the American ability to continue to shape decisions and preserve peace would be to adopt a posture that pulled back from the Western Pacific and focused on the survivability of U.S. forces and on reducing annual costs associated with forward presence. That said, DoD and the Congress need to recognize and plan for the possibility of additional defense budget adjustments in the years ahead. The final recommendation of the report focuses on the need to:

- Examine possible force posture and basing efficiencies, including squadron consolidation (Misawa, Kunsan) and adjustment of units on Korea no longer aligned with Continental United States (CONUS)-based formations.

Overall, DoD is reasonably well positioned to align and focus U.S. force posture in the Asia Pacific region. What is needed is an expanded, integrated PACOM focus on engagement, supported by the approval of incremental funding for key enabling actions that would be valuable and important regardless of future force posture moves. Those incremental approvals should be tied to clear milestones with reporting requirements, so that DoD can begin to move out now and realize the potential benefits of additional engagements, new partnerships, and stronger alliances.
INTRODUCTION

In June 2011, the Secretary of Defense announced in Singapore that the United States would seek a “geographically distributed, operationally resilient and politically sustainable” U.S. force posture in the Asia Pacific region, with a focus on air superiority and mobility, long-range strike, nuclear deterrence, maritime access, space and cyberspace, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. In early 2012, the Department of Defense (DoD) released a new Strategic Guidance, stating that the U.S. military will “rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region” and “emphasize our existing alliances” while expanding “our networks of cooperation with emerging partners throughout the Asia-Pacific to ensure collective capability and capacity for securing common interests.” The President’s budget proposal for Fiscal Year 2013 (FY13) outlines several steps toward implementation of this Strategic Guidance, but most actions will emerge in future DoD programs and budgets. The nature, components, and locations of the future U.S. force posture in the Pacific Command Area of Responsibility (PACOM AOR) continues to evolve to reflect this Strategic Guidance and the renewed emphasis on the Asia Pacific region.

The decisions taken in the FY13 proposed budget and incorporated into agreements with the governments of Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea), and other allies and partners in the region provide several building blocks of a re-balanced force posture. These building blocks include:

- Moving select U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) units from Okinawa and evolving into four Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) to be located in Okinawa, Guam, Hawaii, and Australia; reducing the number of Marines that will move to Guam from 8,000 to 4,700; and capping the total number of Marines in Okinawa at about half their pre-Operation Enduring Freedom number.

- Delinking the construction of the Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) from the Guam move and providing Japanese Facilities Improvement Program (JFIP) support for annual MCAS Futenma maintenance in the interim.

- Relocating a carrier wing (CV-5) from Atsugi to Iwakuni.

- Constructing additional training areas on the island of Tinian and other islands in the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas Islands (CNMI).

- Moving U.S. military forces from Seoul to U.S. Army Garrison (USAG) Humphreys (near Pyeongtaek) and transitioning Operational Control (OPCON) to the ROK pursuant to the U.S.-ROK Strategic Alliance 2015 agreement of July 2010.

- Rotationally deploying 2-4 Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) in Singapore.

- Completing additional access and defense cooperation arrangements with the Republic of the Philippines and undertaking similar discussions with Vietnam and other nations.
The outline of these new force posture elements has raised or reinforced a number of critical questions from U.S. congressional committee and member offices. While the revised agreement with Japan regarding Okinawa and Guam was seen as more easily implemented than the original Defense Policy Review Initiative plan that linked the Marine relocation and FRF issues, Congress remains skeptical of overall costs and schedules, given earlier inaccurate estimates of Guam’s infrastructure and economic assistance needs. This problem has been compounded by the fact that geographically distributing forces adds new variables and potential delays to calculations about cost and executability. These variables include the involvement of more governments (and levels of government) in decision-making (e.g., Australia, Guam, Hawaii), additional supplemental environmental impact statements (SEISs), and new requirements for lift and logistics over a larger geographic area. Moreover, with the functional distribution of roles and missions to put more emphasis on shaping and reassurance activities and with DoD’s shift to adaptive planning over the past decade, preparing for larger contingency operations has become a less predictable benchmark for determining budgets for military construction and force posture. Finally, there is a lack of consensus between the executive and legislative branches regarding strategy toward China. In part this is because the strategy is still evolving, in part because sensitivities in the region constrain DoD’s ability to describe the strategy, and in part because the Congress is not itself focused on the strategic framework of budget-related decisions.

In Section 346 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (2012 NDAA; Public Law 112-81), the Congress required DoD to commission an independent assessment of force posture options for the Pacific Command Area of Responsibility, to include the following elements:

(A) A review of current and emerging U.S. national security interests in the U.S. Pacific Command area of responsibility.

(B) A review of current U.S. military force posture and deployment plans of the U.S. Pacific Command.

(C) Options for the realignment of U.S. forces in the region to respond to new opportunities presented by allies and partners.

(D) The views of noted policy leaders and regional experts, including military commanders in the region.

DoD chose the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) to conduct the assessment, and this report is one of the principal products of that assessment, along with an accompanying classified annex of supporting facts and citations. The findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in this report reflect the views of the project team and do not represent any official views or positions of any part of the U.S. Government, except where cited directly from government sources.

Methodology and Organization of the Report

In order to fulfill the tasking from DoD and the requirements of the 2012 NDAA, CSIS organized an internal project team under the direction of Mr. David Berteau, Director of the
CSIS International Security Program, and Dr. Michael Green, CSIS Senior Adviser and Japan Chair, following task award on March 23, 2012. Before conducting the larger assessment, CSIS was requested by the Department of Defense to complete on short notice a preliminary review of a bilateral realignment plan being negotiated in preparation for the April 27 U.S.-Japan SCC meeting. The project team completed that assessment and delivered it to DoD on April 16 before turning to the large study on the broader PACOM AOR. DoD provided that initial assessment to Congress on April 23, and the U.S. and Japanese governments announced the most recent SCC Agreement days later. After completing the DoD-requested initial assessment, the project team began the study required by Section 346 of the 2012 NDAA.

To assist with the PACOM-wide study, the project team also established a group of independent advisors that included:

- Ambassador Richard Armitage, former Deputy Secretary of State;
- Admiral Timothy Keating, USN (ret), former PACOM Commander;
- General Walter “Skip” Sharp, USA (ret), Commander of United States Forces Korea, Combined Forces Command, and United Nations Command (USFK, CFC, and UNC, respectively);
- General Howard Chandler, USAF (ret), former Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) Commander;
- LtGen Wallace “Chip” Gregson, USMC (ret), former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs and commander of Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC); and
- Mr. Andrew Shearer, former Foreign Policy Advisor to Australian Prime Minister John Howard.

These advisors and numerous others provided critical inputs and review, but only the project team’s authors are responsible for the final analysis and recommendations in this report.

In addition, during May and June, members of the project team visited Japan (Tokyo, Okinawa), Korea, Guam, and Hawaii (including PACOM headquarters as well as the component and subordinate unified commands). The project team also used inputs from trips to Southeast Asia by CSIS Southeast Asia Director Ernest Bower and to Korea by CSIS Korea Chair Victor Cha, and it held a roundtable on force posture options with experts organized by CSIS Pacific Forum in Hawaii. In the course of these trips and in meetings held in Washington, DC, and elsewhere, the project team interviewed more than 250 policy leaders, regional experts, and current and former military commanders from the United States and allied and partner nations. These interviews were conducted on an off-the-record basis to encourage candor and a free-flowing exchange of ideas.

Based on these inputs, the project team reviewed U.S. national security interests, strategic dynamics within the region, current force posture, announced plans, and alternate options for force posture developed by the project team. The report includes the following four sections.
Section One provides an overview of current and emerging U.S. national security interests; delineates emerging force posture requirements; and assesses U.S. advantages, constraints, risks and areas for further investment that should inform force posture planning going forward.

Section Two provides the regional context and assesses major allies, partners and actors in terms of: (1) U.S. interests and objectives; (2) the particular partner’s strategic interests and objectives; (3) the particular partner’s defense strategy and plans; (4) views of U.S. forward posture and prospects for engagement and access; and (5) political risks.

Section Three describes and assesses options for U.S. force posture in the Asia Pacific region, covering an array of potential force posture variations.

- **Option 1: As Is, Where Is** describes the current disposition of U.S. forces in the region as of June 2012, not including announced plans that have yet to be implemented. The Option 1 assessment describes shortfalls and risks in the current force posture, given strategic changes in the region, thereby demonstrating the consequences of inaction on realignment. It also establishes a baseline for assessing other options (and the degree to which those other options address risks) and for evaluating cost differentials among options (since other options may increase, decrease, or hold steady current costs).

- **Option 2: Planned Posture** is based on announced DoD agreements and associated plans for realignment of U.S. forces in the Asia Pacific region. It reflects current planned changes to PACOM force posture. In its assessment of Option 2, the project team assesses those planned changes. It also takes “excursions” to examine alternate paths to achieve currently planned force posture objectives in light of political or operational obstacles (e.g., Futenma Replacement Facility alternatives to Henoko, variations on “tour normalization” in South Korea).

- **Option 3: Increased Posture** proposes a future force posture based on increased requirements for capabilities and resources in the region. It describes sets of capabilities that would measurably improve operations while illustrating the constraints across the region imposed by absorption limits and budgetary realities. Capability sets include increased air, sea, and ground forces, increased lift and logistics, and increased engagement (e.g., training, exercising, equipping) with partner nations in the region.

- **Option 4: Decreased Posture** proposes a future force posture based on significant reductions in capabilities and resources for Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force forces in the PACOM AOR; it does not reflect reductions for Navy forces. It evaluates the consequences of reducing U.S. forces in the region. The rationale underpinning removal of forces from PACOM’s AOR could be to revert forces to the continental United States (CONUS) for greater adaptability to emerging global needs or simply reduce the U.S. military as a budgetary consequence of decreased U.S. defense spending.

The options are assessed using criteria derived from previous CSIS studies on defense policy choices. The criteria are largely consistent with some of DoD’s own criteria but provide more precise analytical sub-criteria (more detail is in Section Three). The criteria are:
- **Geostrategic Security/Political Military**: The extent to which the option improves relations with Asian allies and partners, dissuades potential adversaries, and shapes strategic behavior.

- **Operational/Force Structure and Management**: The extent to which the option provides the military capabilities necessary to maintain peace, commerce, U.S. influence, and global security commitments and to assure, dissuade, deter, or defeat potential adversaries.

- **Affordability**: The extent to which likely implementation and sustainment costs differ from the status quo.

- **Executability**: The extent to which the option is feasible and can be implemented and sustained within desired time frames.

This report does not address risks associated with **space or cyberspace capabilities**. All interviewees asserted that cyber and space are major facets of a strategy for the Asia Pacific region; many interviewees called for an increase in the PACOM budget for cyberspace and space operations. Cyberspace attacks emanating from Russia and China represent a significant problem, and incidents from North Korea are increasing as well. An interruption of U.S. and partner nation communication and data links would affect U.S. ability to execute operations in the Asia Pacific region. However, the project team concludes that while space and cyberspace are two domains in which the United States must achieve superiority in the Asia Pacific region, for force posture purposes, the subject area requires further exploration.

**Section Four** provides the findings and recommendations from the project, drawing from U.S. interests and the lessons from the four options evaluated. These recommendations represent steps that DoD and the Congress should consider with respect to implementing force posture realignment plans in today’s evolving geostrategic and diminishing resource environments.

Overall, this report presents a rapidly developed assessment of the U.S force posture in the Asia Pacific region that is fresh in perspective, comprehensive in scope, grounded in practical actions, and flexible in its anticipation of future changes in the region. If the region evolves in positive directions that support U.S. and global interests, the posture improvements and actions recommended in this report are designed to commit only those resources needed. If the region evolves in more negative directions, the posture recommendations provide a solid basis for necessary and appropriate U.S. responses.
SECTION ONE: CURRENT AND EMERGING U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS

Enduring Interests and New Challenges

U.S. engagement with the Asia Pacific region began with the first passage of the Empress of China from New York harbor in 1784 to export ginseng from western Pennsylvania and bring home tea and china wares from Canton. Today six of the ten fastest growing major export markets for the United States are in Asia, and 60 percent of U.S. goods exported abroad go to the region. Meanwhile, the region is home to five of the eight states recognized as being in possession of nuclear weapons, three of the world’s top six defense budgets, six of the world’s largest militaries (i.e., U.S., China, Vietnam, North Korea, South Korea, India), two conflict areas from the Cold War era (i.e., Taiwan Strait, Korea), continuing tensions between India and Pakistan, and territorial disputes stretching from the Northern Territories of Japan through the East and South China Seas and into South Asia. For four centuries, Asia has been the object of Western influence; now events in Asia are defining the security and prosperity of the world as a whole. The American public understands these trends. Americans defined Europe as the most important region to the United States in public opinion polls taken on foreign policy until 2011. Since then, polls show that the American public has identified Asia as the most important region to U.S. interests.

Historically, U.S. interests in Asia have been defined around three inter-related themes: protection of the American people, expansion of trade and economic opportunity, and support for universal democratic norms. Since the decline of British maritime power in the Pacific at the end of the 19th Century, the underlying geostrategic objective for the United States in Asia and the Pacific has been to maintain a balance of power that prevents the rise of any hegemonic state from within the region that could threaten U.S. interests by seeking to obstruct American access or dominate the maritime domain.

From that perspective, the most significant problem for the United States in Asia today is China’s rising power, influence, and expectations of regional pre-eminence. This is not a problem that lends itself either to containment strategies such as the ones used in the Cold War or to the use of a condominium comparable to Britain’s response to the rise of American power at the end of the 19th Century. China’s defense spending is projected to be on par with the United States at some point over the next 15-20 years. Depending on the focus of these budgets, and coupled with its aggressive pursuit of territorial claims and anti-access/area denial (A2AD) capabilities in areas such as the East, Philippines, and South China seas, China will be in a position to pose a significant potential military threat to the United States and allies and partners. Yet at the same time, the United States and China have established broad economic interdependence, and Chinese leaders—preoccupied with domestic problems—have consistently rejected internal pressures to challenge U.S. interests in the region overtly. Indeed, the United States has economic and strategic stakes in China’s continued development, particularly since a major reversal of Chinese economic growth would present far more significant risks to U.S. economic and security interests.
This complex mix of interdependence and competition has led the United States and other like-minded states to adopt a strategy towards Beijing that combines assurance and dissuasion: expanding cooperation and encouraging China to become a more global player where possible, while hedging against uncertainties regarding longer-term Chinese intentions. The tipping point between assurance and dissuasion is not precise. Chinese perceptions of U.S. or allied weakness would invite greater Chinese assertiveness, while perceptions that the United States seeks to contain or weaken China risk undermining Beijing’s fundamental assessment that it faces a generally benign external security environment.

Figure 1

![Landscape of Security Challenges](https://example.com/landscape_map.png)

Source: MapResources, formatted by CSIS.

The central problem of encouraging a more positive role from China is further complicated by an array of additional security challenges in the region. North Korea remains the most immediate military threat to U.S. interests. The North’s ability to sustain an invasion of the South may have deteriorated, but Pyongyang’s ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs and uncertainty
about stability under Kim Jong-un are forcing the United States and the Republic of Korea to contemplate additional contingencies, including potential North Korean use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in war-fighting scenarios, horizontal proliferation, provocations comparable to the attacks on the ROK’s Cheonan naval vessel and the island of Yeongpyeong, and regime collapse or instability. Divergences of Washington and Beijing over the handling of these scenarios would introduce a major element of strategic competition in the U.S.-China relationship. In addition, the Asia Pacific region is prone to major natural disasters comparable to the December 2004 Asian tsunami and the March 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami. These types of mega-disasters create not only a humanitarian imperative for action but also have the potential to heighten competition for strategic influence among major powers to the extent that the event impacts internal political legitimacy or stability of smaller states.

Terrorism also continues to pose a threat to the stability of states within South and Southeast Asia and to the U.S. homeland, despite considerable progress against such threats as Jemaah Islamiya and the Abu Sayyaf Group over the past decade in Southeast Asia. Finally, Asia’s leading economies remain highly dependent on maritime, cyberspace, and space commons, but they are also becoming technologically equipped—if they were to become adversaries—to threaten or interrupt those domains. All of these challenges, including those emanating from North Korea, have the potential either to increase cooperative security in the region or to intensify rivalry and conflict.

Role of Forward Presence in U.S. Strategy

The United States has enjoyed a comprehensive set of diplomatic, information, military, and economic instruments of power to advance national interests and shape the strategic environment in the Asia Pacific region. Despite a relative decline in overall American military and economic power when measured against increased influence of other nations (e.g., China), the United States will retain distinct advantages over potential state adversaries for decades to come. Diplomatically, the United States will benefit from the desire of major maritime states on China’s periphery—particularly Japan, Australia, South Korea, and India—to align more closely in a beneficial strategic equilibrium as Chinese power grows. While the United States has sometimes struggled to develop strategic information campaigns, there is strong evidence of U.S. ideational power as Asian societies continue to reject authoritarianism and accept universal norms of democracy, governance, and rule of law.

Economically, U.S. manufacturing exports are poised to increase, energy inputs will remain low, and trade agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement could form a sustainable trans-Pacific trade architecture that sustains U.S. access and influence in the region. Any U.S. strategy towards the Asia Pacific region must integrate all of these instruments of national power and not rely excessively on U.S. military capabilities. Nevertheless, U.S. military power has been foundational for peace, prosperity, and strategic influence in the region and will continue to be so for the foreseeable future.

For more than a century, both geography and strategy have led the United States to rely on forward-deployed forces to project power and maintain stability in Asia and the Pacific. This reliance has been a struggle for a maritime power that is also a republic founded on the principle of self-determination. For example, proposals by the Navy Department to seize the Ryukyu
islands or Formosa as coaling stations in the 1850s were rejected by a President and Congress that eschewed European-style empires. In the first part of the twentieth century, the United States anchored its forward presence in the Philippines and Guam, but U.S. military forces hollowed out in the 1920s and 1930s. Both bastions were lost in the first months after Pearl Harbor, forcing a bloody island-hopping campaign across the Pacific Ocean to defeat Japan. After the war, the United States was uncertain where to maintain military forces in the region. In January 1950, then-Secretary of State Dean Acheson declared that the defensive line against communism would be drawn between Japan and Korea.15 The Korean War erupted three months later with a sudden attack from the North and over 36,000 American lives were lost resisting communist aggression and restoring the boundary line.

The Vietnam War marked the high water mark of U.S. military presence across the Western Pacific, but in subsequent decades, U.S. military forces departed from Vietnam, Thailand, Taiwan, and the Philippines and reduced their presence on Guam. U.S. forces consolidated in the post-Cold War era around key facilities in Japan, Korea, Hawaii, and Alaska, with logistics support arrangements in Singapore. For decades, the size and composition of this force has largely been defined by availability of host nation support and by planning requirements for major security commitments such as the defense of South Korea or responding to potential crises in the Taiwan Strait. DoD’s planning assumption through the 1990s was that assets for broader regional engagements would be drawn from that overall capability.

**Emerging Force Posture Requirements**

In recent years the security requirements in the region have become more functionally and geographically dispersed, including deterring and defeating aggression in Northeast Asia while also shaping the security environment across maritime Southeast Asia, where visible Chinese power and ambitions have raised new uncertainties. At one end of the spectrum in Northeast Asia this requires forces that can credibly deter and defeat potential adversaries with expanded A2AD capabilities, while at the other end of the spectrum in Southeast Asia the requirement is for forces that can sustain peaceful engagements across a range of low intensity missions such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) that build partnership capacity, transparency and confidence. While the spectrum of mission requirements increases from low to high intensity as one travels up the littoral from Southwest to Northeast Asia, they are all tied to the same longer-term goal of enhancing regional security cooperation and positively shaping Chinese strategic decisions.

The January 2012 DoD Strategic Guidance provides the context for U.S. force posture planning in this evolving security environment. In the future, DoD must posture U.S. forces to respond to requirements across the spectrum of missions, from assurance and dissuasion to deterrence and the ability to defeat aggression. Assurance/dissuasion objectives feature most prominently in plans in which the goal is to achieve strategic outcomes peacefully by shaping the decisions of allies, partners, and potential adversaries. Deterrence/defeat objectives feature most prominently in crisis planning, crisis response, and contingency planning in which the ability of U.S. and allied militaries to prevail over adversaries is most critical.
U.S. forces that are forward deployed and persistently engaged shape the strategic environment in the Asia Pacific region by:

- Assuring allies and partners of U.S. security commitments, which encourages solidarity against challenges to their interests and discourages unilateral escalation in a crisis;
- Dissuading Chinese coercion or North Korean aggression by demonstrating solidarity with and among allies and partners;
- Shoring up the security and self-capacity of vulnerable states so that they are neither targets of coercion or expansion nor havens for violent extremists; and
- Reassuring China where possible through engagement in bilateral and multilateral security cooperation and confidence-building on common challenges (e.g., counter-proliferation, counter-terrorism).

U.S. forces that are forward deployed and persistently engaged set the stage for more effective deterrence and better contingency capabilities by:

- Shaping requirements, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures of U.S. allies and partners for more competent coalitions across the range of possible contingencies (with Australia, Japan, and the ROK at the higher spectrum of intensity and with other allies and partners at the lower spectrum of intensity);
- Networking those allies and partners with each other to enable more effective coalitions when needed (e.g., U.S.-Japan-Australia, U.S.-Japan-ROK);
- Gaining familiarity with the immediate security environment and with joint and/or interoperable interaction with other allied and partner forces;
- Increasing overall maritime domain awareness for individual countries as well as across the Indo-Pacific littoral and ensuring the integrity of the first and second island chains with respect to adversaries in a conflict;
- Complicating the military planning of potential adversaries by identifying and developing arrangements for access, prepositioning, over-flight, and other needs, thereby dispersing possible targets and providing redundancy; and
- Identifying what planners call “off ramps” for crisis avoidance and de-escalation, if necessary, through regular direct and indirect military-to-military engagement.

There are clear connections between shaping actions and contingency preparations. Given rapid advances in Chinese military capabilities, the consequences of conflict with that nation are almost unthinkable and should be avoided to the greatest extent possible, consistent with U.S. interests. It is therefore critical to achieve the right combination of assurance and dissuasion and to maintain a favorable peace before conflict occurs. At the same time, the ability of the United States to work with allies and partners to achieve those peaceful ends will depend on the perceptions, both of allies and partners and of China, of the U.S. ability to prevail in the event of conflict. U.S. force posture must demonstrate a readiness and capacity to fight and win, even
under more challenging circumstances associated with A2AD and other threats to U.S. military operations in the Western Pacific. Demonstrating such capacity is not automatic; one way to undercut dramatically the regional confidence in the U.S. commitment and the American ability to shape decisions and preserve peace would be to adopt a posture that pulled back from the Western Pacific and focused only on the survivability of U.S. forces and reductions in annual costs of forward presence. Forward presence and engagement are not simply helpful to shaping the environment and setting the stage for effective responses to contingencies—they are indispensable for minimizing the likelihood of larger conflicts.

Advantages, Constraints, Risks, and Areas for Further Investment

The project team identified distinct U.S. advantages, constraints, risks, and investment areas in the Asia Pacific region that should inform force posture planning going forward.

Advantages—These considerations are useful in thinking about how legacy and emerging arrangements, relationships, and capabilities benefit the U.S. force posture in the region, such as:

- Legacy basing arrangements in Japan, particularly in Okinawa, are centrally located at the seam between deterrence missions in Northeast Asia and shaping missions in maritime Southeast Asia. These forces are also positioned to fight tactically within A2AD envelope in higher intensity scenarios that could involve strikes against strategic lift or reinforcements coming across the Pacific Ocean.

- U.S. alliance relations with Japan, South Korea and Australia are at historic highs in terms of public opinion and government support; Singapore, Vietnam and the Republic of the Philippines are all expanding defense cooperation and access arrangements with the United States; defense cooperation with India is increasing, though not in terms of access or presence. All of this is in part a response to recent Chinese assertiveness.

- Host nation support (HNS) in Japan ($2.37 billion in 2012) and South Korea (about $765 million in 2012) allows cost-effective forward basing and the retention of force structure that might prove unaffordable if those forces were returned to CONUS.

- Trilateral cooperation among U.S. partners and allies is expanding, particularly U.S.-Japan-Australia and, to a lesser extent, U.S.-Japan-ROK.

- Allied and partner military services are actively seeking to enhance their own capabilities through closer engagement with U.S. counterparts. This is particularly true with respect to the USMC in Japan, Korea, and Australia, where ground forces seek more expeditionary and amphibious capabilities, but it is also true for air, naval, and ground forces throughout the region.

- Even with reduced defense budgets in the United States, rebalancing efforts after Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom/New Dawn have several benefits, allowing the Army to align more force structure in CONUS to Asia and the Pacific, the Navy to introduce the most modern ships to the region, the Marines to resume unit
deployment plan (UDP) rotations, and the Air Force to deploy more strategic and tactical platforms as needed.

- Despite increasing challenges from A2AD, the United States has a significant head start in developing and fielding capabilities for undersea warfare, missile defense, cyberspace, and complex joint task force and coalition operations. Moreover, there are significant qualitative improvements in U.S. capabilities that are not reflected in numbers of assets in the region. For example, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft provides significantly more capability than fourth generation fighters currently deployed, as do platforms such as the P-8 aircraft compared with the P-3 version or the large-deck amphibious LPD-17 vessels compared with the older LPD-6 version.

- Security cooperation in much of the Southeast Asian and South Asian littoral does not necessarily require a large permanent footprint, provided that such engagements draw from U.S. forces postured for continued rotations and engagement from elsewhere in the region or in the United States.

- U.S. states and territories give considerable reach into the Northern and Central Pacific to buttress U.S. presence forward in Japan, South Korea, and elsewhere. Hawaii and Alaska are approximately eight hours flight time from the Asian littoral; Guam is three hours.

**Constraints**—These considerations are useful in thinking about how arrangements, relationships, and capabilities may disadvantage the U.S. force posture in the region, such as:

- The United States still faces the “tyranny of distance” (e.g., Singapore and the Korean Peninsula are about 8,900 miles and 6,050 miles from San Diego, respectively), which consumes considerable fuel, time, and operational budget resources.

- Legacy U.S. force posture is heavily concentrated in Northeast Asia. Other than Japan, South Korea, and Australia, few allies or partners can provide HNS for permanent stationing of U.S. forces. Even these larger allies are facing fiscal constraints in providing further HNS. Like the United States, these liberal democracies also face challenges from local governments and communities. Local concerns have not yet translated into broad national movements for the withdrawal of U.S. forces, but nevertheless they constrain efforts to realign bases or force posture changes within nations. Human and urban encroachment has also limited training opportunities and hurt readiness in Japan and Korea. Dispersal and distribution of U.S. forces, such as the plan to distribute the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), increases the number of stakeholders and decisions that must be made.

- While most allies and partners seek an enhanced U.S. military presence, none want to be forced to choose between Washington and Beijing. There is also an historic aversion to colonialism, basing, and alignment in many South and Southeast Asian nations, even those with governments seeking closer security engagement with the United States.

- Convincing opinion leaders in Beijing that the U.S. goal is shaping a peaceful environment and not containing an adversarial China is a challenge, particularly since the emerging geography of U.S. security posture and partnerships can lend itself to
counterproductive narratives in China about U.S. containment strategies (even though much of the engagement of the United States is made possible by reaction to Chinese assertiveness).

- The $487 billion in Defense Department cuts mandated over ten years by the Budget Control Act of 2011 has been offset somewhat by declaratory policy and pledges by DoD to “rebalance” capabilities in the Asia Pacific region. Current details do not permit a full determination of whether the “rebalance” may be occurring from decreases in other AORs or from significant increases in the PACOM AOR.

Risks—These considerations are useful in thinking about how various exogenous factors, ranging from potential adversaries’ capabilities and intentions to reduced U.S. planning and resources, may increase U.S. military risks in the region. For example:

- Ballistic missiles are posing increased risk to U.S. bases (especially in Japan and Korea) and lift in terms of quantity, range and accuracy; missiles such as the Chinese DF-21D pose threats to carrier operations and highlight the A2AD challenge in the Western Pacific.

- China is pursuing diplomatic, informational, military and economic instruments for counter-containment in peacetime and counter-intervention in a crisis. Japan and Australia are probably least susceptible to Chinese coercion, but defections by any ally or partner could undermine efforts for dissuasion and possibly undermine operational planning as well. In the absence of crisis or contingency operations, a U.S. request to a partner nation for access, bases, or strategic flexibility with already deployed forces has the potential to cause visible public concern and even rejection, which could undermine U.S. shaping strategies within the region.

- Despite atrophying capabilities for sustained invasion of the South, North Korean WMD programs pose a significant risk in terms of horizontal escalation (transfer to terrorists or third states) and could embolden Pyongyang to engage in more brazen military provocations. Regime stability in the North is also a growing concern, though difficult to assess with any accuracy from outside the country.

- The abandonment of force structure planning for two near-simultaneous major wars could squeeze available U.S. forces. This could mean that contingencies in the Central Command (CENTCOM) AOR could deprive PACOM of needed forces to execute plans in the event of simultaneous crises.

- U.S. decisions on defense spending, sequestration, and force posture all have the potential to undermine confidence in the American ability to sustain current presence and security commitments and could prompt hedging behavior by allies or coercive behavior by potential adversaries.

Areas for Further Investment—U.S. forward deployed forces are positioned for the full range of contingencies but could benefit from additional resources for hardware and training, ranging from strategic lift to equipment shortages to allies’ military resources, to improve U.S. capabilities in the region. For example:
• U.S. forces already face constraints with respect to logistics and lift in the Asia Pacific region. There is one amphibious ready group (ARG) at Sasebo in Japan, capable of maneuver from the sea for a portion of the Marines deployed in the region, and there are sufficient high speed vessels (HSV) to transport the remaining units in the region in peacetime, but HSV cannot engage in maneuver in a high threat environment. This leaves a potential lift requirement for the Marines. Current airlift is more fungible and appears sufficient for peacetime, but it would be stressed in a high threat environment. Geographically distributed forces will raise further logistical challenges for lift, fuel, ammunition, and other support.

• U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force forces that are currently forward-deployed would place high demands on critical ammunition in a long tactical fight without resupply from Guam, Hawaii, and the West Coast of the United States. (Note: U.S. Marines are forward-supplied to sustain a fight for 60 days, though supplies do not include the full range of critical munitions—e.g., precision weapons—required for overwhelming force.) Forward-deployed forces also rely on equipment such as minesweepers, mobile bridge equipment, etc. that are located in CONUS and would require weeks to deploy by sea.

• PACOM pre-positioned equipment could be better aligned to support the diverse missions now required, both afloat and ashore, and stocks may need replenishing since U.S. forces employed them for Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom/New Dawn.

• U.S. forward deployed forces and allied forces could benefit from additional missile defense capabilities—both batteries and reloads—and battlefield recovery capabilities.

• PACOM would benefit from improved counter-WMD capabilities across the region.

• Given the increased size and operational reach of attack submarines from China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy, the U.S. Navy faces an imbalance in its own submarine fleet in the Asia Pacific region. This imbalance will grow rapidly in the mid-2020s as DoD prepares to retire U.S. nuclear attack submarines at a rate twice that of new construction for replacements.

• Allied militaries have excellent capabilities in the Asia Pacific region (e.g., Japan for anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and ballistic missile defense (BMD), ROK for ground warfare) but national budgets can tend to be focused on costly indigenous programs while more immediate requirements go unattended (e.g., command and control, sustainment, and maritime domain awareness).

• There are disconnects in our allies and partners ability to operate together. For example, Japan and Korea have only recently agreed to sign acquisition and cross servicing agreements and general security of military information agreements that would allow more extensive joint U.S.-Japan-ROK exercises.

• PACOM needs increased redundancy and dispersal capacity for airfields and ships. Airfields and ports that could provide redundancy and dispersal dot the Western Pacific,
but access arrangements are still few and far between, even with major allies such as Japan and Australia.

- The U.S. military services under-resource and under-incentivize personnel with foreign area expertise and fail to make adequate use of non-governmental, private sector, U.S. Agency for International Development and other expertise in the Asia Pacific region; Offices of Defense Cooperation in PACOM’s AOR, and DoD’s Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu are well below mandated staff size and below the capacity of comparable offices in Europe.

- The United States could use more reliable mechanisms with the PLA for military-to-military dialogue, crisis management, transparency, and avoiding incidents at sea and in cyber and outer space.

The next section addresses regional security dynamics and U.S. defense relations with key allies, partners, and actors and explains some of their advantages, constraints, risks, and areas for further investment in greater detail. The discussion in Section Two also provides context for assessments of U.S. force posture options in Section Three and for findings and recommendations in Section Four.
This section assesses the strategic dynamics within the Asia Pacific region, examining major allies, partners, and actors in terms of: (1) U.S. interests and objectives; (2) the particular partner’s strategic interests and objectives; (3) the particular partner’s defense strategy and plans; (4) views of U.S. forward posture and prospects for engagement and access; and (5) political risks. The analysis is based on CSIS experts’ past research, as well as extensive not-for-attribution interviews with stakeholders, senior officials, and military personnel conducted across the region for this report. Section Two provides necessary background for the evaluation of force posture options in Section Three and informs the findings and recommendations in Section Four of this report.

Japan

Japan is the lynchpin for U.S. access and influence in the Asia Pacific region. Despite recent economic difficulties and political drift, Japan remains the world’s third largest economy; the United States’ fourth largest trading partner in terms of volume; the world’s second largest funder of the United Nations (UN), International Monetary Fund, and other leading international institutions; the second largest host of U.S. forces overseas; and a like-minded ally in efforts to build an open and inclusive network of nations that advance shared values and interests in the Asia Pacific region and globally. The U.S.-Japan alliance remains the cornerstone of Japan’s foreign and security policies, building on the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security that codified a core strategic bargain committing the United States to Japan’s defense in exchange for access to bases in Japan that would allow for the maintenance of peace and security in the Far East. That strategic bargain remains firmly in place to this day, despite the end of the Cold War, the transition from long-term Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) rule to the current Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government, and the rise of China to become Japan’s largest trading partner. Public opinion polls in Japan demonstrate broad support for the U.S.-Japan alliance, significant antagonism toward North Korea, and heightened insecurity and suspicion towards China. Some polls suggest that a significant minority of the Japanese public remains uneasy with dependence on the United States for security, despite overall pragmatic support for the alliance itself.

Japan’s evolving security strategy, articulated in the 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines, focuses on strengthening U.S.-Japan alliance cooperation, broadening cooperation with other maritime powers such as India and Australia, deterring North Korea, and protecting Japanese maritime sovereignty through a “dynamic defense” concept that involves greater expeditionary capabilities in the southern island chain near Okinawa. Japanese strategists are particularly focused on the defense of the First Island Chain in light of expanded and increasingly assertive PLA Navy exercises as far away as Okinotorishima, and the Japanese Defense Ministry and Self Defense Forces (JSDF) are eager for greater dialogue with the United States on the emerging U.S. AirSea Battle concept. Constraints on defense spending, which has remained flat at about 1 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) since 1993, place a premium on jointness and interoperability with U.S. forces to strengthen deterrence. Japan’s procurement of Aegis and
PAC-3 assets are creating joint and combined bilateral operational practices on missile defense and the Japan Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) decision to procure the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft will increase interoperability with the U.S. Air Force. The procurement of a new 22DDH “helicopter destroyer,” in addition to Japan’s newly built 16DDH Hyuga class destroyers, will—together with joint training on amphibious operations on Tinian—increase the importance of cooperation with the U.S. Marine Corps for Japan. Japan’s prohibition on collective self-defense remains an obstacle to more effective bilateral planning and cooperation, but the national political mood is moving in the direction of relaxing such constraints in an incremental fashion.

Increased defense cooperation, especially at the strategic and doctrinal level, would help to encourage Japan to continue moving in the direction of procurement decisions and defense policy decisions that produce more security for Japan and the region even if defense spending itself remains flat. The ability to affect this outcome is limited by the capabilities present in United States Forces Japan (USFJ) for plans and strategy.

Force posture negotiations between the United States and Japan have focused primarily on the realignment of U.S. forces on Okinawa, which hosts 75 percent of total U.S. forces in Japan. MCAS Futenma has become a particularly controversial facility as encroachment has turned the neighboring city of Ginowan into a heavily populated area. On December 2, 1996, the U.S.-Japan SCC approved a plan that recommended returning approximately 21 percent of the total acreage of U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa, including MCAS Futenma. While progress was made in returning less controversial land and facilities to Japan, it took until May 2006 for the SCC to approve a roadmap for realigning U.S. forces that included construction of a Futenma Replacement Facility located in Henoko, near Marine Corps Camp Schwab in Northern Okinawa. Under the previous plan, 8,000 members of III MEF and their 9,000 dependents would have been relocated from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, and Japan would have provided $6.09 billion of the estimated $10.27 billion in facilities development costs associated with the transfer to Guam. The SCC noted that relocation to Guam would be dependent on “tangible progress” toward completion of the FRF and on Japan’s financial contributions to development initiatives in Guam.

Implementation of the 2006 SCC agreement was thrown into confusion in October 2009 when Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama declared that he would examine options to relocate MCAS Futenma outside of Okinawa prefecture, only to revert to the 2006 roadmap several months later. Local opposition hardened, and the Okinawa Prefectural Government refused to approve the construction plan for FRF at Henoko (required because the facility would be on the coast). In the meantime, members of Congress raised questions about the capacity of Guam to absorb the large influx of Marines and dependents. Recognizing these difficulties, the SCC issued a joint statement on April 27, 2012 outlining the details for implementing a new delinked version of the movement of U.S. forces off Okinawa. Under the newly revised plan, approximately 9,000 Marines and their dependents would be relocated from Okinawa to places outside Japan, including Australia, Guam, and Hawaii, with fewer than 5,000 to be located to Guam. The cost of the reduced move to Guam was estimated at $8.6 billion, of which Japan would contribute $3.1 billion in cash. To support bilateral defense cooperation, the U.S. and Japanese governments also announced that the two militaries would develop joint training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands as shared-use facilities by U.S. forces and JSDF. The agreement also identified U.S. facilities eligible for land return, subject to further discussions between the two governments. Both governments reiterated their belief that the
existing plan for the FRF at Camp Schwab near the Henoko area remained the most viable option for relocating MCAS Futenma and were committed to resolving the issue as soon as possible. The Japanese side also agreed to consider necessary maintenance for Futenma until completion of the FRF under existing HNS agreements.36

A number of alternatives have been suggested to the current plan for the FRF at Camp Schwab, but none are without significant shortcomings. (Note: Section Three of this report provides an analysis of these alternatives.) Offshore islands in the vicinity of Okinawa such as Iejima, Shimojijima, and Ishigaki are notionally attractive but present challenges such as infrastructure, vulnerability to natural disasters, and local opposition. Integrating Marine functions at Futenma into operations at Kadena Air Base (AB) also faces stiff and almost uniform local and national opposition due to concerns about noise and safety. Modifying the Henoko plan to build the runway further up the peninsula than the current shorefront location would have significant overflight impact on local communities. The Northern Training Area is rough terrain and contains local reservoirs. Building the FRF at Camp Hansen, a major training facility already facing significant limitations, would have an adverse impact on Marine readiness. The major risk with shifting to an alternative to the Henoko plan is that the alternative would have to be fully accepted and executable if alliance managers are to avoid another dead end that would weaken the credibility of the alliance and embolden opponents of bases within Okinawa. None of the alternatives to Henoko assessed by the project team fit that condition. It is clear that the Henoko plan also faces challenges, most recently from prefectural election results in early June 2012 that created more headwinds against the plan. However, the April 2012 SCC agreement puts the burden largely on the government of Japan for FRF implementation. While progress is unlikely this year given Japanese political turbulence, future implementation should not be entirely ruled out.

Operationally, there is little question that MCAS Futenma is the best location on Okinawa and the April 2012 SCC agreement allows maintenance and upkeep for continued use of the facility until the FRF is ready. However, there is broad consensus in Japan that a significant accident at MCAS Futenma would immediately put continued operations at the facility in severe political jeopardy, particularly given U.S. commitments to close the base. Improved safety records for the MV-22 Osprey and upgraded Cobra aircraft, together with increased use of flight simulators, will probably decrease the risk profile of operating out of MCAS Futenma compared with operations when the facility was at fuller capacity a decade ago, but the return of assets from Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom/New Dawn will counter those technological advantages and risk mitigation will remain important. Officially abandoning the promise to return MCAS Futenma to Japan would also put the facility in immediate political jeopardy.

There are opportunities for increased shared use of facilities in Japan. The Governor of Tokyo would like to have some civilian use of Yokota AB for private executive jets or cargo and the JSDF would like to put a regiment of infantry in Camp Hansen for co-location and training with the Marines. There are operational complications that come with such dual use arrangements, but the political and strategic payback could be considerable for the United States if there is a broader agreement that leads to better access to the scores of first rate airfields and ports across Japan for U.S. aircraft and ships in contingencies.

Overall, the U.S. forward presence in Japan is secure, with the exception of continued political risk to MCAS Futenma. North Korean and Chinese missile capabilities are increasing the threat
to U.S. bases in Japan, and Beijing resorted to mercantilist measures in the midst of the 2010 Senkaku/Diaoyutai crisis, in which the Japanese Coast Guard detained a Chinese fishing boat and China responded by cutting off rare earth materials to Japan. However, increased levels of interoperability between U.S. and Japanese forces, driven by missile defense requirements and increasingly by challenges to the First Island Chain, have essentially created a joint command relationship between the United States and Japan from the perspective of any possible adversary. This deterrent effect would not be possible without forward deployed U.S. forces in Japan.

Korean Peninsula

Today, the Republic of Korea is the world’s 13th largest economy and the United States’ seventh largest trading partner, a thriving democracy, and a close ally of the United States that shares a commitment to human rights and the rule of law and seeks a greater leadership role in global affairs. Born out of conflict at the beginning of the Cold War, the U.S.-ROK alliance is now a lynchpin of U.S. efforts not only to deter North Korea but also to shape the larger strategic equilibrium in the Asia Pacific region.

The ROK political mainstream prefers three primary alignments in grand strategy: (1) deep ties to the United States; (2) robust economic relations with China; and (3) an active multilateral agenda. The U.S.-ROK alliance, based on the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953, is fundamental to a ROK security strategy that remains focused necessarily on the North Korean threat. The North Korean sinking of the corvette Cheonan in March 2010 heightened South Korean threat perceptions, and support for the U.S.-ROK alliance is consequently robust; 91 percent believe the alliance will continue to be necessary in the future, and 75 percent see a need even after unification of the peninsula. Surveys also reveal concerns about a long-term security threat from China, perceptions fueled in part by a perceived unwillingness on the part of Beijing to blame North Korea for the attack on the ROK frigate Cheonan. China is the ROK’s largest export market and therefore an engine for growth; Beijing also has considerable leverage over North Korea and is considered an important player in that context.

The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between North and South Korea remains the most heavily armed demarcation between ground forces in the world. The North’s ability to sustain a combined arms invasion of the South has degraded considerably over the past two decades, although the threat posed by North Korea to South Korea, Japan, and the United States has increased in other ways. The North has forward deployed many of its over 10,000 artillery tubes within range of Seoul, a modern urban metropolis of 20 million people (and approximately 20,000 American expatriates) that is as close to the threat as the U.S. Congress is from Baltimore Washington International Airport. Experts believe the North has over 200 NoDong missiles that can impact most of Japan, as well as one of the largest chemical and biological weapons arsenals in the world. Despite sanctions and repeated diplomatic efforts by regional powers, Pyongyang has continued to develop a nuclear weapons capability, with quantities of plutonium sufficient to produce nuclear warheads and a uranium enrichment program of unknown but potentially greater capacity. Horizontal escalation remains a major challenge: in 2003 North Korean officials threatened to “transfer” their nuclear capability and in September 2007, the Israeli Air Force bombed a nuclear reactor under construction in Syria that the U.S. government concluded was being built with North Korean assistance. The North has also increased provocative attacks on...
the South such as the March 2010 sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan and the November 2010 shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in the West Sea, as well as Global Positioning System jamming and cyber-attacks. The sudden death of Kim Jong-il in December 2011 and the succession of his third son, the 29-year old Kim Jong-un, raise further questions about national-level decision-making and longer-term regime stability; though for the immediate future, the regime’s succession plan and strategic intentions appear to be on a trajectory set in place by the elder Kim.

The ROK has adopted a military modernization plan and embraced a new vision for the U.S.-ROK alliance as core elements of its security strategy in response to a host of challenges and its own desire to play a greater role in regional and global security. The government is working to implement two major reform initiatives: Defense Reform 2020, a 15-year, $550 million program passed by the National Assembly in 2006 and designed to reduce ROK force levels while promoting more modernized military hardware and technology to enhance war-fighting capability; and Defense Refor­mation Plan 307, a complement to Defense Reform 2020 aimed at enhancing jointness among the services and creating capabilities to engage in military activities short of all-out war in response to future provocations by North Korea along the lines of the Cheonan attack. The foundations for this modernization initiative are the 2009 Joint Vision for the U.S.-ROK alliance, a broad strategic document for enhancing defense cooperation regionally and globally; and Strategic Alliance 2015, a roadmap for the alliance that outlines the transition to two independent commands for the United States and the ROK after a proposed transition of OPCON to the ROK in 2015. The two governments reiterated a commitment to move forward on both fronts in a joint statement released after the U.S.-ROK Joint Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Meeting on June 14, 2012.

In 2004, the U.S. government authorized a realignment plan for reducing and relocating forces in Korea. As part of this plan, the United States redeployed one brigade combat team (of about 3,600 troops) from the 2nd Infantry Division (2ID) from the peninsula in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, with the goal of reducing U.S. troop levels in South Korea from 37,000 to 25,000 by September 2008. In 2008 the Secretary of Defense set the floor for troop levels at 28,500. The realignment plan consists of two elements: the Land Partnership Plan (LPP) proposed by the United States and the Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP) initiated by the ROK.

LPP calls for relocating USFK units and camps north of Seoul (about 10,000 personnel) to US Army Garrison (USAG) Humphreys about 40 miles south of Seoul. The LPP will result in a 50 percent reduction and consolidation of facilities from 104 to 48. Many of the current bases and camps scattered around the country are the legacy of the Korean War; they are literally positioned in the same places when the war stopped in 1953 and have not been moved since. Under the new plan, U.S. forces will cluster around Osan AB/USAG Humphreys, and USAG Daegu, in which there will be five major or “enduring” sites: Osan AB; USAG Humphreys; USAG Daegu; Chinhae Naval Base; and Kunsan AB. (Note: Kunsan AB is located on the southeast portion of the peninsula, outside of USAGs Daegu and Humphreys.) Osan AB/USAG Humphreys will have Army, Air Force, and Joint Headquarters. USAG Daegu will have Army, Navy, Marines, and prepositioned equipment. The LPP will co-locate 2ID and the newly-established Korea Command (KORCOM), which will allow for enhanced coordination, mission command and planning. This realignment of forces on the peninsula is designed to: move the majority of U.S. personnel and equipment outside effective range of North Korean artillery;
enhance Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) capacity; and improve overall flexibility. The consolidation at USAG Humphreys would also allow the United States to conduct U.S.-only planning as needed to deal with the evolving North Korean WMD and missile threats.

YRP is a 2004 bilateral agreement to consolidate and relocate USFK, including about 9,000 U.S. military personnel, from the metropolitan center of Seoul to USAG Humphreys (near Pyongtaek) and other locations. YRP is largely funded by the ROK government. YRP will leave some combined elements, including intelligence, policy development, and some operation elements as a residual presence in Seoul (i.e., Yongsan residual). The timeline for completion of LPP and YRP was originally 2008, but has been delayed due to construction delays and cost-squabbling. Tour normalization has also delayed YRP. In 2008, DoD announced that U.S. families would be able to join military personnel in an effort to phase out one-year unaccompanied tours with normalization tours of 36-month accompanied and 24-month unaccompanied. Tour normalization was estimated to increase the U.S. population at Osan AB/USAG Humphreys to over 50,000. One alternative under discussion is a “3-2-1” staggered formula for tour normalization (i.e., 3 years for accompanied tours of married troops; 2 years for unaccompanied for unmarried troops; and 1 year for unaccompanied tours of married troops), designed to improve readiness without the large cost increases of tour normalization.

A legacy of the Korean War, OPCON refers to the retaining of wartime operational command over ROK forces by the United States. In 2007, the United States agreed to a South Korean proposal to create two separate commands for U.S. and ROK forces by April 2012 and to replace the current U.S.-ROK CFC, headed by the commander of U.S. Forces, with a U.S. Korea Command which would operate through a Military Cooperation Center to coordinate interoperability with the ROK military command. OPCON transition has been controversial within South Korea, particularly among conservative politicians who remain skeptical because the decision was made by then-President Roh Moo-hyun. In 2010, the United States and ROK announced a decision to delay OPCON transition by three years until December 1, 2015, reflecting a response to increased North Korean provocations and a view that concomitant ROK military improvements in command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), transport planes, cyber security, and amphibious lift would not be adequate to meet the original transition date. Strategic Alliance 2015 sets out capabilities that the ROK must enhance in advance of the transition date and the annual military consultations (Military Committee Meeting, or MCM, and Security Consultative Meeting, or SCM) provide the South Koreans with a list of capabilities they must continue to enhance. While the United States would help to provide “bridging capabilities” in the interim, the South Koreans need to better demonstrate a resource commitment to include an upgrade of ground operations command, improved command and control systems, missile defense, and closer coordination of ROK and U.S. exercises and capabilities to meet the range of threats posed by North Korea short of all-out war.

From an operational perspective, OPCON transition could increase efficiencies and better synchronize U.S.-ROK coordination in a crisis if it establishes a relatively seamless transition of command relationships from peacetime through contingency operations. (Currently, the ROK retains peacetime command of its forces up to the point that the armistice is broken, and the American four star commander of CFC/ UNC after that point; however, provocations and escalation can occur in the seam between these two phases, and shifting command staffs in that
time-sensitive, intense environment could prove challenging.). On the other hand, serious ROK capability deficiencies remain for command and control, artillery, and missile defense, and the bilateral command relationships in the new military cooperation center have yet to be fully resolved or tested against operational plans. In addition, the UNC will continue to be indispensable even after CFC is disbanded because it is the internationally recognized legal and political agent for forces operating on the Korean Peninsula and provides the basis for access to seven U.S. bases in Japan in the event of North Korean violation of the armistice (i.e., Yokota, Zama, Sasebo, Yokosuka, Kadena, Futenma, and White Beach). Even after CFC is disbanded, the UNC function could be expanded to internationalize attention to the security challenges posed by North Korea. Alternately, the United States could support the continuation of the combined U.S.-ROK staff under the new OPCON relationship.

The mainstream South Korean public, business community, international investors, and political elite (with the exception of the far left) remain highly sensitive to any reduction in U.S. ground forces on the peninsula, particularly given increasing North Korean provocations, nuclear capabilities, and missile weapons capabilities, as well as China’s growing strategic influence over the North. The flags of the 8th Army and 2nd Infantry Division and the U.S. pledge in 2008 to retain a floor of 28,500 personnel on the peninsula remain important symbols of U.S. commitment and are important for operational efficiency in combating the range of North Korean threats, including but not limited to WMD. The ROK government handled the withdrawal of one brigade from the 2ID well in 2004 but remains vigilant against any plans to reduce the remaining brigade. The mechanized infantry brigade remains important not only as a symbol of commitment and deterrence, but also for shaping cooperation and interoperability with ROK Army units, physical security for U.S. command elements, and NEO. Moreover, the presence of combat units forward reinforces the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence at a time when the ROK and Japanese governments are seeking reassurance in the context of increasing North Korean and Chinese capabilities. The United States has not taken any steps to replace the brigade removed from 2ID in 2004, but there would be clear advantages to augmenting the 2ID with a ROK brigade or rotational units from the U.S. Army National Guard and Reserve. The former would become a forcing function for bilateral U.S.-ROK interoperability and the latter would increase familiarization for CONUS-based units that would have to reinforce in the event of contingencies on the peninsula. The project team found that South Korean officials reacted positively to the idea of rotating a National Guard brigade through the ROK for training. However, this positive view was associated with the “plus-up” scenario—i.e., when this brigade would rotate through in addition to a baseline of force presence on the peninsula. The views were decidedly less enthusiastic when this proposal was seen as replacing a standing brigade in South Korea.

There is also increased ROK interest in expanding the USMC presence on the peninsula because of weaknesses in the ROK Marines’ capabilities to manage West Sea contingencies as revealed in the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong attacks. The utility of USMC training also increases because possible North Korean use of WMD in the central front puts a premium on deep sea maneuver from the sea in any warfighting or instability scenarios. Currently, U.S. plans put the USMC presence on the peninsula at less than 200 troops. In South Korea, brigade-size exercises and combined arms training that cannot be conducted elsewhere in the region are possible. The project team found that senior ROK leaders are open to expanding the USMC presence for exercising, particularly with ROK Marines near the northwest islands (where the Cheonan
sinking and Yeonpyeong island shelling occurred). Currently Mujuk (on the east coast) is the base allotted for Marines as part of LPP, but Camp Casey at Tongducheon, which has traditionally been home to two maneuver brigades, is another possible area for exercises. Under LPP, Camp Casey is scheduled to be returned to South Korea, and use of the facilities would require renegotiation (which may not be as hard as it sounds given the lack of new plans or investment by local officials for after the handover). Gwannyeong port also has potential as a staging area for Marines. In addition, the ROK government is building a new naval base on the island of Jeju at the southern tip of the peninsula. However, despite an apparent ROK willingness to expand exercises and some logistical support for more regular USMC engagement on the peninsula, there is not much political support in Seoul for permanent basing of a MAGTF comparable to that planned for Northern Australia, unless it were dedicated to the deterrence mission on the peninsula.

Other adjustments to current realignment plans have come into focus, given changing North Korean threat patterns and evolving requirements. These adjustments include: retaining the 2ID artillery brigade north of Camp Casey until ROK capabilities are improved and in consideration of increased provocations from the North in 2010-2011; the return of one attack helicopter squadron to the peninsula to reinforce deterrence and fill important risk areas; and moving to rotational replacements for the 2ID artillery brigade, aviation brigade, and combat brigade with regionally aligned and trained forces rotating as units to serve under permanently forward deployed 8th Army 2ID and (in the case of the artillery units) brigade headquarters and enablers on the peninsula. (Note: Section Three assesses this option more fully.)

The United States has an interest in encouraging greater regional shaping missions for the U.S.-ROK alliance and greater interoperability and exercises with other major allies, particularly Japan. The Korean elite and public remain wary of entanglement in security confrontations with China over Taiwan or the South China Sea or any diminishment of focus on the North Korean threat, and sensitivities vis-à-vis Japan continue to influence security cooperation with Tokyo. The current Lee Myung-bak government has been relatively more dedicated than its predecessors to improving Japan-ROK relations but nevertheless rejected a U.S. proposal to create a U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral secretariat in Seoul. However, the future may offer some promise. The two governments are near completion of two major military agreements: a general security of military information agreement that would allow Seoul and Tokyo to systematically share intelligence on North Korea; and an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement that would allow the two countries to share military supplies and services. The first trilateral U.S.-ROK-Japan naval exercises in June 2012 were also promising. In the longer-term, South Korean views of Japan are more malleable than they are of China. For example, in recent polls by the influential Asan Institute in Seoul, only 21 percent of respondents saw Japan as the biggest threat after unification while 63 percent identified China as a threat, and a majority of South Koreans (54 percent) identified tighter defense ties with Japan as necessary to deal with China’s rise.

Australia

Australia is unique among America’s allies in having fought alongside the United States in every major conflict since the start of the 20th century. The 1951 Australia, New Zealand, United States Security (ANZUS) Treaty remains the political and legal foundation of the U.S.-Australia
alliance, and Australia’s decision to invoke the Treaty following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States served to further strengthen bilateral ties. A bilateral agreement in November 2011 announcing plans to establish a rotational presence of 2,500 U.S. Marines in Darwin speaks to the enduring centrality of the alliance in maintaining peace and stability in the Asia Pacific region. Southeast Asia, the South China Sea in particular, is becoming more central to U.S. interests, and Australia’s geostrategic location remains vital in this context, as it was during World War II. The Indian Ocean is also becoming more important, particularly because of the sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) that run through it and the choke points around its perimeter (i.e., the Strait of Hormuz, the Mozambique Channel, and the Malacca Straits), and again Australia’s location proves relevant given the U.S. commitment to preserving freedom of navigation and maritime security throughout the region.

Australia’s strategic history is one of close alignment with a “great and powerful friend”, first Britain and for the past 60 years the United States. The main elements of Australian foreign policy—the U.S. alliance, engagement with Asia and participation in the multilateral system—enjoy broad bipartisan support. While not mainstream, anti-Americanism is prevalent among some elite circles, particularly in academia, parts of the media, and the fringes of the trade union movement and politics. Australian public support for the U.S. alliance has risen to an eight-year high, with 87 percent of Australians regarding it as important for Australia’s security and 74 percent considering the United States as Australia’s most important security partner over the next ten years. Despite some criticism by Australian elites, the public reaction to the announcement that U.S. Marines and aircraft will rotate through defense facilities in Australia’s north has been overwhelmingly positive: 74 percent of the population support the presence (32 percent strongly), while only 10 percent are strongly against.

Current strategic dynamics in Australia reflect regional efforts at military modernization, trade and investment flows, multilateral diplomacy, and ideational alignment with the United States. The Australian public currently feels relatively secure, but China’s rise is combining with concerns about the U.S. economy and the durability of America’s commitment to Asia to generate a degree of uncertainty. These trends were the subject of unprecedentedly explicit government statements in Australia’s 2009 Defense White Paper and are also reflected in public opinion polling. Australian officials track closely the military balance in Asia and in particular the United States’ ability to operate effectively in the Western Pacific, to maintain crucial SLOCs (including through the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean and crucial chokepoints including the Straits of Malacca), to reassure other U.S. allies in the region, and to deter and ultimately defeat threats. The U.S. forward military presence is seen as symbolically and strategically essential; particular focus is given to U.S. force posture discussions with Japan, in addition to developments with South Korea and with respect to Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. Australian officials are particularly concerned by China’s development of A2AD and cyber capabilities and their implications for the U.S. Navy’s freedom of movement in the Western Pacific. These officials are focused on the effectiveness of proposed U.S. responses, including the AirSea Battle concept, to such capabilities. A number of Australia’s Southeast Asian neighbors are upgrading their armed forces, particularly maritime and air capabilities, and Southeast Asian defense spending is growing mainly in response to China’s military modernization and increased assertiveness in the South China Sea. This poses a profound challenge for Australian defense planners in that maintaining a clear regional capability advantage has been a foundation of defense policy for a country in an unstable neighbourhood,
removed from its traditional allies, whose military has to operate over vast distances and draws on a small population base. Recent constraints on defense spending raise concerns about the extent to which Australia can enhance its capabilities in response to multiple security challenges, but major Australian defense acquisitions are intended to strengthen interoperability (e.g., Aegis air combat systems, F-35 aircraft) and could create opportunities for extensive cooperation with the United States and other partners in the region.

Australian trade with China dominates the economic landscape but is offset by U.S. investment in Australia, which demonstrates the important economic dimensions of the alliance.68 China overtook Japan as Australia’s largest trading partner in 2007,69 and bilateral trade continues to grow strongly, driven in part by China’s demand for Australian natural resources. Chinese growth is largely responsible for Australia’s current mining boom and its highest terms of trade in over 100 years.70 The investment picture is very different. The United States continues to dominate, with over one quarter of total foreign direct investment (FDI) in Australia; it was again the leading source of FDI applications in 2010-11. China by contrast accounts for only 1 percent of Australia’s FDI stock, heavily concentrated in the resources sector although its rate of investment is growing strongly from this low base.71

In November 2011 the U.S. and Australian governments announced a rotational Marine Air Ground Task Force presence in Darwin, increased rotation of U.S. military aircraft through facilities in northern Australia, and the prepositioning of associated equipment and supplies. Over 200 Marines arrived in April 2012 to undertake the first six-month rotation under the new arrangement, building to 2,500 (plus ships and, over time, aircraft);72 the “step up” rotational timeline for the Marine presence in Darwin is intended to ensure continuing Australian domestic backing. Current U.S. military posture in Australia also includes a bilateral agreement to operate Joint Defense Facility Pine Gap (since 1970);73 extensive intelligence and security cooperation; and comprehensive combined exercises and training including Talisman Saber,74 a major biennial Australia-U.S. readiness and interoperability exercise using Australian Defence Force (ADF) training facilities in the Northern Territory and Queensland. (The ADF also participates in major PACOM-hosted exercises such as Rim of the Pacific, or RIMPAC, and Pacific Partnership). The Australia-U.S. Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty of 200775 will facilitate defense industrial collaboration by permitting the license-free export of defense goods and services between the Australian and U.S. governments and Australian and U.S. companies that meet security and regulatory requirements. The two governments also are considering means to strengthen space and cyber cooperation.

Australia’s geography, political stability, and existing defense capabilities and infrastructure offer strategic depth and other significant military advantages to the United States in light of the growing range of Chinese weapons systems, U.S. efforts to achieve a more distributed force posture, and the increasing strategic importance of Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. An enhanced U.S. defense presence in Australia would expand potential opportunities for cooperation with Indonesia, other Southeast Asian countries, and India, and it would complement parallel initiatives such as rotationally deploying Littoral Combat Ships in Singapore and increased U.S. military access to the Philippines. Enhanced U.S. Navy access to Her Majesty’s Australian Ship (HMAS) Stirling (submarines and surface vessels) is a possible next phase of enhanced access arrangements with Australia. HMAS Stirling offers advantages including direct blue water access to the Indian Ocean and to the extensive offshore West
Australian Exercise Area and Underwater Tracking Range, submarine facilities including a heavyweight torpedo maintenance center and the only submarine escape training facility in the southern hemisphere, and space for expanded surface ship facilities, including potentially a dock capable of supporting aircraft carriers. The United States could also consider an extended runway and expanded facilities to support bombers and other aircraft; U.S. bombers and other aircraft have been visiting northern Australia for years. In the longer term, the increasing importance of the Indian Ocean may merit enhancing facilities to enable ISR aircraft to operate from Cocos Island (located 1700 miles northwest of Perth with good access to the Bay of Bengal and approaches to the Malacca Straits). Other potential initiatives include increased U.S. support for Australia’s ailing Collins class submarine replacement project (possibly also with Japanese involvement); full Australian participation in U.S. theater missile defense, including an Australian decision to equip its new air warfare destroyers with Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) missiles; building on the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue with Japan; combined trilateral exercises in Guam and possibly Australia to maximize interoperability in areas such as strategic lift, ISR, and ASW; trilateral disaster relief training exercises with Indonesia and other regional partners; and trilateral U.S-Australia-India maritime security exercises in the Indian Ocean.

Each of these options is militarily and/or diplomatically feasible, although some raise greater domestic and regional political sensitivities than others, and some, such as a major expansion of facilities at HMAS Stirling, would entail significant investments. In addition, increased U.S. Navy access at HMAS Stirling would present some operational constraints, in that Stirling is located in the southern part of Western Australian and is therefore further from trouble spots in the Western Pacific than Guam, and further from the Middle East than Diego Garcia. This is also an advantage, however, in light of the growing coverage of Chinese A2AD capabilities. Such options also are subject to important variables such as: the extent to which the Marine presence in Darwin operates effectively with the ADF and is welcomed by the local community; Australian public opinion; maintaining bipartisan political consensus on further strengthening the alliance; adequate resources to support necessary infrastructure and other investments at a time when the United States and Australia are both reducing defense spending; and China’s behavior, including whether its regional and bilateral assertiveness moderates or grows. The potential for China to leverage the economic relationship to influence Australia’s strategic choices—particularly if elite views on China and the alliance were to gain traction—is a risk. Australia also would need to manage relationships with neighbouring countries such as Indonesia, which reacted warily to the announcement of a rotational Marine presence in Darwin, and address major defense capability challenges, particularly replacement submarines, developing its two large landing ships into an effective amphibious capability, and maintaining its air combat edge—an objective made more challenging by continuing delays in the F-35 program.

Efforts to enhance U.S. military presence in Australia and further bilateral defense cooperation are likely sustainable but depend fundamentally on the future trajectory of U.S. and Australian defense spending and the longer-term durability of U.S. military rebalancing towards Asia. Sustained high-level engagement and the sensitive presentation of initiatives with an emphasis on broader benefits to the region could augment domestic support for the alliance, which would also create diplomatic space for Australia to pursue new avenues of regional cooperation with the United States.
New Zealand

Since the suspension of U.S. security obligations to New Zealand under the 1951 ANZUS Treaty in 1986 in response to Wellington’s support for legislation banning nuclear armed or powered vessels, defense cooperation has largely been suspended, with the exception of intelligence. However, more recently the November 2010 U.S.-New Zealand Wellington Declaration reinvigorated dialogue on regional security issues, and the subsequent Washington Declaration of June 19, 2012 focused on bilateral and multilateral exercises to support maritime security, HADR, and UN or other multilateral peacekeeping operations. The New Zealand Defense Force is small, but plans to develop ARG-like amphibious capabilities at the company-to-battalion level offer important coverage for the South Pacific and opportunities for interoperability with Australia, Japan and other allies and partners also developing amphibious capabilities. New Zealand elites distinguish themselves from Australia by noting that while Canberra seeks to be indispensable to the United States in the Asia Pacific region, they would like to be seen as useful (or in the words of one senior New Zealand official: “bloody useful”).

Southeast Asia

Over the past decade, U.S. interests in Southeast Asia have deepened and broadened. There is significantly more U.S. foreign direct investment into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) than there is in either China or India and the ten ASEAN member states represent the United States’ fourth largest market after the North America Free Trade Agreement, the European Union, and Japan. The region is also increasing in importance to strategic equilibrium of the Asia Pacific as a whole. Over 70 percent of maritime commerce passes through the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea, which is also the source of significant hydrocarbon reserves. Since China submitted its “nine-dash line” territorial claim to the United Nations in May 2009, there have been numerous violent incidents in these waters. The United States has a national interest in assisting states in the region with their defense capabilities and supporting multilateral diplomatic resolutions to territorial and other security problems that prevent individual ASEAN states from being picked off and coerced separately by China.

The strategic outlook of the ASEAN member states is diverse. Many are only recently beginning to reduce mutual threat perception, and ASEAN has only recently established institutions for multilateral confidence-building on the military side, such as the ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meetings, which was inaugurated in 2010 with participation from the United States and other ASEAN partners. The region includes: two U.S. treaty allies, Thailand and the Republic of the Philippines; a close security partner in Singapore; and expanding relationships with non-allies such as Indonesia and Vietnam, and potentially Burma/Myanmar.

Despite this diversity, however, there are some common denominators across ASEAN in terms of security perceptions. First, ASEAN member states all share the strategic objective of strengthening cohesion and integration under the 2008 ASEAN Charter. Second, all the member states (with the possible exception of Singapore) are primarily focused on internal security concerns ranging from insurgencies to water security. Third, all ASEAN member states have demonstrated concern at China’s increased assertiveness and have sought to find ways to expand
engagement with the United States without provoking Beijing. As is often explained to American visitors to the region: the United States is now trusted more, but China is never going away.

While leaders within ASEAN have focused primarily on the U.S. diplomatic and economic presence, most have also come to appreciate the importance of U.S. forward military presence as a critical factor in providing peace and stability in the region, while harboring some doubts about the staying power of the United States given economic challenges and a history of inconsistent commitment and presence. U.S. forward military presence and engagement for most of Southeast Asia will inherently exist at the low intensity end of the spectrum of military requirements, to include HADR, partnership capacity building, counter-piracy, search and rescue (SAR), and bilateral and multilateral confidence-building. This will reflect the desire of most member states to avoid becoming pawns in Sino-U.S. competition; continued sensitivities about ASEAN-centrism, non-alignment, and connections with the Islamic world; and the nature of the security challenges that immediately confront most of the states in Southeast Asia. A successful U.S. military engagement strategy for the region will strengthen the capacity of ASEAN member states to manage their own security challenges, assert greater domain awareness over their maritime territories, and build patterns of multilateral security cooperation that expand participation and confidence-building from across the Asia Pacific region as a whole. In addition, extended engagement will also help to counter doubts about U.S. staying power in the region at a critical strategic juncture and deepen interpersonal ties with counterparts and familiarization with logistical infrastructure, such as airfields, that could become important in future contingencies.

The United States has expanded defense cooperation and access arrangements with Southeast Asian allies and partners in important ways in recent years. Singapore has emerged as the fulcrum for U.S. defense engagement in Southeast Asia based on the 2005 U.S.-Singapore Strategic Framework Agreement for a Closer Cooperation Partnership in Defence and Security. In early 2012, Singapore agreed to host up to four U.S. littoral combat ships at Changhi Naval Base where naval facilities already are in place to berth a U.S. aircraft carrier. Since 1990 the United States and Singapore also have conducted Commando Sling, an annual joint training exercise at Paya Lebar Air Base. The U.S. Navy has come to rely heavily on Singapore as a logistics hub in Southeast Asia, particularly for fuel. Singaporean political support for U.S. forward presence is generally robust, but the city state’s grand strategy puts an emphasis on shaping the larger strategic environment through ASEAN-centered multilateral architecture and a stable equilibrium among the major powers as well. This will put some political and strategic constraints on Singaporean support for U.S. operations in the region. In addition, it must be appreciated that despite impressive foreign policy and defense capabilities, Singapore is a small nation state heavily dependent on its immediate neighbors for fuel and water and therefore potentially coercible, particularly if ASEAN solidarity itself is fractured.

With treaty ally Thailand, the United States holds its longest-standing and largest annual military exercise in the Asia Pacific region, the Cobra Gold series. In 2012, this exercise involved over 10,000 servicemen from the United States, Thailand, Korea, Japan, Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia, as well as observers from 20 other nations; Thailand also hosts one of the region’s largest air force exercises in Cope Tiger. The United States has proposed regular use of Thailand’s strategically located U-Tapao airfield for a permanent HADR facility, though the
Thai government has not yet agreed. The U.S. Navy might also pursue enhanced access to Thai ports and rotate littoral combat ships to Thailand periodically. Despite the reconfirmation of close and historic defense ties in the U.S.-Thailand Strategic Dialogue of June 14, 2012, Thailand has a much lower threat perception of China than other maritime states in ASEAN and polls suggest significant distrust of the United States among the elite.

The other U.S. treaty ally in Southeast Asia, the Republic of the Philippines, has ramped up defense cooperation with the United States in recent years, beginning with a Joint Special Operations Task Force established in Mindanao in 2002 to provide training and assistance for counter-terrorism missions and the annual bilateral Balikatan (“shoulder to shoulder”) exercise. It is important to note that the Philippine Senate in 1992 changed the constitution to prohibit permanent bases; U.S. forces’ access is based on the 1998 Visiting Forces Agreement and the 2002 Mutual Logistics Support Agreement. Confrontations with China over competing territorial claims in the South China Sea have revealed the Philippine archipelago to be a weak flank in the First Island Chain and the rapid increase in Chinese maritime activities, including PLA Navy surface action groups, in that region has demonstrated the importance of helping armed forces of the Philippines (AFP) develop their goal of minimal defense capabilities and improved maritime domain awareness; and of increasing U.S. familiarity with AFP counterparts and the terrain of the archipelago. The United States also has interests in assisting with Japanese, Australian and other maritime allies’ cooperation with the AFP for these purposes. The Republic of the Philippines seeks rotational exercises with the United States, Australia and others around the archipelago with increased access and possibly prepositioned equipment, but not permanent bases which are prohibited by Philippines law at present. The U.S.-Philippines Ministerial Dialogue held on April 30, 2012, furthered discussions on security cooperation to include maritime domain awareness, ISR, and cyberspace. In order to assist the Philippines to establish what Manila has termed “minimum credible defense posture” against external threats, the United States pledged on May 3, 2012, to increase foreign military financing (FMF) from $11.9 million to $30 million annually, including the provisioning of two Hamilton-class Coast Guard cutters and a second-hand squadron of F-16 fighters. The current government appears solidly committed to realizing expanded defense cooperation with the United States, but other elites, including members of President Aquino’s coalition, have argued that the government’s stance is putting critical economic relations with China at risk.

As China has asserted its interests and territorial claims in the South China Sea, Vietnam has also sought closer defense cooperation with the United States. In September 2011 the United States and Vietnam agreed to cooperate in five priority areas: (1) establishment of a regular high-level dialogue between defense ministries; (2) maritime security; (3) SAR; (4) studying and exchanging experiences on UN peacekeeping; and (5) HADR. In 2010, Vietnam announced the commercial section of Cam Ranh Bay would be open to visits by all navies, but only once per year. The U.S. Navy was the first to take up the invitation, and in 2010 the USS John McCain engaged in a joint naval exercise in the South China Sea, opening the door to further cooperation. In the longer-term, facilities in Cam Ranh Bay comparable to Singapore’s Changhi pier to support visits by aircraft carriers would be a significant signal of U.S.-Vietnam security cooperation and support for U.S. presence in the South China Sea, but pushing for this option aggressively would be counterproductive and likely rejected by Vietnam at this point. (The Secretary of Defense visited Cam Ranh Bay in June 2012 and in public remarks referred in general terms to the importance of access for the U.S. Navy.) Vietnamese counterparts
indicated to CSIS experts some interest in quiet cooperation in areas such as special operations forces positioning and training, and also the possibility of hosting the Naval Research facility (NAMRU) that Indonesia expelled in 2011. However, defense cooperation and access arrangements with Vietnam will be carefully calibrated by Hanoi so as not to provoke China. While anti-Chinese nationalism and realpolitik concerns about China’s growing power are driving many Vietnamese strategic elites closer to the United States, other elements among those elites also have strong political and ideological ties to China and remain suspicious of reform and convergence with the United States.

With the world’s largest Islamic population, a generally moderate and secular approach to Islam, a vast geographic span, and a successful transition to democracy, Indonesia has emerged as an important and promising U.S. strategic partner in the region. U.S. sanctions imposed against Indonesia, stemming from violence in East Timor and Aceh, restricted defense cooperation for a decade, but the United States normalized defense ties in 2005 and in 2010 reengaged with Indonesian special operations forces, or Kopassus, in conjunction with the U.S.-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership established in 2010. Defense cooperation now encompasses senior level exchanges, training and participation in multinational exercises (e.g., Cobra Gold, Cope Tiger, Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT), RIMPAC) in areas such as maritime security, peacekeeping, and HADR. Indonesian elites continue to have strong ties to non-alignment ideologies and sensitivities to developments in the Middle East, but they also aspire to a larger strategic role within Asia and globally through forums such as the G-20. On balance, Indonesian strategic elites see closer ties with the United States as compatible with these aspirations. Defense and security cooperation with Malaysia has always been productive even when political relations have been difficult in the past. Today political relations are stronger and U.S. naval ship visits to Malaysia have increased from single digits annually 10 years ago to over 30 in 2011. However, like Indonesia, Malaysia also retains strong non-alignment ideological strains and close sensitivities to developments in the Middle East.

Though small in population and reticent in international affairs, Brunei has significant potential as a U.S. partner in the region. Brunei signed a memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation with the United States in 1994 and also participates in CARAT. Brunei has hosted British forces in the past and still maintains a Gurkha battalion at its own expense. As a claimant to the South China Sea and an oil-rich but potentially vulnerable state, Brunei’s leadership has taken note of China’s stance towards the Philippines and Vietnam. Brunei is home to a large modern deep water port that would be fully capable for LCS or hosting visits from other surface ships.

U.S. defense engagement with Burma/Myanmar remains controversial but promising in the long-term, particularly as the military seeks to diversify away from over-dependence on strategic ties to China. Currently, defense cooperation focuses on cooperation to search for the remains of several hundred U.S. pilots who were downed or crashed in northern Burma while carrying supplies from India to China during World War II. Joint searches for the remains of missing American servicemen in neighboring Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos played a critical role in helping improve relations between the United States and those countries. Engagement with U.S. military counterparts from Burma/Myanmar will also expand in the context of the ASEAN Plus Defense Ministerial Meeting (ADMM+) and other multilateral meetings.
India and South Asia

India has emerged over the past decade as an important strategic partner for the United States. The rise of Indian power is significantly less complicating for U.S. foreign policy strategy than the Chinese case because India is a liberal democracy that has generally come to view U.S. power as beneficial for its own future influence in the international system. In addition, the United States has an interest in encouraging India to become a net exporter of security in the Indian Ocean region, which is an increasingly important maritime sphere to U.S. interests in terms of free flow of commerce and energy as well as strategic depth with respect to the chokepoints at the Straits of Hormuz and the Straits of Malacca/South China Sea. Indian participation in the emerging architecture in East Asia and expanding security cooperation with Japan, Australia and ASEAN also serve U.S. interests. Frosty U.S.-India relations during the Cold War and in the wake of India’s 1998 nuclear test began to thaw with then-President Bill Clinton’s 2000 visit to India and then were fundamentally transformed with the Bush administration’s new strategic framework, which included unprecedented agreements on civil nuclear and defense cooperation. While domestic political complications, Indian disappointment with U.S. policy in Afghanistan, and Indian insistence on “strategic autonomy” have all kept the transformation of the U.S.-India relationship at a more incremental pace since then, there is broad consensus within Washington and Delhi that each depends on the other to sustain a favorable strategic equilibrium as Chinese power rises.

Since the United States and India signed the 2005 U.S.-India Defense Framework Agreement\textsuperscript{96} and the 2006 Indo-U.S. Framework for Maritime Security Cooperation,\textsuperscript{97} India now conducts more exercises with U.S. forces than any other country. Over one third of PACOM’s total exercises are conducted with India,\textsuperscript{98} including military exercises across all services (e.g., Exercise Malabar, HADR and amphibious exercises). India is currently in the process of major conventional modernization that could amount to $80 billion by 2015\textsuperscript{99} to replace aging equipment across all services. India has awarded defense contracts worth $8 billion in recent years to U.S. defense companies for equipment that includes C-17 and C-130J transport aircraft, as well as P-8 maritime surveillance aircraft; there was disappointment that Boeing’s F-18 and Lockheed Martin’s F-16 were dropped from the multi-mission role combat fighter competition. Greater U.S.-Indian interoperability and increased Indian capabilities in these areas, particularly with respect to the Indian Navy’s capacity to provide security in the Indian Ocean, are in U.S. interests.

Permanent U.S. basing in India is not possible due to Indian sensitivities about sovereignty. However, it remains a common interest of both the United States and India to explore increased shared use and common access for future operations. The United States will likely rely heavily on facilities at Diego Garcia well into the future, given its strategic location in the middle of the Indian Ocean, 1800 km from Africa and 1200 from the subcontinent. Already Diego Garcia hosts support facilities for surface ships, submarines, pre-positioned military supplies and communications and space facilities and will include infrastructure improvements to support nuclear powered ships and submarine tenders. The U.S. lease of Diego Garcia from Britain expires in 2016 with a 20-year optional extension that must be confirmed by December 2014. Mauritius has laid claim to the British Indian Ocean Territory, which includes Diego Garcia, and the European Court of Human Rights is reviewing the right of Chagos islanders to return\textsuperscript{100} but
the Mauritian Prime Minister is not challenging the continued use of the military facilities by the United States.\textsuperscript{101}

India’s neighbors within the PACOM AOR all face significant domestic challenges in governance, development, and security. While India has historically had very difficult relations with all its neighbors, this has changed over the last five years due to Indian concerns about terrorism (stemming from Pakistan) and growing Chinese influence. India can no longer take stability and influence on its periphery for granted, and weak or failed states in the region could present security challenges to the United States in terms of terrorism or the invitation of great power competition. Sri Lanka has traditionally practiced a non-alignment policy but before 2008 was arguably the most pro-U.S. country in the region, signing up to a range of U.S.-led initiatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative,\textsuperscript{102} the Container Security Initiative,\textsuperscript{103} acquisition and cross-servicing agreements, and intelligence-sharing. As the Sri Lankan civil war intensified and neared its conclusion, relations with the United States and the West grew more strained, and China began filling the void with significant weapons exports and economic assistance. Bangladesh turned the tide against internal terrorist threats with possible ties to Al Qaeda and now enjoys stronger bilateral ties with the United States as part of a larger policy of strategic flexibility vis-à-vis its surrounding neighbor India. Nepal remains in India’s zone of strategic influence but has developed a relationship with Beijing as Kathmandu attempts to focus on implementation of a peace agreement that would allow Maoists to be integrated into the armed forces. The Maldives favor close relations with the United States due to concerns about terrorism and natural disasters and also receives significant development aid from Japan for port infrastructure, but the Indian government is concerned about expanded Chinese assistance and influence as well. PACOM engagement with these states is generally welcomed by their militaries, most of which have a dominant role in domestic politics but a corporate interest in professionalizing. Sustained PACOM Augmentation Teams (PATs) focused on low-key engagement in the areas of humanitarian relief, capacity building, and disaster response capabilities, are effective with these states and can form the entry point for expanded cooperation with larger elements from PACOM as host nations request them. Strategic friction with India would be counterproductive to U.S. interests and has thus far been avoided.\textsuperscript{101}

China

The United States has an economic and strategic interest in China’s continued development given increased economic interdependence and China’s emergence as an engine for global growth and potential as a net contributor to international security on problems ranging from non-proliferation to counter-terrorism. Extensive engagement in the bilateral Strategic and Economic Dialogue,\textsuperscript{104} the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade,\textsuperscript{105} and multilateral forums to include Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and East Asia Summit (EAS) afford the United States opportunities to reaffirm the importance of China’s responsibilities as a major power and to facilitate its integration with the international community in accordance with established rules and norms. At the same time, China’s increased defense spending and pursuit of advanced military capabilities and assertive behavior with respect to territorial claims in the South and East China Seas pose a potential military threat to the United States and its partners and necessitate a comprehensive set of relationships in the
region and a commensurate force posture to discourage any attempt to alter the strategic equilibrium.

Beijing is well aware of U.S. strategies to shape the regional environment and has developed counter-containment and counter-intervention strategies in parallel. The counter-intervention strategies are usually thought of in terms of A2AD military capabilities (described below) but also include diplomatic, information, and economic sources of leverage against the U.S. political system and particularly weaker regional states in order to complicate U.S intervention in Taiwan, South China Sea, or other regional crises that could involve China. The counter-containment strategies aim at weakening U.S. alignment with other states in the region and involve instruments that range from trade agreements and diplomacy to bribery and individual coercion. However, two points must be emphasized in this regard. The first is that economic and diplomatic engagement between China and neighboring states is entirely predictable and normal given economic globalization and not necessarily threatening to U.S. interests. In fact, competitive trade liberalization can be virtuous if it incentivizes states to get in the game by lowering barriers with others and Chinese economic cooperation is critical to the continued success of many economies within the region that might otherwise see dangerous reversals that would create other problems ranging from terrorism to crime and piracy. The second point is that while the United States and China will inevitably engage in a competition of influence to some extent, Beijing’s counter-containment strategies are premised on a mistaken interpretation of U.S. shaping activities as “containment” in the Cold War sense of the word. In fact, the United States does not seek to limit China’s development or international engagement, as was the case vis-à-vis the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Thus far efforts to reassure the Chinese elite and people of this fact have had mixed success, in part because of failures in strategic communication, but also because significant actors within the Chinese elite and among netizens will opportunistically point to virtually any U.S. engagement in the region as “containment.” Distinguishing between legitimate and manufactured concerns in dialogue with Beijing will require careful attention.

The Chinese desire for advanced military capabilities developed over the last 15-20 years stems from extensive analysis of the pillars of U.S. military power projection as demonstrated in the 1991 Iraq War, the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, the former Yugoslavia conflict, and more recently Iraq and Afghan operations. In particular, China realized after the Taiwan confrontations that it possessed a limited set of military options (short of nuclear weapons) and that U.S. power projection in the form of aircraft carriers and long-range precision strike (e.g., B-2 bombers) to deter Chinese aggression were insurmountable for the PLA. This perceived vulnerability ostensibly led the PLA to focus on capabilities that now pose potential threats to the United States and its allies and partners: submarines and anti-ship cruise or ballistic missiles to deter U.S. aircraft carriers; modern fighter aircraft and surface-to-air missiles to counter U.S. air superiority; electronic warfare to weaken U.S. information superiority; and theater-range weapons (medium-range ballistic missiles and land attack cruise missiles) in response to U.S. bases and alliances in the region. A2AD capabilities are perhaps the most conspicuous element of China’s military modernization campaign and commonly interpreted as a grand strategy to keep the United States from operating militarily in the Asia Pacific region and, in the event of conflict, to defeat it in warfare. The degree of strategic coherence underpinning the pursuit of A2AD capabilities is a subject of debate and implementing a comprehensive strategy will require the integration of all forces into joint operations, which would add layers of complexity to a
military command structure that has not faced combat since 1979. Nevertheless, this attempt at power projection will animate Chinese strategic planning well into the future and merits continued scrutiny.  

Any realistic projection of PLA capabilities depends on several variables including but not limited to the absence of a serious internal social or political crisis, no major war that interrupts international trade, and China’s GDP growth rate. Assuming political stability in China and a steady pace of economic growth from 7-8 percent, China will be the dominant Asian power by 2020. The sustainability of economic growth will hinge, however, on rebalancing the economy both in terms of more even distribution of growth to the hinterlands and a growing reliance on domestic consumption vice exports. Against this backdrop, China’s official defense budget could total $500 billion. Regardless of the actual total, the PLA could have all of the trappings of a major modern military power, including one or two aircraft carriers; twice as many major modern surface combatants (e.g., medium-to-long-range air defenses, long-range anti-submarine cruise missiles, growing anti-submarine warfare capability) as today; a large submarine force; a credible sea-based nuclear deterrent; and a modern air force with 5th-generation (J-20) fighters and strike aircraft. Beyond hardware the most significant variables probably would be the degree of “informatization” (i.e., C4ISR) and credible joint warfare capabilities. China could increasingly invest in information warfare, space-based architecture and naval forces to that could add further complexity to an evolving regional security environment. All of this assumes China will be able to maintain internal political stability, establish legitimacy as a global power internationally, control SLOCs, and overcome efforts by other states in the region to counterbalance its attempts at power projection. The story of China’s military rise is therefore one of potential strength and enormous internal and external vulnerabilities.

The United States has a clear interest in strengthening military-to-military relations with China to improve patterns of communication and facilitate confidence building. The United States seeks stable, continuous, and constructive military-to-military relations as part of a wider, prosperous Sino-American bilateral relationship. A strong military to military relationship enables joint cooperation to counter non-traditional security threats, mutual understanding of both sides’ habits and institutions, and clear lines of communication for security and defense officials. These elements of the relationship are most necessary during times of tension or crisis. U.S.-China military-to-military relations have improved over the last five years. Senior Chinese military officials have visited the United States in four of the last six years, and U.S. and Chinese forces conducted joint exercises three times in the same time period. Moreover, in 2011, senior U.S. military officials visited China, and the U.S. and Chinese governments signed a memorandum of understanding on nuclear security that involves the U.S. Departments of Defense and Energy, as well as the China Atomic Energy Authority. However, Beijing often disrupts patterns of military-to-military cooperation in response to U.S. actions related to Taiwan and challenges remain. In the last five years, China downgraded or suspended military-to-military contacts three times in response to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan (2008, 2009, and 2011) and most recently postponed a scheduled U.S.-China counter-piracy exercise in the Gulf of Aden for the same reason. Despite these fits and starts the U.S. military will continue to seek avenues for improved contacts with counterparts in the PLA.
Russia

Broadly speaking, Russia seeks to achieve two foreign policy goals in the near term: augment the prestige of the Russian Federation and maintain relatively high rates of economic growth. These twin objectives also inform Russian involvement in the Asia Pacific region: it seeks increased prestige, trade, and relations with the largest economies in the region and aims to achieve greater influence and inclusion in the process of regional integration. Russia maintains close economic ties to India and China but also exercises with their militaries; China and Russia conducted joint naval exercises for the first time off China’s east coast in April 2012. India is scheduled to participate in a sixth round of the INDRA series of joint, biannual Indo-Russian ground and naval exercises this summer and is a large-scale purchaser of Russian weaponry. Russia could potentially utilize energy trade as a springboard to improve relations with Japan as that nation seeks alternative sources to nuclear energy in the wake of the March 2011 disaster at Fukushima, though a territorial dispute over islands north of Hokkaido continues to hinder bilateral cooperation. Russia also retains a presence in multilateral institutions including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, ARF, EAS, ADMM+, and APEC; in fact, Russia will host APEC in September 2012. Russia is a member of the Six-Party Talks on North Korean denuclearization, though Russia and China have rarely stood by side with the United States in the United Nations Security Council in response to recent North Korean provocations. Russia has raised its diplomatic profile in the Asia Pacific region to ensure it has a stake in the region’s evolving economic and security architecture, but its strategic focus centers mainly on Europe and opportunities for substantive engagement on regional security challenges remain limited.
SECTION THREE: OPTIONS FOR FORCE POSTURE IN THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION

Section Three is comprised of five subsections. The first subsection includes a brief description of the evaluation criteria and process used to assess options. The second subsection, titled Option 1: As Is, Where Is begins with a detailed description of the disposition of U.S. forces dedicated to the PACOM AOR as of May 2012—i.e., the forces’ current composition and location, as well as strengths and shortcomings of that footprint. The next three sections then describe and evaluate three options, which represent various changes to U.S. force posture in the Asia Pacific region: the option titled Option 2: Planned Posture reflects current DoD plans; Option 3: Increased Posture examines increasing U.S. presence; and Option 4: Decreased Posture examines cutting back U.S. presence.

Description of Evaluation Criteria

The project team evaluated PACOM AOR force posture options using four evaluation criteria, based on standard CSIS-developed criteria that incorporate or reflect considerations that DoD used in similar reviews. The project team used these criteria to evaluate Options 2, 3, and 4.

The four criteria used in this study are:

- **Geostrategic Security/Political-Military**;
- **Operational/Force Structure and Management**;
- **Affordability**; and
- **Executability**.

The evaluation criteria for Geostrategic Security/Political-Military and Operational/Force Structure and Management provide ways to assess the extent to which potential options (and individual actions within the options) are likely to support specified U.S. government strategies and objectives, if implemented. That is, the options/actions are assessed against these criteria assuming full option implementation. Two additional evaluation criteria are designed to address implementation likelihood once a decision has been made to implement but before completion: the Affordability of the option and actions within projected financial resources, and the Executability of the option and actions based on potential implementation difficulties (feasibility) and the length of time for the option/actions to be implemented (timeliness).

For each result, the evaluation is coded as shown in Figure 2 below. Where both positive and negative results are found, the score will be shown as “+/-“. A score of “0” (Neutral) indicates there likely will be no impact. Option evaluation also includes a narrative rationale for the scores.
This evaluation process can provide policymakers a better understanding of measures of merit associated with PACOM AOR force posture options, and lead to evaluation results that form the basis for findings and recommended actions in Section Four of this report. Each criterion includes discrete and specific sub-criteria that have been adjusted to address important force posture issues in the PACOM AOR.

These criteria are described in the following sections.

**A. Geostrategic Security/Political-Military:** The Geostrategic Security/Political-Military criterion considers the extent to which the option/actions would dissuade potential adversaries, shape strategic behavior in a manner consistent with U.S. objectives, and improve relationships with key allies and partners that are important to the future stability and growth of the Asia-Pacific region. This criterion is used to evaluate:

1. Allied/partner and host/transit-nation relationships—The extent to which the option would create or strengthen allied/partner and host-transit-nation relationships and encourage increased jointness, interoperability, and partnership capacity.

2. Perceptions of other regional/global partner nations—The extent to which the option would strengthen positive perceptions and confidence in U.S. commitments and military capabilities, encourage cooperative security, and provide a solid basis for enhancing allied, partner, and other friendly nation military capabilities and actions in the Asia-Pacific region.

3. Perceptions of potential adversaries—The extent to which the option would shape potential adversary perceptions by assuring them of U.S. commitment and military capabilities and dissuading them from challenging U.S. security interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

4. Political risk—The extent to which the option is sustainable and minimizes potentially negative impacts associated with evolving U.S. and regional political dynamics such as changes in host-nation governments and strategic trends, and pressure from third nations.

**B. Operational/Force Structure and Management:** The Operational/Force Structure and Management criterion considers the extent to which the option/actions would provide an
effective and sustainable military capability sufficient to maintain peace, stability, the free flow of commerce, and U.S. influence in the region, as well as support global U.S. security commitments. This criterion is used to evaluate:

1. The ability to execute PACOM AOR security responsibilities—The extent to which the option (considering geographical location, personnel, equipment, etc.) would enable the full range of PACOM AOR security responsibilities over the next 20-30 years. This includes engagement strategies, training and readiness, and operations (e.g., counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, HADR, and current and likely regional operation plans).

2. Global Management—The extent to which the option provides military capabilities that complement/support global U.S. security responsibilities and force management.

3. Quality of Life—The extent to which the option affects quality of life concerns, including but not limited to those associated with creating/sustaining supportive infrastructure as well as the impact of repeated and lengthy rotational deployments and training exercises on the men and women of the Armed Forces and their families.

4. Reversibility—The extent to which the option, once implemented, can be adjusted to accommodate evolutions in the strategic, operational, economic, and/or technological environments.

C. Affordability: The Affordability criterion considers the extent to which projected option/actions implementation and sustainment costs can be accommodated within projected available funding. (Affordability is evaluated on a relative basis, using As Is, Where Is costs as a benchmark. A “++” evaluation indicates that the projected cost of the option component likely is much less than the As Is, Where Is option. A “--” evaluation indicates that the projected cost of the option component likely is much greater than the As Is, Where Is option. A “0” (Neutral) evaluation indicates that the projected option component cost likely is about the same as the As Is, Where Is option. See Figure 2 for the scoring legend.) This criterion is used to evaluate likely implementation and sustainment cost differences among the options:

1. Implementation costs—The cost to implement necessary force structure/management (personnel and equipment) changes and the cost to construct/change necessary physical structures.

2. Sustainment costs—The cost to sustain necessary force structure/management (personnel and equipment) changes and the cost to maintain/sustain necessary physical structures.

D. Executability: The Executability criterion considers the extent to which the option/actions are feasible and can be implemented at the desired location(s) within desired timeframes. This criterion does not include consideration of potential option benefits or costs (which are considered under Geostrategic Security/Political-Military, Operational/Force Structure and Management [option benefits], and Affordability [costs]). This criterion is used to evaluate:
1. Feasibility—
   a. The extent to which the option is consistent with existing U.S. Government agreements, laws, and policies.
   b. The projected degree of ease in obtaining necessary U.S. authorities (including authorization, local/regional agreements, and international agreements). This criterion considers prior precedents, complexity of implementation, and national and local objectives and politics.
   c. The extent to which the option is consistent with existing Host Nation government agreements, laws, and policies.
   d. The projected degree of ease in obtaining necessary Host Nation authorities (including authorization, local/regional agreements, and international agreements). This criterion considers prior precedents, complexity of implementation, and national and local objectives and politics.

2. Timeliness—
   a. The time to gain necessary authorization/agreement to proceed (United States, local/regional, international).
   b. The time to complete implementation of the option once authorization has been secured.

For Timeliness, a “++” evaluation indicates the option/action likely is consistent with the desired timeframe, to the extent that the option/action could be accomplished significantly within the desired timeframe. A “--” evaluation indicates the option/action likely is not consistent with the desired timeframe, to the extent that the option/action would take significantly longer to implement than desired. For this criterion, “0” (Neutral) is not a possible score.

Under the process for the project, the team defined and described options, then evaluated those options against each of the above criteria and all their sub-criteria. This section summarizes the evaluation results at the option criteria, not sub-criteria, level. Sub-criteria level results are available separately. The results of the evaluation process are used as the basis for findings and subsequently, for recommendations.

Summary Description of Options

As part of the charter for this assessment, the project team reviewed current U.S. military force posture and deployment plans and provide options for the realignment of U.S. forces in the region to respond to new opportunities and challenges. While there are a myriad of options—both across military components and across countries throughout the Asia Pacific region—the project team categorized excursions into four basic options to better scope and illuminate the advantages and disadvantages of potential avenues for re-balancing U.S. force posture. As mentioned in Section One:
• **Option 1: As Is, Where Is** is the current disposition of U.S. forces in the region as of June 2012, not including announced plans that have yet to be implemented. The Option 1 assessment describes shortfalls and risk areas in the current force posture given strategic changes in the region, thereby demonstrating the consequences of inaction on realignment. It also establishes a baseline for assessing other options (and the degree to which those other options address risks) and for evaluating cost differentials among options (since other options may increase, decrease, or hold steady current costs).

• **Option 2: Planned Posture** is based on announced DoD agreements and associated plans for realignment of U.S. forces in the Asia Pacific region. It reflects current planned changes to PACOM force posture. In its assessment of Option 2, the project team assesses those planned changes. It also takes “excursions” to examine alternate paths to achieve currently planned force posture objectives in light of political or operational obstacles (e.g., Futenma Replacement Facility alternatives to Henoko, variations on “tour normalization” in South Korea).

• **Option 3: Increased Posture** posits a future force posture based on increased requirements for capabilities and resources in the region. It describes sets of capabilities that would measurably improve operations while illustrating the constraints across the region imposed by absorption limits and budgetary resources. Capability sets include increased air, sea, and ground forces, increased lift and logistics, and increased engagement (e.g., training, exercising, equipping) with partner nations in the region.

• **Option 4: Decreased Posture**: posits a future force posture based on significant reductions in requirements and resources for Army, Marine Corps, and Air Forces in the PACOM AOR; it does not reflect reductions for Navy forces. It evaluates the consequences of reducing U.S. forces in the region. The rationale that underpins removal of forces from the PACOM AOR could revert forces to CONUS for greater adaptability to emerging global needs or could simply reduce the U.S. military as a budgetary consequence of decreased U.S. defense spending.

**Option 1: As Is, Where Is**

The As Is, Where Is option is the baseline against which the other options are compared and evaluated. This option represents a current snapshot of U.S. forces in the Asia Pacific region as of May 2012, including personnel, equipment, and installations within the PACOM AOR. The reasoning for this study approach is several-fold. First, describing the current force disposition provides a common basis from which to discuss strengths, weakness, benefits, and shortcomings of U.S. forces laydown. Second, the baseline allows for comparison of possible changes, whether they enhance regional geostrategic security or operational effectiveness of U.S. and allied forces. Third, using the baseline of U.S. forces today allows for a comparative affordability analysis that is heretofore lacking in other such reports on U.S. options in the Asia Pacific region. Since DoD is unable to provide detailed costs of basing, operating, and sustaining forces abroad, any excursion would also suffer from such lack of accurate or reliable costing. By using an As Is, Where Is baseline, affordability issues can be evaluated on a relative basis.
This section summarizes the PACOM overall AOR force posture and provides detail for forces in each host nation.

**Overall PACOM Force Posture**

U.S. force posture in the Asia Pacific region largely results from conflicts, treaties, and mutual security arrangements of the past century, from the Spanish American War of 1898 through the World Wars, the Korean War, the Vietnam War and subsequent arrangements. The main operating bases, ports, and airfields where U.S. forces are stationed have supported U.S. engagement and presence in the region. Approximately 325,000 U.S. military and civilian personnel are currently assigned to PACOM, with nearly 40,000 in Japan, 28,500 in South Korea, 40,000 in Hawaii, and 5,000 in Guam, with most of the remaining forces based in CONUS. Of note, small numbers of special operations forces are engaged in many of the 36 nations within the PACOM AOR. This AOR:

“encompasses about half the earth’s surface, stretching from the waters off the west coast of the U.S. to the western border of India, and from Antarctica to the North Pole. There are few regions as culturally, socially, economically, and geo-politically diverse as the Asia Pacific. The 36 nations that comprise the Asia-Pacific region are home to more than 50% of the world’s population, three thousand different languages, several of the world’s largest militaries, and five nations allied with the U.S. through mutual defense treaties. Two of the three largest economies are located in the Asia-Pacific along with ten of the fourteen smallest. The AOR includes the most populous nation in the world, the largest democracy, and the largest Muslim-majority nation. More than one third of Asia-Pacific nations are smaller, island nations that include the smallest republic in the world and the smallest nation in Asia.”

PACOM is one of six Geographic Combatant Commands and includes four service components, four subordinate unified commands, three standing joint task forces, and four additional supporting units. With combatant command headquarters in Hawaii and with 325,000 troops (represents roughly one-fifth of total U.S. military end strength stationed in over 30 major operating bases throughout the region, a four-star general or flag officer commands PACOM and reports to the President of the United States through the Secretary of Defense. The people and equipment under this four-star official’s disposal include:

- The Navy component command, U.S. Pacific Fleet (PACFLT), encompasses both the Third Fleet and Seventh Fleet, which hosts an aircraft carrier strike group, approximately 180 ships, nearly 2,000 aircraft, and 140,000 personnel. As the primary naval construct for amphibious missions, the ARG consists of an Amphibious Task Force (ATF) and a landing force of Marines and Army soldiers. These ARGs are normally forward deployed to the Mediterranean Sea/Persian Gulf – Indian Ocean area as well as the Pacific Ocean.
- The Marine Corps component command, MARFORPAC, operates the largest field command in the USMC, including two MEFs and about 74,000 total personnel.
- The Air Force component command, PACAF, maintains roughly 40,000 total airmen at nine bases, who fly more than 300 aircraft of 12 types. PACAF is supported by four
numbered air forces, which include the 5th Air Force, the 7th Air Force, the 11th Air Force, and the 13th Air Force.

- The Army component command, U.S. Army Pacific Command (USARPAC), is comprised of more than 60,000 personnel and five brigade combat teams (BCTs).

- The Special Operations component command, U.S. Special Operations Command, Pacific (SOCPAC), can operate as a rapidly deployable Joint Task Force (JTF), and is comprised of four units which total more than 1,200 personnel.

**Figure 3: PACOM area of responsibility and focus areas**

The Department of Defense reports selected costs of U.S. forces in the PACOM AOR by nation (see Figure 4). The overall cost of the U.S. military presence, according to DoD, has been approximately $36 billion for fiscal years 2010-2013. These costs do not include expenditures for equipment or operation of the U.S. Naval fleet that supports the PACOM AOR.
Figure 4: Overseas Costs, FY2010-FY2013

Note: Other* includes all countries with costs less than $5 million.\textsuperscript{133} 
Source: Operation and Maintenance Overview Fiscal Years 2010-2013; CSIS analysis.

DoD also tracks certain costs with respect to host nation support, which DoD defines in reports to Congress as burden sharing (herein referred to as Host Nation Support or HNS).\textsuperscript{134} Host nations support U.S. presence on their soil for a range of activities. In 2012, Japan HNS will total $2.37 billion, and Korea HNS equals about $765 million. As part of HNS, both nations report cash contributions to the United States totaling about $330 million.\textsuperscript{135} Host Nation Support should be considered when evaluating changes to force posture in relation to these nations.

Regarding property, the DoD annually reports to Congress on all installations it maintains whether in CONUS or outside the continental United States (OCONUS). DoD breaks down sites by service and groups by location, within the 50 U.S. states, seven U.S. territories, and 40 foreign countries. As of the Fiscal Year 2012 Baseline report, there were 4,451 CONUS sites, 94 sites in U.S. territories, and 666 sites overseas for a total of 5,211.\textsuperscript{136} The majority of foreign entities are located in Germany (232), Japan (109), and South Korea (85). The DoD report gives a full breakdown of site classifications.

**Japan**

U.S. forces have been stationed in Japan since World War II, based on the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan.

There are approximately 35,000 U.S. military and 5,000 DoD civilian personnel in Japan, with nearly half stationed on the island of Okinawa. While the U.S. maintains numerous smaller sites and facilities throughout Japan, the main U.S. forces presence includes the United States Seventh
Fleet based in Yokosuka, III MEF based in Okinawa, and 130 U.S. Air Force fighters stationed on Misawa and Kadena AB. In order to maintain readiness, and apart from local training, these forces engage in biannual command post and field exercises, named Keen Edge/Keen Sword. These exercises are joint/bilateral training exercises held to increase combat readiness and joint/bilateral interoperability of U.S. forces and JSDF for the defense of Japan. A significant burden for hosting U.S. forces (about 75 percent of total) has been placed on Okinawa prefecture. In 1996, the SCC established the U.S.-Japan Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) to consolidate the U.S. footprint, and subsequent SCC joint statements in 2005, 2006 and 2012 have added further details and adjustments to the realignment effort as noted in Section Two. However, U.S. forces continue to operate out of MCAS Futenma as prefectural approvals for the FRF at Henoko have not been obtained.

Table 1 and Figure 5 below outline the major U.S. military forces stationed in Japan.

### Table 1: Detailed Listing of Major U.S. Forces in Japan

| Army | USARJ/I Corps (FWD): CMDR, ⚫⚫ (Zama) |
|      | 10th SPT GRP (Torii Station) |
|      | 1-1 ADA (Kadena) |
|      | 78th Avn (Zama) |
|      | 78th Signal BDE |
|      | 83rd Ordnance BDE |
|      | MP BDE |

| Air Force | USFJ and 5th AF: CMDR, ⚫⚫⚫ (Yokota) |
|           | 18th Wing: 44th FS (24xF-15C/D) |
|           | 67th FS (24xF-15C/D) |
|           | 961st AWACS (2xE-3B/C) |
|           | 909th ARS (15xKC-135R/T) |
|           | 33rd RQS (8xHH-60G) (Kadena) |
|           | 35th Fighter Wing: 13th FS (18xF-16CD) |
|           | 14th FS (18xF-16C/D) (Misawa) |
|           | Specialized support elements (Misawa) |
|           | 374th Airlift Wing: 36th AS (14xC-130H1) |
|           | 459th AS (4xUH-1N, 3xC-12J) (Yokota) |
|           | Bilateral Air Operations Center (Yokota) |

| Navy / Marines | 7th Fleet: CMDR, ⚫⚫ (Yokosuka) |
|                | Carrier Strike Group 5 (Yokosuka): |
|                | CVN-73 (USS George Washington) |
|                | CVW-5: 4 VFAs; 48xF/A-18 E/Fs, 1 VAQ; 6xEA-18Gs, 1 VAW; 4xE-2s, 1 VRC; 2xC-2s, 1 HS; 9xSH-60s, 3xHH-60s, 1 HSL; 15xSH-60s, 1 CAF; 3xC-12s (Atsugi) |
|                | DESRON-15: 7 DDGs (Yokosuka) |
|                | Expeditionary Strike Group-7 / CTF 76 (White Beach, Okinawa): |
|                | COMPHIBRON-11: LHD-6, LPD-9, LSD-42, LSD-46, LCC-19, Helo Sea Combat Squadron 25, TACRON-12, Det WPAC, ACU-1, ACU-5, MCMRON-7, EODMU-5, Det WPAC |
|                | Naval Region Japan, NAVFORJAPAN, CMDR, ⚫⚫ (Yokosuka) |

| III Marine Expeditionary Force: CMDR, ⚫⚫ (Butler, Okinawa) |
| III MEF MHQ, (Butler, Okinawa) |
| 3rd MARDIV, CMDR ⚫⚫ |
| 1st MAW: CMDR, ⚫⚫ |
| 3rd MLG: CMDR, ⚫⚫ |
| 3rd MEB: CMDR, ⚫ (31st MEU) |
| MAG-12 36xF/A-18 E/Fs; 6xAV-8Bs (Iwakuni) |
Operational Challenges and Opportunities

Current U.S. force presence in Japan and particularly on Okinawa is strategically well placed to respond to any potential contingency in Northeast Asia. For example, both Yokota Air Base and Kadena Air Base have significant capacity to host and transit aircraft for engagement throughout the region, while Yokosuka hosts the 7th fleet. U.S.-Japan security agreements are premised on the assumption that U.S. forces will be used both for the defense of Japan and for the security of the Far East. There are also opportunities for increased access and shared use with Japanese civil facilities and shared use with the JSDF. U.S. forces in Japan are constrained in their ability to train and exercise to the full range of skills necessary to maintain peak readiness, in part because of increased encroachment around facilities over the years. Use of civilian air fields is heavily restricted, but U.S.-Japan cross servicing and other agreements have increased the opportunities to use military aircraft at civilian airports with some frequency and vice versa. Prepositioning of equipment is lacking, but critical for use elsewhere in the region, and is easily accessible from Japan.

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Forces_Japan
South Korea

The U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty continues to serve as the foundation for U.S. strategic deployments on the Korean Peninsula. The United States has maintained a continuous military presence on the peninsula since the treaty’s signature although the size of its commitment has varied. In 2004, the Secretary of Defense authorized a realignment program which called for a reduction of troop strength to 25,000 by September 2008. One 2ID brigade was immediately deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and following combat operations, moved to Joint Base Lewis-McChord. Withdrawals were halted in 2008, resulting in the current troop strength of 28,500. Including military personnel, dependents, and DoD civilians, total DoD personnel in Korea are approximately 52,800.

Table 2 and Figure 6 below outline the major U.S. military forces stationed in the Republic of Korea.

Table 2: Detailed Listing of Major U.S. Forces in the Republic of Korea

| Army | USFK, CFC and UNC: CMDR, ☆☆☆☆ (Yongsan) |
|      | 8th U.S. Army: CMDR, ☆☆☆☆ (Yongsan) |
|      | 2ID: CMDR, ☆☆ (Red Cloud) |
|      | 1/2nd Heavy BCT |
|      | 2nd Combat Aviation BDE |
|      | 210th Fires BDE |
|      | 1st Signal BDE (Yongsan) |
|      | 501st Military Intel BDE (Yongsan) |
|      | 19th Expeditionary Sust CMD: CMDR, ☆ (Henry) |
|      | 65th Medical BDE (Yongsan) |
|      | 35th ADA BDE (Osan) |

| Air Force | 7th AF: CMDR, and DEP CMDR CFC, ☆☆☆☆ (Osan) |
|           | 51st Fighter Wing: 25th FS (21xA-10C) 36th FS (24xF-16C/D) 5th RS(ACC) (3xU-2R) 75th FS(ACC) (12xA-10C) (Osan) |
|           | Air Operations Center (Osan) |
|           | 8th Fighter Wing: 35th FS (18xF-16C/D) 80th FS (18xF-16C/D) (Kunsan) |

| Navy Marines | Naval Forces Korea (CNFK): CMDR, ☆ (Yongsan) |
|             | Fleet Activities (CFAC) Chinhae |
|             | MARFOR-K: CMDR, and UNC/CFC/USFK J-5, ☆☆ (Yongsan) |
Operational Challenges & Opportunities

The U.S. commitment of 28,500 U.S. military personnel in South Korea sends a strong message of dissuasion, deterrence and reassurance to surrounding states in the region—particularly North Korea—and enables closer jointness and interoperability with ROK forces. However, there are operational challenges for forward deployed forces in Korea as they are currently configured. For example:

- The current force structure maintains basically one-of-a-kind units (one heavy brigade, one fires brigade, and one hardened command and control center) which lack redundancy;

- In addition, the ROK expectation is that U.S. military personnel deployed on the peninsula will not be used for PACOM missions elsewhere in the AOR, in contrast to forces stationed in Japan. This has inhibited training, exercise and engagement opportunities;
Moreover, USFK northern camps, and even Seoul Headquarters, are exposed to North Korean artillery due to proximity of the DMZ, and they are spread out in ways that complicate easy provision of logistical support; and

Finally, prepositioned stocks have yet to be reloaded to replace stocks used in other operations.

Guam

Guam came under the control of the United States after the 1898 Spanish-American War as part of the Treaty of Paris, and became a way station for U.S. ships traveling to and from the Philippines and South Asia. Undefended by the U.S. military during World War II, Guam was invaded and occupied by Japan. After the war, the Guam Organic Act of 1950 established Guam as an unincorporated organized territory of the United States, provided for the structure of the island's civilian government, and granted the people U.S. citizenship. U.S. military forces have maintained a presence on the island ever since.

Currently, Guam hosts the headquarters for Joint Region Marianas, covering both Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. Guam has been the home to many different military units over the past 60 years, and was especially active during the Vietnam War as a way station for U.S. bombers. Currently, the U.S. Navy and Air Force operate from the island. The major U.S. Naval presence includes a squadron of three attack submarines. The Air Force operates out of Andersen Air Base, hosting a rotational unit of B-52 bombers and an ISR squadron of remotely piloted aircraft.

Of significance to military readiness and potential military operations in the PACOM AOR are the training ranges on the nearby Mariana islands, including Tinian, Saipan, Farallon de Medinilla, and Pagan, and the very sizable ordnance storage facilities on Guam. In recent years, three Valiant Shield joint exercises based at Guam have boosted U.S. military readiness in the Asia Pacific region, and in May 2012, nearly 1,000 U.S. Air Force and Marines from Iwakuni, Japan conducted exercises on Guam and Tinian, in an exercise named Geiger Fury. Without such facilities, maintaining the readiness of forward stationed military personnel would be significantly more difficult.

Table 3 and Figure 7 below outline the major U.S. military forces stationed in Guam.

Table 3: Detailed Listing of Major U.S. Forces in Guam

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Guam National Guard: Adjutant General, G (Barrigada)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GUARNG Element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st BDE, 294th Infantry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>105 Troop CMD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>94th Civil Support Team (WMD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>36th Wing: CDR and Joint Region Marianas, DEP CDR, G (Andersen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5th BW (AFOSC) (B-52 Deployed), AMC (ARC) (KC-135 Deployed), 12th RS (ACC) (RQ-4 Deployed) (Andersen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AF Contingency Response Group (Andersen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Space facilities (various locations throughout Guam)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guam MSFN Tracking Station (GTS)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Operational Challenges & Opportunities

Guam offers additional port capacity. For air operations, Andersen Air Force Base (AFB) is the western most U.S. sovereign base, ensuring U.S. control over ability to operate and train from the island and surrounding U.S. held territories.

Construction of new facilities on Guam is challenging. Basic infrastructure on the island is outdated, and the multiplier to construct facilities is a factor greater than two. Additionally, the process of commissioning an environmental impact assessment, receiving public comment before proceeding has historically been long and drawn out. And, until training ranges are built or better utilized, stationing ground troops on Guam will mean their readiness and needed skill sets will be diminished.
Hawaii

United States basing in Hawaii dates to 1860, when the first lease was enacted for a U.S. coaling station on the island of Oahu. U.S. facilities remained sparse throughout the remainder of the 19th Century until the establishment of Naval Base Hawaii in 1900 following annexation in 1898. This small facility was later expanded into Naval Base Pearl Harbor and provided a deep water port for naval vessels operating throughout the Asia Pacific region. The island became an increasingly important hub for U.S. military activities in the Far East and was subsequently attacked by Japanese forces in 1941, precipitating U.S. involvement in World War II.

Today, Hawaii serves as the headquarters for PACOM, as well as its subordinate components. USARPAC, headquartered at Fort Shafter, maintains two infantry Brigades (one Heavy, one Stryker) at Schofield Barracks, as well various logistical and administrative elements critical to PACOM operations. PACAF, the 13th Air Force, and the 15th Wing operate from Hickam AFB, providing fighter, bomber, and lift capability to the PACOM Commander. Finally, Pearl Harbor remains the headquarters of the Pacific Fleet while Marine Corps Base Hawaii (MCBH) Kaneohe Bay currently garrisons the 3rd Marine Regiment.

Table 4 below outlines the major U.S. military forces stationed in Hawaii.

Table 4: Detailed Listing of Major U.S. Forces in Hawaii

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USARPAC: CMDR, ☆☆☆ (Shafter)</td>
<td>HQ PACAF: CMDR, ☆☆☆☆ (Hickam)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USARPAC: DEP CMDR, ☆☆ (Shafter)</td>
<td>13th AF: CMDR, ☆☆☆ (Hickam)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ USARPAC (JTF-HD) (Shafter)</td>
<td>15th Wing: 535th AS (8xC-17) 65th AS (1xC-40B, 1xC-37) 154th WG (HI ANG) 199th FS (18xF-22) 203 ARS (12xKC-135R) 169th ACWS 120th FW (MT ANG) 186th FS (6xF-15C/D) (Hickam) Air Operations Center (Hickam)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th ID HQ: CMDR, ☆☆ (Schofield)</td>
<td>25th ID HQ: DEP CMDR, ☆☆ (Shafter)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th ID HQ: DEP CMDR - Operations, ☆ (Schofield)</td>
<td>25th ID HQ: DEP CMDR - Support, ☆ (Schofield)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-25th Stryker BCT</td>
<td>2-25th Infantry BCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-25th Infantry BCT</td>
<td>25th Combat Aviation Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94th Army Air &amp; Missile Defense Command (Shafter)</td>
<td>94th Army Air &amp; Missile Defense Command (Shafter)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th MEDCOM</td>
<td>18th MEDCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Theater Sust CMD (Shafter)</td>
<td>8th Theater Sust CMD (Shafter)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th MSC (Shafter)</td>
<td>9th MSC (Shafter)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI NG: Adjutant General, ☆☆ (Shafter)</td>
<td>HI NG: Adjutant General, ☆☆ (Shafter)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIARNG: CMDR, ☆☆ (Hilo)</td>
<td>HIARNG: CMDR, ☆☆ (Hilo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIANG: CMDR, ☆☆ (Hickam)</td>
<td>HIANG: CMDR, ☆☆ (Hickam)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI ARES: CMDR, ☆☆ (Wheeler)</td>
<td>HI ARES: CMDR, ☆☆ (Wheeler)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Operational Challenges & Opportunities

Hawaii is strategically located for posturing forces as well as maintaining headquarters for the entire PACOM AOR. Its location allows PACOM to maintain command and control easily. However, the cost of living and construction on Hawaii are high. Space is limited, as are training opportunities. Hawaii is also east of the dateline and separated by 3,000 miles from the Western Pacific.

Alaska / CONUS

PACOM, being the largest and oldest of the Unified Commands, embodies several other anomalies. The present PACOM footprint includes areas originally assigned to two other unified commanders. Responsibilities of the Far East Command were assumed on July 1, 1957. That same day, the command assumed some of the responsibilities of the Alaskan Command, and individual Army and Air Force component commands for the Asia Pacific region were established in Hawaii. Then, on April 17, 2002, DoD officials announced changes in the Unified Command Plan. PACOM would help European Command with the far eastern part of Russia and add Antarctica to its AOR. Another anomaly is Alaska. NORTHCOM covers the state, but the troops based there are earmarked for PACOM. Additional forces earmarked for PACOM are based in CONUS (Washington and California).

Another unique issue to Alaska is the Joint Pacific-Alaska Range Complex (JPARC). Operated by Alaska Command, a Sub-Unified Command under PACOM, JPARC is a training complex in Alaska that integrates land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace components into a venue that involves every branch of the military. As such, JPARC is a unique national asset that contributes directly to the PACOM forces readiness.

Table 5 below outlines the major U.S. military forces stationed in Alaska and CONUS.
### Table 5: Detailed Listing of Major U.S. Forces in Alaska / CONUS (dedicated to PACOM)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USARAK: CMDR, ☆☆ (Richardson)</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AK:</td>
<td>3rd Wing: 90th FS (21xF-22A) 525th FS (21xF-22A) 962d AWACS (2xE-3B/C) 517th AS (2xC-12F, 8xC-17) (JBER, AK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>176th WG (AK ANG): CMDR, ☆☆☆</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>144th AS (8xC-130H2) 210th RQS (5xHH-60G) 211th RQS (3xHC-130N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>176th ACWS (JBER, AK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>354th Fighter Wing: 18 AGRS (18xF-16C/D) 168th ARW (AK ANG) 168th ARS (8xKC-135R) (Eielson, AK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joint Pacific-Alaskan Range Complex (JPARC) (Eielson, AK)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| AK NG: Adjutant General, ☆☆ | Navy / Marines |
| AKANG: CMDR, Col (near Fairbanks) |
| WA: 1 Corps HQ: CMDR, ☆☆☆ (Lewis-McChord) |
|                                | 3/2nd Stryker BCT |
|                                | 4/2nd Stryker BCT |
|                                | 2/2nd Stryker BCT |
|                                | 16th CAB |
|                                | 17th Fires BDE |

| 1/25th Stryker BCT |
| 4/25th Airborne BCT |
| 1/52 GSAB |
| 6/17 CAV |
| 2nd Engineer BDE |
| AK ARNG: CMDR, ☆ (Bryant) |
| AKANG: CMDR, Col (near Fairbanks) |

| 1st MEF: CMDR, ☆☆☆ (Pendleton) |
| I MEF MHG, 1st MEB, 11th MEU (C7F/CT76), 13th MEU, 15th MEU, 1st MARDIV, 3rd MAW, 1st MLG |

### Operational Challenges & Opportunities

Alaska is seven to eight hours from the East Asian littoral by air and therefore more proximate to regional missions than forces based on the West Coast of the Lower Forty-eight. Basing U.S. forces in Alaska and CONUS also provides the military with fewer operating and training restrictions than deploying on foreign bases. However, despite its relative proximity compared with California, Oregon or Washington, Alaska is still far removed from places of potential
contingency or conflict compared with Guam and particularly Japan, Korea and other allies and partners within the region.

**Support / Other**

Certain military assets, forces, and training by nature and purpose are better captured in a region-wide presentation. While some logistics stores may currently exist in a specific location, they are in large measure theater-wide assets. Other assets have global, regional, and specific purposes, such as ballistic missile defense, space, and cyberspace. Similarly, certain training exercises are meant to be regionally focused, not simply bilateral or joint.

**Global Support and Logistics**

Global force presence is assisted by prepositioning personnel and equipment in crucial areas to resupply ships and aircraft, as well as provide havens for equipment repairs. Prepositioning facilitates the fast deployment of equipment and supplies to personnel in areas of contingency operations. Positioned stocks, both afloat and ashore, support timely movement of essential military supplies between operating areas with decreased travel time, transport cost, and without reliance on other nation’s transportation networks into theater. Prepositioning stocks also permits the swift arrival of personnel to theater while supplies are transported separately to a specified link-up point once a port or airfield has been secured by early arriving forces.

The Military Sealift Command, tasked with coordinating afloat prepositioning, operates 36 forward-deployed ships for various DoD branches in its Prepositioning Program: 16 Maritime Prepositioned Force (MPF) Ships for the U.S. Marine Corps, 10 Combat Prepositioned Force Ships for the U.S. Army, and 10 Logistics Prepositioned Force Ships for the Air Force, Navy, and Defense Logistics Agency combined. All prepositioning ships are strategically located among the world’s oceans to expedite transportation of equipment, ammunition, food, and supplies to support U.S. forces worldwide.

Specifically for the PACOM region, afloat stocks are located in or around Diego Garcia, British Indian Ocean Territory, and Guam/Saipan in the Western Pacific Ocean. Afloat ships are comprised of container ships, large medium-speed/roll-on roll-off ships (LMSRs), and smaller cargo ships, capable of displacing between 40,000-55,000 tons of cargo each. By service:

- **The Maritime Prepositioned Stock Squadrons-2 and -3** are operational assets of the U.S. Navy's Seventh Fleet, forward deployed out of Diego Garcia, British Indian Ocean Territory Western Pacific, and Guam/Saipan, respectively. Within each squadron, ships are equipped with enough supplies to support a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), roughly 16,000-18,000 individuals, for a period of 30 days. Once a port or airstrip has been secured by previously flown-in Marines, MPF ships provide easy roll-on/roll-off capabilities for ammunition, sustainment supplies, and equipment, reducing time spent for deployment response.

- **Army Prepositioning Afloat, APS-3** is designed to be comprised of one infantry brigade combat team (IBCT) with AUG in Guam, and one IBCT with augmentation in Diego Garcia.
• The Air Force designates prepositioned stocks as War Reserve Materials (WRMs). Afloat WRMs include two Container ships rotating between Diego Garcia and Guam/Saipan.

Prepositioning ashore consists of land based storage sites near possible threats and conflict areas so that personnel may utilize stocks upon arrival, rather than waiting for air transport from CONUS. The Army has prepositioned units (APS-4) stationed at Camp Carroll, Daegu, Republic of Korea, as well as Yokohama and Camp Sagami, Japan. These stocks include unit sets, which are defined as end items, supplies, and secondary items stored in unit configurations brigade, division and corps/echelon above corps, Operational Project Stocks, and sustainment items. Sustainment stocks include primarily war reserve supplies, major end items, and ammunition.143

Special Operations Forces

Special Operations Forces (SOF) have been heavily engaged in the PACOM AOR for decades, particularly after 9/11. SOF leadership in the PACOM AOR includes: the Commander, Special Operations Command Pacific in Hawaii; the Commander, Special Operations Command Korea, U.S. Forces Korea and United Nations Command Special Operations Component; and Deputy Commanding General, Combined Unconventional Warfare Task Force, Yongsan Army Garrison, South Korea. Their force capabilities and deployed locations are generally classified.

Exercises and other Engagements

PACOM, its service components, and its sub-unified commands participate in hundreds of exercises and other engagement activities per year with foreign military forces. As reported by PACOM, some major exercises include:

• Talisman Saber: A biennial Australia/United States bilateral exercise merging Exercises Tandem Thrust, Kingfisher, and Crocodile. Talisman Saber is the primary training venue for Commander Seventh Fleet as a Combined Task Force (CTF) and for III MEF in a short notice, power projection, and forcible entry scenario. The exercise is a key opportunity to train Australian and U.S. combined forces in mid- to high-intensity combat operations using training areas in Australia.

• Cobra Gold: A joint/multilateral exercise with Thailand designed to improve U.S., Thai, and other participants’ combat readiness and joint/combined interoperability.

• Balikatan: A joint exercise with the Republic of the Philippines and the U.S. to improve combat readiness and interoperability.

• RIMPAC: A biennial large-scale multinational power projection/sea control exercise. In 2000, participants included the U.S., Canada, Australia, Japan, South Korea, Chile, and the United Kingdom.144

In addition to such exercises, since 1996, PACOM has participated in more than 20 disaster relief operations in 12 countries (i.e., Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Palau, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Burma, India, Madagascar, Sri Lanka) and one U.S. territory (Guam).
Table 6 below details the support and other U.S. forces in Alaska and CONUS, which are dedicated to PACOM.

**Table 6: Detailed Listing of Support / Other U.S. Forces in Alaska / CONUS (dedicated to PACOM)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support, Logistics, Other (includes SOF)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global Support &amp; Logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOGWESTPAC, CMDR, ☆ (Singapore)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APS-3 (Afloat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1xIBCT with AUG Afloat (Guam)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1xIBCT with AUG Afloat (Diego Garcia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APS-4 (Japan, ROK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1xHBCT (Ashore Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPSRON-2 (Diego Garcia) 15-17 Ships shared with MPSRON-3, MEB Set Afloat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPSRON-3 MEB Set Afloat (Guam/Saipan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army 2x Container Ships, PACOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF 2x Container Ships, PACOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy 1x Breakbulk Vessel, PACOM Sust.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Special Operations Forces:

- SOCPAC: CMDR, ☆☆ (Camp Smith, Hawaii)
- SOCKOR, USFK; (Camp Kim) UNCSOC; and DEP CUWTF, ☑ (Camp Kim)
- SOF: 1 Bn-1st Special Forces Group (Torii Station Garrison, Japan)
- SOF: 353rd Special Operations Group, 9xMC-130 (Kadena, Japan)
- Navy Special Warfare (NAVSPECWAR) Unit One (Apra Harbor, Guam)
- Joint Special Operations Task Force - Philippines (JSOTF-P) (Mindanao and Luzon, Philippines)
- Logistics Support Facility, Singapore
- Maritime Support Vessel at sea

- Joint POW/MIA Command, ☆☆ (Camp Smith, Hawaii)
- Joint Interagency Task Force – West, ☆ (Camp Smith, Hawaii)
- Ballistic missile defense assets (Regionally spread throughout PACOM AOR)
- Space (Assets spread throughout PACOM AOR)
- Cyberspace activities (Spread throughout PACOM AOR)

**Operational Challenges & Opportunities**

Special operations forces have been heavily engaged in the PACOM AOR since before 9/11 and have been extremely effective operating in small numbers in many PACOM AOR nations. However, the demand for worldwide special operations forces is increasing, and high global demand could complicate current plans for increased operations in the PACOM AOR.

Prepositioned stocks are spread throughout the PACOM AOR but still need to be replenished following U.S. engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan. Finally, certain ammunition and other ordnance stores remain in shortage.
Option 2: Planned Posture

This option involves the current planned changes to force posture as detailed to the project team from the executive branch and military service components. The option consists of current DoD plans for U.S. force posture changes – underway and prospective. These plans fall under three categories. First, there are the U.S.-Government of Japan bilateral SSC agreements. Second, there is the U.S.-Republic of Korea Strategic Alliance 2015. Third, there are nascent additional bilateral negotiations and arrangements with Australia and Singapore. Table 7 below summarizes the major planned and projected movements. This is followed by more detailed discussions of the plans, as reported by the media.

Table 7: Summary of Major Planned and Projected Posture Movements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>U.S.-GOJ SCC Agreements</th>
<th>U.S.-ROK Strategic Alliance 2015</th>
<th>Other (Singapore, Australia, Hawaii)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>-9,000 USMC, -3rd MEB HQ, USMC Brig Gen, Futenma Marine Air Base, FRF Marine Air Base, Henoko, Carrier Wing CVW-5, Atsugi Air Base, + Carrier Wing CVW-5, Iwakuni</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>-9,000 U.S. Army troops from Yongsan Base, Seoul, +9,000 U.S. Army troops USAG Humphreys, Pyeongtaek, -2 ID (10,000 troops) near DMZ, +2 ID (10,000 troops) troops south of the Han River</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guam</td>
<td>+1,500 PCS and 3,200 UDP USMC, +3rd MEB-MAGTF HQ, location TBD, USMC Brig Gen, +Supported by $3.1 billion in GOJ funds, add training areas in Tinian and CNMI, and add facilities for basing USMC personnel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+4 LCS, no PCS personnel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Australia | +2,500 USMC, +MAGTF, structure TBD, (Darwin)
--- | ---
Hawaii | +2,700 USMC, +MAGTF, structure and location TBD

**United States-Government of Japan SCC Agreements**

Current posture plans relating to U.S. forces in Japan are borne out of the 2006 Roadmap discussed earlier in this report. Several major actions in the Roadmap remain unfulfilled, including relocation of U.S. Marines from Okinawa and construction of a Futenma Replacement Facility. Both issues have just recently been brought to the forefront.

On February 8, 2012, the United States and Japan issued a joint statement on defense posture that reiterated a commitment to mitigating the impact of U.S. forces on Okinawa. The statement asserted that the existing plan for the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) is the only viable way forward and stressed that the development of Guam as a strategic hub remains an essential part of U.S. strategy in the Asia Pacific region (with an operational Marine Corps presence relocated from Okinawa). Then, on April 27, 2012, the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense and their Government of Japan counterparts announced planned U.S. force posture changes as a result of SCC negotiations. These details are closely connected to the February 2012 U.S.-Japan Joint Defense Posture Statement.\(^{145}\) The central parts of the planned changes to U.S. posture in the PACOM AOR revolve around DoD’s distributed MAGTF concept.

Two prior options that were examined by DoD formed the basis for the current distributed MAGTF plan, the 2006 Realignment Roadmap, and its related and subsequent derivatives. The initial cost estimates of the 2006 Roadmap omitted significant factors and underestimated total costs. As a result, costs essentially doubled from the 2006 Roadmap. Cost estimates for the new MAGTF plan have not been finalized in detail, in part because many factors, such as lift, construction, environmental impact, and elements of Japanese cost-sharing, have not yet been fully determined. However, the April 2012 announcement reported total cost of the relocation to Guam was expected to be $8.6 billion, including $3.1 billion in Government of Japan funding, along with the shift in forces.

Within the distributed MAGTF plan, some broad themes are apparent. The plan:

- Supports the priority of the Strategic Guidance on the Asia Pacific region, even in the midst of budgetary constraints, by providing for dispersed Marine Air-Ground Task Forces;

- Emphasizes the development of Guam as a strategic hub; the U.S. Marine Corps relocation (Okinawa to Guam) will move approximately 4,700 Marines;

- Is based on the United States and Japan having agreed to “delink” both the Marine Corps relocation and the Kadena land returns from Japanese progress on the FRF in Okinawa while providing JFIP support for annual MCAS Futenma maintenance in the interim;
• Involves development of joint training facilities in the CNMI; and

• Requires a new funding arrangement with the Government of Japan involving direct cash contributions, some form of cost-sharing for the new training facilities on the CNMI, and a move away from reliance on low-interest/long-term loans from the Japan Bank for International Cooperation for housing and other public-private-ventures (PPV) on Guam (given a reduced requirement for housing in particular, and therefore reduced revenue streams).

The USMC realignment of troops would remove approximately 9,000 U.S. Marines from Okinawa and redistribute those forces among three other locations – Guam, Hawaii, and Australia. Including those U.S. Marines remaining on Okinawa, the plan builds four Marine Air Ground Task Forces in the PACOM AOR. While nearly half of the Marines currently stationed on Okinawa would leave that island, they would not necessarily be re-stationed elsewhere in the Asia Pacific region, but potentially be part of rotational unit deployments (UDP) into Guam and Australia.

An additional key component of relocating USMC personnel to Guam, and for enhancing joint, bilateral, and multilateral capabilities, is the planned development of training ranges and facilities on Tinian and CNMI.

**United States-Republic of Korea Strategic Alliance 2015**

In June, 2009, President Obama and ROK President Lee-Myung-bak agreed to the “Joint Vision for the Alliance,” which most importantly called for a transition of wartime Operational Control (OPCON) to the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff by 2012. The decision to transition this authority was delayed in 2010 to provide additional time to synchronize a variety of transformation initiatives and will now take place in 2015. This delay was incorporated in the “Strategic Alliance 2015” roadmap, which outlines the alliance’s force structure for the coming years.

In addition to the OPCON transition, the “Strategic Alliance 2015” roadmap incorporates two previously agreed upon initiatives pertinent to the discussion of U.S. force structure on the Korean Peninsula. First, under the October 2004 YRP, 9,000 U.S. military personnel (17,000 total DoD personnel) will move from their current location at the U.S. Army Garrison, Yongsan in Seoul to USAG Humphreys, approximately 40 miles south of the capital city. While South Korea is expected to carry most of the cost burden of this repositioning (estimated at $6.3 billion), the United States will provide approximately $2 billion in construction costs through fiscal year 2016.

Second, under the March 2002 Land Partnership Plan (LPP), some 10,000 soldiers of the Second Infantry Division will be withdrawn from their current positions along the DMZ and consolidated at USAG Humphreys. This move is intended to enhance coordination, mission command, and planning, as well as relocating the majority of U.S. forces outside DPRK artillery range. Funded primarily by the U.S., the initiative is expected to cost nearly $4 billion, with $0.6 billion provided by South Korea.

As a result of these two initiatives, USFK will reduce its installation footprint by 50 percent, from the 104 facilities it maintained in 2002 to 48. Total costs associated with these two moves range from $10 to $14 billion. Units will coalesce around two primary hubs located at USAG...
Humphreys/ Osan Air Base and USAG Daegu, in which there will be five major sites: Osan Air Base, USAG Humphreys, USAG Daegu, Chinhae Naval Base, and Joint Headquarters.

**Other United States Bilateral Efforts**

**Australia**

In November 2011 the United States and Australian governments announced a rotational MAGTF presence in Darwin. Eventually, through stages spanning several years, an entire Marine Air-Ground Task Force, comprised of 2,500 Marines, will be staged at Camp Darwin. On April 3, 2012, the first company-sized rotation arrived at Camp Darwin to perform site surveys. Throughout the six-month deployments, Marines will participate in bilateral training operations with Australian Defense Force (ADF), and engage other countries in the region in exercises. There are still questions regarding costs and cost-sharing, facility usage, lift requirements, and approximate timelines for MAGTF initial operating capability. Joint basing with Australian forces should limit the demand for new facilities to train or house Marines, including ones that would be built with U.S. dollars, though details about such facilities have yet to be finalized or released. Cost implications of stationing Marines at Darwin are also still to be finalized, in terms of costs associated with training, transport, operations, and whether the available facilities need work to meet U.S. standards.

**Singapore**

Under plans for rebalancing to the Asia Pacific region, the U.S. Navy announced that the plan for its newest type of vessel, the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), would be essential to maintaining a fleet size of around 300 total ships. The LCS was designed to take over some of the roles and missions of higher-end surface combatants. The U.S. Navy plans to deploy the LCS to a variety of destinations, but there have been some challenges associated with this new class of ship.

In April 2012, Singaporean Defense Minister Eng Hen Ng approved rotational deployment of up to two LCS vessels, on the basis that they would not be home ported or based in Singapore. At the same time, the Secretary of Defense discussed increasing the ship count by two for a total of four LCS vessels to deploy. This proposal of an additional two LCSs was agreed in-principle at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2012. The first LCS (USS Freedom) would come in the second quarter of 2013 with sustainment provided by Lockheed Martin. This sustainment capability would be to reduce the maintenance burden on the 40-man core crew of the ship. Ongoing discussions between the Singaporean Ministry of Defense and DoD will shape the U.S. Navy’s deployment of four Littoral Combat Ships to Singapore.

**Other Ongoing Discussions**

In addition to the these major building blocks, there are ongoing discussion with allies and partners, such as Thailand, the Republic of the Philippines, and Vietnam, that focus on enhanced access arrangements for engagement and joint training to support possible prepositioning and HADR efforts as reflected by Secretary Panetta’s recent comments on his June 2012 trip to Asia.
Summary of Option 2 Actions

The major building blocks of current plans can be summarized for evaluation into six major actions, as follows:

- **Relocate USMC from Okinawa, Japan**
  - 4 MAGTFs construct (Okinawa (~10,000 troops), Guam (1,700 PCS, 3,000 UDP troops), Hawaii (2,700 troops), Australia (2,500 troops) and sourcing of associated lift requirements is still to be determined.

- **Move Futenma-based U.S. Marines to Futenma Replacement Facility, Henoko, Japan**
  - FRF delinked from USMC troop moves off of Okinawa.

- **Relocate Carrier Wing CVW-5 from Atsugi, Japan to Iwakuni, Japan** [not evaluated because action is nearly complete].

- **Add training areas in Tinian and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands**
  - Existing Tinian training ranges become more capable.
  - Additional facilities built on Pagan Island.

- **Transition wartime operational control of Republic of Korea military forces from Combined Forces Command to ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff. Replace the combined command structure of Combined Forces Command with a supported – supporting command structure with ROK JCS as the supported command and Korea Command (KORCOM) the U.S. supporting command. As agreed to by the U.S. and ROK governments, the U.S will continue to provide certain “enduring capabilities” and for an agreed upon period provide “bridging capabilities” until the ROK military acquires and trains personnel to these capabilities. United Nations Command remains a four star U.S. command**

- **Consolidate U.S. military on Korean peninsula**

- **Rotationally deploy four Littoral Combat Ships in Singapore**

Option 2 Evaluation

The project team evaluated Options 2, 3 and 4 against the current As Is, Where Is force posture baseline. Each option was divided into specific actions which were then evaluated using the four criteria and sub-criteria. In this Section, evaluation results are summarized at the option criteria, not sub-criteria, level. Evaluations at the sub-criteria level are available separately.

To reiterate: the evaluation methodology assumes full implementation of the possible action when considering the Geospatial Security/Political-Military and Operational/Force Structure and Management criteria; the Affordability criterion evaluates likely option/action
implementation and sustainment costs compared to the condition of the As Is, Where Is Option; the Executability criterion considers the extent to which the option/actions are feasible and can be implemented at the desired location(s) within desired timeframes.

The Summary Evaluations for Option 2 are presented below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Criteria</th>
<th>Possible Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 MAGTF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Geostrategic Security/Political - Military</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Operational/ Force Structure and Management</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Affordability</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Executability</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* represents a caveat to the evaluation scoring – see below

**Geostrategic Security/Political-Military**—All six actions evaluated under the current DoD Plan score positively. The governments of both Australia and Japan are supportive of additional MAGTF capability. All allies and partners in the region would support U.S. training facilities being established in Tinian and CNMI, and the sites will increase the capacity for joint and combined training events. OPCON transition gives the ROK ownership, facilitates command and control, and fulfills a U.S. pledge, though there are some negatives in the assessment reflecting domestic political concerns in the ROK and possible risks in terms of strategic signals to potential adversaries. Finally, rotationally deploying four LCSs in Singapore would represent the first instance in decades of the U.S. placing hard assets in Singapore and would increase counter-piracy and counterterrorism capability in addition to deterring possible regional non-state actors.

**Operational/Force Structure and Management**—Several of the Option 2 actions provide better support for certain phases of PACOM security objectives than do others, from peacetime shaping activities through contingency operations. The 4 MAGTF action may weaken support for plans to some extent due to asset dispersion (i.e. distance from potential conflict areas), but it also enhances shaping operations as it increases the ability of the U.S. to conduct engagement, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and HADR operations in the Asia Pacific region. Distribution of forces also has some advantage in terms of survivability. Increasing presence in Hawaii at the cost of reduction in the Western Pacific raises disadvantages similar to moving back to CONUS in that forces would be far removed from potential contingency locations and engagement activities. Training ranges support shaping operations, maintain readiness levels, and help meet operational requirements for U.S. forces, and training ranges afford U.S. partners the opportunity to participate in multilateral exercises. This helps maintain readiness of forces but is not part of war plan execution. In a similar fashion, the LCS action is a positive for
shaping operations and Foreign Military Sales engagement considerations, but LCS capabilities are still being developed and demonstrated. OPCON transition is scored as neutral because operational advantages brought by removing the seam between peacetime and wartime command and control (C2) are offset by remaining questions about post-CFC U.S.-ROK C2 relationships and deficiencies in ROK bridging capabilities.

**Affordability**—Evaluating the absolute affordability of the Planned Force Posture Option actions is difficult due to the lack of detailed cost data. However, this evaluation focuses on relative costs as compared to the As Is, Where Is baseline. In this manner, certain findings can be made. The 4 MAGTF action has very high implementation and sustainment costs associated with the distributed plan as compared to current operations in the PACOM AOR. The FRF, OPCON Transition, and LCS actions all score positively due to planned funding from Host Nation Support. As for consolidation in the ROK, in the long run such pooling of resources and logistics has the possibility of significant cost savings. Construction of the training ranges in Guam and CNMI holds the most cost unknowns, even in a relative cost comparison. (Caveat: There is a possibility that Host Nation Support funds from Japan would not be available to support Tinian range construction; implementation details of the 2012 SCC Agreement are still being developed.) Ultimately, this action is scored negatively on affordability due to increased costs, including those associated with increased distance and dispersion of assets.

**Executability**—Significant executability concerns surround the 4 MAGTF and FRF actions. Australian financial contributions remain an unknown factor. Australia currently imposes quarantine restrictions on equipment moving in and out of country, which could impact USMC operations. Additionally, the possibility of Japan imposing conditions on its $3.1 billion in promised funds could prove problematic for posturing forces.

FRF executability scores negatively. Significant uncertainty remains with respect to the Okinawa Prefectural Government’s ability to deliver remaining approvals required for FRF construction. Executability evaluations with respect to the training ranges score as a positive. Exercises currently take place in Tinian and CNMI. This action is consistent with U.S. environmental procedures and expands U.S and partner nations’ abilities to train in the area. Actions on the Korean Peninsula are currently in process of execution. Some question remains as to whether conservative governments in Seoul would continue implementation after 2013. As for the 4 LCS vessels in Singapore, this too is already being executed. The only concern associated with this action is the U.S. ability to build and certify these ships for operations.

**Additional Excursions**

The project team also examined several excursions from the Planned Force Posture. These included additional basing options for the Futenma Replacement facility and using Army National Guard and Reserves to compliment forces on the Korean peninsula.

**Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) Options**

In May 2006, the SCC approved a roadmap for realigning U.S. forces in Japan that included the relocation of MCAS Futenma, located in the heavily populated area of Ginowan in central Okinawa. The roadmap called for the construction of a replacement facility for Futenma located
in Henoko, near Marine Corps Camp Schwab in Northern Okinawa. Several factors including local opposition have hindered implementation and a number of alternatives have been suggested, but none are without significant shortcomings.

The following evaluation compares the Henoko plan to four alternatives:

- **Kadena Integration**: Marine functions at Futenma would be integrated into U.S. Air Force operations at Kadena Air Base;

- **Offshore Islands**: Marine functions at Futenma would be relocated to an island with runway capacity in the general vicinity of the main island of Okinawa; examples include Iejima, Shimojijima, and Ishigaki;

- **Naha Second Runway**: Marine functions at Futenma would be relocated to Naha Airport, currently shared by commercial aircraft and the Japan Air Self Defense Forces (JASDF), where the Okinawa Prefectural Government plans to build a second runway in the next five years with central government support; or

- **Remain at Futenma**: The U.S. and Japanese governments would abandon the plan to construct the FRF and the Marines would continue operating out of Futenma.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Criteria</th>
<th>Possible Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FRF/ Henoko</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Geostrategic Security/Political</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Operational/Force Structure and</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Affordability</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Executability</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Geostrategic Security/Political Military**—The FRF and offshore island actions score most positively; Kadena integration is least favorable. Completion of the FRF would demonstrate the effectiveness and credibility of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Kadena Integration is problematic because officials at the local, prefectural, and national level oppose this proposal and implementation would adversely impact support for Kadena. The use of offshore islands would eliminate the encroachment factor, a major sore point for the alliance. The second runway at Naha presents an opportunity for shared use but the Japan Ministry of Defense and JSDF are not supportive because of concerns it would complicate political support for completion of the Naha
Airport expansion. A decision to remain at Futenma would violate a U.S. commitment to close Futenma and likely increase pressure on other U.S. bases.

Operational/Force Structure and Management – Three of the five actions score positively. The FRF at Henoko offers capabilities currently available at Futenma with some reductions in runway length. Shared use of Kadena for USAF and USMC operations is possible but would introduce capacity constraints in contingencies. Reasonable runway facilities exist on the offshore islands but fuel and logistics would be complicated by distance from the main island of Okinawa. Quality of life issues for U.S. military personnel would also arise when considering offshore facilities due to lack of infrastructure and development. Naha airport allows for approaches over water that would minimize impact on local communities and is not too far removed from other U.S. facilities, though capacity (crowdedness) is a potential issue. The most important factor with respect to Kadena integration, offshore islands and the second runway at Naha is irreversibility; each plan would become difficult to reverse if executed in light of the U.S. commitment to close Futenma. All in all, Futenma has the best operational profile of any of the options, though risk mitigation factors could impact operations.

Affordability—The cost would not change for the status quo since Marines are currently operating out of Futenma. The FRF scores most positively because costs are to be borne by Japan per the SCC roadmap for realignment of May 2006. Kadena integration is neutral in that potential savings in FRF expenses would likely be offset by comparable levels of military construction (MILCON) at Kadena. Some level of MILCON by the United States also would likely be required for offshore islands to cover expenses for roads and transportation (such as a ferry to transport personnel to and from Iejima, located northwest of Nago in northern Okinawa), or to expand the existing Japanese Air Self-Defense Forces (JASDF) facility at Naha airport.

Executability—All five actions present significant complications in this category. Executing the Henoko plan has proven contentious because of opposition within Okinawa, though most political leaders in adjacent coastal districts are supportive provided helicopters do not fly over their towns. However, the Okinawa Prefectural Government has yet to approve environmental impact statements for the Henoko facility and that could further delay the construction timeline. Even though Kadena integration would take place inside a U.S. base and therefore not require permits, the plan is impossible without local support and that support does not exist. Timeliness is a major concern with respect to offshore islands given the need for environmental impact statements and other forms of local government approval, and there is also a degree of local opposition. The second runway at Naha is favorable in that the Government of Japan supports the plan to build a second runway and the timeline is roughly five years. However, inclusion of USMC assets could complicate the approval process on the Japanese side. Japan’s concurrence with a proposal to remain at Futenma is unlikely without significant political or geopolitical changes in the region. All of the alternatives to Henoko would be close to irreversible once initiated, and failure to execute would add significant new geostrategic and political/military complications in the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Rotating Brigades to the Republic of Korea

The Secretary of Defense pledged in 2008 to retain 28,500 personnel on the Korean Peninsula. The flags of the 8th Army, the 2ID and the 210 artillery brigade ground components of those commands are important symbols of U.S. commitment and jointness with ROK forces.
However, readiness of U.S. forces deployed to the Korean Peninsula remains a concern. Initial efforts to address this problem and provide reassurance to the ROK regarding the U.S. commitment centered on tour normalization but costs were prohibitive.

This action would retain the 8th Army and 2ID headquarters on the Korean Peninsula and rotate trained and ready mechanized infantry, combat artillery, and aviation brigades from CONUS. (Note: The artillery brigade headquarters would stay in place as would equipment for all three brigades.)

Table 10: Summary Evaluation of Option 2 Possible Actions – Rotating Brigades to ROK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Criteria</th>
<th>Possible Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rotation of Ground Components</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Geostrategic Security/Political Military</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Operational/Force Structure and Management</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Affordability</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Executability</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Geostrategic Security/Political Military*—The rotation of ground components creates an opportunity for more brigades to train and become familiar with the Korean Peninsula environment and ROK counterparts. However, the ROK may be concerned about the potential that brigades will not be rotated through Korea.

*Operational/Force Structure and Management*—Operationally, the rotation of ground forces aligns more CONUS-based brigades with the Korean Peninsula mission and could improve readiness, but would require studying additional steps such as extended reception, staging and onward integration (RSOI).

*Affordability*—Rotations reduce the need for MILCON compared to replacing the brigade combat team removed in 2004.

*Executability*—Action is consistent with current U.S. laws and policies. Post-Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom/New Dawn, Army force structure can be realigned to regional missions. ROK support would be necessary.
Option 3: Increased Posture

This option includes force posture alternatives that would increase U.S. capabilities in the PACOM AOR. There are many potential options available to planners that would increase U.S. military capabilities in both the near term and the longer term across the PACOM AOR—too many options to evaluate in this study. By grouping potential growth in capabilities into subsets—sea, air, ground, engagement, force protection, and mission support—this option establishes the breadth of possibilities. Although the actions illustrate the range of possible force posture increases in the Asia Pacific region, they are a comprehensive list of possible actions within this option. Rather, by describing an option set that increases presence and capability by expanding forces and increasing activities across the region, these actions provide a measure of the value and cost of one approach to implementing the DoD’s latest Strategic Guidance.

Increased Seapower Posture

When describing the Administration’s plan for U.S. force posture Asia, Secretary Panetta announced that the U.S. Naval forces would rebalance from a nearly 50/50 split to a 60/40 split of ships in favor of the Asia Pacific region. The details of this shift have not been announced, and there are questions as to whether the final 60/40 distribution would result from moving assets from other parts of the world, building new ships, or the Pacific fleet maintaining current force levels while reducing assets elsewhere. This option examines the possibility of shifting assets and building new assets specifically dedicated to the PACOM AOR.

- Add a second squadron of three SSNs to Naval Base Guam, Apra Harbor, Guam

The United States has a squadron of three SSNs at the naval base on Guam. This option action would locate an additional squadron of three SSNs, moving them from East Coast U.S. bases. The existing infrastructure at the harbor can accommodate adding three SSNs without additional construction, but adding another squadron could necessitate some additional construction. The additional submarines would create a larger footprint at the base, including congestion in the harbor. In addition, there would be increased demand for housing, schoolhouse training loads, etc. which could require military construction and additional Operation and Sustainment costs.

- Add a second Amphibious Readiness Group to Pearl Harbor, Hawaii in support of 4 MAGTF construct

The USMC is supported by an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) in Sasebo, Japan, which does not provide full coverage for III MEF; a second ARG for the Marines would be globally sourced. While there is no definitive requirement for the configuration of an ARG, it typically consists of:

  o One amphibious assault ship (LHA or LHD): the primary landing ship, resembling a small aircraft carrier, designed to transport troops into the war zone by air using transport helicopters.
- One amphibious transport dock ship (LPD): a warship that transports troops into the war zone by sea, primarily using conventional landing craft and Landing Craft Air Cushion hovercraft (LCAC).

- One dock landing ship (LSD): a warship supporting amphibious operations including landings onto hostile shores via Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC), conventional landing craft, and helicopters. The current U.S. plan to distribute 4 MAGTFs across the PACOM AOR (with one in Okinawa, one in Australia, one in Guam, and one in Hawaii) creates the need for additional amphibious readiness capability. Marines can move in high-speed vessels and ferries in support of training and shaping engagements, but for combat maneuvering, the USMC requires an ARG. Thus, moving an ARG from the East Coast to the Asia Pacific region facilitates maneuver, training, and engagement of a 4 MAGTF distributed USMC plan; and would make that “vision” functional.

- **Forward base a carrier group at HMAS Stirling, Perth, Australia**

  The Asia Pacific region includes one homeported carrier action group, in Yokosuka, Japan. This action proposes deploying and forward basing a second carrier from its current homeport on the East Coast of the United States to a location in the western Pacific or Southeast Asia. For evaluation purposes, the option proposes consideration of HMAS Stirling, the Australian naval base in Perth, Australia.

  A typical carrier strike group (CSG) includes:

  - A nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, which also serves as the flagship for the CSG commander and his/her staff;
  - A carrier air wing (CVW) typically consisting of up to nine squadrons;
  - One to two Aegis guided missile cruisers—a multi-mission surface combatant;
  - A destroyer squadron (DESRON) with two to three guided missile destroyers (DDG)—a multi-mission surface combatant, used primarily for anti-aircraft (AAW) and anti-submarine (ASW) warfare;
  - Up to two nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) used to screen the strike group against hostile surface ships and submarines; and
  - A combined ammunition, oiler and supply ship (AOE/AOR), usually Supply-class (T-AOE); provides logistic support.

  Forward basing U.S. assets such as a carrier group would be a force multiplier. Basing (homeporting) a carrier in the Asia Pacific region is the rough equivalent of having three such assets versus one that only is deployed there, because of increased dwell time and usage.

  Forward basing a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier also requires a port with the capability of handling nuclear-powered ships. HMAS Stirling is not nuclear carrier-capable. This
A forward-basing option would require significant construction costs. Comparable cost estimates in the past have ranged from $1 billion to create a nuclear-capable homeport for a carrier at Mayport in Florida to $6.5 billion for similar capability in Guam.

- **Rotationally deploy two Littoral Combat Ships in Chinhae, Korea**

  Current Navy plans call for the new fleet of LCSs, to include forward deploying up to four ships in Singapore and others in CENTCOM and PACOM. In order to expand coverage, there may also be possibilities for deploying elsewhere in the AOR, such as Brunei, Thailand or Korea. Brunei or Thailand would provide greater geographic coverage, while LCS in Chinhae, Korea, could address the mine-sweeping and anti-submarine warfare requirements in Northeast Asia. LCS life cycle costs and maintenance plans remain largely unknown. For purposes of testing the proposition of further rotationally deploying LCS in the region, this Option assesses deployment to Chinhae specifically.

**Increased Airpower Posture**

A critical component of U.S. force posture in the Asia Pacific region is airpower. A rebalancing of focus and forces necessitates relook at both assets and locations from which they base and fight. While the U.S. Air Force had already bolstered its presence and forces over the past decade by adding rotational bomber and tanker forces on Guam and additional strategic airlift assets based in Hawaii and Alaska, this option explores additional forces.

- **Permanently base a bomber squadron in Guam**

  Current stationing of assets in Guam consists of rotational bomber units coming from and returning to CONUS bases. This action would permanently relocate an entire B-52 squadron forward to the PACOM AOR. A full squadron consisting of twelve aircraft would more than double existing capability which is currently four B-52s or two B-2s. While Andersen Air Base, Guam has excess capacity to house such a unit move, it would require some new construction for support facilities and upgrades to housing.

- **Add airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets, both manned and unmanned, to Australia or Guam**

  Existing ISR assets in the region are focused on Northeast Asia. This action would expand the ISR coverage to include stationing of manned and unmanned air assets more broadly in the region, specifically in Guam or Australia. CONUS or Japan-based assets limit time on station and intelligence gathering. Assets would include Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Systems and MC-12W Liberty aircraft. While the Global Hawk does require specialized facilities, this action assumes locations that would require minimal new construction.

- **Add bomber and tanker dispersal locations across Southeast Asia**

  This action would identify and certify dispersal locations across Southeast Asia. There are nearly 50 locations currently under consideration for such dispersal, and these locations will likely require minimal construction. Key actions include acquiring access
agreements, conducting training to validate locations, and construction to meet U.S.
needs. The purpose is not for permanent stationing of aircraft but rather to be able to
disperse aircraft in the event of a contingency operation.

**Increased Ground Forces Posture**

Despite protestations from some quarters that Air/Sea battle precludes the need for ground forces in Asia, other arguments exist for a more robust presence of ground forces. Given that five of the seven largest armies are in the PACOM AOR and that 21 of 26 major countries militaries are led by Army component leadership, engagement by ground forces—armies and USMC personnel—could positively assist U.S. shaping and engagement interests in the PACOM AOR. This option consists of four distinct actions.

- **Designate I Corps as JTF-capable for PACOM and regionally align CONUS-based formations for PACOM security responsibilities**

  I Corps, headquartered in Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington, is one of the three U.S. Army Corps. This Corps would be specifically dedicated to providing forces to the PACOM commander. I Corps is not currently configured to operate as a Joint Task Force Headquarters and would require additional augmentation to fulfill this role. This action takes advantage of the availability of modular combat brigades returning from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

- **Increase USMC rotational presence in Korea**

  USMC training and exercises with the ROK have increased in recent years. This action would further increase these engagements by designating one additional MAGTF in Korea with prepositioned equipment. This action would expand USMC ground forces in South Korea for training, exercises, and engagement with ROK Marines.

- **Delay OPCON transition to ROK**

  Current plans have the United States disbanding the CFC and transitioning wartime OPCON to the ROK JCS as part of the Strategic Alliance in December 2015. Delaying such a move would keep the current command structure and relationships in place until the Military Cooperation Center is fully functional and ROK forces have established necessary bridging capabilities.

- **Implement Tour Normalization / 3-2-1**

  Tour normalization allows military members to serve on accompanied tours while assigned overseas. The 3-2-1 plan would rotate unaccompanied married service members on a one-year obligation, single service members on a two-year tour, and accompanied personnel on a three-year assignment. The program in South Korea is designed to increase U.S. Army readiness by extending and deepening U.S. forces time and commitment to the peninsula.
Align PACOM Force Posture for Expanded Regional Engagement

Critical to shaping the AOR is development and implementation of a robust engagement plan that allows U.S. forces to create and maintain valuable relationships with partner nations. Training, exercising, and partnering are essential to U.S. presence and interests in the PACOM AOR, as such activities encourage increased integration vis-à-vis personnel, planning, and capabilities. This option would increase and align force posture to enable significant expansions of engagement in the region.

- **Increase rank of USARPAC to 4 star general**

  The Pacific Command and its Air and Sea component commands are headed by 4-star general officers, with the concomitant access to other nations’ senior leadership. The Marine Corps and Army components are headed by 3-star flag officers. This action would give comparable rank to the Army component commander for purposes of engagement with foreign counterparts.

- **Expand and prioritize Joint and Combined Bilateral and Multilateral Training Exercises**

  The U.S. already engages in hundreds of exercises in the PACOM AOR annually. PACOM is revising its plans to expand engagements throughout the region, and its training requirements plan. PACOM has an historic opportunity to consolidate, refocus to expand dramatically training engagements to emphasize bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral training and exercises. Locations for such training could include JPARC in Alaska, CNMI, or host nation facilities. Such training would focus on both broad participation at low-end training (e.g. HADR) and enhancing effective coalitions at the high-end (e.g. Australia-Japan-ROK).

- **Transfer and Sustain Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Capability (JPMRC) to PACOM**

  JPMRC provides similar training resources as the National-Training Center in a modular and transportable package that was designed for use in 2007 in the CENTCOM AOR. This would be used for regional training engagement on a bilateral and multilateral basis.

- **Expand the role and capabilities of the Pacific Augmentation Teams (PATs)**

  PATs conduct small unit level engagement throughout South and Southeast Asia under the supervision of SOCPAC. This action would increase the talent pool available from which to pull PATs personnel, to include the National Guard and the Reserves. Given the likely global demand for SOF forces, the PACOM region requires more assets than SOCOM is currently capable of providing. However, the military departments have these additional assets available and with the designation of I Corps as the PACOM JTF would have the ability to execute this expanded role.
**Increased Force Protection Posture**

U.S. bases and facilities are increasingly under threat from ballistic missiles. This action would significantly increase Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) and facilities hardening.

- **Add THAAD and PAC-3 to Andersen AFB, Guam, Kadena AB, Japan and possibly Korea**

  This action would deploy THAAD and PAC-3 assets to Guam, Kadena Air Base, and possibly Korea. It would also expand the number of PAC-3s provided in support of South Korean missions.

- **Harden Facilities at Kadena and Guam**

  Hardening increases the survivability of operational activities and critical infrastructure against threat weapons. These include hangars, maintenance facilities, fuel systems, command and control facilities, and munitions. Hardening generally increases the cost of facility improvements. This action would harden replacement and improved facilities at Guam and Kadena AB. (Note: An additional Force Protection action includes increasing the number of force dispersal locations. This action was evaluated as part of the set of actions for increasing airpower.)

**Increased Posture of Mission Support Assets**

- **Add Special Operations Forces ground and air units**

  SOCPAC does not have sufficient assets for shaping activities and additional areas, such as security cooperation, combatting WMD, Close Air Support (CAS), and ISR. This action would add those assets.

- **Increase Stockpiles of Critical Ammunition and Weapons**

  Historic and current assessments support increasing stockpiles of forward-deployed ammunition and weapons, including Precision Guided Munitions, a range of missiles (Patriot, Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM), Standard Missile-3 (SM-3), etc.), and other critical munitions. This action would add and forward deploy those assets.

- **Add and Expand Prepositioned Stocks**

  A decade of conflict has depleted prepositioned stocks. Such stocks are critical to operations and sustainment of efforts and facilitate the full spectrum of PACOM security responsibilities. This action would replenish prepositioned stocks for the full range of potential uses and make them available for engagement and shaping activities, including smaller footprint prepositioned stocks for HADR and other engagements across the region.

**Summary of Option 3 Actions**

The major building blocks of increasing force posture can be summarized for evaluation into six major actions, as follows:
- **Seapower**
  - Add a second squadron of three SSNs to Naval Base Guam, Apra Harbor, Guam.
  - Add a second Amphibious Readiness Group to Pearl Harbor, Hawaii in support of 4 MAGTF construct.
  - Forward base a carrier group at HMAS Stirling, Perth, Australia.
  - Rotationally deploy two Littoral Combat Ships in Chinhae, Korea.

- **Airpower**
  - Permanently base a bomber squadron in Guam.
  - Add airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets, both manned and unmanned, to Australia or Guam.
  - Add bomber and tanker dispersal locations in the Southeastern PACOM AOR.

- **Ground Forces**
  - Designate I Corps as JTF-capable for PACOM and regionally align CONUS-based formations for PACOM security responsibilities.
  - Increase USMC rotational presence in Korea.
  - Delay OPCON transition to ROK.
  - Implement Tour Normalization / 3-2-1.

- **Align PACOM Force Posture for Expanded Regional Engagement**
  - Increase rank of USARPAC to four-star general.
  - Expand and prioritize Joint and Combined Bilateral and Multilateral Training Exercises.
  - Transfer and Sustain Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Capability (JPMRC) to PACOM.
  - Expand the role and capabilities of the Pacific Augmentation Teams (PATs).

- **Force Protection**
  - Add THAAD and PAC-3 to Andersen AFB, Guam and Kadena AB, Japan and possibly in Korea.
  - Harden Facilities at Kadena and Guam.
- **Mission Support**
  - Add SOF ground and air units
  - Increase Stockpiles of Critical Ammunition and Weapons
  - Add and Expand Prepositioned Stocks.

**Option 3 Evaluation**

Each option is evaluated against the current *As Is, Where Is* force posture baseline. Additionally, each option is broken into major possible actions for evaluation. Each possible action is evaluated using the four criteria and sub-criteria. In this Section, evaluation results are summarized at the option criteria, not sub-criteria, level. Evaluations at the sub-criteria level are included in the Appendix.

The evaluation construct assumes full implementation of the possible action when considering the *Geostrategic Security/Political-Military* and *Operational/Force Structure and Management* criteria. The *Affordability* criterion evaluates likely option/action implementation and sustainment costs compared to that of the *As Is, Where Is* condition. The *Executability* criterion considers the extent to which the option/actions are feasible and can be implemented at the desired location(s) within desired timeframes.

The Summary Evaluations for Option 3 are presented below.

**Table 11: Summary Evaluation of Option 3 Possible Actions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Criteria</th>
<th>Possible Actions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sea</td>
<td>Air</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Geostrategic Security/ Political-Military</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Operational/ Force Structure and Management</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Affordability</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Executability</td>
<td>-</td>
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*Geostrategic Security / Political Military*—All actions have strong positives. Increased presence assures allies, comforts other regional actors, and dissuades potential adversaries. Only with the strong Sea action is there potential for over-pressing U.S. presence in the region in a manner that could lead to increases in tension with China and associated sensitivities with partners.

For the Sea action, Treaty allies recognize growing PLA Navy capabilities and the need for enhanced capabilities in order to implement the AirSea Battle concept. Additionally, positioning a dedicated ARG in the AOR adds significant advantage in terms of additional maneuver
elements for the USMC. Basing of carriers in Australia demonstrates to adversaries the versatility of the U.S.-Australian alliance in multiple scenarios. For perceptions of potential adversaries, this action increases potential dissuasion and deterrence (i.e., China, North Korea). Major treaty allies would likely welcome the increased capability, but other partners might respond negatively because of the possibility of increased tensions and “entrapment” concerns vis-à-vis China.

For the Air action, adding a bomber base is positive due to experience with Flexible Deterrent Operations (FDO) in Guam in previous times of tension and the opportunity to demonstrate to allies a renewed commitment to extended deterrence in light of growing North Korean/Chinese PLA missile and nuclear capabilities. ISR assets would provide shared capacity with allies and increase partners’ domain awareness. Dispersal in some countries would be politically and strategically acceptable but in others could cause potential problems.

For the Ground action, designation of the JTF would demonstrate enhanced U.S. commitment to defense of Japan and ROK. Increased USMC engagement is welcomed by the ROK and also works to shape interoperability and enhance partnership capacity with ROK forces. OPCON transition delay would be welcomed by conservative elements in ROK, but potentially cause friction with progressive elements. This assessment is dependent in part upon the 2012 ROK elections. Finally, Tour Normalization would be welcome as a demonstration of U.S. commitment to the Peninsula and would enhance readiness, but costs are excessive.

For Engagement, joint and combined training opportunities from JPMRC and expanded exercises enhance partnership capacity and trilateral capabilities for effective coalitions. And, as for perceptions of other partners and allies in the region, the opportunity to integrate regional militaries in multilateral exercises and the use of JPMRC enhance capacity building and multilateral cooperation. Expanding the role and capabilities of PATs broadens the geographic functional scope of engagement and interactions between the Army National Guard and Army Reserve units with counterparts across the region.

Force Protection actions such as previous deployments of PAC-3 to Japan and ROK have been well received, which in turn enhances confidence in both alliances. Though less clear, the same is likely true for THAAD. As for perceptions of potential adversaries, Force Protection is beneficial in that it complicates adversaries’ planning efforts. There could be a potential backlash in Okinawa against hardening of bases, though not increased BMD assets based on recent experience. This risk does not apply to BMD deployments or hardening of assets on Guam.

Mission Support actions such as increased SOF presence would enhance high-end engagement capacity with key allies, while simultaneously allowing an expansion of low-end engagement with other regional states. As for other perceptions of other global and regional partners, the increase of SOF expands opportunities with other regional partners for training and capacity building, inclusive of HADR, etc., More flexible use of prepositioned stocks enhance engagement across the AOR. There remains the potential for issues associated with increased SOF activities, especially if not well-aligned with PACOM objectives in region.

Operational/Force Structure and Management—These actions add force structure, which almost by definition score positively for improving U.S. ability to execute PACOM AOR
responsibilities. For the Sea action, an additional forward deployed carrier doubles capacity for
the full spectrum of carrier-based operations and provides a greater ability to cover simultaneous
contingencies in the AOR. A second SSN squadron based on Guam doubles asymmetrical
advantages in undersea warfare. An additional ARG provides maneuverability for the 4 MAGTF
concept. For the Air action, a bomber squadron in Guam enhances deterrence. ISR assets
enhance capabilities across the spectrum of operations and expand regional coverage for U.S.
domain awareness. Possible dispersal locations in Australia and the Philippines complicate
adversary targeting and planning. For the Ground action, I Corps’ ability to execute plans and
enhance engagement potential across the spectrum increases. Interoperability with ROK
Marines is also beneficial to both states. OPCON transition delay grants time for addressing
shortfalls in ROK bridging capabilities and C2. Tour Normalization enhances readiness of Army
personnel. Force protection and mission support increases also bolster execution of PACOM
AOR responsibilities.

The reasons these actions are not scored as “double positive” involve global management issues.
Many of the assets examined across the Sea, Air, and Ground actions are high demand, low
density. Relocating these assets from elsewhere in the world to PACOM necessarily increases
strain on global management. As long as such moves are aligned with emerging threats or
national objectives and strategy, global management should be little effected. Once deployed to
PACOM and then removed from the global pool of resources, flexibility decreases. Several
options also suffer from inflexibility – an inability to reverse decisions – for example, revisiting a
decision to base a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in Australia.

**Affordability**—Compared to the “As Is, Where Is” option, all actions in Option 3: Increase
Posture are more costly to execute. The Sea action would require significant increases in
resources for the Navy, particularly to station a carrier battle group in Australia. Even the more
modest Air and Ground actions would require additional funding and personnel to execute.
Engagement, force protection, and mission support also have clear costs to execute over the
current footprint. Actions with Force Protection and Mission Support, such as hardening and
outfitting SOF forces with high-end equipment, have implementation costs that are significantly
more expensive.

**Executability**—Air, Engagement, and Mission Support actions require little to no change in
current U.S. or host nation laws or authorizations. The Sea action would prove a challenge
because forward-basing a carrier could require substantial costs, including MILCON
authorization and appropriation, which may meet budgetary opposition in both the executive and
legislative branches unless there is significant additional HNS funding. Relocating a carrier may
incite domestic backlash from the CONUS constituency losing the vessel. For the Ground
action, Tour Normalization would require MILCON authorization and appropriations, which
could prove difficult, and delaying OPCON transition to the ROK is counter to the Strategic
Alliance 2015. Hardening at any PACOM installation under the Force Protection action would
also prove difficult to authorize, fund, or complete.

**Evaluating Option 3 under Different Budgetary and Geostrategic Scenarios**
The high negatives associated with affordability under Option 3 suggest that an expansion of
U.S. force posture across these actions is unlikely in the current budget environment. However,
some of the specific actions, such as forward deploying a second ARG or expanding certain
aspects of force protection and engagement capacity, are relatively less costly and may still merit consideration (e.g. dispersal of assets across the region). These specific actions are explored in the recommendations in Section Four.

In addition, the assessment of Option 3 is based on current strategic dynamics and known risks. An increase in the threat environment in the Asia Pacific region (both absolute and relative to other AOR) would lead to different assessments. Affordability would be less affected, since that criterion evaluates only the relative increase or decrease over current costs and not exogenous factors that might lead the administration or the Congress to choose to increase defense spending. However, increases in the threat environment would be reflected in the geostrategic and operational criteria and would likely move them further in the direction of ++ across the board. Two scenarios that are worth briefly considering:

- **Increased threat from China (capabilities and intentions)** — The geostrategic and operational criteria evaluations above built on the assessment in Section Two that Chinese military modernization poses increased risks in terms of A2AD, but that Chinese intentions at present are not to challenge U.S. pre-eminence in the region or to use force to coerce smaller states. However, should China move down either of those paths, and they would be related, the United States would require more forces to maintain a favorable strategic equilibrium in peacetime and to execute other phases of operational planning. Moreover, the downside risk of creating a security dilemma with China that is reflected in the geostrategic criteria above would become less of a negative factor. Executability might also be impacted, depending on the reactions of other allies and partners to an emboldened and more threatening China. This negative scenario remains a risk that this study considered when evaluating force posture options, but it is not a foregone conclusion.

- **Increased North Korean threat (WMD or instability)** — It is not clear yet how the DPRK’s increased nuclear weapons capability and regime succession will impact Pyongyang’s decisions about the use of force. The geostrategic and operational evaluations above built on the assessment in Section Two that U.S. force posture would have to manage greater risk on the Korean peninsula with respect to North Korean use of WMD in warfighting, horizontal transfer of WMD, increased provocations, or sudden instability in the North—and that the North Korean threat was still largely deterred and contained. If North Korea in fact transferred WMD capability, increased provocations markedly, or collapsed, then the demands for U.S. presence would increase. However, in contrast to the China scenario, the increases might be shorter-term. For example, the requirements for stabilization and countering WMD in the event of instability or collapse in the North would be a multi-year, but not long-term matter. This would not necessitate major military construction or facilities associated with long-term commitments, such as home porting a carrier.

**Option 4: Decreased Posture**

This option reflects the possible effects of potential budget scenarios and describes a withdrawal or reduction of U.S. military presence in the PACOM AOR against the baseline presented by
Option 1: As Is, Where Is. The objective of removing forces from PACOM’s AOR could be either to revert forces to CONUS for greater adaptability to emerging global needs or simply to reduce the size of the U.S. military as a budgetary consequence of less U.S. defense spending, reduced threats in the region, or decisions taken for other reasons.

The actions in this option focus on reductions in Army, Air Force, and USMC forces in Northeast Asia. The project team did not include in this option Navy forces deployed, missile defense, or space and cyber; but the option assumes no additional forces deployed into theater for any of these activities. The option also assumes that as ground and air forces are drawn down, the available prepositioned assets would be used in support of PACOM security responsibilities, but would not be replenished.

**Decreased Army Posture**

This action would scale back U.S. Army presence in the PACOM AOR by withdrawing most of the ground forces on the Korean Peninsula.

- **Reduce ground forces in Korea by 14,000 – 18,000 troops**
  
  This action would reduce forces from 28,500 to less than 10,000. As the ROK builds to OPCON transition of the defense forces in South Korea by 2015, the United States would withdraw all operational Army forces. This includes the 1st Brigade/2nd Infantry Division, the 2nd Combat Aviation Brigade, and the 210th Artillery Brigade, leaving only limited command elements and supporting forces for noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) of U.S. civilians that support U.S. Air Forces or are dependents on the peninsula. U.S. combat forces could exercise on the peninsula, but would not be permanently based there. [Reductions in stationed U.S. Army personnel could be partially offset by a rotational presence of National Guard brigade combat teams – see the analysis in Option 2.]

**Decreased Marine Corps Posture**

This action would scale back USMC presence in the PACOM AOR by withdrawing forces identified under current plans for relocation outside of Okinawa back to the United States or simple to reduce USMC manpower end strength.

- **Reduce authorized end strength of USMC III MEF on Okinawa by 9,000 Marines**
  
  This action would relocate the authorized 9,000 USMC personnel previously identified for the 4 MAGTFs plan to CONUS or out of the force structure. The forces relocated back to CONUS could still be deployed in support of the 4 MAGTF plan, and at reduced levels of engagement.

**Decreased Air Force Posture**

U.S. Air Force posture world-wide has been recommended by the Air Force itself for constriction due to budgetary concerns and a need to recapitalize the forces it needs to retain. This action continues that constriction by eliminating two air bases in the PACOM AOR. Both bases have under strength fighter squadrons today whose aircraft could be reverted to the United States to bolster stateside units, or eliminated outright.
• Eliminate aviation assets at Misawa AB, Japan

This action withdraws the two F-16 squadrons from Misawa but leaves behind other needed capabilities. Currently both squadrons of F-16 aircraft, at 18 aircraft per squadron, are under their optimal strength of 24 primary aircraft authorized (PAA).

• Eliminate aviation assets at Kunsan AB, Korea

This action withdraws the two F-16 squadrons from Kunsan. Currently both squadrons of F-16 aircraft, at 18 aircraft per squadron, are under their optimal strength of 24 PAA. Training is limited on the Peninsula, and forces have difficulty maintaining full readiness status.

Decreased Engagement Activities and Resources

This action reduces military engagement in the PACOM AOR.

• Reduce engagement activities that focus on security cooperation

This action would reduce resources available for engagement across the PACOM AOR including PATs, Global Train and Equip (Sec 1206), Joint Combined Enhanced Training exercises (led by U.S. Special Operations Command), and exercises and training. This action does not reduce planning for or commitment to HADR.

Summary of Option 4 Actions

The major building blocks of increasing force posture can be summarized for evaluation into six major actions, as follows:

• Army Posture
  o Reduce ground forces in Korea by 14,000 – 18,000 troops.

• Marine Corps Posture
  o Reduce authorized end strength of USMC III MEF on Okinawa by 9,000 Marines.

• Air Force Posture
  o Eliminate aviation assets at Misawa AB, Japan.
  o Eliminate aviation assets at Kunsan AB, Korea.

• Engagement
  o Reduce engagement activities that focus on security cooperation.

Option 4 Evaluation

Each option is evaluated against the current As Is, Where Is force posture baseline. Additionally, each option is broken into major possible actions for evaluation. Each possible action is evaluated using the four criteria and sub-criteria. In this Section, evaluation results are
summarized at the option criteria, not sub-criteria, level. (Note: Evaluations at the sub-criteria level are available separately.)

The evaluation construct assumes full implementation of the possible action when considering the Geostategic Security/Political-Military and Operational/Force Structure and Management criteria. The Affordability criterion evaluates likely option/action implementation and sustainment costs compared to that of the As Is, Where Is condition. The Executability criterion considers the extent to which the option/actions are feasible and can be implemented at the desired location(s) within desired timeframes.

The Summary Evaluations for Option 4 are presented below.

**Table 12: Summary Evaluation of Option 4 Possible Actions**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Criteria</th>
<th>Possible Actions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Geostrategic Security/ Political- Military</td>
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<tr>
<td>B. Operational/ Force Structure and Management</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Affordability</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>D. Executability</td>
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**Geostrategic Security / Political Military**—Actions all carry significant negative consequences, especially in the Army action. While ROK ground forces are capable, removing U.S. ground forces would raise alarms regarding U.S. commitment. This would weaken U.S. ability to enhance joint capabilities, interoperability, and partnership capacity, while significantly reducing U.S. influence over escalation control and coalition formation in Northeast Asia. For the USMC action, reduction of USMC presence decreases the ability to shape partnership capacity building, including Expeditionary Defense and amphibious operations with Japanese, ROK, Australian and New Zealand forces. It would also reduce the capacity to respond to smaller regional crises that have the potential to escalate or draw in larger powers. While Japanese political opinion would be divided, since many political leaders would welcome an accelerated reduction of Marines on Okinawa, strategically influential elites in Japan could easily read the move as the beginning of overall U.S. disengagement from the region, triggering fears of abandonment. For the Air Force action, the Government of Japan has previously raised objection to Misawa AB withdrawal, especially as viewed in the context of the growing threat from North Korea but not for specific operational reasons. Misawa AB drawdown undermines an example of an existing shared-use facility. For Engagement, this action limits training options and opportunities to shape interoperability bilaterally and among potential coalition partners. All actions would raise concerns among other global and regional partners and embolden potential adversaries in contravention of U.S. national interests.
Operational/Force Structure and Management—Any actions decreasing U.S. posture will inhibit U.S. ability to execute PACOM AOR responsibilities. U.S. force ability to respond to peninsula contingencies is significantly degraded if forces are decreased. However, forces might then be available for other off-peninsula PACOM operations. PACOM security capability across the spectrum of responsibilities would be degraded by losing authorization for 9,000 Marines from Okinawa. If removed from overall USMC end strength, the full spectrum of capability would be degraded. Moving F-16 aircraft out of Misawa AB, Japan, could potentially preclude the possibility of stationing F-35s in Misawa and also could put other activities on Misawa AB at risk. Reducing Engagement activities reduce U.S. ability to form effective coalitions in crises or to respond to localized crises due to inexperience in training together. However, issues of global force management, quality of life, and reversibility drive the Air Force and Engagement actions to neutral scores.

Affordability—At first glance, these actions reducing force posture may appear to save costs. However, all actions scored negatively. Retrograding nearly 20,000 Army personnel, USMC equipment, and two squadrons of Air Force personnel and equipment will incur implementation costs. In sustainment, HNS funding is foregone by reducing the U.S. footprint and the United States may need to absorb additional costs or reduce force structure. If current engagements remain the same but forward deployments are reduced, costs go up for TDY and transport to move people and equipment to and across the AOR. On the Engagement action, there are clear short term cost savings, but long term costs of disengaging and then attempting to re-engage are potentially prohibitive. In fact, the costs (financial and not just strategic) could increase exponentially over what they are today if the actions triggered or failed to anticipate insecurity in the region and if the Congress and the administration then determined that U.S. force posture must be increased again to meet the threat. Facilities, relationships, and host-nation support would not remain cost-neutral or remain accessible at all in the interim.

Executability—Low scores for the Army and USMC actions revolve around inconsistencies with current agreements. The Army action force reduction is inconsistent with the U.S. policy maintaining the 28,500-force strength in the ROK; and also inconsistent with Strategic Alliance 2015, LPP, and YRP. The USMC action is inconsistent with the April 2012 SCC Agreement in that the 4 MAGTFs Distributed Laydown is abandoned or significantly reduced. The Air Force action similarly violates Strategic Alliance 2015, but the ROK may be interested in obtaining fuller use of Kunsan AB and therefore be amenable to revision. In short, U.S. disengagement would violate existing bilateral agreements with key allies and partners, some of which could trigger legal or other actions. This evaluation would depend on the readiness of allies and partners to reach agreement on withdrawal. The Engagement action is readily executable and is consistent with U.S. laws.

Evaluating Option 4 under Different Budgetary and Geostrategic Scenarios

The overwhelmingly negative geostrategic and operational evaluations associated with significant drawdown of U.S. forces reflect the increased geopolitical and operational risk that would be imposed on U.S. forces under these scenarios. That is not to say the risks are evenly distributed across the actions evaluated. Distributing the F-16 aircraft on Misawa and Kunsan AB to other bases in the Asia Pacific region, Alaska, or the West Coast would probably have less geostrategic and operational impact than removing U.S. ground combat units from Korea or even the size of III MEF; in large part because these Air actions are more easily reversible and there is
less threat that the assets would be removed from the overall force structure because of lost host-
nation support and basing.

Moreover, while the actions in Option 4 increase risk considerably, positive changes in
geostrategic circumstances would reduce the negative evaluations. Two scenarios are worth
considering:

- **Unification of the Korean peninsula** — A peace agreement or other political arrangement
  with North Korea would not materially decrease the threat to U.S. allies and forces absent
  concrete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of the North’s WMD and missile
  programs and a significant reduction of offensive conventional forces. However,
collapse of the North and peaceful unification with the South would decrease
significantly the requirement for U.S. ground forces on the peninsula, while residual air
and naval forces would depend on the larger dynamics with China, Russia and Japan after
unification (and, of course, South Korean views, though the general consensus in the
South today is that the U.S.-ROK alliance should continue even after unification). There
is not a straight line from unification to greater stability in the Asia Pacific region,
however. Requirements for U.S. forward presence could increase somewhat or decrease
at an even faster pace, depending on how unification impacts relations among the major
powers, and particularly the U.S.-China relationship. Absent these exogenous variables,
however, it is likely that unification of the peninsula would decrease the negative
geostrategic and operational evaluation scores associated with Army ground forces
above.

- **Emergence of China as a Responsible Stakeholder**— Strategic assessments must be based
  on both capabilities and intentions, but it is likely that the negative geostrategic and
  operational evaluation scores above would decrease in the event China became more of a
  net exporter of security in the region. If China’s interaction with the world is
  characterized by transparency, reduced use of coercive instruments, adherence to
  international norms and agreements, a preference for market approaches over
  mercantilism, and participation in multilateral solutions to security problems – then there
  would be reduced requirement for a U.S. force posture designed to shape Beijing’s
  choices and maintain the capacity to deter or defeat should assurance and dissuasion fail.
  It is difficult to describe exactly what that scenario looks like, but necessary to stress that
  its realization remains the primary goal of U.S. strategy in the Asia Pacific region. It is
  also important to note that broader PACOM security responsibilities would not disappear,
  nor the need for forces to work with China and other states to achieve collective security
goals in a diverse and disaster-prone region of increased importance.
SECTION FOUR: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This report presents the results of the assessment required by Section 346 of the 2012 NDAA to review current and emerging U.S. national security interests in the U.S. Pacific Command area of responsibility, review current U.S. military force posture and deployment plans of the U.S. Pacific Command, assess options for the realignment of U.S. forces in the region to respond to new opportunities presented by allies and partners, and consider the views of noted policy leaders and regional experts, including military commanders in the region. This section provides the Findings and Recommendations of the report.

Overarching Findings

Based on the analyses in Sections One through Three of this report, and drawing on the results of some 250 off-the-record interviews and meetings, the project team developed the following three overarching findings.

Finding One: Forward presence is critically important for protecting U.S. national security interests in the Asia Pacific region.

The United States has an enduring interest in maintaining a favorable strategic equilibrium in the Asia Pacific region that enhances the security of the American people, affords economic access, and reinforces an open and rules-based international order. More than ever, a robust forward U.S. military presence anchored in key alliances and partnerships is critical to advancing this enduring interest. The combination of stakes and opportunities in the PACOM AOR has never been higher. Forward deployed U.S. forces in the Western Pacific face greater risk from advanced capabilities such as A2AD and a broader array of demands, both geographic and across the spectrum of military operations. However, these forces also benefit from increased political support from allies and partners in the region and from technology advantages in critical mission areas such as undersea and amphibious warfare.

Moreover, major adjustments to current force posture are not required to fulfill the two core objectives of shaping the peacetime environment and deterring or defeating potential aggression --as long as the major air, sea and land force components of current U.S. force posture are maintained. The Military Departments in their role as force providers for PACOM can support forward presence from current and planned forces, with adjustments as needed within projected program levels. A key principle of forward presence in the Pacific learned over more than a century of engagement is that the tyranny of distance requires forward deployed forces to prevent war and to keep tyranny at a distance. This is not something that can be done by withdrawing and then re-introducing forces from CONUS in a crisis: by then it will probably be too late.

Finding Two: There are conceptual and implementation disconnects between strategic planning and resource decisions.

DoD’s January 2012 Strategic Guidance and PACOM’s emerging Theater Campaign Plan recognize the historic requirement and opportunity for enhanced engagement in the Asia Pacific
region. However, legacy planning processes, focus on Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom/New Dawn, and the complexity of planning simultaneous missions for shaping and deterrence have combined to create a series of apparent disconnects in conceptualizing and implementing U.S. strategy.

First, there is inadequate visibility into the connections between activities in engagement and shaping and the actions in support of major plans. At the strategic level, success in peacetime engagement reduces the potential occurrence of kinetic engagement in higher intensity contingencies. At the tactical level, successful engagement with partners and allies in peacetime can lead to a more robust U.S. response in the event of the need to execute plans for major contingency operations. However, these connections are not well articulated or operationalized across DoD or the national security agencies as a whole.

Second, there is also a potential disconnect between DoD processes for Adaptive Planning for shaping actions and the incorporation of resource needs into the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). While some resource needs are reflected in the FY13-17 FYDP, there is a long history of inadequate resourcing for Combatant Command needs at the pre-conflict level of plans. Current processes to address that historical disconnect (such as the Integrated Priority Lists) are overwhelmed by other programmatic demands with higher dollar volumes. In addition, there is a disconnect between resource requirements for shaping (small dollar) and resource requirements for major contingency operations (large dollar programs) that must be rectified. The value of small-dollar shaping actions far outweigh their costs, but for the force providers, these small-dollar actions are harder to justify and sustain in DoD’s Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System and with the Congress.

Finding Three: Options for rebalancing toward Asia require validation for affordability and execution.

The current budget situation demands that all force posture options be evaluated for affordability and executability. Regardless of whether legislation eventually obviates the sequestration reductions mandated by the Budget Control Act of 2011, most observers agree that additional defense budget cuts will occur over the next ten years. Every option for supporting the rebalancing toward Asia requires validation against likely budget spending levels and continued requirements in other AORs. Options must also be assessed in terms of flexibility and reversibility.

Recommendations

The recommendations below follow from these three overarching findings. Every recommendation was validated against the evaluation of force posture options in Section Three of the report, which in turn built on the assessment of U.S. interests and regional dynamics in Sections One and Two.

Recommendation 1: Better align engagement strategy under PACOM and across DoD, including improved integration of PACOM with its component commands, between PACOM and Service Force Providers, and among PACOM, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, and the interagency process.
As the PACOM commander prepares his Theater Campaign Plan for engagement across the AOR, it will be important that regional and country-specific planning be integrated under PACOM and not simply the aggregate of plans prepared by service or subcomponent commands. In addition, OSD needs to play a more central role in supporting theater campaign plans, including through the interagency process a whole-of-government approach. This is important because counterparts in the Asia Pacific region are not themselves regional commands but are in fact national command authorities, often under strong civilian leadership. The strategy should foster and sustain engagement opportunities to shape the environment, providing sufficient resources (including new resources in South and Southeast Asia) in an integrated regional approach that expands and leverages exercises, HADR, and training.

Aligning the PACOM engagement strategy will require more than process integration. There are concrete, immediate steps that DoD can take that will significantly improve theater engagement capabilities and increase the chances of successful outcomes. Among those steps are the following:

- Identify desired roles, missions and capabilities for key allies and partners and prioritize these goals in planning for bilateral, trilateral and multilateral training and exercises. Focus in particular on bridging capabilities and trilateral U.S.-Japan-ROK interoperability with the ROK; jointness, BMD, amphibious and ASW capabilities with Japan; and maritime domain awareness, CT, and HADR with the Philippines and other partners across the South and Southeast Asia littoral. Broader multilateral exercises and engagement should also be sustained to integrate additional partners and China to the greatest extent possible.

- Utilize Darwin, Australia, CNMI, Tinian, and JPARC and capabilities such as JMPRC (“National Training Center-in-a-box”) to encourage operationally relevant training and exercises with allies and partners.

- Protect exercise budgets in the face of future reductions; shaping is not possible if U.S. forces cannot interact more robustly with their counterparts.

- Enhance engagement opportunities with ground force counterparts, particularly with the PLA, by designating the USARPAC commander as a four star component command.

- Take advantage of current and planned reductions in OEF force deployment levels that make available active duty Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve components with significant capability and experience. These units should be made available for use in PACOM engagement activities, including expansion of PAT teams, supplemental forces to engage in partner training and exercises, etc.

- Transition U.S. Army I-Corps into a PACOM-aligned Joint Task Force, bringing with it corps-level planning capability, access to regionally aligned forces in CONUS for theater rotations of up to one year (primarily in Korea), and some of the experienced forces noted above.

- Refine and replenish prepositioned stocks in theater and draw on post-OEF retrograde equipment and supplies to augment availability in PACOM AOR.
**Recommendation 2: Implement the April 27, 2012, U.S.-Japan SCC Agreement, with caveats.**

The April 2012 U.S.-Japan SCC Agreement provides needed geostrategic advantages with a key ally and adds operational resilience through dispersing 4 MAGTFs across the Pacific. Significant problems remain with high costs and long implementation times, exacerbated by potential shortfalls in lift, ordnance, and other logistics support. Many of the actions that are included in the SCC Agreement do not need immediate implementation. DoD and the Government of Japan should focus initially on key actions that provide the best returns for enhanced engagement. Early actions should also be those that make sense to undertake regardless of longer-term force posture changes, including future force structure or budget reductions. Implementation plans for the SCC Agreement should be tied to specific milestones and funded incrementally, as each milestone is achieved. Specifically, DoD and the Congress should initiate the following:

- Sustain commitments to construction of FRF at Henoko while continuing to examine alternative courses of action in order to mitigate risks. Of the potential alternatives examined in Section Three, utilizing the second runway at Naha airfield was assessed as most promising against this report’s evaluation criteria. Other alternatives such as Iejima should also be examined as future possibilities. However, none of these alternatives is any more promising than current plans at Henoko, and abandoning current agreements would be counterproductive geostrategically and operationally without high promise of success elsewhere. Nevertheless, alternatives should continually be explored in light of executability challenges at Henoko, political risks associated with continued use of MCAS Futenma, and operational risks (dispersal requirements) in contingency scenarios.

- Move forward with funding necessary for the development of training ranges at Tinian Island and other CNMI locations. Work with the government of Japan to leverage Japanese funding commitments in order to realize early joint-bilateral training opportunities. Expedite the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) process by determining that prior Records of Decision are programmatic decisions and by evaluating proposed updates against those records. In many cases, this could lead to a Finding of No Impact and no need for a Supplemental EIS.

- Implement the distributed lay-down plan but ensure it is incremental, prioritized, and affordable with reversible milestones; require annual reporting on these milestones to Congress.

- Prioritize improvements on Guam, focusing on roads and infrastructure improvements such as pipeline protection that would be mission essential even if fewer Marines move to Guam from Okinawa. These improvements will necessarily include some limited MILCON funding outside of the wire of DoD facilities.

**Recommendation 3: Implement U.S.-ROK Strategic Alliance 2015, with caveats.**

The Republic of Korea presents unique elements for PACOM future force posture planning. As noted elsewhere in this report, no other location in the region presents the constant heightened threat levels as in Korea. Nevertheless, there are opportunities for the United States to both
strengthen preparations for Korea-related plans while potentially expanding trilateral and multilateral interaction with other nations in PACOM for engagement and shaping actions. Among the actions included in this recommendation are the following:

- Track progress toward and adjust schedules for OPCON transition and CFC dissolution via demonstrated achievement of scheduled actions and command and control arrangements (including possible mutually agreed to changes in supported-supporting relationships) and major changes in threat and conditions.

- Examine the option of replacing current U.S. ground combat units in Korea with rotations of trained and ready mechanized infantry, field artillery and aviation (including previously moved squadrons) brigades (with Eighth Army, 2nd Infantry Division, and the 210 artillery brigade headquarters permanently forward). Review should include the impact on readiness in Korea, personnel turbulence (in Korea and worldwide), the overall cost, U.S.-ROK Alliance relations and combat capability, and the overall effect on deterrence against provocations and aggression.

- Adjust but continue consolidation under the YRP/LPP agreements; revise the agreements to properly accommodate specific left-behind units, such as the artillery brigade.

**Recommendation 4: Add additional capabilities to the PACOM AOR.**

No U.S. planning has ever fully funded necessary forces or logistical support, and that situation applies in the PACOM AOR today. In part because of demands from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan; in part because of the process uncertainties from adaptive planning; and in part because of inadequate attention to validation assessments, some shortfalls in PACOM warrant near-term attention and funding support. Among the areas for force investments are the following:

- Station one or more additional SSNs in Guam to provide a critical advantage in an A2AD environment.

- Deploy an additional ARG and enablers (e.g. Landing Craft Air Cushion) to the Pacific theater to provide necessary lift for the distributed MAGTFs to support the full spectrum of U.S. planning. There is currently insufficient ARG coverage for Marines in the Pacific, particularly when compared with assets available for CENTCOM, and this gap in the “rebalancing” of forces is striking.

- Increase movement assets in the Pacific theater, specifically Roll-on/Roll-off ships and aerial tankers.

- Increase Critical Munitions Stockpile, particularly in South Korea.

- Replenish and upgrade prepositioned equipment and supplies, particularly in Korea.

- Expand the use and deployment of UDP Marines to develop and refine expeditionary defense tactics, doctrine, and capability in conjunction with JSDF and ROK forces for the First Island Chain and the West Sea Islands and across the region for broader capability.
To improve operational survivability in the event of major contingency operations, it is also important to strike the right balance between affordability and threat capabilities. Some force posture support actions have been delayed by requirements, such as facility hardening, that create unaffordable costs and produce the opposite of intended results: delays in needed actions that prolong vulnerabilities rather than take modest steps with significant returns. Options for improving operational survivability include bomber dispersal, Ballistic Missile Defense, facility hardening, and rapid recovery/repair. Among the affordable steps in this recommendation are the following:

- Deploy THAAD and PAC-3 assets to Guam, Kadena AB Japan, and possibly Korea.
- Increase runway repair capability across PACOM, particularly at Guam and Kadena.
- Disperse tanker aircraft rather than expend funds on hardening, especially in Guam; additionally, expand operational dispersal across Southeast Asia.
- Increase U.S. Air Force Contingency Response Group (CRG) capability across PACOM and provide additional assets to the CRG at Andersen AFB, Guam.
- Construct an upgrade fuel pipeline at Anderson Air Base in Guam.

**Recommendation 5: Examine possible force posture and basing efficiencies.**

Not every element of PACOM force posture needs to be retained or enhanced. The project team identified a number of proposed force reductions that save little money and significantly increase risk, but there are a few ideas worthy of consideration for efficiency and potential redirection of available resources. While this assessment did not develop a full list of such reductions and efficiencies, such a list might include the following:

- Consolidate F-16 squadrons among Misawa, Kunsan, and Eielson bases to create full 24-primary assigned aircraft squadrons. In the case of Misawa, ongoing use of the base by U.S. and JASDF forces and units would keep the base open for future uses and dispersal actions, though government of Japan objections to removing permanently deployed F-16s from Misawa must be considered.
- Over the years, forces deployed to Korea have grown apart from the current force structure. As a result, some units assigned to USFK serve less useful purposes. A careful review of USFK deployed forces would yield some small reductions, which could leave the force structure or could be replaced by more useful units, either on a permanent or rotational basis.

**Concluding Observation**

It was unusual for an independent not-for profit think tank to undertake the task required under Section 346 of the 2012 NDAA, but there were advantages in choosing an external assessor of DoD strategy. CSIS fully aligned its defense and Asia expertise to the task and executed the assessment in considerably less time than was considered necessary. This intense and focused
research illuminated important—and in most cases reparable—disconnects in strategy and resources while validating the overall DoD approach to force posture strategy in the PACOM AOR. In addition, the study focused CSIS experts on a critically important issue to U.S. national interests that will inform the Center’s future work and perhaps contribute to broader Congressional engagement in the work of DoD and PACOM in this vital region of the world.
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A select group of senior outside advisors also helped the project team scope the research questions and red-team the evaluations, findings and recommendations. These advisors included: Ambassador Richard Armitage, former Deputy Secretary of State; Admiral Timothy Keating, USN (ret), former PACOM Commander; General Walter “Skip” Sharp, USA (ret), former USFK, CFC, UNC Commander; General Howard Chandler, USAF (ret), former PACAF Commander; LtGen Wallace “Chip” Gregson, USMC (ret), former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, and MARFORPAC Commander; and Mr. Andrew Shearer, former Foreign Policy Advisor to Australian Prime Minister John Howard. These advisors provided critical inputs and review, but are not responsible for the final analysis and recommendations.

Finally, while not all senior officials in the U.S. government will agree with all the findings and recommendations in this report, CSIS greatly appreciates the support provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Department of State, PACOM, and all the components and sub-unified commands. They are in the front-lines of protecting U.S. national interests, and we are grateful for their dedication and for the time they shared to help the project team with this report.
LIST OF ACRONYMS

2ID—2nd Infantry Division
A2AD—Anti-access/area denial
AB—Air Base
ADF—Australian Defense Forces
AFB—Air Force Base
AFP—Armed Forces of the Philippines
ANZUS—Australia-New Zealand-United States (alliance treaty)
AOE/AOR—Ammunition, oiler, and supply ship
AOR—Area of responsibility
APEC—Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF—ASEAN Regional Forum
ARG—Amphibious Ready Group
ASEAN—Association of South East Asian Nations
ASW—Anti-Submarine Warfare
ATF—Amphibious Task Force
BCT—Brigade Combat Team
BMD—Ballistic Missile Defense
C2—Command and Control
C4ISR—Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
CARAT—Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training
CAS—Close Air Support
CENTCOM—Central Command
CFC—Combined Forces Command
CMS—Critical Munitions Stockpile
CNMI—Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
CONUS—Continental United States
CRG—Contingency Response Group
CSG—Carrier Strike Group
CSIS—Center for Strategic and International Studies
CTF—Combined Task Force
CVW—Carrier Air Wing
DDG—Guided Missile Destroyer
DESRON—Destroyer Squadron
DMZ—Demilitarized Zone
DoD—Department of Defense
DPJ—Democratic Party of Japan
EAS—East Asia Summit
EIS—Environmental Impact Statement
FDI—Foreign Direct Investment
FDO—Flexible Deterrent Operations
FMF—Foreign Military Financing
FRF—Futenma Replacement Facility
FS—Fighter Squadron
FTA—Free Trade Agreement
FY—Fiscal Year
HADR—Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief
HMAS—Her Majesty’s Australian Ship
HNS—Host Nation Support
HSV—High Speed Vessel
IBCT—Infantry Brigade Combat Team
ISR—Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
JASDF—Japan Air Self-Defense Force
JPARC—Joint Pacific-Alaska Range Complex
JPMRC—Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Capability
JSDF—Japan’s Self-Defense Force
JTF—Joint Task Force
KORCOM—Korea Command
KORUS—Korea-United States
LCS—Littoral Combat Ship
LDP—Liberal Democratic Party (in Japan)
LMSR—Large Medium-Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off ship
LPP—Land Partnership Plan (with Korea)
MAGTF—Marine Air Ground Task Force
MARFORPAC—Marine Forces Pacific
MCAS—Marine Corps Air Station
MEB—Marine Expeditionary Brigade
MEF—Marine Expeditionary Force
MILCON—Military Construction
MOU—Memorandum of Understanding
NAFTA—North American Free Trade Agreement
NDAA—National Defense Authorization Act
NEO—Noncombatant Evacuation Operation
OCONUS—Outside the Continental United States
OPCON—Operational Control
PAC-3—Patriot Advanced Capability-3
PACAF—Pacific Air Forces
PACFLEET—Pacific Fleet
PACOM—Pacific Command
PAT—Pacific Assistance Team
RAAF—Royal Australian Air Force
RIMPAC—Rim of the Pacific Exercise
ROK—Republic of Korea (South Korea)
RSOI—Reception, Staging and Onward Integration
SACO—Special Action Committee on Okinawa
SAR—Search and Rescue
SCC—Security Consultative Committee
SEIS—Supplemental Environmental Impact Study
SLOC—Sea Lines of Communication
SM-3—Standard Missile-3
SOCPAC—Special Operation Command Pacific
SOF—Special Operations Forces
SSN—Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarines
T-AOE—Ammunition, oiler, and supply ship (Supply class)
THAAD—Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
TLAM—Tomahawk Land Attack Missile
TPP—Trans-Pacific Partnership
UDP—Unit Deployment Program
UN—United Nations
UNC—United Nations Command
USAG—U.S. Army Garrison
USARPAC—U.S. Army Pacific
USFJ—U.S. Forces Japan
USFK—U.S. Forces Korea
USMC—U.S. Marine Corps
WMD—Weapons of Mass Destruction
WRM—War Reserve Materials
YRP—Yongsan Relocation Plan
Endnotes


4 See Section 2 endnotes for original agreements.


9 See the Federation of American Scientists’ “Status of World Nuclear Forces 2012” (http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nuclearweapons/nukestatus.html) for a list of estimated and declared nuclear arsenals. Note that Israel has not declared its nuclear arsenal.


11 See the German Marshall Fund of the United States’2011 Transatlantic Trends survey which found that 51 percent of Americans surveyed felt that Asian countries such as China, Japan or South Korea were more important to their country’s national interests than were the countries of the EU (38 percent). http://trends.gmfus.org/

12 This assumes the stable progression of recent years’ defense spending trends. Speaking to Reuters, the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ (IISS) Director General John Chipman said that if current trends were to continue it would take 15-20 years for China to achieve military parity with the U.S. This would require the United States does not hold to its pledge to not allow another power to get to parity with it (http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/08/us-world-military-idUSTRE7273UB20110308).


16 The Pew Global Attitudes Project has documented public opinion regarding foreign perceptions of the United States. While decreasing from 72 percent to 50 percent for the period 2002-2008, Japanese opinions of the US have risen steadily for 2009-2011, with “favorable” responses peaking at 85 percent in 2011 before dipping slightly to 72 percent in 2012 (http://www.pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=1&country=109). South Korean opinion of the US has risen consistently since hitting a low of 46 percent in 2003. For 2007-2010 (the last period for which data was available) “favorable” views of the United States have risen from 58 percent to 79 percent (http://www.pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=1&country=116&response=Favorable). Recent data for Australian
public opinion comes from the 2012 Lowy Institute Poll which shows a steady rise in favorable impressions of the United States from a low of 60 percent in 2007 to a new peak of 71 percent in 2012 (http://lowyinstitute.cachefly.net/files/lowy_poll_2012_web3.pdf).

17 The US and Japanese governments agreed in 2011 to extend host nation support at 2010 levels for 5 years. That budget was 188.1 billion yen. As of June 18, 2012, this would set the value of the agreement, in US dollars, at $2.382 billion. The text of the 1995 host nation support agreement can be found here: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/4.html. The January 21, 2011 announcement extending host nation support can be found here: http://www.usaembassy.gov/e/p/tp-20110121-72.html.


20 The Defense Department’s 2011 Annual Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China identifies the DF-21D as “an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) based on a variant of the CSS-5 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM),” it goes on to state that the DF-21D “is intended to provide the PLA the capability to attack large ships, including aircraft carriers, in the western Pacific Ocean. The DF-21D has a range exceeding 1,500km and is armed with a maneuverable warhead” (http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2011_cmpr_final.pdf, p.3).

21 From the US State Department’s Background Note: Japan (Updated March 5, 2012): “Japan's industrialized, free-market economy is the third-largest in the world” (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/4142.htm#econ).

22 From the Office of the United States Trade Representative: “Japan is currently our 4th largest goods trading partner with $195 billion in total (two ways) goods trade during 2011” (http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/japan-korea-apec/japan).

23 From Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs page “Japan’s contribution to International Peace and Security”: “Japan is the second-largest contributor to the UN budgets among the Member States, bearing 12.5% of the total budget. In addition, Japan supports a wide range of UN activities through voluntary financial contributions, which have been highly valued by the international community” (http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/sc/contribution.html). Also see the Financial Times’ April 17, 2012 article “Japan offers $60bn to boost IMF firepower” for more information on Japan’s involvement with the IMF, including the statement that Japan is “the second-biggest stakeholder in the IMF” (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/df7c3524-885c-11e1-a727-00144feab49a.html).


26 An annual government poll conducted by Japan’s Cabinet Office on December 4, 2011 found that 82 percent of Japanese reported having friendly feelings towards the United States. Only 16 percent of respondents reported not having friendly feelings (http://maritimesecurity.asia/free-2/us-s-pacific-command/japan-poll-finds-record-good-will-for-u-s-new-york-times/). Even before the boost to relations brought on by Operation Tomodachi, a December 2009 Cabinet Office poll found that, to the question “Do you feel close to the United States or not?,” 78.9 percent of Japanese respondents said that they either “Feel close” or “Tend to Feel Close” (http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/backup/polls/2009/poll-09-35.htm).

27 A GoK/AP poll conducted July – August of 2011 found that 94 percent of surveyed Japanese adults said they do not like North Korea. When asked if they think North Korea threatens global peace, 80 percent agreed. The same poll found that 76 percent of Japanese respondents do not like China, while 73 percent believed that China threatened global peace (http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/09/10/2011091000219.html).

28 According to a joint survey conducted by the Yomiuri Shimbun and Gallup from late November to early December 2011, 47 percent of Japanese respondents said they trust the United States “very much” or “somewhat.” This was down 5 points from 2010. 42 percent of respondents said that they do not trust the country “very much” or “at all,” an increase of 5 points from last year. Details of the poll can be found here: http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T111218003925.htm.

The World Bank World Development Indicators put Japanese military expenditure as a percentage of GDP at 1 percent for the years 1993-2010, excepting 2007 and 2008 for which the figure was 0.9% of GDP. World Bank World Development Indicator data can be viewed here: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx. For more information on Japan’s helicopter destroyers, particularly regarding the Hyuga-class warship, see Vice Admiral Yoji Koda (Ret.)’s piece for the US Naval War College, A New Carrier Race?: Strategy, Force Planning and JS Hyuga, accessible here: http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/845c374a-6615-4872-9c65-8dcf522739ee/A-New-Carrier-Race--Strategy,-Force-Planning,-and-. Press coverage by the Kyodo News of the Hyuga’s commissioning can be read here: http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20090319a5.html. For further details on the 22DDH helicopter destroyer, see DefenceTalk’s June 21, 2010 article here: http://www.defencetalk.com/details-of-new-japanese-helicopter-destroyer-27119/

See: http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/dp01.html


The April 27, 2012 Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee states that: “Both governments expressed their commitment to contribute mutually to necessary refurbishment projects at MCAS Futenma, such as those to sustain its safe mission capability until the FRF is fully operational and to protect the environment, on a case-by-case basis and consistent with existing bilateral arrangements, including Host Nation Support. Bilateral discussion of specific refurbishment projects is to be conducted through a channel separate from the one used to discuss realignment initiatives, with initial refurbishment projects to be identified by the end of 2012” (http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scd/pdfs/joint_120427_en.pdf, p.5)


From the Office of the United States Trade Representative – “Korea is currently our 7th largest goods trading partner with $100 billion in total (two ways) goods trade during 2011. Goods exports totaled $44 billion; Goods imports totaled $57 billion. The U.S. goods trade deficit with Korea was $13 billion in 2011.”

The Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea, signed October 1, 1953, can be viewed here: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/kor001.asp

From “South Korea in 2011: Asian Institute’s Annual Survey,” p.13

A March 19, 2006 survey by the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis found that 37.7% of South Koreans believe that China would be the biggest threat to South Korea’s security in the next 10 years. Japan came in second with 23.6% with North Korea in third at 20.7% and the United States at 14.8%. The same poll conducted in 2004 found that 39% of South Koreans thought that the United States was the biggest threat while only 33% listed North Korea, 12% cited China and 8% said Japan (http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2006/ea_skorea_03_21.html).

From the CIA World Factbook, in 2009 China accounted for 24.4% of South Korea’s exports compared to 10.1% for the United States, their second biggest market. China accounted for 16.5% of South Korean imports while Japan and the United States accounted for 13% and 8.5% respectively (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ks.html).


In a February 2008 report on the North Korean ballistic missile program, the Army Strategic Studies Institute reports that the North Korean ballistic mi0073ile inventory then totaled about 800 road-mobile missiles, including about 200 NoDong missiles that could strike Japan (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub842.pdf).
As referenced by Reuters on October 13, 2007 Israeli air strike was on Syrian nuke reactor-NYT viewable online here: http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/10/13/idUSB688812


Analysis of the Strategic Alliance 2015 by the Asia Foundation’s Center for U.S.-Korea Policy can be found here: http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/CUSKPNewsletter29SepWEB.pdf.

This statement can be viewed on the State Department’s website at the following address: http://www.state.gov/tr/pa/ps/ps/2012/06/192333.htm.

A hosted AFP/ARNEWS article detailing the withdrawal of 3,600 soldiers of the 2nd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division from Korea for Iraq can be accessed here: http://www.strykernews.com/archives/2004/05/18/2id_brigade_deploying_from_korea_to_iraq.html

Viewable here: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/98126.pdf

The Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea on the Relocation of United States Forces From the Seoul Metropolitan Area (October 26, 2004) can be viewed here: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/95892.pdf.


The announcement of the delay of wartime control transition, as reported in the Korea Herald, can be viewed here: http://view.koreaherald.com/kh/view.php?ud=20100627000199&amp;cpv=0.

President George W. Bush and President Lee Myung-bak met on April 19, 2008 at Camp David to discuss force levels on the Korean peninsula (http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2009/07/205_22820.html). An agreement to maintain U.S. troop levels at 28,500 was reached and the Korean Defense Minister Lee Sang-hee and his U.S. counterpart Robert Gates met on June 3, 2008 to confirm the agreed levels (http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2008/06/03/16/0301000000AEN200806030032000315F.HTML).


Briefly discussed in Victor Cha’s Statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific (“What’s Next for the U.S.-Korea Alliance): http://csis.org/files/ts120606_Ch.pdf.

A press release from the US Navy on the trilateral naval exercises states that “The exercise will focus on improving interoperability and communications with the ROK navy and the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force, which can facilitate cooperative disaster relief and maritime security activities in the future. The three navies will conduct this exercise beyond the territorial waters of any coastal nation.” The release can be found here: http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=67797.

Full text of the 1952 ANZUS Treaty can be found here: http://australianpolitics.com/issues/foreign/anzus-treaty-text.


The 2012 Lowy Poll notes, on the topic of the ANZUS alliance, that “As mentioned, Australians hold warm feelings towards the United States giving it a high 71% rating on the thermometer scale, steady with last year’s 70%. Consistent with this, support for the US alliance is at its highest levels since the Lowy Institute Poll began in 2005, with 87% of Australians saying ‘Australia’s alliance relationship with the United States’ is either ‘very important’ (59%) or ‘fairly important’ (28%) for Australia’s security” (page 9). The Lowy Poll also states that (page 9): “In an open-ended question, asked to say which country ‘will be Australia’s most important security partner over the next
10 years’, 74% of Australians choose the United States. Interestingly, 10% say it will be China. Just 4% say New Zealand and 3% Great Britain. Australians 18 to 29 years old are the least likely (62%) to say the United States will be the ‘most important security partner’, while those 60 and older are the most likely (83%). Conversely, Australians 18 to 29 years old are the most likely to say China will be Australia’s ‘most important security partner’, with 19% saying this compared with 2% of those 60 and older” (http://lowyinstitute.cachefly.net/files/lowy_poll_2012_web.pdf).

66 The Lowy Poll found that 74% of Australians were in favor of “up to 2,500 US soldiers being based in Darwin,” up from 55% in 2011. Amongst those in favor, 32% were “Strongly in favour,” 42% were “Somewhat in favour.” Meanwhile, 10% were “Strongly against,” and 12% were “Somewhat against.” The study also found that 46% of Australians were in favor of allowing more than 2,500 soldiers to be based in Australia (http://lowyinstitute.cachefly.net/files/lowy_poll_2012_web.pdf).


68 According the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s “Trade at a Glance 2011,” two-way trade between China and Australia reached 19.1% of total Australian trade in 2010, with Japan and the United States comprising 12% and 9% respectively. The United States remained Australia’s largest source of foreign direct investment with over $120 billion in FDI for 2010, more than the next two FDI leaders (UK and Japan) combined (http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/trade/trade-at-a-glance-2011.html).

69 The Australian Bureau of Statistics said in August of 2007 that Australia’s trade was worth 50.5 billion AUD in the 12 months leading up to the previous July. Trade with Japan in that same period amounted to 49.7 AUD. Japan had been Australia’s largest trading partner for the preceding 36 years (http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific_business/view/297154/1/Html).


73 The agreement between the United States and Australia authorizing the use of the Joint Defense Facility at Pine Gap can be found here: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/112459.pdf.

74 More information on Talisman Sabre 2011 can be found on the Australian Department of Defense’s website, accessible here: http://www.defence.gov.au/opEx/exercises/ts11/.


76 The Wellington Declaration on a New Strategic Partnership between New Zealand and the United States can be found on the US State Department’s website here: http://www.state.gov/tp/prs/ps/2010/11/150401.htm


78 According to the Office of the US Trade Representative, US foreign direct investment India was $27.1 billion in 2010 (http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/south-central-asia/india), foreign direct investment in China was $60.5 billion in 2010 (http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/china) and in 2009, the last period for which data was available, US foreign direct investment in ASEAN was $122.9 billion (http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/southeast-asia-pacific/association-southeast-asian-nations-asean).


80 Details on the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) can be found on ASEAN’s website here: http://www.asiansec.org/18816.htm.

81 The Strategic Framework Agreement can be viewed at the following address: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/95360.pdf.


84 As reported in the Washington Post- U.S. eyes return to some Southeast Asia military bases (June 22, 2012). Accessible here: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/2012/06/22/gJQAJKP83vV_story_1.html

85 The Joint Statement of the Fourth United States-Thailand Strategic Dialogue can be found on the State Department’s website here: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/06/192397.htm.

86 See CSIS’ Strategic Views on Asian Regionalism (February 2009) for further discussion Asian regional threat perception. The report can be found here: http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090217_gill_stratviews_web.pdf

87 The U.S.-Philippines Visiting Forces Agreement is hosted online here: http://www.chanrobles.com/visitingforcesagreement1.htm.

88 The 2007 Mutual Logistics Support Agreement can be found here: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/132080.pdf.


94 Details surrounding the June 27, 2010 U.S.-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership agreement can be found in a White House press release here: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pres-office/us-indonesia-comprehensive-partnership.

95 Information can be found on the British Ministry of Defence’s Gurkha unit website here: http://www.army.mod.uk/infantry/regiments/royal-gurkha-rifles/default.aspx

96 The agreement’s text can be found here: http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CFQQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fmerln.ndu.edu%2Fmerln%2Fmpial%2Freports%2FUS_India_Defense_Framework.doc&ei=m1HXT-AOajo0QHgwPy3sAwkusg=AFQjCNEpyjOlH1NaGnKtdAlb24iKe-Dn8Q&sig2=whif6cB-VWnKo2BwBnPslQ.


99 Application No. 35622/04 In The European Court Of Human Rights Between: -The Chagos Islanders (Applicants) and The United Kingdom (Respondent) and Human Rights Watch Minority Rights Group International (Interveners) from June 19, 2009 can be viewed here: http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/10/02/chagos-islanders-v-united-kingdom

100 Mauritian Prime Minister Navinchandra Gamgoolam’s visit with U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron on June 8, 2012 is described the The Guardian here: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/08/mauritius-chagos-islands-sovereignty-talks.


This is referenced in A Survey of Russian Federation Foreign Policy. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Unofficial English translation provided by the Ministry.


Michal Michalek reports on the April 22, 2012 start of exercises in the following article: http://www.pacom.mil/web/site_pages/uspacom/facts.shtml. The article states that “China has deployed 16 ships and two submarines for the drill. This includes five missile destroyers, five missile frigates, four missile boats, a support vessel and a hospital ship. They’ll be accompanied by 13 aircraft and five shipboard helicopters. The Russian contingent, four warships from their Pacific Fleet plus three supply ships, left their home port in Vladivostok on April 15. They are being led by ‘Varyag’, the flagship of the Russian Pacific Fleet.”


All PACOM component commands and PACOM subordinate unified commands have their headquarters in Hawaii, with the exception of U.S. Forces, Japan (USFJ) and U.S. Forces, Korea (USFK). USFJ and USFK have their headquarters at Yokota AB (Japan) and Yongsan Garrison (ROK), respectively.

The U.S. 3rd Fleet is based at Naval Base Coronado, California and operates in the Eastern Pacific Ocean.

The U.S. 7th Fleet is based at Yokosuka, Japan and operates in the Western Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean.

Carrier Strike Group Five (CSG-5), which operates CVN-73 (George Washington), is forward deployed in Yokosuka, Japan.


The 5th Air Force is based out of Yokota AB, Japan.
The 7th Air Force is based out of Osan AB, Republic of Korea.
The 11th Air Force is based out of Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska.
The 13th Air Force is based out of Hickam AFB, Hawaii.


1-1st special Forces Group, 353rd Special Operations Group, Navy Special Warfare Unit One, and Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines.

As outlined in Operation and Maintenance Overview Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Estimates, DoD includes the following budget accounts for “Overseas Costs”: MIPERs; O&M; Family Housing O&M; Family Housing Construction; and MILCON. Exclusions to this definition include funding for DoD activities in the U.S. in support of overseas activities and depot maintenance performed in the U.S. by overseas units.

There are a total of 12 countries within the PACOM area of responsibility in this category that include: Bangladesh, Burma, Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Madagascar, Mongolia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Thailand.

The three types of Host Nation Support included are: Direct Support (e.g. cash payments), Indirect Support (e.g. taxes or fees waived), and In-Kind Contributions (e.g. host nation-funded construction). Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2011 Burden Sharing Contribution Report, (Washington: Department of Defense, 2011), Enclosure.


