



Graduate School of
**BUSINESS &
PUBLIC POLICY**

Financing Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response

The Case of the Tōhoku Earthquake and Operation Tomodachi

***9th Annual Acquisition Research Symposium
Acquisition Research: Creating Synergy for Informed Change***

May 16 - 17, 2012

Associate Professor Aruna Apte and Assistant Professor Keenan D. Yoho
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy
Naval Postgraduate School

Report Documentation Page

*Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188*

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1. REPORT DATE MAY 2012	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2012 to 00-00-2012			
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Financing Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response: The Case of the Tohoku Earthquake and Operation Tomodachi		5a. CONTRACT NUMBER			
		5b. GRANT NUMBER			
		5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER			
6. AUTHOR(S)		5d. PROJECT NUMBER			
		5e. TASK NUMBER			
		5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School, Graduate School of Business & Public Policy, Monterey, CA, 93943		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER			
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)			
		11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)			
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified	Same as Report (SAR)	19	

Recent work in the area of HA/DR supported by ARP and focused on operations and finance


Operations

- Kaczur, Aurelio, and Joloya (2012), *An Analysis of United States Naval Participation in Operation Tomodachi: Humanitarian and Disaster Relief in the Tsunami-Stricken Japanese Mainland*
- Greenfield and Ingram (2011), *An analysis of U.S. Navy humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations*, Naval Postgraduate Thesis and Acquisition Research Program Report.

Finance

- Herbert, Prosser, and Wharton (2012), *A Cost Analysis of the Department of the Navy Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response to the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami*, Naval Postgraduate Thesis and Acquisition Research Program Report.
- Ures (2011), *Financing naval support for humanitarian assistance and disaster response: an analysis of cost drivers and cash flows*, Naval Postgraduate Thesis and Acquisition Research Program Report.


Areas impacted by the earthquake



	135°E				140°E					
INTENSITY	I	II-III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X+	
SHAKING	Not felt	Weak	Light	Moderate	Strong	Very strong	Severe	Violent	Extreme	
DAMAGE	none	none	none	Very light	Light	Moderate	Moderate/Heavy	Heavy	V. Heavy	


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The first 35 days of operations*




*Source: Adapted from briefing developed by CDR Fred Dini, SC, USN, JSF Japan Comptroller, May 2011

ODHACA funding process




The Navy was the key responder for the US DoD and therefore drove most costs




*Data source: Department of the Navy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Financial Management and Comptroller (OASN (FMC))
Data range: 11 March 2011 – 15 April 2011


The Pacific Fleet had a significant response and therefore drove most of the costs




“Operations support” was the primary cost driver and accounted for more than 60% of total costs



A breakdown of “operations support” activities shows that flying hours and airlift drive more than 40% of costs in that category



The US Navy provided the greatest number of aircraft in the first 30 days and drove most of the flying hour costs



Pacific Fleet was the main cost driver for Navy flying hour costs

Aircraft Type	USMC	USN	Total	% of Total
Rotary Wing	\$1,621,521	\$3,166,498	\$4,788,019	27%
Fixed Wing	\$2,344,167	\$10,356,238	\$12,700,405	73%

AIRCRAFT TYPE	COMPONENT		TOTAL COSTS
	USMC	USN	
FA-18C		\$1,955,153	\$1,955,153
SH-60F		\$1,925,685	\$1,925,685
KC-130J	\$1,733,258		\$1,733,258
FA-18F		\$1,708,762	\$1,708,762
C-2A		\$1,657,015	\$1,657,015
FA-18E		\$1,654,170	\$1,654,170
CH-46E	\$1,480,954		\$1,480,954
P-3C		\$1,478,054	\$1,478,054
E-2C		\$1,324,857	\$1,324,857
HH-60H		\$745,684	\$745,684
EA-6B		\$447,896	\$447,896
MH-60S		\$380,010	\$380,010
UC-35D	\$327,027		\$327,027
UC-12F	\$224,258		\$224,258
CH-53E	\$140,568		\$140,568
C-12		\$130,332	\$130,332
SH-60B		\$115,120	\$115,120
UC-12W	\$59,625		\$59,625
Total	\$3,965,688	\$13,522,736	\$17,488,425


Navy Pacific Fleet flying hour costs excluding F/A-18s of all types

Aircraft Type	USMC	USN	Total	% of Total
Rotary Wing	\$1,621,521	\$3,166,498	\$4,788,019	41%
Fixed Wing	\$2,344,167	\$4,590,257	\$6,934,424	59%

AIRCRAFT TYPE	COMPONENT		TOTAL COSTS
	USMC	USN	
SH-60F		\$1,925,685	\$1,925,685
KC-130J	\$1,733,258		\$1,733,258
C-2A		\$1,657,015	\$1,657,015
CH-46E	\$1,480,954		\$1,480,954
P-3C		\$1,478,054	\$1,478,054
E-2C		\$1,324,857	\$1,324,857
HH-60H		\$745,684	\$745,684
MH-60S		\$380,010	\$380,010
UC-35D	\$327,027		\$327,027
UC-12F	\$224,258		\$224,258
CH-53E	\$140,568		\$140,568
C-12		\$130,332	\$130,332
SH-60B		\$115,120	\$115,120
UC-12W	\$59,625		\$59,625
Total	\$3,965,688	\$7,756,755	\$11,722,444

A total of 23 Navy ships participated in Operation Tomodachi


Vessels on Station By Day (30 days of operation) & Costs
11 March to 15 April 2011




Flying Hour and Steaming Costs Compared to Total Costs

Event	Total Flying & Steaming \$	Total Disaster Costs	Flying Hrs & Steaming as % of Total	Flying Hrs as % of Total
2010 Haiti Earthquake	\$72,131	\$155,135	46%	28%
2004 Indonesian Tsunami	\$35,178	\$63,775	55%	44%
2011 Japan Earthquake & Tsunami	\$34,929	\$81,091	43%	32%
2010 Pakistan Floods	\$19,909	\$22,181	90%	75%

Flying Hour and Steaming Costs Compared to Total Costs




Flying hours and steaming costs for Haiti, 2004 Indonesian Tsunami, 2011 Japan Earthquake and 2010 Pakistan floods



Conclusions

- There have been 4 studies on operations and costs of disasters
 - These studies have changed the way we think about the cost drivers
 - Not just personnel costs -- flying time tends to be the largest driver, the number of ships you send as well as ship type has significant cost consequences
- Flying hours and steaming time are the biggest cost drivers
- Navy is a significant DoD participant in HA/DR
 - More of the world population is moving to coastal (littoral) areas
 - Navy can access the coastal (littoral) areas with specialized equipment utilizing specialized skills
 - Not just about moving materiel – other capabilities –especially nuclear expertise – that are important depending upon the disaster
- If HA/DR operations are a primary mission of the U.S. Armed Forces as defined by key part of our national security strategy as outlined in *Priorities for 21st Century Defense* (p.6), then such operations should be considered during the planning and development of programs that support operations (such as shipbuilding, calculation of aircraft life, etc.)





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