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Approved for distribution: December 2011

Dr. W. Eugene Cobble, Jr.
Director, Strategic Initiatives Group

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Dedication

Five OPNAV Strategy & Concepts Branch (N513) staff officers died or were severely wounded in the line of duty in the Al Qaeda attack on the Pentagon, September 11, 2001

- CAPT Bob Dolan USN
  - Branch head
- LCDR Bill Donovan USN
- LCDR Pat Dunn USN
- LCDR Dave Williams USN
- LT Kevin Shaeffer USN

This study is respectfully dedicated in their honor

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30-40 Capstone Documents: 1970-2010

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Overview of what's here

Types of capstone documents
- Strategies
- Doctrines
- Concepts
- CONOPS
- Principles
- Visions
- White papers
- Philosophies
- Policies
- Guidance
- Analysis
- PR
- Ethos

Analysis of each document
- Context
- Rationale
- Content
- Criticism
- Influence

Analysis of all the documents
- Comparisons
- Constants
- Changes
- Insights
- Conclusions
- Judgments

Lessons learned
- How to write the next one
- Check list Recommendations

What this is

- A study of the development of US Navy strategy and policy, 1970-2010
  - By analyzing content & context of official Navy strategy & policy documents
  - In briefing slide format. Unclassified.
  - In seventeen volumes (this is the introductory volume)
  -Parsed by decade (1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 2000s)
  -With some discussion of pre-1970 documents & 2011 events
  -Comparisons & analyses
  -Recommendations: How to write the next one
Analysis of each document

- What was it?
- Why was it written?
- What was going on at the time?
- What documents did it cite?
- What other documents had influence at the time?
- How was it written?
- What were its key ideas?
- What did it say that was new?
- What did it leave out?
- What has been written about it?
- For what was it criticized?
- What was its influence & why?

Substance (vs. form): Slides w/ blue borders

- What were its key ideas?
- What did it say that was new?
- What did it leave out?
What else is here?  *Context for each decade* CNA

- Comprehensive surveys of
  - The global system; world events
  - The nation: US political, economic, opinion trends
  - US national security policies; planned & actual adversaries
  - Defense, services, Navy budgets & manpower trends
  - Allied, joint & US Navy operational command structures
  - US national security & defense documents
  - USN deployment strategy, ops, exercises, forces
  - USN status, force level numbers & capability trends
    - Incl. organizational development, sealift, basing, Merchant Marine, shipbuilding, key individuals, Navy-relevant policy literature, ONI public documents
  - USN relations w/ USMC, USCG, USAF, USA, foreign navies
    - Incl. relevant developments within each service

Purpose of this study

- To identify, organize & present data (and context) on development & influence of USN capstone documents, 1970-2010
- To analyze the data and make comparisons, judgments & recommendations to inform current and future USN capstone document efforts
Why this study? And why now?

♦ USN developed a “New Maritime Strategy” (2005-07)

♦ As part of development process, USN wanted:
   ♦ Record of previous such endeavors
   ♦ Useful insights drawn from that record

♦ Subsequently, USN wanted:
   ♦ Record of development of “new maritime strategy” itself
   ♦ Record of development of four 2009/2010 documents derived from new maritime strategy
   ♦ Documents useful for educating USN pol-mil officer sub-specialty community in their field

The utility of looking at the record

The past is our best guide to the future.

Actually, the past is our only guide to the future; it is the sole source of evidence. Since the future, by definition and the laws of physics, has yet to happen, any and every claim about the future is guesswork; it is theory, speculation.

If history, by your choice, is a closed book to you, and the future -- the focus of your interest -- has yet to happen, what remains? The answer is the present and the lessons you derive from your personal life experience. These aids to wisdom are unlikely to be impressive.

Premise

“I believe in the power of our past to inspire and instruct.”

ADM Michael Mullen, USN
Chief of Naval Operations
22 July 2005
U.S. Naval Academy
Annapolis, Maryland

What this study can do

- Help USN better understand why it is what it is today
- Help foster thinking about appropriate USN roles in the future
- Help inform USN decisions on formulation and dissemination of new capstone documents
  - Identify stages in document development, dissemination
  - Give range of USN options & choices; “best practices”
- Provide context, perspective to USN staff officers
- Provide a basis for more sophisticated analyses
What study drafts have already done (I)

- Helped inform USN decisions on formulation and dissemination of new capstone documents
  - E.g.: Naval Operations Concept 2010
- Provide context, perspective to USN staff officers
  - E.g.: OPNAV N51, N00X, N00Z
- Used by USN CNO Transition Team (2010)

What study drafts have already done (II)

- Provided a basis for more detailed analyses
  - Dr. John Hattendorf’s edited NAVWARCOL volumes on US naval strategy in 1970s, 1980s, 1990s
  - Ph.D. dissertations by
    - CAPT Peter Haynes USN
    - Larissa Forster (Switzerland)
    - Sebastian Bruns (Germany)
    - Amund Lundesgaard (Norway)
- Simultaneous and subsequent CNA studies
Study origins: 14 April 2005

- “3/1 Strategy Workshop” at Lockheed Martin offices
  - POC: CAPT Robby Harris USN (Ret)
    - Director, Advanced Concepts
  - To inform “3/1 Strategy” construct

Original request

- Look at
  - The Maritime Strategy (1982-9)
  - . . . From the Sea (1992)
  - Forward . . . From the Sea (1994)

- Answer questions
  - What were they?
  - What prompted these initiatives?
  - What was the Effect?
  - Keys to Success?

- But . . . we found that there were many more

Study sponsorship

- OPNAV N51 (2005-7)
- Under Secretary of the Navy Robert Work (2010-11)
Analytic approach

- Understand the question
- Develop appropriate methodology to answer the question
- Gather data: Documents, interviews, workshops
  - Use only unclassified & declassified sources
- Find patterns in the data
- Analyze the patterns & make comparisons
- Make judgments & recommendations
- Keep unclassified, for wide distribution & broad potential advisory/educative effects

What questions does this study answer?

- Original question:
  - What should the U.S. Navy do to ensure its next capstone documents are successful?
- Refined questions:
  - What should decision-makers and authors consider when drafting Navy capstone documents?
    - What are the right questions to answer?
    - What past best practices have been identified?
  - What has been the Navy’s recent prior experience in drafting capstone documents?
Methodology

- Empower an experienced analyst/ SME
- Conduct extensive naval, academic literature review
- Conduct interviews & personal correspondence
- Conduct conference, workshops. Surface data, issues
- Draft, present strawman briefs, as “murder boards”
- Provide updated briefs & circulate successive drafts within wide network, for review & criticism
  - Include sponsors, USN, retired USN, outside USN
- Develop typologies from data & analyses
- Improve data and analysis; develop recommendations
- Socialize approach, findings prior to final publication

Study analyzes documents

- There is a range of options to choose from in organizing an analysis of the evolution of strategic-level thinking
  - Ideas
  - Events
  - Personalities
  - Documents
- This study focuses on & is organized by documents
Study format: Slides

♦ Why slide format?
  ♦ Slides are the *lingua franca* of the practicing US Navy strategy & policy community, and those who support & comment on US Navy policy & strategy
  ♦ Document began as a briefing
  ♦ Original intent: Publish an annotated briefing
    ♦ I.e.: Each page to have a slide on top, with explanatory text on bottom
  ♦ Slide numbers grew as more data & analyses were included
  ♦ Number of slides and time & funding limitations eventually precluded annotation

♦ Limitations
  ♦ Provides only a (detailed) skeleton; lacks flesh & muscle

Methodological difficulties

♦ Proof of document “success” is impossible
♦ Too many interacting military, political, bureaucratic, economic & human factors to track
♦ Impossibility of untangling all relationships
♦ Difficulty in finding data
  ♦ Very sparse and unbalanced literature
♦ Difficulty in finding *accurate* data
  ♦ Memories can be thin reeds
♦ Precise parallels between past & present & *future* are speculative
Caveat: The Navy is about ops, not documents (I)

- Essence of post-WW II US Navy is *operations*
  - Specifically: Global forward operations in peacetime, crises & war
  - Most post-WW II US Navy officers most of the time have been at-sea operators, or direct enablers of operations, not desk-bound “scribes”
  - Focus of study, however, is on *documents*, not *operations*
  - Necessarily focuses on USN officers as “scribes”
  - No intent to slight importance of activities of operators, or of scribes when on operational tours, in contributing to US Navy & to the Nation

Caveat: The Navy is about ops, not documents (II)

“We believe in command, not staff.
We believe we have ‘real’ things to do.”

Admiral Arleigh Burke USN
Chief of Naval Operations (1955-1961)
Study focus: Strategic level of war

- Levels of war
  - Strategy
  - Operations
  - Tactics
- Inter-related
  - Strategy requires tactics ("top-down" construct)
  - Tactics can enable strategy ("bottom-up" construct)
- USN operators mostly focus on tactical level at sea
- Study focus, however, is on strategic level of war
Limits of this study (I)

- Study cannot definitively ensure or predict future “success:” What will “work” & what won’t
- It also cannot definitively explain what “worked” in the past
  - Valid measures of effectiveness (MOEs) difficult to identify, calculate & compare
  - Each situation had important unique characteristics
  - Few past efforts to measure “success” beyond anecdotes
  - Past data on “success” missing, uneven &/or uncertain

Limits of this study (II)

- Study does not focus on:
  - Allied, coalition, national security, defense, joint or other service or agency strategies and documents
  - Except as they relate to US Navy capstone strategy & concept documents
- Study does not provide full texts of each document
  - Available in related Naval War College “Newport Paper” series
- Limitations due to classification of some documents
  - Many documents have been declassified
  - Some documents remain classified, which limits UNCLAS description & analysis
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### What are “capstone documents?”

- **Criteria**
  - General, over-arching “Washington-level” documents
  - Convey fundamental beliefs about the application of US naval power
  - Intended to inform USN subordinate commands & documents
  - “Ref A”
  - CNO involvement, visibility, signature
  - A couple of exceptions

- **Self-descriptions are of little help**
  - “Strategies,” “concepts,” “visions,” “strategic plans,” etc.
  - Few formal definitions
  - Even formal definitions change over time
30-40 Capstone Documents: 1970-2010

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<td>Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11</td>
<td>May 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 12</td>
<td>Oct 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Operations Concept (NOC)</td>
<td>May 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP 1: Naval Warfare</td>
<td>Aug 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 13</td>
<td>Oct 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No in-depth analysis here of: (I)

- Unsigned & aborted draft efforts, e.g.:
  - *Won if by Sea* (1990)
  - *The Strategic Concept of the Naval Service* (1992)
  - *Power and Influence ... From the Sea*
  - *Naval Operational Concept* (1997)
  - *Beyond the Sea ... (1998-9)*
No in-depth analysis here of: (II)

- CNO Guidance (CNOGs) & Navy Objectives
- ONI products (e.g., *Understanding Soviet Naval Developments*)
- Influential in-house USN studies & analyses
- Unofficial efforts

No in-depth analysis here of: (III)

- USN annual “Capstone” communications to the Congress
  - Annual Navy “Posture Statements” (through FY 2000, & resumed)
  - Navy testimony before Congress
  - Annual Navy *Program Guides* (since 1993)
  - Annual Navy “Budget Highlights” documents
Posture statements; Program guides; Budget highlights

Posture Statements & Program Guides (I)

- Annual general pubs justifying Navy overall budget requests to Congress
- First chapter normally presented Navy policy & strategy
  - Often reprinted verbatim or paraphrased current USN capstone document
  - But not always comprehensive (e.g.: FY 07 Program Guide)
- Reflect current CNO & OPNAV thinking
- Short-term influence: one year; but opportunity for continuity
Posture Statements & Program Guides (II)

- **Last glossy** Navy *Posture Statement*: for FY 2000
  - SECDEF Rumsfeld cancelled all glossy service posture statements for FY 2001 & later
  - But still published as initial CNO FY budget testimony
- 1st annual Navy *Program Guide (Force 2001)* published for FY 93
  - Became *Vision…Presence…Power* in FY 1998
  - Became *Sea Power for a New Era* in 2006
  - No program guide published in 2008 for FY 09
    - Printed copy OBE due to 2008 DDG-1000 decisions
    - 2009 & 2010 editions titled simply *Navy Program Guide*

Terminology & definitions: Difficult issues

- **This study**
  - Identifies & acknowledges the issues
  - Does not address these issues definitively
- Worthy of further study & analysis
Identifying the right terminology

Terminology: USN capstone documents

- At least 35 “capstone” strategy & concepts documents since 1970
  - Some explicitly said they were “strategy” or “strategic”
    - E.g.: The Maritime Strategy, Navy Strategic Plan
  - Some explicitly said they were “visions” or “concepts”
  - Others said they were something else, but contained important elements of strategy or vision
    - E.g.: “Navy Policy Book, Fleet Response Plan”
  - Most—even those labeled “strategy”—have occasioned debates as to whether or not they really were “strategies”
Were capstone documents “strategies”?

- Or were they
  - “Doctrines”?
  - “Concepts”?
  - “Strategic concepts”?
  - “Concepts of operations (CONOPS)”?
  - “”Principles”? “Mission statements”? “Missions”?
  - “Visions”?
  - “White Papers”?
  - “Philosophies” or “styles” of warfare?
  - “Policies”? “Guidance”? “Strategic plans”?
  - “Analysis”?
- Definitions differ – & change over time – for each

Terminology: Authorities & reality

- Agreed DOD joint definitions
  - Evolves over time. Continuously updated
  - Missing some definitions; in other Joint Pubs however
- Navy definitions
  - NTRP 1-02 Naval Supplement to the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (2006)
  - Superseded NWP 1-02 (1995) & NWP-3 (pre-1995)
- Navy usage
  - Often at variance with formal joint & Navy definitions
The Navy and terminology (I)

- US Navy never rigorous in its approach to policy/strategy/concepts terminology
  - Definitions considered dull, unimportant
- Individual idiosyncratic approaches abound (and change over time)
- Generally little knowledge or appreciation of existence of joint – and even Navy – official definitions
- Strong contrast to Joint Staff & US Army approach
  - Definitions considered important, useful, necessary
  - Included in Gen Martin Dempsey USA list of issues important to the US Army: “Getting the words right” (2010)

The U.S. Navy & terminology (II)

- “When I use a word . . . it means just what I choose it to mean . . .”
  
  Humpty Dumpty
  
  In Lewis Carroll, *Through the Looking Glass*
The U.S. Navy & terminology (III)

- **The record:**
  - Terminological disinterest, disregard, unawareness,
  - **E.g.:**
    - USN leaders variously termed . . . *From the Sea* (1992):
      - A “white paper”
      - A “vision”
      - A “strategic concept”

Terminology: Scattered among sources (I)

- **Example #1:** “Missions & capabilities” (in 2009)
  - Sea control operations **Joint**
  - Power projection **Navy**
    - Maritime power projection **Joint**
  - Forward presence **Navy**
  - Strategic deterrence **Joint**
  - Humanitarian assistance/DR  -----  ----- 
    - Humanitarian & civil assistance **Joint**
    - Foreign HA, Foreign DA **Joint**
  - Maritime security operations (MSO)  -----  ----- 
    - Maritime interception operations (MIO) **Navy**
Terminology: Scattered among sources (II)

Example #2: “Warfare tasks” (in 2009)

- Strike warfare: Navy
- Amphibious operations: Joint
- Anti-air warfare: Navy
- Anti-submarine warfare: Joint
- Anti-surface warfare: Joint
- Surface warfare: Joint
- Mine warfare: Joint
- Naval special warfare: Navy
- Electronic warfare: Joint
- Information operations: Joint

What is “strategy”? (I)

The concept of “strategy” has proven notoriously difficult to define. Many theorists have attempted it, only to see their efforts wither beneath the blasts of critics.

...Straightforward definitions go fundamentally astray, for strategy is a process, a constant adaptation to shifting conditions and circumstances in a world where chance, uncertainty, and ambiguity dominate.

Williamson Murray & Mark Grimsby
“Introduction: On Strategy”
What is “strategy”? (II)

- Enormous literature. Numerous definitions
- Definitions evolve & diverge
  
  The art and science of developing and using political, economic, psychological, and military forces as necessary during peace and war, to afford the maximum support to policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat.
  
  Joint Pub 1-02 (1994)

  A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.
  
  Joint Pub 1-02 (2008)

  This definition is bureaucratically appealing, politically correct, and relatively useless.

  Gabriel Marcella & Steven Fought
  “Teaching Strategy in the 21st Century”
  JFQ (1st qtr 2009)

What is “strategy”? (III)

- **Strategy** = plan of action
  - Choosing & using certain *Means* → in chosen *Ways* → to achieve certain specific *Ends*
  - In a given *Context*
What is a “Navy strategy”?

- The US Navy’s theory about how its forces contribute to US national security
  - A set of concepts & arguments
- It should coherently enumerate, think through, lay out, & ideally prioritize:
  - Maritime components of threats to the nation
  - Strategies those threats are likely to employ
  - Reasons why these threats & strategies are salient
  - Optimal potential Navy operations to counter those threats & strategies
  - Reasons how & why these operations will work

“Navy,” “naval” & “maritime” strategy

- All include “how the U.S. Navy is/should be used”
- Naval strategy sometimes also means “include USMC”
- Maritime strategy sometimes means “include USCG”
  - Maritime industries believe it should include them too
- Maritime strategy has also meant “a type of total national strategy”
  - As opposed to a continental strategy
"Naval Strategy:” The formal Navy definition

*The use of naval forces (including naval aviation and Marine forces) to achieve naval objectives determined by national strategy, with the overall objective of controlling the seas and denying to an enemy the use of those sea areas important to enemy operations*

- Virtually unchanged in 20+ years
  - NTRP 1-02 Navy Supplement to the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Aug 2006)
  - NWP 1-02 Navy Supplement to the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Jun 1995)
  - NWP 3 (Rev. D) Naval Terminology (Feb 1985)
- Exclusive focus on sea control

"Strategy” & “doctrine” (I)

- Most of these documents are closer to “doctrine” than “strategy”
  - “Doctrine” is
    - Abstract, conceptual & general
    - Official and authoritative (Directive in joint system, US Army)
  - “Strategy” has a particular context
- USN formally says “doctrine” is an essential bridge between “strategy” & “Tactics, Techniques & Procedures” (TTP) (NDP 1 Naval Warfare (1994))
“Strategy” & “doctrine” (II)

♦ “Strategy” is a far more positive term in USN than “doctrine”
  ♦ USN officers “wary of doctrine.” “What little doctrine the Navy has, it ignores in favor of operational flexibility”
  ♦ CAPT Wayne Hughes USN (Ret), *Fleet Tactics*
  ♦ “To the naval strategist, the combination of definitions and doctrine becomes rather toxic”
  ♦ CAPT Roger Barnett USN (Ret), *Navy Strategic Culture* (2009)
  ♦ Few USN mechanisms to ensure knowledge of doctrine
  ♦ Strong contrast w/ joint system & other services, esp/US Army
  ♦ But 1st study of doctrine was USN (Dudley Knox, 1915)

“Strategy” & “doctrine” (III)

♦ “Navy “wariness” re: doctrine not solely a US phenomenon

“Over the course of their histories, most Commonwealth navies have acquired reputations for their aversion to written doctrine”

“Strategy” & “concepts” (I)

- Dictionary definition of concepts: “General ideas”
- Joint forces definition of concepts: “Future-oriented; beyond the FYDP”
  - Innovative, debatable, unvalidated
  - As opposed to doctrine (Current, authoritative)
- Actual Navy usage: Closer to dictionary than joint usage
  - Sister service usage tracks with Joint definition
- “Operational”, “operating” & “operations” concepts
  - Have specific, future-oriented meanings in joint usage
  - Navy view has been that they are closer to “capstone doctrines”

“Strategy” & “concepts” (II)

- Navy striving to develop an approach to “concepts” reflecting the joint force approach (2009-11)
  - OPNAVINST 5401.9 Navy Concept Generation and Concept Development Program (Feb 2010)
    - “A concept is a notion or statement of an idea with an expression of how something might be done; a visualization of future operations . . .”
  - Navy Warfare Development Command, Guide for Navy Concept Generation and Concept Development Program (Feb 2010)
    - Similar to OPNAVINST
    - Superseded by Jun 2011 edition
    - But content of various Naval Operations Concepts often has not conformed to these definitions
“Strategy” & “concepts” (III)

♦ “Those who think about naval matters are, for the most part, entirely at ease with concepts and quite uninterested in definitions”
  
  CAPT Roger Barnett USN (Ret)
  Navy Strategic Culture: Why the Navy Thinks Differently (2009)

♦ But his idea of a “concept’ is itself not in conformance with contemporary joint usage
  ♦ “Concepts are abstract, indistinct, and malleable”
  ♦ Closer to common dictionary usage

“Strategy” & “strategic concepts”

♦ “Strategic concept”
  ♦ Popularized by Samuel Huntington in 1954
  ♦ Periodically used by Navy and naval commentators
  ♦ No official joint definition
  ♦ Some Navy “strategy” documents may really be “strategic concepts”
“Strategy” & “concepts of operations”

♦ Concept of operations (CONOPS)

A verbal or graphic statement that clearly and concisely expresses what the joint force commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation.


♦ Fleet Warfighting CONOPS

A written document specifying how the Fleet will employ current capabilities . . . to effectively and efficiently perform the missions assigned by the Combatant Commander (CCDR) to naval forces.

COMUSFLTFORCOMINST 5401.1A
Fleet Concept of Operations (CONOPS) Development (Mar 2009)

“Strategy” & “principles”

♦ Universally accepted, self-evident truths. Axioms.
♦ To inform, for better understanding. Not directive.
♦ Navy leaders have often put forth their own sets of “principles” (often calling doctrine “principles”)
♦ USN has had little recent interest in classic “principles of war”
♦ A few exceptions:
  ♦ NWP 10 Naval Warfare (1950s) included “Principles of War”
  ♦ NDP1 Naval Warfare (1994) included “Principles of War”
  ♦ RADM John Morgan interest (2003)
    ♦ Yielded essay contest, book, articles
“Strategy” & “vision”

- Term borrowed from American corporate business usage
  - Popular in 1990s
  - Future-oriented, like concepts
  - Short, succinct, inspiring statements of what an organization intends to become & achieve at some point in the future. Broad, all-inclusive, forward-thinking intentions.
  - The image of an organization’s goals before it sets out to reach them. Describes aspirations for the future, without necessarily specifying the means that will be used to achieve desired ends.
  - May be as vague as a dream or as precise as a goal or a mission statement

“Strategy” & “white papers”

- Term borrowed from UK usage
  - Authoritative report outlining government policy & proposed actions
  - Play specific roles in UK politics & government policy
  - Not part of normal US government usage
  - But term sometimes applied to US Navy capstone documents to lend them authority
“Strategy” & “philosophies of warfare” (I)

- “Philosophies,” “styles,” “types” of warfare
- Usually discussed in pairs, as polar opposites
- One pole often used as a “straw man”
  - Annihilation vs. attrition
  - Attrition vs. maneuver
  - Attrition vs. effects-based operations (EBO)
  - Conventional vs. nuclear (or strategic)
  - Conventional vs. unconventional (or guerrilla)
  - Irregular vs. regular (or conventional)
  - Asymmetric vs. symmetric
  - “3-block war,” hybrid war vs. single-type

“Strategy” & “philosophies of warfare” (II)

- “Attrition warfare” vs. “maneuver warfare”
- Characterized USMC writings
  - Late 1980s onward
- Adopted in several subsequent Navy & naval capstone documents
- Large literature analyzing “maneuver vs. attrition”
- Terms defined as “philosophies” in Navy Supplement to Joint Pub 1-02 (NTRP 1-02)
  - Not part of US joint lexicon (Joint Pub 1-02)
- Naval Doctrine Pub 1: Naval Warfare (2010)
  - “Doctrine,” but “describes our operating philosophy”
“Strategy” & “policy” (I)

- Current usage:
  - Politicians make “policy”
  - Generals & admirals make “strategy”

Strategy is the art of applying power to achieve objectives, within the limits imposed by policy

Gabriel Marcella & Stephen Fought
“Teaching Strategy in the 21st Century”
*JFQ* (2009)

“Strategy” & “policy” (II)

I know of no way to make a sharp, easy distinction between policy & strategy. They blend & overlap. Both provide guidance for plans & operations.

Policy . . . provides guidance under which officials work to attain an effect desired.

Policy must dominate strategy; strategy influences policy

RADM (Ret) Henry Eccles
“Strategy – The Theory & Application”
*Naval War College Review* (1979)
Another usage

- “Strategy” as “operational,” for “warfighting”
- “Policy as “administrative,” for “management”
- Reflecting the dual DOD chains of command

... I try to separate military strategy from policy. Military strategy needs a specific enemy and, though developed in peacetime, is applied during war. ... I do not expect a global conflict so the issue before us today seems more one of naval policy.

CNO ADM Frank Kelso USN
SASC Confirmation Hearings (1990)

USN has used term in at least two ways:

- Annual CNO direction in building or refining the Program Objectives Memorandum (POM)
  - Navy Strategic Guidance in support of PR 11 (2009)
    - Similar direction also found in Navy Strategic Plans
  - Contained elements of strategy
  - Audience is chiefly DON Washington-area military & civilian staff charged with POM & budget development
- Periodic statements of CNO intentions & planned way ahead
  - CNO Guidance (CNOG)
  - (Similar to CJCS, CMC, other service leader usage)
  - Audience was entire US Navy, especially staffs

No official joint or Navy definition for “guidance’
“Strategy” & “analysis” (I)

♦ Analysis (in a military context):
  ♦ A tool to assist in decision-making
  ♦ Usually conducted to yield specific answers to specific questions, e.g.:
    ♦ How many ships to buy?
    ♦ How many weapons of what kind to use?
  ♦ To achieve that level of specificity, analysts make **assumptions**
    ♦ Usually much more narrow & specific than those of strategists
  ♦ Strategists & analysts often disagree on assumptions
  ♦ SECDEF McNamara-era emphasis on analysis had continued in OSD ever since
    ♦ Somewhat discredited following use measuring/claiming Vietnam War “success”

“Strategy” & “analysis” (II)

♦ SECNAV Claytor, USN Woolsey, later SECNAV Lehman saw them as antithetical (late 1970s/1980s)
  ♦ “Strategy” often equated w/ “professional military judgment”
  ♦ Believed OSD emphasis on quantitative policy analysis de-valued, eviscerated strategy & “intellectual audacity”
  ♦ Saw aspects of campaign analysis as pernicious
    ♦ “How much is enough?” = “the wrong question” for navies
    ♦ Downplayed analytic focus on scenarios & marginal changes
    ♦ Preferred to use lessons from historical experience
    ♦ Saw need for flexibility in face of uncertainty
    ♦ Emphasized role of naval forces in seamless transitions from peace to crises to war
  ♦ Also saw “analysis” as cover for OSD subjective judgment
  ♦ Then “Peaceful coexistence” (1990s & 2000s)
    ♦ Campaign analyses central to USN programming in 2000s
One of the great heresies of our time, the cult of “systems analysis . . . Instead of a tool, it became the decision process.

The grafting of the systems analysis cult onto the navy had a particularly unfortunate effect. Given the overwhelming engineering bent of the naval officer corps and the effects that Rickover’s obsession with engineering was having throughout the navy, the seeds of systems analysis found naval waters most hospitable, and they grew like hydrilla, choking off strategic thinking.

The result of these trends was the disappearance within the navy itself of any coherent rationale for the navy and its historic mission. One looks in vain through the congressional testimony of the late 1960s and 1970s for a consistent intellectual case for the navy. . . . Things that could be quantified, put into statistics, and massaged by computers became the total product of the Department of the Navy headquarters.

John F. Lehman, Jr. (SECNAV 1981-7)
Command of the Seas (1988)

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Drafters often conflated “strategy” with developing a “Navy Story” or “narrative” for external public relations.

Some documents were designed to increase public and congressional understanding of and support for the Navy.

Terming them “strategies” and “strategic concepts” was seen as giving them a respectability that furthered this aim.

“Story” or “narrative” is also a document-crafting technique.

Flow from a beginning through a middle to a successful ending.

Most notably used in The Maritime Strategy (1980s).
“Strategy” & “Ethos”

- “Institutional ethos”
  - Term borrowed from organization theory
  - The largely informal rules of an organization:
    - Its history, cultural values, norms, taboos

- “Navy Ethos” (Nov 2008)
  - USN’s “distinguishing character, culture, guiding beliefs”
  - Short statement of values
  - CNO ADM Roughead directed, in CNOG 2007-8
  - Product of Navy-wide solicitation for inputs
  - Criticisms: Too long, not focused enough on combat
  - Not claimed as part of 2007-9 capstone document “trifecta”

“Strategy” & “Creed”

- Creed
  - A statement of belief – usually religious belief

  - An institutionally-developed personal statement

- I am a United States Sailor.
- I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States of America and I will obey the orders of those appointed over me.
- I represent the fighting spirit of the Navy and all who have gone before me to defend freedom and democracy around the world.
- I proudly serve my country’s Navy combat team with Honor, Courage and Commitment
- I am committed to excellence and the fair treatment of all.
“Strategy” & “Core Values Charter”

♦ Charter
  ♦ A written instrument, usually a grant, contract, or guarantee of rights

♦ Navy Core Values
  ♦ CNO ADM Kelso promulgated (Oct 1992)
    ♦ In the wake of “Tailhook 91” incident

♦ Department of the Navy Core Values Charter
  ♦ Signed by successive SECNAVs, CNOs, CMCs

A broad framework which outlines those key principles embodied in our Core Values of Honor, Courage, and Commitment... they shape our standards and define our priorities/ethos.

This study’s approach

♦ Does not further analyze debates on nature of strategy, concepts, vision, doctrine, story, etc.

♦ Lines between policy & strategy, strategy & operations, strategy & doctrine, etc. can be fuzzy

♦ This study acknowledges the issues involved, but does not focus on definitional rigor, to more clearly show context and sweep of US Navy thinking
A way to categorize US Navy capstone documents

Can/should the USN have a strategy?

♦ Yes. It’s the service’s responsibility to:
  ♦ Describe & amplify on global maritime aspects of national military strategy
  ♦ Recommend changes and professional judgments
  ♦ Organize, train & equip coherently, now and in future

♦ Others often don’t agree
  ♦ Joint Staff, combatant commander staffs
  ♦ Civilian & military defense specialists
  ♦ Believe services can have “visions,” “policies,” “doctrines,” etc., but not “strategies”
  ♦ “Strategy” = domain of joint staffs
Why strategies, concepts & visions? (I)

Samuel P. Huntington*
“National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy”
US Naval Institute Proceedings (May 1954)

*Age 27
Why strategies, concepts & visions? (III)

The fundamental element of a military service is its purpose or role in implementing national policy. The statement of this role may be called the strategic concept of the service."

If a military service does not possess such a concept, it becomes purposeless, it wallows about amid a variety of conflicting and confusing goals, and ultimately it suffers both physical and moral degradation.”

Samuel Huntington (1954)

Why strategies, concepts & visions? (IV)

If a service does not possess a well-defined strategic concept, the public and the political leaders will be confused as to the role of the service, uncertain as to the necessity of its existence, and apathetic or hostile to the claims made by the service upon the resource of society.

A military service capable of meeting one threat to the national security loses its reason for existence when that threat weakens or disappears. If the service is to continue to exist, it must develop a new strategic concept related to some other security threat.

Samuel Huntington (1954)
Why strategies, concepts & visions? (V)

- Two audiences:
  - “The public and the political leaders”
  - The “military service” itself

Samuel Huntington (1954)

The four functions of (grand) strategies

- A guide for the allocation of scarce resources
- Helps complex organizations coordinate their activities
- Communicate interests to others (potential adversaries, allies & friends)
- Permit criticism & correction; organize public discourse; allow for policy evaluation

—Barry R. Posen
“A Grand Strategy of Restraint”
in *Finding Our Way: Debating American Grand Strategy*
(June 2008)
Kinds of policies (and strategies)

- Declaratory policy/ strategy (our topic)
- Deployment strategy
- Planned employment strategy
- Actual employment strategy
- Acquisition strategy
- Personnel and training strategy

Issues:
- Which, if any, leads others?
- Alignment

Declaratory strategy/ policy

- Proclamations and official descriptions of US Navy policy and strategy announced by the US Navy leadership
- What the US Navy leadership wants others – inside and outside the Navy – to know and believe about the Navy’s policy intentions, as a component of the U.S. government
- Central vehicle: “Capstone documents”
Parallel tracks vice sequencing

It’s less like this...

Declaratory Strategy → Acquisition Strategy → Planned Employment Strategy → Actual Deployment & Employment Strategies

...And more like this...

Declaratory Strategy
Acquisition Strategy
Planned Employment Strategy
Actual Deployment & Employment Strategies

...with limited feedback

Strategy as a determinant of naval power

Strategy/policy/concepts/doctrine etc. is a determinant of national naval power, not the determinant

CAPT John Byron’s construct: Four determinants*
  ♦ Strategy
  ♦ Force structure
  ♦ Resource input
  ♦ Technology

Each drives & is driven by the other 3

*US Naval Institute Proceedings (Jan 1987)
Why start with 1970?

- Familiar. Spans living USN memory.
- An obvious, traceable trail of successive CNO involvement, commitment, & visibility begins.
- Not to say that there were no USN strategies/concepts/visions стратегические планы etc. before 1970.

200 years of USN “capstone documents” (I)

- 1775: Continental Congress resolutions (Oct-Nov 1775): Interdiction
- 1775-6: Continental Congress Naval Committee & Naval Commissioners orders: Interdiction
- 1777-83: Captain John Paul Jones correspondence
- 1798+: SECNAV Reports to the Congress
- 1800s: Adams, Hamilton, Jefferson & USN supporters writings
- 1812: Navy captains letters to SECNAV Hamilton
  - Especially Commodores Rodgers & Decatur
- 1821: Captain Elliot et al. in Fortifications (Bernard) Board report on coast defense
200 years of USN “capstone documents” (II)

- 1830s: Naval officer Naval Magazine articles
- □ 1851: USN officer reports to SECNAV on coast defense strategy
  - Esp. Dupont Report on National Defences
- ♦ 1861: CAPT Dupont & Blockade Board
- ♦ 1861-5: SECNAV Mallory (CSA): commerce-raiding & homeland defense
- ♦ 1870s: Admiral Porter: Commerce-raiding & homeland defense
- ♦ 1874+: US Naval Institute Proceedings articles

200 years of USN “capstone documents” (III)

- ♦ 1881-2: Admiral Rodgers et al., Naval Advisory Board reports
- ♦ 1885+: Naval War College lectures, papers, games
- ♦ 1889: SECNAV Tracy Report to the Congress
- ♦ 1890: Navy Dept. Report of the Policy Board
- ♦ 1890s+ Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan writings
  - ♦ Sea power through decisive battle fleet action
- ♦ 1890s-1930s: Color Plans
1900-50: General Board of the Navy
- Strategy & policy studies & memoranda
- *U.S. Naval Policy* (1922)

1900s:
- *War Plan Black* (vs. Germany)

1916:
- RADM Bradley A. Fiske, *The Navy as a Fighting Machine*
  - Forward fleet ops

1920s & 30s:
- *War Plan Orange* (vs. Japan)
- *F.T.P. 143, War Instructions, 1934*
- Army-Navy “Rainbow Plans” (1939-40)

1940s: World War II
- CNO ADM Harold Stark, “Plan Dog”
  - Germany first
- U.S. Pacific Fleet, *Pacific Fleet Tactical Orders & Doctrine* (PAC 1) (Jun 1943)
- U.S. Fleet, *Current Tactical Orders & Doctrine* (USF 10A) (Feb 1944)
- COMINCH ADM Ernest J. King, *F.T.P. 143(A) War Instructions, United States Navy, 1944* (Nov 1944)
  - Context:
    - Global offensive
    - Membership in new Joint Chiefs of Staff
Mid-late 1940s: Cold War & containment (I)

- At first:
  *People in the navy did not know very much about strategy . . . That’s why we did not have any organization to lay out the navy’s case or defend ourselves . . . We suffered from a lack of knowledge within the navy of what the navy was all about . . .”
  
  Reminiscences of Admiral Arleigh Burke

- Then emergence of a coherent global, offensive “transoceanic” strategy vs. Soviet Union
  - Quick response, protracted war, nuclear strikes, persistent combat-credible forward presence
  - Initial focus on Mediterranean theater, NATO ally support
    (1949)
  - Fleet balance: Shift from PAC to LANT

Mid-late 1940s: Cold War & containment (II)

- JCS PINCHER war plan vs. USSR (1946)
- SECONAV James Forrestal, Policy of the United States Navy (Jan 1947)
- DCNO (OPS) VADM Forrest Sherman, “Presentation to the President” (1947)
- CNO FADM Chester Nimitz, “The Future Employment of Naval Forces” (1947)
- CNO FADM Chester Nimitz, USF-1, Principles and Applications of Naval Warfare: United States Fleets
  (May 1947)
  * Capstone of new post-war USN United States Fleets doctrine & tactics pub series
- General Board of the Navy (CAPT Arleigh Burke), National Security and Navy Contributions Thereto Over the Next Ten Years (1948)
1950s: Continued Cold War
  - Naval strategy diffused
  - Soviet Union still the principal threat
  - Limited wars
  - “Finite” (or “minimum”) nuclear deterrence
  - Naval alliances & foreign military assistance
  - Regional presence
    - East Asia & Mediterranean focus
  - Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) focus
  - “Continental” (homeland) defense

Numerous naval technological transformations
  - Nuclear power & weapons, jet aircraft, helicopters, missiles, angled carrier decks, mirror landing systems, steam catapults, undersea surveillance systems, etc.

CNO ADM Robert Carney (1953-1955)
  - Significant USN strategic thinker & writer
  - Outlook profoundly shaped by World War II
    - Continuous Atlantic & Pacific theater operational experience
  - Wrote & published often: To US Navy officer corps
    - “Role of the Navy in a Future War,” Naval War College Review (Jun 1954)
    - “Always the Sea,” Proceedings (May 1955)
    - “Principles of Sea Power,” Proceedings (Sep 1955)
  - Chartered OPNAV Long-Range Objectives Group (OP-93)
CNO ADM Burke (1955-1961)

- Significant USN strategic thinker
- But no “capstone” documents
  - Exception: *Origins of United States Navy Doctrine* (Apr 1960) (pamphlet)
- OPNAV Long-Range Objectives Group (OP-93) did studies & annual *Long Range Objectives Statement*
- “Burke made no public or radical restatements of national or naval strategy or policy, nor did he require the staff of the CNO to produce one . . . he understood that creating real capability would do more for the service than articulating strategies that national policy was not ready to accommodate, and that the Navy was not yet ready to implement”.

CAPT/ Dr. David Alan Rosenberg (2010)

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**Naval Warfare: NWP 10 series (I)**

- NWP doctrinal & tactical pub series superseded USF series
- Evolving *NWP 10* series superseded *USF 1*
  - May 1954 *NWP 10*
    - Same date as Samuel P. Huntington, “National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy” article in US Naval Institute *Proceedings*
  - 1956-60 *NWP 10* (Changes 1-4)
  - Nov 1961 *NWP 10(A)*
  - Apr 1970 *NWP 10(B)*
Naval Warfare: NWP 10 series (II)

- Signed by RADM
  - ADCNO, Fleet Ops & Readiness
  - Roughly equivalent (in 2010) to N31
  - (Contrast w/ later CNO signatures on NWP 1 & NDP 1)

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Naval Warfare: NWP 10 series (III)

- Contents
  - Concepts of national power, national security, sea power
  - Control of the seas
  - Organization for US national security
  - DON organization
  - Types of naval operations
    - An ever-evolving list
    - 1970 edition included riverine warfare, domestic HA/DR
  - Regional security arrangements
  - Principles of War (through 1960)
Naval Warfare: NWP 10 series (IV)

- “The basic publication of the NWP series”
- “Presents the basic principles of sea power and naval warfare and the broad aspects of the naval operations which are generally necessary to conduct naval warfare”
- “An authoritative reference for experienced officers and a suitable text for . . . junior officers and midshipmen”

NWP 10 May 1954

- “A source for general information on the Navy as part of the national security establishment & on naval warfare”

NWP 10(B) Apr 1970

Naval Warfare: NWP 10 series (V)

- Types/aspects of naval operations
  - NWP 10 w/ changes (1960)
    - Striking force operations
    - Naval air operations
    - Amphibious operations
    - Submarine operations
    - Mining operations
    - Air defense operations
    - Anti-submarine operations
    - Mine countermeasures operations
    - Control & protection of shipping
    - Scouting operations
    - Base defense operations
    - Logistics operations
    - Support operations
    - Blockading operations
    - Search and rescue operations
  - NWP 10(B) (1970)
    - Strike force operations
    - Amphibious operations
    - Anti-air warfare
    - Anti-submarine warfare
    - Mining and mine countermeasures
    - Riverine operations
    - Support operations
    - Surveillance and blockading
    - Search and rescue
    - Domestic emergency operations
Naval Warfare: NWP 10 series (VI)

- **NWP 10(B):**
  - Emphasis on “control of the seas”
  - “Projection of power,” “deterrence” & “presence” mentioned only occasionally, in passing
  - Provided “domestic emergency operations” policy
    - No mention of foreign disasters or humanitarian assistance ops
  - “Blockade” discussed as a discreet & important naval operation

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1960s interlude (I)

- Focus more on PPBS than on drafting strategy
  - SECDEF McNamara management initiatives
  - OPNAV focus on **campaign analysis**
    - E.g.: CYCLOPS ASW I, II, III; *War at Sea I & II, ASWFLS*
- Focus more on current combat ops, regional contingencies, nuclear strategy, than on planning future global war vs. Soviets
  - Vietnam War ongoing: Strike & in-country COIN ops
  - Crises: East Europe, Middle East, Caribbean, Far East
  - Soviets achieving strategic nuclear weapons parity with US
  - US global naval preponderance; limited Soviet Navy threat
- Continued fleet focus on absorbing revolutionary systems & tactics developed & introduced in 1950s
1960s interlude (II)

♦ Compartmentalization & bifurcation of USN strategic thinking vs. Soviets
  ♦ Anti-Soviet SSBN warfare decoupled from other aspects of anti-Soviet naval warfare
  ♦ Anti-Soviet SSBN warfare discussed only at highest levels of classification, & within only a few USN communities (submarines, NAVFACs, intel, etc.)
  ♦ Reinforced USN fragmentation by “union” community
♦ CNOs: ADMs Anderson, McDonald, Moorer
  ♦ ADM Moorer went on to become CJCS
♦ Few flag officer strategy books, articles
♦ OPNAV Long-Range Objectives Group (OP-93) *Long Range Objectives Statements* superseded as internal Navy strategy & policy statements by OP-06 *Navy Strategic Study* (mid-1960s)

1960s interlude (III)

♦ But . . .
  ♦ OP-06 *Navy Strategic Studies* (TS) (from mid-1960s)
  ♦ A few CNO-signed US Naval Institute *Proceedings* articles
  ♦ NWP 10 *Naval Warfare* updates
♦ Strike, AAW, ASW, inshore warfare improvements
1960s: Some literature on the period

- CDR Linton Brooks, “An Examination of Professional Concerns of Naval Officers” *Naval War College Review* (Jan-Feb 1980)

1960s: Naval policy & strategy literature (I)

- Hanson Baldwin, *The New Navy* (1964)
- Analyses of World War II experience
1960s: Naval policy & strategy literature (II)

- Focus on bureaucratic politics, civil-military relations

Actual document texts: Sources (I)

- Can be found in a series of Naval War College Press “Newport Papers” (NP)
- Seeds planted by CNA work
- Naval War College Press editor Carnes Lord had vision & created the opportunity
- Naval War College professor & noted maritime historian Dr. John Hattendorf edited
Actual document texts: Sources (II)

- 3 volumes published to date
    - Co-edited with CAPT Peter M. Swartz USN (Ret)
- 4th volume forthcoming
  - *U.S. Naval Strategy in the First Decade of the Twenty-first Century* (2012?)

Actual document texts: Sources (III)

- *U.S. Naval Strategy in the First Decade of the Twenty-first Century* (forthcoming)
Analyses of 1990s, 2000s documents texts

♦ “The United States Navy Since President Ronald Reagan,”
  ♦ Kenneth Hagan & Michael T. McMaster
  ♦ In Sea Power: Challenges Old and New (Australia) (2007)
♦ US Navy Strategy and Force Structure After the Cold War
  ♦ Amund Lundesgaard
  ♦ Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies (2011)
  ♦ CAPT Peter Haynes USN
  ♦ Ph.D. dissertation, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey (2011)

Analyzing capstone documents: Issues

♦ Overall judgments
♦ Why weren’t they similar?
♦ What can they influence?
♦ Have they been “successful”? 
  ♦ How to measure “success”? 
    ♦ Measuring outputs & inputs
♦ Factors contributing to success
♦ Secondary consequences
♦ Reciprocal causality
♦ CNOs matter
  ♦ CNO goals
  ♦ Why no impact?
  ♦ Impediments to overcome
  ♦ Links to fleet operations
  ♦ Links to USN budget requests
  ♦ Who should do what?
  ♦ Why so many documents?
  ♦ Better analysis needed
Overall judgments

♦ USN has not lacked for capstone documents
  ♦ At least 25 over the full careers of current USN leadership
♦ They often matter
♦ They usually spawn further debate
♦ “Success” is hard to measure
♦ There is no consistent, agreed system, formula, format, or process for producing these documents, or the ideas in them.

Why weren’t they all similar?

Question:
♦ Why such a mix of strategies, vision, policies, doctrines, etc.?

Answer:
♦ Different eras & different problems require different kinds of documents
♦ Different CNOs have different needs
♦ US Navy generally indifferent to nomenclature issues
What can they potentially influence?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What can they potentially influence?</th>
<th>U.S. Navy</th>
<th>Inside U.S. government</th>
<th>Adversaries</th>
<th>Allies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy &amp; Grand Strategy</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Employment Strategy
  (OPS & Training)                   | ✓         | ✓                     | ✓           | ✓      |
| Acquisition Strategy               | ✓         | ✓                     | ✓           | ✓      |
| Morale, confidence, unity of effort | ✓         | ✓                     | ✓           | ✓      |
**What can they potentially influence? DOTMLPF**

- **Doctrine**
- **Organization**
- **Training**
- **Material**
- **Leadership & education**
- **Personnel**
- **Facilities**
  - Developed for analyzing operational deficiencies
  - Acronym gained currency within DOD in 2000s
  - Capstone documents can help ensure consistency

**What did they help influence? DOTMLPF**

- **Helped influence**
  - *Project SIXTY*
  - *Missions of the Navy*
  - *Sea Plan 2000*
  - *The Maritime Strategy*
  - *...From the Sea*
  - *NDP 1: Naval Warfare*
  - *Forward...From the Sea*
  - *Seapower 21*
  - *Fleet Response Plan*
  - *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*

- **DOTMLPF re:**
  - Sea control
  - Forward presence
  - Power projection
  - Forward operations
  - Joint littoral projection
  - Navy-Marine Corps team
  - Forward presence
  - Sea Shield, FORCEnet
  - Readiness to surge
  - Maritime Security Ops
  - Humanitarian Assistance
  - International engagement
What can capstone documents do?

- If “successful”, they can:
  - Create or contribute to a “general climate of opinion” re: present & future purposes, uses, & forces of the Navy
    - Borrows from Dr. Warner R. Schilling’s analysis of the role of Congressional oversight
  - Build or reinforce consensus & unity within the Navy
  - Avoid (to paraphrase Dr. Samuel Huntington):
    - Confusion by the American public and its political leaders as to the Navy’s role
    - Uncertainty as to the necessity of the Navy’s existence
    - Apathy or hostility to the Navy’s claims upon the resources of society

Have the documents been “successful”?
Have the documents been “Successful?”

- How to measure?
- What factors made for success?
- Issues:
  - Measuring outputs: Very difficult
  - Measuring inputs: Easier
  - Secondary effects of documents
  - The problem of reciprocal causality

Measuring outputs

- What is “success”? 
- How do you measure it?
- Two models
  - Barry Posen: Four functions of grand strategies
  - Raphael Cohen: Three metrics to observe doctrine’s effects
Four functions of (grand) strategies

1. A guide for the allocation of scarce resources
2. Helps complex organizations coordinate their activities
3. Communicate interests to others (potential adversaries, allies & friends)
4. Permit criticism & correction; organize public discourse; allow for policy evaluation

—Barry R. Posen

“A Grand Strategy of Restraint”
in *Finding Our Way: Debating American Grand Strategy*
(Jun 2008)

Three metrics to observe doctrine’s effect

1. Who reads it?
   ◆ Target audience?
   ◆ Others?
2. Who quotes it?
   ◆ How often?
   ◆ What forum?
3. Does it substantially change anything?
   ◆ Hard to determine causality
   ◆ Difficulty of quantifying relationships
   ◆ What and how to measure?
   ◆ Competing causal explanations of outcomes
   ◆ Anecdotal reflections

—Raphael Cohen

“A Tale of Two Manuals”
*Prism* (Dec 2010)
Outputs: How measure “Success?” (I)

- Effect on joint, DOD, national security, & allied policy & strategy
- Retain/regain/enhance USN freedom to shape its own destiny
- Have desired effect on the adversary/adversaries
- Become central message & *lingua franca* of USN policy- and decision-makers & their staffs
  - Resource for OPNAV documents, flag officer speeches & testimony
  - Real influence or “lip service”?

Outputs: How measure “Success?” (II)

- Influence USN programmatic decisions
  - Usually stated as a goal; rarely achieved
  - Legacy programs, OSD guidance, technology push are primary program drivers
  - Hard for Navy strategy/concepts/policy/doctrine to compete as influence
  - Hard to discern cause and effect due to complexity of intervening layers of processes
  - But, NSPGs & *Navy Strategic Plan* attempt(ed) to measure
Outputs: How measure “Success?” (III)

- Increase integration of USN platforms, systems & communities
- Influence fleet operations, exercises, war games, training & analyses
- Stimulate internal USN conceptual & strategic thinking & debate
- Better USN reputation for intellectual thought
  - Within DOD & externally

Outputs: How measure “Success?” (IV)

- Effect on subsequent documents
  - Mostly positive in the past
  - But some negative reactions
    - Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy vs. Project SIXTY
Caveat

“In the other services, when you make a policy decision, the debate stops. In the Navy, when you make a policy decision, the debate starts”

ADM Stanley R. Arthur
VCNO (1992-95)

Measuring inputs

♦ Four naval experts re: Alignment is “success”
♦ Government Accountability Office (GAO)
  ♦ Identified 6 major characteristics of a strategy
  ♦ Identified 27 element of those characteristics
♦ Library of Congress Congressional Research Service (CRS)
  ♦ Identified 9 considerations in evaluating strategies
♦ Harvard University Olin Institute
  ♦ Identified 7 lessons from case studies
♦ CNA research, workshops, interviews, & other solicited expert inputs
  ♦ Factors contributing to “success”
  ♦ Checklist
Contrasting views

- George Baer & Joe Bouchard: Alignment with national policy
- Roger Barnett & Sam Bateman: Alignment with Navy strategic culture
- Sam Bateman: Convincing to politician appropriators, Persuasive to friends & allies & credibly threatening to potential adversaries

Is such “success” a sufficient criterion?
- Should USN have not written documents in 1970s?
- How can documents shape the future if they are tied to current culture?
- How can this “success” be measured?

GAO: Desirable characteristics of a strategy

- U.S. Congress’s General Accounting Office (GAO) has developed & used a set of desirable characteristics for national strategies (2004)
- Consulted public & private sector sources
- 1st published & used in: Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism (GAO-04-408T) (Feb 2004)
- Subsequently used in:
  - Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Needs a Risk-Based Approach to Enhance Its Maritime Domain Awareness (GAO-11-621) (Jun 2011)
I. Purpose, scope & methodology

II. Problems, risks & threats

III. Goals, objectives, activities & performance measures

IV. Resources, investments & risk management

V. Organizational roles, responsibilities, & coordination mechanism

VI. Integration among & with other entities

In other words...

I. Why was it produced? What’s the scope of its coverage? What’s the process by which it was developed?

II. What problems & threats is it directed toward?

III. What’s it trying to achieve? What steps will achieve those results? What priorities, milestones, and performance measures gauge results?
GAO: 6 desirable characteristics of a strategy

IV. What’ll it cost? What are the sources & types of resources & investments needed? Where should resources & investments be targeted by balancing risk reductions & costs?

V. Who will be implementing the strategy? What’ll their roles be compared to others? What mechanisms coordinate their efforts?

VI. How does the strategy relate to other strategies’ goals, objectives & activities? To subordinate levels and their plans to implement the strategy?

GAO: The 27 elements of a strategy (I)

I. Purpose, scope & methodology
   1. Identify the impetus that led to the strategy being written
   2. Discuss the strategy’s purpose
   3. Define or discuss key terms, major functions, mission areas or activities
   4. Discuss the process that produced the strategy
   5. Discuss the assumptions or principles & theories that guided the strategy’s development
II. Problems, risks & threats
   6. Discuss or define the problems the strategy intends to address
   7. Discuss the causes of the problems
   8. Discuss the operating environment
   9. Discuss the threats at which the strategy is directed
   10. Discuss quality of data available, e.g.: constraints, deficiencies, unknowns

III. Goals, objectives, activities, & performance measures
   11. Address overall results desired, “end state”
   12. Identify strategic goals & subordinate objectives
   13. Identify specific activities to achieve results
   14. Address priorities, milestones, & outcome-related performance measures
   15. Identify process to monitor & report on progress
   16. Identify limitations on progress indicators
IV. Resources, investments & risk management

17. Identify what the strategy will cost
18. Identify the sources & types of resources or investments needed
19. Address where resources or investments should be targeted to balance risks & costs
20. Address resource allocation mechanisms
21. Identify risk management principles and how they help implementers prioritize & allocate resources

V. Organization roles, responsibilities, & coordination mechanism

22. Address who will implement the strategy
23. Address lead, support and partner roles & responsibilities of specific organizations
24. Address mechanisms and/or processes for parties to coordinate efforts
25. Identify processes for resolving conflicts
VI. Integration among & with other entities

26. Address how the strategy relates to strategies of other organizations, horizontally
27. Address integration with relevant documents from higher authority & subordinate organizations, vertically

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CRS: Considerations for evaluating strategies

- U.S. Congress’s Library of Congress Congressional Research Service (CRS) has developed & used a set of considerations for evaluating strategies (2008)

- Published & used in
  - CRS Report for Congress: National Security Strategy: Legislative Mandates, Execution to Date, and Considerations for Congress (May 7, 2008; updated Jul 28, Sep 23, Dec 15)
1. Frequency
   ♦ How often should strategies be changed and updated?

2. Synchronization of timelines
   ♦ Are superior & subordinate strategies issued in a logical sequence?

3. Clear relationships among strategic documents
   ♦ Are types of strategy documents sufficiently different from each other to warrant separate publication?
4. Prioritization
   ◆ Are objectives and missions prioritized?

5. Roles & responsibilities
   ◆ Do strategy documents assign responsibilities for carrying out missions?

6. Fiscal constraints
   ◆ Has the strategy been fiscally constrained?

7. Competition of ideas
   ◆ Was the strategy created through a competition of ideas?
   ◆ Is an alternative document also being published to provide a competitive mechanism, once the strategy is published?

8. Intended audience
   ◆ Who is the intended audience?
   ◆ Has the strategy been classified appropriately for its audience?

9. Timeframe
   ◆ Does the strategy address the current situation or the future?
2 conferences held on uncertainties in military & strategic planning

11 historical case studies examined

- Included Andrew Krepinevich, “Transforming to Victory: The U.S. Navy, Carrier Aviation, and Preparing for War in the Pacific”

Derived 7 Lessons Learned


Seek multiple viewpoints as inputs: Civilian & military, domestic & foreign

Balance both short-term & long-term perspectives & desired effects in planning

Hedge your bets: Balance your forces & your R & D

Be flexible in identifying friends & foes

Prepare effectively for allied planning & operations

One dominant power can make for more effective alliance planning, but resentments must be managed

Be adaptable: Avoid rigid plans, unrealistic goals, & undesirable side effects. Reconsider assumptions.
CNA: Factors contributing to “Success” (I)

♦ From CNA research, workshops, interviews:
  ♦ No competing USN “capstone documents”
    ♦ One capstone document at a time
  ♦ CLAS & UNCLAS versions
  ♦ Satisfy a real need by OPNAV, fleet & nation
  ♦ Show how all NCCs & fleet commanders fit
  ♦ Time release of the document for maximum impact
  ♦ Tie to national policy & joint & coalition strategy, explicitly & implicitly

CNA: Factors contributing to “Success” (II)

♦ From CNA research, workshops, interviews:
  ♦ Acknowledge joint, sister service & allied relationships
  ♦ Push or real buy-in by the CNO. CNO signs
  ♦ Continuity across CNO terms
  ♦ Real buy-in by cross-section of senior OPNAV & Fleet flags
    ♦ One or two champions not enough
  ♦ USMC buy-in
  ♦ Simplicity & power of title, core elements, structure
    ♦ Reduce central message to a few simple concepts
From CNA research, workshops, interviews:

- Plan dissemination; seize all distribution opportunities
- Start with a briefing, then wide multi-media distribution
- Relate to Navy as a whole, not just a collection of individual communities, but ensure all important communities are addressed to ensure buy-in
- Ensure threat characterizations are supported by Intel community & administration
- Build on what came before OR lead/reflect changes

Use plain English

- What the Fleet, the Congress, the public, allies, & adversaries understand

Involve all USN intellectual institutions in some fashion:

- OPNAV, CEP, ONI, SSG, NWC academics & War Gaming Center, NPS, NWDC, US Naval Institute, CNA, etc.,
- Especially Naval War College:
  - For substance & for cachet

Choose specialists as drafters

Allocate sufficient manpower & dollar resources
From CNA research, workshops, interviews:

- Tough internal criticism, discussion, debate, at AO & flag levels
  - Know how to handle attacks
  - Incorporate valid ideas
  - Stick to your guns
- Consider effects on adversaries

Secondary Consequences (I)

- Influence on other services
  - USN routinely briefs to other service colleges
- Often strong influence on allied & coalition naval thinking
  - Affects their support for USN
  - Affects how they present themselves to their own parliaments, ministries of defense
  - USN routinely briefs strategies & concepts at ISS, Navy talks, etc.
Secondary Consequences (II)

- Influence on civilian national security specialists & academia
  - Reflected in education of next generation of policy wonks (including USN officers in graduate education)
- Influence on adversaries
- Influence on contractors
- Open debate on US naval policy and strategy

Problem: Disentangling “reciprocal causality”

USN Declaratory Strategies can influence
BUT...
- DoD strategies
- Operations
- Organization
- Technology
- Force posture
- Perceptions of others

USN Declaratory Strategies can influence

- DoD strategies
- Operations
- Organization
- Technology
- Force posture
- Perceptions of others
Reciprocal causality: Strategies & force goals (I)

Do capstone documents drive or justify force goals?

♦ Classic “chicken and-egg” issue

♦ On surface, they seem to justify them, ex post facto

♦ Force goal announcements often precede publication of capstone documents
  ♦ “600-ship Navy” goal preceded Maritime Strategy publication
  ♦ 451-ship DOD “Base Force” goal preceded The Way Ahead & . . . From the Sea
  ♦ 346-ship “Bottom-Up Review” goal preceded Forward . . . From the Sea
  ♦ 313-ship CNO goal preceded A Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century

Reciprocal causality: Strategies & force goals (II)

♦ Truth is more complicated

♦ Same ideas & concepts often drive both force level goal decisions & capstone document contents

♦ Force levels & capstone documents are developed at different paces
  ♦ Force level goal decisions are often driven by tight deadlines mandated by external authorities
  ♦ Capstone documents normally originate from internal USN tasking.
    ♦ Deadlines can & do slip
    ♦ Need for internal USN inclusiveness lengthens capstone document development processes

♦ Some capstone documents try to drive the next round of force level goal development
  ♦ . . . From the Sea preceded “Bottom Up Review” (BUR) (1993)
  ♦ A Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century preceded “QDR 2009”
CNOs usually matter . . . A lot

- CNO has 2 main roles
  - Provide professional naval advice to President, SECDEF, CJCS, SECNAV, other chiefs
  - Craft Navy program & budget recommendations
- Timing & nature of CNO capstone document involvement is a vital contributor to success
- Each CNO has taken a different approach

SECNAVs sometimes matter

- Examples
  - Claytor & Sea Plan 2000
  - Lehman & The Maritime Strategy
  - O’Keefe & …From the Sea
  - Dalton & Forward…From the Sea
  - Danzig abortive initiatives
  - England & Naval Power 21
  - Winter speech at ISS 2007
Goals of a CNO capstone document (I)

- Internal to the Navy
  - Show linkages among current initiatives
  - Lend coherence to USN force structure
  - Build internal USN consensus, cohesion & esprit
  - Integrate internal USN communities
  - Focus exercise, war gaming, experimental, education, training efforts

Goals of a CNO capstone document (II)

- External to the Navy
  - Demonstrate that USN leadership is:
    - Thoughtful
    - Consistent with national & joint policy
    - In step with or ahead of the times
    - Highly trustworthy tool of national policy
    - Has a compelling rationale for its desired new procurements
    - Unified
  - Give sister & allied services a sense of how best to partner with USN
  - Contribute to deterrence and perception management of potential adversaries
  - Shape and leverage national security policy documents
Why don’t documents have more impact? (I)

Three alternative hypotheses presented

1. Does not matter for the current fight
2. It is all about timing and politics
3. Bureaucratic culture
   - His own preference as an explanation

“More guidance is not always more value added”

--Raphael Cohen
“A Tale of Two Manuals”
Prism (Dec 2010)

Why don’t documents have more impact? (II)

Hypothesis #1: Does not matter for the current fight
- Tends to be “one war behind”
- And even when it serves to document & institutionalize changes that have already been made (combating institutional memory loss), it may well not be heeded either

Hypothesis #2: It is all about timing and politics
- Needs supportive leaders
- Requires a “pressing need,” e.g.: linkage to world events & operations
Why don’t documents have more impact? (III)

Hypothesis #3: How accepting is the bureaucratic culture?

- Organization’s cultural attitudes toward doctrine (and other forms of capstone thinking)
  - Are they routinely considered “roadmaps” or simply “background information” and “just another resource”?
- But they can help outsiders understand the organization better
- Inter-agency products reflect brokered consensus compromises, & don’t ensure equal acceptance across all signatories.

Impediments to overcome (I)

- Opposition on substantive grounds: “Wrong strategy” or “Wrong vision”
- Other influences drive force structure decisions beside USN strategies or visions
- Warfare/platform communities retain power
- Administration changes
- Next USN strategy/concept follows too soon
- Low relevance to actual fleet ops
- Navy leadership changes
Impediments to overcome (II)

- Joint system opposed to “service strategies”
- Lack of USN appreciation of influence of these documents
- USN officer focus often tactical vice strategic
- USN “wariness of doctrine”
- Internal USN “turf” issues
- Fear of debate and discussion
- Navy-Marine Corps issues

Impediment to overcome (III)

- “Practically the entire OPNAV organization is tuned, like a tuning fork, to the vibrations of the budgetary process… {T}here is a vast preoccupation with budgetary matters at the expense of considering planning, or readiness or requirements, or operational characteristics or any of the other elements contributing to the ability of the Fleets to fight.”

—OP-03G (Fleet Ops) memo
To OP-090 (Program Planning)
(Sep 1970)
Impediment to overcome (IV)

“I felt that no office in the Navy Staff could effectively draft any sort of NOC – whether Navy or naval – because CNO’s Title 10 responsibilities always got in the way. In other words, every document produced by the Navy Staff had to support the Navy’s programming and budget message, which in effect meant justifying on-going programs. That had the effect of stifling conceptual innovation . . . “front end” innovation like developing the NOC should be at the Naval War College, not the Navy Staff.”

—CAPT (Ret) Joe Bouchard
OPNAV N513 (1995-7)
(Mar 2006 e-mail)

But . . . USN views CNO & OPNAV as more authoritative than NAVWARCOL; & certainly more that NAVDOCCOM or NWDC

Sporadic fleet demand for/ influence on documents

Some important exceptions:
- 7th Fleet post-Vietnam/PRC experience led to Hayward Future of U.S. Seapower
- Submarine force, numbered fleet ops & exercises influenced The Maritime Strategy
  - In turn, The Maritime Strategy influenced fleet deployments
- DESERT STORM experience influenced …From the Sea, NDP 1
- OEF and OIF surge experience influenced Fleet Response Plan
  - In turn, Fleet Response Plan altered fleet deployment strategy
- But…all “Washington” documents have been initiated & drafted by recent (& future) fleet sailors & operators
Why so few links to the fleet?

- Fleet operations are directed by SECDEF, CJCS, CINC/CDDR & their staffs
- **Not** directed by SECNAV or CNO or OPNAV
- SECNAV, CNO & OPNAV are focused on Navy programs, budgets, acquisition, relations with USMC, & fostering Navy institutional unity
  - Documents usually reflect this focus
- Navy POM processes – unlike those of other services – are mostly conducted within OPNAV
  - To the extent that capstone documents are seen as part of the POM process, their drafting reflects this

Links to USN budget requests

- **Issues:**
  - To link explicitly or not
  - One document or a family documents
  - Presentations to Capital Hill
    - The SECNAV Lehman “tripartite” message
    - Stand-alone strategy presentations
Who should do what re: USN strategy?

- CNO?
- OPNAV N3/N5?
- CNO special assistants?
- USFF?
- Navy component commanders (NCCs)?
- Naval War College?
- Navy Warfare Development Command?
- Contractors?
- U.S. Naval Institute?

Why so many documents?

DILBERT: (c) Scott Adams/Dist. by United Feature Syndicate, Inc.
Why so many documents? (I)

- Conditions change
- National policies & strategies change
- Personalities change
- It was ever thus:
  - *War Plan Orange*
    - 27 versions in 36 years

Why so many documents? (II)

- Conditions change
  - Ending of the Vietnam War
  - Iran Revolution & Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
  - Gorbachev regime in USSR
  - End of the Cold War
  - Tiananmen Square incident
  - Desert Storm victory
  - Taiwan Straits crisis
  - USS Cole (DDG-67) terrorist attack
  - Al Qaeda attacks on America
  - Extension of the wars in Afghanistan & Iraq
  - Economic conditions change
Why so many documents? (III)

- National policies & strategies change
  - 8 Presidential administrations
  - Numerous Presidential directives & “doctrines”
  - Numerous treaties & changes in US public law
  - 14 National Security Strategies (since 1987)
  - 4 roles and missions reviews (since 1989)
  - 5 National Military Strategies (since 1992)
  - 2 announced Nuclear Posture Reviews (since 1994)
  - 2 National Defense Strategies (since 2005)
  - 3 Quadrennial Defense Reviews (since 1997)
  - Numerous PPBS guidance & other DOD directives
  - Numerous JSPS documents & joint doctrine pubs
  - Other defense reviews

Why so many documents? (IV)

- Personalities change
  - 8 U.S. Presidents
  - 13 Secretaries of Defense
  - 11 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
  - 15 Secretaries of the Navy
  - 11 Chiefs of Naval Operations
  - 20+ DCNOs for Plans, Policy & Operations (OP-06/N3/N5)
  - 30+ Directors, Strategy, Plans & Policy (OP-60/N51/N5SP)
  - 35+ Strategy branch heads (OP-605C/603/N513/5SC)
  - 100+ Other thoughtful, activist OPNAV VCNOs, Special Assistants, DCOSs, ACOSs, Division Directors, Branch Heads, Deputies, Action Officers, Contractors
  - 17 Naval War College Presidents; 100s of professors
  - NAVDOCCOM & NWDC commanders & staff officers
Better analysis needed: I. Assessment

- This was a merely an introduction to assessment issues
- More rigorous analyses could prove helpful
- E.g., assess influence & impact of each on:
  - USN ops, plans, training recommendations & decisions
    - By the President, SECDEF, CJCS, CDRs
    - By USN commanders
  - USN force structure recommendations & decisions
    - By the Congress, President, SECDEF, OSD
    - By OPNAV
- One updated document (‘80s) vs. several (‘90s)
  - Which is more effective approach?
  - Don’t the times drive this?

Better analysis needed: II. MOEs

- How to measure success?
  - Budget share?
  - Operational effectiveness?
  - Acquisition-operations alignment?
  - Favorable press reports?
  - Preservation of autonomy?
  - Richness of the debate?
  - Other?
Better analysis needed: III. Processes

- Need to flesh out each case study
- Discuss strategic planning processes
- Disentangle causes and effects

Better analysis needed: IV. Expansion

- Go farther back in time
- Trace USMC experience
- Trace USA, USAF, USCG, joint experiences
- Trace foreign experiences
Appendices

- Presidents
- National security directives
- National security strategies
- Secretaries of Defense
- National defense strategies
- Defense reviews
- Nuclear posture reviews
- Functions papers
- Chairmen of the JCS
- National military strategies
- Joint visions
- Capstone joint doctrine pubs
- Roles and missions reports
- Secretaries of the Navy
- Chiefs of Naval Operations
- Plans, Policy & Operations DCNOs
- OPNAV Strategy & Policy Directors
- OPNAV Strategy Branch heads
- Contributors to this effort

Presidents & national security directives (I)

- Nixon/Ford administrations (1969-74, 1974-77)
  - National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMs)
  - National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs)
- Carter administration (1977-81)
  - Presidential Review Memoranda (PRMs)
  - Presidential Directives (PDs)
- Reagan administration (1981-9)
  - National Security Study Directives (NSSDs)
  - National Security Decision Directives (NSDDs)
- G. H. W. Bush administration (1989-93)
  - National Security Reviews (NSRs)
  - National Security Directives (NSD)
Presidents & national security directives (II)

- Clinton administration (1993-2001)
  - Presidential Review Directives (PRDs)
  - Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs)
- G.W. Bush administration (2001-09)
  - National Security Presidential Directives (NSPDs)
- Obama administration (2009-)
  - Presidential Study Directives (PSDs)
  - Presidential Policy Directives (PPDs)

National Security Strategies (NSSs) (I)

- President Ronald Reagan (1981-9)
  - National Security Strategy of the United States (Jan 1987)
  - National Security Strategy of the United States (Jan 1988)
- President George H.W. Bush (1989-93)
  - National Security Strategy of the United States (Mar 1990)
  - National Security Strategy of the United States (Jan 1993)
National Security Strategies (NSSs) (II)

- President William Clinton (1993-2001)
  - A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Jul 1994)
  - A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Feb 1995)
  - A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Feb 1996)
  - A National Security Strategy for a New Century (May 1997)
  - A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Dec 1999)
  - A National Security Strategy for a Global Age (Dec 2000)

National Security Strategies (NSSs) (III)

- President George W. Bush (2001-9)
  - The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Sep 2002)
  - The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Mar 2006)

- President Barack Obama (2009-)
  - National Security Strategy (May 2010)
Secretaries of Defense

- 1969 Melvin Laird (R)
- 1973 Elliot Richardson (R)
- 1973 James Schlesinger (R)
- 1975 Donald Rumsfeld (R)
- 1977 Harold Brown (D)
- 1981 Caspar Weinberger (R)
- 1987 Frank Carlucci (R)
- 1989 Richard Cheney (R)
- 1993 Leslie Aspin (D)
- 1994 William Perry (D)
- 1997 William Cohen (D)
- 2001 Donald Rumsfeld (R)
- 2006 Robert Gates (R/D) (to 2011)

National Defense Strategies

- SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld (2001-6)
Defense reviews

- Bush/Cheney/Powell
  - “Base Force” review (1990)
- Clinton/Aspin
- Clinton/Cohen
- Bush/Rumsfeld
  - Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) (Sep 2001)
- Obama/Gates
  - Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) (Feb 2010)

Nuclear posture reviews & policies (I)

- Nixon/Ford/Schlesinger
- Carter/Brown
- Reagan/Weinberger
- G.H.W. Bush/Cheney
  - Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNI) (Sep 1991)
Nuclear posture reviews & policies (II)

- Clinton/Perry
  - *Nuclear Posture Review* (Sep 1994)
- GW Bush/Rumsfeld
  - *Nuclear Posture Review* (Dec 2001)
- Obama/Gates

DOD DIRs 5100.1 ("Functions papers")

- SECDEF McElroy, *Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff* (Dec 1958)
- SECDEF Weinberger, *Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components* (Sep 1987)
Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

- 1970 ADM Thomas Moorer USN
- 1974 Gen George Brown USAF
- 1978 Gen David Jones USAF
- 1982 GEN John Vessey USA
- 1985 ADM William Crowe USN
- 1989 GEN Colin Powell USA
- 1993 GEN John Shalikashvili USA
- 1997 GEN Hugh Shelton USA
- 2001 Gen Richard Myers USAF
- 2005 Gen Peter Pace USMC
- 2007 ADM Michael Mullen USN (to 2011)

National Military Strategies

- ADM William Crowe USN (1985-9)
- GEN Colin Powell USA (1989-93)
  - National Military Strategy of the United States (Jan 1992)
- GEN John Shalikashvili USA (1993-97)
- GEN Hugh Shelton USA (1997-2001)
- Gen Richard Myers USAF (2001-5)
- Gen Peter Pace USMC (2005-7)
- ADM Michael Mullen USN (2007-11)
**Joint visions**

- GEN John Shalikashvili USA (1993-7)
  - Joint Vision 2010 (Jul 1996)
- GEN Hugh Shelton USA (1997-2001)
  - Joint Vision 2020 (Jun 2000)
- Gen Myers USAF (2001-5)
  - Joint Operating Concepts (Nov 2003)
- Gen Peter Pace USMC (2005-7)
- ADM Michael Mullen USN (2007-11)
  - Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, Version 3.0 (CCJO) (Jan 2009)

**Capstone Joint Doctrine Pubs**

- GEN Colin Powell USA (1989-93)
  - Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces: “Joint Warfare is Team Warfare” (Nov 1991)
- GEN John Shalikashvili (1993-7)
  - Joint Pub 1: Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States (Jan 1995)
- GEN Hugh Shelton (1997-2001)
  - Joint Publication 1: Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States (Nov 2000)
- Gen Richard Myers USAF (2001-5)
- Gen Peter Pace USMC (2005-7)
  - Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (May 2007)
- ADM Michael Mullen USN (2007-11)
  - Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (May 2007) (Ch 1 Mar 2009)
Roles & missions reports

- CJCS ADM William Crowe USN
  - *Roles and Functions of the Armed Forces: A Report to the Secretary of Defense* (Sep 1989)

- CJCS GEN Colin Powell USN
  - *Report on the Roles, Missions and Functions of the Armed Forces* (Feb 1993)

- Commission on the Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (CORM)
  - *Directions for Defense* (May 1995)

- SECDEF Robert Gates
  - *Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report* (Jan 2009)

Secretaries of the Navy (1969-2009)

- Jan 1969  John Chaffee
- May 1972  John Warner
- Apr 1974  J. W. Middendorf
- Feb 1977  Graham Claytor
- Oct 1979  Edward Hidalgo
- Feb 1981  John Lehman
- May 1987  James Webb
- Mar 1988  William Ball
- May 1989  H. L. Garrett
- Jun 1992  Daniel Howard (a)
- Oct 1992  Sean O’Keefe
- Jan 1993 ADM Frank Kelso (a)
- Jul 1993  John Dalton
- Nov 1998  Richard Danzig
- Jan 2001 Robin Pirie (a)
- May 2001  Gordon England
- Jan 2003 Susan Livingstone (a)
- Feb 2003 H.T. Johnson (a)
- Oct 2003 Gordon England
- Dec 2005 Dionel Aviles (a)
- Jan 2006  Donald Winter
- Mar 2006 B.J. Penn (a)
- Jun 2009  Ray Mabus
 Chiefs of Naval Operations (1970-2010)

- Jul 1970    ADM Elmo Zumwalt
- Jun 1974    ADM James Holloway
- Jul 1978    ADM Thomas Hayward
- Jun 1982    ADM James Watkins
- Jul 1986    ADM Carlisle Trost
- Jun 1990    ADM Frank Kelso
- Apr 1994    ADM Jeremy M. Boorda
- May 1996    ADM Jay Johnson
- Jul 2000    ADM Vern Clark
- Jul 2005    ADM Michael Mullen
- Sep 2007    ADM Gary Roughead (to 2011)

OPNAV DCNOs for Operations, Plans & Strategy

- 1971 VADM Frank Vannoy*
- 1973 VADM George Talley*
- 1975 VADM Joseph Moorer**
- 1977 VADM William Crowe**
- 1980 VADM Sylvester Foley**
- 1982 VADM Arthur Moreau**
- 1983 VADM James A. Lyons, Jr.**
- 1985 VADM Donald Jones**
- 1986 VADM Henry Mustin**
- 1988 VADM Charles Larson**
- 1990 VADM Robert Kelly**
- 1991 VADM Leighton Smith**
- 1994 VADM Paul Reason**
- 1996 VADM James Ellis**
- 1998 VADM Thomas Fargo**
- 1999 VADM Robert Natter**
- 2000 VADM Timothy Keating**
- 2002 VADM Kevin Green**
- 2004 VADM John Morgan***
- 2008 VADM Douglas Crowder
- 2009 VADM Bruce Clingan

Black = OP-06  Blue = N3/NS
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CNA studies on U.S. Navy strategies and their context


