Comprehensive Civil Information Management: How To Provide It

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COMPREHENSIVE CIVIL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT: HOW TO PROVIDE IT

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ABSTRACT

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This is an inversion of industrial war, where the objective was to...break the enemy’s will. In war amongst the people the strategic objective is to capture the will of the people….

—Rupert Smith

In a recent article, Major General Michael T. Flynn and others argue the U.S. intelligence community is failing the nation’s real information needs as a result of an adversary fixation and near exclusive reliance on classified sources. They challenged the intelligence community to reform itself by orienting on a new strategic objective: resolving the frustration currently experienced by policy makers, strategic decision makers, and tactical leaders in getting the information they need to be successful in a 21st century environment. The article recommends multiple reforms within the intelligence community centering on developing and sharing of unclassified information vertically, horizontally, and across domains to include civil society such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and others. Many of the proposed reforms would occur within the intelligence community and service U.S. government customers from the “strategic squad” through the President. Another key reform recommended establishing Stability Operations Intelligence Centers (SOICs), focused on sharing information with PRTs, NGO’s, private citizens, and the military’s Fusion Centers at various levels. The SOICs would co-exist as equals with the Fusion Centers focused on the traditional “red” enemy forces. However, solutions like the separate SOICs are not sufficient, they just add to the constellation of existing “…isolated, uncoordinated, unmonitored, and undisciplined pockets of excellence.” What is really required in the 21st century security environment is a tiered world-wide comprehensive civil information
management system in order to understand the complexity of the 21st century environments in which we must fight and win our nation’s wars.

A Changed World

“Globalization” represents an interconnected world. These interconnections both represent and affect U.S. interests and make the security environment much more complex. Currently, the United States has four overarching interests: security of U.S. citizens, allies, and partners; a strong U.S. economy in open international markets and global commons; respect for human security; and a stable international order. For example, it is a globalized economy whether finding investors for a new business, providing goods to new customers, or finding better sources of material and labor for manufacturing. There are security repercussions for the United States in a globalized economy. It requires open access to the global commons of sea and air in which goods and services travel and open markets and stability in the international order. Continued American economic prosperity depends upon a secure global commons, free trade, and stability. However, while current defense priorities focus on protecting these overarching interests, it must be done with a lower level of defense spending. Reducing the national deficit is also in the United States’ national interest. In this cost-savings environment, new and better ways must be found to protect and promote U.S. interests. Any such way must account for a more interconnected and complex environment and promote efficacy so that costs are more acceptable.

Globalization has also empowered civil society. In part this is the result of the advancement of ideals such as rule of law and human security, both representing fundamental values promoted by the United States. But the systems associated with globalization—information, transportation, communications, and economics—are also
instrumental. Nongovernmental groups and individuals—nonstate actors—have more ways of exercising power and choose to do so in the 21st century. In many ways they are more adept at using these systems and the global commons to advance their interests than many states. Terrorists and transnational criminals are negative examples of this empowerment. Multinational corporations are a business example. There are also a wide range of transnational religious, humanitarian, social, and professional organizations that function as NGOs in the international arena. Individuals obtain their power through the appeal of their purposes and use of the global systems and commons. Power is inherent in the interconnectedness of globalization.

Viewing interconnectedness as a spider web is one way of understanding how interconnectedness works in regard to civic society power. “Pulling on a strand” produces a harmonic effect, usually muted by the weight of the web. However, strength comes from multiple individuals or groups in multiple locations pulling with the same motivation. Individual activity can vary from donating money to terrorist organizations or NGOs to being an active terrorist or paid NGO employee to expressing opinions publically. Seemingly individual actions, when coordinated, create harmonic effects and movement in the web that can affect U.S. interests in good and bad ways.

Two examples demonstrate the inherent positive power in this interconnectedness and the ease with which NGOs and others assemble and operate in the internet enabled global commons. Any individual can visit globalgiving.com to donate money to this nonprofit organization and it will direct the donation to grassroots projects around the world. Individual donations combine to fund projects such as a water project in Mozambique. In another example, the United Nations documented
trapped, earthquake victims in Haiti sending messages requesting, directing, receiving much needed assistance and aid from NGOs and individuals. “Cloud-, crowd-, and SMS-based technologies” enabled individuals (world-wide) to respond. Individual and NGO responses included: translating messages, continuous mapping using updated data, and monetary donations. NGOs are a potential way to help support U.S. interests because they often have a better sense of social and cultural conditions. Donor nations recognize the need to integrate social and cultural conditions and potential into their assistance programs; but have not truly done so.

Today, NGOs are a powerful part of the world order that U.S. leadership helped create. It seems obvious tacit approval, which is at the least not getting in the way of helpful NGOs, remains in the U.S.’ national interest; after all it does not necessarily cost the U.S. government anything. However much more is to be gained. First, better focused, pin pointed NGO aid goes through fewer layers of the host government. Less government limits the amount of graft and corruption as officials at different layers often take a “cut” and transfer cash out of the nation it was intended to reach. Second, NGO assistance can come in imaginative and innovative forms better suited to the local circumstances. In one example documented on globalgiving.com, cultural behavior was changed in regard to educating girls in Burkina Faso. In this program, donations provide an initial year’s education and a lamb for the girl’s family. The family must raise the lamb and use the profits to pay for the daughter to attend school for 12 years. The profits from the initial lamb provide an opportunity for the family to prosper as well as pay school costs. The NGO reinforces local leaders’ positions by going through them for executing the project. Individual donors do not just educate a child; they change
behavior using the livestock investment to promote and value female education. Such private aid has great positive potential for U.S. security concerns.

Private aid can also create, or exacerbate, friction within the host environment. Beginning in the 1980’s, many donors began by-passing the host nation and provided aid directly to locally situated NGOs and private volunteer organizations (PVOs-name for domestic NGOs). Enabled by globalization’s systems, pinpoint aid replaced the role of host ministries by providing resources directly to local level government and PVOs. However, some local organizations are political rivals of the existing government and use the aid as means to discredit officials and regain power. Providing material or financial support to a political rival seldom gains government support and even the most careful administration of assistance can undermine the efforts and legitimacy of a government who is unable or less inclined to provide such services. The resulting friction and disorder can lead to instability and create security issues within the international order.

On yet another level, NGOs represent a means of transition. U.S. strategic defense guidance specifically states the United States. will not conduct “long term, long duration stability operations.” However, Department of Defense Instructions (DoDI) state stability operations will have the same importance as offensive and defensive operations. Taken together, the strategic guidance directing fighting and winning our nation’s wars includes securing the victory through successful stability operations. The guidance defines successful stability as transitioning responsibility to the host nation or other non-military actors within 2-3 years of ending active combat operations. For many troubled states, inherent to this transition is consideration of how development within the
host nation will be continued. Development, whether donor state or NGO conducted, is a “steady state” activity.\textsuperscript{20} The U.S. military responsibly handing off civil responsibilities to NGOs represents a successful military end state, as does handing them off to the host nation or U.S. agencies and intergovernmental organizations (IGO) that represent normalcy in developmental assistance.

Keeping in mind that NGOs and PVOs represent a range of religious, humanitarian, social, and professional organizations, it is easy to see that NGOs span a range of nation development activities from governance with law related professional organizations, to economics, to services. With thought and knowledge, why shouldn’t this be ethically leveraged in the interests of better and more stable states and a more secure international order? Add to this the potential of multinational corporations, education organizations, and the numerous intergovernmental organizations in assistance and development roles and a real strategic advantage in positive power is revealed, if it can be recognized and applied. Yet, both of the latter are problematic. We do much better understanding the negative forces at work.

Many policy makers and military professionals still have difficulty appreciating the number of NGOs and the corresponding influence they wield. More than 500 NGOs engaged the indigenous population during the Kosovo conflict alone.\textsuperscript{21} NGOs influence changes not only in distant villages and states, but U.S. government policy, as demonstrated by the Guidelines for Relations Between US Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations. Senior policy makers directed the Defense Department follow these instructions and the Joint Staff later codified into doctrine.\textsuperscript{22} It is well past time to get on board. The world has changed!
Engaging these empowered individuals and organizations represents a potential solution to many underlying sources of insecurity. Empowered civil actors and a return to normalcy often represent the best solutions to problems of conflict and transition. Yet more than this, knowing and tracking all the activity in an area of interest at any level yield insights on the will of the people—who is dissatisfied, why, and means of resolution, and, what works or doesn’t work. It provides the opportunity to leverage the power of globalization along positive lines while keeping the U.S. deficit in line. It is more than a whole of government approach; it is a comprehensive approach with all the tools of the international order understood, considered, and suitably involved. All that is missing is the means to acquire and share the appropriate levels of information and context—shared knowledge that allows for integration of efforts and builds on success. It is a strategic shortfall and the U.S. military is square in the middle of it.

The Problems with Existing Capabilities

The bottom line with existing capabilities is they fail to provide comprehensive civil information management (CCIM). General Flynn and his co-authors allege that by failing to develop comprehensive civil information management “our senior leaders—the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, Congress, the President of the United States—are not getting the right information to make decisions.”23 The lack of CCIM knowledge is also an issue in decision making at the regional, country, operational, and tactical levels. There are a number of reasons for this.

The need for a comprehensive appreciation of civil society’s contribution has been obvious for some time. So have the problems surrounding a comprehensive appreciation. President George W. Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive/ NSPD-44 in December 2005 establishing department and agency roles and
responsibilities across the U.S. government and the spectrum of conflict for development. NSPD-44 establishes Department of State (DoS) as the supported department and other departments and agencies of the U.S. government, including Defense, as supporting. It provides DoS the authorization to create a Coordinator and an Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability (S/CRS), with the task to identify states at risk of or in conflict and develop a framework for planning and coordination of U.S. government efforts. Defense tasks in NSPD-44 include the specific support requirements to “identify, develop and provide relevant information” (process and product) as well as personnel on a “non-reimbursable basis” (comprehensive management). Its focus suggests a holistic requirement for a persistent CCIM process and product with a liaison cell at S/CRS. Notwithstanding Department of Defense (DoD) issues with its tasks, DoS has never quite achieved its part of the NSPD-44 intent.

Successes include the creation of the Civilian Response Corps and collaborative efforts like Guidelines, which “presents the first strategic ‘doctrine’ ever produced for civilians engaged in peacebuilding missions.” Working with NGO’s as well as DoS, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), DoD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and others, the U.S. Institute for Peace and the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute provided a set of guidelines and a strategic framework for thinking about and integrating all civilian and military efforts. The guidelines became a part of Joint doctrine in 2011. In many ways, Guidelines facilitate the comprehensive approach to development and sets parameters for CCIM, but did solve CCIM. And the S/CRS ran into the very difficult issues of bureaucratic wrangling within DoS and
resourcing as budget concerns reemerged. In its present configuration, it is a part of a solution, but well short of what is needed.

The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, which now covers S/CRS, advocates for a comprehensive approach to counter-insurgency combining elements of national power into something called “control.” Control implies that populations can be positively influenced if the right conditions are established, but in order to do this “…decisions at all levels must be based on a detailed understanding and awareness of the environment…no…strategy can be better than the degree of understanding on which it is based.”27 The personnel at DOS grasp the knowledge sharing problem, but have not solved it.

USAID has an obvious interest in development and understanding the social-cultural environment. USAID has relied heavily on contractors, a number of whom have been NGOs, to execute its programs. It also shares civil information in a decentralized manner as do other agencies through participation in comprehensive and interagency efforts such as the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). USAID established an Office of Military Affairs for centralized policy and training to facilitate understanding and integration.28 In addition, USAID stations Senior Development Advisors (SDAs) and liaison officers (LNOs) at each Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) and the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) as part of an exchange program with DoD officers.29 Exchanges and collective efforts such as the PRT represent one level of opportunity for CCIM, but exchanges and ad hoc organizations fail to address the fundamental issues of information/knowledge management and understanding.
DoS does seek to exploit information. The Foreign Assistance Dashboard represents State’s transparency effort for American foreign aid. Foreign Assistance Dashboard includes State, USAID, and Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) projects. State recently re-designed the dashboard to accept data collaboratively from other contributors. Projects are displayed in terms of cost, nation, and sector (e.g. “transportation”) and can be viewed by others who might be considering their own projects. MCC seeks to reduce poverty through stimulating economic growth with development projects funded by U.S. foreign aid. A common theme of collaboration weaves itself throughout MCC. In addition to a generic website, www.mcc.gov, MCC established a number of other websites that provide project data, background reports, U.S. budget specifics, bi-weekly news stories, and other reports and information of interest. MCC even offers free software downloads to access and view their information. Such transparency also serves MCC’s agenda as a mentorship tool for advocating transparency of government during development. In these cases a lot of information is available if you know where it is located and how to use it, but it represents little analysis and again is only a partial answer to CCIM.

UnityNet represents the Defense Intelligence Agency’s recognition of the need for CCIM and a conceptual response. It is comprehensive in nature, including NGO’s, IGO’s, Private Volunteer Organizations (PVO’s), military civil affairs teams, PRT’s, HTT’s, and Female Engagement Teams (FETs). One aspect (Fab-Fi) is immediately fungible, that is freely exchangeable, world-wide, while others are not. UnityNet violates a basic premise of CCIM—integration—by making government one layer of information and populace another. Data segregation arises from a concern that providing host
governments the shared data would enable a corrupt government to “tax” development projects. Segregating data potentially violates NSPD-44, which specifically states US government actions “…should enable governments abroad to exercise sovereignty over their own territories.” Knowingly conducting operations and withholding that information can undermine this sovereignty. At a minimum, it poses the same issues as NGO development without a government’s knowledge. It differs in that one nation’s actions that undermine another nation’s government in an indirect manner could be interpreted as “unconventional warfare.”

DoD has worked hard at resolving the information and knowledge problems associated with socio-cultural issues and integrating civil society efforts, but have also fallen short. Oddly enough, DoD issues are not ones of authority and resources. Ample authorities and resources exist for creating and participating in CCIM. In addition to NSPD-44, Department of Defense Instructions (DoDI) and Department of Defense Directives (DoDD) provide both guidance and authorities applicable to CCIM solutions. DoDI’s are more authoritative than DoDD’s, but each establishes DoD policy and provides authority relative to CCIM. DoDI 1000.17 provides guidelines for performing persistent liaison, which enables being “comprehensive.” DoDI 1205.18 establishes procedures and authorizations for reserve component (RC) full time support (FTS). One specific provision is for FTS to provide RC advice, expertise, and liaison to active component (AC) activities and senior defense officials. Since 78% of the 7,944 Civil Affairs (CA) billets are in the RC, this DoDI is largely applicable to any CCIM solution involving CA.
In addition, DoDI 3000.05 applies by establishing “stability” as a core mission and with requirements to support not only U.S. agencies, but foreign governments, IGOs, and NGO’s. Its language implies “comprehensive”, as it advocates “interoperable” and “complimentary” solutions. Multiple references to functional specialists suggests access to knowledgeable experts. Without using the term “civil information,” DoDD 2000.13 makes coordination with other U.S. government agencies, other nations' civilian agencies, and NGO’s a CA task. Equally important are the requirements to assess “long term impacts” before operations and support in “peace and war throughout the range of military operations.” Persistent CCIM is the means to meet these requirements. DoDD 3000.07 also applies with its reference to sharing information globally and regionally, plus interaction with civilian agencies. It represents authority for collaboration.

Resources are important. Congress enacted the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012 in January 2012. Within this law, two important things occurred. First, Congress reduced authorizations, most predominately in the active components of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. A reduction in end strength in a complex security environment obviously creates resourcing issues. However, another provision authorized defense to mobilize up to 60,000 reserve component members (all services) for “unnamed authorizations.” These authorizations can obviously apply to recognized CCIM needs. DoD has significant capabilities and the potential to create others. The problems with CCIM are ones of structure, organizational culture, and doctrine and practice.
DoD capabilities vary by level, intent, force provider, and specific tables of organization and equipment. Capabilities were also influenced with the implementation of modularity and the Army divorcing of active Army (AA) and Army Reserve (AR) civil affairs structure. Nonetheless, the military has significant capabilities for CCIM. Intelligence resources are substantial, but because of penchants for an enemy-centric focus and over classification inherently problematic for the openness required by CCIM. While intelligence information must be integrated appropriately, it is the capabilities built around CA perspectives and forces that are key.

CCIM capabilities and functions in the Army revolve around two central doctrinal ideas, the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) and Civil Information Management (CIM) cell. CMOC can refer to either a group of people or a place to collaborate. Sometimes it is both. Organizationally, beyond the involved actors, a CMOC “capability” consists of four people, none of whom are functional specialists. As to a location, Guidelines envisioned a location away from the military base, post, or camp that can be perceived as neutral. A CMOC enables collaboration in an unclassified environment, to include communications for NGOs, IGOs, PVOs, and other U.S. government agencies. A neutral location also facilitates interaction between the populace, these organizations, and the local government. Actual facilities need to be non-military, such as leased, as transition from the U.S. military to the host nation or others does not end collaboration amongst NGOs, IO’s, local populace, and U.S. and other donor state development agencies.

CA units possess organic communications capabilities to support these CMOCs throughout the operating environment. Communications capabilities come from signal
and computer and administrative trained staff, not civil affairs trained Soldiers.\textsuperscript{42} CMOC’s require unclassified communications for not only U.S. military, but also the NGO’s, IO’s, and other U.S. government agencies. Enabling NGO communications and coordination is cost effective, as these organizations represent two to three times the resources the U.S. government can provide.\textsuperscript{43} Classified communications plug CA units into supported Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), divisions, and other U.S. systems. Relying on organic CA capabilities reduces misperceptions of entitlement and ownership with supported units and allows CA re-allocation of resources.

CIM cells, introduced in 2005, represent an opportunity to inject CMOC generated awareness into the overall common operating picture.\textsuperscript{44} Consisting of four personnel, one CIM cell each is provided at the CA battalion (BN), brigade (BDE), and Civil Affairs Command (CACOM) levels. These resources represent all the coverage for division/ JTF, Corps, and Army Service Component Commander levels. CA commanders are charged with updating the Brigade Combat Team common operating picture, regardless of system, without a CIM cell.\textsuperscript{45} If these structures are the solution, or part of a CCIM solution, questions about the adequate structuring and resourcing of them are valid given the demands the adoption of modularity in force structure deployments creates.

In 2006, the Secretary of Defense directed CA split based on active or reserve component status with the intent of improving conventional force access to CA.\textsuperscript{46} Recent activation of the 85\textsuperscript{th} CA BDE, assigned as a direct report unit to FORSCOM represents a third divergence of command and control.\textsuperscript{47} The split of command and control resulted in divergent solution paths for CA support. Active Army CA units focus
on USSOCOM systems and Reserve CA is directed to utilize systems used by the supported units. Supported units utilize different battle command systems, as do geographic combatant commands. As a result any CCIM integration becomes fragmented at every strategic, operational, and tactical level horizontally and vertically, and between rotations.

Prior to 2006, United States Army and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC), an AR command, provided unity of effort and command as the headquarters for all Army CA (AA and AR) as part of USASOC. In 2006, the AA CA BDE remained under USASOC as a direct reporting unit, with USACAPOC providing peacetime command and control for all CONUS based CA and functional guidance for the Germany based CA BDE and Hawaii based CA BDE headquarters. The 2006 realignment changed USACAPOC’s mission to that of a force provider. Now AA units and AR units differ significantly in command and control when deployed. Regardless of component, some combatant commander will have COCOM authority over CA capabilities. For SOCOM units, SOCOM retains COCOM authority. The Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) exercises OPCON authority, and the supported commander in theater exercises TACON authority. In the role of supporting conventional forces, AR units change assignments multiple times, ostensibly for validation to deploy. All units, regardless of component, must have an AA COL certify task proficiency to deploy. For RC units, this means transfer of COCOM command authorities to NORTHCOM/ 1st U.S. Army upon mobilization. Once certified, COCOM authority transfers to the GCC upon arrival and ends with departure. On transfer of COCOM authority, deployed AR forces must utilize unit specified programs of record for
reporting. All of these differences have precluded any standardized system of CCIM. An overarching headquarters pulling the potential information and knowledge assets into a CCIM does not exist.

Capabilities and potential resources exist to provide comprehensive civil information management. Information also exists but there is a need to better understand the dangers information overload and cultural bias and the roles of human analysis and cultural expertise. Some capabilities, or “isolated pockets of excellence,” represent the data decision makers need. Other capabilities exist which can either provide additional context or simply facilitate information flow. For example, four GCC’s sponsored a program called the All Partners Access Network (APAN). Initially developed in PACOM, SOUTHCOM employed APAN for integration in the burgeoning United Nations, volunteer-based Haiti response. Its success generated additional interest. APAN’s information sharing tools includes wiki, chat, GIS, file lists, and single sign-on. Design includes accepting RSS, SMS, and MMS formatted data and information exchange with USMC’s FIST, USSOCOM’s CIM-DPS, HTS’ MAP-HT, UN formats, and open source NGO programs. APAN includes non-secure internet protocol routing (NIPR) and secure internet protocol routing (SIPR). APAN is a program of record. The acronyms notwithstanding, APAN demonstrates what a CCIM system might look like in part.

Additionally, as a functional combatant commander, USSOCOM sponsored CIM-DPS as the proponent solution for CIM. USSOCOM established the 95th CA BDE and the U.S. Army’s Corps of Engineers’ USACE Reach Back Operations Center as the repository for CIM. Current access requires an unclassified internet connection,
account, and issued common-access-card. Plans to move CIM-DPS onto the USSOCOM enterprise will (most likely) prevent any non-USSOCOM unit or system from accessing it.\(^5\) CIMDPS uses GIS technology with linked attachments, utilizing the ike-GATER system for data collection and submission.\(^5\) Nonetheless, it too demonstrates CCIM can be done.

Prior to 2006, all CA forces had access to the 4\(^{th}\) POG’s (now MISOC) Strategic Studies Detachment (SSD). SSD contains PhD level research capability to provide cultural context to information.\(^5\) Access to SSD in the past was obtained through the common headquarters of USACAPOC. Obtaining access today would require a request through FORSCOM to OSD to SOCOM to USASOC to MISOC. Realistically, it does not happen, but the capability and resources do exist. Cultural expertise also exists in the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s Culture Center, which provides cultural awareness training.\(^5\) Another such resource, the U.S. Army Human Terrain System (HTS) provides PhD level, cultural context through reach back and teams assigned to BCT level and higher. Like the Culture Center, HTS reports to the Intelligence Community.\(^5\)

In large part, the myriad of systems exchange data and not context. It is information without knowledge. Often, gathered information never serves a larger purpose. Ms. Carol A. Wortman documents three significant, and distinctly different, challenges for multiple battle command systems that provide insights to this larger problem. First, if a unit utilizes a unique system, all data, information, and knowledge are lost when that unit leaves. Second, all data (stored on unit systems) literally gets packed and sent to that units’ home station with the units’ hardware. Third, new data
(acquired by a new unit after the old one leaves) cannot be put into historical context. On a small scale this describes the information problem for all CCIM. Ultimately, everyone is concerned about CCIM and work hard at it, but too many systems are proprietary and only serve the limited purpose of the designing organization. Even when it is accessible, it lacks real context and formatting that makes it useable and actionable. Ultimately, senior policy makers and decision makers at every level do not care what system is used, they need a comprehensive civil common operating picture that allows them to take appropriate action.

**Collaborative Civil Information Sharing as a Method of CCIM**

Civil information is a complex undertaking and the current way it is pursued is still too rooted in 20th century thinking. Such thinking does not recognize a changed world and how things work and need to work in the 21st century. Civil society is a major key to security in the international system with tactical, operational, and strategic implications for U.S. military operations and security interests. Assuming understanding of the importance of civil society to national security at every level, CCIM is fundamentally a problem in sharing and integrating what is already known—information and knowledge—by multiple actors in the environment in a way that it can be supported and used. What is needed are a 21st century methodology and mechanism for the sharing and integration—collaborative information sharing. With the empowerment inherent to globalization, the hierarchical structures of the 21st century are not sufficient. Leaders still need to make decisions, but the information and knowledge needed to provide context for those decisions comes from the bottom up and horizontally as well as from the top. Civil society cannot be directed from the top down; it must be shaped and integrated into national security concerns at all levels in ways that serve national
interests and the interests of the non-state actors alike. Only effective collaborative information sharing and understanding of context in light of security concerns can do this.

Comprehensive sharing and collaboration require information and knowledge flow to and among the various levels and across domains. However, in a 21st century socio-cultural environment, the local level is both the greatest repository as well as the greatest consumer of civil information. The other levels are no less important, however needs, context, and effects are locally derived. The local level has been problematic because in the past it has not been able to provide timely: information, analysis, and assessments required by decision makers at the interagency and higher levels; a demonstrated inability of local levels to process and share necessary information among themselves; and inadequate resources. Again, other levels share these same issues, but the solution hinges on the local level and building up.

Conceptually, a solution is simple as indicated in the diagram below. Actors at the local (tactical), operational, and strategic levels have different information based in facts and context that constitutes information and knowledge of value to all other actors as they make decisions in regard to their realms of responsibility. As positive actors, they all share the same or similar goals—human security, national and international stability, etc. Negative actors, even when posing as positive actors, are issues of facts and context that once known can be addressed at the various levels. All of the positive actors need access to knowledge in various forms—information, data, context, and analysis. In the diagram below, this knowledge is represented as an automated knowledge system labeled the World Wide Green Board. The Green Board is
accessible to all the acknowledged actors and managed by an appropriate CCIM organization to administer, manage, staff, and assure a degree of validity.

CCIM organizations exist at various levels based on need, but all feed and use an appropriate Green Board. A particular level or user’s Green Board can be tailored for that users needs, but accesses and feed the larger knowledge base—the World Wide Green Board. CCIM organizations may serve several needs, but their primary purpose is to facilitate knowledge sharing and understanding in effective ways—it is more than just a computer system, results require human interaction to assure things happen as a result of knowledge acquired. Different levels may focus, manage, or use the knowledge in different ways or to create new knowledge. For example, the department and strategic level may have an interest in a specific issue or nation and also a need for a regional and global perspective. Collaborative forums, such as

Figure 1.
interagency working groups, already exist at the highest levels that may assume a CCIM function. The lower a CCIM organization operates, logically the more local the focus, but even here higher level knowledge serves the primary purpose of lower levels to de-conflict and shape tactical actions by all parties by providing details and larger context.

Knowledge and understanding turns existing processes on their heads and informs decision processes at all levels. For example, answering the question “what can we provide the interagency,” instead of asking “what can you do for me” identifies potentially better solutions and generates more focused requirements and priorities. In the process it better serves national security and gets better use of constrained funding at all levels. Building appropriate Green Boards is technically feasible and as already been demonstrated as indicated earlier. Processes that consolidate open source material, create or release more content, and link and motivate functional expertise are also feasible. For example, functional and cultural expertise has been increased and need to continue increasing. It does need to be institutionally structured into the CCIM and Green Board model. The current U.S. national political environment mandates use of current capabilities, but the security environment argues to use them differently.

Clearly, at the lower levels the U.S. military must play a major and larger role in the CCIM organizations. Other agencies’ budgets and structure historically fall short of managing such efforts. The future portends no change. They can be supportive, but cannot assume the effort, particularly at the lower levels. In a similar manner, NGOs
have no appetite for a leading role, even though there is much evidence that if you build a “CCIM field” they will come.

Within the military, all services have interests to be served and capabilities to commit, but only the Army has the capacity to play the leading role. The majority of this capacity resides in the CA forces. CA battalion, brigade, and command headquarters companies already possess small teams specifically designed to process today’s CIM and other resources do similar things. With some organizational changes, changes in structure, and an appropriate mandate, Army CA and its Joint partners could undertake the task. If done properly, other CA missions would benefit exponentially. Numerous details would have to be worked out and this would take time. Yet, as the Defense Strategy indicates, the problems are unlikely to go away anytime soon and the current solutions are not meeting strategic or local needs. The U.S. military, and particularly the Army, should not back away from this challenge—after all, it is a matter of national security and national blood and treasure.

Conclusion

The United States has four overarching strategic interests in the 21st century: security of U.S. citizens, allies, and partners; a strong U.S. economy in open international markets and global commons; respect for human security; and a stable the international order. The protection and advancement of all four of these interests are intertwined with and dependent on an understanding of the civil environment. Globalization has empowered civil society and national security requires persistent knowledge and awareness of the civil environment at the global, regional, national, and local levels. The current stovepipe systems and data sharing systems of the U.S. government cannot meet the need for persistent knowledge and awareness: changes
in thinking and in structure are required. Collaborative civil information management provides the awareness of the civil environment required by today’s operating environment. All the major components and authorities exist for the minor restructuring required. New resource requirements are minimal and any new cost would easily be recovered in the reduced duration of stability operations and lesser development costs associated with better performance. The question is not “can we”, but “will we?” True awareness and success lies in better collaboration.

Endnotes


3 Ibid., 18.

4 Ibid., 9. MG Flynn quotes GEN (ret) McChrystal, “Our senior leaders—the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, Congress, the President of the United States—are not getting the right information to make decisions with. We must get this right. The media is driving the issues. We need to build a process from the sensor all the way to the political decision makers.”

5 Ibid., 21.


9 Panetta, 1.


14 Lange, 2.


16 Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pederson, 197.


18 Panetta, 6.


23 Flynn, et. al., 9.


26 JP 3-08, J-1–J-6.


33 George W. Bush, NSPD-44, 2.


Joint Publication 3-08, Appendix J.

This was concluded from review of respective MTOEs.

MAJ Samuel Kyle Simpson II, “Reserve Component Structure and Capabilities”, Restructuring Civil Affairs for Persistent Engagement (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, AY 2010), 40.


Erik J. Dahl”Warning of Terror:Explaining the Failure of Intelligence Against Terrorism”, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 28, No 1 (Medford, MA: Tufts University, February 2005), 38-44.

Olson, 2.


56 Flynn, et. al., 17.


58 Ibid., 4-6.
