THE US ARMY’S PRE-COMMISSIONING PROGRAMS: THE POTENTIAL APPLICATION TO US CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AS A MEANS TO INCREASE COLLABORATION

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

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General Studies

by

MATTHEW K. WILDER, NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
B.A., Rhodes College, Memphis, Tennessee, 2002

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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This thesis examines the potential application of training and education methods utilized by the United States Army pre-commissioning programs to the civilian intelligence agencies with respect to how they might increase collaboration. Specifically, this thesis focuses on how the common basis of education and shared hardship provided by the United States Military Academy at West Point, Officer Candidate School, and ROTC creates a collaborative environment and instills a sense of enduring collaboration for graduates. Research focused on the curriculum design and training found in each pre-commissioning program that builds long-term collaboration in the students such as immersive experiences and the building of a professional identity. Three distinct approaches to adapting the Army pre-commissioning programs to the civilian intelligence community are assessed using the structured-focused methodology, along with the use of evaluation criteria adapted from the Army course of action screening criteria of Feasible, Acceptable, Suitable, Distinguishable, and Complete (FAS-DC). Potential approaches for implementation are identified, along with options for future research and subsequent steps necessary to execute the recommended approach.
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THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Matthew K. Wilder

Thesis Title: The US Army’s Pre-Commissioning Programs: The Potential Application to US Civilian Intelligence Agencies as a Means to Increase Collaboration

Approved by:

________________________________________, Thesis Committee Chair
Ralph O. Doughty, Ph.D.

________________________________________, Member
Mark R. Wilcox, M.A.

________________________________________, Member
Elizabeth A. Bochtler, M.A.

Accepted this 8th day of June 2012 by:

________________________________________, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


This thesis examines the potential application of training and education methods utilized by the United States Army pre-commissioning programs to the civilian intelligence agencies with respect to how they might increase collaboration. Specifically, this thesis focuses on how the common basis of education and shared hardship provided by the United States Military Academy at West Point, Officer Candidate School, and ROTC creates a collaborative environment and instills a sense of enduring collaboration for graduates. Research focused on the curriculum design and training found in each pre-commissioning program that builds long-term collaboration in the students such as immersive experiences and the building of a professional identity. Three distinct approaches to adapting the Army pre-commissioning programs to the civilian intelligence community are assessed using the structured-focused methodology, along with the use of evaluation criteria adapted from the Army course of action screening criteria of Feasible, Acceptable, Suitable, Distinguishable, and Complete (FAS-DC). Potential approaches for implementation are identified, along with options for future research and subsequent steps necessary to execute the recommended approach.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

When agencies cooperate, one defines the problem and seeks help with it. When they act jointly, the problem and options for action are defined differently from the start. Individuals from different backgrounds come together in analyzing a case and planning how to manage it. Since 9/11, those issues have not been resolved.

— The 9/11 Commission Report, 22 July 2004

To create a diverse community of professionals necessary to provide the best possible intelligence to policy-makers the Community needs to recruit and hire the best people, give them career development assignments in other IC agencies, and begin evaluating them based on how well they engage and collaborate with their colleagues across the IC.

— Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 100 Day Plan for Integration and Collaboration

This thesis examines the post 9/11 lack of collaboration among civilian intelligence agencies and several possible methods of countering this dangerous and disturbing trend. The intent is to explore the possibility that methods used by the US Army in the pre-commissioning programs designed to provide the education and training of future officers to form an enduring basis for collaboration may be appropriate and adaptable for use in the Intelligence Community (IC). For the purposes of this thesis, Army pre-commissioning programs refers to the three traditional paths to achieve the goal of a fully educated and trained Army officer: the United States Military Academy (West Point), the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC), and the Officer Candidate School (OCS). While no method of training or education results in a perfectly collaborative environment, the Army pre-commissioning programs do ensure a commonality among graduates that forms the basis of collaborative behavior.
There are real and daunting challenges associated with reform, especially within the IC due to the large number of agencies and equities involved. However, there is intrinsic value in the academic task of exploring options to build the skills for collaboration and a shared basis of knowledge in the education of an intelligence professional. In order to clearly examine the processes that instill collaboration, it is necessary first to define the term itself. Collaboration is defined as “working with others or together especially in an intellectual endeavor” and “to cooperate with an agency or instrumentality with which one is not immediately connected” (Merriam-Webster 2011). The Collaboration Consulting Team for the Deputy Director of National Intelligence has a more specific definition: “the interaction among members of the IC and their partners—exploiting their diverse expertise and organizational resources to create higher value intelligence than an agency or officer can do individually to achieve the mission of the IC” (DDNI/A Collaboration Consulting Team 2009). For the purposes of this thesis, the ideal collaborative environment is a combination of the above two definitions. In the IC, collaboration must include diverse individuals and groups working together within, across, and outside established institutions in the pursuit of an intellectual endeavor. However, it is useful to first understand some of the criticisms that the IC has faced after the 9/11 attacks and to understand that the reforms suggested by the 9/11 Commission have been insufficient to remedy the IC’s issues with collaboration.

After the attacks of 9/11, President George W. Bush recommended a joint congressional commission to review the events leading up to the terrorist incidents to determine any lessons learned and to propose a way ahead for the IC. The 9/11 Commission’s findings were published in July 2004 and concluded that a lack of
collaboration within the civilian intelligence agencies contributed to missed opportunities that may have warned the nation that an attack was imminent (The 9/11 Commission Report 2004). This sentiment also was confirmed in a January 2009 Government Accountability Office Study, which asserted that concrete information sharing methods are not sufficiently developed and that there is no system in place to hold intelligence agencies accountable for collaboration (USGAO 2009).

This assessment is especially stark considering the reforms put in place after the 9/11 Commission Report was published, to include the creation of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and such collaboration tools as Intellipedia. However, lawmakers and IC leaders recognized that the previous structure of the civilian intelligence agencies made intelligence collaboration difficult at best. It is important to recognize that the necessity for the IC to fundamentally address how to improve collaboration was also grounded in law, conclusive reports, and executive order:

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA): Requires the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to ensure maximum availability of and access to intelligence information within the IC consistent with national security requirements. The statute also calls for protecting sources and methods in the context of maximizing the dissemination of intelligence information following DNI-established guidelines for classification, retrieval (in the form when initially gathered through finished products), and writing products at the lowest classification possible to support customers.

The 9/11 Commission Report: Emphasizes the need to change the mindset from “need-to-know” to “need to share.” Moreover, it places the DNI as the principal change agent in creating a culture within the IC focused on data “stewardship” rather than data “ownership.” The 9/11 Commission challenges the concepts of “originator controlled” (ORCON) adopted by collectors, which inhibits information dissemination and sharing and creates diffused information ownership and inconsistent access standards.

Executive Orders (13311, 13356, 13388, and others): Direct that agencies be held accountable for sharing information and promptly grant access to their terrorism information to other agencies with counterterrorism functions, and in conducting
these activities, protect the freedom, information privacy, and other legal rights of Americans. (Office of the Director of National Intelligence 2008, 6)

Despite the clear mandate from the President and Congress to make concrete changes, there are still significant barriers to change both in the structure of civilian intelligence agencies and how intelligence officers are trained.

There are several significant factors that inhibit real progress. One possible factor is the lack of positive reinforcement and rewards for collaboration, as opposed to punishment for a lack of collaboration. This tendency is easily recognized by examining how few significant awards within the civilian IC are given for collaborative efforts (Office of the Director of National Intelligence 2007). This idea will be readdressed in the thesis methodology as an evaluation factor against which approaches are examined. However, this thesis hypothesizes that the primary factor to interagency collaboration is a lack of a common foundation of education and training that are key enablers for creating a collaborative culture. The key problem is that since the publication of the 9/11 Commission Report in 2004, the US civilian IC continues to be hindered by limited collaboration among themselves, which poses a threat to national security. Unfortunately, there are examples that poor interagency collaboration affects national security, to include the failed 2009 Christmas Day airline bombing. Several subsequent IC reviews have identified collaboration shortfalls that resulted in missed opportunities to recognize and respond appropriately to the attack. While this thesis recognizes that some incremental improvements to collaboration may have occurred, there remain approaches to further improve collaboration.
Assumptions

Due to the broad nature of the issues and agencies involved, this thesis includes five assumptions to focus the research and recommended approaches:

1. Collaboration among civilian intelligence agencies remains at a suboptimal level and this condition has a negative impact on intelligence fusion and national security.

2. Changes enacted as a result of the 9/11 Commission Report such as the establishment of the position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) have been insufficient with respect to increasing collaboration across agencies and intelligence issues.

3. Attempts to increase collaboration within the IC at the mid-to upper career level such as the IC Officers Program and Joint Duty Program have been ineffective. This assumption is valid because intelligence and collaboration shortfalls continue to be identified despite efforts to increase collaboration.

4. The recommended approaches of this thesis may represent departures from the education and training model currently used within the IC and the resulting potential for security risks that are present in any environment. However, for the purposes of this thesis, it is assumed that it is possible to implement appropriate safeguards to ensure operational security for any recommended approach.

5. The Army pre-commissioning programs are effective in instilling graduates with a common basis for collaboration. This assumption is valid because an examination of the pre-commissioning programs reveals that each contains
common elements of education, training, and shared hardship that the literature review indicates are core elements of collaboration.

Given these assumptions, it is also apparent that the size constraints of the thesis will not allow for an examination of the IC and its associated challenges as a whole. Therefore, five delimitations focus and limit the thesis to civilian intelligence agencies and the academic exercise of examining how the US Army pre-commissioning programs might apply.

**Delimitations**

1. The civilian intelligence agencies referenced in this thesis are limited to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC), and the functional offices within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). The functional management of the primary intelligence disciplines (Human Intelligence, Signals Intelligence, Geospatial Intelligence, Measurements and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT), and Open Source Intelligence) is resident in these organizations with other civilian agencies serving as enablers to collection and primary intelligence analysis.

2. The collaboration challenges present in other members of the IC, including intelligence organizations resident within the military services and domestic intelligence/law enforcement organizations, are not addressed in this thesis. However, the research and recommendations that result may apply to those organizations and could serve as a basis for further study.
3. Although the political concerns of any approach will be explored in a general sense, it is only to serve as a function of the feasibility analysis in the evaluation criteria. Specific political approaches to implement the approaches resulting from the thesis research are not addressed. It is evident that any proposed change to the status quo will involve political support, but that is beyond the scope of this thesis.

4. Budget estimates presented are based upon the expenditures of analogous institutions and are for feasibility comparison. The estimates are limited to operating budgets and lifecycle costs but are not intended to be all-encompassing in scope or a comprehensive fiscal analysis.

5. There are several variations across the military services of pre-commissioning programs. For continuity of the thesis, the analysis and potential approaches to increase collaboration across the IC are limited to those programs that are specific to the US Army. Other military services have valid models for pre-commissioning education which may translate well to the IC, but that is outside the scope of the thesis.

Research Questions

This thesis answers the primary research question: Can the training and education methods used by the US Army pre-commissioning programs be applied to the US IC to form a comprehensive and complete approach to improve collaboration among civilian intelligence agencies? In order to answer this research question, potential approaches are evaluated using the Army Course of Action (COA) screening criteria. This method is proven to objectively examine courses of action for validity and is especially applicable
considering that this thesis examines several Army pre-commissioning programs to potentially answer the research question. The recommended evaluation criteria are modified versions of those found in FM 5-0, *The Operations Process*, and are further explained in chapter 3.

In addition to the primary research question, several secondary research questions enable the thesis to expand on the primary question and serve to narrow the scope of approaches. The secondary research questions follow and are not in order of precedence:

1. Is an approach similar to West Point appropriate for the education of intelligence professionals in such a way as it can be applied to the IC?
2. If an approach based on West Point is not appropriate, is another approach based upon other Army pre-commissioning programs such as the OCS or ROTC more applicable?

Addressing the secondary research questions enables the thesis to be of mutual benefit to both the Army and the IC. The primary thesis statement for this work is that one of the US Army’s pre-commissioning programs can be adapted and applied for use by the civilian IC in order to improve collaboration and information exchange.

**Research Significance and Framework**

Scholarly research in pursuit of answering the research questions and the resulting approaches are of use to both the Army and the civilian IC in several ways. The IC will be the beneficiary of the years of experience the Army possesses in building an education and training model that forges lifetime connections among a diverse population. Likewise, the Army will benefit from a greater understanding of how traditional military
concepts can be applied to the benefit of its own intelligence workforce and civilian employees.

The thesis first examines the literature that currently exists regarding how the Army builds the basis of collaboration into educational programs, specifically the theories and curriculum of pre-commissioning officer education. The thesis then describes the research methodology used during the analysis to assess the recommended approaches and to formulate the recommendations to answer the research questions. It is necessary at this point to analyze the literature that exists with regard to collaboration, and the US Army pre-commissioning programs.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

This thesis seeks to address the primary research question: Can the training and education methods used by the US Army pre-commissioning programs be applied to the US IC to form a comprehensive and complete approach to improve collaboration among civilian intelligence agencies? Two secondary research questions serve to expand upon and help answer the primary research question. The secondary research questions are:

1. Is an approach similar to West Point appropriate for the education of intelligence professionals in such a way as it can be applied to the IC?
2. If an approach based on West Point is not appropriate, is another approach based upon other Army pre-commissioning programs such as the OCS or ROTC more applicable?

To address these questions, the literature review has three main themes: (1) Aspects of Intelligence Education and Training; (2) West Point and its suitability to the IC; and (3) Professional Identity, Shared Hardship, and Culture as factors of collaboration.

Aspects of Intelligence Education and Training

The principles of education and training at all academic levels and for nearly every audience have been studied in the US for generations. However, education and training tailored to the unique needs of the IC are relatively new, beginning with the concepts developed for the Central Intelligence Agency by Sherman Kent. These concepts were first published in the inaugural issue of *Studies in Intelligence* in September 1955 and introduced the concept that the education and training of an
intelligence officer could (and should) be accomplished effectively by both academics and experienced field operatives (DiRienzo and Frerichs 2011, 71). In the 3rd Quarter, 2011 issue of *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Dr. Stephen DiRienzo and Dr. Rebecca Frerichs, both of the National Intelligence University (NIU), referred to MG Michael Flynn’s recently published criticism of the IC as a catalyst to further examine intelligence education and training. They also delineated the difference between intelligence education and intelligence-focused training while advocating for a program that offers both. Specifically, the authors define education as a more comprehensive, broad based educational experience as opposed to the narrower and often less comprehensive nature of training (DiRienzo and Frerichs 2011, 71). Although DiRienzo and Frerichs are strong promoters of the education offered by their employer, the NIU, their points are no less valid for a solution rooted in the principles of Army pre-commissioning education. The authors assert that the interdisciplinary and broad nature of intelligence education is not congruent with the more specific training needs and goals of the 16 agencies that comprise the IC. The ODNI was originally created to coordinate these needs and goals and develop IC-wide analytical standards. While IC professionals are trained to these standards, the authors insist that while they complement the goals of intelligence education, they should not dictate their development. DiRienzo and Frerichs also contrast the methods of intelligence education, which are often structured and Socratic, with training which is didactic and practical in nature. For the authors, this is the primary point

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1MG Flynn served as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence in Afghanistan and wrote an article that was critical of the effectiveness of US intelligence efforts in the country. His article was published by the Center for a New American Society and is available at http://www.cnas.org/node/3924. He has since been promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General.
of departure from intelligence education to intelligence training (DiRienzo and Frerichs 2011, 71).

The authors also highlight a flaw in much of the contemporary theory of intelligence education in that implementing standards for intelligence training and analytical performance do not equal intelligence education. Interestingly, although the authors seem to advocate for a comprehensive approach to intelligence education and training, the NIU does not offer an undergraduate degree program. The article continues on to examine the CIA with respect to education and training. It also contains insights regarding the current state of intelligence training conducted by each individual agency and a possible explanation as to why some agencies and individuals are disinclined to accept a comprehensive education and training solution. Di Rienzo and Frerichs state that for the IC, a potential way forward is to model the original basis for education in the CIA that is based upon the principles of inclusive education instead of the tailored tradecraft education of individual agencies. However, the authors also admit that while intelligence education is appreciated in theory, few intelligence leaders appreciate the complex methodologies that accompany a thorough educational program with regard to strategic planning and tactical implementation. DiRienzo and Frerichs insist that as it stands now, few intelligence practitioners are conscious of the advantages of education beyond its ability to put the practitioner on the path to career advancement (DiRienzo and Frerichs 2011, 71-72).

DiRienzo and Frerichs continue with the article to make an important assertion regarding the linkage between education and training with collaboration:
Lying between the binary positions of defensive and offensive operations and proactive and reactive mission statements, both education and training are committed to protecting the integrity of that indispensable component of successful operations: collaboration.

To create an environment that institutionalizes success, the IC must first come to terms with the value of intelligence education. Doing so requires a firm understanding of what intelligence education is and what it can do, as opposed to overemphasizing training, which is better understood but does not address the full spectrum of the threat confronting the United States today. As such, only in this manner can the IC justifiably assess the point at which more training or more education is better suited to gauge those threats and to make strategic suggestions for the future. (DiRienzo and Frerichs 2011, 71-72)

The value of the broad-based educational experience in addition to the didactic, training based approach that is more familiar to the IC is also confirmed by research in the field of higher education. Specifically, in all fields of education, there may be an educational advantage to moving past discipline-specific standards to achieve a deeper intellectual capacity and expand critical and creative thinking (Astin 1992, 6).

University scholars also have varied opinions on the study of intelligence, intelligence education, and curriculum design. Professor Stafford Thomas writing in the International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence outlines four distinct approaches to studying intelligence as: (1) The historical/biographical approach: In this category, studies look at specific historical case-studies or chart chronological periods. As part of this, the work can either be memoir-based or archive-based; (2) the functional approach: This category studies the intelligence cycle appropriate for the needs of a national security strategy and also looks at the development of intelligence activities, processes, and technologies; (3) the structural approach: this approach studies the institutional development of the IC; (4) the political approach: This approach concentrates exclusively on the political dimension of intelligence and examines the
ethics of intelligence gathering, sharing and public information (Thomas 1988). While these are important components in the study of intelligence, they may be better studied by students purely on the intellectual level instead of being pertinent to the education of intelligence practitioners.

**West Point and the IC**

There exists a moderate amount of literature regarding the curriculum of West Point and the historical development of the education model. However, this thesis focuses on the current curriculum and what, if any, parallels can be drawn between how West Point educates its students and how they contribute to a collaborative environment. There is also the concept of how well West Point bonds diverse people. Interestingly, there is evidence that as early as 1955, the methods that West Point employs to educate cadets is an effective method of quickly bonding and assimilating diverse groups of people (Dornbusch 1955). Evidence supports that these methods contain and may instill the building blocks of enduring collaboration.

The current West Point curriculum is a common, relatively rigid 47-month program of shared education and experiences that lead to numerous benefits, which presumably include enduring collaboration. However, there is insufficient evidence at this point to determine definitively that there is a direct linkage between a West Point education and an increase in collaboration. It also does not consider other US Army education paradigms such as ROTC or Officer Candidate School. There is sufficient evidence through a 1997 Naval Postgraduate School sponsored study to link higher performance, retention, and promotion rates to graduates of military academies as opposed to ROTC graduates (Lo 1997, 60-65). While representing a valuable study of
military officers spanning 20 years, this study does not include other models of Army education, such as Officer Candidate School. This author also believes that the results of the study may be a factor of the high quality of candidates that are drawn and accepted to a military academy and not fully reflective of the education alone. This correlation can be demonstrated by examining the average grade point average, standardized test scores, and overall “whole person concept” of West Point candidates compared to the candidates for other Army pre-commissioning programs.

The IC has not ignored the potential benefits offered through an “academy like” education such as the West Point education model. The 2001 Strategic Investment Plan published by the Central Intelligence Agency, advocated for a National Intelligence Academy to be established by FY2010. The goal of the academy, “in addition to increasing professional knowledge and skills, would be to foster interaction—and bonding—among officers across the agencies. The program also would provide a venue for retired IC officials to teach, write, and both document and transmit the history of the IC to future generations” (Central Intelligence Agency 2001, Ch 2). The Strategic Plan, however, does not elaborate on funding specifics or congressional support for such an academy and it is unclear why the academy was not implemented as outlined in the plan.

For the purposes of this thesis the “West Point education model” refers to the combined experience of 47 months of intensive education that includes a common core curriculum, intensive training, and shared hardship that are unique to the Army pre-commissioning programs. This model combines the potential benefits of inclusive education that DiRienzo and Frerichs addressed, along with the aspects of hardship and intensive training that build collaborative behavior. The West Point model was expanded
upon and defined by Bruce Keith in his analysis of West Point in a volume of “Liberal
Education,” which is a publication of the Association of American Colleges and
Universities. According to the author, the West Point model is a combination of a core
curriculum of twenty-six core academic courses and a complementary disciplinary major
co-curriculum (Bruce 2010). Many colleges and universities use this education model,
but the West Point model is unique in that it integrates a defined leader development
model and curriculum that works in concert with the academic curriculum. West Point
also mandates summer immersion experiences as an integral part of the curriculum that
encourages the transfer of educational experiences from one context to another (Bruce
2010). The author correlates the West Point experience as an overall transformational
learning exercise that forces students to adapt to ill-defined situations and forces the
building of collaboration between students, peers, and mentors (Bruce 2010). The very
structure of West Point is also a major contributing factor to the West Point model.
Students are organized into military companies that feature carefully selected active-duty
officers and non-commissioned officers that serve as dedicated counselors and mentors.
In this manner, students model the behavior that is necessary for their future careers (in
this case, the military). They also are actively taught, coached, and assessed by
professionals whose sole purpose is to maximize the potential of each student in a
professional setting (Bruce 2010). These combined experiences make the West Point
model both effective at building professional competency, as well as difficult to
reproduce in any other setting.

Intelligence challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan have triggered an examination of
how well existing intelligence training and education have served to produce intelligence
professionals who are adaptive and adept operators in the current operational environment. A recent article in *Joint Forces Quarterly* examines intelligence education and the qualities of an intelligence academy. The article suggests that while the paradigms for the training and education of intelligence officers have traditionally been separate, they must be joined in such a way as to produce officers who are both technically competent and have the intellectual capacity for strategic thought (DiRienzo and Frerichs 2011, 72). Although these authors propose that the National Intelligence University (formally the DIA based National Defense Intelligence College) could provide such training, they overlook the fact that the university’s programs do not include the interdisciplinary education that they advocate in their paper and do not offer a comprehensive undergraduate education. Despite these points, the paper points to an intelligence service academy as the only appropriate setting for the complete education and training of an intelligence officer. The paper also makes it clear that while many institutions provide some aspects of comprehensive intelligence education and training, none yet exist that provide the complete experience in a “full service” setting.

In addition to the IC, there are other communities of professionals that have considered a school similar to West Point as a means to instill professional identity and collaboration. While these schools do not exactly replicate the experience that Army cadets have at West Point, they replicate the experience with a similar curriculum and the way in which the students live and train together. Advocates of public service and alumni of such organizations as Teach for America have proposed the creation of a US Public Service Academy. Congressional proposals describing this potential academy are comprehensive regarding the potential students, admissions process, and operating
budget (Asch 2006). Despite good intentions, though, the proposal relies upon a tentative public/private funding structure that only accounts for yearly operating costs and an admissions structure similar to the existing service academies (Asch 2006).

An independent cost-benefit analysis of the proposed US Public Service Academy provides much more detail regarding the total lifecycle cost of the establishment of a new service academy. While this thesis does not explore budget considerations in detail, a rough estimate of overall costs are important evaluation criteria when evaluating potential parallels and similar approaches that may apply to the IC. The analysis reveals that, although up-front costs may exceed $600 million, they represent non-recurring costs of construction and are offset over the projected life of the academy (Martin 2007, 19-25). The analysis also reveals more details regarding congressional sponsors of the academy. John Bradford and Eli Lehrer also conducted research involving a cost/benefit analysis, this time comparing the service academies to ROTC in terms of overall cost versus total output in numbers of military officers. They concluded that the service academies’ total expenditures per student are often many times that of the average ROTC student while providing only fifteen percent of overall officer accessions each year. Instead of continuing this trend, Bradford and Lehrer advocate sustaining ROTC and converting the existing service academies into an eleven month “finishing school” for officers (Bradford and Lehrer 1999, 56-57). Their research does indicate that an intelligence academy would represent the higher expenditure option for training students.

Information found in the preceding articles and books seem to indicate that an educational experience similar to that found at West Point could be adapted to the IC. However, there are case studies from countries that have Intelligence Academies that
report that not only has collaboration not improved, in some cases it has been a
hindrance. As part of her doctoral research, Romanian political scientist Claudia
Cristescu from the West University of Timisoara conducted a study of Intelligence
Academies while conducting curriculum design for a possible Intelligence Studies
curriculum for civilian universities in Romania. Although Romania has both a National
Intelligence Academy and a National Intelligence College, her research has demonstrated
that the rigorous entrance requirements and “elite” status of graduates has only served to
alienate them from lawmakers. This complicating factor is also accompanied by a
populace within Romania that was already fearful of intelligence officers because of
intelligence agencies mistreatment of the public during the Cold War (Cristescu 2011, 3).

She asserts that intelligence has become a “quasi-intrinsic component of
contemporary state structure” (Cristescu 2011, 5), and this status has led to several degree
programs and courses in intelligence studies that were established partially in:
Mercyhurst College in Pennsylvania and Georgetown University in the United States;
Brunel University and the Universities of Salford and Wales-Aberystwyth in the United
Kingdom; Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University in
Canada. In Spain, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos in Madrid in 2005 set up a program
offering a dedicated academic program in intelligence studies. However, few departments
of intelligence studies have been established in academia. Most frequently, universities
have arranged for the intelligence studies programs to be included within the framework
of their interdisciplinary schools of international studies. Other universities have
incorporated intelligence studies as part of, discipline-based graduate degree programs
(Cristescu 2011).
In the US, the subject has largely been located within political science departments. As a result, there is less emphasis on historical case-studies and a greater attention paid to theoretical deliberations. In Europe, the subject has a far more historical grounding, with the major emphasis on empirical case-studies. The courses tend to reflect the departments within which they are taught. Thus, courses offered through politics or international relations departments largely consider the role of intelligence in those contexts; whereas history department courses are far more case-study based and centered on institutions and countries. The undergraduate degree programs include individual courses on intelligence, and tend to relate back to the academic disciplines of political science, international relations or history. At the master’s level, curricula typically focus on theoretical issues in the discipline. International affairs masters programs, in particular, tend to emphasize interdisciplinary curricula that integrate academic and professional approaches. At the doctoral level, the orientation is usually toward preparation for the research initiative that is expected to contribute to the advancement of knowledge in the given field of study (Cristescu 2011, 6-7).

Interestingly, the challenge to improve collaboration through the education of intelligence professionals seems not to be an exclusively American problem, nor are the issues surrounding the ideal setting, candidates, and how to balance security clearances with a realistic and accurate intelligence education. Despite Cristescu’s excellent research of intelligence education at the international level, this author believes that her criticism of intelligence academies may have been influenced by the poor reputation that intelligence officers had in those respective nations. Overseas, intelligence officers were often thought of as spying on the populace and enforcing domestic internal security,
especially in the former Soviet Bloc nations. An intelligence academy in the United States is unlikely to inspire the same level of fear and negative connotations among US citizens. Although there are several theories and methods regarding the structure of an intelligence academy, some literature is convergent regarding the development of collaborative behavior, specifically that professional identity, shared hardship, and culture play key roles in collaboration.

**Professional Identity, Shared Hardship, and Culture as Factors of Collaboration**

The concept of professional identity and the steps taken to inculcate it within a group are well known within business circles. West Point’s answer to the establishment of a professional identity is a shared educational experience combined with ‘friction.’ West Point’s definition of friction is the “realization that one’s current capacity does not meet the demands of the situation confronted” (Cadet Leadership Development Committee 2009, 6). There are several examples in literature that outline how the military as a whole uses friction to instill identity. Studies also suggest that the Army pre-commissioning programs’ use of friction to inculcate professional identity is applicable and transferrable to the civilian world.

A jointly conducted study involving the consulting firms of McKinsey and Company and The Conference Board compared techniques for instilling professional identity used by some of the leading civilian corporations with the methods used by the US Marine Corps. Although the Marine Corps model is somewhat different from either the West Point or overall Army education and training model, the techniques are very similar in their use of shared hardship. The study concludes that civilian organizations
that use a military model to instill professional identity have a more collaborative nature and overall higher performance when compared with peer organizations that do not use the model (Katzenbach and Santamaria 2009, 1-4).

There are several theories that indicate that shared hardship combined with a common training experience can instill the basis for enduring collaboration. One such process is outlined in a description of how the CIA indoctrinates and trains recruits new to the agency. This process emphasizes immersion into a professional culture and the bonding experiences of a group of diverse people enabled through a rigorous training program (Waters 2007, 24-54). Although this paradigm works well for small groups of CIA employees in both analytical and operational specialties, there is no wider participation in the program from other intelligence agencies and thus no emphasis on interagency collaboration. The concept itself may be valid, but its implementation would have to be adopted to include far more participants if it is to have a significant impact on IC collaboration. It is possible that these same experiences of shared hardship and common training experience can be replicated and based upon one of the Army pre-commissioning approaches to instill interagency collaboration.

Research conducted at the Business Administration and Leadership Departments of Harvard Business School, however, advances the concept that effective leaders (and, the article asserts, collaborators) are often refined by what the authors term as a “crucible” experience (Bennis and Thomas 2002, 40). The authors define a crucible experience as “a transformative experience through which an individual comes to a new or altered sense of identity” (Bennis and Thomas 2002, 40). Although the authors use various examples of crucible experiences such as the traumatic consequences of business
decisions, crucible experiences and shared hardship often are used interchangeably and that crucible experiences often are a factor of shared hardship. While they both are often found in varied Army training programs, the concept of shared hardship is a condition common to each of the Army pre-commissioning programs and is formative to the development of collaborative behavior.

The CIA and Harvard Business School are not the only entities that are concerned with collaboration. In 2009, the Office of the Secretary of Defense conducted a Multi-Layer Assessment concerning collaboration among agencies in support of the counter-terrorism and counter-weapons of mass destruction effort. Assessment participants identified six key imperatives that must be present to increase collaboration. These are Perception of Mission Criticality, Mutual Benefit Among Agencies, Mutual Trust, Access and Agility in Intelligence, Incentives, and Common Understanding (Pherson and McIntyre 2009). Despite these imperatives, the authors’ proposed solutions of “collaboration cells,” technology, and training at the mid and upper career levels have been attempted since 9/11 but have not had a sustained effect on collaboration.

A recent School of Advanced Military Studies monograph states that collaboration within the IC is a factor of organizational culture. Organizational culture is defined as “the specific collection of values and norms that are shared by people and groups in an organization” (Hill and Jones, 394). The monograph author identified several shortfalls in the organizational culture of both the Department of Homeland Security as well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Specifically, the Department of Homeland Security was not yet sufficiently mature to develop an organizational culture separate from its component agencies, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation was
opposed to intelligence collaboration because of outdated legislation and attitudes (Egli 2011, 28, 38). The Bureau also was hindered by a lack of a common training program for intelligence analysts (Egli 2011, 38). Perhaps most interesting is how the monograph links an effective organizational culture with a stable membership in the culture and shared history. The author states:

The primary organizational culture difference between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Homeland Security is stable membership and shared history. Stability in organizational culture means that its members are firmly established. Shared history in organizational culture means that its members have gone through the social learning and/or socialization process while overcoming challenging events. (Egli 2011, 41)

In total, the monograph links effective organizational culture that is established with a common training program, a rigid sense of membership, and socialization to cultural norms through shared hardship. The previously mentioned literature seems to indicate that these aspects are the essential building blocks to collaboration and will form the basis for the proposed approaches described in the next chapter.

Another Harvard Business School case study used the collaboration challenges resident in the IC to examine barriers to collaboration. The Harvard research indicates that barriers to collaboration are primarily a result of interpersonal and organizational bias and territoriality (Bazerman, Caruso, and Rogers 2008, 15). These may be contributing factors, but the lack of collaboration within the IC is too pervasive to be solved by leadership emphasis and organizational design alone. Otherwise, post 9/11 collaboration would have been refined long ago. Likewise, a recent Congressional Research Service report indicates that the US Congress and national security leaders have long realized that collaboration was a more complicated issue than many believe and one that may be addressed through reforms and mandates concerning the education, training,
and experience for national security officers (this includes intelligence professionals) (Dale 2011, 12). Analysis of recent congressional actions with regard to the National Security Professional Development (NSPD) system advocate for sweeping changes in the way collaboration is encouraged and the human resources, funding, and incentives changes necessary to sustain change (Dale 2011, 1). Although many of the original initiatives explained in this congressional report have since stalled, the legislative actions described convey the predominant theories of how to instill collaboration and will be fully explored in subsequent chapters.

The literature concerning intelligence education and training, the specifics of a West Point education, and the roles that professional identity, culture, and shared hardship play in establishing collaboration within the IC is diverse and comprehensive. Some trends in the literature were readily apparent. First, although intelligence training is crucial to the development of an intelligence officer, the studies conducted by DiRienzo and Frerichs among others indicate that it is no substitute for immersive and comprehensive education, especially with regard to building collaborative behavior. Second, there is precedent for the concept of a National Intelligence Academy found in CIA planning documents and literature that seems to link the methods used by West Point with the foundation of successful collaboration. As a caveat, there is no substantive body of literature that correlates the methods used in the Army pre-commissioning sources of ROTC and OCS with collaboration. However, this author believes that this is due to a lack of academic studies undertaken with regard to these two approaches, whereas West Point has dedicated faculty and students that archive the history of the academy and the performance of graduates. Finally, literature and studies link a strong sense of
professional identity, shared hardship, and organizational culture as necessary for building collaboration.

Although the literature referenced in this thesis addresses many peripheral and complementary topics that contribute to a greater understanding of some aspects of education, collaboration, and the Army pre-commissioning programs, there does not appear to be any substantive body of knowledge that directly addresses the thesis topic. Therefore, the purpose of this literature review is to attempt to fill a void in the existing literature by linking existing concepts and applying them to address the problems of collaboration in the IC through the Army pre-commissioning program methods.

This thesis continues in the following chapter by defining the methodology used to distinguish among potential approaches to address the lack of collaboration within the IC.
CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The primary research question this thesis addresses is: Can the training and education methods used by the US Army pre-commissioning programs be applied to the US IC to form a comprehensive and complete approach to improve collaboration among civilian intelligence agencies? The secondary research questions are:

1. Is an approach similar to West Point appropriate for the education of intelligence professionals in such a way as it can be applied to the IC?
2. If an approach based on West Point is not appropriate, is another approach based upon other Army pre-commissioning programs such as OCS or ROTC more applicable?

This thesis answers the research questions stated above by examining several potential approaches that are screened using specific criteria within the framework of the formal Structured/Focused Methodology and a standardized interview methodology.

Structured/Focused Comparison Methodology

This thesis utilizes the Structured/Focused Comparison Methodology to examine the courses of action posed above. There are two key components to this methodology. The methodology is structured because it examines each approach against a common framework or evaluation criteria with the goal of answering the research question (George/Bennett 2002, 67). It is also focused because it only deals with certain defined aspects of each approach to provide a uniform basis for comparison (George/Bennett 2002, 67). This particular methodology was chosen because of the need for a focused
method of analysis as applied against a number of courses of action with disparate characteristics. For the purposes of this thesis, each of the three approaches was formally examined using the defined course of action (approach) screening criteria which are described later in the chapter.

**Interview Methodology**

To fully capitalize on the base of knowledge regarding the Army pre-commissioning programs resident in the Army community, six interviews were conducted. These interviews, although not large in number, were indeed important because of the significance of each person’s experience within their field. Informed consent for the use of information gained from the interviews was obtained through the standard Informed Consent Release Form, copies of which are found in Appendix A. The people interviewed and their biographies when available and operational security allowed are:

1. COL Michael Meese, Professor and Head of the Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York. COL Meese teaches economics and national security courses and leads the 70 military and civilian faculty members in the Department and the Combating Terrorism Center who teach political science, economics, and terrorism-related courses. He is a graduate of the National War College, an honor graduate of the Command and General Staff College, a distinguished graduate from the US Military Academy, and holds a Ph.D., MPA and an M. A. from the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University.
2. Mr. Howard Taylor, National Security Agency Fellow to the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York. Mr. Taylor serves as a faculty member and representative of the IC to the West Point Corps of Cadets.

3. Dr. John Persyn, Assistant Professor, Faculty and Staff Development Division, US Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. Dr. Persyn earned a Ph.D. in Adult Education.

4. Mr. Tom Barnhouse, Assistant Professor, Faculty and Staff Development Division, US Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. He earned a Master of Science degree in Adult and Continuing Education from Kansas State University.

5. Mr. Dallas L. Eubanks, Assistant Professor, Department of Tactics, US Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas and Former Professor of Military Science, Michigan Technological University, Houghton, Michigan. Mr. Eubanks earned a Bachelor of Science Degree (Journalism) from Arizona State University in 1988, and later a Master of Arts Degree (National Security and Strategic Studies) from the US Naval War College in 2000. He studied at the University of Oxford in Summer 2010, and is currently working on his Ph.D. in Security Studies at Kansas State University. He was named the Fort Leavenworth Military Instructor of the Year in 2006.

6. MAJ Gregory Vinciguerra, Former Assistant Professor of Military Science, Princeton University, Princeton New Jersey. MAJ Vinciguerra is currently a student at the Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas.
The interviews were conducted in person where possible. Telephonic interviews were conducted when time and distance made personal interviews impractical and in all instances, written notes were taken of interview responses. Initial interview questions were standardized with follow up questions asked as deemed necessary by the author. However, not every author had an opinion regarding every topic of discussion. The primary questions were:

1. Do you believe the West Point education experience can be adapted for use by the IC?
2. If an “academy” style experience is not feasible, would an education model based on a shorter OCS or ROTC paradigm be appropriate?
3. How does a profession establish a culture of collaboration?
4. How does a profession inculcate professional identity?
5. Assuming that the IC needs to improve its collaborative processes, what other aspects do you believe are important to instill collaboration?

Potential Approaches

This thesis addresses the primary and secondary research questions by examining three approaches to adapt the Army pre-commissioning programs to the IC. They are examined via the primary research methodology using five screening criteria. The three potential approaches are:

1. A four year undergraduate National Intelligence Academy based on the West Point model of instruction. This approach would begin with a small class size and a core cadre of professors and instructors who would be drawn from the civilian
IC as a whole and would then ideally expand to include an ever-increasing number of new potential employees.

2. A much shorter IC Officers Basic Course that is based on the US Army’s Federal Officer Candidate School (OCS) at Ft. Benning, Georgia. In effect, this approach approximates an officer candidate school for civilian intelligence officers. This approach would likely be approximately 13 weeks in length and would receive employees who had an existing undergraduate degree and quickly inculcate them with the requisite base of knowledge to operate in the IC. Due to the relatively short instruction period, this approach would necessitate using some method to quickly bond the class in order to facilitate enduring collaboration, most likely by increasing the significance of the immersion experience. A variation on this approach would be similar to the National Guard OCS as implemented by the various states. Because of the constraints of National Guard service (one weekend per month and two weeks per year), this program accepts soldiers who already possess an undergraduate degree and who have passed a rigorous selection process. These soldiers then receive the same training and curriculum of those that attend Federal OCS but in a format that extends throughout the course of a year.

3. A third approach involves classroom instructional preparation separate from a period of immersion. This approach is analogous to the Army Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) and offers many of the same benefits to include a curriculum that allows for a diverse education and a separate six to eight week
immersion experience without the all-encompassing nature of an academy environment.

**Evaluation Criteria**

In order to answer the research questions, analysis of potential approaches are evaluated using a modified version of the Army Course of Action (COA) screening criteria found in FM 5-0, The Operations Process. Results are as follows:

- **Feasible**: The approach is possible with respect to resources and time. Considerations of time, rough cost estimate, and the potential political and civilian agency support are also feasibility considerations. Other feasibility concerns include the ability to procure adequate facilities, instructors, accreditation, and an appropriate candidate pool.

- **Acceptable**: The approach must balance cost and risk with the potential benefit for both the IC and the participants. Included in the cost/benefit analysis for this thesis is the potential for security violations and counter-intelligence threats that may arise from the potential approaches. The cost/benefit analysis must also be acceptable from the perspective of the student with regard to career and personal incentives derived from participating in each approach.

- **Suitable**: The approach applies and attempts to answer the research question. Specifically, this criterion examines how thoroughly each approach answers the research questions with respect to the ability to build professional identity into the IC as a potential means to increase collaboration.

- **Distinguishable**: Each approach must differ from others by at least one significant characteristic.

- **Complete**: The approach must be capable of answering all aspects of the primary research question and must address aspects of the secondary research questions. (Headquarters, Department of the Army 2010, B-15)

Although the Army Course of Action Screening Criteria are doctrinally used as screening criteria for courses of action, this thesis alternately uses these modified versions as evaluation criteria and an integral part of the Structured/Focused Methodology. At this point, each approach can now be examined using the methodology and evaluation criteria as described.
CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS

The primary research question this thesis addresses is: Can the training and education methods used by the US Army pre-commissioning programs be applied to the US IC to form a comprehensive and complete approach to improve collaboration among civilian intelligence agencies? The secondary research questions are:

1. Is an approach similar to West Point appropriate for the education of intelligence professionals in such a way as it can be applied to the IC?

2. If an approach based on West Point is not appropriate, is another approach based upon other Army pre-commissioning programs such as OCS or ROTC more applicable?

This thesis examines the primary and secondary research questions by examining three approaches to adapt one of the Army pre-commissioning programs to the IC. They are examined via a primary research method using interviews and a number of evaluation criteria. The three potential approaches are:

1. A four year undergraduate National Intelligence Academy based on the West Point model of instruction. This approach would begin with a small class size and a core cadre of professors and instructors who would be drawn from the civilian IC as a whole and would then ideally expand to include an ever increasing number of new potential employees.

2. A much shorter IC Officers Basic Course that is based on the US Army’s Federal OCS at Ft. Benning, Georgia. This approach would likely be approximately 13 weeks in length and would enroll employees who had an
existing undergraduate degree and sufficient experience in an intelligence agency and quickly inculcate them with the requisite base of knowledge to collaborate effectively in the IC. A variation on this approach is the National Guard OCS as implemented by the various states. This method was developed by various states and is designed to prepare officers for service in each state’s respective National Guard. Because of the constraints of National Guard service (one weekend per month and two weeks per year), this program accepts soldiers who already possess an undergraduate degree and who have passed a rigorous selection process. These soldiers then receive the same training and curriculum of those that attend Federal OCS but in a format that extends throughout the course of a year.

3. A third approach involves classroom instructional preparation separate from a period of immersion. This approach is analogous to the Army ROTC and offers many of the same benefits to include a curriculum that allows for a diverse education and a separate immersion experience without the all-encompassing nature of an intelligence academy.

There are five evaluation criteria used to evaluate each approach:

**Feasible**: The approach is possible with respect to resources and time. Considerations of time, rough cost estimate, and the potential political and civilian agency support are also feasibility considerations. Other feasibility concerns include the ability to procure adequate facilities, instructors, accreditation, and an appropriate candidate pool.

**Acceptable**: The approach must balance cost and risk with the potential benefit for both the IC and the participants. Included in the cost/benefit analysis for this thesis is the potential for security violations and counter-intelligence threats that may arise from the potential approaches. The cost/benefit analysis must also be acceptable from the perspective of the student with regard to career and personal incentives derived from participating in each approach.
Suitable: The approach applies and attempts to answer the research question. Specifically, this criterion examines how thoroughly each approach answers the research questions with respect to the ability to build professional identity into the IC as a potential means to increase collaboration.

Distinguishable: Each approach must differ from others by at least one significant characteristic.

Complete: The approach must be capable of answering all aspects of the primary research question and must address aspects of the secondary research questions. (Headquarters, Department of the Army 2010, B-15)

Each approach can now be analyzed by examining the concepts for the potential students, instructors, curriculum, budget, and incentives. The descriptions of each approach contain details that are possible variations and are presented as a representative example only for evaluation purposes. It is not the intention of this thesis to assert that the descriptions of each approach are the only options for implementation. Nor is it the intention of the thesis to assert that the evaluation criteria represent a complete analysis of each evaluation component. Rather, they represent an initial analysis based on the literature review and interview results. Further and more extensive study of the nature recommended in chapter 5 is necessary for a full development of each approach.

The National Intelligence Academy Approach

The National Intelligence Academy approach may be based upon the 47 month academic schedule of the United States Military Academy at West Point (USMA Academic Affairs 2007, 4). The ideal setting for such an academy would be a facility within driving distance of the Washington, D.C. Metro area to ensure ease of access to the headquarters of each of the civilian intelligence agencies. However, to reduce costs, a re-purposed facility (perhaps a redesigned campus such as the National Intelligence University) of sufficient size may be adapted to fit the needs of the academy. The facility should be of sufficient size to include classrooms, lodging, recreation, fitness, and
outdoor training facilities. However, it should also be designed to be segregated from the
general public to contribute to the security of the facility and the effectiveness of the
immersion experiences.

The academy will likely attract younger applicants as it will involve the pursuit of
an undergraduate degree and an intensive program of instruction, much like that of West
Point. A cornerstone of West Point education is that it focuses on entry level employees
(in this case, Army cadets who aspire to be officers) who are typically younger and less
experienced. A prominent journal article documents that younger people are better able to
develop complex problem solving skills and learn subjects rooted in technology (Baltes
1993, 580-594). Despite this assertion, the same article also admits that learning is a
continuous process and that older people learn differently (Baltes 1993, 581). However,
unlike West Point, it will not be exclusive based on age, marital status, dependent status,
the results of an intensive physical fitness test, or the ability to secure a nomination from
an elected official. All those who meet entrance requirements will be eligible to attend.
Entrance requirements will be similar to that of any selective university to include
standardized test scores, high school or undergraduate grades, the results of an in-person
interview, and because of the potential physical requirements of the intelligence
profession, a physical exam. The Defense Language Aptitude Battery will also be
administered during the interview process and be used as a basis for admission. Entrance
to the academy will likely be administered by a panel of intelligence officers and
educators at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) level. Depending
on interest and capacity, inaugural classes at the academy will likely start with several
hundred students and scale up as needed to support the demand of graduates from each
civilian intelligence agency. The ideal student for the academy would be a highly qualified and service minded individual who also would likely be competitive for an appointment at a service academy. Successful completion of the academy would ensure employment to a position within the IC.

The instructors for the intelligence academy likely will be permanent employees of the academy who are augmented by rotational instructors from the IC. These instructors may have been previous faculty from each of the agencies separate colleges and training programs, but it is important that experienced field officers are also incorporated. Each instructor will be certified to teach by the ODNI and possess not only superior academic credentials, but also a demonstrated commitment to collaboration and a desire to teach new employees. The instructors will not remain employees of their parent agency, but will instead be hired, rated, and evaluated by the leadership of the academy, which should be comprised of experienced members of the Senior Executive Service.

The curriculum of the academy should be determined by the Dean of the College in conjunction with the ODNI and will be comprised of a common core of classes as well as optional broadening fields of study. The successful completion of the program leads to a Bachelor of Science degree in Intelligence Studies which will meet the requirements for national accreditation through the Commission on Higher Education. A representative academic program may look similar to the four year curriculum utilized by West Point.
Table 1. National Intelligence Academy Academic Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fourth Class Year</th>
<th>Third Class Year</th>
<th>Second Class Year</th>
<th>First Class Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intro to Calculus</td>
<td>Calculus II</td>
<td>English IV</td>
<td>Internship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemistry I/II</td>
<td>Prob and Statistics</td>
<td>Political Science III/IV</td>
<td>Internship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History I/II</td>
<td>History III</td>
<td>Foreign Language IV</td>
<td>Internship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Language I/II</td>
<td>Foreign Language III</td>
<td>Intelligence Law</td>
<td>Internship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Psychology I</td>
<td>English III</td>
<td>Intelligence Operations</td>
<td>Elective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English I/II</td>
<td>Political Science I/II</td>
<td>Advanced Analytical Skills</td>
<td>Intelligence Practical Exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intro to Intelligence</td>
<td>Intelligence Collection</td>
<td>Elective</td>
<td>Intelligence Certification Courses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical Analysis</td>
<td>Intelligence Analysis</td>
<td>Lifetime Sports</td>
<td>Elective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethics/Honor</td>
<td>Collaborative Methods</td>
<td>Collaboration Tools</td>
<td>Collaboration Capstone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership Fundamentals</td>
<td>Leadership Reaction Course</td>
<td>Intro to Weapons</td>
<td>Weapons/Tactics/Combative Skills</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The curriculum includes a core curriculum with intensive periods of language study, intelligence specific courses to expand the students’ knowledge of the IC as a whole and specific instruction on ethics, honor, and collaboration skills that continue throughout the duration of the program. It also includes leadership instruction as well as courses designed to instill professional identity through shared hardship experiences such
as weapons training and a leadership reaction course. After the second class (junior) year, the ODNI assesses students to determine which agency they will join upon graduation. That decision will be partially determined by overall class rank and partially by student preference, much the same as career fields and branches are determined at West Point.

The budget for such an academy will likely be its greatest barrier to implementation. Utilizing an analysis of the projected cost of a similar institution for the public service sector (in this case, a proposed Public Service Academy), the estimated cost of total construction would be approximately $600 million, with $200+ million in annual operating costs (Martin 2007, 20). This estimate assumes new construction with a student body comprising 1800 students and with facilities similar to that of other service academies (with the exception of a few spaces, there would be no need for the entire facility to be secured for classified information). The current yearly operating budget for West Point in FY 11 is $132 million, with a number of federal programs contributing to offset costs (USMA Board of Visitors 2011). However, this operating budget does not include the cost for the salaries of faculty who are active duty officers. The approximate cost per graduate is estimated using FY ’97 dollars at $340,000 (Tench Francis School of Business 2004, 7). Although federal and state funding will offset operating costs, the initial appropriation of construction funds may be a significant political and practical point of contention to the ODNI.

Given the amount of resources dedicated to training each student, both the employee and the gaining agency will require a significant return on their respective investments. The student should expect to receive recognition for completing a demanding and tailored degree program with preferential assignments and consideration
for accelerated promotion. MAJ Egli, in her monograph previously mentioned in the
literature review, examined collaboration between the Department of Homeland Security
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation using noted psychologist Edgar Schein’s
organizational culture model and concluded that collaboration could be increased by
rewarding collaborative behavior (Egli 2011, Abstract). The gaining agency will receive
an employee who has received extensive education and training as an intelligence officer
and should expect an officer who is far more prepared than his or her peers. Due to the
significant investment by the government, an additional service obligation will likely be
necessary, with the current obligation being two years of service to the civilian agency
for every year of sponsored training. The intelligence academy graduate will also be
entitled to wear a lapel pin or badge identification device signifying graduation from the
academy. These will also be a visual representation of the professional identity that
graduates will share, as well as identifying graduates from non-graduates.

Two observations by the individuals interviewed offered input that relates to this
approach. Mr. Howard Taylor, the National Security Agency representative to West
Point, commented that the academy setting fosters such experiences as a common core
education, shared hardship, and competition that create a basis of collaboration within a
class (Taylor 2011). MAJ Gregory Vinciguerra noted that such training events as
leadership reaction courses and some form of physical training are rapid methods to bond
students and begin to instill identity (Vinciguerra 2011). Although these events are not
unique to an academy approach, a National Intelligence Academy does maximize the
opportunities for these events to take place. Given this information, the screening criteria
can now be used to examine this approach.
Feasible

The intelligence academy approach has challenges with respect to feasibility. Although likely the most comprehensive approach to the issues affecting the IC, it is also the most expensive approach when compared to the other approaches (described in the following paragraphs). It also involves significant time for construction and support from all participating civilian intelligence agencies. Political and fiscal planning is also intensive for this approach, as is the infrastructure necessary to facilitate an appropriate instructor and candidate pool.

Acceptable

This approach may not have an acceptable cost/benefit ratio due to the high initial and recurring monetary costs involved, as well as the political costs that involve the supporting civilian intelligence agencies. It is however, the most secure option from a counter-intelligence perspective because it would be a dedicated facility and the potential for significant personal and career incentives for the students are high because of the longer and more rigorous nature of the approach.

Suitable

This approach addresses the primary and the first secondary research question by determining that the education and training methods utilized by the Army pre-commissioning programs, and specifically West Point, can apply to the IC. It is also potentially the most comprehensive approach to increase collaboration within the IC as a whole.
Distinguishable

This approach is significantly different from the other two approaches.

Complete

The approach is capable of addressing all aspects of the primary research question and fully addresses the first secondary research question. It is the most complete of the approaches, as it addresses all aspects of building collaborative behavior as identified in the literature review. It also provides the most opportunities for collaborative reflection which is an integral component of experiential and transformational learning (Eyler 2009).

Given this analysis, the subsequent IC Officers Basic Course approach can now be examined.

The IC Officers Basic Course Approach (Analogous to OCS)

This approach involves several possible variations. One an approximately 13 week continuous program; the other is a one weekend per month based program with an integrated immersion experience with a total duration of a year. Because of the short duration of the program, this would likely be a program that students would attend within one year of employment at a civilian intelligence agency. This approach represents an important distinction from the intelligence academy model, in which selection and accession to an agency would occur after program completion.

This approach would likely be located near the National Capital Region and could be purpose built, or utilize a number of military facilities in the area that may offer the resources and space necessary for student training. Possible locations include Camp
Frettard, Maryland or Edgewood Area, Maryland. Both locations are suitable with regard to space and resources. They also both conduct the Virginia State OCS program (the training areas, although located in Maryland, host the Virginia OCS program because of their proximity to the National Capital Region).

This approach can accommodate any number of students, but unlike the intelligence academy approach, would likely involve smaller classes because of the shorter duration of training. Because of the length of training, this approach would not offer a bachelor’s degree. Therefore, applicants must have an accredited undergraduate degree or be able to complete a degree within one year. The application process would again be managed by ODNI, with students evaluated on undergraduate and current job performance. The ideal candidate would be an existing employee of a civilian intelligence agency with less than one year of service and an excellent undergraduate academic record. Much like the intelligence academy approach, instructors would be drawn from the civilian intelligence agencies.

The curriculum would be tailored to the length of the program and consist of shortened versions of the intelligence-specific courses as described in the service academy approach. However, a strong foundation in honor, ethics, and collaborative techniques would remain, as would weapons familiarization and the leadership reaction course. Language training would be during short periods of immersion and online education. For the one weekend per month variation of this approach, an intensive two week immersion experience would be incorporated to assist in the formation of professional identity. Students would be assessed through instructor feedback. Although this approach is based on a shorter duration military model, organizations that use a
military model to instill professional identity have a more collaborative nature and overall higher performance when compared with peer organizations that do not use the model (Katzenbach and Santamaria 2009, 1-4).

The budget for this approach would be variable based upon the necessity to alter an existing facility, or build a new facility. However, estimates for this approach place costs per student at approximately $32,000 not including upfront costs (Tench Francis School of Business 2004, 7). This represents a significant cost savings compared to the intelligence academy, but it also is a truncated training program. The incentives for the student and the parent intelligence agency are much the same as an intelligence academy. The graduate of this approach should expect to receive tangible career benefits, with the employing agency realizing a return on investment of a more prepared and employee who is equipped with the foundation for collaborative behavior. Graduates of this approach would likely also incur a service obligation of at least one year. However, those students who fail to graduate would have this failure annotated on their performance evaluation. A representative program of instruction may be represented by the following table.
Table 2. IC Officers Basic Course Program of Instruction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Week 1-4</th>
<th>Week 4-8</th>
<th>Week 8-11</th>
<th>Weeks 12-13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic</td>
<td>IC Overview</td>
<td>Advanced</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analytical</td>
<td></td>
<td>Analytical</td>
<td>Practical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skills</td>
<td></td>
<td>Skills</td>
<td>Exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intro to</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>Elective</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>Collection</td>
<td></td>
<td>Certification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Immersion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis</td>
<td>Analysis</td>
<td>Instruction</td>
<td>Exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethics/Honor</td>
<td>Collaborative</td>
<td>Collaboration</td>
<td>Collaboration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Methods</td>
<td>Tools</td>
<td>Capstone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>Intro to</td>
<td>Weapons/Tactics/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundamentals</td>
<td>Reaction</td>
<td>Weapons</td>
<td>Combative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Course</td>
<td></td>
<td>Skills/Graduation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Created by author.

Three individuals interviewed offered observations that identified this particular approach as having some tangible benefits to the IC as well as improving collaboration. COL Michael Meese, Professor and Head of the Department of Social Sciences at the United States Military Academy, realizes the value in a set of defining experiences, a common base of knowledge, and the value of incentives in the approach; however, he also states that the overall experience matters more than a degree program such as the intelligence academy approach (Meese 2011). Professor T. N. Barnhouse of the US Army Command and General Staff College recognizes that this approach also may have an advantage because potential students are existing employees of an intelligence agency who have already completed a bachelor’s degree program. Therefore, they likely have the advantage of maturity and possible leadership and collaboration experience (Barnhouse 2011). Professor John Persyn, also of the Command and General Staff College, reiterates the position that the duration of training is less important than ensuring that there is a
common component and sustained collaborative efforts after the training has concluded (Persyn 2011). The screening criteria identify some important distinctions between this approach and the intelligence academy approach.

**Feasible**

This approach is perhaps the most feasible of the three, with the lowest overall impact regarding budget, time investment required for students and agencies, as well as the facilities requirement. Because of the relatively short duration and budget required, political opposition should be greatly reduced when compared to the other two approaches.

**Acceptable**

This approach is very attractive with regard to cost/benefit for both students and civilian intelligence agencies. However, the potential for security violations and the counter-intelligence threat may be amplified because students and instructors will turnover at a relatively high rate when compared with the other approaches and there is therefore a higher likelihood of infiltration by agents of other nations. There are also likely fewer career incentives for the student when compared to the other approaches because of the short duration of the training and therefore fewer opportunities for substantive instruction.

**Suitable**

This approach addresses the primary research question and secondary research question two.
Distinguishable

This approach is significantly different than the other two approaches.

Complete

The IC Officers Basic Course is not as complete as the other two approaches because of the constrained timeline available for the education aspects of collaborative behavior. It may be more suited as a separate training program in addition to an approach designed to build collaboration within the IC, or as a potential stand-alone solution.

The ROTC Approach

The ROTC approach would represent a combination of aspects of the intelligence academy and the OCS approach in many ways, just as ROTC is for the Army. This approach would involve students earning an undergraduate degree in an accredited university while also participating in an intelligence curriculum. Much like in ROTC, there will also be an intensive, immersion experience that is separate from the university based program of instruction. The location could be any college or university, but would likely be limited to one or two locations because of cost and logistical considerations. An institution that has an existing ROTC program may have more resources such as leadership training and assessment locations that would be advantageous to this approach.

The students would ideally be comprised of 100-300 total and could either be direct entry into college or existing employees of civilian intelligence agencies without undergraduate degrees who are in their first year or two of employment. The entrance criteria would be similar to the other two approaches, with the grades of the last school attended, a personal interview, and any work experience being considered. The instructors would be
comprised of both the university’s existing faculty and faculty chosen from the civilian intelligence agencies.

The curriculum for this ROTC approach would most likely entail a normal undergraduate course of instruction according to the student’s desires and the needs of the IC. The intelligence specific curriculum would be similar to the intelligence academy approach. However, graduates of this program would receive a bachelor’s degree in their chosen field. If the university approves, a minor in Intelligence Studies could also be earned. The leadership, language instruction, collaboration, ethics, and honor curriculum would also be identical to the intelligence academy approach and would last the entire program of study. There should also be an immersive experience during one summer similar to the Leadership Development and Assessment Course\(^2\) that Army ROTC students pass. Because each student would essentially be on a full scholarship, funded by the IC, the service obligation would be one year of service for every year of education. A representative academic program for the ROTC approach may appear as in the table below.

\(^2\)The Leadership Development and Assessment Course is a five week immersive experience that each contracted ROTC student must complete before commissioning.
Table 3. ROTC Approach Academic Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Freshman Year</th>
<th>Sophomore Year</th>
<th>Junior Year</th>
<th>Summer</th>
<th>Senior Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Core Course 1</td>
<td>Core Course 4</td>
<td>English IV</td>
<td></td>
<td>Academic Major Course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core Course 2</td>
<td>Core Course 5</td>
<td>Academic Major Course</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core Course 3</td>
<td>Core Course 6</td>
<td>Foreign Language IV</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Language I/II</td>
<td>Foreign Language III</td>
<td>Intelligence Law</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Psychology I</td>
<td>English III</td>
<td>Intelligence Operations</td>
<td></td>
<td>Intelligence Minor Course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English I/II</td>
<td>Political Science I/II</td>
<td>Advanced Analytical Skills</td>
<td></td>
<td>Intelligence Minor Course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intro to Intelligence</td>
<td>Intelligence Collection</td>
<td>Academic Major Course</td>
<td></td>
<td>Intelligence Minor Course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical Analysis</td>
<td>Intelligence Analysis</td>
<td>Academic Major Course</td>
<td></td>
<td>Intelligence Minor Course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethics/Honor</td>
<td>Collaborative Methods</td>
<td>Collaboration Tools</td>
<td></td>
<td>Collaboration Capstone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership Fundamentals</td>
<td>Leadership Reaction Course</td>
<td>Intro to Weapons</td>
<td></td>
<td>Weapons/Tactics/Combative Skills</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comprehensive Immersion Experience

Source: Author. Adapted from the National Intelligence University Curriculum Model.

The budget for this approach would be somewhere between that of an intelligence academy and the OCS approach, depending on any additional construction, personnel costs, or modification of existing facilities at the college or university. Each Army ROTC scholarship student costs approximately $86,000 per year of education, depending on the cost of the host college or university (Tench Francis School of Business 2004, 7). As an example of the average budget of a ROTC department with relatively high enrollment, the University of Washington received $2,483,967 in incoming scholarship funding from the Department of Defense, with total funding as $6,685,903; this figure does not include
$215,783 in operating expenses that is provided by the university (University of Washington 2012, 7). This is the budget data for an ROTC program with 330 students. For this approach, the funding would likely be of a similar nature, but provided by the IC Title 50 funds instead of Department of Defense Title 10 funds. Regarding the cost/benefit of the ROTC approach, one series of studies indicate that the ROTC approach is far more cost effective than any academy solution because of the inherent overhead costs of an academy that do not necessarily graduate a better student (Bradford and Lehrer 1999, 56-57).

The incentives for completing this course of instruction would be very similar to those realized in the intelligence academy approach. LTC Dallas Eubanks, USA, Ret. is a former ROTC Professor of Military Science and sees lasting value in this ROTC approach. He characterizes the ROTC approach as better preparing graduates for the realities of the workforce and as better emphasizing interpersonal skills that contribute to the formation of professional identity which contribute to collaboration (Eubanks 2011).

**Feasible**

This approach is a true balance between the other two approaches, both in budget and impact to the civilian intelligence agencies. It is feasible with respect to the budget, the potential for political support at the national and agency level, and the ability to educate/train students. However, this approach would likely involve political considerations at the university level that is outside the scope of this thesis.
Acceptable

This approach is very attractive with regard to cost/benefit for both students and civilian intelligence agencies. The overall security and counter-intelligence threat is more significant than either the Intelligence Academy or IC Officers Basic Course because of its inherent location in the vicinity of a civilian university with the resulting uncleared personnel and uncontrolled environment.

Suitable

This approach addresses the primary research question and secondary research question two.

Distinguishable

This approach is significantly different than the other two approaches.

Complete

The approach sufficiently addresses secondary research question two and partially answers the primary research question. The ROTC approach, much like the OCS approach, does adapt the Army pre-commissioning education and training methods to fit the needs of the IC. However, it also provides an environment that is less comprehensive in scope with regard to immersive experiences when compared to the National Intelligence Academy approach.

Given the overview of the three approaches, each approach can now be compared and evaluated. A chart is used to compare each approach against the evaluation criterion. Numerical values from zero to two are assigned to each of the approaches according to how well they answer the primary research question and to what extent they satisfy the
stated FAS-DC evaluation criterion. A value of zero indicates that the approach does not sufficiently meet the criterion; a value of one indicates the approach partially meets the criterion, and a value of two indicates that the approach fully meets the evaluation criterion. Note that this approach comparison is not representative of every statistic that could be utilized to evaluate each of the approaches. It represents an initial evaluation based on the information and literature available. Subsequent analysis will require a more defined analytical model.

Table 4. Approach Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Feasible</th>
<th>Acceptable</th>
<th>Suitable</th>
<th>Distinguishable</th>
<th>Complete</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Overall Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Intelligence Academy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IC Officers Basic Course</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROTC Approach</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Created by author.

The comparison did not weight any of the evaluation criteria because each element of the criterion is equally critical to the overall success of the approach. The approach comparison indicates that the National Intelligence Academy approach is the more complete approach and the overall best solution that answers the research questions.
With this realization, conclusions and recommendations can now be determined for the future implementation of this approach.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

This thesis partially answered the primary research question through analysis of literature and interview methodology: Can the training and education methods used by the US Army pre-commissioning programs be applied to the US IC to form a comprehensive and complete approach to improve collaboration among civilian intelligence agencies? In order to answer this research question, potential approaches were evaluated by modifying the Army Course of Action (COA) screening criteria to serve as evaluation criteria. In addition to the primary research question, two secondary research questions enabled the thesis to expand on the primary question and serve to narrow the scope of the potential approaches:

1. Is an approach similar to West Point appropriate for the education of intelligence professionals in such a way as it can be applied to the IC?
2. If an approach based on West Point is not appropriate, is another approach based upon other Army pre-commissioning programs such as OCS or ROTC more applicable?

The primary thesis statement for this work is that one of the US Army’s pre-commissioning programs can be adapted and applied for use by the civilian IC in order to improve collaboration and information exchange.

The primary research question was addressed by a comprehensive review of complimentary literature and the statements of subject matter experts. Additionally, this thesis addressed secondary research question one by asserting through analysis that an
approach similar to West Point is appropriate for the education of intelligence professionals and is applicable to the civilian IC in such a way that it will improve collaboration. For this thesis, although three distinct approaches were considered, the National Intelligence Academy approach appears to be the overall best solution to address collaboration challenges within the IC. While a National Intelligence Academy is likely the most budget intensive approach, it nonetheless represents the most complete and comprehensive solution with respect to curriculum, building collaborative behavior, and the opportunity for immersive experiences to address the serious issues of intelligence collaboration. Based upon these conclusions, this author has identified some potential key recommendations for further study and how a National Intelligence Academy might be structured.

**Areas for Further Study**

To ensure a detailed focus for the thesis, assumptions and delimitations were adopted that limited the scope of the research and recommended approaches. There are a number of topics that would contribute to the analytical depth of aspects related to intelligence and collaboration. Some include:

1. An education theory and empirical study based examination that addresses the length of education as it relates to collaborative behavior and how long education programs should be in order to effect lasting change. Likewise, a study may also examine the benefits of instilling collaborative behavior at the undergraduate level as opposed to graduate level education.
2. A more intensive examination of the three potential approaches based on the Army pre-commissioning programs with respect to education methods and theory.
A graduate level thesis or dissertation would likely be necessary to fully explore why the Army pre-commissioning programs are effective and how these principles can be applied to the IC.

3. More extensive cost/benefit analysis of each approach with respect to an in-depth fiscal analysis that considers procurement cost, operations and management cost, recurring vs. non-recurring budget items, and total lifecycle costs.

4. Analysis of each approach from a political perspective and the processes involved to secure federal funding. This may include an analysis of legislators that are likely to support such an approach, the sub-committees in the House of Representatives and Senate that would need to consider and approve the approach, and any cost sharing agreements that would be necessary between the IC and other sources of funding.

5. Expanded training and education approaches tailored to other branches of the government that may benefit from an adaptation of the recommended approach to improve collaboration within their respective organizations.

6. Analysis of the second and third order effects if the recommended approach is implemented. This may include a detailed study on how diversity and performance management is affected as well as a long term performance management study that compares the collaborative behavior of graduates of the recommended approach versus non-graduates.

**Potential Recommendations for a National Intelligence Academy**

To fully realize the potential that a National Intelligence Academy offers to the IC, it may maximize its effectiveness by making allowances for:
1. A common core curriculum of intelligence instruction—This aspect is fundamental to developing a shared basis of knowledge from which specialization can occur. In addition, students will benefit from instruction in an inherently joint environment where the instructors and student body are comprised from several different intelligence agencies.

2. An immersion experience that is designed to bond students and enhance instruction—These experiences are common, in some form, to all US Army pre-commissioning education and training. They have proven successful for quickly bonding diverse students. The thesis indicates that this bonding experience assists in building the fundamentals of collaboration.

3. The opportunity for language testing via the Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB) or a similar assessment as well as instruction at the appropriate level of each student’s proficiency. Foreign language development is invaluable to the IC, not only for practical application, but for the enhanced understanding of foreign cultures that result from this education. Foreign language proficiency is also often rewarded within the IC in the form of a monthly stipend and expanded assignment opportunities. As a result, this can serve as an additional incentive to participate in the education and training approaches described in this thesis.

4. Tangible incentives—Incentives should include tangible components such as distinctive lapel pins or badge attachments, a monetary stipend, and equitable opportunities for promotion and assignments based upon merit. The intangible incentives of increased sense of professional identity and the synergy that results from collaboration will quickly result.
5. A strong foundation in the principles of ethics and honor—This instruction will emphasize that both are indispensable to the IC and form the building blocks of professional identity. The students should sign and live by an honor code that is common to the US Army that states that they will not “lie, cheat, steal, or tolerate those that do.” Another tenet that should be just as ingrained as honor is collaboration, a primary purpose of the National Intelligence Academy. Students should also sign a pledge and receive daily indoctrination on the meaning and techniques of collaboration to include the concepts of information sharing, how to navigate bureaucracy and the meaning of the guidance provided by the DNI regarding “need to know vs. responsibility to provide.” This instruction should also include detailed classes on proper security classification to ensure ease of collaboration, and use of the various online collaboration tools that have failed to independently achieve their intended purpose of bridging the gap between intelligence agencies.

6. A modified program of physical training and familiarization with military tactics and weapons. Although these skills should not necessarily be a “testable” aspect of the instruction, it is a cornerstone Army pre-commissioning skill and a proven tool for building cohesion. They also are skills that often are valuable at some point in the course of a career in intelligence and useful for professional training and personal growth. This instruction should not be seen as a discriminator against students of differing abilities and should be implemented in full compliance with equal opportunity regulations.
7. A comprehensive, detailed study to fully develop the approach prior to expenditure of funds.

**Recommendations**

Because of the necessity for a significant amount of federal funding, planning, and upfront costs associated with the establishment of a National Intelligence Academy, this author has several recommendations. Most importantly, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence should commission an interagency staff study to determine necessary first steps, assess the level of support across the civilian intelligence agencies, and begin to establish political support. After these initial actions when federal funding is secured, site selection and competitions for the design of the academy can begin. With these steps, the nation’s first National Intelligence Academy may soon be postured to increase collaboration across the civilian IC.
APPENDIX A

INFORMED CONSENT FOR USE OF ORAL HISTORIES

CONSENT AND USE AGREEMENT FOR ORAL HISTORY MATERIALS

You have the right to choose whether or not you will participate in this oral history interview, and one you begin you may cease participating at any time without penalty. The anticipated risk to you in participating is negligible and no direct personal benefit has been offered for your participation. If you have questions about this research study, please contact the student at: _______ or Dr. Robert F. Baumann, Director of Graduate Degree Programs, at (913) 684-2742.

To: Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Room 4508, Lewis & Clark Center
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

1. I, Michael J. Meese ________, participated in an oral history interview conducted by
   Matt Wilder ________, a graduate student in the Master of Military Art and Science
   Degree Program, on the following date [s]: 29 October 2011 ________ concerning the
   following topic: Developing an Intel Academy and related approaches to the Profession.

2. I understand that the recording [s] and any transcript resulting from this oral history will belong to
   the U.S. Government to be used in any manner deemed in the best interests of the Command and
   General Staff College or the U.S. Army, in accordance with guidelines posted by the Director,
   Graduate Degree Programs and the Center for Military History. I also understand that subject to
   security classification restrictions I will be provided with a copy of the recording for my professional
   records. In addition, prior to the publication of any complete edited transcript of this oral history, I
   will be afforded an opportunity to verify its accuracy.

3. I hereby expressly and voluntarily relinquish all rights and interests in the recording [s] with the
   following caveat:
   X None Other:

I understand that my participation in this oral history interview is voluntary and I may stop
participating at any time without explanation or penalty. I understand that the tapes and transcripts
resulting from this oral history may be subject to the Freedom of Information Act, and therefore, may
be releasable to the public contrary to my wishes. I further understand that, within the limits of the
law, the U.S. Army will attempt to honor the restrictions I have requested to be placed on these
materials.

Michael J. Meese
Name of Interviewee

Michael J. Meese
Signature

15 Nov 11
Date

Matt Wilder

Accented on Behalf of the Army by

Date


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Dr. Ralph Doughty  
Interagency Chair  
USACGSC  
100 Stimson Avenue  
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

Mr. Mark Wilcox  
DJIMO  
USACGSC  
100 Stimson Avenue  
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

Ms. Elizabeth Bochtler  
Chair of Intelligence Studies  
USACGSC  
100 Stimson Avenue  
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

COL William Raymond  
Director, SALT  
USACGSC  
100 Stimson Avenue  
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

Ms. Letitia A. Long  
Director  
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency  
7500 GEOINT Drive  
Springfield, VA 22150-7500