THE EFFECTIVE INTEGRATION OF THE ICGLR TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE SECURITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE GLR OF AFRICA

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

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Strategic Studies

by

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The Effective Integration of the ICGLR towards Sustainable Security and Economic Development in the GLR of Africa

Following the 1994 genocide an estimated two million people fled the country into exile in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The group that fled was comprised of a formidable military force in varying states of combat readiness. Seventeen years after the genocide, its contesting effects still haunts the Great Lakes Region of Africa.

Until recently the region has been marred by violence perpetrated in the DRC rural areas by the armed rebel groups from both Rwanda and Uganda. Today the Democratic Forces for Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a rebel group that masterminded the 1994 Tutsi genocide is believed to use vast regional and international networks to bolster their supply of arms, recruit extra soldiers with intention to destabilize Rwanda. The regional arrangements in response to the FDLR’s threats have primarily been individual state based. Under the auspices of the UN and African Union (AU), the ICGLR was established in 2006 as a regional organization tailored towards providing sustainable security and development in the GLR. This thesis will show that the ICGLR is not an honest broker; it is an organization comprised of representatives from eleven nations which all have their own national interests to pursue. It will highlight that the ICGLR is not the UN of the GLR and therefore cannot accomplish much due to current structural conditions in the region. It will recommend possible courses of action to address structural issues to make the ICGLR’s strategy more effective for sustainable security and economic development to the GLR.

The ICGLR’s strategy, Great Lakes Region of Africa, Stabilty and economic development
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

THE EFFECTIVE INTEGRATION OF THE ICGLR TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE SECURITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE GLR OF AFRICA, by Major Pascal Nzaramba, 103 pages.

Following the 1994 genocide an estimated two million people fled the country into exile in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The group that fled was comprised of a formidable military force in varying states of combat readiness. Seventeen years after the genocide, its contesting effects still haunts the Great Lakes Region of Africa.

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<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<td>FAR</td>
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<td>LRA</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Problem Statement

For more than 16 years the Great Lakes Region (GLR) of Africa has been the most troubled part of the world. Exacerbated by the 1994 Rwandan genocide, violent conflicts and civil wars have caused overwhelming suffering and loss of lives. Although much effort has been made in the past to bring an end to the escalation of violence and conflict in the region, there has been limited achievement to this end. The collapse of democratic institutions to some extent has undermined efforts tailored towards sustainable peace and security. Currently, there is danger of organized armed violence perpetrated on Rwandans by the former Rwandan Armed Forces (ex-FAR) who committed genocide then fled the country to Zaire now referred to as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). As the situation stands, the ex- FAR who fled the country have formed a formidable military force capable not only of destabilizing Rwanda but also the region as a whole.

It is believed that the ex-FAR who occupy rich gold regions of the Congo forests use vast regional and international networks to bolster their supply of arms (United Nations 2009). Regional response to these emerging threats has primarily been individual state based. These arrangements have increasingly undermined not only regional, but also international initiatives towards sustainable security and regional development. The security dilemma in the GLR calls for collective measures towards the restoration of peace and security, and development.
Background

Approaching the GLR crisis that emerged following the 1994 Rwandan genocide requires a comprehensive synergy by the international community and a regional initiative. After the genocide in Rwanda, an estimated two million Rwandan refugees fled the country into the DRC. Worse still, the group comprised of former Rwandan Army (ex-FAR) and militia (the Interahamwe) who committed genocide regrouped into a rebel organization called the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). Currently the FDLR are largely responsible for the spread of violence in the DRC and the greater parts of the region. According to the UN, the rebels are believed to use vast regional and international networks to bolster their supply of arms (United Nations 2009). The global witness describes the FDLR as having a stranglehold on the mineral trade in large parts of south Kivu. The FDLR’s economic activities is said to be successful in wider parts of the DRC and some local residents describe them as the ‘big businessmen’ (Global Witness report 2009).

Although deterioration of the security situation in the GLR manifested itself throughout both the colonial and post-colonial periods, the 1994 Rwandan genocide has become the defining moment for GLR security. Ms. Sadako Ogata, the former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, notes the fact that genocide in Rwanda was the culmination of decades of missed opportunities. Ogata highlights that though the genocide was stopped; its consequences have still not been dealt with adequately and have led to the deaths of tens, perhaps hundreds of thousands of more people whether by gun, by diseases or by starvation during the fighting in 1996-97 (Ogata 2000, 245).
The Security Situation in the GLR Post 1994 Rwandan Genocide

Despite the security and political instability that characterizes the GLR, the period that followed the 1994 genocide in Rwanda has had far reaching security implications. This is due to the defeated former Rwandan armed forces that regrouped and started attacking Rwanda from the DRC border. Post genocide experience in dealing with regional security problems have demonstrated that the international community was not willing or has been reluctant to effectively save the millions from the killings.

Filip Reyntjens, in his book *The Great African War*, underscores that, the sources of instability in the GLR were, in essence, domestic, reflecting as they did the political conflicts in Rwanda, Burundi, the Kivu and Zaire (Reyntjens 2009, 43). He argues that the sudden arrival of almost half a million Rwandans into the eastern province of Zaire the middle of 1994 was a culminating point and it engendered the very unstable political-military landscape in the GLR (Reyntjens 2009, 43). The source of the conflict was increased by the presence of rebels dedicated to the destruction of Rwanda. During these conflicts the Congolese authorities made extensive use of the Rwandan Hutu rebels, who now constituted FDLR leadership, to fight Rwanda (International Crisis Group 2009, 2). In addition, Reyntjens notes that Zaire’s President Mobutu’s regime was implicated in neighboring wars. It supported the Khartoum government in its wars against the southern Sudanese rebellion, and DRC territory served as a rear base for attacks by armed movements against Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi (Reyntjens 2009, 43). According to Ogata, the Rwandan genocide set in motion a series of events that are still in the process of unfolding. They include not only the exodus of Rwandan Hutus from the country, but also the collapse of the Mobutu regime in Zaire. Ogata notes that the large refugee camps
in Goma, in the Kivu province of eastern Zaire, were close to the Rwandan border and became a microcosm of Rwanda before 1994, and a significant military threat to the new government in Rwanda itself (Ogata 2000, 251).

Although it is not easy to ascertain the degree of support the DRC gave to the FDLR against the Rwandan government, Colin Thomas-Jensen, Noel Atama, and Olivia Caeymaex in their review of Operation Kimia II, note that the Congolese government frequently collaborated with the FDLR in the past. That dangerous alliance is one that the Rwandan government has consistently had to contend with to pursue the FDLR in the DRC (Jensen, Atama, and Caeymaex 2009). Similarly, the International Crisis Group’s African report holds that the former ex-FAR and their civilian associates represent an armed threat just a few dozen kilometers from Rwandan territory. The report underlines that the effort to neutralize FDLR rebels was the main drivers of the two regional wars that brought Kinshasa and Kigali into conflict in 1996-1997 and then again in 1998-2003 (International Crisis Group 2009).

During these conflicts, the Congolese authorities made extensive use of the Rwandan Hutu rebels, who constitute the FDLR, against Rwanda (International Crisis Group 2009). The unresolved ethnic tensions, exacerbated by the FDLR presence and a large population of refugees, have provoked regional and global outrage. As the situation on the Rwanda-DRC border got worse, Prunier notes that the basic cause which led Rwandan leadership to attack the DRC in September 1996 was the presence of the large, partially militarized refugee camps on its borders (Prunier 2009, 67). The reality is that Rwanda remained threatened due to the presence of the armed FDLR operating on its borders within the DRC. Moreover, Ogata argues that the Rwandan government
repeatedly requested the immediate repatriation of refugees or their removal away from the border area. It is true, “but this was more easily said than done” (Ogata 2000, 251).

The standing argument is that from the early 1995, the ex-FAR in eastern DRC mounted a series of cross-border attacks into Rwanda (Ogata 2000, 254). In Rwanda’s justification for attacking DRC territory and targeting the refugee camps in North and South Kivu was the need to put an end to armed incursions by the Hutu extremists based in the refugee camps (Ogata 2000, 262). Putting the situation into a security context, the Rwandan national security interest was at stake and therefore it was critical that the Rwandans intervene for self-preservation. While hope for an international response seemed to be remote, the right to self-defense was in favor of Rwanda. In fact, the several appeals made to the international community for action provided no realistic answers to the regional problems at hand.

According to Reyntjens the documents in his possession confirm that the ex-FAR were preparing a large scale offensive against Rwanda from Goma in northern and southern Bukavu in the eastern DRC. In agreement with other authors on the subject, Reyntjens claims that faced with the unwillingness or inability of the international community to tackle this problem, Kigali’s patience reached its limit (Reyntjens 2009, 47). Armed activities by the ex-FAR targeted not only Rwanda where they had come from, but also neighboring countries. For example, the March 1999 attack on Bwindi in southern Uganda that resulted in the death of several Americans and other tourists, and one Ugandan national park guard, was carried out by the Liberation Army of Rwanda (ALIR) (United States vs. Karake et al. 2006, 1).
Further accounts about the role of the DRC in support of the rebels is noted by former U.S Ambassador Robert Gribbin that ex-FAR forces at Kamina, southern DRC, military bases were being re-armed and otherwise supported by Kabila (Gribbin 2005, 279). Perhaps, the 1996 Rwanda and Uganda allied attack into the DRC was a reaction to the situation that seemed too much to bear as the FDLR continued their cross border attacks and human atrocities in the region. According to Reyntjens, Rwanda’s and Uganda’s combined allied attack followed an early warning that the situation was running out of control (Reyntjens 2009, 48). Similarly, Ogata contends that the failure to stop genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the failure to prevent militarization of the refugee camps at Goma in 1996-97, and the failure to effectively monitor the dispersal of the true Rwandan Hutu refugees taken hostage by the Hutu extremists has shown that if civil conflict and forced displacement are not properly addressed, the longer term consequences can be catastrophic (Ogata 2000, 272). This background sets a stage for this research on the effectiveness of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) in resolving the GLR’s current security problem.

**Primary Research Question**

What can be done to make the ICGLR more effective in addressing the current security problems in the GLR?

**Secondary Research Questions**

In order to provide reasoned answers to the primary research question, it is important also to answer the following questions:
1. What are the causes of conflict in the GLR and what are the approaches to mitigate the instability?

2. What is the ICGLR’s strategy and what are its associated ends, ways and means?

3. What are the regional member states’ of the ICGLR security interests and what do they have in common or in conflict?

4. What are the achievements of the ICGLR thus far in providing answers to the region’s security problems?

5. What are the likely risks to the ICGLR’s security strategy in the GLR?

Assumptions

The researcher sees the following assumptions to be valid for this research;

1. The ICGLR will continue to provide a consultative forum for collective bargaining in the field of security, stability, good governance and economic development in the GRL

2. Unilateral armed intervention among the member states is highly unlikely despite the slowness of actions against the FDLR in the DRC.

3. The International Community will continue to increase its support to the ICGLR’s initiative to defeat the FDLR.

4. Due to the experience of 1994 genocide, Rwanda will continue to lead in influencing positive change in the Great Lakes region.
Definition of Terms

For the purpose of this study, the following terms will be used throughout this research.

Acceptability: From the synergistic balance of ends, ways, and means, the acceptability of the strategy is based on the attainment of the objectives using the instruments of power in the manner envisioned accomplishes the strategic effects desired at acceptable costs. Do the strategic effects sought justify the objectives pursued, the methods used to achieve them and the costs in blood, treasure, and potential insecurity for the domestic and international communities? In this process one considers intangibles such as national will, public opinion, and actions/reactions of nations, allies, adversaries and actors (Yarger 2006).

Anarchical: A state of lawlessness where commitment to international or regional obligation is limited and questionable.

Conference: Means the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region

Conference Secretariat: The Secretariat of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region.

Cross-cutting Issues: Are the issues identified by the ICGLR to impact on GLR security to include institutional capacity, leadership, illegal minerals, armed rebels, and gender based violence.

Dar-Es-Salaam Declaration: The Declaration on Peace, Security, Democracy, and Development in the Great Lakes Region, adopted and signed at the first Summit of the Conference in Dar-Es-Salaam (United Republic of Tanzania on 20 November 2004)
Feasibility: From the synergistic balance of ends, ways, and means, the strategy achieves the attainment of the objectives using the instruments of power in the manner envisioned and accomplishes the strategic effects desired at acceptable costs. Can the strategic concept be executed with the resources available (Yarger 2006).

Forces for the Democratic Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR): The defeated former Rwandan Armed Forces responsible for masterminding the 1994 Tutsi genocide and now operating as the armed rebels on the DRC territory.

Fund: The Social Reconstruction and Development Fund established under the ICGLR Pact.


Marshall Fund: The U.S. funds provided to revitalize Post World War II devastation for rebuilding the European economies while bolstering democratic rule.

National Coordination Mechanisms: National Mechanisms responsible for facilitating the implementation of the Pact in the member states.


Program of Action: The Programs of Action adopted under the ICGLR Pact setting the guidelines (strategic ways) of implementation of the Pact.
Protocols: An instrument of agreement adopted or subsequently adopted under the Pact of ICGLR setting the objectives (Strategic ends of the ICGLR).

Regional Inter-Ministerial Committee: The organ composed of the Ministers of the member states in charge of the conference.

Strategy: A strategy is the employment of specific instruments of power (Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic) to achieve the political objectives of the state in collaboration or in competition with other actors pursuing their own possibly conflicting-objectives. A strategy must meet the criteria of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability determined by the ends, ways and means (Yarger 2006).

Structural problems in the GLR: Conditions reflecting obvious slowness both in social, economic and political change that makes it difficult to collectively approach critical regional security issues.

Suitability: From the synergistic balance of ends, ways, and means, the suitability of the strategy is the state of achieving the objectives using the instruments of power in the manner envisioned and accomplishes the strategic effects desired at acceptable costs. Will the attainment of the objectives using the instruments of power in the manner stated accomplish the strategic effect desired (Yarger 2006).

Summit: The organization composed of the Heads of States and Governments of Member States of the ICGLR.

Limitations

The research is conducted during the ongoing consultations and ongoing implementation of the ICGLR strategy. The researcher finds it likely that more relevant information on the subject may be published towards the conclusion of this research
period. As the research is concurrently conducted with other studies, time constraints may affect the comprehensive results. However, since the research methodology does not entail any fieldwork, only documents available in the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) will be used.

Scope and Delimitations

The ICGLR is comprised of eleven countries. The countries differ with regard to their institutional capacity to interact with the organization, but also with regard to their interests and degree of involvement in regional conflicts (Norad 2009). Moller notes that it is better to subdivide the continent into simple geographical sub-regions (Moller 2001). In order to pay particular focus on shared conflict, the GLR will be delineated into sub-regions suitable for the analytical purposes of this research into more manageable entities. The Norwegian Agency definition of the regional member countries in terms of core countries and peripheral countries forms a basis for an insightful scope of this research. In terms of space this research will be limited to the GLR core countries to include the DRC, Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda. In terms of subject matter, research focuses on the effectiveness of the ICGLR in sustainable peace, security and economic development in the GLR. In terms of time the research will cover the period from 1994 to the present. Nevertheless, the research will remain flexible to cite examples deemed relevant to the scope. This thesis is not a study of regional armed intervention and will not in any way discuss the future of ICGLR participation in military intervention in member countries.
Significance of the Study

The research seeks to re-examine the trends of current conflicts in the GLR within the framework of the ICGLR mechanisms to regional sustainable peace and development. If approached properly, the ICGLR’s strategy will provide a viable path to the regional conflict and security challenges that the region is facing. The researcher believes that the successful completion of this research will contribute to the academic body of knowledge as well as strengthen the culture of collective resolve to attain sustainable regional security and economic development.

Summary and Conclusions

Chapter 1 was an introduction to the topic of this thesis. It provided the overarching consequences of the 1994 Rwandan genocide to the GLR. Chapter 1 has provided the background and the justification for the establishment of the ICGLR. This chapter has stressed the importance of cooperative security as a measure to restore peace and sustainable regional security. The chapter 2 literature review will underscore relevant literature to provide realistic answers to this research. The purpose will be to identify known and unknown facts and assumptions in the study. The chapter 3 research methodology will describe the process that will be used to analyze the data presented in chapter 4 in order to provide recommendations on how to leverage and make the ICGLR’s overall strategy more effective. Chapter 4 conducts the analysis and provides synthesized answers found to the questions presented in this thesis. Chapter 5 will present conclusions and recommendations for more effective implementation of the ICGLR’s strategy for sustainable security and development.
CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The GLR constitutes one of the most insecure regions of Africa. This region’s security has been exacerbated by the foreign armed rebels operating from the DRC. Foreign armed rebel groups include the FDLR, responsible for orchestrating genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the Lord Resistance Army (LRA), and Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) from Uganda and the Alliance of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (ADFL) both opposed to the DRC regime and operating from the DRC. Perhaps, the FDLR rebel group from Rwanda is the most dangerous due to its combat readiness. Until recently the region has been marked by violence perpetrated in rural areas by irreconcilable rebels who committed the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Today the ex-FAR and Interahamwe militias constitute the rebel group called the FDLR. Despite the regional initiatives to neutralize and disarm the rebels, people in the GLR remain the victims of violence. Due to the lack of a credible commitment to regional and international obligations, countries in the region have not been able to mobilize efforts to effectively combat the FDLR. The ways used to tackle regional security challenges has been largely individual, state-based activities which have produced little results.

In his book *The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: A People’s History*, Nzongola argues that institutional decay and bad governance is the epicenter of regional conflict (Nzongola 2002). This background provides an insight into reexamining the comprehensive approach to the ICGLR within the framework of collective bargaining.
and preventive security in order to provide answers to the many security issues at hand.

This chapter is organized into four sections:

1. The causes of conflict in the Great Lakes Region.
2. The ICGLR origin and justification.
3. The ICGLR’s strategy and its associated ends, ways, and means.
4. The ICGLR members’ shared security interests versus national interests.

The Causes of Conflict in the Great Lakes Region

Conflicts in the GLR are interlocking, intertwined and cross-cutting particularly in the ICGLR’s core member states of Burundi, the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda. The major problem that makes the situation worse is the institution’s structural inability to address the root causes of conflict. Collier and Hoeffler in their article, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” argue that the causes of civil wars and communal, ethnic or religious conflicts are predominantly political and economic grievances, motivations and issues (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 56). On the other hand, Armin Langer and Graham K. Brown, in their article “Cultural Status Inequalities: An Important Dimension of Group Mobilization” contends that the recent causes of violent conflicts have focused predominantly on political and economic grievances. To them, in many conflicts, political and economic issues are accompanied by perceptions of cultural discrimination, exclusion or inequality of treatment (Arnim and Brown. 2007). The most extreme form of cultural status inequality consists of the phenomenon, sometimes labeled “cultural genocide” whereby the state explicitly takes on the cultural garb of the dominant group and repudiates the expression of other cultural identities not only in the public sphere, but also the private sphere (Arnim and Brown 2007).
Conflicts in the GLR are interrelated. In his book, *Africa: Confronting Complex Threats*, Kwesi Aning states that with the key challenges to human, regional and international security, it is impractical to examine and understand Africa’s armed conflict within which they occur by examining them in an isolated manner. He argues that due to the interconnectedness among key actors and players in Africa’s conflict, one should begin to describe them as security complexes (Aning 2007). In the UN’s perspective, security complexes can play out through a number of mechanisms: sub-regional economic networks that directly and indirectly fuel insecurity through the exploitation of and sale of natural resources; regional military networks that supply weapons to combatants; and provision of training facilities to those who are willing to destabilize the region (UN Security Council 2004).

The researcher has reviewed and analyzed comprehensive documentation covering the synopsis of the conflict in the GLR and there are diverse theories surrounding the causes of conflict within the GLR. Whatever the causes, conflicts have a direct impact on regional security. Although conflicts are not a monopoly of some regions, the GLR has peculiar conflicts that have caused international outrage. Interstate disputes, ethnic conflicts, civil wars and externally instigated armed rebellion and conflict over natural resources are some of the main threats to social order in GLR communities. The region also accounts for a large number of the refugees on the continent resulting from civil wars and ethnic conflict.

**Refugee Problems**

The issue of refugees is a historical problem that has greatly undermined regional stability. Failure to repatriate the 1959 Rwandan refugees has been the central problem of
conflict that triggered the Rwandan civil war in 1990. Issues of refugees as a cause of conflict cannot be examined in isolation of political power control and economic greed. This is the major factor underpinning forced displacement. Ms. Sadako Ogata, the former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in her evaluation of UNHCR preparedness and response, traces the origin of conflict in the GLR from persistent influx and unwillingness to settle the refugee problem. She acknowledges that the ethnic tension and conflict in the GLR of central Africa have been the cause of repeated instances of human displacement (Ogata 2000, 245). The pattern of events in the last 50 years is rooted in a long history of violence, but it is also a history of missed opportunities such as the right to nationality.

Paul Collier in his article, the *Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy*, presents a high risk of conflict in countries where incomes are low. He argues that when people are poor they have little to lose from joining a rebel group, so that rebel organizations find recruitment cheap (Collier 2006, 10). At least, there should be no doubt about the link between refugees, missed opportunities and armed rebellion. Ogata contends that failure to pursue just solutions to old grievances has in all too many cases, years or decades later, led to a recurrence of violence and to bloodletting on an even greater scale than before. To her, the legacy of the crisis in Rwanda was the presence of Tutsi refugees in all neighboring countries and the denied right to return home (Ogata 2000, 245). Currently, armed groups such as the FDLR, use refugees residing in the DRC as an easy source of recruiting.
FDLR Armed Rebels Operating in the DRC

The DRC has become a home of armed rebels originating from Rwanda and Uganda. Recently, the FDLR rebels from Rwanda, the ADF and the LRA from Uganda are the central reason for the conflict between the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda. Credible documentation supports the role of the DRC in instigating proxy wars against Rwanda. According to Colin Thomas-Jensen, Noel Atama, and Olivia Caeymaex in their assessment of Operation Kimia II, DRC collaboration with FDLR armed rebels increased tension between the DRC and Rwanda (Jensen, Atama, and Caeymaex 2009). Like Atama, Khardiagala argues that recently the battle lines in the DRC are primarily between remnants of Rwanda’s Hutu militias, implicated in the 1994 genocide, who have constituted themselves as the FDLR (Khardiagala 2008, 5).

Filip Reyntjens, in his book *The Great African War*, claims the sources of instability in the GLR were, in essence, domestic reflecting as they did the political conflicts in Rwanda, Burundi, and the Kivu region in the DRC more generally. Their repercussions were increasingly felt throughout the larger region (Reyntjens 2009, 43). It is widely accepted that although there was known insecurity in the region prior to 1994, the consequences of the aftermath of this tragedy has been the most recent defining moment in the region’s security.

The LRA Rebels in the DRC

Apart from the FDLR of Rwanda, there are similar rebels of Ugandan origin operating in the DRC. They include the LRA a rebel group commanded by Joseph Kony, and the Allied Democratic Forces and the Peoples Redemption Army both operating in the forests of the DRC. According to Khardiagala, the bulk of LRA forces are still
scattered in the DRC where they continue to represent a source of insecurity for civilians (Khardiagala 2008). Human Rights Watch argues that since its campaign in 2008, the LRA alone has killed an estimated 2,400 and abducted 3,400 civilians (Human Rights Watch 2011). Yet, Human Rights Watch notes that the mistrust between the Congolese and Ugandan military has hampered coordination and cooperation between them against these rebel groups (Human Rights Watch 2011). For instance, Human Rights Watch has underscored that, on January 16, 2011, Congolese authorities denied the Ugandan army permission to send an intercepting force to Banda, along the DRC border with Uganda, in order to go after the LRA leader (Human Rights Watch 2011). The reason for the denial was to prevent Uganda’s exploitation of the DRC as it did in 1998-2003 (Human Rights Watch 2011).

Crisis Over Lake Albert Basin Oil

The oil discovered in the Lake Albert Basin in 2006 has now generated severe tension between the DRC and Uganda. Khardiagala notes that as the previous sources of insecurity between Uganda and the DRC in the northern Kivu decline, new tensions between the DRC and Uganda have been growing ever since oil was discovered in an area which is shared by both countries (Khardiagala 2008). To him, this potential conflict mirrors the internal conflicts in both countries over natural resources by diverse groups and yet both countries are caught by surprise due to lack of institutional capacity to manage these conflicts (2008). The insights presented here suggest that, with or without the ICGLR, there is still animosity within the GLR.

Similarly, in their book *Peace and Conflict*, Hewitt, J. Joseph, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Ted Robert Gurr identified variable factors that influence the risk of
instability. They are political and economic grievances, militarization, and neighborhood security (Hewitt, Wilkenfeld and Gurr 2012, 6). Their synthesis of political institution consistency, economic openness, militarization, and neighborhood security serves to illuminate a mix of democratic and autocratic features in the GLR (2012, 6). These variables are deemed directly relevant to this thesis and will be utilized in chapter 3 as a framework for analyzing the political and economic dimensions of a conflict in the GLR in chapter 4.

Conflict Minerals in the DRC

Rich mineral deposits in the DRC have become a contested ground for both state and non-state actors in the GLR. Since the military campaign against the FDLR armed rebels in the DRC by Rwanda and Uganda in 1996, the regional contention over natural resources in the DRC has caused global outrage. Until the establishment of the ICGLR, the DRC had accused Rwanda and Uganda of illegal exploitation of its natural resources. According to Global Witness, a majority of DRC government officials have benefited from the presence and FDLR control of rich mineral deposits. A government official in the DRC has estimated that at least 90 percent of gold exports were undeclared, as such provincial government officials struggle to control mineral exports (Global Witness Report 2009). The FARDC works in collaboration with the FDLR and through mutual agreement sometimes share the spoils from mining deposits (Global Witness Report 2009). Conflict of interests over mineral control at all levels created a fertile ground to maintain chaos by allowing safe haven to the FDLR as they collaborate in safeguarding interests over mineral deposits. According to Karen Ballantine and Heiko Nitzschke in their article, Beyond Greed and Grievance, access to natural resources is the major cause
of conflict in the region. To them, the so-called “resource wars” in the DRC have significantly shaped current ideas and policy perspectives on the role that economic factors, particularly rebel exploitation of natural resources, play in a contemporary armed conflict (Ballantine 2004). Ballantine argues that there is a close correlation between armed conflicts that afflict this region and natural resource exploitation. To her, the economic agendas are consequential to the character and duration of armed conflict resolution, with predatory economic behavior becoming critical to sustaining, prolonging, and transforming conflict (Ballantine 2004). Global Witness presents evidence to support this argument. It underscores that the FARDC is involved in mineral exploitation in collaboration with the military hierarchy including senior officers in the provincial command to augment their meager salaries (Global Witness Report 2009). It is noted that the extent of military mineral exploitation without impunity illustrates the deeper problem which characterizes the Congolese army and the country’s governing institutions as a whole (Global Witness Report 2009). In Lusaka, Zambia in 2010, a special summit for the regional Heads of States signed a declaration setting up a regional mineral certification mechanism with a possibility of imposing sanctions on the defaulters (ICGLR 2010b). As noted, all of these scholars have approached the regional conflict in a different perspective. Their insights fit in this research’s findings and provide a good ground for comprehensive analytical research.

**The ICGLR Background and Justification**

Although the GLR conflict has been a historical problem, the ICGLR, whose mandate is to usher in peace and security, is a new creation (Norad 2009). It was established as an international response to conflicts in the GLR particularly following the
1994 Rwandan genocide. According to Gribbin, the Rwandan crisis had been a learning experience and the international community has subsequently approached similar crises more directly or with greater finesse (Gribbin 2005). The 1999 Lusaka Cease Fire Agreement was the impetus for withdrawal of foreign forces from the DRC. It also pressed demands on the DRC to cooperate in dismantling and disarming the FDLR operating in DRC territory (United Nations 2000b). As identified, Lusaka Cease Fire Agreement terms called for the immediate halt to any assistance, collaboration and/or sanctuary to negative forces bent on destabilizing neighboring countries all in an effort to ensure good neighborliness (United Nations 1999). Waugh has argued that the withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan forces by no means marked the end of the regional conflict (Waugh 2004, 143). Indeed, this demonstrated a positive step toward commitment to regional and international collective security.

Although the situation has not been completely alleviated, the regional initiative to establish the ICGLR in order to deal with regional security problems at a regional level opens a critical platform for dialogue. The ICGLR’s history began in 2000 with the United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSC) 1291 and 1304 that called for an ICGLR on peace, security, democracy and development in the GLR. Its establishment was an initiative to bolster consensus and a common approach to regional security as a consequence of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The ICGLR is not a conference, but a regional organization of the countries in the GLR whose primary objective is to prevent conflict. Its establishment was based on the recognition that political instability and conflicts in the GLR have a considerable regional dimension requiring corrective effort to
promote sustainable peace and development. These conflicts constituted a major threat to international peace and security (ICGLR 2006k).

In the Norwegian Agency’s perspective, as one of many international efforts to find a solution to the multitude of problems that confronts the GLR, governments of the countries in the region were brought together under the auspices of the UN, African Union (AU) and the group of friends in 2003 that marked the official starting point of the ICGLR (Norad 2009, 4). The ICGLR recognized that insecurity which had swept over the region was leadership deficiency related and therefore set its priority on institution building in order to create conditions for sustainable security and development of the region (ICGLR 2006k). The organization is composed of eleven member states, namely: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic (CAR), Republic of Congo (ROC), Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia (ICGLR 2006k).

In November 2004, the eleven Heads of State of the member countries adopted the Declaration on Peace, Security and Development in the GLR. The Dar-Es-Salaam Declaration presented a political statement with an intention and innovative approach towards addressing the root causes of conflict and constraints to development (Government Dar-Es-Salaam 2004). The ICGLR’s mandate is comprised of the Dar-Es-Salaam Declaration and the ten Protocols and the Programs of Action (ICGLR 2006k). The ICGLR Pact provides for national coordination mechanisms responsible for facilitating the implementation of the pact in member states. In addition, the Executive Secretariat headquarters in Bujumbura, Burundi, is responsible for coordinating and monitoring implementation of the Pact towards sustainable security and development in
the GLR (ICGLR 2006k). The objective is that by 2012, ICGLR Secretariat should be recognized as an effective and efficient institution to coordinate the initiatives of member states and stakeholders in the GLR (Norad 2009).

Strategically, the ICGLR’s mandate is to create the conditions favorable for sustainable security and development between the member states. The Norwegian Agency for Development supported the established of the ICGLR Secretariat in order to define the GLR into manageable entities that entails the ICGLR huge challenges to fulfill its mandate (Norad 2009). In its perspective, important themes include the question of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability, and institutional capacity, and development in the region (Norad 2009, 3). Indeed, it identified democracy and good governance, economic development and regional integration as well as cross-cutting issues as critical for the ICGLR to build peace (Norad, 2009). The Norad report provides relevant insights that this thesis has identified in table 1 as critical variables that will form a basis for analysis in chapter 4.

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<th>Table 1. The ICGLR strategy’s objectives for sustainable security</th>
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<td><strong>Objectives (ends)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Peace and Security</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Democracy and Good Governance</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Economic Development and Regional Integration</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Cross-Cutting issues</strong></td>
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<td>• Leadership</td>
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The ICGLR has been operationalized, but the most important aspect for the region to achieve security is the political will that all member countries must exhibit and their intent to carry through on their commitment. Nevertheless, Heyl notes that a glimpse at the political situation within the GLR shows no sign of stabilization any time soon (Heyl 2010). The World Bank presents four aggregate governance indicators that this research deemed to be critical for regional stability. The four governance aggregates are, voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, and control of corruption (World Bank Institute 2010). These aggregates are very important for this research in analyzing the GLR countries’ risk of instability to be able to draw logical conclusions. The insights presented by different authors provide a good basis from which to assess what the ICGLR can do to resolve regional conflict. The view that regional organizations have developed sophisticated regulatory and institutional mechanisms that enable them to tackle member’s disputes more vigorously than before is yet to be seen within the ICGLR’s realms of operations (Abass 2004).

The ICGLR’s Strategy and its Associated Ends, Ways, and Means

The research has identified for review different authors’ perspectives on the feasibility, acceptability and suitability of the ICGLR’s strategy. Feasibility, acceptability, and suitability, as defined in chapter 1, have been identified as important ingredients necessary for a strategy to be implemented. Although the ICGLR Protocol on Non-Aggression and Mutual Defense allows armed response in self-defense, within the framework of the ICGLR Pact on Security, its strategic objective is not premised on military interventions, but on preventive security (ICGLR 2006). It is worth noting that
the ICGLR’s strategic strength is centered on the ability to strengthen partnerships and
ingoodwill to negotiate. Richard L. Taylor in his article, *The Tribal Alliances: Ways\nMeans, and Ends to Successful Strategy* argues that exercising military force achieves the
ends but at expensive cost of resources and lives (Taylor 2005). To be successful, for
him, a strategy must utilize all elements and tools of power at its disposal. He sees ways
as broad courses of actions, means as resources and the ends as clear and concise
objectives to support a strategy (Taylor 2005, 3).

**Strategic Ends**

Different authors in strategic studies have provided critical insights to guide this
research. In Kelley Summer’s perspective, a strategy is a business approach to a set of
competitive moves that are designed to generate a successful outcome. To him, there are
four big questions involved in a strategy: where are we now; where do we want to go;
how will we get there; and how do we know if we got there (Summer 2009). Like
Summer, Christopher McKenna and Thomas Powell highlight the content of a strategy as
vision; mission; goals; products and services; customer groups; resources; competitors;
and key issues and how to address them (McKenna and Powell 2006). Yarger claims that
strategy has distinct attributes and differs from planning in its scope, assumptions, and
premises, but it provides the structure and parameters for more detailed long-range and
short term planning. He states that both strategy and planning use ends, ways, and means
and are bounded by the criteria of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability (Yarger 2006,
16). David Joblonsky, in building on Yarger’s concept, contends that in the context of the
state, strategy is the employment of specific instruments of power (political, diplomatic,
economic, military, and informational) to achieve the political objectives of the state in
cooperation or in competition with other actors pursuing their own possibly, conflicting objectives (Jablonsky 2008). The ICGLR’s strategic ends can be summed up as creating conditions for security, stability, and sustainable development between member states (ICGLR 2006k).

Strategic Ways

For a strategy to succeed, Taylor emphasizes that there must be feasible ways to the ends and that ways are broad courses of actions (Taylor 2005). The ICGLR’s focus to date is premised on institutional capacity building from where good governance and economic development can begin. Mutual defense and non-aggression has been emphasized as a measure for security cooperation (ICGLR 2006n; ICGLR 2006o).

The ICGLR’s Pact has established regional follow up mechanisms consisting of the Summit of Head of States, regional Inter-Ministerial Committee, the Conference Secretariat, National Coordination Mechanisms and the Collaborative forums for the implementation of the ICGLR Pact (ICGLR 2006k). The program of action for peace and security provides for joint coordinated efforts within a regional framework for the prevention, management and peaceful settlement of conflicts. The design of the program reflects two principle concerns, namely the existing structures and mechanisms to promote peace and security in the GLR must be utilized and strengthened and specific issues must receive special attention and should be the subject of priority programs under the Pact on Security, Stability and Development (ICGLR 2006a).

According to Taylor the establishment of a coalition contributes to mutual security intended to deter aggression and help set conditions for success in combat if settlement fails (Taylor 2005). Noting that a primary cause of conflict could be the issue
of refugees, the ICGLR’s strategy sets a legal framework regulating the recovery of land and properties by post-conflict returning refugees and/or Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) as a measure to deal with future conflict. The ICGLR’s Protocol on Non-Aggression and Mutual Defense in the GLR recognizes self-defense in the case of deliberate armed attack. The restraining mechanisms set out in the protocol may make military action less likely if states are committed to their obligations.

Strategic Means

According to Alfred D. Chandler Jr., a strategy is the determination of the basic long-term goals and objectives of an enterprise and the adoption of action and the allocation of resources necessary for carrying out these goals (Chandler 2003). Similarly, Harry R. Yarger, an expert of security strategy, argues that a strategy provides a coherent blueprint to bridge the gap between the realities of today and a desired future. To him, it is consideration of the relation about how to apply resources to achieve a desired result in a specific strategic environment overtime (Yarger 2006). Prominent authors in strategic and security studies agree that for a strategy to be successful there should be an enduring link between ends, ways and means. Broadly discussed, once the means do not measure up to the expected ends this is what Holcomb termed the ends-means mismatch (Holcomb 2008). In essence, a mismatch leads to the risk of failure of the strategy or even lack of limited achievement of the desired end state.

In order to efficiently function, the ICGLR’s strategic vision sets modalities of financing and management. This area falls under the purview of states’ contributions, assistance from sponsors, such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the World Bank and donations from the groups of friends (Norad 2009). Although this
research does not in any way intend to analyze the ICGLR’s budget strength, an estimate may be useful for this research to assess the ICGLR strategy’s level of feasibility, suitability and acceptability criteria. The primary role of the ICGLR summit, the supreme organ of the conference, is to approve budgetary resources and allocate additional resources and assess progress made in implementation of the Pact in view of budgetary constraints (ICGLR 2006k). Nevertheless, the life of an organization depends on effective structure with able leadership which this research finds to be an indispensable resource especially in the GLR where leadership is a formidable problem. Michael E. Porter in his book, *What is a Strategy*, supports this argument. He argues that developing and guiding a strategy requires a leader to make good choices, setting limits and providing discipline for operational improvement as leadership functions (Porter 1996). It is argued that lack of a clear leader or a hegemon among the ICGLR countries makes it difficult for any member countries to provide leadership, vision and the ability to set agendas and priorities (Norad 2009). As observed leadership is a challenge that ICGLR is facing and maintaining focus may fundamentally be problematic.

**Strategy’s Risk**

According to James Holcomb, managing strategic risk arises when ends and means are not in consonance. He argues that the simple definition of risk as an imbalance in ends, ways, and means is straightforward, but clearly incomplete. Holcomb poses a potent question about how to measure the degree of risk in any particular strategic endeavor; to him, this is the heart of the dilemma (Holcomb 2008). Yarger outlines that a strategy is the disciplined calculation of overarching objectives (ends), concepts (ways), and resources (means) within acceptable bounds of risk to create more favorable future
outcomes than might otherwise exist if left to chance or the hands of others (Yarger 2006). The argument attempts to illuminate the inherent and underlying risk within strategies. Yarger’s insights enables strategists to anticipate risks as well take acceptable risks in order to meet the desired end. It is not easy to determine the risks within a strategy, however, unrealistic ends may cause risks, the non-feasible course of action or ways may be risky and a lack of resources may create risks to those well-developed ends and ways. An example where risk is possible is from The Economic Community for the Great Lakes countries (CEPGL)’s experience. The CEPGL’s major attribute was to ensure security of the states and maintain peace along their respective frontiers, as well as to promote trade and free movement of persons and goods (United Nations 1976). However, according to CEPGL Executive Secretary Gabriel Toyi, since the restoration of the CEPGL in 2007, the DRC has never honored its annual contribution, while Rwanda and Burundi have outstanding debts by 2010 (Mugabe 2010).

Regardless of the skepticism about the inherent failures of the regional organizations, the assessment presented by different authors on the ICGLR’s background gives an ample body of qualitative literature substantiating the ICGLR’s strategic direction. The understanding of this examination of the strategy and its associated ends, ways, and means is the purpose of an analysis of the ICGLR’s achievements in chapter 4.

The ICGLR Members’ Shared Security Interests versus National Interests

Hans J. Morgenthau, a renowned writer in security studies, holds that writers about interests in international politics have always found it hard to make statements that are both significant and generalizable. He highlights that the best that can be produced is
a typology or a checklist, rather than a guide to content or judgment. In considering the interests of external actors, it may help to break down the topic into interests in conflict itself, interests of the parties to the conflict, and interests in the management of conflict (Morgenthau 1983). A further categorization of conflicting interests is introduced by Udalov Vadim to facilitate analysis. To him, interest usually appears at the forefront of politics during periods of major turbulence in foreign policy. Underneath this argument is the absence of common criteria and still deeper lies the lack of agreement about the very nature of interest as a category (Zartman and Kremenyuk 1995). To Vadim, the outside states’ interests are shaped by such elements as the stable distribution of power and expectations, a structure that can itself deal with change and challenge, and a limitation on temptations to adventures and escalating rivalries (Zartman and Kremenyuk 1995). Although it is not easy to draw a clear line between national interest and security interests, Harold J. Clem in his book, National Security Management: The Environment of National Security sets a stage for this question. To him national interests are “the general and continuing ends for which a nation acts (Clem 1983). He noted that national security is vital interests and which, when threatened, can make the nation to use military action” (Clem 1983).

In the Norwegian Agency’s paradigm, the ICGLR is attempting to build a regional institution that covers a volatile region with countries and governments with different interests and degrees of involvement in the current conflicts (Norad 2009). The study by Prunier provides insight that the countries which constitute the ICGLR have conflicting interests and interpretations of the crises that have caused so much death and despair in this part of Africa (Prunier 2009). Although his arguments seem to be
generalized, his study opens with an interesting chapter which focuses upon the conflict of interests of the regional member countries of the ICGLR and their level of participation in implementation of its strategy.

According to Bjorn Moller, a liberal writer on African regional organizations claims that the devolution of responsibilities to regional organizations presupposes a division of the world into regions. To him, not only has the regional level generally been disregarded in international relations literature, but the definition and the delimitation of regions remain controversial, both theoretically and politically (Moller 2005). Barry Buzan, in his book, *The New Security Studies*, presents an account of the lack of a clear GLR definition. To him delimiting such a subset is controversial because several criteria might be applied, each yielding different results, none of them being more correct than the others (Buzan, Waever, and Wilde 1998).

Charlotte Heyl in her article *The ICGLR: An African Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe* (CSCE) presents an interesting and succinct version of the ICGLR. She argues that the GLR does not represent a uniform conflict region; rather, the region is home to a variety of conflicts (Heyl 2010, 90). She points out that armed conflict took place in eight of the eleven ICGLR’s countries in the years prior to the conference. Yet these were internal conflicts that nevertheless had spill-over effects such as flows of refugees and arms trade, which in turn contributed to destabilization in neighboring countries (Heyl 2010). These are different actors taking part in each of the various conflicts. There is no single conflict in the region in which all ICGLR member countries are involved (Heyl 2010). She further highlights that the idea of a Marshal Fund for the ICGLR prompted the countries to reach a consensus in the negotiations of the
Nairobi Pact. If this is true, the research tends to agree with Heyl that judging by the lack of financial commitments for the ICGLR special fund for reconstruction and development, there is a risk that participating countries may no longer see any additional value in the ICGLR (Heyl 2010).

The theoretical views presented by different authors on the perceived reasons for conflicts in the region vary considerably. That said, their overall assessment presents a good foundation that guides this research. Identification of the ICGLR’s perceived interests in its strategy forms a basis for an analysis of the security interests of ICGLR member states with regards to their degree of involvement and commitment.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The purpose of this research is to assess effectiveness of the integration of the ICGLR’s strategy for sustainable security and economic development in the GLR of Africa. Chapter 3 describes the methodology that was used in this research and defines the methods that were used for data collection. This research utilized a qualitative methodology to collect, review, interpret and analyze the literature that produced findings that cannot be arrived at by means of statistical data or other means of research criteria (Strauss and Corbin 1990).

Qualitative Research Methodology Definition

Qualitative data are considered to be the rough material researchers collect from the world they are studying. They are the particulars that form the basis of analysis (Bogdan and Biklen 1992). The qualitative researchers choose their analysis methods not only by the research question and the type of data collected, but also based on all the philosophical approaches underlying the study and allow the interpretive approach to be used (Miles and Huberman 1994). Qualitative research method includes interviews and observations, but may also include case studies, surveys, and document analysis. By collecting data from different sources, the researcher evaluates extensive data with an open mind. As the study progress, he/she continuously examines the data for patterns and the patterns lead the researcher to build the theory (Savenye and Robinson 2001). The qualitative method of research fares better in bringing to light answers to the questions
asked in chapter 1. According to Bouma, the advantages of qualitative research design in this kind of investigation is that it remains flexible and the details of the approach are often modified as the research proceeds and the statement can be analyzed in similar ways to other data (Bouma and Atkinson 1995). The qualitative method of research enables in-depth examination of the data in the field studied and allows the use of subjective analysis and does not follow any predetermined variables for study (Creswell 2007). The major weakness of this method is that it is regarded as the “lowest rung” of academic research (Sandelowski 2000).

**Methods of Data Collection**

In order to answer the questions posed, the researcher obtained and analyzed first hand or primary source data written on the subject. Research was focused on the use of official documents on the ICGLR’s strategy and other relevant sources of information. The chapter 3 research methodology is organized into four sections:

- **Section 1**: Describes how the data was obtained.
- **Section 2**: Credibility of sources used in the research.
- **Section 3**: Identifies the conflict drivers for analysis and describes how the data will be analyzed.
- **Section 4**: Summary and conclusions.

**Section 1: How Was Data Obtained?**

The data was obtained from print documents and electronic materials. Available literature was found to be sufficient to guide a comprehensive research and come up with an informed analysis for future recommendations. During the research process relevant
data were obtained and critically analyzed to provide answers to the questions. The data collected enabled the researcher in identify the purpose of the ICGLR and the mechanisms it has adopted and employed to mitigate and further promote regional stability and development. The information found was sufficient in describing the regional environment prior to and during the establishment of the ICGLR. The data also provided a review of the weakness, strengths and problem at hand that may inhibit the productive ways forward.

Section 2: Relevance of Sources used in the Research

The qualitative method of research, particularly print document inventory for the analysis, was used. The qualitative methodology used in conducting the research is the most suitable for this thesis. According to Mahoney, the advantages of the document method are that the documents are locally available and obtainable; they are inexpensive, useful in describing goals and objectives, and are an unobtrusive way of determining values, interests, and climate. However, the disadvantage of the document method is that it may be incomplete or inaccurate and, at times, time consuming and may be difficult in accessing or locating suitable and relevant documents (Mahoney 1997).

The researcher analyzed documents deemed to be relevant to this field of study. The documents utilized in this research include the Dar-Es-Salaam Declaration, the ICGLR Pact and its 10 Protocols and Programs of Action for policy formulation and implementation. Other credible sources were obtained, reviewed and analyzed in order to identify new strength that would add relevance the ICGLR’s strategy. The sources utilized were obtained from or through the Combined Arms Research Library and online websites. The purpose of analyzing different documents on the subject of this thesis is to
assess the ICGLR’s overall strategy with the goal of identifying additional ways and means to more effectively realize the strategy’s long-terms security objectives.

Section 3: How the Data will be analyzed

The analysis used in this thesis is document descriptive data analysis. Ratcliff argues that descriptive data analysis allows constant comparison of documents such as pacts, look for indicators of categories such as behavior, evaluating the impact of programs and policies (Radcliff 1995). Lenth contends that not all sample size problems are the same, nor is a sample size equally important in all studies. For example, the ethical issues in an opinion are very different from those in medical experiments, and the consequences of an over or under-sized study also differ (Lenth 2001). Obviously without quantitative data it is always difficult to argue in absolutes. This is not what this research is intending to accomplish. Rather it is to describe and analyze a wide range of literature found to be relevant in answering the research questions posed. Chapter 2 underscored a range of conflict variables leading to this analysis.

Selected Conflict Variable in the GLR

The GLR has experienced the most violent conflict for several decades. The experience of the 1994 Rwandan genocide caused both regional and global outrage. Genocide resulted from a politicized ethnicity in an attempt to exterminate the Tutsi as a tool to maintaining political power and control the nation’s meager resources by the Hutu regime. Recognizing that political and economic grievances are the dominant causes of conflict in the GLR is central as the ICGLR attempts to solve them. Chapter 3 identified and utilized political and economic variables as the major causes of conflict influencing
other related symptoms of conflict identified as cross-cutting issues (Norad 2009). They
are human displacement; exclusion (both ethnic and political exclusion), and economic
depprivation. Heyl notes that a glimpse at the political situation in the GLR shows that
there is no sign of stabilization any time soon (Heyl 2010). Chapter 2 underscored that
the ICGLR’s mandate is to create the conditions favorable for sustainable security and
development between the member states. The table 2 conflict model shows the political
and economic variables that will utilized for data analysis in chapter 4.

Regional Conflict Variable Explanation
Conflict in the GLR has been described as the most deadly since the Second
World War and involves a multitude of actors with different interests (Prunier 2009).
Political and economic grievances are the most dominant causes of conflict in the GLR.
Political elites have an insatiable desire for control of economic resources making
political transition more violent. This has been true for the GLR and particularly Rwanda,
leading to the 1994 Tutsi genocide. Political assassination and coups d’état have been
commonplace. The list is shortened just for the purposes of giving examples. There was a
coup in the DRC in 1960 by Mobutu, in Rwanda by Juvenal Habyalimana in 1973, in
Uganda by Idi Amin in 1971 and in Burundi by Pierre Buyoya in 1987 and then again
1996. Political assassinations are not infrequent as well. Of the recent, an elected Burundi
President Melchior Ndadaye was assassinated in 1993. In the DRC, President Laurent
Desire Kabila was assassinated in 2001. Of all the coups and assassinations that have
occurred, none of them can be analyzed without considering the role of control of
political power and economic grievances. Political and economic variables are considered
critical for chapter 4 analysis. They are presented in table 2 and marked by letter (X) and have been identified to be applicable to all the four countries.

Table 2. Conflict Variables Model and risk of instability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Conflict Variables</th>
<th>Cultural discrimination and Symptoms of conflict</th>
<th>Non-state Actors in the conflict and Neighborhood security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Exclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Framework of the Analysis

Table 1 in chapter 2, the literature review, presented peace and security, democracy and good governance, economic development and regional integration as well as crosscutting issues, defined as institutional capacity and leadership, as a precondition for regional stability. Table 2 in chapter 3, utilized the political and economic variables identified and in chapter 2 literature review that will be analyzed to assess how they can influence conflict and risk of instability. Table 3 presents the aspect of aggregate governance indicators for the GLR identified by the World Bank Institute from 1996-2010. A similar table (table 4) will be utilized in chapter 4, the analysis of the GLR countries’ performance in percent ranging from 0-100 vis-à-vis their institutional
capacity from 2007-2010 to analyze the risk trend of instability in the four core counties of the GLR.

Table 3. Country Risk of Instability Assessment Matrix.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country’s Rating in Percentage</th>
<th>Aggregate governance indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Voice and Accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Period in Years 2007-2010 in %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The matrixes in tables 1-4 serve to analyze the conflict in the GLR in terms of political stability and levels of violence, voice and accountability, government effectiveness, and control of corruption. The assessment goes beyond the current regional conflict. It identifies and analyzes institutional capacity as a critical requirement expected from each member country in the GLR as a firm foundation for the long term achievements of the ICGLR’s strategic objectives identified in chapter 2. The analysis
made is critical for answering the primary and secondary research questions to provide a logical conclusion and recommendation in chapter 5. The primary and secondary research questions are restated as follows: What can be done to make the ICGLR more effective in addressing the current security problems in the GLR?

1. What are the causes of conflict and instability in the GLR and what are the prospects of resolving the conflicts?
2. What is the ICGLR’s strategy and what are its associated ends, ways, and means?
3. What are the regional member states of the ICGLR’s interests and what do they have in common or in conflict?
4. What are the achievements of the ICGLR thus far in providing answers to the region’s security problems?

Section 4: Summary and Conclusions.

Chapter 3 described the research methodology and provided a definition of the qualitative methodology that was used in this research. It highlighted the advantages and disadvantages of the methods used and underlined the methods of data collection. Chapter 3 selected and displayed the variables to be utilized in the chapter 4 analyses and restated the research questions that this research attempted to answer. Chapter 4 will present the analytical research findings and will answer the research questions introduced in this chapter. Chapter 4 will determine the effectiveness of the ICGLR’s strategy and show how to make it more effective to bring about sustainable peace and development of the GLR. The researcher will remain focused on the utility of identified variables for
analysis in order to arrive at a logical conclusion that can be integrated to attain the ICGLR strategy’s objectives in the most effective manner.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

The primary motivation of this research was to examine the effectiveness and the capacity of the ICGLR’s strategy in sustainable peace, security and economic development in the GLR of Africa. Relevant documents on the regional conflict were analyzed and it was emphasized that the central cause of conflict is domestic politics and economic grievances escalating into violence which exacerbate regional instability. The research was focused on assessing the ICGLR’s strategic approach to solve the causes of conflict in the GLR. Attempting to solve the symptoms of conflicts, rather than its root causes, has not been able to provide realistic answers to the problems at hand. The aim of this research was to show that building institutions that seek to support peace as well as addressing root causes of conflict is a critical enabler to obtaining the ICGLR’s strategic ends. GLR’s conflicts are tied to the root cause of conflict, identified as political and economic, which directly impact on the flow of refugees and pursuit of conflict minerals. The armed rebels have also been identified as non-state actors in the regional conflict.

Chapter 4 is organized according to the research questions presented in chapter 3 and are as follows: what are the causes of conflict and instability in the GLR and what are the prospects of ending the violence? What is the ICGLR strategy and what are its associated ends, ways and means? What are the regional member states of the ICGLR security interests and what do they have in common or in conflict? What are the achievements of the ICGLR thus far in providing answers to regional security problems?
What are the likely risks to the GRL’s security if the ICGLR’s strategy fails? Answering the secondary research questions is intended to provide the answers to the primary research question. To restate it, what can be done to make the ICGLR more effective to address the current security problems in the GLR?

In order to achieve this end state, the research has identified the structural problems within GLR government institutions that the ICGLR must take note of before addressing the current instability. There are obvious institutional weaknesses in the GLR with a limited capacity to respond effectively to regional conflicts. That said, several attempts by many if not all, regional organizations to resolve GLR instability has not been successful.

**Causes of Conflict in the Great Lakes Region**

Conflict is not a new phenomenon in the GLR. Literature reviewed has revealed that the recent causes of conflict have focused predominantly on political and economic grievances. The conflict which reached an alarming proportion in 1994 is attached to bad political systems in the core countries of the region; those countries are the DRC, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. The existence of armed rebels in the DRC, ethnicity and the refuges problems, illegal exploitation of resources and support to armed rebels have been the current regional conflict issues. Current concerns about the ongoing conflict in the region ignore the political nature of these contentious issues. However, what is true is that none of them is a stand-alone from the political and economic drivers of conflict. For example violence in Rwanda has been over resources and power control. Ethnicity alone was used by politicians to mobilize political support based on ethnicity in pursuit of power and control of national resources.
Political Dimension of Conflict in the GLR

Major dominant causes of conflict and instability in the GLR have a political dimension. Table 2 has shown that in many conflicts, political and economic issues are accompanied by perception of cultural exclusion, discrimination, or inequality of treatment. The conflict model shows that political grievances accompanied by exclusion, deprivation and human displacement have long characterized the region. While the regimes with inconsistent political institutions have been identified to be more prone to political instability, the impact of institutional consistency enables democratic transition (Gurr, Hewitt, and Wilkenfeld 2012, 6).

As table 2 shows, the GLR presents a mix of democratic and autocratic features with a degree of political exclusion and human displacement. The non-state actors presented in table 2 shows that the likelihood of political instability in a state increases substantially when a neighboring state is currently experiencing armed conflict. Indeed, the ADF and LRA from Uganda are capable of posing security threats to the DRC, the FDLR from Rwanda poses security threat to Burundi, the DRC and Uganda, and the FNLR from Burundi increases instability in the DRC. Gurr notes that the neighborhood conflict is a significant predictor of political instability (Gurr, Hewitt, and Wilkenfeld 2012, 6). Two key ingredients that the ICGLR identified for creating conditions of stability are democracy and good governance. The existence of true democracy plays a central role not just in enabling conflict prevention. The degree to which this can be realized depends on political leaders’ ability to create conditions that can make it work. Perhaps this is the weakness in the GLR countries’ political structures. Bain warns that political leaders must be coddled or opposed, or appeased as circumstances and prudence
demand because they play key roles in shaping the evolution or breakdown of international security (Bain 2006). This argument supports what has been observed of the political instability and the role of political leaders in all the four countries of the GLR. In assessing the effectiveness of the ICGLR strategy, political leadership must not be ignored. For instance, since the colonial period, the political system in Rwanda has been marked by politically motivated ethnic discrimination to exclude the Tutsi minority from gaining political power. More often than not, politicization of ethnicity escalated into mass killings and forced large numbers into exile. Yet human displacement has been identified as only a symptom of political instability in the GLR.

Vorrath notes that none of the GLR countries has consolidated democratic governance. Rather, consolidation of democracy remains a vague hope for the countries of the GLR and substantial improvement depends on local governments and political elites who bear large parts of the responsibility for the current situation (Vorrath 2011). Stable economic performance and security cannot be realized in the GLR without good political leadership. It is worth noting that lack of will power among the regional players in the ICGLR is one of the factors inhibiting the implementation process of the ICGLR Pact. As the ICGLR attempts to solve the problem of refugees, political exclusion remains the same in the GLR. Large numbers of armed groups operating in the DRC, namely the FDLR from Rwanda, the LRA and ADF from Uganda and the FNL from Burundi, are directly linked to political grievances. Their ability to obtain a sustainable source of recruits depends on the political environment in each of the countries involved. As earlier mentioned the failure of GLR has been due to the limited will power to promote democracy and good governance. Parker notes that, leadership in the GLR lacks
a meeting of political minds and an agenda when it comes to specific situations or matters (Parker and Rukare 2002). The literature reviewed showed that there is an insatiable demand for popular power and the rights of people to participate in shaping their societies.

According to Vorrath, despite recent elections in Burundi, the DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda the GLR shows worrying trends toward electoral authoritarianism and political fragmentation, with new divisions that intensify the potential for confrontation. There is a shrinking political space and a tight grip on the state by the ruling elites and their parties. For instance, while president Museveni of Uganda made important strides by restoring political hope to Ugandans in 1986, lack of power transition for the last 26 years is not aligned with the ICGLR’s strategy for peace and development. Constitutional manipulation to extend political term of office is counterproductive to regional stability. This is what Vorrath termed historical exclusion and autocratic regimes (Vorrath 2011). As observed, what seems to be true as observed is that the recent elections in the DRC have been received with mixed feelings even among the civil society in the country. Fairly put in words of Hall and Banner, the selections were characterized by lots of irregularities and manipulation by the ruling party (Hall and Benner, 2012). The continued deterioration in democratic governance is synonymous with the lack of government capacity to have mechanisms to steer away from war and violence. The GLR is squarely characterized by civil unrest, ethnic divide, suspicion and political divergence. Rwandan post-genocide history has been emblematic of this. Since the promulgation of its first Constitution in 1962 the Bahutu harassed and arrested Tutsi, forcing them to flee.
The pressure of political refuges or civil war refugees in the GLR countries is the greatest distraction in attaining a sustainable level of security. Leaders’ failure to reassess the way of approaching politics from ethnic identity works against regional stability and undermines the ICGLR’s strategic objectives identified in this thesis. As observed, by the end of 1994 an estimated 2,101,000 Rwandan refugees were still in the DRC and by the end of 1999, the number had reduced to 62,000 (Ogata 2000). This does not mean the situation is of any better. Similarly, Burundi refugees alone accounted for 519,600 living both in Rwanda and the DRC (Ogata 2000). With an unstable political environment, repatriating refugees will remain a big challenge. The problem lies with the country of origin in creating an authentic welcoming environment for the refugees to return. A prominent example is Rwanda. Clearly the 1994 civil war is inextricably linked to the lack of political will to repatriate the 1959 refugees. As of now, there are a huge number of refugees spread all over the GLR. Repatriation of refugees should be the top priority upon which political stabilization can be built. Rebuilding Rwandan institutions of governance will depend on a new government’s resolve to continue creating an enabling environment conducive for long term peace, security, stability and development.

Surya has pointed out that there is no magic in achieving peace and security other than nurturing a new outlook and cultivating a culture of inclusive and democratic politics in a decentralized framework that allows people to have a stake in governance (Surya 2003). This argument assumes going beyond the issues of political and ethnic identity that made genocide possible. Indeed, President Paul Kagame of Rwanda stated that the “winner takes all” model is counterproductive and not workable in societies still grappling with the challenge of healing and reconstruction (Surya 2003). There is hope
the region can take learned lessons from the Rwandan experience to reexamine their political systems. It is critical that the GRL countries’ leaders develop domestic policies that work together toward enabling the ICGLR’s strategy to achieve the best end state.

**Economic Dimension of Conflict in the GLR**

This research was motivated by assessing the ICGLR’s developmental goals in the GLR. It is clear that poor economic performance is directly linked to bad governance and those weak governing institutions undermine development goals and initiatives. Lack of stable national policy to manage national resources and finance promotes economic disparity. Earlier on a mention was made that country’s economic openness reduces the degree of instability. One of the crucial factors identified as a dominant cause of conflict is the existence of economic grievances. The documents analyzed have revealed that a high risk of conflict is dominant in communities where incomes are low. The analysis revealed that when people are poor, they have little to lose from joining a rebel group (Collier 2006).

Although the GLR countries differ considerably in terms of capacity and economic stability, Table 2 shows that deprivation is cross-cutting within GLR countries. The monopoly and concentration of the national resources in the hands of political elites greatly undermines regional stability. Intentionally, limiting equal rights to access national resources for human development increases popular disenfranchisement. This causes a great number of disaffected people to join the opposition. Although the ICGLR seeks to readdress poor performing economies in the GLR, governance indicators in each country shows little chances of fostering an improved economy. Poor performance in regional political administration has directly impinged on economic development.
Institutionalized corruption creates conditions that facilitate the mismanagement of public monies that continue to go unchecked.

Although it is very difficult to assess the conceptual impact of economic development on conflict and security, Dambisa notes that contemporary conflicts are born out of competition for control of resources. They are predominantly a feature of poorer economies and they are increasingly internal (Dambisa 2009). Through reviewing conflict theory within the economic realm, the underprivileged community is prone to being politically manipulated. This evidence has revealed that the Hutu militias who executed genocide in Rwanda were drawn from the impoverished and unemployed youth. There is no surer way of disengaging the youth from armed rebels’ manipulation and inducement into armed rebel activities than creating employment opportunities.

The UN initiative in establishing the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) emphasizes enhancing cooperation and inspiring development efforts tailored by each country to suit specific development needs towards a common end for lasting peace (UNSCR A/RES55/2(2000). The ICGLR Protocol on regional integration envisages regional integration as a sure path to economic development with equal opportunities. While this is true, it has been noted that without structural institutions to deter domestic corruption little if any results will be expected. Since the military campaign against the FDLR armed rebels in the DRC by Rwanda and Uganda in 1996, the issue natural resources has faced a number of challenges. As the current conflict in the GLR cannot be analyzed without the Rwandan genocide that triggered Congo war in 1996, it is also clear that the regional conflict over natural resources is linked to this conflict. Credible literature on mineral resources has shown that mineral sites are used as a source of
financing the FDLR. Despite a declaration by the Heads of States setting up regional mineral certification mechanism with possible sanctions on non-compliance, it has been ascertained that both DRC government officials and military units are directly involved in mineral smuggling. As observed, the economic agendas attached to conflict minerals have become critical to sustaining, prolonging, and transforming conflict. However, within the framework of the ICGLR, the Rwandan government and the DRC agreed to crack down on mineral smuggling. On 8 January 2012 Rwanda arrested and suspended four senior military officers suspected of involvement in the illegal sale of Congolese minerals (Strategy Page.com 2012).

Credible documents analyzed discovered that the Armed Forces for the DRC (FARDC) are involved in mining and smuggling of minerals in areas where they deploy (Global Witness 2009). If the ICGLR strategy against illegal exploitation is to work, the DRC must take uncompromising steps to restrict its armed forces from the illicit trade of conflict minerals. Although poor economic performance has been identified as a dominant cause of conflict, it alone is not sufficient to lead to violence without political influence. Reforming the ICGLR economic performance is possible if political elites demonstrate their will to integrate the ICGLR program on economic development and regional integration. Indeed, managing competition between groups that vie for political power and other resources to reduce the risk of instability is the Alpha and Omega of democratic governance (Hewitt 2012).

Assessment of the Instability in the GLR core countries

The literature review revealed that the lack of appropriate political institutions in the GLR enable the persistence of conflicts. Table 4 utilizes a four aggregate governance
indicators matrix to assess the risk of instability in the four core countries of the GLR: Burundi, the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda. As the instability assessment shows the GLR countries have not much more than a marginal capacity to govern effectively. This poses great challenges in trying to create effective regional cooperation. Democratizing is required for regional stability and development. Table 4 shows the selected four dimensions of governance aggregates presented, by percentage by each aggregate per each country’s performance. Values range from 0-100 with 100 as the better score. The matrix displays the country’s performance for all the four aggregates for the evaluated years from 2007-2010. The percentage score are comparable to variables presented in table 1 in chapter 2 to analyze countries’ stability progress or the risk of instability to confirm the achievability of peace and security, democracy and good governance, economic development and regional integration and cross-cutting issues including institutional capacity.
Table 4. Country Risk of Instability Assessment Matrix.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country’s Rating in Percentage</th>
<th>Dimension of Governance aggregates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Voice and Accountability Period in Years 2007-2010 in %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>28 27 30 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>10 11 10 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>15 11 11 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>31 31 32 33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Burundi

A mention was made that Burundi faced a recent violent conflict after the introduction of a multi-party system paving the way to the democratic elections in 1992. Since the country’s first democratically elected Hutu President, Ndadaye Melchior, was assassinated in 1993, it was obvious that Burundi was not fully prepared to be ruled democratically. The assessment of four dimensions of governance aggregates, voice and accountability (28-31 percent) is fairly good. The other three, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness and control of corruption exceed only those of the DRC. However, the significant improvement in government effectiveness (9
to 18 percent) is encouraging and shows good signs of improvement. Although the country’s instability assessment has uncovered that Burundi has an overall huge governance deficiency, the governance structure shows that instability in Burundi is constantly on its horizon.

The DRC

The current political situation in the DRC is hard to assess. The literature review revealed that corruption is almost as bad as an influence on its governance as government effectiveness. Corruption pervades the entire community to include the public officials to the lowest citizens and the military hierarchy. It is clear that DRC is a weak sister and lacks political maneuverability in the GLR stabilization process. Despite its recent concluded elections in 2009, the assessment made in the four dimensions of governance has shown that the DRC governance structure is almost non-existent. Out of four dimensions of governance aggregates measured, only voice and accountability shows some improvement from (10-11 percent); however, the rate is still very poor. The other three of political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness and control of corruption are within the ranges of (00-05 percent) which are the lowest of the other three GLR countries evaluated. Only a one percent improvement in governance effectiveness by 2010, starting from a value of zero percent in 2007, it is clear that the stability of the DRC in the near future is not guaranteed. Muzonga notes that the current political transitions in the DRC indicate that the legacy of Kleptocracy continues to be the model of governance after the demise of Mobutu (Muzong 2002). As earlier underscored, the current crisis and weaknesses within the system is seen by many as a new opportunity to allow the political elites to continue to plunder and misappropriate for their own ends.
It is worth reemphasizing that good governance includes conflict management. Resurrecting governing institutions in the DRC is still a challenge that the ICGLR must face if stability is to be achieved in the GLR.

**Rwanda**

This thesis envisages that the ICGLR’s strategy in the GLR stability and development could use post genocide Rwanda as a case study. A number of documents reviewed have revealed that Rwandan history had very huge governance deficiencies. However, having gone through the 1994 genocide, it is confirmed that Rwanda is systematically recovering from it and its aftermath. The assessment made in the four dimensions of governance, only voice and accountability shows a tendency of decline from (15-12 percent). The research found out that politics of identity have been identified as a cause of conflict in the country’s history and as such it can no longer be tolerated as a basis for political manipulation. Those who continue to espouse ethnic issues are legally restricted which sends a clear message to others with similar ideology. This is demonstrated by Rwanda’s voice and accountability rating drop from 15 percent in 2007 to 11 percent in 2010. Perhaps this has influenced the country’s rating in this domain.

The other three aggregates of political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness and control of corruption exceed other countries dramatically. Political stability and absence of violence has remained relatively the same (32 percent in 2007 and 31 percent in 2010). Its rating of government effectiveness has increased slightly (48 to 51 percent) and its control of corruption is gaining growth with a modest increase as well (59 to 62 percent) from 2007 to 2010. Although poverty levels remain high in the rural areas, the European Union (EU) notes that there are very view (if any)
countries in the world that have been faced with, and have responded to such a wide-ranging set of reform requirements with such limited resources availability (EU 2007). The argument is further supported by Col Brian Spelling of the US Air War College who notes that Rwanda presents a unique challenge. Observing the progress made and where the country has come from reflects the commitment of the country’s governance and leadership in all domains, including its security forces (Kagire 2012).

Rwanda has confidence that the ICGLR’s strategy can be utilized to leverage the GLR’s stability and economic development. With continued government’s commitment to transform previous adversity into opportunities, it can be said that Rwanda is willing to embrace regional peace. The problem at hand is how to mobilize other countries’ support while attempting to market itself as a quasi-hegemon in the ICGLR to make it more effective.

Uganda

As earlier noted, like its neighbors Uganda has gone through hard political times. The performance in its economy has been wide ranging and human development has been quite impressive up till the 1970s. Although Uganda has been trying to recover from bad governance since current President Museveni came to power in 1986, the political climate has not been impressive. This is due to constitutional manipulation intended to maintain power. Uganda’s performance is by far greater than Burundi and the DRC in all areas and better than Rwanda only in voice and accountability (31 percent in 2007 and is now at 33 percent in 2010). The other three areas assessed of political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness and control of corruption have declined or stayed the same from 2007 to 2010. Of priority concern is the drop in government
effectiveness in 2007 from 40 percent to 33 percent in 2010. Despite Uganda’s anti-
corruption laws, it has remained the same, 21 percent in 2007 and 21 percent in 2010.
The trend demonstrates inconsistency and unstable democratic institutions. It is argued
that in Uganda the implementation gap between the existence and actual implementation
of key anti-corruption safeguards is one of the largest in the world (Global Integrity
2009). While the legal framework is strong on the books, in practice the implementation
falls short. Low levels of funding and insufficient capacity hinder almost all government
oversight agencies including the Inspector General of Government. Indeed, despite
Uganda having the highest rating in voice and accountability (31-33 percent), the
freedom of press to report irregularities in government institutions has had a limited
ability to force the government to enforce rules due to conflicts of interests (Global
Integrity 2009).

Assessment of the Prospects for the GLR Conflict
Prevention

An assessment of prospects of conflict prevention in the GLR has been the main
focus of this research. The literature review has shown that conflict prevention is what
the ICGLR is striving to achieve since its inception. The analysis demonstrated that
political and economic grievances sharpen the conflict in the GLR. Self-help has been
resorted to in response to the existence of cross-cutting issues related to the conflict. For
instance Rwanda pursued the FDLR into the DRC in 1996 for fear of imminent attack by
the FDLR across the border from the DRC. However, the central problem was DRC
political leadership’s in the DRC’s support of the FDLR. This shows that there was a
political component that was ignored to keep the war from happening. This suggests that
although economic factors have been identified to account for regional conflict, it alone cannot determine the trend of events given the political leadership needed to mitigate the trends. The assessment made by utilizing the four dimensions of governance revealed that the shrinking of political space and insatiable demand for power still exists. Conflict prevention, economic recovery and social reconciliation all rest on the political leadership’s ability to pursue a new post-conflict agenda. However, given that the DRC has been identified as a weak sister there is no way to ensure the armed rebels can be weakened. Although the ICGLR brokered the bilateral operation *Umoja Wetu* (Our Unity) and set a diplomatic stage for cooperative security, the DRC is showing unwillingness to pursue the same agenda. Human Rights Watch has documented cases of known mistrust between the DRC and Uganda that has hampered the operation coordination against the LRA (Human Rights Watch 2011).

Although instability remains in the GLR at varying rates, the alternative to steer away from war requires political will and effective leadership. In fact this thesis has identified aggression as being initiated by political leadership and it is what the ICGLR is striving to fix. While national interests may pervade the desired end state of the ICGLR’s strategy, very few interests have been identified as vital. The pursuit of just wars in national interests encourages bad strategy. In order to avert from deadly conflicts, pursuing only a military means in the GLR cannot serve as the foundation of an enduring peace. It is argued that when Rwanda and Uganda intervened in the DRC for their respective offensives against the FDLR and the LRA in early 2009, they used the Pact as a platform to legitimize their interventions. This suggests that both Rwanda and Uganda in some cases see the relevance and the utility of the ICGLR to prevent conflict (Norad
2009). It has been identified that Rwandan President Kagame and President Museveni of Uganda have a new and broader vision for the region. Their role in influencing diminished unilateralism is critical and the voluntary withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan forces from the DRC confirms this. Although the international community was very reluctant in intervening in the Rwandan crisis in 1994, this research has confirmed that the international community’s security agenda in the aftermath of genocide has dramatically changed. The creation and support given to the ICGLR confirms this. The ICGLR’s forum in supporting the recovery of political institutions to enable preventive diplomacy has sent a strong message that there is little room for regional self-help left. If pursued by member states with only a modicum of partisan consideration the strategy could lead to positive development such as increased institutional capacity.

As this research project is nearing completion, new developments in the GLR security evolution have been observed. To this end, in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2031 (2011), a four-nation Joint Military Task Force has been formed to hunt down Kony and his LRA rebels. The operation is composed of the DRC, Central African Republic, South Sudan and Uganda. The force includes 5000 soldiers from AU member nations and logistical support from the UN to set up a joint military operation to hunt down Kony (New times 2012). This is a challenge to the GLR to reconsider a military force as the option of last resort. The ICGLR’s strategy assumes that its members have common security interest and can get closer to achieving regional security by identifying and acting on those interests within their elements of national power.
What is the ICGLR’s Strategy and what are its Ends, Ways and Means

Ascertaining the effectiveness of the ICGLR’s strategy was the primary focus of this research. Measuring the ICGLR’s capability in handling the huge challenges of uniting a highly divided region has proven to be a challenge. Official ICGLR documents provide information relevant to answering this question. The central instruments on which the ICGLR’s strategy is based are the Dar-Es-Salaam Declaration and the ICGLR Pact and its organic Protocols and Programs of Actions which provides an elaborate and implementable strategy. The ICGLR’s strategy provides a forum for a dialogue among the member nations of the GLR. Its strategic strength is centered on the belief that partnership and willingness to negotiate is more cost effective than exercising military force. One way to assess the effectiveness of the ICGLR strategy has been to dissect its strategy according to the ends, ways, and means methodology. The literature reviewed extensively described the ICGLR’s strategy and its ends, ways, and means. Table 1 in chapter 2 has already identified the objectives (ends) of the ICGLR here restated as peace and security, democracy and good governance, economic development and regional integration and cross-cutting issues which are also found as the ends in Table 4. An analysis of the ways and means will be made to identify how a more effective strategy can be crafted by the ICGLR to more effectively achieve its stated ends.
Table 5. The ICGLR’s Strategy and its Ends, Ways, and Means.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ends</th>
<th>Ways</th>
<th>Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Democracy and Good Governance</td>
<td>2. Establishment of Democracy and Good governance Center</td>
<td>2. Mandatory Contributions from member states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Economic Development and Regional Integration</td>
<td>3. Election observation and monitoring</td>
<td>3. Voluntary contribution from cooperation and development partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Cross-cutting issues to include;</td>
<td>4. Bilateral and Regional cooperation</td>
<td>4. Group of Friends contributions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Institutional capacity building</td>
<td>5. Peaceful settlement of disputes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Leadership</td>
<td>6. Certification of mineral resources</td>
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A literature reviewed summed up the ICGLR’s strategic ends as creating conditions for security, stability and sustainable development in the GLR. The strategic ends of the ICGLR clearly translate into four questions identified as critical for an implementable strategy. They are: where are we now, where do we want to go, how will we get there, and how do we know if we got there (Summer 2009). Table 5 was used to analyze if there is any disconnect between the ICGLR’ strategic objectives (ends), course of action (ways), and the resources (means) to achieve the desired end state. As observed, the ICGLR objectives (ends), and course of action (ways), clearly captures the essence of preventive security in the GLR. Although the resources necessary for carrying out the ICGLR goals are modest, the research has revealed that there is a fundamental leadership disconnect. Lack of a clear leader or hegemon among the ICGLR countries makes it
difficult to provide leadership, vision and, not the least, the ability to set agendas and priorities (Norad 2009). This is, in the words of Holcomb, a strategic dilemma (Holcomb 2008) or a fundamental risk that may be mitigated if a proper alignment of its ends, ways, and means is ever accomplished.

**An analysis of Regional members’ security interests**

Findings indicate that the GLR include the countries with different interests and their levels of participation in the ICGLR differ considerably. The GLR is not only full of tension, but also a home to a remarkably high number of regional organizations. As observed in Table 6, at least each country of the eleven ICGLR members is participating in more than one regional organization with different mandates. They include the Common Market for Eastern and Southern African States (COMESA), CEPGL, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Economic Community of Central African States (CEEAC), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community and Monetary of Central Africa (CEMAC) and Southern African Development Community (SADC). However, none of these organizations include all countries in the larger Great Lakes area or have an explicit focus on peace and security only. Undoubtedly there is a multitude of overlapping agendas with obvious possibilities for duplication of efforts (Norad 2009). The unifying nexus of all is the ICGLR whose objective is to set a regional framework for consultations structured around the Pact on Peace, Security, Stability, Democracy and Good Governance, Economic Development and Regional Integration. In this framework the GLR countries that this research focused on are represented in bold letters.
Table 6. Membership in the ICGLR and other regional organizations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>CEPGL</th>
<th>CEMAC</th>
<th>CEEAC</th>
<th>EAC</th>
<th>ICGLR</th>
<th>IGAD</th>
<th>Tripartite</th>
<th>COMESA</th>
<th>SADC</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
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<td>Kenya</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>RoC</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Sudan</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>Tanzania</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Zambia</td>
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Several documents reviewed have confirmed that Burundi, the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda have in common the root causes and symptoms of conflict. It was noted that each country has, as a result of conflict, a different non-state actor accelerating instability in the region. This was confirmed by the conflict variable model of analysis presented in table 2, chapter 3. The aggregates utilized to measure the four countries’ governance indicators in table 3 showed that GLR countries differ considerably in terms of their institutional capacity and the degree of the involvement in regional conflicts. That said, it is clear that the GLR is not a homogenous region. The four main governance aggregate indicators in Table 4 are weighted in percentage and used to confirm the validity of the utility of the variables used throughout this research in analyzing the data. In reviewing Table 6 it shows that only Burundi, the DRC and Rwanda participate in the CEPGL. Uganda is not a member and is not interested in what goes on in the CEPGL. Burundi,
Rwanda and Uganda participate in the EAC, the DRC does not. Three out of the four countries do not participate in IGAD, only Uganda does. The common sub-regional organization that brings the four countries’ common interests together is the ICGLR and COMESA. The ICGLR and COMESA may be leveraged for common security and economic development in the GLR. However, a review made in the history of the GLR has shown that member states have often encountered serious differences of political opinion in crisis situations that have led to divergent courses of action. It happened between the DRC and Rwanda over the FDLR and happened previously between the DRC and Uganda over the LRA. When it comes to the GLR, in answering the question of what are the common interests that exist, there is no clear answer to this question; the ICGLR must take note of this. Lack of common interests is the critical issue that continuously inhibits overcoming the structural problems with ICGLR leadership. The ICGLR doesn’t have all the answers to regional problems. There must be a common ground for compromise for the good of regional stability. There is no magic formula for achieving peace and security in the region other than cultivating a new approach focused on common goals within the ICGLR’s strategy.

What are the Achievements of the ICGLR Thus Far in Providing Answers to Regional Security Problems?

In order to succinctly provide the answers to this question trends of events, pre- and post-establishment, of the ICGLR were reviewed to ascertain what has changed and what has not. The Pact on Security and Stability and Development, adopted by the ICGLR in 2006, was one indication of this, particularly as it included a common security strategy. Though many parts of the ICGLR’s strategy have not progressed since the Pact
was signed, the Pact has become a benchmark for countries’ cooperation in creating conditions for sustainable security and development. The progress made so far is encouraging and improving as days go by.

What has changed?

The primary objective of the ICGLR was to create conditions favorable for sustainable peace and economic development in the GLR. What was found is that priority areas identified as central in setting these conditions are democracy and good governance. This area has been discussed and analyzed in length throughout this study. Although there are indications of slowness in recovery, the ICGLR has made important strides in resurrecting good governance and democratic institutions in the region as this section on the ICGLR’s achievements have underscored. As observed, the ICGLR has significantly approached conflict prevention from the realm of relations, mutual defense, and political trust, control of natural resources and promotion of democracy.

Diplomatic relations

Diplomatic relations between the DRC and the Rwandan government were severed in 1996 following the Rwandan Defense Forces’ pursuit of the former ex-FAR into the DRC after committing genocide; both countries accused each other of aggression. It can be claimed that establishment of the ICGLR provided a forum for discussion leading to the opening up of embassies in the Kigali and Kinshasa capitals respectively.
Mutual Defense and Bilateral Operations

Although mutual distrust is still pervasive in the GLR, Rwanda and the DRC made an attempt to cooperate and implement a common approach to dismantle FDLR rebels. As a regional initiative for collective self-defense, the Joint Communique mandated the joint military operation, code named *Umoja Wetu*. An assessment of the operation *Umoja Wetu* shows that the coalition certainly made tactical gains in 2009. The FDLR lost its access to markets, key communication routes and some mining areas. Less than ten days after conclusion of the *Umoja Wetu* offensive operations, the international community imposed new sanctions on five senior political and military leaders of the FDLR, including Callixte Mbarushimana and General Sylvester Mudacumura (International Crisis Group 2009). This is a milestone in undercutting the FDLR’s political support network. As General John Numbi, commander of the *Umoja Wetu* joint operation argues that the operation met 85 percent of its objectives. Indeed, as the situation stands, the FDLR’s operational capacity has been dramatically reduced and their organizational leadership has been undermined. At the end of operation *Umoja Wetu*, MONUC repatriated 512 Rwandan former combatants and 805 members of their families in 2009 (International Crisis Group 2009). Although much is yet to be achieved, the role of commitment to integrate the rules of the ICGLR’s protocol on mutual defense by the two countries cannot be underestimated.

Political Achievements

The assessment made proved that there have been decades of mutual distrust and political suspicion in the GLR. The ICGLR’s establishment has created a political forum of dialogue among the GLR countries and has bridged the political gap for peace
building. Operation *Umoja Wetu* was a significant success for both Rwanda and the DRC as Belgium, the U.S., France and the United Kingdom pursued the policy of submitting a list of four FDLR leaders to the UN Security Council so that they could be placed on the list of individuals targeted by the travel ban and assets frozen envisaged by UNSCR 1857 (2008). Earlier on it was mentioned that the international community had been reluctant in responding to Rwanda’s security concerns. Through the ICGLR, the international community is showing signs of strong cooperation to this end. It is hoped that the FDLR’ political networks will have no platform to continue bolstering support for armed rebels activities and undermining established institutions in Rwanda.

**Control of Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources**

In reviewing the literature, it was discovered that one of the region’s main problems prolonging the conflict is the issue of conflict minerals. The ICGLR has directly linked violence to the illegal exploitation of natural resources and the regional initiative to fight the illegal exploitation of natural resources has been promoted as a model project. Commitment to obligations in good faith is critical to achieving this. On November 4, 2011, Rwanda returned to the DRC about 82 tons of smuggled minerals seized by Rwandan police (Helton 2011). It is worth noting that Rwanda’s return of these minerals demonstrated political commitment to its obligations. However, Human Rights Watch has documented cases of known FDLR and DRC Armed Forces’ cooperation in mineral smuggling. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act imposing additional reporting requirements on U.S. companies, regarding their sources of certain conflict minerals, supports and reinforces the ICGLR initiatives against illegal
exploitation of natural resources in the GLR (The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Act, 2010, S# 1502).

Promoting Democracy

While assessing the ICGLR strategy, one of the major ends identified is democracy and good governance. Assessing the variable of government effectiveness in Table 3, it has been noted that government effectiveness is not impressive in the GLR. Nevertheless there are signals that the protocol on democracy and good governance is bringing in good changes. For instance, the Lusaka Levy Mwanawasa Regional Center for Democracy, Good Governance, Human Rights and Civic Education was created and will address good governance and leadership deficiencies in the region (ICGLR 2011a). The center is a stepping stone for institutionalizing democracy and good governance. Its capability to identify governance related gaps is vital in proposing authoritative institutional reforms and imparting democratic values; all focused toward a better governed region. Democratic entitlement of all persons falls under the purview of the UN Charter. However, the ICGLR’s operational mechanisms have been empowered to meet this mandate in the GLR. The ICGLR Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance provides for independent election monitoring and observation missions in GLR countries. In view of implementing the protocol, in 2009 an election observation mission was conducted in the DRC. At the same time, at the special ICGLR Summit in January of 2010, the ICGLR received the mandate for election observations in the GLR. Although nothing much has changed regarding democratic elections in the GLR, election monitoring done in Burundi and the DRC serves as a stepping stone for improved operations. This protocol captures the essence of the ICGLR’s intent and shifts from
rhetoric to action to denouncing irregularities both in elections and constitutional manipulations.

What has not changed?

The root causes of conflict identified during assessment of the risk of instability in the GLR remains the same. They are continued political and economic grievances thriving in unstable and less than democratic institutions. According to Frank M. Bryan, real democracy demands first the presence of citizens. Real democracy requires that no cohort of society be excluded (Frank 2004). Analysis made on the GLR institutions, shows that sustaining democratic institutions and good governance capable of preventing and responding to conflict in the GLR is a formidable problem. Post-election violence in Kenya in early 2008 demonstrates a considerable setback of democracy in the region. The regional member states’ ability to maneuver in building strong democratic institutions to influence the best outcome of the ICGLR’s strategy and the willingness to embrace its commitment to regional obligation is “a new instrument of power.” Positive steps towards better governance have been taken since inception of the ICGLR. However, the increased effectiveness of governance cannot be realized if the political atmosphere does not change significantly.

Primary Question: What can be done to make the ICGLR More Effective in Achieving Regional Sustainable Security and Development?

The answers to the secondary research questions were discussed and analyzed conflict and instability in the GLR. The research has identified political and economic grievances as the root causes of conflicts in the GLR. Secondly, the analysis showed that the ICGLR strategy’s ends, ways, and means to achieve goals are not adequate. The
research revealed that the ICGLR’s strategy lacks a clear and defined leadership to set priorities and agendas. It appears to be too much of a consensus based discussion and consultative organization light on the ability to facilitate or direct action. Thirdly, the secondary research questions examined the ICGLR member states’ national and security interests to determine what they have in common or in conflict. It was stressed that the GLR is composed of different countries having different interests and their level of commitment to the ICGLR’s objectives differs considerably. It was also underscored that all ICGLR countries participate in more than one regional organization and therefore have some common, divided, and competing interests which oftentimes conflicts with the ICGLR’s goals.

Lastly, the secondary research questions assessed achievements of the ICGLR in providing suitable answers to regional security problems. The research underscored that although the ICGLR has made significant contributions in the key security areas of conflict management, diplomacy and mutual defense, the root causes of conflict in the GLR remain unchanged. The answer to the primary research question sums up the significance of shrinking democratic values, political will and weakness within domestic institutions that undermines the ICGLR’s initiatives. The answers to the primary research question can be summed up as; make improvement in democratic governance, revitalize leadership, build and empower government institutions, and integrate regionally in order to make the ICGLR’s strategy more effective.

Democratic Governance

Several documents reviewed emphasized that democratic governance is key to conflict prevention. The aim of the instability assessment model in table 4 was to
ascertain this. Political stability and absence of violence, as well as government
effectiveness indicators, has been directly linked to democracy and good governance. It
was underlined that effective democracy and good governance impose restraints on
violence. The level at which the GLR stands in democratic governance requires much
effort to improve it. Putting it in Richard’s operational terms, democratic governance
entails measures that involve setting the rules for the exercise of power and settling
conflicts over such rules (Richard 1999); this is what the region should focus on. Earlier
on a mention was made that the Center for Democracy, Good Governance, Human Rights
and Civil Education that has been inaugurated in Lusaka. This is a priority area to pursue
in order to address governance related gaps and draw lessons for the best practices
towards a well governed and stable region.

Democracy goes beyond holding elections. A note was earlier made to suggest
that mere elections in the GLR are a vague hope pursued by the political elite to
manipulate the public and sway the international community. Effective democracy must
entail good governance as an essential ingredient for political stability. Snyder notes that
democratically elected leaders are accountable to the people who bear the burdens of war.
Democracies will not attack each other and will regard each other’s regimes as legitimate
and non-threatening (Snyder 2004). The survival of the GLR not only requires effective
governments to calibrate their national policies to integrate the ICGLR’s strategy, but
also to implement them. By establishing the ICGLR the international community showed
that conflict prevention is a core activity. However, this initiative can only have impact if
there is political will within the country’s ruling elite to commit to take democratic
principles as an integral part of their policy making.
Leadership

A glance into the history of the GLR political trends has shown that political leaders are responsible for the breakdown of security. It has been pointed out that the pursuit of military victory in the GLR will not bring about the desired peace and development. The ICGLR Protocol on Mutual Defense condemns the outright the use of force against another state. Paulus notes that, by definition, aggression is a leadership crime (Paulus 2009). Focused leaders are imbued with ability to curb the politics that divide at all levels. This is what is needed to invigorate the ICGLR’s strategy. Focused leadership capable of making the best choice is not only for its own interests but for the greater good of the region as well critical for halting the state of decline in the region. The members of the ICGLR must soon commit to the quality of leadership that is necessary for the ICGLR’s strategy to succeed. This research is a wakeup call to the ICGLR member states and its stakeholders to reassess and revisit the aspect of leadership in the GLR. The ICGLR’s strategy appeals to regional leaders to conform their leadership style to established international standards. Only then can the ICGLR, through its member states, be more effective in providing sustainable security and economic development to the GLR.

Institutional Capacity Building

Building post-conflict institutions’ capacity calls for an integrated strategy that seeks to restore order and remake the previously dysfunctional institutions. An assessment made on each country showed that there is considerable internal weakness within political institutions. The ability to control corruption is increasingly becoming low in the GLR countries. The indicators displayed in Table 3 and analyzed in Table 4
shows that only Rwanda is within an acceptable range (59-62 percent). The institutional capacity remains central in making decisions and in following them through fruition. Currently the bigger problem is that institutional capacity is severely lacking. Inevitably without stable and capable institutions, the entire political process gets stuck. According to Santiso, institution building in post-conflict countries has become a central component of the UN efforts at building sustainable peace grounded in the conviction that peace, development and democracy are inextricably linked (Santiso 2002). This design of the ICGLR’s strategy serves to provide a comprehensive approach to this effort. Political leaders are at the epicenter in promoting integrity, accountability and proper management of public affairs and must continue creating an enabling environment conducive to institution building as a precondition for long term peace, security, stability and development. Corruption encourages mismanagement of public monies, creates grounds for unfair distribution of services, and devours institutions capacity. The pursuit for regional integration is not possible and cannot live side by side with endemic corruption; it must never be tolerated at all levels if transparency is ever to be realized. It is not enough to have laws; effective enforcement must follow, rest the ICGLR’s strategy would be failed good intentions. With Uganda as an example, while the legal prohibitions against corruption are strong on the books, in practice the enforcement of those laws falls short (Global Integrity 2009). Regional integration and foreign investment demand clear policies that allow credible institutions to support economic development. Regional Integration for Peace Economic grievances were identified as a central factor in fuelling conflict. The initial stage in this analysis noted that there is an unbalanced economy and a widening of
income inequality in the GLR. Regional integration is a realistic way that seeks to encourage balanced economic development in the region. It diminishes the potential causes of regional conflict emerging. It more than anything promotes mutual cooperation as countries concerned pursue common interest in trade and economic development. Earlier on an analysis of peace and conflict revealed that a country with economic openness creates conditions for integration with the global economy. Indeed, countries that are more tightly connected to global markets have been found to experience less instability (Hewitt, Wilkenfeld, and Gurr 2012, 6). Countries must pursue this goal because it also creates conditions for the citizens to widely benefit from other countries’ advantages while lowering grievances. Dambisa notes that conflicts are born out of competition to control resources and are predominantly a feature of poorer economies and are internal (Dambisa 2009). Similarly the focus of new security concerns is not the threat of traditional interstate wars, but the fear of underdevelopment as a source of instability (Sandra, Black, and Shaw 2006). In contemporary security sector reform and peace building, regional integration is an important measure in not only preventing conflict, but also peace enhancement through economic integration. Even before the introduction of the ICGLR, regional integration has been considered vital through the CEPGL. The degree of involvement in trade among countries lessens the conflict levels as they all benefit from trade. The UN initiative in establishing the MDGs is a way toward enhancing cooperation and inspiring development efforts (UNSCR A/RES55/2(2000). Implementation of the ICGLR protocol on economic development and regional integration captures the essence of the UN MDGs as a way to strengthen
confidence of its partners (ICGLR 2006e). For the ICGLR to set favorable conditions for economic development, the GLR states must reform economic and political institutions.

Summary and Conclusions

This chapter presented and analyzed the research findings. It has underscored that the GLR is faced with a multitude of interrelated conflicts driven by the lack of political cohesion and economic grievances. An analysis dissected the GLR member countries’ interests and ascertained that there is considerable disparity and their level of involvement and level of commitment to achieve the ICGLR’s strategy differs. Indeed, it confirmed that member countries participate in different regional organizations with possible overlap of agendas and duplication of effort. It is observed that the root causes of the conflict in the GLR remains the same. Chapter 4 has highlighted the achievements of the ICGLR in promoting sustainable security and development. In sum, the research has warned that the ICGLR is not an honest broker. It is an organization comprised of representatives from 11 nations which all have their own national self-interests to pursue. Indeed, the ICGLR is not the UN of the GLR and therefore cannot do everything. The research has ultimately suggested plausible ways of how to make the ICGLR more effective in providing sustainable security and economic development. It assessed and answered the secondary and primary research questions and prepared the readers to understand the findings and draw their attention to the recommendations in chapter 5. The conclusion derived from this chapter forms the foundation of the final chapter of this thesis. Chapter 5 will make final conclusions and recommendations.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

The purpose of this research was to examine the effective integration of the ICGLR in sustainable security and development of the GLR. Since their independence, the GLR core countries have experienced huge challenges of intertwined complex conflicts with spillover effects. The experience of the 1994 Rwandan genocide became a defining moment of regional instability. The existence of political divergence has more often led to unintended outcomes and limited success in conflict prevention. Chapter 5 is organized as follows; summary of the findings discussed in chapter 4, summary of the findings, interpretation of the findings, security implications of the findings, summary and conclusions, and recommendations.

Summary of the findings discussed

This thesis identified a number of factors underlying the instability in the GLR. The analysis made revealed that the conflict in the GLR is not a new phenomenon. The current instability in the GLR was exacerbated by the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The research noted that the recent focus on the foreign armed rebels operating in the DRC misrepresents the political and economic dimension of conflict in the GLR. A mention was made that the obsession for power and political identity culminated in the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Although genocide was stopped, its effects have been felt across the neighboring countries and it remains the defining moment of current regional instability. The DRC government was identified in aiding and supporting the FDLR against the
newly formed government after the 1994 genocide. The findings underscored that intervention in the DRC in pursuit of the FDLR by Rwanda and Uganda was due to the international community’s failure to restrain the FDLR’s aggression on Rwanda.

This research has examined the ICGLR’s strategy to ascertain if there is any disconnect that can inhibit its implementation or lead to its failure. It was observed that ICGLR member countries have divergent interests, and their capability and level of involvement in the ICGLR differs considerably. However, their common interest is both in the ICGLR and COMESA which can be leveraged for common goals. The research has uncovered that the ICGLR’s strategy objectives (ends), course of action (ways) are synchronized. However, it was observed that, although its resources (means) are modest, the ICGLR lacks a leader who can determine its priorities and agendas. Lack of a clear leader, or hegemon, among the ICGLR countries makes it difficult for any member country to provide leadership, vision and not the least the ability to set agendas and priorities. The research identified that the ICGLR’s strategy can be leveraged to address the regional security problems. Indeed bilateral Operation *Umoja Wetu* between the DRC and Rwanda demonstrate that the ICGLR’s security strategy can be pursued for common security and regional integration for economic development.

**Interpretation of the findings**

The GLR is one of the most conflict ridden regions in Africa. The proximity of neighboring countries with external problems has manifested the increasing trend of violence with cross-border effects. The effects of the Rwandan genocide spread to the DRC, Burundi and Uganda and dragged the region into deadly conflict. The interlocking drivers of conflict in the GLR have given rise to current regional conflict tied to armed
rebels presence in the DRC. It is worth noting that political and economic grievances drives today’s regional conflict with limited ability to resolve them. An analysis made on risk of instability of the GLR identified that there is limited political stability in the region. However, with the ICGLR’s pursued strategy of preventive security, the risk of instability is within a manageable range. Although there is still a degree of differences in certain security issues, political mistrust and suspicion among the GLR countries have lessened.

**Security implication of the findings**

The analysis made confirmed that the trigger of the current conflict in the GLR was the existence of armed rebels operating in the DRC. Indeed, it was identified that the DRC was implicated in supporting the FDLR against Rwanda. The continued political mistrusts and suspicion have more often than not led to unintended consequences when it comes to critical security issues. As observed there is limited common interest that brings together political leaders within the ICGLR. This is a critical issue that continuously inhibits overcoming the structural problems with ICGLR leadership. The ICGLR doesn’t have all the answers to regional problems; there must be a common ground for compromise for the good of regional stability. Achieving peace and security in the region requires cultivating a new approach focused on common goals within the ICGLR’s strategy. Pursuing military means in the GLR cannot serve as the foundation of an enduring peace. Klare notes that a country either holds security in common with other nations or simply cannot achieve it (Klare and Yogesh 1998).
Summary and Conclusion

The primary motivation of this research was to analyze the effectiveness integration of the ICGLR for sustainable security and economic development in the GLR. During the conduct of this research the author identified that approach to regional conflict has always ignored political and economic causes of conflict and instability in the GLR. Although the threat posed by the presence of different armed rebels operating in the DRC is considerable, the lack of political will to effectively implement the ICGLR’s strategy in neutralizing the rebels is a formidable problem. While the research underscored that the ICGLR has made significant strides bolstering regional consensus toward sustainable security, the cause of conflict in the GLR remains unchanged. Indeed, the prevalent conflict of interest among the member countries of the GLR has been identified as most critical in undermining common security objectives. The analysis made during this research shows that there is a fundamental problem of institutional weakness and governance related deficiencies in the GLR. As such, there is inherent political disparity that inhibits unity of effort for regional action when it comes to making critical security decisions. As observed, lack of common interests derails the ICGLR’s strategy in achieving the desired end state. In sum, the ICGLR is not an honest broker, it is an organization comprised representatives of eleven member states which all have their own national interests to pursue. Indeed, the ICGLR is not the UN of the GLR and cannot accomplish much as long as the structural conditions in the region are not resolved. The research has suggested that there is no surer way of achieving regional stability and economic development other than embracing the ICGLR’s strategy not as a form of academic checklist but as integral part of the GLR countries’ national policies.
Recommendations for Action to the GLR Core Countries

The first recommendation concerns the GLR countries differing interests. Political divergence undermines regional initiatives aimed at fostering security. The GLR countries should actively pursue cooperation strategy through mutual defense toward to common security to promote and enhance stability in the region.

The second recommendation is focused on democracy and good governance. Political instability is directly linked to the insatiable demand for power control and limited democratic institutions. The GLR countries must pursue a strategy of political pluralism and open political participation.

Thirdly, corruption has been identified as undermining democratic principles. It is counterproductive to institution building and undermines stability and economic development. The GLR countries should pursue, promote, and strengthen institutions through enacting rules that outlaw the vice of corruption, ensure 360 degree transparency and holding accountable leaders at all levels.

The fourth recommendation addresses the existence of the armed rebels in the DRC. Pursuing cooperative security must be a top priority within the ICGLR’s strategy. Lessons learned from Operation Umoja Wetu must be integrated and implemented.

The fifth recommendation seeks to address the problem of refugees from the GLR. The GLR countries, with the help of international community, must actively engage and influence voluntary repatriation and reintegration of refugees from all GLR countries and beyond. Those countries accepting the repatriation of its citizens must effectively re-integrate them into the society and the economy.
The sixth recommendation addresses economic deprivation and unjustified economic disparity. Pursuing a strategy that allows checks and balance and strengthening institutions that protect property rights will reduce the degree of disaffection and desire to control economic driven opposition.

The seventh recommendation is about leadership related deficiencies. The region must pursue the implementation and operationalization of the Levy Mwanawasa Center for Democracy, Good Governance and Human Rights and Civic Education.

The eighth recommendation seeks to leverage and synchronize information sharing. Actively pursue the establishment, staffing and operationalization of the joint intelligence center in Goma, DRC.

The ninth recommendation concerns exploitation of natural resources. The GLR countries should actively collaborate in implementing the Lusaka Agreement for the certification of minerals. The DRC must work towards disengaging its troops from mineral deposits and credible sanctions for non-compliance must be enforced within the realm of the ICGLR’s strategy.

The tenth recommendation concerns military intervention. The research confirmed that the ICGLR’s strategy is not about military intervention. However, it was underscored that the recent operation against Kony is soliciting troops from outside the GLR. To be meaningful the GLR countries should pursue a strategy for dispensing a small but effective military force for intervention as the option of last resort.

Lastly, the current relatively stable political and diplomatic environment in the GLR is a creation of the ICGLR initiative and forums. The countries in the GLR must pursue a stronger dedication to the ICGLR’s strategy and leverage its strengths.
Recommendation for Action to the International Community

The first recommendation to the international community concerns the support for the ICGLR’s strategy. The international community’s establishment of the ICGLR has thus far been a benchmark for the GLR’s quest for sustainable security and development. Sustainable support to the region should pursue continued sanctions against senior political and military leaders of the FDLR and denying them safe haven.

The second recommendation concerns the implementation of the ICGLR’s strategy. A mention was made earlier that commitment to an international obligation is a formidable problem for the region’s leaders. The international community must pursue a strategy of bolstering the regional leaders’ political will and consensus toward creating conditions favorable to operationalizing the ICGLR’s strategy.

Recommendation for further study

During this research a number of issues were identified that have up to now remain unanswered. One of the issues that pose critical questioning is observance of the ICGLR’ Pact which sets a legal framework for the peaceful settlement of disputes. The causes of conflict that were identified during this research remain the same. This defeats the operational logic of the ICGLR’s strategy. Failure to implement and enforce the rules is a fundamental problem for the region. Additional research is recommended to venture into enforcement mechanisms for noncompliance with the ICGLR strategy’s standards and principles. The research would consider possible sanctions for any country’s violation of the ICGLR’s strategy and possible enforcement mechanisms. The research would further endeavor to address leadership problems that remain a limiting factor in setting vision and priority agendas for the ICGLR’s strategy.
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