EUROPEAN UNION’S MILITARY CRISIS MANAGEMENT: CHALLENGES AND PERSPECTIVES

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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**Abstract**

This thesis is built on research guided by the primary research question: Does the European Union (EU) possess effective military crisis management decision-making mechanisms to plan and execute peacekeeping missions without external assistance? The focus of the research is the evolution of European security awareness in the last twenty years (1992-2012). Towards this purpose, the research was addressed using three case studies.

The first case study on the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina coincides with the period of awakening for the EU and its member states in the areas of security and defense. The second case study, Operation Concordia in Macedonia, was used to assess the progress of EU military crisis management. The third case study, the EU operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is an ongoing operation, gives relevant data on current developments and results of the EU military crisis management.

Further research of the EU’s military crisis management as well as operations yet to come should be of great interest to the other researchers interested in this topic.

**Subject Terms**

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

EUROPEAN UNION’S MILITARY CRISIS MANAGEMENT: CHALLENGES AND PERSPECTIVES, by Major Gjorgi J. Vasilevski, 86 pages.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

During the Cold War period, the political analysis of the possibility of military crisis management was dependent on the relationship of super-powers, military-political blocs, and military confrontation, primarily in Europe. After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the creation of conditions of a new political situation in Europe, all of those elements completely lost their meaning. Thus, the modified nature of conflicts and crises that confronted Europe in the early 1990s indicated the urgency for creating more subtle political approaches. Crises and conflicts in the past 20 years (between 1992 and 2012), for example in the Western Balkans, clearly showed that the European Union (EU) had not developed an effective system for this type of crisis management. When it comes to the activities that the EU has undertaken in the field of crisis management, the Western Balkans was the first of many areas where the EU has made efforts to highlight this field and the decisions that were made in response to events that occurred there. At the same time, the Balkan crisis helped shape the evolution of political concepts for crisis management.

This paper will analyze three case studies in order to address and answer the research question: Does the EU possess effective military crisis management decision-making mechanisms to plan and execute peacekeeping missions without external assistance? These case studies are: (1) The Bosnian War (1992-1995); (2) EU Operation Concordia in Republic of Macedonia (2003); and (3) EU Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina (ongoing since 2004).
In the early 1990s, it became clear that European countries should take more responsibility for their common security and defense. The initial inability of Europe to intervene and prevent or resolve the Bosnian conflicts led to a collective perception that the EU must work on the imbalance between far-reaching economic power and limited political power. It became clear that coordinated diplomatic activities, which were supposed to end the conflict through political means, must be supported by credible military crisis management capacities.

Before 2000 there was no formal relationship between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU. During the 1990s, the Western European Union (WEU)\(^1\) had acted as a liaison between NATO and the European countries that were trying to build a stronger European security and defense identity within NATO.

The situation changed in 1999. The EU leaders, bearing in mind the conflicts in the Balkans, decided to develop a security and defense policy within the EU. This policy would have the EU, in coordination with NATO, take responsibility for many functions that were previously handled by the WEU. The model of military crisis management that the EU introduced in 1999, known as a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP),\(^2\) had a clear intergovernmental character. “The main idea was to improve European

\(^{1}\)Western European Union Website, “Western European Union,” http://www.weu.int (accessed 8 May 2012). WEU was an organization created by the Brussels Treaty in 1948 as a collective defense in response to the Soviet attempt to impose control over the countries in Central Europe after the World War II. Its existence ended formally on 30 June 2011.

\(^{2}\)Since 1 December 2009 it has been known as the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). Both terms, ESDP and CSDP, will be used interchangeably throughout the paper.
capabilities for military crisis management missions in order to fulfill the ambition to provide capacities for autonomous EU action.”

The ESDP is an instrument that is intended to provide professional expertise and practical implementation of a comprehensive military crisis management system for the EU. The debate today does not apply to the roots of the creation of the ESDP, but it applies more to ESDP’s functionality, decision-making in military crisis management, and specific results in the EU’s military crisis management operations. The EU has developed military crisis management instruments and bodies and applies them not only within the European region, but outside the region as well, within a broader global context. When considering how the EU functions, one must take into account its dual nature and consider the inside and outside perspectives. When analyzed from an internal perspective, the EU is a political system without a state. In other words, it is a unique political entity, a political system that “lacks” the requirements to be considered a state. Instead, it includes 27 sovereign and independent states under its umbrella and has a multilayered model of decision-making. “The first layer is sub-state or regional, the second is national and the third is supranational.” The fact that the EU is a unique form of political community which has had no parallel in the history of political and international relations is especially important to consider when it comes to foreign and security policy. This thesis will seek to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the EU

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4 Ibid., 48.
decision making process and military crisis management mechanisms in the context of
the three case studies.

The Research Question

The end of the Cold War triggered a series of important questions, including those
related to the modified role of the EU in international relations. In the newly defined
environment, the EU tried to fill the power vacuum created by the disintegration of the
Warsaw Pact, and to pacify unstable countries in Central and Eastern Europe. “It was
thought that the EU could become a global policeman, but also diplomatic conflict
mediator, a bridge between the rich and the poor and joint supervisor of the global
economy.”5 However, what prevented the Union in the early 1990s from effectively
playing all these roles, as Hill put it, was the “gap between expectations and capacities.”6
This gap was most clearly evident in the 1990s especially during the war in the former
Yugoslavia. The EU was unable to prevent the war using diplomatic efforts because they
could not agree on a common decision making policy and military crisis management.
The Belgian Foreign Minister at that time, Mark Eyskens, gave his famous review which
was often cited later, that “Europe is an economic giant, a political dwarf, and a military
worm.”7 In 1995, it was U.S diplomacy and military power which finally showed the

5Christopher Hill, “The Capability-Expectations Gap or Conceptualizing Europe’s

6Ibid., 305.

7Craig R. Whitney, “War in the Gulf: Europe; Gulf Fighting Shatters Europeans’
01/25/world/war-in-the-gulf-europe-gulf-fighting-shatters-europeans-fragile-unity.html?
Europeans in Bosnia and Herzegovina in which direction they should focus their efforts to become more effective actors in the international arena.

In order to answer the main research question, the author found it important to analyze three case studies. Those analyses underpin the author’s assessment as to whether or not the EU has effective military crisis management decision-making mechanisms in order to plan and execute peacekeeping missions without external assistance. Four secondary research questions have also been used in the assessment of the three case studies:

1. Was the EU able to respond?
2. Which EU policy guided crisis management operations?
3. What structures and processes facilitated the EU’s crisis management operations?
4. What were the EU-NATO relations or interactions during those operations?

**Significance**

The main objective of this thesis is to explore the status of military crisis management decision-making within the EU since the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of Yugoslavia in correlation to the rapid political changes and challenges of EU structures and policies. The results of this research will show how the events that occurred in the 1990s, generally in Europe and particularly in the Balkans, created certain conditions that influenced the shaping of the EU’s foreign and security policy.

The significance of this thesis is reflected in the hypothesis that the EU is slowly but certainly moving beyond its traditional economic and political boundaries and entering a domain that typically belonged to NATO. The findings from this research will
help in understanding the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), the level of development of those policies over the years, and how that level of development will enable the EU to carry out their own missions of military crisis management.

Definitions of Key Terms

The following terms and definitions will be used throughout the research:

Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP): The organized and mutually accepted foreign policy of the EU, primarily designed to guide EU’s security, defense, and diplomatic activities.

Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP): Formerly known as the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) “is a major element of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and is the basis of EU policy covering defense and military aspects.”\textsuperscript{8} It has been an important part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy since the European Council meeting in Cologne in 1999.

Crisis Management Missions: “are often undertaken by multinational force. They involve a variety of activities, including military ones, aimed at creating or maintaining a secure and environment in order to enable peace to be established and/or to end a crisis. They include traditional peacekeeping missions, peace-enforcement and peace-making

\footnote{Ibid.}
missions, stabilization and reconstruction missions, conflict-prevention missions and humanitarian operations.”

Decision Making Process: A decision-making process involves multiple elements, starting from identifying the problem, gathering information about the problem and possible solutions and consequences of them, setting the goal to which should come with problem solving, review of instruments that can help in making most appropriate decision, their application, negotiation between the parties concerned and making the final decision. In fact, the process of decision-making is a comprehensive activity that enables the identification and selection of alternative problem solutions that are most suited to the goal. “The emphasis is on collecting information that helps reduce the uncertainty of the consequences of the decision, study the circumstances in which the process takes place, the timeframe for decision making, funds available, as well as mechanisms for decision.”

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): “Is a political and military alliance whose primary goals are the collective defense of its members and the maintenance of a democratic peace in the North Atlantic area. NATO has a military and civilian headquarters and an integrated military command structure. Most of the NATO forces

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remain under full national command and control until member countries agree to undertake NATO-related tasks.”

The European Union: “The European Union is a supranational and intergovernmental union, economic and political partnership between 27 European countries. It has delivered half a century of peace, stability, and prosperity. Its member states have set up common institutions to which they delegate some of their sovereignty so that decisions on specific matters of joint interest can be made democratically at European level.”

Assumptions

It is important that this research remain relevant. It must be assumed that despite ongoing economic and political challenges, the EU will retain its current structure and vision for the future.

Limitations

The thesis will be challenging for two reasons: First, there are numerous materials which explore this topic, but due to the current economic crisis in the EU, the past three years have shown a lack of interest in research in this area. Second, in striving to find a more objective view of the EU’s military crisis management operations, this research studied materials by authors from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. The author has the impression that the Macedonian authors have a prevailing sensitivity toward the

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question of the need for such operation, and that the Bosnian authors have more sensitivity toward mutual blame for the situation in their country when it comes to the EU’s operation Althea. Even though the author hails from this region, objective sources were reviewed during research, and an attempt was made to avoid stereotypes and misconceptions concerning the EU’s development in the field of military crisis management and decision making which are related to this issue. The biggest limitation to this thesis is the often changing EU political and legislative environment. The thesis will be limited to the EU’s concept that affects its foreign, security and defense policy. Although, ESDP recognizes both civilian and military crisis management, this thesis will only refer to military crisis management.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Robert Schuman’s idea for establishing the European Coal and Steel Community in the 1950s has evolved throughout the years, into what it is known today as the European Union (EU), an organization of 27 member states. The EU declares itself a global security and political factor, but also an adequate crisis manager. One question comes to mind right away: to what degree is EU’s “adequacy” developed in order to manage a crisis and to what level EU can engage in crisis management operations?

Judging by all of its characteristics, the EU is a *sui generis* actor, which the international community had not seen previously. It is a unique actor in both its policy and action. “It is neither a state nor an international organization.”¹³ Judging by its model and action, it is undoubtedly somewhere in between federation and confederation. The EU itself claims that “it is the first real postmodern concept in the international relations.”¹⁴

The domain of analysis in this thesis will be limited to the EU’s concept that affects its foreign, security and defense policy. Therefore, the first step is to begin by reviewing the literature that primarily examines these fields. The scope of the thesis will cover analysis of the EU’s key institutions that are directly and indirectly associated with decision making in the field of military crisis management. Because EU-NATO relations

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are an essential part of the analysis, they will be an integral part of this paper, as well. The author’s intention is all information included in this analysis will be practically illustrated through the three benchmarks in the evolution of the EU’s military crisis management: the wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995), Operation Concordia (Macedonia) in 2003, and EUFOR Althea (Bosnia and Herzegovina) since 2004.

Many scholars have been engaged in studying and analyzing the EU especially in the area of security and defense policy. Therefore, the literature analyzed for this study will be categorized by type: books and publications.

The existing literature constitutes an abundance amount of written material which elaborated on the EU’s ability in military crisis management decision-making from many different and even conflicting views. This diversity of perspectives made the procedure even more complicated, while at the same time making the analysis even more interesting. In reviewing the literature and writing this thesis, the author attempted to stay as objective as possible and refrain from showing partiality to a specific person’s views. Those conflicting views are understood only as a challenge in finding a middle ground between extremes. The extremes reflected mostly the professional backgrounds of the authors, their native regions (mostly from the EU or U.S.), and their specific personal claims.

Books

Andreas Staab, in the second edition of his book, The European Union Explained, provides a comprehensive and clear picture of the EU from its creation until today. He managed to illustrate all the changes occurring in the EU over the years by analyzing the relevant documents which either introduced new or complemented the existing
agreements (treaties). Staab begins with the evolution of the EU represented by the parameters of the European integration and the enlargement process. The first chapter deals with the controversy over the Lisbon Treaty, disagreements over policy reform, and determining financing for these policies. In addition, he discusses the concern that some member states have about the EU’s further expansion and integration especially after the assimilation of Western Balkans and Turkey. The aim of this book is not to prove that the EU is the European equivalent of the U.S., but, on the contrary, to illustrate that the EU is more than just an ordinary international factor. Staab opens a wide debate concerning the EU’s politics and policies. In the first section, he describes each institution comprehensively, especially in regards to its function, competences, influences, and weaknesses. He concludes with a discussion and analysis of major EU policies, including CFSP which is of particular interest to the thesis. Among other things, he analyzes the impact which these policies have inside and outside the Union, and on the global scene.

Robert E. Hunter, the author of *The European Security and Defense Policy–NATO’s Companion or Competitor*, analyzes the ESDP in relation to NATO and its policies. This book is relevant to this paper because it analyzes whether or not ESDP can influence NATO, and what the benefits and challenges of that influence would be. Hunter begins with the birth of the ESDP as an idea at the end of the 1990s. He states that the main role of the ESDP was to awaken Europe from the lethargic position in which she found herself following the wars in Yugoslavia, and also to address her feeling of being incapable of confronting the ability of the U.S. to take initiative in those wars. Hunter claims that the U.S., acting through NATO, correctly invested a lot of time and effort in the second pillar of the EU (which was CFSP), because the U.S. was convinced that only
a politically mature and economically strong Europe would have a military capacity
equivalent to that of the U.S. and that would contribute to their mutual security. On the
other hand, he states that the U.S. pushed Europe to build such capacities within NATO
rather than outside it.

The development of ESDP and the political maneuvers of the Europeans have
raised the question about whether the ESDP will be developed within NATO or outside
NATO. According to Hunter, as a result of these developments, NATO officials,
especially Americans, feared two things. First, Europe would remain militarily weak; and
second, Europe would separate from NATO. This would certainly undermine the
importance of NATO, which proved to be an effective instrument in the post-Cold War
era during the Balkan wars and the first Gulf War 1990-1991.

In his conclusion, Hunter cited some benefits the EU gained from ESDP. Among
those benefits, ESDP “laid the basis for the EU’s eventually having a truly functioning
European foreign policy.”15 This policy is a guarantee that the EU members “could act
with some military force if NATO (meaning, in practice, the U.S.) chose not to be
engaged.”16 Hunter claims that ESDP gave the Europeans the possibility of raising their
voices in decisions made within NATO. The European governments benefited from
having a legal mandate for military action.

The author raised several issues that could undermine NATO and U.S. interests.
Those issues must be solved in a way that NATO and EU actions will work for the best

15Robert E. Hunter, The European Security and Defense Policy-NATO’s
Companion or Competitor? (National Defense Research Institute, Europe: RAND, 2002),
Summary, xiv.

16Ibid.
of the transatlantic security and political relations. Hunter argues that ESDP can cause competition with NATO structures and processes. He states that having more than one place for operational planning can lead to different outcomes that can undermine any situation in which the EU might have to hand over responsibility to NATO. Regardless, Hunter proposes that ESDP should not be a cause for separation between the U.S. and NATO on one side, and the European allies on the other, but a cause for reducing the irritating and complicated factors in ongoing transatlantic issues.

Bastian Giegrich, in his book, *European Military Crisis Management–Connecting Ambition and Reality*, analyzes the capability of the EU in the field of military crisis management. The international community, when faced with this paradox of the end of the Cold War and increasing conflict, found itself in the situation that called for increased involvement in military crisis management operations. In response, the international community requested the involvement of the Western democracies, the EU and its member states, because of their welfare, relatively competitive military apparatus, and of course their commitment to the development of democracy and human rights. It was hoped that the involvement of the EU would contribute to expanding the international community’s capacity for action. The post-cold war period triggered the EU to emphasize its efforts to define military, political, and strategic framework to strengthen its (and its member states) role in crisis management.

Giegrich is analyzing the EU’s needs in order to be militarily capable. In other words, he is confronting its ambitions on one hand, and the EU’s current situation on the other hand. In order to explain this vacuum between ambitions and reality, Giegrich examines the national ambitions of the particular member states and their performance in
the EU. He analyzes their internal reasons by using the examples of Austria and Germany as countries which are not in favor of using military force; and the example of the UK as a country which, if necessary, is always willing to use military force to resolve problems.

Giegrich says that the EU should not and must not be the reason for failure in the area of military crisis management. He argues that the reason for this should be found in the national ambitions of the member states, and the EU should influence the national authorities’ awareness and their readiness to foresee the EU’s capability for performing full spectrum military crisis management operations, independent of other international organizations. He goes further in his analysis and identifies the national decision making systems and institutions, national strategic cultures, the broader national norms for involvement in the operations of this kind, and national material readiness, as factors that determine the national level of ambition of a member state. Giegrich concludes with the suggestion that the EU must find a new balance between its inclusiveness and the effectiveness of its activities in this area if it wants to maximize its performance in military crisis management operations and give life to their ambitions.

In his collection of essays, “Command and Control: Planning for EU Military Operations,” Luis Simón attempts to analyze and at the same time identify the EU’s strengths and weaknesses when it comes to decision making, planning, and executing military crisis management operations. He reasons that the absence of permanent planning in the EU and an ability to execute such planning are the primary inhibitors of the development of ESDP. He explains that the basis and evolution of the EU’s military planning and Command and Control (C2) are the result of compromises between the big “Three” - France, Britain and Germany. Moreover, Simon maintains that Britain and
Germany and their interests are to blame for the continuing absence of permanent
military planning and C2 capabilities within the EU. In his proposals, Simon contends
that a compromise should be found between the need of continuous planning and C2, and
the concept of forming an Operational Headquarters (OHQ). Therefore, he proposes to
strengthen the military assessment capability in the planning department (currently within
the EU Military Staff), by setting up a planning skeleton which will contribute by
improving the planning and increasing the flexibility of the planning process of the
Union. To illustrate his suggestions, Simon analyzes the EUFOR Operation Althea in
Bosnia and Herzegovina in terms of planning the operation and problems that the EU is
facing.

Publications and Papers

In his monograph, “The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European
Union’s Common Security and Defense Policy: Intersecting Trajectories,” Dr. Sarwar
Kashmeri states that the EU and its common security and defense policy are capable of
executing a wide range of missions without assistance from NATO. “Dr. Kashmeri
contends that through CSDP, Europeans are increasingly taking charge of managing their
own foreign and security policy.”17 Moreover, he argues that in the Post-Cold War era,
NATO faces many problems and challenges in defining the purpose of its existence.
“NATO is no longer the sole and preeminent Euro-Atlantic security actor. NATO’s
continued existence, is in a supporting capacity to CSDP and in its ability to craft a

relationship with CSDP that will allow North America and Europe to act militarily together, should that ever become necessary.”¹⁸ Dr. Kashmeri reasons that “by using EU’s CSDP, Europeans are now capable of defending their own territory, except in extraordinary situations and threats that require a combined response from the EU, Canada, and the United States.”¹⁹ In a conclusion, Kashmeri suggests that NATO should be bridged to the EU’s CSDP. In that case, the EU and NATO should “continue to serve as the platform to enable the United States, Europe, and Canada to act militarily together in cases where severity of the issue calls for joint action.”²⁰

Dr. Christopher S. Chivvis, in his paper based on the 10 year development of ESDP, “Birthing Athena, the Uncertain Future of European and Security and Defense Policy,” explores the direction in which the further development of an ESDP should move. It is not difficult to notice his U.S. perspective, because his analysis is made in conjunction with NATO and the U.S. The author’s hypothesis is that the ESDP should be developed within NATO. Dr. Chivvis proposes three models for further development of the ESDP. The first one is Light ESDP, where “ESDP would develop into a dependable junior partner responsible for managing stabilization and reconstruction missions under the auspices of the UN, NATO, or national authority.”²¹ In other words, ESDP would develop its capacities and institutions for civil-military operations which would lead to

¹⁸Ibid., Forward.

¹⁹Ibid., vii.

²⁰Ibid., vi.

the EU playing a junior role in the broader international environment. He claims that this model will not bring the EU autonomy in operations, but will make the EU highly dependent on NATO in general, and on the U.S. in particular. The second model the author suggests is for ESDP to develop a common European force complemented with a capability for major interstate war.”22 This developed ESDP would be “capable of regime changes (like the U.S. in the case of Iraq and Afghanistan), with or without assistance from NATO.”23 The third model of ESDP development would make Europe capable enough to take autonomous action “to resolve problems that threaten European interests more intensively than U.S. interests.”24 In other words, it would be able to respond to crises similar to those in the early 1990s in Bosnia. The author assumes that such crises will “occur in Europe, on its borders, or in neighboring regions.”25 This model of ESDP would not take over large scale military operations because it would intersect with U.S. interests; therefore NATO would be an appropriate tool. To develop these models, Dr. Chivvis argues that the EU should allocate more funds for development of its (member states) military capabilities. In order to be successful, ESDP must be part of a transformed transatlantic security system. The author expresses his U.S. point of view when claiming that “the positive attitude of the U.S. toward this policy is a practical prerequisite ESDP’s success.”26 He maintains that the U.S. can easily prevent future

22Ibid., 15.
23Ibid.
24Ibid., 16.
25Ibid.
26Chivvis, 28.
development of ESDP, because there are still skeptics in the U.S. who are convinced that ESDP could weaken, or in the worst case, destroy NATO. When it comes to EU-NATO relations, the author’s view is that these relationships need to better define the “Berlin-Plus” agreement. It is effective only when “NATO as a whole is not involved,” and the EU is the primary player using the capabilities of NATO. Dr. Chivvis says that the “Berlin-Plus” needs transformation because “this model may “work” only in situations where there are no interlocking interests between NATO and the EU;” for example in the Balkans to some extent, but not in recent cases like Afghanistan and the war in Iraq.

He concludes with several suggestions. Among those, the most relevant for this paper are: “(1) Focus on developing capabilities; (2) Fix Berlin-Plus; and (3) The EU should not think of developing and building a European Union Operational HQ (EUOHQ) because it would give enemies of ESDP in Washington and London – an easy target.”

Dr. Michael E. Smith, in his paper, “Developing a ‘Comprehensive Approach’ to International Security: Institutional Learning and the CSDP,” approaches the issue from the EU and CSDP perspective. He claims that since the 1990s, but more effectively after 2003, the EU has gained some experience concerning CSDP, has drawn lessons from that experience, and has succeeded in implementing those lessons in its military crisis management operations. Dr. Smith, unlike Dr. Chivvis, contends that since the introduction of the ESDP, the EU has built a number of institutions and processes capable of facilitating the EU’s military crisis management operations. He defends the view that

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27 Ibid., 32.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid., 39.
since the 1990s, the EU has come a long way in developing its foreign policy performance and its learning processes in this domain. “In fact, it could be argued that there has been more dynamism and institutional innovation in this domain than in any other EU policy area in the past decade.”\(^{30}\) Dr. Smith also openly discusses the future challenges and problems the CSDP faces with this policy, such as “a lack of adequate resources, bureaucratic disputes over lines of authority in the CSDP and the failure to develop a stronger OHQ in Brussels to oversee CSDP operations.”\(^{31}\) The author claims that despite these problems and limitations, the EU has proven that it has a significant number of institutions with the capacity to continuously innovate in the domain of CSDP operations. He characterizes the EU as a bridge crossing the gap in security between major combat operations and maintaining a secure environment in the “failing, war-torn or crisis-prone states.”\(^{32}\) Such a Union, which responds on the basis of a UN mandate and at the invitation of the host nation, will always be received with respect, and not as self-interested occupiers. Dr. Smith concludes that this perception of the EU by the hosts and the international community will always mean a prerequisite for successfully completed mission.


\(^{31}\)Ibid., 21-22.

\(^{32}\)Ibid., 22.
Summary and Conclusion

This chapter has surveyed the literature that explores EU’s ability as it relates to military crisis management based on ESDP and the interaction of the EU with various other international organizations. While analyzing those books and other written material, the author realized that this topic aroused great interest among many scholars on both sides of the Atlantic. Europeans increasingly saw military crisis management as the idea that would help the EU to become more independent in their actions. The U.S. scholars, at least those that the author discovered, looked on this ability of the EU with some suspicion. They approach this issue with the point of view that this development will undermine the importance and the role of NATO. It is essential to examine the EU interventions and operations from the 1990s through today in order to understand the EU’s decision-making readiness and ability or ambition to execute operations without any external assistance in today’s international environment. Such a study will assist in overcoming challenges the EU will face in the near future and reaching the desired level of effectiveness for the EU’s military crisis management.
CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

Everybody is ambitious. The question is whether he is ambitious to be or ambitious to do.33

—Jean Monnet, in Kissinger Years of Upheaval

The role of the EU is subject to different interpretations in contemporary international relations. Until the beginning of the 1990s, the EU was first and foremost an economic organization with few strictly political aspects. The situation in the Balkans in the beginning of the 1990s and the introduction of the Maastricht Treaty triggered the EU to evolve into a new type of political and economic entity, capable of formulating specific security and defense policies.

The view of the European political authority, Jacques Poos in the early 1990s, that “this is the hour of Europe not the hour of the U.S,”34 were in favor of the member states who wanted emancipation from U.S. protection and domination. A new stronger identity led the EU to seek greater participation in the international community by strengthening its political and military components. The beginnings of the EU’s military crisis management can be traced back to the events in the Balkans. It is still present in operation Althea. In this study, the author has analyzed the results and processes that have led the EU in its transformation from a civilian power that primarily practices diplomacy and economic relations, into a neoclassical power, which will include a

33Jean Monnet, in Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1982), 5.

If we go back to the 1990s and briefly recall the disintegration of Yugoslavia, we may ask whether the development of EU’s military crisis management and its decision making is a utopia. The primary research question of this study emerged as a result of the EU’s transformation and the author’s personal reasoning: Does the EU possess effective military crisis management decision-making mechanisms to plan and execute peacekeeping missions without external assistance?

In the author’s attempt to answer this question, three case studies will be analyzed: (1) the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995); (2) the EU Operation Concordia in the Republic of Macedonia (2003); and (3) the EU Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina (ongoing since 2004). These three situations have had a major impact on the EU and the building of its military crisis management policies and processes. In chapter 2, the author elaborated on the primary literature which provided key parameters for the early development of the EU’s military crisis management, the institutions that process and are responsible for decision making, and the relations and connections between the EU and NATO as the transatlantic organization responsible for the security in Europe. In this chapter, the author will attempt to explain how the EU slowly, but surely, is becoming more of a relevant factor in the international arena in regards to military crisis management and its preparedness for independent execution of operations of this type. The method of “structured, focused comparison”\(^\text{35}\), which is used throughout the research, is “simple and straightforward.”\(^\text{36}\) This method allows the author

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\(^{35}\)This method is elaborated by Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett in *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Harvard, NY: MIT Press, 2005), 67-73.

\(^{36}\)Ibid., 67.
to focus on certain aspects of the three case studies. Using this method, the author will gain useful knowledge of the EU’s military crisis management and the decision making process. This method has two main characteristics. First, “the method is structured, in that the researcher writes general question that reflect the research objective and that these questions are asked of each case study to guide and standardize data collection, thereby making comparison and cumulation of the findings of the cases possible.”37 The author will use a standardized set of secondary questions for each case study, in order to ensure that comparable data is acquired to facilitate comparison. Second, this method is “focused in that it deals only with certain aspects of the case examined.”38 The three case studies used for this thesis will be analyzed with a specific research objective and a theoretical focus suitable for that objective. The precondition for applying this method is the formulation of those general, standardized questions. The proposed set of secondary questions will be valuable for this research because they reflect the research objective of this paper.

By answering those questions and using this methodology, the author will analyze the case studies which occurred in the time during which the EU developed their military crisis management and the institutions responsible for decision making. The extant literature identifies the events in the Balkans in the 1990s as a key event that initiated the EU’s quest for a military crisis management capability. That is why, all three case studies, are related to this region of Europe. The author chose these case studies in an attempt to assess and respond to the primary research question.

37George and Bennett, 67.
38Ibid.
First, this paper examines the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its impact on the EU. Here, the author will identify geopolitical factors that made an impact on the EU and somehow forced the EU to internally change its policies to be able to deal with similar crises. Second, the study leaps ahead almost 10 years to analyze the application of the processes and policies that were initiated by the wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina. If the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina precipitated the development of the EU’s military crisis management capability, then by using the EU operation Concordia in Macedonia, the author will attempt to determine if these capability exists, and if so, to what extent the EU has managed to use it. Third, since the EU operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina is an ongoing operation, the author will analyze the current state of the EU in the field of military crisis management and decision making; specifically identifying the challenges and prospects for this capability taking into account two current key challenges: the EU after the Lisbon Treaty and the economic crisis which the EU is going through.

Chapter 5 provides the qualitative analysis of the EU’s military crisis management and decision making through past and current events. It encompasses the EU’s operations in the Western Balkans which have led to the creation of institutions and policies that marked the EU as a military crisis management player. In order to test the validity of the hypothesis, the analysis of each case will be based on the following set of standardized questions: (1) Was the EU able to respond? (2) Which EU policy guided such crisis management operations; (3) What structures and processes facilitated the EU’s crisis management operations; and (4) What were the EU-NATO relations or interactions during those operations?
Overview

Observed from a perspective over an extended period of time, one can easily conclude that up to the early 1990s, the European Community was primarily concerned with economic integration, which additionally encompassed some political aspects. With the conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty\(^39\) in 1992, the EU became a new type of political and economic entity, capable of formulating particular policies in the field of security and defense.

In many ways, the changes that occurred inside the EU in the early 1990s influenced the EU to shift its own interests from economy to security issues. This is based on the fact that the wars in Yugoslavia occurred in the backyard of the EU, and the Union could not remain indifferent. The Maastricht Treaty has two meanings when it comes to security of the EU. First, it introduced the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the concept that allowed the EU using its newly accepted foreign policy to “speak with one voice.”\(^40\) Second, it attempted to transform the EU from the “civilian power, an actor in the international scene which exerts its influence by means that do not imply the use of


military force but of diplomatic and economic instruments,“41 into an actor who openly and courageously represented its intention to build the institutions and policies capable of decision making and launching operations for military crisis management. This process of transformation is still active and has influenced all military crisis management operations in which the European Union was directly or indirectly involved.

The Evolution of Post-Cold War European Security

After the end of the Cold War, two issues came to preeminence: the security and defense strategies that had dominated Europe after the Second World War and the dominant role the U.S. had played as the main guarantor of security for the Western alliance. The resultant changes corresponding to the post-Cold War European security environment led to a radical alteration in the position of the EU’s member states. “Until then their foreign and security policy was determined mostly by NATO and their respective governments, but after the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, they received a much larger role in creating this policy.‖42

Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, NATO faced no traditional threat, and as a result, began to reconsider the reason for its existence. In addition, “European

41Ana E. Juncos, “The EU’s Post-Conflict Intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina: (re)Integrating the Balkans and/or (re)Inventing the EU?” Southeast European Politics 6, no. 2 (November 2005): 94.

security was no longer a strategic priority for the U.S., so they reduced the number of troops in Europe from 400,000 in 1990, to only 120,000 in 1998.\textsuperscript{43}

Simultaneously, the U.S. insisted that European countries take greater responsibility for maintaining the security in Europe. They accused the Europeans of not allocating sufficient funds for defense and allowing their armed forces to lag behind the U.S. military forces in terms of organization, equipment, and training. This insistence by the U.S. towards creating a stronger “European pillar” in NATO, was critical to maintaining an organization in the years to come. Countries like Great Britain and the Netherlands insisted the WEU be a permanent bridge in the area of defense between NATO and the EU. In contrast, France (and Germany somewhat) considered that the WEU should acquire operational capabilities and preserve its right to act independently, regardless of NATO.

The very essence of the dispute, which has a long history, was whether the WEU, if integrated into the EU, would develop into an “organization that would be an alternative to NATO (the French position), or merely strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance (the position of Great Britain, supported by the U.S.).”\textsuperscript{44}

In the early 1990s, despite the disappearance of the Soviet threat, the European countries were faced with numerous foreign policy and security challenges that required coordinated joint action. In this context, Calleo notes that “the end of the Cold War did


not mean the end but only transformation of European security problems.”⁴⁵ One of these security problems was of course the conflict in Bosnia.

The Europeans drew two conclusions from the Bosnian conflict. First, they could not expect the U.S. to resolve a European crisis. Second, they had no political mechanisms or military power for accomplishing the Petersberg Tasks⁴⁶ adopted earlier, which included not only humanitarian and peacekeeping missions, but peace enforcement missions. The Bosnian crisis in effect served as a decisive event that strengthened the commitment of European countries to build an independent foreign and security policy. In this context, the French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe said: “The conflict in Bosnia has shown the necessity to go beyond the guarantees of NATO and the United States (U.S.) to build a genuine European defense able to support our common foreign policy interests.”⁴⁷ As Simon Hix stated, “The political Union formalized by the Maastricht Treaty led to transformation of the inefficient system of European political cooperation into a common European foreign and security policy (CFSP).”⁴⁸ In the years that followed, however, many things have changed because of the evolution in the politics in major European countries such as the UK, France, and Germany. Without those countries, the achievement of the common European policy would be not possible.

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⁴⁵Calleo, 304.


France, after its long absence from the NATO military structures, has tried to
overcome its differences with the U.S. over the concept of European defense, and began
to re-integrate back into the military system of NATO. The concept of European security
and defense identity that was accepted into NATO “has demonstrated U.S. readiness to
respond to French demands for greater European participation. Also, this concept
reaffirmed the U.S. commitment that European allies should have a greater role in
maintaining peace and security on the European continent.”

The changes in German foreign and security policy after the Cold War and the
reunification of Germany are extremely important, because without the active
participation of this country no one can imagine an effective common European security
policy. The unification of Germany did however awaken apprehensions in other EU
countries that Germany could again try to dominate Europe. “This was supported by the
German policy in the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis, when Germany practically put
before the other states a fait accompli to recognize the independence of Croatia and
Slovenia.” German policy after the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia however was
moderate and basically advocated a multilateral European approach to foreign policy.
Ultimately, "the changes that occurred in Germany after the Second World War, and the
‘anti-war political culture’ of postwar Germany were serious obstacles to greater German
participation in the creation of a common European defense and security policy.”

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49Wallace and Wallace, 483.

50Dalgaard-Nielsen, 17.

51Ibid., 2.
Despite U.S. and European insistence, Germany has shown little interest for greater participation in the world security affairs, or in European politics and security for that matter. Indeed, it appears that internal constraints, not external obstacles prevented Germany from having a "higher profile in world politics." At the beginning of the war in Yugoslavia, Germany promoted a policy that "the participation of German troops will contribute to worsening rather than resolving the problem." After this war, Germany changed its policy and participated by sending troops to support the Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. “It was Germany’s decisive step in the direction of greater military participation in NATO and the EU to resolve the conflict in Yugoslavia.”

The role of Great Britain is of utmost importance to the EU’s CFSP. “The British have traditionally been the biggest skeptics towards the formulation of common European defense policy, fearing that it could threaten NATO and disrupt ‘the special relationship’ that exists between the UK and U.S.” Prime Minister Tony Blair chose the common foreign and defense policy “to improve the ‘image’ of his country on the continent and to promote the UK as the leader of the EU.” He announced his country's support for the "second pillar" of the EU, when he stated that: “There is a strong will that

52 Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2.
53 Ibid., 4.
54 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
the United Kingdom apparently shares for Europe to play a significant role in foreign policy and defense."\textsuperscript{57} According to Edmonds, France and Great Britain were the only European countries that at that point possessed the potential to conduct expeditionary military operations. Without their participation, the common European defense policy would lack credibility.

The adopted Declaration of Saint Malo (France) in 1998, clearly specified that “The European Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, and a readiness to do so in order to respond to international crises.”\textsuperscript{58} Saint Malo played a crucial role in the further development of the EU’s CSDP as the main element of the EU’s CFSP responsible for military crisis management. “The new policy was to provide the EU with the necessary tools to prevent or manage regional conflict should it arise again.”\textsuperscript{59}

The introduction of the CSDP effectively set the foundation for a common defense policy. “Its aim was to develop civilian and military capacities for conflict prevention and crisis management at the international level.”\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{57}Edmonds, 6.


\textsuperscript{60}Ibid., 24.
Emerging Military Crisis Management Decision-Making Structures and Institutions

To effectively achieve the previously mentioned policies, new structures and institutions were created. The EU decided that these structures and institutions needed to provide efficient, safe and effective decision-making mechanisms in the event of a crisis. The new structures are Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS).

The Foreign Affairs Council is one of two key bodies at the European Council’s level that make both political and strategic decisions relevant to CSDP. It is comprised of all member states’ Foreign Affairs Ministers who receive recommendations from the Political and Security Committee (PSC). The PSC is composed of representatives of all member countries at the ambassadorial level. This permanent body is responsible for initiating and resolving all aspects of the EU’s CFSP and CSDP. The PSC, under the authority of the Council of the EU, exercises political and strategic control over the EU’s military crisis management operations. The role of PSC is explained in table 1. This body has a central role in defining the processes for the possibility of responding to situations that might require the EU to conduct military crisis management operations. “The PSC performs decision-shaping rather than decision-making functions,” and depends upon the European Council for political and strategic decisions. It is also authorized to forward directions and guidelines to the Military Committee. The PSC should act and function

very similarly to the North Atlantic Council, which is the highest political body of the
NATO structure.

The EU Military Committee (EUMC) is the highest military body within the
Council. “It is composed of the member states’ chiefs of defense represented by their
military representatives.” These representatives are generally the heads of general staffs
of the member-states armies. This committee “directs all EU military activities,” and
gives the PSC military advice and recommendations, and issues guidelines and directives
to the EU Military Staff (see table 1 for the role of EUMC).

The EU’s Military Staff (EUMS) provides the link between the Military
Committee and military resources available to the Union. It is also a source of military
expertise for the High Representative (HR) of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy. EUMS performs decision-making mechanisms such as early warning, situation
assessment and strategic planning “according to the Petersberg tasks including planning
and implementing the European national and multinational forces and the implementation
of policy directives and decisions of the Military Committee.” The military crisis
management decision-making process and the interaction between these newly created
institutions are described in table 1.

62Kashmeri, 15.
63EU Official Website, “The European Union Military Committee,”
64Kori N. Schake, “Do European Union Defense Initiatives Threaten NATO?”
August 2001, Strategic Forum, National Defense University, Washington DC,
EU–NATO Partnership: The “Berlin-Plus” Agreement as a Platform for Cooperation

In the early 1990s, with the end of the Cold War, NATO appeared to lose the primary reason for its existence while a more integrated European Economic Community (EEC) became more responsible and more concerned in its own security in a world that was rapidly changing. In response, the Alliance conducted a substantive review and adjustment of its missions and its operational framework in preparation for a potential response to emerging challenges. A European security and defense identity was established within NATO. This gave Europeans a greater role and greater responsibility in providing for their own defense and security with and thru the Alliance. Today’s Euro-Atlantic area has two leading security strongholds: NATO and the EU. While the EU started to “militarize” itself, NATO increasingly developed a political character. Both organizations simultaneously made a breakthrough in the global framework, outside of their traditional area of action. The last ten years, however, have confirmed that the EU and NATO do not necessarily share the same interests, perceptions of security challenges, and means to respond to those interests and challenges. “ESDP . . . did not take its first steps in practice until the negotiation of the so-called “Berlin-Plus” arrangements allowing the Union’s fledging security policy access to NATO assets and capabilities to conduct its operations.”

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Despite these considerable challenges, there is no doubt that NATO and the EU have a strategic partnership, if for no other reason, than because 21 of the 28 NATO member states, are members of the EU. In addition, the largest number of troops supporting NATO missions around the world comes from EU countries. This fact is particularly evident in Afghanistan. The cooperation and consultation with NATO in regard to collective security matters is an important aspect of the EU political dialogue.

A key step in further defining and consolidating the EU-NATO strategic partnership was the signing of the EU-NATO Declaration on European Security and Defense policy in 2002. The declaration confirms that NATO remains the foundation for collective defense of its members, and that a stronger European role will contribute to the vitality of the Alliance, especially in the field of crisis management. The so-called “Berlin-plus” agreement is a comprehensive framework of practical cooperation in the field of crisis management between the EU and NATO. The most important issues that are covered and regulated by the “Berlin-Plus” arrangements include “providing the EU

66 The Allies underlined their determination to improve the NATO-EU strategic partnership at the NATO’s Summit in Lisbon in November 2010.


69 “Berlin-Plus” is a comprehensive package of agreements for further cooperation between the EU and NATO. This package was concluded in March 2003 between the EU’s High Representative Javier Solana and NATO Secretary General George Robertson.
access to NATO operational planning, use of NATO military assets and resources in EU-led operations, and use of the resources of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) for EU-led operations.”\textsuperscript{70} This agreement also makes the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) available to the EU to serve as the commanding general of an EU-led operation (for more see table 2).\textsuperscript{71} Based on the European security strategy, “the EU and NATO agreed on permanent military arrangements which will ensure cooperation at the operational level.”\textsuperscript{72} Accordingly, “in 2005, NATO established a permanent liaison team within the EU’s Military Staff. In 2006, the EU established a planning cell at SHAPE.”\textsuperscript{73} The primary tasks of the NATO liaison team and the EU cell are to ensure smooth communication and cooperation in the military field between the Alliance and the EU. In addition, the EU cell at SHAPE is tasked with improving the preparation of EU-led operations that occur within the “Berlin-Plus” agreement, and in that case, to support DSACEUR in performing duties as commanding general of the EU operations. The EU’s operational planning process is described in details in table 2.


\textsuperscript{71}NATO Parliamentary Assembly.


Table 1. Simplified Overview of the ESDP Decision-Making Process

Table 2. EU’s Operational Planning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EUMC</th>
<th>Operational Commander</th>
<th>PSC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>presents PSC the draft IMD (worked out by the EUMS). When approved by the PSC, EUMC tasks Operational Commander to develop concept of operations.</td>
<td>and his military HQ develop a draft military concept of operations and presents to EUMC</td>
<td>agrees and submits military concept of operations to the Council. If Council approves the concept of operations, then PSC is tasked to develop final Operation Plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMC</td>
<td>Operational Commander</td>
<td>PSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>presents military concept of operations to PSC and provides advice and recommendations comprising the evaluation of EUMS</td>
<td>supported by EUMS works out a draft military operation plan. The draft operation plan is briefed to EUMC and then EUMC presents draft operation plan to PSC for approval.</td>
<td>submits operation plan to Council. If approved by Council, the military operation will be launched.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CHAPTER 5

ANALYSIS

Since the beginning of the 1990s and especially with the wars in Yugoslavia, the EU, in one way or another, has been engaged in contributing to the achievement of peace and stability in the Balkans region. The EU’s military crisis management operations are decided, planned, and executed on behalf of the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy.\(^{74}\) So far, the EU has executed eight CSDP military crisis management operations.\(^{75}\) This chapter will analyze the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) (1992-1995), Operation Concordia in the Republic of Macedonia (2003), and Operation Althea in BiH (ongoing since 2004) with a focus on the EU’s military crisis management\(^{76}\) and decision making ability.

The War in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995)

The end of the last century brought several events that significantly changed the geopolitical map of Europe and brought about years of institutional development within the EU. Among those events were the wars in Yugoslavia which had a huge impact on the EU, particularly since they occurred in the EU’s backyard and the EU was really unprepared to manage such a crisis.

\(^{74}\)Before the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 this policy was known as the European Security and Defense policy (ESDP).


\(^{76}\)This particular analysis refers only to the EU’s military crisis management. The EU’s civilian crisis management as a part of CSDP (ESDP) is not part of this analysis.
1. Was the EU able to respond?

Due to the complex and hostile environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time, the European political establishment was not able to effectively respond to prevent the Bosnian conflict. They failed to solve the problem, as a result of several factors. Those factors were:

(a) Political and institutional:

Simultaneously with Yugoslavia’s crisis and armed conflicts in its immediate neighborhood, the EU adopted the Maastricht Treaty, which created fundamental changes in the EU’s architecture and unification and created the opportunity for comprehensive and intensive action in the area of the EU’s foreign and security policy. With this treaty, the EU established the CFSP, which anticipated the formulation of a common defense policy. Eager to resolve this crisis quickly, both the EU and the international community (IC) engaged in finding peaceful solutions, and this effort was “the first test for the embryonic Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).”77

At the outset of the Bosnian conflict, the prevailing view in Europe was that the conflicts in Yugoslavia were a “European problem” in which the U.S. should not interfere. In this regard, Jacques Poos, the Foreign Minister of Luxembourg, stated “this is the hour of Europe, not the hour of the United States.”78 He thereby expressed the EU’s ambitions and expectations from CFSP. However, European countries were neither united nor prepared to successfully cope with the difficult situation, specifically in Bosnia and Herzegovina. “The support that Serb and Croat separatist tendencies in Bosnia

77 Juncos, 88.

78 Gordon, 74.
gained from Tudjman and Milosevic led to a situation where the establishment of peace and maintenance of a unified political entity in Bosnia is only possible with strong political and military action by the international community.\textsuperscript{79} The CFSP and the European Political Cooperation (EPC),\textsuperscript{80} where all joint actions of the European countries were coordinated, however, were not strong enough to formulate a single policy.

(b) Europeans were not ready to take care of their neighborhood’s security:

One of the reasons for the failure of the Europeans in Bosnia was the fact that there was no tradition of taking joint action, unless it involved defending their own territory. According to Brenner, over the course of half a century, “they got used to relying on the U.S. (as a foreign power) to maintain their own stability and defense and achieve their broader international interests.”\textsuperscript{81} The Bosnian war led to the conclusion that not only could the Europeans not expect that the U.S. would resolve crises in Europe, but that they also did not have any political mechanisms or military capability for interventions that were imposed as the “Petersberg tasks.”\textsuperscript{82} The tasks included not only humanitarian and peacekeeping missions, but also military actions to establish peace. The Bosnian war was a trigger for strengthening the commitment of the European countries to build an independent foreign and security policy. In this context, the French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe said:” The conflict in Bosnia demonstrated the necessity to go

\textsuperscript{79}Brenner, 3.

\textsuperscript{80}The European Political Cooperation was the predecessor to the CFSP and was the name for coordinating the EU’s foreign policy.

\textsuperscript{81}Brenner, 7.

\textsuperscript{82}EU Official Website, “The Petersberg Tasks.”
beyond the guarantees of both NATO and the U.S. and build a true European defense that can support our common foreign policy interests.”83

(c) Lack of decision making capabilities and readiness to respond individually or collectively:

Although the WEU itself did not possess a common military capability, some of its member states possessed military forces capable of engaging and stopping the genocide in Bosnia, either individually or collectively. Ultimately, they all failed to do so. France was initially ready to send a significant number of combat-ready forces, “but it refused to act until a firm cease-fire was holding on the ground.”84 The United Kingdom (UK) on the other side, preferred to intervene under NATO because it assumed that “only NATO is capable to provide major forces to conduct heavy combat operations, and by that completely undermined the EU’s position.”85 Germany favored a full-scale intervention as the “sole method capable of ending the war,”86 although “its constitution forbade its participation outside the NATO treaty-area.”87

During this time, the WEU member states agreed that the WEU should and must do something to stop the Bosnian war and cooperate with the authorities for a peaceful

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85 Ibid., 30.

86 Ibid., 32.

transition of the territory. However, “ultimately the fear of casualties and Soviet

denunciation of any planned Western intervention, led to the failure to task the WEU
even with the support of EC-planned humanitarian relief operations.”88

In the first post-Cold War test for the united Europe to prove their ability to
respond quickly and decisively, but “the curious alchemy of German leadership, Italian
support for it, British limitation of it, [and] French ambition . . . [created an] alloy of
common foreign policy . . . inescapably less than gold.”89

2. Which EU policy guided such crisis management operations?

The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina coincided with the period when the EU began
to transform as an institution. What was previously an economic and political entity
began growing into an entity harboring ambitions to manage military crises. The war
revealed that the EU was unprepared. The EU had not developed any policy that could
effectively prevent conflict. CFSP was still in its infancy. One must realize that in the
beginning, there was no EU crisis management operation in the Bosnian war. This was
seen as an example of the EU’s lack of ability or will to respond militarily in order to put
an end to the conflict from the very beginning. In the facing criticism from the
international community and, especially U.S., the EU underwent structural changes
through introducing the Maastricht Treaty (also known as the Treaty on European Union)
and its pillar system, with CFSP affecting the EU’s foreign and security policy. The
CFSP was launched at a time when the entire Union was trying to understand the new

88Bradford, 32.

89Ibid., 33.
global and political picture created with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.

The structure of CFSP included military issues according to Article J.4.1 of the Maastricht Treaty: “The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense.”

This provision of the Maastricht Treaty notwithstanding this policy did not make the EU’s “military crisis management capabilities stronger and therefore did not help the EU in solving the crisis better than the EPC had done.”

The only crisis management policies that the EU had developed were in the fields of accession and economy. “Apart from the wars in the Balkans, the EU’s policies and its attractiveness as a political and economic partner have helped in the rest of Eastern Europe to defuse many ethnic, political, or social problems that could have triggered crises.” During the 1990s in Europe, the EU’s only asset for bringing about change was to act through diplomatic and economic policies. The EU’s nascent foreign and security policy was found wanting. “The inability to act and even to agree on a common line

90EU Official Website, “The Maastricht Treaty.”


during the first stages of the crisis in former Yugoslavia showed the limitations of the newly-created CFSP.”

3. What structures and processes facilitated the EU’s crisis management operations?

The experience of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina did not lead to any coherent and effective approach to military crisis management. The EU had concentrated its efforts in the diplomatic and economic spheres and attempted to stop the violence using those means. Those efforts eventually failed to convince the conflicting sides to abandon their actions. “The Balkan crises . . . constituted a wake-up call for European leaders by making obvious the lack of political will, cohesion in foreign policy, and the deficiencies of its decision-making procedures.” This was the reason that the EU did not play a central role in stopping the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since it lacked military crisis management structures and processes to initiate a military response to the Bosnian war, the EU relied on the U.S.-led NATO, acting as a military and security structure of the EU. Having realized this, in the years that followed, the EU worked hard on building structures and decision making processes for military crisis management (see page 54-55 below). Confronted with the embarrassing situation of prematurely being considered a factor on the international scene without any structures and processes for solving such a complex crisis, “the EU disengaged from the Balkans to reevaluate the meaning of collective European security and reassess foreseeable future threats.”

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93 Juncos, 95.

94 Brimmer, 41.

95 Bradford, 36.
4. What were the EU-NATO relations or interactions during this operation?

During the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, both the EU and NATO were facing changes and challenges. The EU had just introduced its institutional reforms, while NATO, especially after the end of the Cold War, was seeking its raison d'etre. Hence, even though some form of cooperation was introduced there were no institutionalized relations between both organizations. The EU’s failure to respond and its inability to cope with such a complex crisis left NATO as the primary actor in solving this conflict. The Alliance was in the midst of conducting a substantive review and adjustments of its missions and operational framework in preparation for a possible response to emerging challenges. Unable to respond, but motivated by the opportunity for comprehensive and intensive action that resulted from the Maastricht Treaty, the EU saw NATO as a tool for possible military response in Bosnia. The EU-NATO relations began with the introduction of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) that was established within NATO. ESDI gave the Europeans a greater role and more responsibility in providing for their own defense and security within the Alliance.

“The move within the European Community towards political union, including the development of a European identity in the domain of security, will contribute to Atlantic solidarity and to the establishment of lasting peace throughout the whole of Europe.”

96 Brimmer, 178.
independently operate.”97 The Union’s reluctance to agree on decisive action in the wars in former Yugoslavia was the reason behind the statement by U.S. President George H. W. Bush that “the U.S., although prepared to tolerate the WEU as the European pillar of the Alliance, no longer could afford to entertain the unreliable and inept WEU as a viable alternative to NATO.”98

At that time, the WEU was given the right to participate in processes of risk assessment and with a symbolic level of contribution to be part of any response to future threats in Europe. Given the weak situation among the members within the WEU, “ESDI proved to be ineffective and act only as observer in the epic Balkan struggle that was to transpire.”99

Operation Concordia (Republic of Macedonia)

Following its 1991 declaration of independence, Macedonia has remained under the constant threat of hostility between its two major ethnicities – Macedonians and Albanians. Constant complaints of under-representation in the state institutions and discriminations against the ethnic Albanians “were becoming embedded in the new Macedonian state structures.”100 At the beginning of 2001, huge demonstrations and riots in the city of Tetovo turned into a “violent conflict against the Macedonian government

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97Bradford, 33.

98Ibid.

99Ibid., 34.

that led to a significant populace displacement.”¹⁰¹ The sporadic fights between the ethnic so-called Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA) and the Macedonian government forces continued over the next eight months. With a strong commitment and the involvement of the EU and NATO, the conflict ended in August 2001 with the adoption of the Ohrid Peace Agreement. With this agreement, the ethnic Albanians were given more political rights, the Albanian language was recognized as the official language in areas where 25 percent of the population was Albanian, and the armed insurgents were given amnesty if they disarmed and peacefully integrated into the society.

1. Was the EU able to respond?

For the first time in its existence, the EU was to join in an operation; initially by providing political and economic aid, and then consequently, assuming control of the entire EU operation Concordia in Macedonia. This operation was the first successful test of the EU’s military crisis management. The responsibility for implementation of the Ohrid Peace Agreement (during 2001-2002) was shared among the political authorities of the Republic of Macedonia (for full implementation of the conclusions of the agreement), NATO (through the implementation of its Operation Essential Harvest was responsible for disarming the rebels), and the EU (which was responsible for political and economic assistance).

The first phase of the international crisis management operation in Macedonia during the 2001-2002 was characterized by the absence of the EU’s military capabilities.

Hence, its efforts were directed towards what the EU knew best and could accomplish most effectively—politics, economics, and finance. “Put simply, NATO provided the muscle for the proper implementation of the agreement while EU was responsible for furnishing economic support.”\textsuperscript{102} The wars in Yugoslavia at the beginning of the 1990s proved that the EU was unable to fully prevent a humanitarian disaster, even if such a disaster. The most important lesson that the EU gathered from this situation was that the EU must be capable of executing military crisis management operations. Consequently, at the EU Council meeting in Barcelona (2002), “the EU member states foreign ministers reaffirmed the EU's readiness to organize and conduct a mission that would follow up the NATO mission in Macedonia.”\textsuperscript{103}

UNSCR 1371\textsuperscript{104} of September 2001 gave legal and political authorization to the EU to launch its first military operation code-named Concordia. Operation Concordia’s mandate included the creation of a safe and stable environment so that the Ohrid Peace Agreement could be fully implemented. Concordia’s forces helped to a large extent to successfully complete the process of disarming the rebels and “became a regular element

\textsuperscript{102}Mace, 474.


in the daily lives of the residents in the regions previously affected by the crisis.”\textsuperscript{105} For
the EU this meant realizing the long standing dream of developing its own military crisis
management capability and turning its policies into independent operations. Concordia
“contributed to its internal political success, because it demonstrated that the EU was now
capable of conducting a small-scale military conflict management operation.”\textsuperscript{106}

2. Which EU policy guided such crisis management operations?

Operation Concordia, which emerged from the EU’s ambition for crisis
resolution, was the first military crisis management operation launched after a decision
made under auspices of CSDP, and the first EU operation under the “Berlin-Plus”
agreement using NATO capabilities. The implementation of the CSDP in Concordia was
a small but significant test for the EU and its ability for military crisis management. At
the same time, the EU had not neglected its diplomatic and economic policies. The
combination of civilian and military aspects of crisis management as part of CSDP gave
new impetus to further international crisis management operations. The EU would “soon
offer ‘one-stop shopping’ for political, diplomatic, economic, social as well as military
instruments to exert influence or put pressure on the parties to a conflict.”\textsuperscript{107}


\textsuperscript{107} Brimmer, 178.
Regarding the implementation of the CSDP, Concordia is considered a successful military crisis management operation, which met their goals within its political mandate. “Operation Concordia demonstrated that the EU is capable of conducting small-scale military crisis management operations in support of its CFSP objectives.”¹⁰⁸ The operation in Macedonia was a first test for the ESDP, and that test was seen as a success. “ESDP have served the political aim of actively fostering a certain image of the EU, which Brussels can now capitalize on.”¹⁰⁹ According to Catriona Mace, EU Operation Concordia “added a military dimension not only to the EU’s role in the Balkans, but to the CSDP as a whole.”¹¹⁰

3. What structures and processes facilitated the EU’s crisis management operations?

During the war in Bosnia the EU found itself unprepared and institutionally underdeveloped for military crisis management. In the years leading up to Operation Concordia, the EU had built completely new institutions and processes in the field of CSDP. These institutional reforms were triggered by the same three EU member states who were reluctant to take action in the 1990s during the Bosnian wars. France's initiative was to build and develop the military dimension, i.e. “the military expertise, decision-making structures and capabilities, of ESDP, in order to make the Union a

¹⁰⁸ Mace, 487


¹¹⁰ Mace, 474-490.
credible and autonomous actor in this domain.”\textsuperscript{111} The UK continued with their previous position of “preserving the central role of the Atlantic Alliance as the main forum for European defense and has been wary of duplicating at EU level institutional structures.”\textsuperscript{112} Germany, on the other hand, “insisted on fostering the civilian dimension and resources of CSDP, building on the comprehensive approach of the EU to crisis management, from conflict prevention to post-conflict stabilization.”\textsuperscript{113} The rapid institutional development and faith in ESDP after only three years of its promotion had given the EU great confidence in its decision to conduct an independent mission.

The entire process from the initiation to the decision for executing Operation Concordia went smoothly when compared to the situation 10 years before. The EU’s Political and Security Committee (PSC), as an ESDP body, in performing its decision “shaping” process, has recommended and assisted the European Council in its decision-making process to launch a military crisis management operation in Macedonia. Following the EU Council’s approval\textsuperscript{114} of the Political and Security Committee’s decision, a Committee of contributors\textsuperscript{115} was established for operation Concordia. The Committee


\textsuperscript{112}Ibid., 22.

\textsuperscript{113}Ibid.


\textsuperscript{115}Ibid.
was considered to be a forum where all contributing countries would collectively discuss all issues related to the troops’ deployment and their activities on the ground. As is stated in the PSC’s decision, the PSC “which exercises the political control and strategic direction of the Operation, will take account of the views expressed by the Committee of Contributors.”

On 18 March 2003, the “European Union Council approved Concordia’s Operational Plan (OPLAN): EU military engagement in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” which was prepared by the EU’s Military Staff (EUMS) verified by the EU’s Military Committee (EUMC) and submitted by PSC. ”Its specified mission was to conduct an operation in FYROM under OHQ (Operation Headquarters) command.”

Prior to operation Concordia, the EU made a significant effort to develop ESDP and its institutional bodies and processes. Operation Concordia was the first military crisis management mission that established the ESDP’s institutions and bodies as functional. For the first time, the PSC, the EUMC, and the EUMS, as main bodies of the ESDP, assisted the EU not only in the planning and decision making process, but also throughout the operation with the successful execution of Concordia in Macedonia.

4. What were the EU-NATO relations or interactions during the operation?

116Ibid.


A key step in defining strategic partnerships and determining the practical relationship between NATO and the EU was taken with the EU-NATO Declaration on European Security and Defense Policy— the ESDP. It confirmed that NATO remained the foundation for collective defense of its members and that a stronger European role would contribute to the vitality of the Alliance, especially in the field of crisis management.

The cooperation and consultation with NATO is an important aspect of the EU political dialogue. As a result of this strong relationship and mutual understanding, the two organizations concluded a package of agreements, known as “Berlin-plus.” The agreement formed a comprehensive framework of practical cooperation between the EU and NATO in the field of crisis management. “It efficiently determines the conditions on how EU will access NATO facilities during the execution of independent crisis management operations but most of it remains classified.”

During the EU Council Summits in Seville and Copenhagen (2002), the Union announced its strong desire to replace NATO’s mission Allied Harmony in Macedonia after the expiration of its mandate in early 2003.

“The structure of the operation Concordia was designed to create a discrete EU chain of command that nonetheless recognized the operational need for coordination with

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119NATO Official Website, “EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP.”

This operation was led by the so-called “framework nation”, and France took that role. Concordia’s chain of command remained under the political and strategic control of the EU, but in close cooperation with NATO at all levels. Analogous to this, the EU’s Political and Security Committee (PSC) remained in close cooperation with the North Atlantic Council (NAC). At the operational level, the EU-NATO cooperation was mirrored in the fact that both headquarters were co-located and NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (DSACEUR) had a “double hatted” function, acting at the same time as Concordia’s Operational Commander. Having this additional role, he had to report to two separate but parallel organizations—the EU and NATO. In accordance with the “Berlin-Plus” agreement, Concordia’s OHQ co-located with SHAPE in Mons (Belgium), while Concordia’s tactical headquarters co-located with the NATO Headquarters in Skopje. The EU Command Element (EUCE) which was co-located with the Allied Forces South (AFS) in Naples (acting as a Joint Force Command) was responsible for all actions in the Balkans, served as the link between OHQ in Mons and the tactical headquarters in Skopje.

Operation Concordia was the first test of the effectiveness of the EU-NATO operational cooperation. Concordia was the first military operation undertaken in the history of the EU, and also the first EU operation that relied on the use of NATO facilities, based on the “Berlin-Plus” agreement.

121Mace, 482.

Operation Althea (Bosnia and Herzegovina)

NATO’s decision to complete the deployment of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) helped the EU in the process of preparing to execute Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Althea is an EU mission that is carried out completely under the "Berlin-Plus" agreement using NATO capacities and capabilities. Both the formal and legal mandate for operation Althea came through UNSCR 1575,\textsuperscript{123} where it was clearly stated that the EU intended to start the mission, including the military component. EU Operation Althea has a primary goal of ensuring compliance with the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement, and contributing to the establishment of a safe environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

1. Was the EU able to respond?

Satisfied with the results of Operation Concordia in Macedonia, the EU was more than ready to lead another operation–Althea. Experiences gathered in Macedonia encouraged the EU to engage in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Judging by the reactions of the EU’s officials, the EU was more than able (politically and institutionally) to respond to potential challenges, even militarily. “Since the United States wished to draw down its military presence in Bosnia, the time was right for the EU to take over from NATO.”\textsuperscript{124} Encouraged by its internationally recognized achievements in Macedonia, the European Council unanimously adopted a decision to launch a much larger military crisis


\textsuperscript{124}Grevi, Helly, and Keohane, 212.
management operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This decision was also influenced by
the EU’s prevailing belief “that NATO had accomplished its mission of preventing a
return to civil war in Bosnia.”

When Operation Althea took over from SFOR, it was (and still is) EU’s biggest
military crisis management operation with just less than 7,000 troops. In spite of the
large number, the force generation for this mission went more smoothly than was
expected, “mainly because 80 percent of SFOR peacekeepers were European, and their
governments wished them to remain on in Bosnia as part of the EUFOR force. Thus, they
simply changed their NATO/SFOR badges to EUFOR insignia.”

Not only did the EU confirm that it was ready and able to launch a military crisis
management operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the request of the international
community, but it reaffirmed the credibility it had gained in its previous ESDP missions.
The EU earned huge trust internationally, which led to cooperation with so-called third
countries, willing to engage with troops under the EU insignia. “Operation Althea also
included contributions from twelve non-EU countries, with the largest non-EU contingent
coming from Turkey (450 soldiers).”

125 Julie Kim, CRS Report for Congress RS21774, Bosnia and the European
Union Military Force (EUFOR): Post-NATO Peacekeeping (Washington, DC:

org (accessed 29 January 2012).


128 Ibid., 215.
With this operation, the EU demonstrated its ability to manage military crises in two ways. In the short term, the EU and Althea made a successful transition from SFOR and maintained a secure environment for consistent implementation of the Dayton Agreement. In the long term, the EU and Althea are supporting the efforts of Bosnia and Herzegovina to prepare its institutions for joining the Euro-Atlantic organizations. Today, Bosnia and Herzegovina is closer than ever to joining these organizations.

2. What EU’s policy guided such crisis management operations?

As was the case of Concordia in Macedonia, Operation Althea was conducted under the auspices of the ESDP. “Due more to necessity than to choice, the Balkans has been the test ground, first for the weak CFSP in the beginning of the 1990s, and now for the new ESDP project.”

The EU’s presence in the Balkans remained after the EU’s engagement through operation Concordia. Actually, Concordia seemed to be just a test for the EU’s readiness to launch a larger military crisis management operation. As Eva Gross stated “the mission signaled that the EU was ready to assume further security functions in the Balkans, and Concordia in many ways represents a prequel for operation EUFOR Althea.” After the failure to cease one of the bloodiest conflicts in recent European history in the 1990s, the EU returned to Bosnia and Herzegovina, to assist in the implementation of the Dayton Agreement. In order to make this implementation easier, the EU has instituted not only

129 Juncos, 94.

civilian policies (diplomatic, political and economic), but also military policies. With the implementation of its ESDP, the EU declared that it was ready to “move from a declaratory foreign policy focused on diplomacy, to a more action-orientated foreign policy focused on more proactive crisis management.” In a broader connotation, Althea is part of a larger political concept for a comprehensive EU approach towards Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Balkans as a whole. The EU, just as with Concordia in Macedonia, offered a “one-stop shopping” set of policies to affect the overall situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This combination of policies, including the military, comes from the EU’s Security Strategy of 2003, where it is stated that “none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments.” At the end of the day, the EU, for the first time, was able to employ all instruments of foreign and security policy to achieve desired outcomes.

3. What structures and processes facilitated the EU’s crisis management operations?

Operation Althea is an EU military crisis management mission that is carried out completely under the “Berlin-Plus” agreement using NATO capacities and capabilities. Both the formal and legal mandate for operation Althea came through UNSCR 1551, which clearly stated an appreciation for the EU’s intention to start the mission, including with a military component. This mandate followed the letter of intent sent by the

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131 Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 57.

132 European Security Strategy Brussels.

Presidency of the European Council to launch an operation that would succeed the NATO’s SFOR mission. The UNSC allowed the EU to use the same Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) as NATO, as a legal basis to implement the military component and method of utilizing that component. The European Council expressed its readiness for launching a military mission as a part of the ESDP, with the adoption of the Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP. This decision gave the PSC political control and strategic direction for the mission. At the same time the operational commander was tasked with developing OPLAN, Concept of Operation (CONOPS), and Rules of Engagement (ROE). The PSC would be responsible to the Council for their actions. However, the Council had a primary and absolute right to make any decision relevant to the objectives of the operation or its possible termination. The EUMC was responsible for the proper execution of the military portion of the Operation Althea. As in the case of Operation Concordia, DSACEUR acted as an Operational Commander and the operational headquarters were co-located with SHAPE in Mons, Belgium. “Having a three star General, who is an integral and senior part of the NATO planning system, has helped ensure that EUFOR Althea has worked well at SHAPE, where the EU operations headquarters is located.”


4. What were the EU-NATO relations or interactions during the operation?

As it was the case in Macedonia with Operation Concordia, the functional relationship between NATO and the EU is seen through the “Berlin-Plus” agreement. “EUFOR Althea largely profited from the fact that it could access NATO structures and, in particular, the (infra) structures on the ground consigned by SFOR.”

Just like EU’s Operation Concordia, NATO’s DSACEUR is Althea’s acting operational commander. Stationed in NATO’s SHAPE in Mons, he “interacts regularly with the EU’s Political and Security Committee and facilitates liaison between it and the NAC.” Previously established liaison teams in both structures, share their expertise “to smooth relations between staff members from both entities and there is daily contact between representatives in Bosnia and Herzegovina from both sides.”

Summary

The method of structured, focused comparison as a simple and straightforward tool for analysis provided results which are shown in table 1. When examined closely, the results show that the EU made serious improvement throughout the years. The EU’s military crisis management has opened a new chapter in the EU in general, and in the EU’s CFSP in particular. In summary, one can say that slowly but surely, the EU is

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138 Ibid.
becoming a relevant factor even in the military crisis management domain. This was not a natural area of interest for an organization like the EU.

Table 3. Overall Findings of the Analysis

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>QUESTION</td>
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<tr>
<td>Was the EU able to respond?</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What EU policy guided such crisis management operations?</td>
<td>NO specific security and defense policy</td>
<td>YES First test of the ESDP</td>
<td>YES ESDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What structures and processes facilitated the EU’s crisis management operations?</td>
<td>NO structures and processes were established to facilitate crisis management operation</td>
<td>EU established the whole new structure to facilitate decision making and execution of military crisis management.</td>
<td>Structures such as PSC, EU Military Committee and EU Military staff facilitated the execution of Althea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What were the EU-NATO relations or interactions during those operations?</td>
<td>NO or extremely limited cooperation and/or interactions between two organizations.</td>
<td>Strong cooperation on military crisis management operations on behalf of “Berlin-Plus” agreement.</td>
<td>This ongoing operation is a result of the strong EU-NATO relations based on “Berlin-Plus” agreement.</td>
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Source: Created by author.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The last 20 years have witnessed the European ambition to develop into a relevant global actor. From its inception, the EU focused its sphere of interest on economic and political issues. At the beginning of the 1990s, the EU acquired the ambition (not by its own will) to develop in the field of military crisis management. According to the general consensus of most observers, the EU began developing in that direction because of two factors: the end of the Cold War and the conflict in former Yugoslavia. The first factor, marked with the fall of the Warsaw Pact led to the forming a security disbalance within the Europe. Even more, because of the fact that many NATO countries started to decrease their troops. The second factor, however, forced the EU to consider a dynamic response in a domain that was not “traditional” for this organization.

Prevention and resolution of conflicts for the EU was an unknown field of action, and therefore all of its early attempts to resolve them proved unsuccessful. The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was a painful experience, not only for the citizens of that country and region, but also for the European Union, which desired to act vigorously to stop the conflict and atrocities associated with the conflict. The circumstance in which the EU found itself reflected its ambition to do something more militarily, but not its actual operational readiness to do so. The initial failed attempts at military intervention were a sufficient indication that the EU must adapt to emerging situations and institutionally transform. Realizing its weaknesses and shortcomings, the EU took the second half of the 1990s to introduce new policies, processes and institutions that would play a greater role in the field of military crisis management. The development of the EU’s military crisis
management capability has progressed significantly in the last 10 years. Although at first glance it is a short period, the EU has had enormous institutional and political success in implementing new processes and policies regarding its military crisis management. This success is generally evident in the launch of the ESDP, and in particular through the numerous operations\textsuperscript{139} under the auspices of this policy. The EU’s motive for engaging in military crisis management operations in the Balkans can be understood as an attempt to restore lost credibility (especially after the great failure during the wars in former Yugoslavia), and impose democratic values, human rights and rule of law.

When the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia escalated in early 1990s, EU member states did not show determination first to make a decision to intervene, and second, to take the initiative and react independently with military means to resolve these conflicts. European military impotence and the dependence on the U.S. (militarily), forced the EU member states to create the ESDP. Just a few years later, the EU insisted on showing off their newly built capacity for decision making, embodied in institutions such as the PSC, EU Military Committee and EU Military Staff, and their willingness to perform military crisis management operations. The Balkans once again served as a testing ground where the EU would examine this policy and its readiness for military crisis management operations. Overall, the EU has made enormous progress in striving to become a significant security factor in the Balkans.

This thesis has approached the issue by examining three case studies. The research began with an analysis of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the EU approach in dealing with it. The second case, although almost ten years later, was an analysis of the EU Operation Concordia in the Republic of Macedonia. This analysis showed to what extent the EU had developed its institutions and decision making processes in the field of military crisis management. Operation Concordia was the first operation under the auspices of ESDP and served as a practical test for this policy. The third case analyzed the EU Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This operation is significant because it is the largest military crisis management operation that the EU has ever executed. Since this operation is still ongoing, it continues to produce conclusions and lessons learned that could well serve the EU in removing flaws and successfully overcoming challenges.

The findings of this analysis support the conclusion that the EU has evolved significantly from an entity that was unable to intervene militarily, into one that today successfully leads military crisis management operations. After a long period of NATO preeminence, the EU, very modestly at first, and more energetically in the last several years, began to work intensively to develop its own institutions, processes and facilities that would be able to respond to future security challenges, either alone or in partnership with NATO or UN forces. Based on the analysis, it seems that the EU has developed structures, processes and mechanisms to make decisions regarding military crisis operations. According to those decisions, the EU has succeeded in not only participating in military crisis management operations, but also in leading such operations. Taking into account the fact that operations Concordia and Althea were inherited from NATO, the
analysis also indicates that the EU may still face some significant challenges if ever required to unilaterally launch military crisis management operations in response to a high intensity conflict.

In both operations Concordia and Althea, the EU took over from NATO in a phase of relative peace and without armed confrontation between belligerents. Therefore, the experience that the EU gained through these operations has been mainly in post-conflict stabilization of the countries where EU forces operated. These ESDP operations were launched in order to contribute to the stabilization of both countries by building a safe and secure environment. By basing ESDP on the principles of international law and multilateralism, it seems that the EU is trying to develop peaceful relations with other security actors. The EU also aims to become a global player, especially in the field of conflict and crisis management. The EU aims to strengthen its civilian and military capabilities which will provide more and more opportunities to influence global developments in the years ahead.

The findings of this thesis indicate that the EU will continue to strive independently, or in cooperation with NATO as the main pillar of a collective security and logistical support arrangements, enabling then to to respond to new security challenges across the globe or within Europe.

In a speech during the Second World War, the Prime Minister of the UK, Sir Winston Churchill stated: “this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.”\textsuperscript{140} Considering the development of ESDP, and

thus the EU’s military crisis management processes, this quote accurately describes the
stage the EU is in today. If in the late 1990s it was an embryonic project, today ESDP has
ended the childhood and entered adolescence where it may potentially have to face
serious developmental challenges.

The EU’s military crisis management processes, today and in the future, must be
subject to a wider debate among EU member states. Such debate should be approached
from two perspectives. The first is that although the EU is capable of making decisions in
this area, it lacks assets (both military and logistical) in order to carry out independent
military crisis response operations on a large scale. The military capabilities of the EU
member states are far from those of the U.S. Therefore the EU Member states will have
to generate more funds towards improving individual or collective security capabilities.
In that case the EU would not be dependent on assistance from outside as it is now with
Berlin plus and NATO.

Judging by the current political situation in the EU, it seems that any major
military loss experienced during potential combat operations could bring the whole ESDP
concept into question. This would create conditions in which EU member states would
return to the NATO concept of collective security. Other countries, such as Austria or
Sweden (not NATO members), would return to neutrality. This situation would once
again make the EU militarily impotent in comparison to NATO.

The second perspective is linked to the first. Recent announcements that the U.S.
will shift its strategic interests from Europe to Asia, should give additional impetus to the

winstonchurchill.org/learn/speeches/speeches-of-winston-churchill/1941-1945-war-
EU member states for effective building of European security. This would mean that EU should start more intensively with developing its military capacities. Such a development would be a chance for the EU to grow as global security factor who can act independently without external assistance. Whether “the hour of Europe”\textsuperscript{141} as Jacques Poss stated, will really come is yet to be seen.

**Recommendations**

The EU has managed relatively quickly to establish a functional system of institutions capable of making military crisis management decisions. What remains a challenge today and in the near future is the fact that the EU is heavily dependent on NATO assets. This conclusion is based on the fact that the EU Operations Concordia and Althea were carried out under the auspices of the “Berlin-Plus” agreement that makes the EU dependent on NATO.

From the military crisis management perspective, the EU is far from being able to independently run military operations without having to request assistance from outside. Another consideration is that EU operations to date, and as envisioned for the foreseeable future are military crisis management rather than Full Spectrum Operations (FSO) conducted in a combat environment.

In conditions of major economic crisis the EU currently faces, it is unlikely that the EU states will decide to increase their military expenditures to build capable assets to act independently in the international arena. It is an expensive investment that most of the EU countries are not willing to incur, at least not in these circumstances. The best solution would be a chance for the EU to grow as global security factor who can act independently without external assistance.

solution for the EU is to continue and even extend its strategic partnership with NATO. Collective security in the Euro-Atlantic region has to remain the responsibility of NATO. By using a comprehensive approach, involving civil and military crisis management, the EU could likely play an in post-conflict crisis management operations (the case of EU operations Concordia and Althea). Based on the findings of this thesis, the EU obtained the best results under these precise circumstances.

To obtain a complete picture of EU’s military crisis management, further research on the rest of the EU’s military missions such as EUFOR Congo and Chad, should be done. The intent of this paper was to do examine the beginnings of EU’s military crisis management (the war in Bosnia) to see to what extent has ESDP developed and its ability for making decisions and conducting independent operations (Operation Althea). A goal of this thesis is also to raise interest in opening a wider debate among researchers in the field of EU’s military crisis management. The impact of the current economic crisis in the EU on the development of future military capabilities or independent crisis management performance internationally would be one of the topics in that debate. A second topic for discussion would be how the recent U.S. announcement about shifting its security interests toward Asia, on one hand, and Russian objections to NATO’s plans to install an anti-missile shield in Europe, on the other, would set conditions for the future development of EU’s military crisis management.
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