WINNING THE SOFT WAR: THE EMPLOYMENT
OF TACTICAL PSYOP TEAMS IN
COMBAT OPERATIONS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
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General Studies

by

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**Winning the Soft War: The Employment of Tactical PSYOP Teams in Combat Operations**

The employment of tactical PSYOP teams (TPT) directly affects the outcome of operations. In the past 10 years, the U.S. Army failed to fully employ TPTs in operations a significant percentage of the time. The operational cost of not employing low-density military specialties is significant. The quality of the command relationship was the determining factor in how effectively commanders employed TPTs. Education and training played a secondary role in the effective employment of TPTs; but the value of relevant training and education is undeniable.

This paper examines the employment of TPTs in operations over the last ten years. It applies information from subject matter experts analyzing the impact of doctrine, training and education, and command relationships on the employment of TPTs. The paper concludes with key concepts that promote proper employment of TPTs and recommendations for future research.
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRONYMS</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILLUSTRATIONS</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLES</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitions</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumptions</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitations</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delimitations</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctrine</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevant Theory, Articles, and Papers</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaps</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH DESIGN</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical Interview Participants</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPT Employment</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctrine</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education and Training</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Relationships</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributors to Success and Failure</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPER 5 CONCLUSION</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctrine</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training and Education</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Relationships</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective Employment</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommended Future Research</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOSSARY</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX A INTERVIEWS</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRONYMS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CALL</td>
<td>Center for Army Lessons Learned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARL</td>
<td>Combined Arms Research Library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>Information Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFKSWCS</td>
<td>John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPOTF</td>
<td>Joint PSYOP Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRTC</td>
<td>Joint Readiness Training Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISO</td>
<td>Military Information Support Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOE</td>
<td>Measures of Effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOS</td>
<td>Military Occupational Specialty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>Psychological Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFODA</td>
<td>Special Forces operational detachment A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOFA</td>
<td>Status of Forces Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TA</td>
<td>Target Audience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAA</td>
<td>Target Audience Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPT</td>
<td>Tactical Psychological Operations Teams</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ILLUSTRATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1</td>
<td>Tactical Psychological Operations Detachment</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2</td>
<td>Historical Interview Questionnaire</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3</td>
<td>Tactical PSYOP Company</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4</td>
<td>Tactical PSYOP Detachment</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 1.</td>
<td>Persuasion Principles</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2.</td>
<td>Overall Effective Use</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3.</td>
<td>Effective Use 2001-2006</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4.</td>
<td>Effective Use 2006-2011</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5.</td>
<td>Overall Percentage</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6.</td>
<td>Percentage 2001-2006</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 7.</td>
<td>Percentage 2006-2011</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 8.</td>
<td>Doctrine 2001-2011</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 9.</td>
<td>Doctrine 2001-2006</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 10.</td>
<td>Doctrine 2006-2011</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 11.</td>
<td>Education and Training 2001-2011</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 12.</td>
<td>Education and Training 2001-2011</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 13.</td>
<td>Education and Training 2006-2011</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 14.</td>
<td>Command Relationships 2001-2011</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 15.</td>
<td>Command Relationships 2001-2006</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 16.</td>
<td>Command Relationships 2006-2011</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 17.</td>
<td>Command Relationships</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tactical Psychological Operations Teams (TPT) deployed in support of ongoing operations to every theatre and combatant command in the last ten years. TPTs played a direct role in Afghanistan and Iraq with upwards of 48 teams working in either theater at any given time. The role they played in building relationships to influence the local population is difficult to measure, but when allowed to perform their mission benefits were clear. A TPT is a rather small element consisting of a team leader who is a Staff Sergeant, a Psychological Operations Sergeant who is a Sergeant, and a Psychological Operations Specialist, who is a Specialist. Locally hired interpreters normally augment teams. TPTs in conventional operations traditionally support battalions and in non-conventional operations support special operations elements. The active duty component and the reserve components generate TPTs. Active duty TPTs normally support Special Operations Forces and reserve units normally support conventional units. The challenge should seem obvious; a three-man team supports a battalion size element of often over 1,200 personnel, and a battlespace that may include a local populace of over 100,000 people. In addition, team leaders interact with Captains and Majors to advise the supported commander, a Lieutenant Colonel, on Psychological Operations (PSYOP) activities.

The Afghanistan Pakistan Hands Program is an example of this emphasis, blending what Military Information Support Operations (MISO) brings to the fight with a cadre of regional experts in an attempt to address the gaps identified by the combatant
commander. Combatant commanders recognize that face-to-face operations, which is a basic task for TPTs, pays dividends in the fight. Cultures throughout Afghanistan and Iraq embrace the dialogue and relationships developed from the face-to-face operations. TPT leaders argue that this is where they are most valuable. The importance of personal relationships is evident when one examines the values held by most cultures in a region. Moreover, personal relationships often solve problems faster than bombs and bullets, with far less bloodshed. If one is to understand what really makes TPTs effective, then one must analyze their mission. Supported units often overlook TPT capabilities during operational planning. Furthermore, the Joint PSYOP Task Force (JPOTF) pushes products with broad themes and messages that are great for a region, but frequently weaken the credibility of the TPT on the ground which is in a better position to make a difference.

In the last 10 years and in two different theaters, we can find examples of commanders employing MISO assets to perform guard duty or other security functions outside of their specialty. Even worse, we see media headlines of PSYOP being utilized to gather information on how to persuade United States (US) politicians on current military issues or broadcasting messages regarding the burning of bodies in Afghanistan. Whether it is the failure to employ MISO within their specialty or improperly using them within their specialty, one may identify alarming trends. One fails to see the same trends when looking at other Special Operation Forces. The reasons for these issues are complex and may relate to the mystique of MISO and the abandonment of the term Psychological Operations.
As evidenced from recent discussions with observer controllers from Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), the tactical level MISO struggles to conduct operations within their designated functional area. Specifically, when asked if they had seen an improvement in the employment of MISO over the last 10 years, the observer controllers opined that supported commanders continue to fail to effectively employ MISO elements. The reasons are not readily evident, but their initial approach to the problem is ensuring MISO elements brief supported commanders on MISO capabilities and limitations. The focus of this research will cover the reasons that supported units do not effectively employ TPTs. The primary, secondary, and tertiary research questions provided below address the thesis subject in detail:

Primary Question: Are Tactical Psychological Operations teams used effectively (employed in their functional area) in operations?

Secondary Questions:

Q1-How does doctrine affect the employment of TPTs?
Q2-How does education and training affect employment of TPTs?
Q3-How do command relationships affect the employment of TPTs?

Tertiary Questions:

T1-What is the biggest contributor to the success of TPTs?
T2-What is the biggest contributor to the failure of TPTs?

Significance

Early religions appear to be the first historical evidence of Psychological Operations. Early civilizations documented their religions themes and messages and passed that understanding from one generation to the next. The common link between
each is a clear effort to influence one’s emotions, motives, reasoning, and ultimately change their behavior. Common early religious themes included the care of children and the elderly. The first documented military example of PSYOP is Alexander the Great of Macedonia. He instructed his men to construct large pieces of armor that would fit men seven to eight feet tall and leave it on the battlefield, making the enemy think his soldiers were giants, to prevent the enemy from following his retreating army. In WWII, the US executed a PSYOP campaign, both domestically and internationally, to turn the tide against the enemy and gain overwhelming domestic support. The Office of War Information conducted the domestic effort primarily through propaganda.¹ The fallout from the all points attack is laws limiting the use of PSYOP and restricting the audience. The Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 limited the use of PSYOP to foreign audiences and remains in effect today.

PSYOP, recently renamed MISO, has a distinct history and lineage dating back to WWII. During WWII, PSYOP became rooted in planning and made impacts on the battlefield. Throughout the years, the US Army overhauled and reorganized PSYOP. During the last six decades, the US Army conducted studies on the role of PSYOP in conflict, and its proper organization and recommended frequent changes. The impacts of these changes on the commanders’ understanding of PSYOP’s contribution to the fight are evident today. The proper employment of PSYOP is a critical task for commanders, and far too often commanders delegate the control of units to subordinates, or even ignore the asset altogether. Commanders can employ PSYOP in all aspects of an operation, campaign, or war, unlike many other weapon systems. When commanders properly utilize PSYOP, they shape the battlefield in ways lethal munitions cannot.
In 2003, through interaction with the local populace, a PSYOP detachment gained information that led to the capture of four of the top 55 most wanted people in Iraq. In addition, the same unit secured a communications site and prevented its destruction. The unit also ran a television and radio station that had a potential audience of over four million people based on the broadcast area of a 300 meter FM/VHF/UHF tower. Commanders who recognize the value of reaching millions of people with one broadcast can leverage PSYOP assets to change the face of the situation in their area of operations. The Joint PSYOP Task Force (JPOTF) moved TPTs multiple times during the deployment when commanders failed to utilize them in their functional area. When supported units failed to allow TPTs to conduct PSYOP, it affected both the morale and the combat effectiveness of assigned TPTs. These struggles were not unique to this unit, but common during the first rotation through Iraq.²

The PSYOP Specialist (37F) is a highly trained soldier in a low-density Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). According to the US Army recruiting website www.goarmy.com, an Infantryman’s (11B) training is 14 weeks. In comparison to a PSYOP Specialist, an Infantryman could be considered a high density MOS. The PSYOP Specialist’s total training time is 43 to 51 weeks. The training investment for PSYOP Specialists is more than three times that of an Infantryman. The investment in developing a PSYOP Specialist in relation to the relative low number of soldiers available in any given deployment should demonstrate the importance of properly employing PSYOP soldiers and maximizing the time they are utilized in their functional area.
**Definitions**

For the purpose of this research, the following definitions are helpful in examining the subject:

**Military Information Support Operations (MISO)/Psychological Operations (PSYOP):** planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives.³

**Tactical Psychological Operations Team (TPT):** in high-intensity conflict the TPT normally provides PSYOP support to a battalion. Higher rates of movement during combat operations allow tactical commanders to reinforce units in contact with PSYOP assets as needed. During more static and/or urban SOSO, planning and execution of operations are primarily conducted at the company/Special Forces Operational Detachment A (SFODA) level, and the company/SFODA is the element which most often directly engages the local government, populace, and adversary groups. The company requires a more dedicated PSYOP capability to manage the population found in a company sector, particularly in urban environments when population densities are much higher (for example, 50,000 to 200,000 per company sector). Operating in the team or company AO allows the TPTs to develop rapport with the TAs. This rapport is critical to the accomplishment of their mission. The TPT chief is the PSYOP planner for the supported commander. He also coordinates with the TPD for PSYOP support to meet the supported commander’s requirements.⁴
Face-to-Face Communication: is the conveyance of a message by the sender in the sight or presence of the receiver. Face-to-face communication ranges from two or more individuals in informal conversation to planned persuasion among groups. The credibility of the PSYOP messages delivered by face-to-face communication is increased when the communicator is known and respected. By disseminating through face-to-face communication, PSYOP forces have the opportunity to interact with the local populace and get direct and immediate feedback and reactions from the Target Audience (TA).5

Target Audience (TA): an individual or group selected for influence or attack by means of Psychological Operations.6
**Doctrine**: (DOD) fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.\(^7\)

**Information Operations (IO)**: (DOD) actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one’s own information and information systems. (Army) The employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to affect and defend information and information systems, and to influence decision making. Also called IO. See also defensive IO; information; information system; offensive IO.\(^8\)

**Assumptions**

For the research to remain relevant, this thesis assumes that PSYOP will remain part of ongoing and future operations. All historical interview participants have been treated as subject matter experts under the assumption that they possess the rank specific education required for PSYOP Specialists. Employment in functional area includes employment within common soldier tasks. Finally, it is determined that qualitative analysis provides the most appropriate approach in relation to this research subject.

**Limitations**

This thesis defines limitations as those things over which there is no control. A great deal of information pertaining to PSYOP is classified and there is no control over classification levels. Classified material is not considered for this thesis. PSYOP is a low density MOS which makes it very difficult to find research participants. Most of this
literature addresses strategic PSYOP. This research is limited due to the geographic location. The research radius includes units within four hours of Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Delimitations

This thesis defines delimitations as self-imposed research boundaries. The study does not examine strategic MISO, or look at MISO outside of the US Army. This paper does not address measures of effectiveness. The study covers operations in Afghanistan and Iraq from November 2001 to November 2011. Interview participants only include subject matter experts that in direct supervision of TPTs. Interview participants only include soldiers from the 10th Battalion 7th Psychological Operations Group. Historic interview questions are only those approved by the Director of Graduate Programs at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC). Research methodology limits interviews to November and December of 2011. The research does not take into account the maneuver commander’s perspective.

Summary

In summary, the US Army meets the demand for PSYOP through a low-density MOS, and assigns TPTs to operational units as the lowest level of support. TPTs consist of three PSYOP specialists who integrate with supported units and fulfill inform and influence requirements. The research questions focus on doctrine, training and education, and command relationships to determine their affect on the employment of TPTs in their functional area. In chapter 2, this thesis will address literature related to TPTs.


3Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-05.30, Psychological Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2005), Glossary 16.

4Ibid., 3-10.

5Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-05.301, Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2007), 6-10.

6Ibid., Glossary 11.

7Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2004), 1-65.

8Ibid., 1-99.
CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

A search of Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) identifies 34,429 publications containing information related to tactical psychological operations. A refined search limits publications to “tactical psychological operations teams,” and 40 publications remain. When a screening is conducted for relevant abstracts, the search yielded 16 publications related to the research. Review of these 16 articles reveal that gaps exist in literature when reviewing the role of TPTs in operations over the past 10 years. This thesis organizes the literature review into history, doctrine, training, and other publications relevant to tactical PSYOP. The organization of the literature in this manner aligns relevant literature with the research design in chapter 3.

History

The history of the PSYOP team is rich and for the U.S. Army, in relation to the earliest form of the TPT, it dates back to North Africa and Italy in WWII. Sandler’s, “Cease Resistance: It's Good For You!": A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations, provides one of the most comprehensive historical reviews of PSYOP. Sandler identifies that the struggle at the tactical level was evident in WWII when units formed ad hoc teams with limited equipment and resources. In Italy, these teams interacted with the local populace in what may be the first example of face-to-face communication as related to the PSYOP team. Eventually, from the lessons learned in North Africa and Italy, teams with radio broadcast skill sets and loudspeakers mounted
on their trucks became tactical norms within the limited PSYOP community. Supported units readily accepted the benefit of these teams when large numbers of enemy troops surrendered en-mass, but the PSYOP community would not enlist these numbers to measure their effectiveness.¹

During each interwar period, following the growth of PSYOP personnel and doctrine, the specialty ranks diminished and the Army almost forgot the contribution of PSYOP. This cycle continued even though commanders continued to employ PSYOP in almost every major conflict since World War I. In the early 1980s, this cycle was finally broken when President Reagan expanded the military. In Grenada, PSYOP proved its usefulness although there were serious problems in planning integration. Based on Reagan’s expansions, PSYOP units remained functional with leadership intact after Grenada, and the lessons from Grenada remained fresh in their minds. The lessons from Grenada allowed the PSYOP leadership to prove their effectiveness in Panama and set the conditions for future growth. Shortly after Panama, the (DoD) established United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, published new PSYOP doctrine, and established the MOS 37F (PSYOP Specialist).²

Sandler’s history of PSYOP essentially ends where Operation Uphold/Restore/Maintain Democracy: The Role of Army Special Operations, November 1991-June 1995 begins. Dr. Joseph Fischer provides a detailed account of PSYOP in Haiti. The account of PSYOP in Haiti demonstrates TPT flexibility and importance. One of the first challenges noted for tactical PSYOP was the struggle for assets when competing with maneuver commanders who found it difficult to measure the contribution of PSYOP.³ TPT’s conducted 760 ground missions in Haiti and monitored the effectiveness of the campaign
through face-to-face communication. The permissive environment allowed TPT’s to widely disseminate product and routinely interact with the TA. The result according to the authors: “The effectiveness of the early psyop campaign is beyond dispute.” Haiti demonstrated the importance of PSYOP especially with regard to influencing the local populace.

In the last 10 years, several articles note key concepts and contributions of TPTs in Afghanistan and Iraq. Steven Merkel and John Clement in the article, "Battlekings: Return to Baghdad as a Maneuver Battalion: Doing More with Less," discuss how TPTs become essential when in an environment of diminishing resources. In addition, they emphasize proper integration and planning to truly enjoy the value of TPTs. The article outlines planning meetings that discuss the importance of key players being involved during planning sessions weeks ahead of planned operations, and following up each meeting with a subsequent weekly meeting as the operation date approached. Darin J Blatt, Eric Long, Brian Mulhern, and Michael Ploskunak provide a look into TPTs from a Special Forces detachment perspective in the article, “Tribal Engagement in Afghanistan.” The article states that TPTs are integral in identifying and establishing dialogue with key leaders. It also discusses the ability of TPTs to gain the widest possible message dissemination by putting radios in the hands of tribal elders. David Sammons points out one the more difficult areas of contingency in his 2004 thesis, when he states the following about Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) in relation to PSYOP: “First, the cause and effect assessment of human emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and behaviors of organizations, groups or individuals is simply no easy task. Combat leaders have enough difficulty in assessing the human behavior and motives of their own troops,
much less that of enemy’s fielded forces possibly in denied territory.” MOE will continue to challenge the PSYOP and IO community for years to come, but discussions will continue to refine the process.

There is a great deal of literature on tactical PSYOP especially during the WWII era, followed by a diminishing emphasis with each subsequent major operation. The CARL search yielded over 100 documents relating to PSYOP. The focus of most literature in the last 10 years is on the strategic level and offers only limited articles addressing TPTs. Fortunately, the MISO community is rather small, and one may glean information from the team level through the network of current and former specialists. These specialists have served in almost every rotation through Afghanistan and Iraq in the last 10 years. The 362nd Psychological Operations Company alone covers three deployments at the division level and below in the last 10 years; two to Iraq and one to Afghanistan. The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) has provided hundreds of documents covering the last 10 years to include interviews, operation orders, and observation reports. FM 3-05.30, Psychological Operations, and FM 3-05.301, Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, provide the required doctrinal information.

**Doctrine**

Doctrine provides the guiding principles and boundaries for TPTs. A thorough review of doctrine reveals the importance of command relationships, and the value of TPTs to the supported commander. The emphasis on command relationships is evident in NATO, joint, and Army doctrine. The principles of proper command relationships are similar in each doctrine. NATO doctrine recommends TPTs be Tactical Control
(TACON) to maneuver commanders, although they recognize the sensitivity of PSYOP and acknowledge nations may be reluctant to give control of PSYOP units to another nation. Joint guidance suggests tactical PSYOP units be attached to the combatant commander, and they may further be Operationa Control (OPCON) to components based on the mission and requirements. FM 3-05.30 further emphasizes the importance of command relationships and recommends OPCON and TACON relationships for TPTs with overall coordination left to the Psychological Operations Task Force. FM 3-05.302 focuses on establishing the command relationship early to allow TPTs time to integrate before the onset of operations.

Doctrine ultimately does not dictate the command relationship; it only recommends. The challenge with doctrine is that it is too broad and left open for interpretation. This is both an advantage and a disadvantage for commanders and supporting units. As we examine doctrine, one can see that the emphasis is really on the commander and their ability to provide the proper interpretation and guidance for any given situation. The doctrine reviewed clearly emphasized the importance of having the right command relationship, although it failed to define what the right relationship should be. Understanding the complexities of command relationships and how they impact overall performance of units is a fundamental challenge for commanders and supporting units. Command relationships can empower units or stifle them, depending on the command climate and the degree of control established by the type of command relationship. Without regard for the real impact, doctrine has only emphasized the importance of the command relationship and left it to commanders to determine the proper relationship to establish.
It is important to note that doctrine places PSYOP under the broad umbrella of IO as one of the core elements. This is a hotly debated issue within the PSYOP community and has effects on command relationships and the ability of tactical PSYOP to advise commanders on the battlefield. The case may be that the supported commander is overwhelmed by the amount of information on today’s battlefield. It is easier to compartmentalize programs and assets to better manage the complex nature of the operational environment. FM 3-13 outlines the core elements of IO: operations security, psychological operations, military deception, electronic warfare, and computer network operations. The diverse nature of these elements and the challenge of them being coordinated by a staff officer who is frequently not a subject matter expert in any of the fields is an obvious challenge. According to FM 3-13, in an effort to synchronize operations, the core elements are organized under the umbrella of IO. FM 3-13 specifically states the following about tactical PSYOP:

Tactical PSYOP seeks to influence PSYOP targets directly. It uses face-to-face, limited production printed products and loudspeakers. Tactical PSYOP can:

1. Influence adversary civil populations not to interfere with friendly force efforts.
2. Induce cooperation or reduce active opposition.
3. Reduce collateral damage by giving instructions to noncombatants in the combat zone.
4. Reduce collateral damage by giving instructions to noncombatants in the combat zone.
Further, FM 3-13 seems to oversimplify the expertise that Tactical PSYOP units bring to the operational environment.

Training

Doctrine establishes multiple tasks on which TPTs are required to train and perform in operations. PSYOP soldiers perform six core tasks: design, develop, produce, distribute, disseminate, and evaluate. Beyond these six core tasks, ST 3-05.302, *MTP Tactical PSYOP Company*, outlines 39 collective tasks for TPTs. Among these, 10 collective tasks are truly PSYOP specific and critical to PSYOP activities. The 10 tasks are below:

1. Conduct Face-to-Face Communication
2. Conduct Mounted Loudspeaker Operations
3. Manage PSYOP Dissemination
4. Develop the PSYOP Plan
5. Conduct Integration and Coordination with Support Unit
6. Conduct PSYOP Evaluation
7. Conduct Local/Media Assessment
8. Manage Collection of PSYOP-Relevant Information
9. Disseminate Audio Products (Manpack Loudspeaker)
10. Conduct Propaganda Analysis

Two of the 10 collective tasks, integration and coordination with supported unit and face-to-face communication, deserve further attention. Within the PSYOP community, integration with the supported unit seems to be the life or death of a TPT. The pressure of integration, according to doctrine and available literature, would suggest
that the burden lies broadly on the shoulders of the TPT leader. The gap left by the uneven burden often means that the personality of the TPT leader determines the quality of the relationship. The quality of the relationship can obviously have negative effects on integration. Face-to-face communication activities require support from the commander to gain access to the TA, and provide the security required to conduct operations. The ability to conduct PSYOP specific tasks relates directly back to effective integration and the cyclical nature of integration and face-to-face. Both certainly affect each other.

Integration efforts and the established command relationship share a close relationship, which according to FM 3-05.30, states the following:

PSYOP may operate under various C2 arrangements. The mission, the length and scope of operations, the supported GCC, and the commanders at each level determine the exact C2 structure. PSYOP may be an integral part of joint or multinational operation, or an activity in support of OGAs. This chapter discusses the C2 structure as it relates to the Army PSYOP force. This discussion focuses on C2 arrangements and the command relationships developed to facilitate effective PSYOP support. 4-2. Effective PSYOP needs a responsive C2 structure. The command relationship arrangements for C2 of PSYOP must: Provide a clear, unambiguous chain of command; provide enough staff experience and expertise to plan, conduct, and support PSYOP; ensure the supported commander involves selected PSYOP personnel in mission planning at the outset; ensure the supported commander involves selected PSYOP personnel in mission planning at the outset.10

FM 3-05.302 emphasizes the importance of integrating with the supported unit which sets the tone for all follow-on TPT operations. As with the TA, TPTs must establish trust, respect, and credibility with the supported command or risk limited operational effectiveness. From logistics to intelligence support, TPTs must integrate with the staff sections to conduct operations. TPTs must exchange information freely to facilitate integration and build staff relationships. In addition, the TPT leader must provide an effective capabilities brief tailored to the unit’s area of influence and
operations. The command post provides the TPT leader with the best opportunities to provide PSYOP relevant planning and operations to the supported commander. Time spent in the TOC is time understanding the priorities of the supported unit, and allows the TPT leader to provide timely and relevant guidance to the supported commander.

According to FM 3-05.302, face-to-face communication embodies almost all elements of PSYOP, and allows TPTs to integrate into the operating environment to develop rapport and credibility with the TA. Personal communication is the only way to encourage dialogue where opposing sides can thoroughly discuss the difficult subjects of economics and politics. The credibility developed through personal interaction and the immediate feedback from the audience, enables TPTs to define their messages and build better relationships with the TA. There are advantages and disadvantages to face-to-face communication. The most notable advantage is that it builds credibility, and the biggest disadvantage is that it is very limited in kinetic operations. TPTs must properly plan each face-to-face engagement, to include the security situation and individual responsibilities, especially that of the interviewer.

**Relevant Theory, Articles, and Papers**

Beyond doctrine and training are several articles that prove insightful for this thesis. The science of persuasion embodies what it is to conduct PSYOP. The diplomatic community readily accepts concepts of persuasion as basic components of the art of diplomacy. Politicians use the science of persuasion to gain momentum for their political campaigns and negotiate deals on Capitol Hill. However, outside of government and the military one can find the purest forms of the science of persuasion. Advertising, marketing, and sales professions have embraced the concepts for hundreds of years.
Throughout the last century, the PSYOP community honed these skills by adopting successful techniques and discarding less successful practices. The US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (JFKSWCS) teaches PSYOP officers key principles relating to influence operations developed by Robert Cialdini, a leading social psychologist. Dr. Cialdini received his Ph.D. from the University of North Carolina and authored, *Influence: Science and Practice, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion,* and *Yes!: 50 Scientifically Proven Ways to Be Persuasive.*

Robert Cialdini uses six principles of persuasion: liking, reciprocity, social proof, consistency, authority, and scarcity. *The Harvard Business Review* further outlines these principles in the following excerpt:
Table 1. Persuasion Principles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principle</th>
<th>Example</th>
<th>Business Application</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LIKING: People like those like them, who like them.</td>
<td>At Tupperware parties, guests’ fondness for their host influences purchase decisions twice as much as regard for the products.</td>
<td>To influence people, win friends, through: Similarity: Create early bonds with new peers, bosses, and direct reports by informally discovering common interests—you’ll establish goodwill and trustworthiness. Praise: Charm and disarm. Make positive remarks about others—you’ll generate more willing compliance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECIPROCITY: People repay in kind.</td>
<td>When the Disabled American Veterans enclosed free personalized address labels in donation-request envelopes, response rate doubled.</td>
<td>Give what you want to receive. Lend a staff member to a colleague who needs help; you’ll get his help later.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCIAL PROOF: People follow the lead of similar others.</td>
<td>More New York City residents tried returning a lost wallet after learning that other New Yorkers had tried.</td>
<td>Use peer power to influence horizontally, not vertically; e.g., ask an esteemed “old timer” to support your new initiative if other veterans resist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSISTENCY: People fulfill written, public, and voluntary commitments.</td>
<td>92% of residents of an apartment complex who signed a petition supporting a new recreation center later donated money to the cause.</td>
<td>Make others’ commitments active, public, and voluntary. If you supervise an employee who should submit reports on time, get that understanding in writing (a memo); make the commitment public (note colleagues’ agreement with the memo); and link the commitment to the employee’s values (the impact of timely reports on team spirit).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTHORITY: People defer to experts who pro vide shortcuts to decisions requiring specialized information.</td>
<td>A single New York Times expert-opinion news story aired on TV generates a 4% shift in U.S. public opinion.</td>
<td>Don’t assume your expertise is self-evident. Instead, establish your expertise before doing business with new colleagues or partners; e.g., in conversations before an important meeting, describe how you solved a problem similar to the one on the agenda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCARCITY: People value what’s scarce.</td>
<td>Wholesale beef buyers’ orders jumped 600% when they alone received information on a possible beef shortage.</td>
<td>Use exclusive information to persuade. Influence and rivet key players’ attention by saying, for example: “…Just got this information today. It won’t be distributed until next week.”</td>
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</table>


The ability of PSYOP professionals to embrace principles of persuasion is one of the primary keys to unlocking TPT tasks. During initial training, the JFKSWCS trains PSYOP soldiers in the principles of persuasion and influence. PSYOP soldiers influence the TA by implementing these principles in operations. Thus, supported commanders can
change and shape their area of influence with appropriate themes and messages delivered by PSYOP forces who have tailored them in a way that capitalizes on principles of persuasion.

Commanders must give greater attention to the role of PSYOP as forces continue to downsize. When one has diminished resources, the emphasis on PSYOP seems natural, but what about the effectiveness of these units? “Strategic Communication & Influence Operations: Do We Really Get It,” by Dr. Lee Rowland and CDR Steve Tatham RN, argues that the military has the methodology, but fails to conduct a proper TA analysis to ensure leaders tailor themes and messages to the audience. The article points to the fact that the bulk of the force on the ground are maneuver soldiers, and the US Army has not trained maneuver soldiers to conduct PSYOP or perform TAA. The challenge facing supported commanders is that the expertise lies within the TPT and is only three people deep. However, without trained experts, it is unlikely commanders will conduct a successful TAA, and the impact on the TA will often be barely evident, or in a worst-case scenario push the TA in the opposite direction.

Another author who provides insight into TPTs is Major Patrick McCarthy Jr. He explores the relationship between IO, PSYOP, and the supported commander in, “7 Deadly Sins of PSYOP.” Using Dante’s epic poem, “The Divine Comedy,” McCarthy uses the seven deadly sins; lust, gluttony, greed, sloth, wrath, envy, and pride to describe pitfalls to avoid in tactical PSYOP. McCarthy points out the rift between PSYOP and IO, but more importantly, he discusses challenges within PSYOP. “Envy” is used to describe how PSYOP elements may see other activities, such as civil military operations or door-kicking operations, as more attractive and yielding immediate effects. He emphasizes that
PSYOP units must guard against this and stay within their field, even though the effects often take much longer to realize. “Lust” describes the obsession with product format without regard for the TA. This obsession can delay an already lengthy approval time, and render a product ineffective. McCarthy summarizes by characterizing PSYOP efforts as crucial components of the modern battlefield. These efforts must guard against pitfalls which will derail their operations.

The three articles provide a view of PSYOP and its challenges. Understanding the importance of the art of persuasion to TPTs, ties directly into assessing effects through TA analysis. Noting that TPTs face distractions in combat links these three articles together and aids in establishing a baseline for the context of the research.

**Gaps**

The review identified large gaps in literature, specifically addressing issues related to TPTs in the last 10 years. Doctrine indicates that the most critical PSYOP tasks take place at the team level. Further, beyond doctrine, little information relates to the proper employment of PSYOP. The resident Intermediate Leadership Education (ILE) Core Course at CGSC, dedicates a marginal period of time to covering PSYOP, in spite of the fact that it provides the final opportunity for officers to learn about PSYOP prior to battalion or brigade command. Doctrine identifies face-to-face communication as one of the most effective trained tasks in PSYOP. Face-to-face communication takes place at the TPT level, not in the plans section or at the JPOTF. Effective PSYOP requires face-to-face communication, PSYOP for development and implementation. Yet, the literature favors strategic operations with little regard for the TPT. Current literature, outside of a few documents, ignores the challenges TPT leaders face in relationship to the overall
organization of the Army at the tactical level. In addition, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) provides supported commanders little training on the employment of TPTs, and often relies on IO officers to fill in the gaps. These IO officers do not have the subject matter expertise to provide the commander with guidance. The primary question directly examines this gap and the focus of the research will attempt to identify information about the employment of PSYOP teams through interviews with subject matter experts with experience in operations over the last ten years.

Chapter 2 discussed relevant literature with emphasis on that which relates to doctrine and training. Other literature served to shed light on the duties and responsibilities of TPTs to include some of the challenges TPTs face in operations. Chapter 3 focuses on research design and outlines the methods used to research the primary, secondary, and tertiary questions.

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2 Ibid., 325.


4 Ibid., 80.

5 Ibid., 81.

6 Ibid., 80.


10 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-05.30, *Psychological Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 15 April 2005), 4-1.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH DESIGN

The gap identified by the literature review requires application of the qualitative research method to answer the primary and secondary research questions. The challenge of the void in available material relating to TPTs over the last 10 years demonstrates the lack of attention given to TPTs, and the difficulty in determining their effectiveness in operations. Based on the absence of material relating to TPTs, the qualitative research method is chosen to analyze the research questions. Using a qualitative method, the main emphasis in investigating the research questions relied on historical research interviews conducted with primary sources, which provides the most reliable and relevant information available. The data necessary for this research required outside collection beyond what was available through the CARL at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Historical interviews offer several advantages:

1. It provides data that is considered primary data, which is considered by researchers as the best source of information when conducting research. Primary data is considered the most valid data and closest to the truth.¹

2. It provides data from recent events from sources that are easily accessible. All interviewee candidates could be found in US Army Reserve units within three hundred mile radius of Fort Leavenworth and be available for interview during unit training assemblies.

3. It provides unique data that may contribute to the body of academic research for additional research on PSYOP and especially TPTs. The data covers ten years of deployments in two theatres and multiple regions with in each theatre.
Interviewees are chosen based on their position during deployments. Interview candidates are limited to TPT leaders, assistant TPT leaders, Tactical Psychological Detachment (TPD) commanders, and TPD Non-Commissioned Officers in Charge (NCOICs). The deployment period is limited to November 2001 to November 2011. Volunteer interviewees are identified during the US Army Reserve assembly meetings of the 362nd Psychological Operations Company (POC) located in Bentonville, AR, and 308th POC located in Belton, MO. Interviews are conducted in November and December of 2011.

The historical interview questions are designed to specifically address the primary and secondary research questions. The following figure is a copy of the historical interview questionnaire.

Questions are selected to ensure each research question is addressed to each interviewee. In addition, to further correct for potential bias in interview responses, Likert type scales are added to several questions. The Likert type questions will aid in organizing each research question in respective groups of thought on each topic.

The first two questions focus on the primary research question: Are Tactical Psychological Operations teams used effectively (employed in their functional area) in operations? The first historical interview question; Tactical Psychological Operations Teams (TPT) are used effectively (used in functional area and according to doctrine) in operations, qualifies the use of TPTs. The use of the word “effectively” requires further defining beyond “used in functional area and according to doctrine.” When addressing effectiveness for the purpose of this research, it is limited to employment in one’s
For the purposes of this research, effective use is defined as employment in PSYOP specialist individual and collective tasks.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Options</th>
<th>Explain:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Tactical Psychological Operations Teams (TPT) are used effectively (used in functional area and according to doctrine) in operations?</td>
<td>☐ Never ☐ Seldom ☐ Some of the time ☐ Usually ☐ All of the time</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. What percentage of your time while deployed did you spend working in your functional area?</td>
<td>☐ 0% - None ☐ 25% or less ☐ 50% ☐ 75% or more ☐ 100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Doctrine played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.</td>
<td>☐ Strongly disagree ☐ Disagree ☐ Neither agree nor disagree ☐ Agree ☐ Strongly agree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. How did doctrine affect the employment of TPTs during your deployment?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Education and/or training played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.</td>
<td>☐ Strongly disagree ☐ Disagree ☐ Neither agree nor disagree ☐ Agree ☐ Strongly agree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Education/training affect the employment of TPTs?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Command relationships played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.</td>
<td>☐ Strongly disagree ☐ Disagree ☐ Neither agree nor disagree ☐ Agree ☐ Strongly agree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Based on your experience, how did command relationships (Supporting unit vs. supported unit, OPCON, TACON, ADCON, etc.) affect the employment of TPTs?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the success of TPTs?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the failure of TPTs?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 2. Historical Interview Questionnaire**

*Source: Created by author.*
Question one of the historical interview questions also has a Likert type scale attached. This will facilitate the grouping of responses. Three different methods are used to categorize responses. The first method will simply group answers by the response without regard for deployment dates or number of deployments to determine the overall trend in relation to whether or not TPTs are used effectively in operations. The second method will group responses by deployment dates to determine if there is any change from the earlier deployments to the later deployments, and whether or not the different periods match the overall trends. The final method will compare the answers for individuals interviewed for multiple deployments to establish any trends unique to this group.

The second historical interview question; What percentage of your time while deployed did you spend working in your functional area?, attempts to quantify the use of TPTs in relation to effective use during operations, forcing the interviewee to choose a rough percentage to define their response. Responses to the second question relate back to the first question to validate the identified trends of the first question. In addition, a comparison of each individual’s response to question two against their response to question number one identifies any trends or issues related to the primary research question and then summarizes these trends. Finally, grouping responses by deployment dates and then by individuals with multiple deployments identifies alternative trends.

Historical interview questions three through eight examine the secondary questions outlined in chapter 1. Secondary questions are grouped with the appropriate historical interview questions below:

Question 1: How does doctrine affect the employment of TPTs?
Doctrine played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

How did doctrine affect the employment of TPTs during your deployment?

Question 2: How does education and training affect employment of TPTs?

Education and/or training played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

How did education/training affect the employment of TPTs?

Question 3: How does command relationships affect the employment of TPTs?

Command relationships played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Based on your experience, how did command relationships (Supporting unit vs. supported unit, OPCON, TACON, ADCON, etc.) affect the employment of TPTs?

Historical interview questions three, five, and seven have Likert type scales associated with them. This paper grouped the answers for these questions in the same manner as historical interview question one. First, this research organized answers by the response type, then grouped by deployment dates, and the last grouping will compare the answers for individuals who were interviewed for more than one deployment.

Historical interview questions three, five, and seven have follow-on questions that further examine the role of doctrine, training and education, and command relationships. The answers to these questions will shed light on potential reasons for any noted trends. In addition, they will assist in determining relevance of any issues identified by the research. Synthesizing the Likert type scales with the in-depth explanations and follow-on questions will paint a clear picture of operations from subject matter experts who have
considerable deployment experience. Answers to the more in-depth questions are analyzed to identify any other trends or issues.

This paper aligned the tertiary questions with the final two questions in the historical interview questions.

Question 1: What is the biggest contributor to the success of TPTs?

In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the success of TPTs?

Question 2: What is the biggest contributor to the failure of TPTs?

In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the failure of TPTs?

The tertiary questions aid in determining if connections exist between identified issues in the secondary questions and provide further support for trends. Questions eight and nine of the historical interview questions also identify potential areas for further research.

The research design takes into account both internal and external validity to ensure draws accurate conclusions are drawn from the research data. For the purposes of internal validity, this paper uses the triangulation strategy. Leedy and Ormrod define the strategy in “Practical Research: Planning and Design” below:

Triangulation. Multiple sources of data are collected with the hope that they will all converge to support a particular hypothesis or theory. This approach is especially common in qualitative research; for instance, a researcher might engage in many informal observations in the field and conduct in-depth interviews, then look for common themes that appear in the data gleaned from both methods. Triangulation is also common in mixed-method designs, in which both quantitative and qualitative data are collected to answer a single question.\textsuperscript{2}

External validity is also crucial to the body of research being useful beyond the specific subject and time period studied. This paper used a representative sample to improve external validity as defined below:
A representative sample. Whenever we conduct research to learn more about a particular category of objects or creatures—whether studying rocks, salamanders, or human beings—we will often study a sample from that category and then draw conclusions about the category as a whole . . . Human beings are another matter. The human race is incredibly diverse in terms of culture, child-rearing practices, educational opportunities, personality characteristics, and so on. To the extent that we restrict our research to people with a particular set of characteristics, we may not be able to generalize our findings to those with a very different set of characteristics. Ideally, we want the participants in a research study to be a representative sample of the population about which we wish to draw conclusions.³

In addition, to ensure the validity of the research this paper used two other strategies to strengthen the conclusions found from the analysis of the data. First, this author sought feedback from colleagues in the field to determine the validity of conclusions. Second, respondent validation from participants in the study is sought to determine if they agree with the conclusions of the research.⁴ Adherence to these methods and strategies ensures the research is defendable within a community of experts. Chapter 4 includes detailed analysis based on the outlined research design.


²Ibid., 99.

³Ibid., 100.

⁴Ibid.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Historical Interview Participants

The historical interview participants come from a wide array of backgrounds and are relatively young leaders who have spent most of their adulthood in and out of theatres of war. Most of the participants are in their mid-twenties and were teenagers when 11 September 2001 took place. They have dedicated their lives to the service of this country and worked to shape the last 10 years of war. Most notable from all the interviews was their passion for PSYOP and their commitment to adding to the body of knowledge that is the essence of PSYOP. The period of focus for this research was from November 2001 to November 2011. This 10-year period saw both the build of troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the subsequent draw down and redeployment from Iraq. This research included participants based on their service as TPT leaders or their direct involvement with TPTs in either Afghanistan or Iraq during the above stated time period.

Twenty-six interviews are conducted between November and December of 2011. Each interview covered only one deployment, and followed the format outlined by the historical interview questions discussed in detail in chapter 3. Out of the 17 participants, nine served in two different deployments. Twenty-two of the interviews were deployments to Iraq, and the remaining four interviews covered deployments to Afghanistan. The following is a graphic depiction of the Likert style questions and an analysis of all responses.
TPT Employment

Tactical Psychological Operations Teams (TPTs) are used effectively (used in functional area and according to doctrine) in operations? (see tables 2, 3, and 4).

Table 2. Overall Effective Use

Source: Created by author.

Table 3. Effective Use 2001-2006

Source: Created by author.
Forty-two percent of interview participants indicated in historical interview question one that commanders effectively used TPTs “some of the time”. Thirty-eight percent stated commanders “usually” used TPTs effectively. Fifteen percent of the participants claimed to be used in their functional area “all of the time”. The difference between the first five years of operations and the second five years does not demonstrate significant differences in overall trends. Interviewees gave different explanations for how often they were used in their functional area including; types of operations, SOFA, and command relationships.

Interviewees chose “some of the time” more than any other category, and their explanations fall into three main categories: command relationships, confusion between Civil Affairs and PSYOP, and the expectations established by previous TPTs. Command relationships provides an umbrella for the majority of responses. Interviewees captured the impact of command relationships in the following quotes:
“If . . . we had a good working relationship then we were able to get out and do what we were supposed to do.”¹ If the commander understood the role of PSYOP and would allow the PSYOP team the leeway in order to accomplish their mission, then they were much more effective.² The role of command relationships in the effective employment of TPTs demonstrates the challenges associated with employing low-density specialties in operations. Relationships built on a clear understanding of TPT capabilities and limitations led to better employment of TPTs. Two interviewees stated that the supported units combined TPTs with Civil Affairs units. This decreased their ability to conduct PSYOP. The reason for combining the units was a lack of understanding of PSYOP and the fact that TPTs do not have an officer assigned at that level to interact with battalion staff. In both events, it diminished the effectiveness of the TPTs. Expectations established by previous TPTs is the third theme influencing effective employment of TPTs. If the previous TPT was tactically and technically proficient and demonstrated this in operations, than future teams would more likely be employed effectively. If the previous TPT was not tactically and technically proficient, this challenged the credibility of all future TPTs and made it more difficult for them to integrate.

What percentage of your time while deployed did you spend working in your functional area? (see tables 5, 6, and 7).
Table 5. Overall Percentage

Source: Created by author.

Table 6. Percentage 2001-2006

Source: Created by author.
Question two expands on question one and quantifies the amount of time spent in the functional area of PSYOP. According to the data, 31 percent of the participants spent 50 percent or less working in their functional area. Forty-two percent spent 75 percent or more working in their functional area and 27 percent spent 100 percent of the time working in their functional area. Essentially, one-third of the participants worked 50 percent or less of the time in their functional area, and only one-fourth worked in their functional area 100 percent of the time. In addition, the changes between the first five years and the second five years may go against the assumption that improvements continue throughout operations. The first five years’ participants indicated they spent more time in their functional area in comparison to a decline in time spent in their functional area for the second five years. One of the significant changes was in the number of respondents indicating they spent only 25 percent in their functional area. It increased from zero percent in the first five years to 18 percent in the second five years. The other significant change was that the number of respondents who spent 100 percent
of the time in their functional area in the first five years, was half that of those who spent 100 percent of the time in their functional area during the second five years. Explanations vary on the reason for the reduction in time spent in their functional area, but it is concerning to see a diminished use of a low-density functional area through the continuum of operations.

Interviewees provide multiple explanations for the three main groupings. For the teams that spent 100 percent of the time working in PSYOP the explanations vary but one participant gives more insight than others. He stated the following: “We supported them in every way that we could, and all we had to do was just report in to them on what we had done, and any information that we had gained, how they could better accomplish their mission, any information that their soldiers would need, we would provide that to them.”3 The commitment to support and the positive relationship with the supported unit seemed to contribute the amount of time spent in the functional area, and was evident in the explanations for those that selected 100 percent. The next grouping is 75 percent or more, and it is the predominate selection among all participants. Participants identified several detractors including supporting intelligence missions, civil affairs, and drawdown requirements. The interviewees who selected 75 percent or more seemed to feel they were utilized, but not to their full potential. One participant summarized with the following words: “Like I said we were underutilized, but we were never really asked to do things that were typically the responsibility of some type of support troops or the folks that they viewed as just hey you’re just sitting around there, why don’t you go there and do something else.”4 The last group includes those who selected 50 percent or less. The most common explanation for only spending 50 percent or less in their functional area
was that commanders assigned them missions outside of their functional area. The cause is not readily identifiable but one PSYOP specialist stated the following: “These commanders had been with other PSYOP companies and had negative experiences. As soon as they heard PSYOP they’re like I don’t need you, I don’t want you, you don’t do anything for me.” Other participants who selected 50 percent or less attributed it to the operation tempo and the drawdown of US forces. The SOFA limited TPT interaction with the populace, therefore constraining their operational capabilities.

When comparing questions one and two, similar conclusions are drawn. TPTs spend the majority of the time in their functional area, but only a small percentage spend all of their time in their functional area. The concerning trend was that one-third of the participants spent 50 percent or less in their functional area.

**Doctrine**

Doctrine played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs. (see tables 8, 9, and 10).

Table 8. Doctrine 2001-2011

![Table 8. Doctrine 2001-2011](image)

*Source: Created by author.*
Table 9. Doctrine 2001-2006

Source: Created by author.

Table 10. Doctrine 2006-2011

Source: Created by author.

Question three relates to doctrine’s role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Forty-six percent of the participants either disagreed or strongly disagreed that doctrine played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs. Twenty-seven percent neither
agreed nor disagreed and 27 percent either agreed or strongly agreed. It is significant to note that almost half of the participants did not believe doctrine played a direct role in the employment of TPTs. Another one-fourth of the participants were neutral leaving the dominant view from participants that doctrine had little impact on the effective employment of TPTs. The first five years and the second five years did not vary significantly from the overall trends.

Interviewees gave three main explanations when asked why they gave such a strong response when asked if doctrine played a direct role: doctrine is the baseline, commanders do not follow doctrine and supported commanders do not know PSYOP doctrine. One interviewee stated the following: “Doctrine gives us a baseline or foundation to start from but PSYOP is really an attainable skill set learned through experience, ingenuity, and creativity.” Based on the concept that doctrine is the foundation or baseline, one could argue either way; that it should take a direct role in the employment of TPTs or that it does not simply because it is only a guide. However, for participants who interpreted it as only a foundation, doctrine did not play a direct role. For those who stated commanders do not follow doctrine, they expressed it best in the following quote:

It’s like, we want this. We want it tomorrow. There’s no one to pretest it. We don’t have enough people to pretest it anymore. We can’t get any personnel to assist us to go outside the wire to actually pretest. Pretesting is a big part of our utilizing of products, the hand bills the teams hand out and stuff like that and you don’t get the information you need you don’t necessarily get what works.

The challenges identified by interviewees, like the statement above, demonstrate activities that directly oppose PSYOP doctrine. The final explanation from interviewees, “commanders do not know PSYOP doctrine,” highlights the difficulties of integrating
into a supported unit focused on conventional operations. Jill Chalfant captures it best:

“When you’ve got a small battalion in his little AO, he doesn’t understand the strategic responsibility and that I think was the hardest part for our guys, trying to explain how our doctrine is because it’s so new to these commanders.”

Conventional unit commanders have very little exposure to PSYOP and TPTs. For majors in the resident course, CGSC dedicates less than four hours to special operations even a smaller amount dedicated to PSYOP. The lack of familiarity with PSYOP is evident in the challenges faced by TPTs in operations.

Question four continues to explore the impact of doctrine on operations: How did doctrine affect and influence the employment of TPTs during your deployment?

Participants outlined several positive roles that doctrine played in operations. Michael Barnett provided one of the most detailed examples of doctrine’s positive role in the excerpt below:

I guess one example is, we were trying to fight the kidnapping of politicians’ children actually in the operating environment, and so one of the effective ways of actually doing a product is (determining) who’s the target audience. The target audience is basically people that are kidnapping the children and so what are their vulnerabilities? Their vulnerabilities are X, Y, and Z. And we were able to establish products by our doctrine and we were able to reduce the rate from 15 to, can’t quote me here but I believe it was between 5 and 7. We went from 15 a month to 5 to 7 a month, was our impact indicator of its effectiveness. But we had the federal police involved, the Iraqi police involved, that gave us the reports of all the kidnappings and stuff and then we created a tracking matrix to control that.

Barnett applied doctrine to a unique problem and demonstrated that with adherence to the basic concepts outlined in doctrine, one can achieve exceptional results in operations. But the experience of most TPTs found doctrine as a framework as outlined in the following:

“It’s a good framework if you don’t have a lot of time to decide what you’re going to do,
you don’t have time to get creative.” The challenge for doctrine remained; commanders do not know PSYOP doctrine. Four interviewees stated it as one of their challenges. One interviewee stated it in the following way. “The only problem was the level of understanding of those lower levels units, platoons, and companies, and battalion and brigade, all the way up to the brigade.” James Spears provided one of the worst scenarios for the role of doctrine in operations. “The supporting unit, for the most part, doesn’t care about the doctrine. They don’t care what you can do, or what you should do, or how you need to do it. They only care that you do what they want you to do.” Spears paints a dire picture for doctrine’s place in operations, especially if this is coupled with the commanders’ lack of any PSYOP knowledge or experience. Doctrine may have played a different role if commanders had a better understanding of PSYOP. The question’s responses emphasized the point that most commanders experience PSYOP through their TPT, and this experience provides them their primary education about PSYOP doctrine and its role. If this dynamic remains, TPT leaders will continue to bear the burden of educating senior officers. The fact that almost half of the participants believed doctrine did not play a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs may indicate that doctrine contributes to the one-third who spent less than 50 percent of the time working in their functional area. The problem may not lie with how TRADOC has written PSYOP doctrine, but how much reference there is to PSYOP doctrine in the supporting doctrine that is more commonly used by commanders. This could also point to problems in education and training at all levels, which may require additional emphasis on PSYOP doctrine and its role in operations.
Education and Training

Education and/or training played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs. (see tables 11, 12, and 13).

Table 11. Education and Training 2001-2011

![Bar chart for Education & Training 2001-2011]

Source: Created by author.

Table 12. Education and Training 2001-2011

![Bar chart for Education & Training 2001-2011]

Source: Created by author.
Table 13. Education and Training 2006-2011

The responses to question five revealed that the majority of participants held similar views in relation to education and training. When asked to qualify their answers to the following statement: Education and/or training played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs, 69 percent of the participants either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement. The participants who strongly agreed made up close to half of the total participants. Fifteen percent of the participants neither agreed nor disagreed, and 16 percent either disagreed or strongly disagreed. The difference between the first five years of operations and the last five years of operations displayed similar trends and was not broken out separately.

For the majority of participants the emphasis focused on training and its benefits. Participants discussed the importance of education, but there was a clear separation between education and training for many of the participants. The common theme emphasized in regards to training is that it should be specific to an area of operation to
include the culture, current situation, and the supported unit. Participants summed up the emphasis on training in the following quotes: “Having an education, knowing your area of operation is key to the success of the PSYOP team. Knowing your supporting unit, knowing their history, working with them, all factors in the role of working as a cohesive team.”\(^\text{13}\) “For this deployment specifically it would have to be cultural awareness training, language training that I didn’t really get my first tour and it was tailored to the battlespace that I was going to take over so when I hit the ground running I knew I had a lot more cultural awareness and some situational awareness of what was going on.”\(^\text{14}\) Harris provides additional insight into the importance of training in the following quote: “But that training was really good because we were basically training on fresh information from the ground. It was PSYOP relevant, I think was the most important part of that. But if we hadn’t had that training we would have really been going in there blind.”\(^\text{15}\) The participants also emphasized that to maintain its relevancy, trainers must take into consideration the current situation and the unique challenges associated with their specific area of operation. Interviewees also saw training as one of the most effective ways to convey the wealth of experience senior PSYOP specialist had in comparison to inexperienced subordinates.

Question six; How did education/training affect the employment of TPTs?, expands upon question five and provides insight into the identified trends. The most evident impact of education and training was on establishing credibility with the supported unit and the local populace. The better the training and education prepared a TPT for the tactical and cultural environment, the greater affect the team had during operations. No participant noted a problem with too much training or education. The
unique combination of trainers conveying their experiences in addition to the baseline training, appeared to affect the overall training experience in a positive way. Interviewees conveyed the importance of education and training in the following excerpts.

We’re PSYOP. We do everything depending on what the situation calls for. As PSYOPers we have to not just be studying the culture, the people, the religion, the language, everything about it. We have to know everything there is to know about an area where we’re operating because our job is to find those buttons to push in order to change behavior in people. So education is vital ...  

The training focused on face-to-face techniques, it focused on utilizing the tools of the PSYOP soldier, interview techniques, loud speaker operations, gather atmospherics, what to look for so forth. So the three to four months prior to actually hitting theater that training I think was huge and it was very successful. 

The responses that indicated training was not relevant and had little impact on operations, pointed mostly to inadequate training focused on the wrong activities. One participant’s training experience focused almost solely on maneuver tactics with only a fraction of the training spent on PSYOP specific skills. They found that the training did not do enough to prepare them for deployment since it did not train enough on PSYOP.

**Command Relationships**

Command relationships played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs. (see tables 14, 15, and 16).
Table 14. Command Relationships 2001-2011

Source: Created by author.

Table 15. Command Relationships 2001-2006

Source: Created by author.
Command relationships evoked the most consistent responses of all the historical interview questions. Participants for the most part, did not distinguish between OPCON, TACON, etc., but instead focused on the human dynamics of the relationship. The point made was one that argued the type of relationship determined in the operations order was irrelevant if the TPT established a positive personal relationship with the command structure. Eighty-eight percent of the participants either agreed or strongly agreed that command relationships played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs. Twelve percent neither agreed nor disagreed, and none of the participants disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement. The differences in the first five years and the last five years were nominal, with overall results within one percentage point of the individual trends. The only note was a shift in those who strongly agree to agree in the later half of the evaluated period.
TPT leaders emphasized the importance of command relationships in operations and the effectiveness of TPTs throughout the majority of their comments. The following excerpts speak directly to the issue at hand.

Without our team chief’s ability to perform the job effectively, decreases and negatively impacts the ability to be successful. Really, you’re dependent because they own the territory, they own the environment. If you’re not able to basically convince them that they need you in such a way, you really have to become marketable and independent. Without those specific character traits it becomes very hard to get in there. If you have a command that’s more firm, more stern in your interactions with them and you don’t come up to par with them, your command relationships could decrease and your ability to actually perform for them will also decrease. Command relationships play a very direct role in being effective.18

If my company commander doesn’t get along with 2/3’s commander, I’m not going to be used. Not only is the TPT reflecting well or poorly on the commander if the commander isn’t a good commander, that looks poorly on us. They’re going to think we’re the same. If they don’t get along, we’re not going to get along with that unit. We’re not going to get used well at all.19

Speck and Welter give insight into the value of the command relationships in the following excerpts from their interviews:

Your relationship with your supporting unit is like your bread and butter. They have to trust you, you have to trust them. They are your security and it goes vice versa. They’re the ones who let you go out of the gate. They’re the ones who feed you and house you so having a good, strong relationship with them is good.20

That relationship has got to be good, but also more importantly is my relationship with that supported unit. That command relationship has to be flawless really for me to be able to do my job. If we’re not hitting it off well, I’m not working. I’m sitting in a room or in a chow hall or something like that which fortunately never happened. Like I said before sir, I learned from the first deployment how to develop that good working relationship and keep that good working relationship. You know it was hard work. You had to work on it every day, but as long as that relationship was good they were willing to do whatever we needed, provide us with whatever assets they could to get us outside the wire.21

The above comments solidify the importance of the command relationship on effectiveness. Essentially, negative command relationships result in degraded TPT
effectiveness. Instead of conducting PSYOP missions, a maneuver commander assigned one team the mission of playing reveille in the morning and retreat in the evening on their loudspeakers. This is a prime example of a team that was unable to establish a positive command relationship.

Question eight attempts to shed more light on the role of command relationships in the effectiveness of TPTs. The participants’ emphasis on the type of command relationship was more evident in the responses for question eight. Participants identified OPCON as the least desired command relationship and general support as the ideal command relationship with TACON rated closely to general support. The main reason for OPCON’s negative perception was the lack of flexibility inherent with the relationship. The authoritative nature of OPCON relationships challenges the dual reporting requirements of TPTs, and creates conflict when each command has competing goals or demands on the TPT. TACON reduces the conflict and allows more flexibility for TPT leaders. TACON also allows efficient realignment of units as appropriate to support differing units depending upon the mission and higher headquarters’ priorities. General support stood out to participants because of the flexibility it gave TPTs to support both the PSYOP chain of command and the supported unit. Though interviewees discussed the doctrinal types of command relationships in more detail in question eight, examples of less desired types being overcome by the establishment of personal relationships with the command were common. The following statements highlight some of the participant’s views.

That has to be built and merged and that’s why I think the previous questions are good to ask as well because they all fall in line with this of how you are effective in your relationship with your supporting battalion because they have to see you
in such a light that you can be effective if that makes sense. So again, it’s very important that you have a good command relationship. In fact, I would say that in many aspects, it is the most important thing you have to be attentive to. 22

The S-3 told him I’m not 100% sure what they do, but I do know they’re effective at whatever they do because the word on the street, everybody that we talk to is, don’t shoot the guys with the speakers on the truck because they’re good people. So that made me feel really good to know that the battalion commander that we were supporting had given us enough leeway that whenever we would go on a raid, we went on a lot of raids with the supported unit, that we weren’t the ones kicking in the door, we weren’t the ones going in and frisking people. We were the ones outside giving water and food to the women and children and trying to help relieve some of the stress, playing with the kids. And that seems totally out of place for a military operation, but that was one of the things that made us effective, and when people began to see that, they began to come to us and point out where the weapons caches were, they pointed out where bad guys were hiding or where they were staying, and it made us much more effective because it put a human face on the military. 23

Welter and Williams discuss actual operational command relationships of OPCON and TACON in the following:

During this deployment it was a lot better than my first deployment even though we were OPCON’d and even TACON’d to some of these units as opposed to being general support to these units. Ultimately they would tell us what to do, how to do it, where to do it, but for the most part we were involved in the training process from the beginning. We would advise them. Never told the commander his decision was a bad decision or a stupid decision. I would give him, based on my assumptions or what I knew about a certain area, I would give him my recommendations on how to conduct something or different courses of action. Either course of action he went with, I would make sure I was advising him of what to do, what we could do to help that course of action go more smoothly with the local populace. I’m a strong believer that we shouldn’t be any more than OPCON’d to these units. General support would be ideal in my opinion. 24

The OPCON situation forced us to do a lot of things that we didn’t need to be doing, especially with us being a company minus we didn’t have the manpower to do. 25

Ultimately, participants identified the personal relationship established with the supported commander as the most important aspect affecting the effectiveness of their team. The quality of the relationship influenced all aspects of operational effectiveness
and team leaders recognized the impact in almost every deployment. Leaders cannot
discount the role of command relationships when evaluating the effectiveness of TPTs in
light of the comments provided by PSYOP specialists.

**Contributors to Success and Failure**

When discussing success, the focus of question nine, participants’ answers varied
but three core themes surfaced: training, flexibility, planning integration, and command
relationships. Several participants pointed to pre-deployment training as the biggest
contributor to their success. The training was found to be most valuable when it was
focused on the theater of deployment and taught by soldiers who had recent and relevant
experience in the region. Interviewees emphasized both soldier flexibility and command
flexibility to accomplish the mission. Many argued that the flexibility, creativity, and
quality of the soldier combined, were key to the success of the TPT. TPTs noted planning
integration as the next area that is a critical aspect to the success of the team. Early
integration into the S-3 and the planning cycle set the conditions for TPTs to deliver
effective themes and messages that impacted operations in a manner that was evident to
the supported commander. This integration allowed the supported unit to take note of the
TPT contribution earlier in the operational cycle adding to the amount of TPT
involvement in future operations. Interviewees emphasized that command relationships
were key to the success of TPTs. Participants highlighted the importance of command
relationships, training, flexibility, and integration in the following quotes:

I would say the easiest way to say that is the ability to be creative and flexible on
the battle front because things change, optempo changes, operations change in a
heartbeat. You have to be very quick to react to things and I would say that the
biggest contributor to the success of that is really all the previous things, being on
guard all the time always trying to take advantage of extra training, military or
civilian, anything you can get. Then practice applying those and implementing those in different training environments to become prepared. But for us the basic contributor was the experience that we were getting before that either doing training at the unit or going to places, going to Jordan, going to all different kinds of places, those training environments were the biggest contributors to our success downrange.26

It’s just a matter of being creative and finding the most influential and impactful way to change a target audience and I think between face to face communications and so forth, especially in the Iraqi theater it really is about minds and about people and less about combat in a lot of sense and the more recent part of warfare.27

It would have to be command relationship and the effective use of psyop elements. By the second one, I mean did the supporting unit understand what we could do for them and did they let us do that job within the planning cycle. Did they let us get inside the planning cycle so that we were part of the considerations as they moved through all the things they wanted to do, move someone, kill someone, capture someone, or whatever else, so those are the two essential things for me.28

The biggest contributor to success according to Ellison is the establishment of trust and integrity between the commander and the TPT. Harris emphasizes training from experienced soldiers as the biggest contributor. Both soldiers outline their views in the following.

Biggest contributor to success. Along with that is the command relationship. The commander has to trust you. He has to know that if he gives you a little bit of leeway, you’re not going to come back and do something to cause him problems. So you have to be a person of integrity. You have to be a person with his best interests in mind and want to see him succeed in his mission while accomplishing yours. If you have that trust of the commander, you’ll succeed.29

By far I would say the fact that we did our pre-mobilization training with PSYOP soldiers who had just gotten back from the theater of operations we were going into was the biggest contributor to our success.30

Lawson and Todd emphasize initiative and adaptability as the key contributors to success in operations. “The ability to have either your direct superiors or whoever you’re supporting to say, hey this is our main goal. The mission and how you accomplish it is up
to you. That is by far the largest contributor to any PSYOP team success, is having the ability to have the free reign to take the initiative to think outside the box and accomplish the mission.”31 Smart young soldiers that are able to adapt to the mission, and that’s probably the biggest contributor to this mission.32

Failure for TPTs often represented the opposite of what contributed to success. The last question on the historical interview questionnaire addresses what contributed the most to TPTs failure. TPT leadership identified a great variety of factors that contributed to the failure of TPTs. They noted leadership, inexperienced team chiefs, the relationship with IO, command relationships, SOFA, lack of the ability to interact with TA, and measures of effectiveness applied beyond one rotation of troops, among the major contributors to TPT failure. Leadership and inexperienced team chiefs went hand in hand for many of the participants. With the demand so high on PSYOP, many units recruited staff sergeants from other military specialties and reclassified them as PSYOP. The lack of experience and prior deployments in PSYOP left these TPT leaders at a disadvantage. This was due to the fact that so much of the tactical PSYOP education took place during deployments in entry level positions. Supported units often organize TPTs under IO, which often creates barriers between the TPT leader and the supported unit operations officer and commander. IO officers are not subject matter experts in PSYOP, and their lack of knowledge can contribute to IO fratricide. TPTs define IO fratricide as when so many competing ideas flood the TA that none of the themes and messages is effective. Several TPT leaders stated that this was the biggest contributor to TPT failure. Participants continued to emphasize the contribution that command relationships have on the success and failure of TPTs.
The SOFA and the inability to interact with the TA go hand in hand. Toward the end of the conflict in Iraq, a more restrictive SOFA limited the ability of TPTs to interact with the TA. In Afghanistan, the terrain and the lack of TPTs had the same limiting effect on interaction with the TA. Either way the impact was the same, TPTs must interact with the TA to carry out their basic tasks. Without this interaction, TPTs argued that failure is the most likely outcome. Limiting TPT interaction with the TA compounds the challenges they have in effectively influencing the population. In order to influence the population, they must understand the population and get feedback from the TA to create effective messaging. The final contributing factor to the failure of TPTs is the lack of measures of effectiveness covering the campaign instead of just on deployment. PSYOP themes and messages influence audiences over a period of time that can extend well beyond a one-year rotation. However, when a unit rotates, the next unit essentially starts with a new baseline and the historical trends from a TA are essentially lost, making it much more difficult to determine if influence operations are moving in the right direction.

Below are quotes from participants that outline the premise for each argument.

The only thing I would say there is maybe too many ideas. Like the good idea fairy kind of got control on some of the stuff towards the end of the deployment where there was a lot of different input on one thing so it didn’t get much focus. It never got refined. It was just like a big cluster of ideas that didn’t get refined as good as it could have been.\textsuperscript{33}

But as far as your long-term campaigns, you’re not going to be able to measure that in one company’s tour so the measures of effectiveness for that were pretty much nonexistent. So from the beginning of the war to the end of the war there’s no way we can put on paper, this village, over time we can mark one particular thing. So the biggest failure was we didn’t stick to doctrine like we should have and at every point at every tour you could have started, but you would show up and it’s just a lot of extra work to go ahead and do that kind of stuff because you can go get a lot of stuff done. The problem is you can put it in your reports, but if the guys that replace you don’t see exactly what you were doing and can measure themselves against what you were doing the rotation before, then you can find
yourselves going a lot of different directions and you fall back and lose a lot of success. I think that is a problem PSYOP wide.\(^3\)

For this deployment at this time, the Status of Forces Agreement. That really limited our ability to go out and accomplish certain things, certain missions and it really cut down our area of operations and the ability to go the majority of the places geographically.\(^5\)

In summary, the historical interview questionnaire filled many of the gaps in defining what contributes to the effectiveness of TPTs, but it also leaves more questions. Command relationships surfaced as the most critical component of TPT effectiveness in operations. Training and education placed close behind command relationships in order of importance. The role of doctrine in the effectiveness of TPT was questionable. An argument may be made that it is appropriate for doctrine to be more of a foundation than anything else. In chapter five the analysis and conclusions are further explored.

\(^1\)Steven Welter, interview 1 by author, Bentonville, AR, 5 November 2011.
\(^2\)James Ellison, interview by author, Bentonville, AR, 5 November 2011.
\(^3\)Ibid.
\(^4\)Collins Cockrell, interview by author, Bentonville, AR, 6 November 2011.
\(^5\)Jill Chalfant, interview 2 by author, Bentonville, AR, 6 November 2011.
\(^6\)David Serpa, interview 1 by author, Bentonville, AR, 2 December 2011.
\(^7\)Matthew Todd, interview 2 by author, Bentonville, AR, 5 November 2011.
\(^8\)Chalfant, interview 1.
\(^9\)Michael Barnett, interview 2 by author, Bentonville, AR, 6 November 2011.
\(^10\)Darren Lee, interview by author, Bentonville, AR, 6 November 2011.
\(^11\)Cockrell, interview.
\(^12\)James Spears, interview by author, Bentonville, AR, 5 November 2011.
13 Alex Speck, interview by author, Bentonville, AR, 3 December 2011.

14 Serpa, interview 2.

15 John Harris, interview 1 by author, Bentonville, AR, 5 November 2011.

16 Ellison, interview.

17 William Huber, interview by author, Bentonville, AR, 5 November 2011.

18 Barnett, interview 1.

19 Spears, interview.

20 Speck, interview.

21 Welter, interview 2.

22 Barnett, interview 1.

23 Ellison, interview.

24 Welter, interview 2.

25 Jacob Williams, interview 2 by author, Bentonville, AR, 5 November 2011.

26 Barnett, interview 1.

27 Ibid.

28 Cockrell, interview.

29 Ellison, interview.

30 Harris, interview 1.

31 Lawson, interview 1.

32 Todd, interview 2.

33 John Anthony, interview by author, Bentonville, AR, 5 November 2011.

34 Harris, interview 2.

35 Lawson, interview 2.
Army leadership should note the fact that almost half of the participants believe doctrine did not play a role in the effective employment of TPTs. This may not be a unique challenge for most low-density specialties, but the participants clearly note it as an issue for TPT leadership. As discussed in chapter 4, the three main reasons doctrine had little impact are: doctrine is the baseline, commanders do not follow doctrine, and supported commanders do not know PSYOP doctrine. The first reason, doctrine is a baseline, is not necessarily a negative issue for PSYOP doctrine since all doctrine provides the baseline for Army operations. The issue of real concern is when supported commanders ignore doctrine or when commanders operate outside the guidelines established within doctrine. When supported units do not follow doctrine, the cause may be the last reason provided, commanders do not know PSYOP doctrine. Supported commanders are not required to know PSYOP doctrine, but the argument stands that they must know enough to stay within the guidelines established in doctrine. Under the current model for officer education, the only opportunity that maneuver commanders have to learn PSYOP doctrine is to use their own initiative.

Training and Education

The role of training and education in the effective employment of TPTs was found to have more of an impact than the role of doctrine. Sixty-nine percent either agreed or strongly agreed that training and education played a direct role in TPT
effectiveness. Participants shared that when training was current, directly related to the theater of deployment, and taught by experienced PSYOP professionals who recently deployed to the same theater of operations, it made the TPTs all the more effective during their rotation through the theater. Not only did it make them more effective, but it allowed them to quickly establish credibility with the supported unit and the local populace. The participants revealed negative perceptions of training and education, and relayed that when it is not current or relevant it provides little support to employing TPTs effectively.

Command Relationships

Command relationships showed the clearest and most consistent response from interviewees. The comparison between the secondary questions demonstrated that command relationships were one of the critical components of effective employment of TPTs. The research emphasized command relationships (i.e. OPCON, TACON, etc.), as possible components of the effective employment of TPTs. However, participants emphasized personal relationships developed with the supported unit as the deciding component of effective employment. None of the participants disagreed with the idea that command relationships played a direct role in TPT’s effectiveness. No other question using the same Likert scale had the same level of response. Participants understood the importance of command relationships, and discussed their dedication to properly developing these relationships with supported units. Several of the participants felt so strongly about command relationships that they felt that without a strong relationship TPTs could accomplish nothing.
Command relationships did not end with just one note. They were critical to overall integration into the supported unit, and more importantly, integration into the planning cycle. More than one interviewee pointed out the importance of integration of the TPT into the supported unit’s planning cycle. The integration began with a solid relationship built on trust and the TPTs ability to demonstrate its value in operations according to participants. The value of integrating into the planning cycle better positioned TPTs to shape the area of operations and have the support required to conduct face-to-face operations with the TA. Once the TPT has integrated into the planning cycle and proven themselves in operations they become integral to all operations.

**Effective Employment**

The real concern revealed as a result of the research is the fact that one-third of the interviewees spent 50 percent or less of their time working in their functional area while deployed. This number may not seem alarming for conventional units, but as discussed in chapter 1, PSYOP is a low-density specialty. Not only is PSYOP a low-density specialty, but the Army invests up to three times the money and time training PSYOP specialists than they invest in training infantry soldiers. The comparison makes a compelling argument that the Army should be concerned when such a large investment in troops is under-utilized in operations. The research revealed that command relationships had the biggest role on the amount of time TPTs spent in their functional area. The research also revealed that the SOFA had a negative impact on TPT operations in the last five years of the reviewed period. The SOFA restricted TPT activities and limited their interaction with the TA. Without access to the local populace, or with even limited access, TPT operations often ceased altogether. Also, teams found themselves in a train
and assist mode that was not complementary of their specialized skills. Under the train and assist mission, the guidelines only allow them to pass on non-sensitive areas of the PSYOP specialty, mainly those tasks that were aligned with public affairs. The SOFA and the transition of operations from US to host nation is a natural progression of operations, but the Army must scrutinize the need for specialized units that are severely restricted by those very transitions more carefully.

**Recommended Future Research**

The research revealed four areas that deserve further research: officer education, measures of effectiveness, employment of low-density military occupational specialties, and training for ongoing operations. Research into officer education should focus on the appropriate levels of exposure to PSYOP doctrine and proper employment of TPTs. The research identified Intermediate Level Education/Advanced Operations Course as the last required military education for battalion command, and noted the limited coverage of PSYOP in the core program. Future research should explore additional opportunities to educate future commanders at the battalion and higher levels, and determine the baseline of knowledge required to successfully employ PSYOP in operations.

Measures of effectiveness is the next area not covered by this research. PSYOP doctrine employs several methods to gauge the effectiveness of PSYOP campaigns. Surveys, interviews, and post testing are among some of the methods PSYOP used to measure the effectiveness of PSYOP. The challenges with PSYOP and measures of effectiveness are that commanders cannot always directly tie themes and messages to the TAs’ actions. Complicating the matter further is the fact that PSYOP campaigns may play out over months, and sometimes years. Research in this area must focus on
designing better methods to measure the effectiveness of PSYOP in a shorter more efficient manner.

The research identified that employment of low-density military occupational specialties is an area that may have a similar set of challenges compared to PSYOP specialists. Research should focus on similar low-density specialties to determine if the challenges are common to all low-density specialties. Types of training are the final area that requires further research. Participants voiced strong opinions about what type of pre-deployment training benefited them in operations and what type did not. The comments from the interviews argue for training that directly relates to the theater of operation taught by soldiers who have recent experience in that theater. The direction of this research should identify the appropriate dynamics of pre-deployment training for PSYOP units. Benefits from this research will enable the Army to better prepare troops for future operations and increase their effectiveness in operations.

Conclusions

The research revealed that command relationships play a significant role in the effective employment of TPTs, and that training and education enables TPTs to establish positive relationships with supporting units by making their contribution on the battlefield more evident. The disturbing issue revealed by the historical interviews was that one third of the participants were used 50 percent or less of the time in their functional area. The failure to utilize the TPTs in their functional area pointed back to command relationships and the reliance on the supported unit to conduct operations which is driven by that very relationship.
PSYOP commanders can employ TPTs more effectively and a higher percentage of the time by noting three basic components revealed by this research. The three components are: conduct relevant training and education that is theater specific and taught by PSYOP specialists with recent deployments to the same theater; ensure TPTs understand the importance of establishing a positive command relationship and that establishing this relationship is a priority for TPTS; and finally integrating the TPT into the planning cycle to ensure that all operations have a PSYOP component. These three components enable PSYOP leadership to overcome some of the obstacles of effective employment. More importantly, they identified that in the past there has been very little research or writing about the challenges faced by TPTs. There is an abundance of material on strategic PSYOP, but the purpose of this research was to determine if supported units effectively employed TPTs in operations. The answer to that question revealed that the majority of TPTs felt they were effectively employed, but it also revealed that one third were not, as discussed in previous sections. Any number below 75 percent in relation to time spent in functional area is of concern, and the effort of this research is to aid in improving the usage of TPTs in all future operations.
Tactical Psychological Operations Company (TPC). The Tactical Psychological Operations company is the centerpiece of PSYOP support to ground commanders (Figure 3-6, page 3-8). The level of PSYOP support required ranges from one TPC per division/SF group in high-intensity conflict to as much as one TPC per brigade/regiment/Special Forces (SF) battalion in SOSO. The higher level of support in SOSO is determined by the need to influence the larger urban population generally found within a static brigade/regiment/SF battalion sector. In recent operations population densities in brigade-equivalent sectors ranged from 500,000 (Kosovo Peacekeeping Force [KFOR]) to 2+ million (Operation IRAQI FREEDOM [OIF]). Supported units include Active Army and RC divisions/brigades, Marine expeditionary force (MEF)/divisions/ Marine expeditionary battalion (MEB)/Marine expeditionary unit (MEU), battalions/companies, military police brigades/battalions conducting I/R operations, and air security squadrons. Support elements are tailored to provide PSYOP staff planning and to conduct tactical PSYOP support. The TPC has limited product development and production capability. For PSYOP support beyond the TPC’s capabilities, coordination is made through the higher-echelon PSE to the POTF, or directly to the POTF if a higher-echelon PSE is not deployed. The TPC is normally task-organized with assets from the broadcast and print companies of the dissemination battalion. This support may include a flyaway broadcast system (FABS) or a Special Operations Media System-Broadcast (SOMS-B) to provide the TPC a direct support (DS) broadcast asset. In addition, each TPC may be task-organized with a Deployable Print Production Center (DPPC) from the print company of the dissemination battalion. This tactical vehicle-mounted, light print asset provides the TPC with a responsive and mobile digital print capability. The TPC is then able to produce limited PSYOP products, such as leaflets, handbills, posters, and other printed material (within the guidance assigned by the POTF and authorized by the approval authority).
Tactical Psychological Operations Detachment (TPD). In high-intensity conflict the TPD normally provides PSYOP support to a brigade-size element or equivalent, such as a MEU, an SF battalion, a Ranger regiment, a special mission unit, an armored cavalry regiment, a Stryker Brigade, an MP battalion responsible for an I/R facility, or a separate infantry regiment or brigade (Figure 3-8, page 3-10). Due to the need to influence the larger urban population densities sometimes present in static unit sectors in SOSO, the TPD can support a battalion or equivalent-sized unit. The TPD analyzes the higher-HQ operation order (OPORD) and the associated PSYOP tab or appendix (Appendix 2 [PSYOP] for Army OPORDs/ooperation plans (OPLANs) and Tab D [PSYOP] to Annex P [IO] to Annex C [Operations] for Joint OPORDs/OPLANs) to determine specified and implied PSYOP tasks. These tasks are subsequently incorporated into the supported unit PSYOP annex. These PSYOP tasks also are focused specifically on how they will support the scheme of maneuver. Therefore, the TPD commander normally recommends to the operations officer that he either retain his organic TPTs under TPD control or allocate them to subordinate units. The TPD exercises staff supervision over TPTs allocated to subordinate units, monitoring their status and providing assistance in PSYOP planning as needed. Unlike the TPC, however, the TPD does not have any organic PSYOP product development capability. The TPD coordinates with the TPDD for the PSYOP capability required to accomplish the supported unit’s mission. The focus of TPD planning is on integrating series dissemination to support the maneuver commander.2
Psychological Operations Action (PSYACT). An action conducted by non-PSYOP personnel, that is planned primarily to affect the behavior of a TA.3

Combatant Command (Command Authority) COCOM. The command authority over assigned forces vested only in commanders of combatant commands or as directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense in the Unified Command Plan and cannot be delegated or transferred. Title 10, U.S. Code, section 164 specifies it in law. Normally, the combatant commander exercises this authority through subordinate joint force commanders, Service component, and functional component commanders. COCOM includes the directive authority for logistic matters (or the authority to delegate it to a subordinate joint force commander for common support capabilities required to accomplish the subordinate’s mission).4

Operational Control (OPCON). The authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving:

- Organizing and employing commands and forces.
- Assigning tasks.
- Designating objectives.
- Giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish missions.

OPCON normally includes authority over all aspects of operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions. It does not include directive authority for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. The combatant commander must specifically delegate these elements of COCOM. OPCON does include the authority to delineate functional responsibilities and operational areas of subordinate joint force commanders. In two instances, the Secretary of Defense may specify adjustments to accommodate authorities beyond OPCON in an establishing directive: when transferring forces between combatant commanders or when transferring
members and/or organizations from the military departments to a combatant command. Adjustments will be coordinated with the participating combatant commanders. JP 1 discusses operational control in detail.

Operational Control (OPCON). (Further defined) Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commands. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training.

Tactical Control (TACON). Inherent in OPCON. It may be delegated to and exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. TACON provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. TACON does not provide organizational authority or authoritative direction for administrative and logistic support; the commander of the parent unit continues to exercise these authorities unless otherwise specified in the establishing directive. (JP 1 discusses tactical control in detail.)

Tactical Control (TACON). (Further defined) Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed, and usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command.

Support. Support is a command authority in joint doctrine. A supported and supporting relationship is established by a superior commander between subordinate commanders when one organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force. Designating supporting relationships is important. It conveys priorities to commanders and staffs planning or executing joint operations. Designating a support relationship does not provide authority to organize and
employ commands and forces, nor does it include authoritative direction for administrative and logistic support. Joint doctrine divides support into the categories listed.

**General support**—That support which is given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof.⁹

**Mutual support**—That support which units render each other against an enemy, because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities.¹⁰

**Direct support**—A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force’s request for assistance.¹¹

**Close support**—That action of the supporting force against targets or objectives which are sufficiently near the supported force as to require detailed integration or coordination of the supporting action with the fire, movement, or other actions of the supported force.¹²
Table 17. Command Relationships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>If relationship is:</th>
<th>Have command relationship with:</th>
<th>May be task-organized by:</th>
<th>Unless modified, ADCON responsibility goes through:</th>
<th>Are assigned position or AO by:</th>
<th>Provide liaison to:</th>
<th>Establish/maintain communications with:</th>
<th>Have priorities established by:</th>
<th>Can impose on gaining unit further command or support relationship of:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organic</td>
<td>All organic forces organized with the HQ</td>
<td>Organic HQ</td>
<td>Army HQ specified in organizing document</td>
<td>Organic HQ</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Organic HQ</td>
<td>Attached; OPCON; TACON; GS; GSR; R; DS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>Combattant command</td>
<td>Gaining HQ</td>
<td>Gaining Army HQ</td>
<td>OPCON chain of command</td>
<td>As required by OPCON</td>
<td>As required by OPCON</td>
<td>ASCC or Service-assigned HQ</td>
<td>As required by OPCON HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attached</td>
<td>Gaining unit</td>
<td>Gaining unit</td>
<td>Gaining Army HQ</td>
<td>Gaining unit</td>
<td>As required by gaining unit</td>
<td>Unit to which attached</td>
<td>Gaining unit</td>
<td>Attached; OPCON; TACON; GS; GSR; R; DS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>Gaining unit</td>
<td>Parent unit and gaining unit; gaining unit may pass OPCON to lower HQ</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
<td>As required by gaining unit</td>
<td>As required by gaining unit and parent unit</td>
<td>Gaining unit</td>
<td>OPCON; TACON; GS; GSR; R; DS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACON</td>
<td>Gaining unit</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
<td>As required by gaining unit</td>
<td>As required by gaining unit and parent unit</td>
<td>Gaining unit</td>
<td>TACON/GS GSR R DS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 1 In NATO, the gaining unit may not task-organize a multinational force. (See TACON.)
ADCON = administrative control
AO = area of operations
ASCC = Army Service component command
DC = direct support
G = general support
GS = general support–reinforcing
H = headquarters
NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OPCON = operational control
R = reinforcing
TACON = tactical control

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, February 2008), B-10, Table B-2, Command Relationships.

1Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-05.30, Psychological Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2005), 3-7 to 3-8.

2Ibid., 3-9.

3Ibid., Glossary-16.
4 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008), B-5.

5 Ibid., B-6.

6 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-05.30, Glossary-13.

7 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-0, B-6.

8 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-05.30, Glossary-20.

9 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-0, B-6.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.
Each interview was executed as an oral history interview and adhered to Army policies of informed consent in compliance with federal law.

1. John Anthony

Segerstrom: This is Lorne Segerstrom. It is November 5, 2011 and I am conducting a historical interview on tactical psyop with – please state your name.

Anthony: John Anthony.

Segerstrom: What was your assigned unit during the deployment?

Anthony: 362.

Segerstrom: What was your rank and position during this deployment?

Anthony: E-5.

Segerstrom: What were the dates of this deployment?

Anthony: April ’09 to June ’10.

Segerstrom: What was the region of deployment?

Anthony: Sadr City, Iraq.

Segerstrom: What was your supported unit?

Anthony: 2-5 CAV.

Segerstrom: I am going to ask you several questions. Some of these I will qualify or quantify before I ask them. For the first question qualify with never, seldom, some of the time, usually or all of the time and please explain. Tactical Psychological Operations Teams (TPT) are used effectively (used in functional area and according to doctrine) in operations.

Anthony: I would say some of the time. The reason I would say that is because a lot of what we did was our own in a way to where we had to kind of adapt to our situation area, so effectively, some of the time. Some of the stuff that was getting kicked down to us didn’t work in our AO so we just kind of had to adapt and do what did work for us and
then we built off of that and actually ended up pushing that on up through higher and by the time we ended our deployment we were doing stuff at a higher level before we really didn’t.

Segerstrom: What percentage of your time while deployed did you spend working in your functional area?

Anthony: 100% of the time. We only bounced out to get resupply and stuff. The rest of the time we just spent on the JSS and working with the guys that we were attached with, working with the Iraqi army we were attached with also.

Segerstrom: So you didn’t spend any of your deployment doing guard duty or security, or any other functions outside your area?

Anthony: No, it was pretty great. 2-5 covered all the guard duties and securities. They just did all of that and they understood what we were there for and so we just got to do our job which was great.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree or disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Doctrine played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Anthony: I’m going to say here neither agree nor disagree. The reason I say that is it’s just going back to one, where you use doctrine to an extent but it’s not the full basis of what you’re doing so you’re just using it as kind of like a building block but you’re going to have to modify that to in order to work with where you’re at, the people where you’re at or how you can make that function. So doctrine plays a role but it’s not the end all be all I don’t think.

Segerstrom: Do you have any examples of how sometimes you modified it?

Anthony: Sure, as a psyop NCO we’re not really supposed to be training up guys. That’s not really what we’re supposed to do and that’s kind of what we ended up doing, was doing a lot of training with the Iraqi army which was kind of new to everybody because COIN ops ? So trainup is something we probably shouldn’t have been doing, but we were doing, and we kind of were new to it so we were making our own thing out of it. We had slides for stuff that had been released that we could use that was psyop related and we were just adapting it to fit with what we could tell these guys and what would work in the AO and that’s a great example.

Segerstrom: How did doctrine affect and influence the employment of TPTs during your deployment?

Anthony: It basically helped us whittle down what the overall psyop objective was, what we needed to do to get the job done or what the task was for the company at the battalion
level and we just took that and what worked the best was just kind of adapting ourselves to our environment rather than going, well this is what we have to do and we have to get out there this way, and this is what we’re being told, and this is what we have to get out, but is there a way that we can do that to make it more effective.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Education and/or training played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Anthony: I agree with that. The more training you can do the better. You take the time to learn your AO prior to going rather than while you’re there, or when you’re in your MOB when you know what you’re going to be working with, when you know who you’re going to be working with and you take the time to train on how to do that, it’s definitely beneficial. A lot of stuff with psyop, especially talking face to face, is going to be on the fly. You kind of just pick that up as you go. Some guys are good at it, some guys aren’t good at it. But if you have some kind of background on it, it makes the transition a lot of easier I think, less stressful.

Segerstrom: How did education and training affect the employment or influence the employment of tactical psyop teams during your deployment?

Anthony: I think that one was based on where guys got assigned and what those guys did with their AOs was based off of what they could do. There were some guys with ? and they were really good at product development and that’s what they were working on, changing billboards and stuff like that and having a really good media presence. We didn’t do as much of that. We just kind of passed out what was handed down to us that would work. You know you can’t just hand out everything and just played more of a role on face to face. In our AO, the education level of the people was very low, so with us talking was the best way to get info out. You couldn’t really do billboards or handouts without having a face and some talking points behind it. So I think it just depends, but it definitely played a role.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement would you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree, and explain? Command relationships played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Anthony: I agree with that for sure. Our command specifically saw what we were doing and decided to try to take that and run with it on a higher level with the ?, the ?, and the ? and got to the point where myself and Sgt Lawson were working with those areas to try to train their officer types and the people that make the decisions so that they could have a better web of information media than they have right now. They have no infrastructure so that’s what we were trying to work with. That played great. I think 2-5 CAV’s command did really good for us as far as helping us out, helping us do our job. The S-2 there at the 2-5 CAV, I got to work with him directly, working with key leaders in Sadr, so that was beneficial to us to get that kind of information for us, as well as giving it to him. It just built our relationship with 2-5.
Segerstrom: Based on your experience, how did command relationships (supporting unit vs. supported unit, OPCON, TACON, ADCON, etc.) affect or influence the employment of TPTs?

Anthony: I think if you had prior experience in your AO, that was their AO choice as far as our command goes. You know these guys have prior experience with Iraq, even some guys had prior experience with Afghanistan, so if they had prior experience in Iraq, like Sgt Harris did, that was probably a big push on where they put him and what they put him in charge of. We kind of got the crap hole in Sadr, but I actually ended up really enjoying it. Because to me, that’s where I work the best, is talking. So working face to face with people and gathering information that way is where I like to be.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the success of TPTs?

Anthony: I just think communication is a big deal. Our Det NCO was great and we had a constant line with him and when we didn’t have, it would go down every couple days, touch base with him and catch up and then he would kick that up too. So there was a really good communication line between the top and us to know what was going on at our level and what needed to be going on at their level to help us out. So I think that was the best contributor to our success was just being able to communicate and have fulfilled by our chain of command.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the failure of TPTs?

Anthony: The only thing I would say there is maybe too many ideas. Like the good idea fairy kind of got control on some of the stuff towards the end of the deployment where there was a lot of different input on one thing so it didn’t get much focus. It never got refined. It was just like a big cluster of ideas that didn’t get refined as good as it could have been. That would be my only negative.

Segerstrom: Do you have any other thoughts or conclusions?

Anthony: No sir, that’s good.

Segerstrom: Okay, thank you.

2. Michael Barnett 1

Segerstrom: This is Lorne Segerstrom. It is November 6, 2011 and I am conducting a historical interview on tactical psyop with – please state your name.

Barnett: Michael Barnett.

Segerstrom: What was your assigned unit during the deployment?

Segerstrom: What was your rank and position during this deployment?
Barnett: Corporal. I was an ATL and then later on became a ? Team Chief.

Segerstrom: What were the dates of this deployment?

Segerstrom: What was the region of deployment?
Barnett: Afghanistan.

Segerstrom: What area specifically in Afghanistan?
Barnett: A lot of areas actually. Salerno, ? ? ? and then the regions up and down the Pakistani border off and on.

Segerstrom: What was your supported unit?
Barnett: First half of the deployment would be 3rd Special Forces Group, the second half would be 2nd of the 75th Ranger Battalion.

Segerstrom: I am going to ask you several questions. Some of these I will qualify or quantify before I ask them. For the first question qualify with never, seldom, some of the time, usually or all of the time and please explain. Tactical Psychological Operations Teams (TPT) are used effectively (used in functional area and according to doctrine) in operations.

Barnett: Usually.

Segerstrom: Can you please expand upon that?
Barnett: Command relationships tend to negatively affect TPTs.

Segerstrom: What percentage of your time while deployed did you spend working in your functional area?
Barnett: Actually, for myself and my teams, we always hit 100% of the time in our functional area. We never really had a problem with that.

Segerstrom: So no time was spent doing guard duty or anything outside your functional area?
Barnett: No.
Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree or disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Doctrine played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Barnett: I would definitely agree. I would explain that by saying yes I agree doctrine plays a role, but because of dynamic operations, a lot of the doctrine primarily provided a foundation for creative developments of our doctrine.

Segerstrom: How did doctrine affect or influence the employment of TPTs during your deployment?

Barnett: By using doctrine, the creativity of the job was easier to implement and be effective even though it has its limitations, the team chief is able to augment by using doctrine as a foundation, meaning me as a team chief, and doctrine helps you kind of expand laterally. Think of all the different ways you can affect a target audience out in the field. And then you use all of those foundations to kind of be creative with it, for example target audience analysis and how you’re going to analyze the target audience and then you use all the creative aspects that are involved with that process to actually go out there and deal with your specific operation that you’re trying to achieve. So that’s how doctrine was very effective in employment.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Education and/or training played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Barnett: Strongly agree and the interesting about being a Reserve versus Active Duty in other things is there’s a major emphasis on education and also trying to get military schools and stuff accomplished. You’re getting such a dynamic range of both professionalism and skills that pertain to, for example, myself and what I want to do in life, which means that I’m very passionate about it, and I can take these skill sets and take them out into the field. As far as my civilian education, it greatly impacted the success of the operation. And for training, greatly impacts it as well because I’m able to take and merge both my civilian professional skills and also the training the military provides in my specialty and apply that during operations. Including badge schools too, the military is very oriented around badge schools which give you credibility in talking to supporting commands. So even though we view them in the military as “hoobie scoobie” schools, there’s things that you should get from your peers, it actually affects as in 37F in more impactful ways. It’s very important that in order to have those that you’re able to gain an impactful conversation and be listened to and talk, especially in a world where they teach you as an NCO trying to convince a lieutenant colonel or so forth on decisions that are being made in the field.
Segerstrom: How did education and training affect the employment or influence the employment of tactical psyop teams during your deployment?

Barnett: To kind of continue on that as well, a better way to say that maybe is, what we would do without it. Without it, we would not be effective. Even if you cut the civilian education out of it, it would greatly decrease our ability to be effective because you learn to write essays and things in the civilian world as well, and then bring that into your professional development training as an NCO in the military as well. I don’t know if I can say that enough. The more education and the more training a soldier can get it is a complete 360 environment of psychological operations team chief, will greatly impact the effectiveness and professionalism that soldier will have downrange.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement would you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree, and explain? Command relationships played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Barnett: I would say strongly agree. Without our team chief’s ability to perform the job effectively, decreases and negatively impacts the ability to be successful. Really, you’re dependent because they own the territory, they own the environment. If you’re not able to basically convince them that they need you in such a way, you really have to become marketable and independent. Without those specific character traits it becomes very hard to get in there. If you have a command that’s more firm, more stern in your interactions with them and you don’t come up to par with them, your command relationships could decrease and your ability to actually perform for them will also decrease. Command relationships play a very direct role in being effective.

Segerstrom: Based on your experience, how did command relationships (supporting unit vs. supported unit, OPCON, TACON, ADCON, etc.) affect or influence the employment of TPTs? I know you touched on that some already.

Barnett: Again, to continue on that as well. For Afghanistan, working with the 2/75th Ranger Battalion, when you walk in there, you have got to convince them that you can do your job because they’re not going to take you and do operations anywhere. If they see that you can’t handle your own and be independent and exit an aircraft effectively, move 6 clicks on a target, when you get there, they don’t want to micromanage you when you get down there and you have to have a great command relationship with them. That has to be built and merged and that’s why I think the previous questions are good to ask as well because they all fall in line with this of how you are effective in your relationship with your supporting battalion because they have to see you in such a light that you can be effective if that makes sense. So again, it’s very important that you have a good command relationship. In fact, I would say that in many aspects, it is the most important thing you have to be attentive to.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the success of TPTs?
Barnett: I would say the easiest way to say that is the ability to be creative and flexible on the battle front because things change, optempo changes, operations change in a heartbeat. You have to be very quick to react to things and I would say that the biggest contributor to the success of that is really all the previous things, being on guard all the time always trying to take advantage of extra training, military or civilian, anything you can get. Then practice applying those and implementing those in different training environments to become prepared. But for us the basic contributor was the experience that we were getting before that either doing training at the unit or going to places, going to Jordan, going to all different kinds of places, those training environments were the biggest contributors to our success downrange.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the failure of TPTs?

Barnett: There are a lot of ways that you could really answer that. I would say for one part, the individual personality of the team chief is actually important and when that personality is one that doesn’t get along with others very well that is a very big contributor to failure of TPTs. One that I have added here is specifically the poor and abuse of TPTs by subordinate commanders and the psyop chain of command not focusing on proper and effective uses of TPT implementation. For example, when even the officer chain of command doesn’t know the job well enough, but yet the supported battalions tend to take advantage of that lack of knowledge and lack of understanding of how proper implementation of psyop should be that hurts the team greatly and the team is therefore doing operations and jobs that actually aren’t effective. They’re just tasked pointless tasks downrange. So those are the things that hurt it the most because a TPT is many ways can operate without the help but just the team. If everything isn’t coming together to support the team and make sure they’re going to be effective anything outside of that lane greatly contributes to the failure of the TPT.

Segerstrom: Any closing thoughts on this deployment?

Barnett: I do not.

Segerstrom: Thank you.
Segerstrom: What was your rank and position during this deployment?

Barnett: I was a Staff Sergeant, Team Chief.

Segerstrom: What were the dates of this deployment?


Segerstrom: What was the region of deployment?

Barnett: I served just below the Green Zone, in Iraq, downtown Baghdad, the local name was ?

Segerstrom: What was your supported unit?

Barnett: Supported units during the deployment were first, the 319th and 10th Mountain.

Segerstrom: I am going to ask you several questions. Some of these I will qualify or quantify before I ask them. For the first question qualify with never, seldom, some of the time, usually or all of the time and please explain. Tactical Psychological Operations Teams (TPT) are used effectively (used in functional area and according to doctrine) in operations.

Barnett: Usually, and I would say that command relationships tend to negatively effect the proper use of TPTs.

Segerstrom: What percentage of your time while deployed did you spend working in your functional area?

Barnett: 100% of the time. There were no problems with side taskings. We always stayed within our job function.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree or disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Doctrine played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Barnett: I would say I disagree because doctrine wasn’t held to as a standard. It was deviated from. It almost, to many points, wasn’t looked at by some of the chain of command and because of that there were a lot of small steps which probably could have been dealt with, but it became more random. I guess I could be more specific. What I have here is doctrine was effective when it was utilized but when ignored, it became ineffective. Poor use of products without properly analyzing the target audience. One of the biggest issues we had that doctrine would have fixed, actually is the effect of product dissemination, and how we develop products, and how to actually effect the target
audience, which is huge part of the job. So on the ground level, whenever you’re trying to, you have the subordinate commander’s intent, and you’re trying to follow that intent along with your ? your ?. That’s the framework which you work in. The products that were randomly distributed, I think we distributed like a million products in our OE, and almost none of them except for the ones that we developed at the team level and then some that were within the chain of command, the target audience analysis and the worksheet weren’t even adhered to. Nobody even cared about vulnerabilities, susceptibilities, and the things that really mattered the most. The vulnerabilities weren’t even exploited. It was more of everybody stay very generic, very uniformed, as if the product could be used all over the country and how that hurt us is that we couldn’t really effectively change our audience because it was almost like it was an informal pamphlet instead of something really effective. But doctrine would have been more specific. It would have gone down a list of how to write a ? worksheet, national objectives, basically your ?, your ? and your vulnerabilities, how the susceptibility of the target audience, you know and so forth. Following those step by step procedures would have solved a lot of problems, especially with a proper target audience analysis. I would even go further to say that we had no handoff with a collection of previous target audience analyses that had been completed and that hurt us greatly because whenever those didn’t get handed off well to us, or even improperly completed and we didn’t have anything to go by, it took us months to develop our own repoire and our own analysis of the populace. Once that was done, we started producing products, there became such an overabundance of ? pushed idea, pushing thousands of products out all over the OE instead of actually focusing on the narrowed target audience, if that makes sense. I may be too general or random but it’s just the idea of products is the focus is supposed to be on one target audience not just the generic population because you’re not really going to be able to see impact indicators and see your measures of effectiveness because of that.

Segerstrom: How did doctrine affect or influence the employment of TPTs during your deployment?

Barnett: I mean really to continue on that even. In one note, I would say we stopped a lot of it by confronting the issue with arguments taken from doctrine. Really defining the target audience in a lot more specific way. I guess one example is, we were trying to fight the kidnapping of politicians’ children actually in the OE, and so one of the effective ways of actually doing a product is who’s the target audience? The target audience is basically people that are kidnapping the children and so what are their vulnerabilities? Their vulnerabilities are X, Y, and Z. And we were able to establish products by our doctrine and we were able to reduce the rate from 15 to, can’t quote me here but I believe it was between 5 and 7. We went from 15 a month to 5 to 7 a month, was our impact indicator of its effectiveness. But we had the federal police involved, the Iraqi police involved, that gave us the reports of all the kidnappings and stuff and then we created a tracking matrix to control that. Things that don’t work is whenever we receive products randomly for no specific reason and we are instructed to go out into the OE and just disseminate these products. For example, even though sometimes they can be effective, they can become in some ways, for lack of a better word, a bullet on a NCOER or an
OER, and you say well you submitted X number of products. Well, for example, we had a guy get hit by a RPGR in one of our guard towers and whenever the guy got hit, the first thing everybody wants us to do is, hey you just go out and throw products out to the populace and tell everybody that, hey listen, stop the violence. Well that’s great that they want them to stop the violence, but who do you want to stop the violence. What is the desired effect? Is it just to stop all violence or is that really measurable? No it’s not really measurable, just stopping all violence. You have to be specific. We want X, Y, and Z to happen and the fact that we didn’t focus on that, that hurt us and so this is where top driven down products came. We got top down driven products that were submitted to us. We were forced to disseminate them into the population and then there’s no way to really find out if they were effective or not. So in many ways, I guess the coined term that goes around the psyop world, is IO fratricide. We have submitted so many messages into the OE that nothing is effective. That seems to be a trend even in battles what you are producing good quality products. To be more direct, doctrine does play a great role in a lot of ways because it kind of gives you a framework to live in but when you don’t understand and aren’t living by the framework at least you can’t really veer from that to be creative and punctual. The whole function of your job ends up suffering because you don’t have that as a foundation so you’re kind of floating in the air or something.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Education and/or training played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Barnett: I would again say strongly agree. For myself, specifically, we did so many hours of cultural training. I went to Oman, Jordan and went to ? training in Oman, Jordan and all these different trainings that we had done really changed my mindset because I came from the Afghanistan theater of thought to the Iraqi theater of thought and the mindset of the people, even though a lot of traits may be similar, a lot of things weren’t. There’s a lot more sophistication in Iraq, way beyond. It was almost like going from nomadic people in some sense to people who have college degrees, doctorates, in some sense. So there’s a large expanse between the two. So with getting really deep into the culture and learning the language. For example, we worked with the federal police all the time. They were our major bread and butter for going up and down the streets and getting operations done. We would even task them out to do things in some ways and whenever we did that, one of the biggest things, it might sound funny, was just being able to speak Arabic a little bit to them, just being able to say how they’re doing, how’s their family doing. Just that training alone allowed us to get in way better than the supporting battalion could which is how we got utilized later to just basically be an LNO in some sense, which is what we want anyway. We wanted to kind of control all the face to face communications that go out of the battalion to the populace so that just provided a lot better control. So training and everything, the more training you have obviously it can’t just be blanket training. It’s got to be focused, but I would say training definitely impacts and plays a direct role in effective employment of TPTs.

Segerstrom: So how did education and training affect the employment or influence the
employment of tactical psyop teams during your deployment?

Barnett: I would say another way to even go with too is this deployment, working with 82nd Airborne and 10th Mountain Division. You’ve got a mountainous organization and an airborne organization so? airborne wings is a big thing especially as an NCO. I mean you walk into a talk and you brief a lieutenant commander and so forth and you have nothing, and even though it sounds kind of petty, it means something especially in the 82nd Airborne if you don’t have wings you don’t even fit in. In a lot of ways that kind of specific training really benefits the psyop soldier in being effective. Because of that training, they were able to become more effective in small things that in some way shouldn’t matter, it helps kind of counter those things.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement would you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree, and explain? Command relationships played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Barnett: I would say strongly agree for sure. And to be specific, when our team landed in ? 319th we had a somewhat decent relationship with them. I remember because they were there first. They were used to a specific team and we started operations with them but with the ? and the new folks came in, one of the great things about it was the roles switched. We became the subject matter experts on the ground because we had been there for so many months. 10th Mountain came in and they’re like, hey you guys are the experts now, instead of the reverse role. Now what can you do for us. So that thought and that mentality automatically put us ahead of the game and then the capabilities brief was fantastic because we somehow managed to get them to sit down. Our capabilities brief was supposed to be 10 or 15 minutes and it stretched out to be an hour and a half because the colonel wanted to talk about so many things, and at the end of that command relationship building process, we were able to be just completely ? The XO looked at me and said, anything you need, just tell me what you need and we’ll support you. So to go from the previous command relationship, where we were still doing operations, but we weren’t really given the full reign of everything - obviously some reasons, we were fresh we just got back in country we were just getting to know everything, getting our target audience analysis stuff squared away. Going from that to, I mean that’s a direct comparison between the two, seeing how command relationship just one deployment affects it and we just stole the show at that point. We started working with just everybody doing operations and stuff. But I will say one of the problems that we had in our command relationships was the way the 82nd Airborne separated out their operations. They had the S-3 operations split in a separate area actually, a separate building and they had the effects cell that controlled fires. I guess another way to say this, lethal and nonlethal operations. In doctrine, we’re supposed to be basically operations supposed to be able to be out there, be tactical, be operations and in some sense also be in the nonlethals because yet again we are nonlethal, what is the term for it? I can’t think of it, but basically be there to help do nonlethal operations as well and they put us in that environment. However one of the problems of being an NCO and not being an officer in
the fire effects cell, was the FSO who runs the effects cell. The problem that we had was
that he tried to control and dictate a lot of things that the battalion commander had
already given us free reign on, so there was a petty game that seemed to played
sometimes and I think a lot of teams had the same problem. There seemed to be
somebody underneath the battalion commander that wanted to control it and claim
responsibility for something that wasn’t theirs and that actually seemed to hurt our ability
to do operations in a lot of ways because they tried to make us go through them to get a
task completed, whenever we didn’t need them to begin with to get tasks completed. So
that was probably our biggest deal. Another thing too with that is command relationships
in this past deployment were effective because in our chain of command sometimes
would, instead of going to us so we could be the face of psyop in the OE, they would
sometimes come down to the command to that fire support officer that ran the effects
cell. So that kind of undermined us. So why come to an E-6 when I can go to a captain or
a major or somebody else that can tell that E-6 what to do. So that undermined the ability
to have great repoire with the command in some sense and to have good command
relationships. So I think that was something that was effective.

Segerstrom: Based on your experience, how did command relationships (supporting unit
vs. supported unit, OPCON, TACON, ADCON, etc.) affect or influence the employment
of TPTs? I know you touched on that some already. Can you expand on that anymore?

Barnett: Sure, I can flip it around too. Without good command relationships we wouldn’t
have been effective at all. Imagine if the command just said no we won’t let you go out.
In some sense we could play the cute command game and go up to ours and have the
brigade tell the battalion to let us go out, but we still wouldn’t have had the loving
support that would have really made psyop effective which is what we did. So I would
say without it, think of the opposite. We wouldn’t have been able to be successful in the
sense that we were.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the success of TPTs?

Barnett: I’m a huge advocate of creativity because in the psyop world there are so many
ways to affect a target audience it’s ridiculous. It’s just a matter of being creative and
finding the most influential and impactful way to change a target audience and I think
between face to face communications and so forth, especially in the Iraqi theater it really
is about minds and about people and less about combat in a lot of sense and the more
recent part of warfare. So trying to get them from one state to another you really have to
be creative, and creativity and how we conduct our key leader engagements. People have
to really believe in you and if you’re not, if you don’t have the ability to sell yourself will
be a big contributor.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the failure of TPTs?

Barnett: I would say again IO fratricide, the ability of not using effective ways to do our
job. Even though there are problems with doctrine, if you just follow the simple things in
it, it just makes things work well together. But when it’s not followed, and if it would have been followed, some of the failures that happened wouldn’t have happened.

Segerstrom: Any closing thoughts on this deployment?

Barnett: That would be it.

Segerstrom: Thank you.

4. Jill Chalfant 1

Segerstrom: This is Lorne Segerstrom. It is November 6, 2011 and I am conducting a historical interview on tactical psyop with – please state your name.

Chalfant: Jill Chalfant.

Segerstrom: What was your assigned unit during the deployment?

Chalfant: 362nd Tactical Psyop Company.

Segerstrom: What was your rank and position during this deployment?

Chalfant: I was a Staff Sergeant, Product Development NCOIC.

Segerstrom: What were the dates of this deployment?

Chalfant: January 2003, and I was E-VAC’d out September 2003.

Segerstrom: What was the region of deployment?

Chalfant: Iraq.

Segerstrom: What specific area in Iraq?

Chalfant: ?

Segerstrom: What was your supported unit?

Chalfant: 4th Infantry Division.

Segerstrom: I am going to ask you several questions. Some of these I will qualify or quantify before I ask them. For the first question qualify with never, seldom, some of the time, usually or all of the time and please explain. Tactical Psychological Operations Teams (TPT) are used effectively (used in functional area and according to doctrine) in
operations.

Chalfant: Some of the time.
Segerstrom: Can you please expand on that?

Chalfant: At the beginning it was really hard for the teams to integrate. Psyop was new for the 4 ID, and they didn’t really know what we were all about, and how to use us, and at that moment it was a shoot, move, and communicate mentality. So for the TPTs to roll out with a loud speaker, they looked at that as being nonkinetic, and they were really wanting to be kinetic. I think at the beginning of the operation that was kind of putting us in the background.

Segerstrom: What percentage of your or the team’s time while deployed did you or they spend working in your functional area?

Chalfant: I would say 100%.

Segerstrom: They didn’t spend any time doing guard duty or other tasks that were outside their functional area?

Chalfant: My guys, in the Product Development Section, was 100 percent doing psyop work. We didn’t get stuck with guard duty, but the teams, yes. From what I understand they were involved in a lot of miniscule kinds of things. Let’s see, doing loud speaker for birthday parties and stuff like that.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree or disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Doctrine played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Chalfant: I disagree on that one. Any time that we would have to show the doctrine, it was still shot down. I think that was more so because our doctrine is so philosophical. It’s hard for a movement commander to sit there and have to take it all in when - I don’t know how to explain it - psyop doctrine is; they want results right then. A combat commander wants results. He doesn’t have time to say, well yes I got to follow your guidelines but your bosses aren’t here in my battle space. For any kind of approval processes that we have to go it’s got to go really high because it can have a strategic effect over the whole area of operation. When you’ve got a small battalion in his little AO, he doesn’t understand the strategic responsibility and that I think was the hardest part for our guys, trying to explain how our doctrine is because it’s so new to these commanders.

Segerstrom: How did doctrine affect or influence the employment of TPTs during your deployment?

Chalfant: There were times that it was very helpful, but it was a battle. We would have to
tell the commanders that we were protecting them from using us in a way that could potentially cause further damage. I think at the time when we explained it to them, I’ll set the doctrine aside and just kind of break it down and make it simple to them, then yes, it worked. But we pretty much had to say if you do this, you will get into trouble and after having several heated discussions, it finally sunk in.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Education and/or training played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Chalfant: Yes, I would strongly agree. This was something new for psyop since the Iraq War and the Gulf War. That was a short war and the effects of psyop was very positive just because of the different type of issues that were going on with Saddam, and the target audience was, they were weak and we were able to hit that, and we had great psyop results. But with this war it was more indepth because we actually went into the country and were having to understand all the different tribes, how they played in their own government, how they worked with our military. I mean it was pretty much on the job training as far as education goes with the culture. We did as much as we could prior, prepping for the deployment, getting a quick brief on the Iraqi philosophy, the Muslum, the Shunis, the Shiites, and that was done with ?, with our language personnel, actual natives that could give us the heads up on how to best interact. It did have a good effect. Some of our teams were able to really blend in and get into the culture.

Segerstrom: How did education/training affect or influence the employment of TPTs during your deployment?

Chalfant: I think probably one of the, I’ll say on the negative side, there wasn’t a lot of really good training on the military decision making process with the teams understanding how to get involved with the planning process, with getting involved in the targeting with the S-3 shops. They didn’t integrate there. They were more running out with small infantry teams, going into villages, hitting weapons caches. They didn’t have the opportunity to really integrate in that way, I think, because they just didn’t understand it they didn’t have good knowledge of it.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement would you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree, and explain. Command relationships played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Chalfant: Oh, yes, strongly agree. That’s just like anywhere you go, you’ve got to integrate. If you set a bad example right up front, you’re going to have a hard time to make it up. That’s what I was talking about with the psyop support that the 4 ID got was a representative from Ft. Polk. We never had any communication about what her role was really going to be. So she went right in to 4 ID integrating with them and setting up, unfortunately, a bad relationship. When we came in and started integrating with our command and staff they were like, whatever, we don’t have any use for you. The
relationship had already been ruined with this other person, just one person. So it was a constant battle to rebuild. When the XO, or the DCO, when he left during the middle of the deployment that helped because it brought in a new face and we could try to build our relationship again.

Segerstrom: Based on your experience, how did command relationships (supporting unit vs. supported unit, OPCON, TACON, ADCON, etc.) affect or influence the employment of TPTs?

Chalfant: Okay you got the OPCON, TACON, ADCON. We were OPCON’d and that was very difficult for us to be able to move our units around when we needed to and we weren’t actually getting utilized properly. I want to say that was a lot.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the success of TPTs?

Chalfant: Collecting of intel. Our guys were right there in the thick of it with the populace. We helped gather information to find Saddam. We helped gather information to find al ? Our TPT’s our sitreps were constantly praised by the other ODAs and other governmental agencies that were in theater because of the intel that they were collecting. Of course at that time it wasn’t intel, but our guys were able to, not that aggressive kinetic infantrymen, that’s the way our role is, so when they’re able to move in and build that relationship with the ? or whatnot that were in that region that they were operating in, they collect all kinds of stuff.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the failure of TPTs?

Chalfant: I would say not being able to have good control over our unit or our teams, the OPCON. The other thing I think was the teams not really having a good understanding of how a battalion staff operates and being able to integrate with them. Instead they were having to run out just find ways to get out the ?, find people to help them get out and get the security. A lot of times we would roll just with our own teams to go out and do our own operations.

Segerstrom: Do you have any closing thoughts on this deployment?

Chalfant: Overall, I think it was the beginning of psyop really in the future as opposed to from Vietnam. We had never, psyop had never operated like this ever before. It’s changed it and it’s constantly changing to get its ? It was our opening debut so to speak and Iraq was our stage and everybody all of a sudden when they saw how we operated, they wanted us. When they saw the results, they were like yeah, I get it. But it’s taken 12 years for that to really hit home.

Segerstrom: Thank you.
Segerstrom: This is Lorne Segerstrom. It is November 6, 2011 and I am conducting a historical interview on tactical psyop with – please state your name.

Chalfant: Jill Chalfant.

Segerstrom: What was your assigned unit during the deployment?

Chalfant: 362nd Tactical Psyop Company.

Segerstrom: What was your rank and position during this deployment?

Chalfant: I was a Sergeant First Class, Detachment NCOIC.

Segerstrom: What were the dates of this deployment?


Segerstrom: What was the region of deployment?

Chalfant: ?, Afghanistan.

Segerstrom: What was your supported unit?

Chalfant: 173rd and 82nd and then we had Canadian SF and then we had American SF, 3rd Group and 7th Group.

Segerstrom: I am going to ask you several questions. Some of these I will qualify or quantify before I ask them. For the first question qualify with never, seldom, some of the time, usually or all of the time and please explain. Tactical Psychological Operations Teams (TPT) are used effectively (used in functional area and according to doctrine) in operations.

Chalfant: I put some of the time. With my teams, I say this because they had to fall in line with their last psyop counterpart and they pretty much picked up where those guys left off because those guys still had integrated with the commanding unit that my guys were falling in on. So my guys pretty much had to get their feet in and rebuild a different relationship and so for a couple of months it was hard and they were not going out the wire. For example I had one team that ended up being stuck with CA. They’re like we’ll put you psyop guys over with the CA captain because they thought that’s how it rolled. If you don’t have a captain, if you don’t have an officer, you’re just an E-6, where’s your
officer? Well I’m not CA. There’s this captain. You guys go report to him. That was encouraged. But that team integrated pretty good with the CA and they split their missions so they could get out the wire. So they had they’re both security to each other. CA would go do what they needed to do. Psyop would go do what they needed to do, flip flop during the time. Our team helped build a radio station, the first radio station that was ever in that region. I’m trying to remember the name of that region.

Segerstrom: What percentage of your or the team’s time while deployed did you or they spend working in your functional area?

Chalfant: I put 50 %. I’ll get into that later, but I’d say the other 50 was dealing with trying to rebuild a relationship from past deployments. These commanders had been with other psyop companies and had negative experiences. As soon as they heard psyop they’re like I don’t need you, I don’t want you, you don’t do anything for me. It’s like, well that team you were with is not who I am, and it was just a constant battle to rebuild the relationship. The other half of it was once they got in and were able to get out and do their job then they did have some good results.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree or disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Doctrine played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Chalfant: Yes, it really did. The teams didn’t use it. Let’s see how should I say this? I’m trying to think what phase we were in. I think we had seven rotations so here you had seven different rotations prior to when we hit boots on ground, so we’re having to fall in on other sister psyop units that didn’t follow doctrine or did follow doctrine. It was very convoluted. The products were old and outdated. I never saw a product ? psyop supporting objectives, a current one, updated ones. We couldn’t get updated ones because we were in a different mission, different operation. We’ve got different targets out there. We’re working on it, that’s what I would get. So that was really hard for us. When we fell in on our other company to do our left and right seat, they didn’t have preapproved loud speaker scripts. It was just here this is what we’ve been doing, this is what we fell on. I think it just kind of became that way for every company that came through the country.

Segerstrom: How did doctrine affect or influence the employment of TPTs during your deployment?

Chalfant: I would say it was 50/50. We had it better. If I want to compare it to Iraq of ’03 with psyop being really brand new to these combatant commanders. This time in 2006 or 2005, these guys have already been exposed to psyop so they understood our approval process. It was more like yeah, yeah, I know, I gotta go through your whole approval process, but that ain’t gonna work for me, can you find a shortcut. So that was where the whole battle was. I need psyop support objectives. I need psyop objectives so I can start
trying to do some products? requests from you and that was our product development section. Then you had the? guys that were doing their own products and they were doing their own doctrine in a whole other different location. Now I got off track. You had other government organizations that were doing spoof psyop that was totally on their own but could be in the same battle space that we were in. To me doctrine was not happening if that makes any sense.

Segerstrom: It does.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Education and/or training played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Chalfant: Oh yes, strongly agree. And again that goes with understanding the whole region of Afghanistan. It’s more, it doesn’t have the? mindset of Iraq. It’s got a lot of influence of India and Persia and thousands of years of history with it and constant wars that goes into play. As opposed to Iraq which is a big power in that region. There’s more pride there. Afghanistan was split. You had the Taliban and war lords and they were very abusive with the population. There was no safety. The villages were constantly under the wire, under scrutiny for anything they did wrong that wasn’t approved by whoever was in control of wherever it was. So yes, we did get a lot of prep and understanding of that type of culture as opposed to Iraq. We didn’t get squat. We had a two-week AT with? and we had two language linguists who came out from Monterey and they both spoke many languages, but they were from the region that was? I was in the? class and he was very informative on the? culture and also giving us a quick understanding of the language and how much Afghans love music, and haven’t been able to have music because of the Taliban. So our teams took that and grabbed as much Afghani music they could and that was another way they were able to integrate. They played music with those loud speakers. It was let’s have tea. We don’t talk military. It’s cool. You’re not here to take things from me so to speak.

Segerstrom: How did education/training affect or influence the employment of TPTs during your deployment?

Chalfant: Kind of like I said with the music and going into the villages. The children was kind of a safety thing. They knew that we won’t do anything to them if they throw the children at us so we learned that as an intel thing. But every week I’m going to come and see you. I’m not going to tell you when or whatever. Once they saw that we weren’t lying and oh yeah that’s what the last psyop did or last civil affairs. You call yourself civil affairs right. So we had to build a different repoire and once our teams were able to do that we were able to integrate with them.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement would you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree, and explain. Command relationships played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.
Chalfant: I strongly agree with that and I’ll start off with saying politics. Every commander that our team came in contact with had one goal. They wanted to make a good impression for that time they were there whether it be, I want this village to have a new school, or I want to put an internet café out in the middle of nowhere. They had a lot of unrealistic expectations for that type of society so we were constantly battling somebody’s career as opposed to the actual mission.

Segerstrom: Based on your experience, how did command relationships (supporting unit vs. supported unit, OPCON, TACON, ADCON, etc.) affect or influence the employment of TPTs?

Chalfant: Very much. I’ll give you an example. We were basically cut off from getting any support from our rear unit, our company headquarters, when it came to equipment. Since we were OPCON’d they were like you’re on your own. You’re going to have to find your own equipment. Okay great, but I’m also supporting unit and you’ve got six guys and I have a whole battalion or brigade to deal with, so when it came to getting refit with our radios or getting our vehicles taken care of our guys had to get pretty creative on how to integrate with the supporting unit supply, or the supporting unit motor shop, and so they had to actually use their own psyop methods.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the success of TPTs?

Chalfant: Let’s see, I guess being able to integrate with the battalion S-3 shop. Us actually integrating really well at the brigade level with our IO cell. We helped start the IO working group and got involved in planning, and we actually were invited in to be a part of preparing new OPCONs that were coming out, the new missions. Our other teams that were out into the other valleys and what not. They were having to support the 503rd. One of my teams was supporting, my captain, my detachment commander, was able to brief how that team could help them with missions that were coming up, tactical missions. With him actually getting into that relationship with the DCO and our IO, that positive relationship gave our team face time out there in the field in the battle space missions. So yeah integration was a big part.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the failure of TPTs?

Chalfant: Well unfortunately, with this deployment my detachment happened to be one of my teams that was involved with the burning body incident that happened down in the region. I want to say reporters was probably the biggest failure that affected my team, but also the human factor was played into it. The team was integrated so well that they were going out on missions every week. They’d be gone for nine days on a mission and getting into fire fights and losing friends that they met within the 82nd and 503rd and their refit time was short and they were just a 3-man team. I had an E-5 that was the team chief for battalion. He had a S-3 major that he had to report to that was pretty aggressive with him and demanded him at multiple meetings and briefings. That took a real toll on him. He had to utilize his two team members that were E-4s to go and sit on and brief with battalion bubs and battalion daily intel briefs. So when you see an E-4 going into a
battalion talk, it’s like where’s my stapler. It was pretty stressful and I want to say they were kind of abused because of the rank. At the same time, he did what he did, yes sir. He kept his respect with the whole military honor and dealing with his superiors and helped him integrate. He had positive results with several missions that got him praises with the battalion commander, the 82nd battalion commander, that he was under. It just happened to be a mission where you’re going to take that reporter and he’s going in the truck and we need to roll. They’re like we don’t want a reporter with us because our mission is sensitive, you know what to do. This is coming from a butter bar lieutenant to an E-5. How long story short, the reporter had his own objective to make money. An incident happened to where a platoon gets into a fire fight that’s not even the same grid square as where my TPT guys were and there you go. Bad guys kill our guys. We kill some of the bad guys. It’s battle, it’s heated. The villagers nearby were asked to take care of the dead Taliban. They said they’re Taliban no we won’t have anything to do with them. So they burned them for hygiene. I’ve got a butter bar lieutenant that loud speaker script that to us was pretty much against the themes that we had approved, which was just a typical harassment theme to get the enemy to come out so we could attack them. The reporter videoed it and put it on the news. Of course, none of that was reported in the sitrep, about the burning bodies. The Pentagon got ahold of it and it just trickled down from there. So long story short, my guys being supported to a battalion to a division, they became scapegoats. Yes I’m defending them but I think psyop became the scapegoat. The way the reporter did his video made it look like my psyop guys are standing over the bodies lackadaisical joking about the situation and not having any care over the Muslim culture. So it gave the interpretation that my guys were just a bunch of renegades running around the mountains of Afghanistan. It was embarrassing to the psyop name. And the question comes after all that was, where is the psyop doctrine what are you all doing with your script? Is that approved? Your script. According to the themes at that time, yeah it was. We took it directly off of a poster. A poster where we had a Taliban that was covered up in a blue burka with an AK-47 sticking out from underneath it. It was you are the cowardly dogs. You are dressing up as a woman to hide behind to attack us. That was the theme in that poster and that was the theme in that broadcast. So it’s war and so I defended my guys. Yes, it wasn’t put in the sitrep that the bodies were burned but it wasn’t anything against the culture of Islam. It was done for hygiene. I don’t know where it got communicated that it was to disrespect the culture. I don’t know how that came about. So psyop was shut down for about 4 months. No psyop in theater at all and I had my sister detachments that were supporting SF teams. They’re like you guys are going out with us no matter what. You can be our extra gun. This is ridiculous. So the governor of at the time got paid a million dollars for his inconvenience, embarrassment, disgrace on his faith which to me was pretty sad. We just totally lost our mission there when we just give somebody some money who would rather just kill a Taliban. The government at the time was not in favor of the you come back to society to denounce you’re Taliban, you’ll be forgiven. He’d just as soon kill them all. That to me was, yeah, the mission failed because of politics. That there is where I try to use the example with commanders that this is where your ass can get in trouble because you’ve got to see that we follow our doctrine, or we need to have that there. Otherwise strategically, this is what can happen. This small little team out in the middle of mountain
or wherever and here you’re on utube. There you go.

Segerstrom: Well, thank you.
Segerstrom: This is Lorne Segerstrom. It is November 6, 2011 and I am conducting a historical interview on tactical psyop with – please state your name.

Cockrell: My name is Captain Collins Devon Cockrell.

Segerstrom: What was your assigned unit during the deployment?

Cockrell: I was Detachment Commander for 3622 and I was with 362 Psyop Company.

Segerstrom: What was your rank and position during this deployment?

Cockrell: I was a Captain. I was the Detachment Commander for Tactical Psyop Detachment.

Segerstrom: What were the dates of this deployment?

Cockrell: For Iraq, we arrived in beginning of August 2009 and departed in May 2010.

Segerstrom: What was the region of deployment?

Cockrell: Southern Baghdad FOB Falcon and basically the area from Falcon all the way south down past ?, so the Triangle of Death, basically the Triangle of Death.

Segerstrom: What was your supported unit?

Cockrell: Two support units. The first was a National Guard Unit, the 30th Infantry Brigade from North Carolina and then there was a ? and then the second was 1st Brigade, 3th Infantry Division.

Segerstrom: I am going to ask you several questions. Some of these I will quantify or qualify before I ask them. For the first question qualify with never, seldom, some of the time, usually or all of the time and please explain. Tactical Psychological Operations Teams (TPT) are used effectively (used in functional area and according to doctrine) in operations.

Cockrell: Some of the time. And to qualify that, some of the time we were used effectively to go out and do engagements and be the eyes and ears for the supported unit and to collect information, to either push out information or supervise the dissemination of information, and other times we were begging and pleading to go out on patrols. We were relegated to a gut truck position. We were confused with the CA element. We were ignored. We were underutilized. It depended on both, on sometimes the company level command, the platoon level command, and then also the higher level commands. It changed from both the individual subunits within the supported unit and then sometimes
when we had the ?, the new unit itself, there was an indication process or maybe there was a continuing problem with them effectively utilizing it.

Segerstrom: What percentage of your time while deployed did you or your team spend working in your/their functional area?

Cockrell: It was 75% or more, close to 100%. Luckily we were never asked to be guards, never asked to do gate duty. We were never asked to do anything really outside of our area. Like I said we were underutilized, but we were never really asked to do things that were typically the responsibility of some type of support troops or the folks that they viewed as just hey you’re just sitting around there, why don’t you go there and do something else. So when they let us do things we did things within our focal area.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree or disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Doctrine played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Cockrell: I would agree but it’s a tough question. It’s probably the toughest question that’s on this questionnaire because doctrine is so large and I know we only have two main FMs that cover our area of responsibility. I guess one of the better examples of effective use of doctrine is when we were training Iraqis and they were trying to determine who would train a certain slice of it, who would train counter propaganda; and our higher, in this case 1/3, had put that responsibility with public affairs. I went and got the doctrine, went and got the FM, and came back and said no by doctrine we do counter propaganda, we do scheme analysis, if that information comes in it’s ours. Another example is I was able to get a FRAGO with my supported brigade that any piece of enemy propaganda that was received by any unit within the 30th would be brought to me, specifically me. Not the 2 shop, not the 2 at the battalion and brigade level but to me. Then we would do a scheme analysis, and then of course we would disseminate that to our supporting brigade. So those are examples where we were able to use doctrine, not as a stick, but just to remind them these are our specific core responsibilities. We can help you to perform them but doctrinally these are ours and they recognized that which is I thought was a good thing.

Segerstrom: How did doctrine affect or influence the employment of TPTs during your deployment?

Cockrell: We functioned as you’re supposed to function. The detachment worked at the brigade level. The teams worked at the battalion level. The only problem was the level of understanding of those lower levels units, platoons, and companies, and battalion and brigade, all the way up to the brigade. What was their understanding of what we could do for them and that changed from time to time in part because they had a lot going on and it was very distracting. Either they were in combat operations or the phase down from combat operations, a transition into a stabilize and support operations with the 1st Brigade 3rd ID. So there’s a lot going on with them. The key distinction was always were they
able to stop and think about I’ve got this psyop element what’s the best way to employ them. The lucky thing is I had a pretty good relationship with, or I had a very good relationship with my 7s, so they were never the problem. They were never the ones that did not so much have an understanding of what we could do. It was just the fact that we were trying to get ourselves into the planning cycle ahead of Operation Typhoon Thunder or something like that, to make sure that when they went out and did whatever, we were able to be there and they were able to understand that we were there for immediate tactical support or with ? teams. That they should think about ahead of time what they would want to do to influence the population before the operation, during the operation, after the operation, and actually have that incorporated in the planning process. It’s not something at the very last minute my guys are going out and trying to do it on the fly, and try to talk to platoon leaders or company commanders and say I’m here now you know I can do these things, and they’re like oh yeah that’s right you’re the psyop guys, you can help us do these things. That was the hard thing to do, and I didn’t fault them. It wasn’t that they didn’t like us. It was just because it seemed to me that they forgot, or it wasn’t plugged in to their planning cycle that I’ve got this psyop element and they can do these things. When they remembered it, they were almost always really glad because they were oh yeah. They were never concerned about my guys’ tactical ability. They were never worried about their ability to function as another infantry gun truck out there. With them it was just forgetting all the things they could do in addition to that. You’re not CA right? No, we’re not CA. We do this whole other suite of things for you.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Education and/or training played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Cockrell: By education, do you mean our education and training, or do you mean the training and education of the supporting unit that was utilized by us?

Segerstrom: Most definitely you can combine both in this question depending on the impact you saw.

Cockrell: Well for us, education and training was essential. I was very lucky because my teams were very good. My team chiefs were very, very solid and smart guys even though we had people drop out at the very last point during the deployment, which was a little worrisome because we trained with those guys through the process. The frustrating thing was that at Ft Dix we had three days, out of two and half months, we had three days of actual psyop training. That included some of the combat pistol training, but three days of actual “this is your MOS” training. Of course, when you get to theater, those guys don’t care about all the other junk that they make every mobilizing unit do. They just want to know can you do the specific job that they are expecting you to do. But again, luckily my guys, in addition to all the training we did, they did additional training on top of the very much rote cookie cutter training that the Army forced on our unit. They didn’t evaluate us and determine, and in the case of my guys they would have figured out very quickly these guys are tactically proficient, nearly at the point of the infantry unit. They know how to
maneuver, shoot, communicate. They know how to operate. They’re not a broken down postal unit that has never deployed before and doesn’t know how to man a gun truck. These guys know how to do all those things so we could crank it up a level and maybe get the training done early and let them move into their own MOS training. Luckily, we were able to do a bunch of training ourselves so that we could be as ready as we could be so when we got to theater we could function as tactical psyop teams. Again, that was self-driven and that was because my NCOs were so strong, and because we knew that’s what we needed to do, and all of us had been on previous deployments. Whether psyop or not, we really knew what we needed to do, and focus on, and the issue for the training of the other supporting units. We didn’t go out to NTC or JOTC with the 30th or the 1/3. I’m sure they had some kind of psyop element. I don’t know the quality or effectiveness of those units so I don’t know how effectively they were in the planning process. I do know that my previous unit wasn’t as happy with their supporting psyop element, for whatever reasons, so we were able to kind of improve that relationship. The key thing is does the supported unit understand what psyop can do for them because when they either have time or they have that moment of clarity where they can see what we can do and we are able to shine, they are usually extremely happy with what we can do. As the battle space, like it did in Iraq, transitions from a kinetic one to an unkinetic one and the hot guns go away, which happened during deployment, the only thing the commander can shoot is projects and information, that’s it. He’s having 45-minute, 2-hour briefings on CA projects and then he’s wanting to influence the target population. That’s when it becomes critically important for them to understand how they can effectively use us and how they can keep us in that planning cycle so they don’t get confused by the fact that all they had to do was do a psyop, or as they might call it IO do an IO product. You don’t ever correct your boss on those issues, no matter how frustrating it is, and just characterize it as an IO product. You just want to provide them the support they need, but again there can be nothing more important than helping those guys understand that this is what these guys can do for you. The thing is if they’re not happy with the level of effectiveness of their psyop detachment, they should expect the very best and they should be able to say I want better guys because I need all these skills suites. When you look at what the IO working group’s doing, when you look at what the 7 shop is doing, 85% of his capabilities are psyop. There’s a little bit of mil det, there’s a little bit of?, there’s a little bit of a few other things, but 85% of his ability to influence, maybe 5 or 10% of that’s in key leader engagements, but most of that is going to be us.

Segerstrom: How did education/training affect or influence the employment of TPTs during your deployment?

Cockrell: Again, for our abilities, the fact that we were able to train together, function together and even try to act as psyop detachments or psyop teams, and a psyop detachment in the middle of very basic, very poorly run training at Ft. Dix. We just tried to reinforce what we were doing. We basically functioned as a three-man, we would roll out as a three-person vehicle. You have two people, three people in the vehicle, which violated what the Ft. Dix people understood that you should have, four people in the vehicle. One guy, two guys on the ground, one guy in the turret, and one guy in the seat.
Well typically teams are three guys. We would just tell them no that’s not how we roll, this is our way our actual units are constituted. We used that training that did not meet our needs and made it work as well as we could, and used it for team building, and team chief leadership skills, and all the other things that those guys have to do. Again, a lot of that was self-driven and there was nothing more important for those guys that were going to Iraq with me than for them to be able to look back on their previous deployments. These guys have gotten smarter every time they’ve deployed, even if it was as different an environment as Afghanistan in ‘04/’05, and Iraq in ‘06/’07, or whatever else, and Iraq again in ‘09/’10. They had a whole lot of those skill sets that were very useful.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement would you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree, and explain. Command relationships played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Cockrell: That’s easy. I strongly agree and there’s nothing that’s more important than that relationship and that’s the onus that’s on the detachment commander. Now sometimes he can totally be set up for failure because either the previous detachment did a really bad job and now they don’t like psyop any more, or the commander just thinks psyop is bad, or they don’t understand it, thinks you’re a waste of space. I mean you may be dealt a hand you can’t deal with, but in most cases you can. I felt my job was to go to literally every meeting. I went to every meeting I could for the first month or so that I was there. I was at every meeting, meetings I wasn’t ever expected in. Not so much to be able to contribute, but to be seen as that psyop guy, and then do my very best to take the complete load of my responsibilities away from my 7 so that he depended on me to do all that work. I was his go to guy. I did that and I tried to make myself as essential as possible to him so that he would call me and talk to me about things the brigade commander wanted to do. Also I tried to take over all the briefing responsibilities I possibly could so that he didn’t have to worry about them because I wanted to be the guy that stood up in the briefing to the brigade commander and talk that piece so he knew that this is the guy that does the psyop stuff. I did that because if I strengthen and improve that command relationship it made it better for my teams because if they had any issues the brigade could talk to the battalion, could talk to the company, could talk to the platoon, and could sort those things out. Plus, if I’m effective and they’re effective it makes it more effective for them because they have top cover to do what they needed to do. Ultimately as a leader, my job is to enable my teams to effectively do their job. Obviously I’ve got the planning piece and I might end up targeting work groups and all those kinds of things. I might be able to find out about things weeks sometimes before an operation kicks off, my teams know ahead of time, sometimes ahead of the battalions or the companies, that an operation’s coming up, so they can get ahead of the information cycle. Again, the critical thing is for me to have a strong and effective relationship with the command group because that makes my teams look good and that makes us look more effective. There’s nothing more important than that. I think that’s critical.

Segerstrom: Based on your experience, how did command relationships (supporting unit vs. supported unit, OPCON, TACON, ADCON, etc.) affect or influence the employment of TPTs?
Cockrell: Well you know the old joke is that your direct support, when they want you to do something, and you’re opcon to them, if you need something from them. That’s just one of my favorite old jokes. The command relationship was critical because my ability, you know beans and bullets, you know the vehicle being fixed. We always got supplies from our psyop company and the division which is actually who we worked for. The fact that we were able to get so many things from the supported units that we worked for, as far as supplies, the fact that we were able to integrate. We even had one of my teams wear, they took off their ? patches and put on the patches for their supported unit. I thought that was brilliant because they wanted to be seen as an organic part of that supported unit. So there’s two pieces. There’s beans and the bullets logistics piece, that you want to make sure you have an effective support because we’re all wearing Army uniforms. It doesn’t matter who gets this or that. You know my guys were able to get a lot of stuff from the supporting unit. There’s just nothing more important because if the command relationship is good, then if TPTs are sitting around on their butt and they can’t go out with their platoons, on their ? units, on their patrols, then I can talk to my 7, and then he can talk to the 3, and then the 3 can talk to his 3s down below him, and ask him why they’re wasting those teams. We actually had that happen. What, you don’t need them, okay we’ve got other things for them to do. Oh no, no, no. Because they’re sitting around and they want to go out with you guys why won’t you let them go out with you. That’s good because we can work those things out organically within the brigade.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the success of TPTs?

Cockrell: It would have to be two things. It would have to be command relationship and the effective use of psyop elements. By the second one, I mean did the supporting unit understand what we could do for them and did they let us do that job within the planning cycle. Did they let us get inside the planning cycle so that we were part of the considerations as they moved through all the things they wanted to do, move someone, kill someone, capture someone, or whatever else, so those are the two essential things for me.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the failure of TPTs?

Cockrell: Failure to have an effective command relationship was number one. If they don’t respect you and they don’t like you and they don’t think that what you do is relevant, then that could be your fault because you don’t have a good relationship with them. They don’t view you as professional. Whatever the issue it doesn’t matter. Then the other failure can be psyop units that don’t function effectively. There was a lot of shake and baking going on in the last few years. A lot of people that were part of psyop that had never done anything like that and some of them were some very good people, very nice people, but they were not able to do these very complicated tasks and carry that whole weight on their shoulder. You have to be very proactive without being a complete pain in the ass about it. You have to be very proactive to be an effective psyop guy. You have to be willing to walk into meetings where people ask who are you and why are you here. I’m here because I just want a lesson learned and I’m the psyop guy. Oh, okay.
Again one of the most important things we can do is make sure that these maneuver units and the commanders of those maneuver units understand from the beginning of their education process that psyop means, whatever you want to call it, what we can do for them, and how we can support them, and to think about this at the very beginning of a planning cycle. Almost more than anything else, you have to think about influence operations at the very beginning of any kinetic operation. It’s too late to think about it at the very end. All you’re doing is doing a message saying everybody stay off the streets. If that’s the first time you’re doing influence operations on somebody, it’s way too late you know off the fly messages. That’s the critical thing, is getting inside that planning cycle for those leaders so that they’re not having to learn it in the middle of the war, they learned it back in the school house.

Segerstrom: Do you have any closing thoughts?

Cockrell: I just want to say that I think this is a great research project that you’re doing and I’m glad to be able to talk about it and effectively able to express myself because I think it’s just extremely important to look at these things because there are a lot of great folks in the psyop world. There’s a lot of smart people that work really hard. Ours is one that’s, we’re a very small branch. We’re a very different kind of branch because of the way we’re constructed. It’s just very important that we get a lot smarter about how we plug ourselves into everything that we’re doing, not just the counterinsurgency environment. In all the future operations we need to be a part of the planning cycle, psyop, whatever IO is. Psyp officers need to be brought in, I think, to talk to maneuver commanders as they go through their training process so they meet them outside of that environment. Maybe meet them at the school house. There’s just a lot of ways that we can get integrated into things. Most of all, we have to work on our own professionalism so that we’re the subject matter experts recognized by the Army as doing these specific tasks. That’s all I’ve got. Thank you.

Segerstrom: Thank you.

7. James Ellison

Segerstrom: This is Lorne Segerstrom. It is November 5, 2011 and I am conducting a historical interview on tactical psyop with – please state your name.

Ellison: James Ellison.

Segerstrom: What was your assigned unit during the deployment?
Ellison: 362nd Psyop Company.

Segerstrom: What was your rank and position during this deployment?
Ellison: During the deployment I was a Staff Sergeant, Team Chief.

Segerstrom: What were the dates of this deployment?


Segerstrom: What was the region of deployment?

Ellison: I was in ?, mainly the Saladin Province, Iraq.

Segerstrom: What was your supported unit?

Ellison: 4th ID, 1st Brigade.

Segerstrom: I am going to ask you several questions. Some of these I will qualify or quantify before I ask them. For the first question qualify with never, seldom, some of the time, usually or all of the time and please explain. Tactical Psychological Operations Teams (TPT) are used effectively (used in functional area and according to doctrine) in operations.

Ellison: Some of the time, sir.

Segerstrom: Can you please explain and expand upon that answer?

Ellison: In my experience, downrange, that was contingent completely upon the supporting unit commander. Depending on his understanding on the role of psyop and his mission. If the commander understood the role of psyop and would allow the psyop team the leeway in order to accomplish their mission, then they were much more effective. Some of the commanders that I encountered, were more about maintaining complete control of body counts for their operations. They wanted a certain number of people. For example, I supported a unit for a very short time in ?, and that battalion commander just wanted bodies out on patrol. He wasn’t concerned with the particular psyop mission. He was more concerned with his particular mission and just having people there to support that. And so we weren’t effective doing, per se, psyop, but the unit that I supported predominantly, the commander was excellent working with us. He gave us leeway in order to accomplish our mission. We supported his mission at the same time, but he didn’t, I guess you would say, keep his thumb on us or micromanage us.

Segerstrom: What percentage of your time while deployed did you spend working in your functional area?

Ellison: 100%, sir.

Segerstrom: Can you please explain?
Ellison: Well, I was the team chief. And as I said, the vast majority of the commanders that I supported while there were really good. We would go in and explain to them our capabilities and what we could bring to the table for their mission and they would let us run with it basically. We supported them in every way that we could, and all we had to do was just report in to them on what we had done, and any information that we had gained, how they could better accomplish their mission, any information that their soldiers would need, we would provide that to them.

Segerstrom: So there was no time spent doing guard duty or security, or things outside of your functional area?

Ellison: No sir. That was one of the things, according to doctrine when I went through the school house, psyop doesn’t do that. I ran into a situation where an S-3 wanted us to do some of that and we explained to him that we don’t because every time the QRF goes out the door they have different people on the QRF on a rotating basis. We don’t. Every time it goes out the gate, we’re with them. We were running at least two missions, several hours a day, so we didn’t have time to do guard duty. If you take a 3-man team and you pull somebody for guard duty, that team is pretty much disabled. He contacted my detachment commander, and my detachment commander supported me on that and said no, we don’t do guard duty. We don’t do that kind of thing. We’re a specialized element to do a specialized job, and that worked out for us.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree or disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Doctrine played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Ellison: Initially, sir, I’m going to have to say I disagree, but with caveats. The reason I say that is when we were there we were in the initial phase of the invasion. All the training that we had gotten was geared toward Kosovo and the Balkan region and none of it really applied to our situation. The basic doctrine of psyop worked and it was effective. I did run into a commander who said psyop doctrine is out the window. We’re making it up as we go. My team didn’t go with that. We stuck with the doctrine and it worked for us. We were effective.

Segerstrom: How did doctrine affect or influence the employment of TPTs during your deployment?

Ellison: The doctrine was guidelines telling us in given situations, broad guidelines of how we could operate. The doctrine also gives us leeway to be flexible. For us the doctrine wasn’t hard and fast rules. In psyop you have to be flexible. It’s not like a line unit where you can only do things a certain way. You have to be flexible in every given situation because we’re dealing with people. With the human element, everybody is different. You can’t be standardized. You have to have guidelines and parameters, but you have to have the freedom to maneuver between those parameters, and that’s the way the doctrine worked for us.
Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Education and/or training played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Ellison: Again, I will agree with a caveat. The training that we received was geared towards Kosovo and Bosnia, and it was totally ineffective, as far as the role playing that we went through. The actual training on the doctrine and “how to” of psyop was good. It was very good. I also had personal education in graduate studies in marketing which was extremely effective as well. The studies in anthropology and social psychology were vital. Getting to know people, how to read people, their personal reactions, and how to adjust in face to face communication, how to read people’s response with the product that we were disseminating. Those things were vital. But the actual train-up for the deployment was really not that good.

Segerstrom: So how did education and training affect the employment or influence the employment of tactical psyop teams during your deployment?

Ellison: Well again, the basic tactical training as far as rifle, marksmanship, mountain training, the tactical side of it, the Army training, was good, the medical training was really good, all of that. It was vital. But with psyop we have to be jacks-of-all-trades. We have to be able to adjust to any given situation. And I’ve heard psyopers and I’ve even heard senior psyop NCOs say, we’re psyop, we don’t do that. In my philosophy that’s incorrect. We’re psyop. We do everything depending on what the situation calls for. As psyopers we have to not just be studying the culture, the people, the religion, the language, everything about it. We have to know everything there is to know about an area where we’re operating because our job is to find those buttons to push in order to change behavior in people. So education is vital, and the training, I don’t feel like there’s enough tactical training. It has to become second nature and that comes just through repetition.

Segerstrom: So once you were downrange what did you see, the impact or the influence of the things you’ve already commented on, training and education? Do you have some specific examples of what adjustments you had to make or a negative impact that you had to correct, and what you did to address it?

Ellison: Yes, sir. As soon as we got to Iraq and my team rolls out, we’re looking for missions. At that point, our supporting unit didn’t have missions for us. We hadn’t received any missions from the higher psyop team yet. So we were basically out looking for opportunities to conduct face to face. We’re driving around and we see people out on the sidewalk and one of them waves us down so we stop. Fortunately, my ATL spoke Arabic and we were able to communicate and that started us. The customs and the cultures were different from what we’d been told, what we’d been trained on. So we had to adjust. We had to quickly identify behaviors and try to understand what it was that they meant. For example, we saw a newer car driving by and it had bloody handprints all over it. We stopped them. We wanted to know what was going on. Come to find out it was a local custom. When you get a new vehicle, you kill a chicken and put your hand
prints in blood. It’s kind of like a blessing. We had no idea. We thought they ran over somebody. But that’s just one example of where the training didn’t quite help out.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement would you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree, and explain? Command relationships played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Ellison: I strongly agree that they did. The command relationship, that was something that still to this day, I’m not 100% sure what exactly our command relationship was. That’s because depending on who you were talking to they would give a different answer, and depending on which team was with which unit, they may have a different command relationship. For us, for my team, it worked really well because we were general support, we got our food, we got our supplies, our housing from the supporting unit and we got a security element from them. We would go out and conduct missions for psyop. When they had missions, we would go out with them, conduct missions. But we had a lot of leeway to actually do psyop. Some of the other teams that were there in the country with us, they did not have that liberty at all. One particular team, they wound up never even really leaving the gate and they’d stay on the FOB all the time. They were relegated from what I understand to playing revile in the morning on the loud speaker and taps at night.

Segerstrom: Based on your experience, how did command relationships (supporting unit vs. supported unit, OPCON, TACON, ADCON, etc.) affect or influence the employment of TPTs?

Ellison: Again, my detachment commander came down to see our team. We were out on mission, and he talked to the S-3. The S-3 told him I’m not 100% sure what they do, but I do know they’re effective at whatever they do because the word on the street, everybody that we talk to is, don’t shoot the guys with the speakers on the truck because they’re good people. So that made me feel really good to know that the battalion commander that we were supporting had given us enough leeway that whenever we would go on a raid, we went on a lot of raids with the supported unit, that we weren’t the ones kicking in the door, we weren’t the ones going in and frisking people. We were the ones outside giving water and food to the women and children and trying to help relieve some of the stress, playing with the kids. And that seems totally out of place for a military operation, but that was one of the things that made us effective, and when people began to see that, they began to come to us and point out where the weapons caches were, they pointed out where bad guys were hiding or where they were staying, and it made us much more effective because it put a human face on the military.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the success of TPTs?

Ellison: The biggest contributor is, first of all, you’ve got to have good people in psyop. If you have bad people in psyop, by that I mean people who do not have initiative. You have to have initiative. You can’t be a follower and be in psyop. You have to have
initiative. You have to have creativity. You can’t be somebody who’s a cookie cutter soldier like in a line unit. You have to be able to think on your feet. You have to be able to assess a situation quickly and then be able to adapt and adapt your team for whatever situation it may be. You have to take the initiative to learn about the culture on your own because at the time when we deployed there was no information on Iraq. I had to put together a lot of information for our unit. One more time, what was the question, sir?

Segerstrom: Biggest contributor to success.

Ellison: Biggest contributor to success. Along with that is the command relationship. The commander has to trust you. He has to know that if he gives you a little bit of leeway, you’re not going to come back and do something to cause him problems. So you have to be a person of integrity. You have to be a person with his best interests in mind and want to see him succeed in his mission while accomplishing yours. If you have that trust of the commander, you’ll succeed.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the failure of TPTs?

Ellison: That would have to be the flip side of what I just said. Our company had top notch soldiers in it. But sadly, we didn’t have enough soldiers to fill the battle roster so we received soldiers from other units who were cookie cutter soldiers who didn’t initiative and didn’t have the creativity to actually be psyopers. Some of them had never been tactical psyop before. They were desk pushers at battalion, things like that. As a result, they could not develop trust with the command authority, and they did not have the leeway to actually operate as a psyoper, so they weren’t effective. Got to have that command relationship, a good one. You’ve got to have that leeway and like I said, doctrine gives you parameters. You’ve got to be able to maneuver all around inside those parameters. The same with the commander, the commander has to give you parameters and you have to be able to maneuver around in there without crossing those lines. If you’re going to have to cross his line, explain to him why you’ve got to go outside that area, and he’s got to be able to trust you.

Segerstrom: Any final thoughts?

Ellison: I love psyop, sir. I think it’s the best job in the Army and it can be the most effective. We are a battlefield multiplier. The commander can use us to do so much of the work so that his troops don’t have to do it. We’re not just a speaker team. We’re not just passing out pamphlets and fliers and posters. In fact, a lot of the stuff that we get from higher, because the strategic psyop is so detached from the tactical psyop, they don’t know what’s going on down here. The reports that we send up, they may pigeon hole them. As a result, there’s a big disconnect. On the tactical level, we can effect so much change if we’ll just communicate, if there’s good communication with our supporting unit and the higher elements.

Segerstrom: Thank you.
Segerstrom: This is Lorne Segerstrom. It is November 5, 2011 and I am conducting a historical interview on tactical psyop with – please state your name.

Haanpaa: Tyler Haanpaa.

Segerstrom: What was your assigned unit during the deployment?

Haanpaa: The 344 Tactical Psyop Team.

Segerstrom: What was your rank and position during this deployment?

Haanpaa: Corporal, Assistant Team Chief and also the Team Chief.

Segerstrom: What were the dates of this deployment?

Haanpaa: Roughly April 2010 through February 2011.

Segerstrom: What was the region of deployment?


Segerstrom: What was your supported unit?

Haanpaa: I was with 82nd Airborne and also 3rd Infantry Division.

Segerstrom: I am going to ask you several questions. Some of these I will qualify or quantify before I ask them. For the first question qualify with never, seldom, some of the time, usually or all of the time and please explain. Tactical Psychological Operations Teams (TPT) are used effectively (used in functional area and according to doctrine) in operations.

Haanpaa: I would say usually. Most of the time in Iraq, we would be able to go out and do the tactical missions. On my side when we were there, it was closer to Operation New Dawn and we were trying to push further away from actually doing our tactical missions.

Segerstrom: What percentage of your time while deployed did you spend working in your functional area?

Haanpaa: I would say about 25%.

Segerstrom: During the times that you weren’t working in your functional area what kind of tasks were you doing?
Haanpaa: We were teaching the Iraqi Army classes in a classroom environment.

Segerstrom: What type of classes?

Haanpaa: It was supposed to be psyop. It turned more into media which made it hard for us because that’s not our job. We had to adapt into it and do what we had to do.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree or disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Doctrine played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Haanpaa: I have to be partial on that with this one as well. I mean it’s hard to say that we used doctrine when we didn’t do a lot of psyop while we were there. The parts that we wanted to do, our supported units, they didn’t want to hear it. I mean they just wanted what they wanted and that was it.

Segerstrom: So did you disagree?

Haanpaa: I disagree.

Segerstrom: How did doctrine affect the employment of TPTs during your deployment?

Haanpaa: As in how?

Segerstrom: What parts of doctrine did you see used or not used, and the lack of clarification within doctrine did that impact your point, what parts of doctrine that you saw not using it?

Haanpaa: The main part that we used in was all product based and that was about it for our deployment.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Education and/or training played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Haanpaa: Neither agree nor disagree.

Segerstrom: Can you expand upon that?

Haanpaa: The position that we were put in made it really difficult. The training that we got prior was nothing to what we found out the first day boots on ground. They said you’re not going to be doing that, you’re going to be teaching these classes. We were very ill-prepared for that.
Segerstrom: So in addition to that preparation or ill-preparation, how did education and training affect the employment or influence the employment of tactical psyop teams during your deployment?

Haanpaa: The good thing about the training is that it taught us our job. When we went and we started teaching these classes, it was pretty much just telling them what our job is. We never got out and actually did our job.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement would you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree, and explain? Command relationships played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Haanpaa: I neither agree nor disagree with that one as well. Our command, we were kind of set to the side. We spent a lot of time in the office, and our supported unit, they just talked to our headquarters and completely bypassed us. Then all of a sudden, they would want our help and we weren’t there anymore because they were just completely putting us off on the side burner. Between the two commands, they talked, but they completely bypassed the actual team aspect of how to get the things done.

Segerstrom: Based on your experience, how did command relationships (supporting unit vs. supported unit, OPCON, TACON, ADCON, etc.) affect or influence the employment of TPTs?

Haanpaa: It made it difficult. I mean it was really hard. Whenever we would get a task we would go up to the supported unit and say this is what needs to get done. They didn’t want anything to do with it. All they wanted was their paper product. Past that they couldn’t have cared less whether we were even out in ? or not. That’s all they wanted.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the success of TPTs?

Haanpaa: Definitely our PDD back in headquarters. Whenever it came to the product, if we needed it, we could make a phone call or send an e-mail, and it was “snap” right back. Everything we did and our success was definitely from them.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the failure of TPTs?

Haanpaa: Communication. By far communication. Whenever we would do classes, we would send our commander story boards to keep him updated. When it came down to the end, he thought we did one class. We sent him stuff on eight and he had no idea. Didn’t even read the e-mails. So then there was a hurry trying to figure everything out because he never talked to us. We never got phone calls, e-mails, checking up on us. I mean we could have traveled all around Iraq on a bird and he wouldn’t have ever even known the difference.

Segerstrom: Do you have any other thoughts or conclusions?
Haanpaa: Not really. Like I said our experience, especially when our deployment pretty much got split half and half on OIF and New Dawn, so we were pretty much trying to phase ourselves out of a job which was a good thing. We came pretty close to it but when it came to actual communication and relationship with the commands, it was not anything that we expected it was going to be. It was very faint on both sides and that’s about it.

Segerstrom: Okay, thank you.

9. John Harris 1

Segerstrom: This is Lorne Segerstrom. It is November 5, 2011 and I am conducting a historical interview on tactical psyop with – please state your name.

Harris: John Harris.

Segerstrom: What was your assigned unit during the deployment?

Harris: 307th Psyop Company out of St. Louis, MO.

Segerstrom: What was your rank and position during this deployment?

Harris: I was a Specialist serving as an ATL.

Segerstrom: What were the dates of this deployment?

Harris: September of 2004 to May of 2005.

Segerstrom: What was the region of deployment?

Harris: Iraq.

Segerstrom: Specifically.

Harris: Mostly around Baghdad, central Iraq.

Segerstrom: What was your supported unit?

Harris: I worked with several units. Units that I can remember I worked with 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain, 1/5 CAV, 3rd ACR, the 256th Louisiana National Guard Brigade and I worked with a unit from the 25th ID for about a week.

Segerstrom: I am going to ask you several questions. Some of these I will qualify or quantify before I ask them. For the first question qualify with never, seldom, some of the time, usually or all of the time and please explain. Tactical Psychological Operations
Teams (TPT) are used effectively (used in functional area and according to doctrine) in operations.

Harris: I would say usually.

Segerstrom: Would you please explain?

Harris: At that stage in the war it was mostly kinetic operations. We were doing offensive operations like a lot of cordon searches. We would do route denial, just keeping track of ?, snap TCPs. So the tactical side of psyop is pretty easy, a lot of logical operations, passing out generic product with command information for the most part.

Segerstrom: What percentage of your time while deployed did you spend working in your functional area?

Harris: I put 50%. I think we were doing psyop things, but like I said, we would go on a lot of missions where it was snap TCPs and we might get to pass out product or we might not. So during an 8-hour patrol you may get 5 minutes of pysop development.

Segerstrom: Can you explain what a snap TCP is?

Harris: A snap TCP is where you would just convoy around your area of responsibility. You would stop randomly, set up a tracker checkpoint and search vehicles, talk to individuals, just look for anything suspicious.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree or disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Doctrine played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Harris: I put neither agree nor disagree. I don’t know what most of the teams did on my deployment. My team was kind of a reaction team, the way we were utilized by our company. Any time there was something going on that needed a TPT that they didn’t have that asset already we would get pushed. I think the longest I worked with any one unit was 6 weeksm which was very abnormal. For my team, I would not necessarily agree. For the other teams, I think they were in one location with one unit for the most part which makes it easier to do long-term psyop planning and operations.

Segerstrom: How did doctrine affect or influence the employment of TPTs during your deployment?

Harris: Like I said, because we did so much tactical stuff, the psyop doctrine itself did not affect us too much and because we weren’t in one place, we weren’t able to do long-term campaigns or anything like that, or even really assessments because we would go into an area and the mission might be, for example, when the Marines went into Falujah, for
about 4 weeks prior, the main MSRs going into Falujah were shut down. So what we did was go up and down the MSRs stopping traffic, getting them off the road. We did that a lot with the loud speaker. So there’s not really, I guess you would say it’s not complicated, psyop. It’s really simple. So the doctrine, sticking to doctrine, is very simple. So I would say we did stick to the doctrine, but the doctrine that we used was elementary.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Education and/or training played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Harris: I definitely agree with that. The pre-mobilization training that we did at point was not at a location like Ft. Dix. It was like a 4 month pre-mob trainup. We did 2 weeks at Ft. McCoy that was done by I guess ? but specifically I deployed with the 307th but the 362nd the company I’m in now had just returned from Iraq so they were the ones who were conducting the training. And then we did 2 weeks of training at Ft. Bragg which was mostly just range time and the administrative part of mobilizing. But that training was really good because we were basically training on fresh information from the ground. It was psyop relevant, I think was the most important part of that. But if we hadn’t had that training we would have really been going in there blind.

Segerstrom: How did education and training affect the employment or influence the employment of tactical psyop teams during your deployment?

Harris: Going with the last question, I think it was really important. One thing that I noticed was my team leader on my first deployment was reclass, and he could do the tactical side of it, but as far as going and talking to people and having objectives and all that, I don’t know what they were really training for the team leader at that point, but going in with lines of questioning and everything. I don’t think that was even existing at that point so it affected us a lot, but mostly on the tactical side.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement would you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree, and explain? Command relationships played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Harris: For this one, I put neither agree nor disagree. It does, but as far as a team leader working for the battalion commander, that relationship in that tour was not that important, because you were doing mostly tactical operations. You would just go in, the only time you would spend at battalion would be to find out what companies were doing what missions and whatever missions you saw that were relevant you would go talk to the company commander and platoon leader. And the company commander and platoon leader relationships were 10 times more important than the battalion commander relationships, because the battalion commander was I guess so overwhelmed with everything going on that he was not able to get his fingers into the actual missions being conducted as much. It was more just give his intent and then the lower level officers were
the ones actually going out and planning the stuff in accordance with the battalion commander’s intent.

Segerstrom: Based on your experience, how did command relationships (supporting unit vs. supported unit, OPCON, TACON, ADCON, etc.) affect or influence the employment of TPTs?

Harris: I don’t really think if affected us much at all. For the most part, when you go out and work with a unit, they’re just there to help you with whatever you need. They don’t usually ask how you’re attached to them. They just find out what you can do for them. If you need something you just go to them. You don’t have to brief that battalion commander. If you need motor pool support, you go to that motor pool, tell them that you’re working with them, and they’ll help you out. I really don’t think there was much of an effect there.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the success of TPTs?

Harris: By far I would say the fact that we did our pre-mobilization training with psyop soldiers who had just gotten back from the theater of operations we were going into was the biggest contributor to our success. If we hadn’t done that, you know it seems like if you don’t know what situation you’re going into, when you go in and you have to start making up your own stuff because the 2 week left seat right seat is really not long enough to get in and get into the battle rhythm of the team that you’re replacing. So often times you find yourself for two weeks overwhelmed and you have to sit down and figure everything out and start over on your own. Going in there with an idea of what kind of operations we would be expecting I think really helped our left seat right seat, and again the fact that it was mostly kinetic operations which are pretty simple and the psyop support helped too with us being able to go in and be effective.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the failure of TPTs?

Harris: This is a question that psyop guys sit and talk about all the time. I think we were effective for that stage in the war. At that point security was so bad that you couldn’t do any long-term stuff. You couldn’t go in and work with the sheik as you saw later after General Petraeus came out with the coin strategy you saw we were able to do more long-term and a lot more targeted operations. Not necessarily after an individual, but to effect changes and at that point it was just non-stop counter IE and finding bad guys. I don’t think that we failed at TPTs, I think that the overall way we were going about our business, the entire U.S. operation in Iraq, was just a little off. But as far as what operations were going on, I think we supported those pretty good.

Segerstrom: Thank you.
10. John Harris 2

Segerstrom: This is Lorne Segerstrom. It is November 5, 2011 and I am conducting a historical interview on tactical psyop with – please state your name.

Harris: John Harris.

Segerstrom: What was your assigned unit during the deployment?

Harris: I worked for the 362nd Psyop Company out of Fayetteville, Arkansas.

Segerstrom: What was your rank and position during this deployment?

Harris: I was a Sergeant and then promoted to Staff Sergeant. I served the whole tour as the Team Leader.

Segerstrom: What were the dates of this deployment?

Harris: August 2009 to May 2010.

Segerstrom: What was the region of deployment?

Harris: Central Iraq.

Segerstrom: What was your supported unit?

Harris: I started out with the 30th HBCT, North Carolina, National Guard and they were replaced by 1st Brigade, 3rd ID halfway through the tour.

Segerstrom: I am going to ask you several questions. Some of these I will qualify or quantify before I ask them. For the first question qualify with never, seldom, some of the time, usually or all of the time and please explain. Tactical Psychological Operations Teams (TPT) are used effectively (used in functional area and according to doctrine) in operations.

Harris: I put some of the time. Once again, we found ourselves at an odd point in the war and as far as doctrine was concerned, I found that it always kind of lags behind the situation on the ground, and doctrine is actually written after finding a way to be successful. The part with this tour that would be difficult I guess would be, the conventional units have restructured themselves and now they have IO as a big component. It’s probably the biggest component besides just going out and getting bad buys in the coin strategy and we found ourselves working with and kind of for, IO officers at the battalion and brigade level. You can follow doctrine and most of the times we tried to but a lot of the problems we encountered there’s not necessarily a doctrine for. What you have to do is kind of look around and see what other teams are doing in the
same situation and try to replicate that in your area. But the big problem is if you have an IO officer who wants to work and wants to utilize you, you can get a lot of good stuff done. If you have an IO officer who wants to think that he's the subject matter expert on your particular job, and you come up with an opinion that’s different than his, or a method to do something that’s different than his, or an idea that he thinks can’t be done, you’re hamstrung.

Segerstrom: What percentage of your time while deployed did you spend working in your functional area?

Harris: I would say 75% or more. The biggest thing we did this tour, because of the SOFA agreement, U.S. forces were drawing down, part of the commander’s intent, the division commander’s intent was, I believe to be responsible for draw down of forces and transition of authority. From that we deduced that we could go out and conduct operations and try to influence some change, but that was going to be a short-term deal. Long-term, U.S. forces were going to be gone, so we figured the best thing we could do was to try to train Iraqi military personnel to utilize the media, any capabilities they have, as far as information on battlefield was concerned and we wanted to train them to do that so that when we left, there wasn’t a fall out and there was something going on after we left.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree or disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Doctrine played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Harris: That’s kind of an odd question to answer. There was no doctrine on the actual teaching that we were doing. There were directives from division to conduct the training. There were some classes put together that we fell in on, but there was no doctrine. There were just directives. But as far as the classes are concerned, they were very similar to the psyop doctrine that we were taught. So in part, there was no doctrine for what we were doing, but as far as the passing of the torch I guess you would say to the Iraqis, doctrine played a huge part.

Segerstrom: How did doctrine affect or influence the employment of TPTs during your deployment?

Harris: Like I said, mostly the doctrine that we had was just used as tools to teach the Iraqis or as material to teach the Iraqis. The teaching of the class was more, had more to do with leadership, and as far as NCOs were concerned, just basic instructing and I guess that’s not psyop doctrine, but Army doctrine. We teach classes the way we’d been taught classes so in that aspect Army doctrine affected us, but psyop, like I said, the doctrine was a little bit behind what was actually going on.
Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Education and/or training played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Harris: I agree with that. Like I said, we were using the psyop doctrine as material to teach the Iraqis but at the same time we brought our own experience with that doctrine from prior deployments. We didn’t have just one guy doing stuff. We were pulling from all the team leaders and the detachment personnel as well. The education and training that we received as psyop soldiers was really good to use the examples to teach the Iraqis because it’s a lot easier to learn something if you can give examples and most of our experience was in Iraq, so when we gave examples of things that happened in Iraq, the Iraqis obviously were familiar with it, so it helped a lot.

Segerstrom: So how did education and training affect the employment or influence the employment of tactical psyop teams during your deployment?

Harris: I don’t know that it affected us that much because it really felt like for a little bit we were steering blind, we were just trying to conduct psyop missions. It was really difficult because of the type of missions that the units were running. At that point in the war, we were so focused on civil affairs, using ? funds and micro?, stuff like that, that there wasn’t a good opportunity to use psyop so we really weren’t sure what to do. We were trying to find things to do. Once we fell into the training role, it really took off, but we weren’t taught to do that training. To be honest, we weren’t really sure, like we had heard a little about teaching or training Iraqis, but we had no experience with it. The training for what we did, I guess, once again, it was a little bit behind.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement would you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree, and explain? Command relationships played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Harris: I agree with that. If you have a commander that wants to utilize you, you’re going to be able to do a lot of great things. If you have a commander that doesn’t want to utilize you or doesn’t want to deal with the extra tools that he has at his disposal, then you’re going to fall down into a staff and the staff may or may not want to use you. But if you can get one good win with a commander early on, then they’re going to have faith in you. That’s the biggest problem with psyop, they don’t know you, they haven’t trained with you, you don’t know who they’ve trained with at ? or ? or anything like that and you don’t know if the people are being serious there. So the command relationship is really everything or nothing. A lot of times with what we were doing, I would need from the military training teams, I would need a colonel or a lieutenant colonel from one of their teams to do something and I can’t get them to do that. But when I get my battalion commander on board, and it gets put into their operations and we’re writing CONOPS for what I’m coming up with, then there’s a check on that guy. If he’s not doing his job the colonel sees it, because we’re talking about these CONOPS in the meetings so if you can
get your commanders on your side then you can get people who are way outside your normal realm of being able to reach out and touch to be able to do the work for you.

Segerstrom: Based on your experience, how did command relationships (supporting unit vs. supported unit, OPCON, TACON, ADCON, etc.) affect or influence the employment of TPTs?

Harris: Once again, I didn’t really have any problems with this. It’s something that we always kind of fear in psyop, that we’re going to have that power struggle between our supported unit and our headquarters unit of you belong to me. I didn’t run in to that. We had some problems getting billboards up because of contracting issues. They weren’t going to be able to get it up for a while because the contract wasn’t written ahead in time, far enough ahead in time that we could get those billboards up when we wanted. So there was some agitation there. So we just told them the contracting issue was there. There wasn’t anything we could do about it and as soon as it was done, we would get them up. That was about the only hiccup I had either tour with that struggle.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the success of TPTs?

Harris: The biggest by far, and I noticed this between my two tours, and this is not a doctrine thing, this is just kind of on personnel. My first tour, I had a good NCOIC but he didn’t ride us really hard. My second tour, my NCOIC was camped out up our rear end all the time to do stuff. At first it seemed like he was just riding us to ride us, but really because of our leadership’s motivation to get the job done at our detachment level, they put so much pressure on us that we had to do stuff. And normally, when other teams would say well we don’t have anything to do so we’ll chill today, we were having to try to find stuff to do and what happened is we ended up actually getting a lot of good stuff done because we weren’t allowed to be lazy. So I really think the biggest component to our success was the fact that we had leadership that went out of their way and inconvenienced themselves to make sure that we were doing our job. It’s easy to sit back and just say hey okay whatever people are doing. But it’s difficult to drive your guys to do extra work. That leadership is by far the most important thing.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the failure of TPTs?

Harris: Again, I wouldn’t say we failed, but something I have discussed with some of the detachment NCOICs that were originally in our unit there at the beginning of the war, was the handovers that are not that good with psyop. They’re not that good with any of the units, but the paperwork side as far as doctrine is concerned, as far as finding out whose spheres of influence are, conducting surveys, going out doing assessments, stuff like that. That’s not done over time periodically and so it’s really difficult for us to measure our success because your measure of effectiveness in generally psyop is something that can be something don’t be on the ? well that’s something that you can measure right now. But as far as your long-term campaigns, you’re not going to be able to measure that in one company’s tour so the measures of effectiveness for that were
pretty much nonexistent. So from the beginning of the war to the end of the war there’s no way we can put on paper, this village, over time we can mark one particular thing. So the biggest failure was we didn’t stick to doctrine like we should have and at every point at every tour you could have started, but you would show up and it’s just a lot of extra work to go ahead and do that kind of stuff because you can go get a lot of stuff done. The problem is you can put it in your reports, but if the guys that replace you don’t see exactly what you were doing and can measure themselves against what you were doing the rotation before, then you can find yourselves going a lot of different directions and you fall back and lose a lot of success. I think that is a problem psyop wide. That’s going to be difficult to fix. We can’t fix it now, but for future missions, that’s something that’s got to be done. Soldiers are going to have to find the time to do it.

Segerstrom: Thank you.

11. William Huber

Segerstrom: This is Lorne Segerstrom. It is November 5, 2011 and I am conducting a historical interview on tactical psyop with – please state your name.

Huber: Captain William Huber.

Segerstrom: What was your assigned unit during the deployment?

Huber: I was with the 307th Tactical Psyop Detachment and we fell under the 319th Psyop Company.

Segerstrom: What was your rank and position during this deployment?

Huber: I was a Captain and I was assigned as the Detachment Commander.

Segerstrom: What were the dates of this deployment?

Huber: We hit theater August 2010 and we left theater in June 2011.

Segerstrom: What was the region of deployment?

Huber: We were in Afghanistan RE East.

Segerstrom: What was your supported unit?

Huber: We supported two brigades. The first brigade was the 173rd Airborne Brigade out of Italy and then we supported the 410 Mountain Division.
Segerstrom: I am going to ask you several questions. Some of these I will qualify or quantify before I ask them. For the first question qualify with never, seldom, some of the time, usually or all of the time and please explain. Tactical Psychological Operations Teams (TPT) are used effectively (used in functional area and according to doctrine) in operations.

Huber: With my TPTs, I would say all of the time.

Segerstrom: Can you expand on that a little bit more?

Huber: Yes, my TPTs were assigned to four different battalions, and they were utilized with every mission that they went on with the battalion. It ranged from loud speaker operations or simple face to face with the local villagers and village elders. So I would say, yes, all the time they were used when they went on missions.

Segerstrom: What percentage of your time while deployed did you or your team spend working in your functional area?

Huber: I would say at least 75% or more.

Segerstrom: During the times that you weren’t working in your functional area what kind of tasks were you doing? Security, guard duty, absolutely nothing?

Huber: The type of tasks they were doing, they were just kind of working with the Afghans. They were working with other units, a lot of just kind of admin and logistical type work.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree or disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Doctrine played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Huber: I would say that I strongly agree with my teams.

Segerstrom: Can you expand on that?

Huber: They very quickly early in our deployment they were able to work closely with the battalion S-3s and the battalion commander and get his intent on what their mission was and what the battalion commander needed them to do in his AO. So they were close with the S-3s and pretty much all of their missions was working with the local populace. So again, strongly agree that doctrine played a direct role.

Segerstrom: How did doctrine affect or influence the employment of TPTs during your deployment?
Huber: Like I mentioned, early on they developed a quick relationship with the battalion S-3s and the battalion commanders and then that trickled down to company commanders and platoon leaders that actually went on missions. They were on missions the company commanders and platoon leaders let them have pretty much free reign to get into the villages and talk to who they needed to talk to, gather information, atmospherics, things like that. So that’s pretty much what they did.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Education and/or training played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Huber: I would strongly agree. My teams were highly educated and they had a lot of experience, prior experience as psyop soldiers. So we had a good, the teams had a good three to four months of training trainup prior to being deployed. That training consisted of psyop classes at the company level and then once they went to RTC West which is at Ft. ? they got a full month of training, tactical and psyop training there, and once we hit on ? date we went to Ft. Dix and then ? came down and did additional psyop training and tactical training.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Education and/or training played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Huber: I would strongly agree. The reason why, again, I had a couple of teams that kind of struggled early with developing a good relationship with command. The reason why is prior psyop teams that were there before us had some issues. I would say personality conflicts and things like that. It took a little while for my teams to work through that and develop a strong relationship with especially the battalion S-3. The battalion IO was a huge factor in getting on missions and working psyop missions. Battalion commanders of course and I think one of the biggest effectiveness was working with those company commanders and platoon leaders that actually went on missions. They developed a close relationship with those guys and they would get a lot of extra duties to kind of integrate with them and help them on missions outside the psyop arena. So again, strongly agree.
Segerstrom: Based on your experience, how did command relationships (supporting unit vs. supported unit, OPCON, TACON, ADCON, etc.) affect or influence the employment of TPTs?

Huber: Our supporting unit, we had a close relationship with our supporting unit the 219th. They supported us with product and things like that so developing that close relationship helped us get product and which of course we needed to push out to the teams, my teams would push out to the missions but again develop those close relationships and maintain those and working through issues and misconceptions and things like that it made the teams more effective. So again like the IO the battalion IOs they worked close with them the battalion S-3s so the supported unit they really like that they really respected that we went above and beyond trying to work close with them and listen to them and especially getting to know the intent of what the missions were.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the success of TPTs?

Huber: Probably a combination of things, their previous psyop experience they had some very good training prior to being deployed quickly developing those command relationships with the different battalion sections and then just overall good communication within their battalion.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the failure of TPTs?

Huber: Afghanistan is very unique especially when you’re where we were at a mountainous region. I think one of the biggest failures is the teams were not able to get to villages as often as they liked. For example some of the villages, I went out on a mission with one of my TPTs some of the villages that we entered and talked to the leaders they haven’t seen coalition forces or U.S. forces in a year or twelve months so the difficulty of trying to influence or persuade a village or key leaders is that much harder if you don’t get back to that village on a regular basis so that was part of it and then the battalions well the brigade did not utilize the psyop planner like they should to plan actual psyop missions and that’s kind of one of my failures too I didn’t push that as strong as I should have to actually plan psyop missions specific missions to actually go back to those villages or concentrate in certain areas.

Segerstrom: Do you have any other closing thoughts?

Huber: No, this was my first psyop deployment and it was quite an eye opener and just I was fortunate I was able to get out with my teams on a few occasions and that was an eye opener just looking at some of the challenges and issues that they faced on a daily basis so especially seeing that they would try to work with certain villages and not be able to get back to that village on a regular basis the difficulties of trying to influence and persuade somebody is very challenging if you never see them.

Segerstrom: Well, thank you.
Segerstrom: This is Lorne Segerstrom. It is December 3, 2011 and I am conducting a historical interview on tactical psyop with – please state your name.

Lawson: Sam Lawson.

Segerstrom: What was your assigned unit during the deployment?


Segerstrom: What was your rank and position during this deployment?

Lawson: I began as an E-4 Corporal and moved up to 5.

Segerstrom: What were the dates of this deployment?

Lawson: It was 2004 to 2005.

Segerstrom: What was the region of deployment?

Lawson: Afghanistan.

Segerstrom: What was your supported unit?

Lawson: 3rd and 7th Special Forces Group.

Segerstrom: I am going to ask you several questions. Some of these I will qualify or quantify before I ask them. For the first question qualify with never, seldom, some of the time, usually or all of the time and please explain. Tactical Psychological Operations Teams (TPT) are used effectively (used in functional area and according to doctrine) in operations.

Lawson: Usually, usually were. Supporting the special forces at the time, the psyop mission kind of took a back seat. Some missions, not all of the time. We were also out there facilitating and they were not allowing us to do our psyop job and achieve the psyop objectives that we had in Afghanistan. So that would definitely be usually, but not every single mission.

Segerstrom: What percentage of your time while deployed did you spend working in your functional area?

Lawson: It would have been 75% or more. I found myself quite often, before I became a team chief, when I was an ATL, I would be in a support role or something else like sending out a sniper? or doing an ambush or something. Once I became a team chief and
I was able to actually do our job. I was actually able to get out and write my own con ops and my own op orders and get outside that wire with the other facilitators.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree or disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Doctrine played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Lawson: I would neither agree nor disagree on that one. Doctrine actually never really came into play when we were in Afghanistan. It was kind of a real shoot from the hip half job I would say. The actual, by the book, this is how you achieve psyop, was never undertaken really. It was kind of how can we best get the job done and kind of get outside the wire and do it.

Segerstrom: How did doctrine affect or influence the employment of TPTs during your deployment?

Lawson: Well, seeing how I was pretty much brand new to the unit at time, I got there about six months before we deployed, I really had no idea how to do psyop, especially doctrinally. We didn’t learn at AIT how to actually be psyopers and when my team chief was removed and I as thrust as a corporal into a team chief slot, I didn’t really understand fully what I was doing and how to get it done. So I really just kind of called some of the senior NCOs and said, how do I do this. They pretty much gave me a quick guideline of how to get outside the wire and how to conduct psyop. So mainly, doctrine didn’t really help out much at all.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Education and/or training played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Lawson: Strongly agree. Definitely strongly agree. I’m a huge fan of passing on the information and experience and that’s how I learned to become a psyoper. It’s pretty much how I go about it with my detachment of training and making sure the team chiefs are ready to step up to the next level and ATLs are ready to fill that team chief slot. It’s imperative that we have time and that we have the ability to function and be able to get out and get this experience from the veterans down to the new guys. We’re burning out so fast we’re losing this wealth of knowledge and experience, so we have to have the training.

Segerstrom: How did education and training affect the employment or influence the employment of tactical psyop teams during your deployment?

Lawson: Pretty much like I just said a minute ago, when I got ahold of all the seniors and they pretty much passed on the information on how to do it, that’s exactly how I employed the team and utilized it.
Segerstrom: Based on the following statement would you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree, and explain? Command relationships played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Lawson: I agree. My OIC at the time, his name was Captain?, well now he’s a major, He might be out by now, I’m not sure. He pretty much gave us the free reign to do what we had to do. He just said, these are our objectives, what we have to do as a detachment, how you accomplish that task and that mission is up to you so that was fantastic for us to have the ability to get anything done because we didn’t have that choke hold from our command.

Segerstrom: Based on your experience, how did command relationships (supporting unit vs. supported unit, OPCON, TACON, ADCON, etc.) affect or influence the employment of TPTs?

Lawson: Well, I’ve had experience with a separate unit. There was a national guard infantry unit that we were just attached to for a little while. But they took that attachment to mean we were operationally controlled by them, so they tried to dictate where we went and how we dispersed our detachment, and that pretty much stifled us. But when we were with the special forces group, I think we were TACON’d to them, and they just said our command relationship wasn’t a detachment they just said you help us out we’ll help you out and it was fantastic. But some supported units really take that micromanagement to a whole other level, and they think that because of our attachment relationship they can pretty much dictate and order us around to do whatever they want us to do, and that really limits, if not negates, our ability to conduct psyop.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the success of TPTs?

Lawson: The ability to have free reign. The ability to have either your direct superiors or whoever you’re supporting to say, hey this is our main goal. The mission and how you accomplish it is up to you. That is by far the largest contributor to any psyop team success, is having the ability to have the free reign to take the initiative to think outside the box and accomplish the mission.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the failure of TPTs?

Lawson: It was the stifling command relationship that I mentioned earlier from the command infantry unit, absolutely. That pretty much just shut us down.

Segerstrom: Any other thoughts on this deployment?

Lawson: I don’t know how much psyop we actually got done. We had a lot of things on paper, but I don’t know if we actually changed or influenced the target audience very effectively. Yeah, that’s pretty much it. We ran a lot of missions but I don’t know how effective we really were overall.
Segerstrom: Thank you.

13. Sam Lawson 2

Segerstrom: This is Lorne Segerstrom. It is December 3, 2011 and I am conducting a historical interview on tactical psyop with – please state your name.

Lawson: Sam Lawson.

Segerstrom: What was your assigned unit during the deployment?

Lawson: 362 Tactical Psyop.

Segerstrom: What was your rank and position during this deployment?

Lawson: Staff Sergeant and Team Chief.

Segerstrom: What were the dates of this deployment?


Segerstrom: What was the region of deployment?

Lawson: Sadr City in Baghdad, Iraq.

Segerstrom: What was your supported unit?

Lawson: 1st CAV.

Segerstrom: I am going to ask you several questions. Some of these I will qualify or quantify before I ask them. For the first question qualify with never, seldom, some of the time, usually or all of the time and please explain. Tactical Psychological Operations Teams (TPT) are used effectively (used in functional area and according to doctrine) in operations.

Lawson: Usually. Our command relationship with 2/5 CAV was stellar, because I wasn’t actually supporting the entire battalion because of the way everything was broken down with the Status of Forces Agreement. We pretty much surrounded Sadr City with just one battalion, and I was supporting a single company, and two other teams were supporting separate companies as well, just at different locations around Sadr City. But we were in the square area. It was fantastic. We really got along well with the command there, and so it became a more traditional deployment. We were actually conducting psyop. We were actually, how do I explain it, we pretty much had free reign to do what we needed to do. If I had a mission, or a place that I needed to go, or a KLE, a Key Leader Engagement to
conduct, I pretty much went on to the op order, cut a quick little FRAGO on it and then we conducted it. So it was very psyop specific and we weren’t being tasked or utilized in various facilitation roles or support roles that sometimes you get pulled into to make that relationship work with the command. Trying to butter your way into their good graces by helping them out with something else. We pretty much just hit the ground running and go.

Segerstrom: What percentage of your time while deployed did you spend working in your functional area?

Lawson: 75% or more. It wasn’t the full time because like I just said there are sometimes that you just have to do separate missions or fulfill a role, or fulfill a need for someone else to get what we need to do, to accomplish what I’m trying to shoot for. Sometimes I would go out and facilitate the S-2 with some specific points that are, what’s the term when they have their bullets that they’re going to accomplish?

Segerstrom: Their CCIR.

Lawson: Their CCIR, their MPRs, thank you. I would help the S-2 or I would do something for the 3, and then when I needed something they would say, hey Sgt Lawson you got it, here’s a platoon, do what you got to do. 75% or more, but not every time.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree or disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Doctrine played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Lawson: I would agree with that one. It was definitely not like Afghanistan where I had no clue what I was dong basically. I finally had enough experience and know how doctrine implies a psyop team should work and how it should function, especially how it should fall into that command support role and I was actually able to apply that a lot more and make it more effective to ensure that my team was outside the wire getting done what we had to get done basically.

Segerstrom: How did doctrine affect or influence the employment of TPTs during your deployment?

Lawson: As I just said, it helped me out. It helped me understand better the big picture and how psyop is really supposed to work. It wasn’t the make or break of how I used my team or how we decided to angle our point of attack on a mission, but it definitely was in the background and gave us that general guideline framework to operate in. but it was by no means the hard and fast rule as everyone well knows once they finally get deployed, you just wing it.
Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Education and/or training played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Lawson: Strongly agree, especially on this Iraq deployment, education really enhanced our ability to function as a psyop team with all three of us. I had two soldiers who hadn’t deployed before and didn’t have any experience in psyop. So as we’re going through we’re always expanding and dropping off information and experience to the younger soldiers. On top of that we also took over this whole IDO role, like Information Dissemination Operations education. So we were teaching Iraqis and trying to establish a chain of command for them and all of this. It was ridiculous what we tried to undertake. But while educating others, you’re also making yourself better. So that definitely helped my guys. When they’re teaching an Iraqi how to do IO or information dissemination, it helped them become even better psyopers.

Segerstrom: How did education and training affect the employment or influence the employment of tactical psyop teams during your deployment?

Lawson: As I said, it definitely helps. It’s the linchpin of any psyoper to be effective. You have to constantly be sharpening and honing your sword, and if you’re not soaking up information like a sponge from the old guys, you’re wrong.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement would you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree, and explain? Command relationships played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Lawson: Strongly agree. As I mentioned before, we had a fantastic relationship with our supported unit. Even at the battalion level, even though they weren’t collocated with us, but it was outstanding. If I needed anything or if I had a wild hair and I wanted to go somewhere that we’d never been before for whatever reason, they just jumped on it. These guys were dismounted CAV, so they’re tankers that are doing foot patrols in the biggest slum in the country. So they thought it was just fantastic to go out and see what psyop does because they thought we were like these high speed spook dudes. They just thought it was the coolest thing. They would come back and brag and say, I was out with psyop today, what’d you do?

Segerstrom: Based on your experience, how did command relationships (supporting unit vs. supported unit, OPCON, TACON, ADCON, etc.) affect or influence the employment of TPTs?

Lawson: For this deployment especially, our command relationship was fantastic and so we were able to do pretty much anything we needed to. I cannot for the life of me remember what the relationship was, if we were TACON or not. I’m not sure, but even if we were OPCON’d to them, they weren’t micromanagers so they wouldn’t try to move you like a chess piece. If I needed to go or switch to the ? or whatever reason, all we did
was given them a heads up and then we made the move and did what we had to do. That was very fruitful because they weren’t micromanagers. They stayed in their lane and we stayed in ours.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the success of TPTs?

Lawson: The ability to accomplish our mission with complete and 100% support from our supported unit. Like I said, if I had a KLE, or if I was trying to start a sociological spider clod of all the persons of interest in the area, they just said run with it, make it happen. Because I was getting the psyop mission accomplished and making the S-2s and 3s lives a lot easier, especially? That ability to do whatever I thought I needed to accomplish and then the free reign to do that was the biggest contributor to our success.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the failure of TPTs?

Lawson: For this deployment at this time, the Status of Forces Agreement. That really limited our ability to go out and accomplish certain things, certain missions and it really cut down our area of operations and the ability to go the majority of the places geographically. That as well as the agreement, some command somewhere, made with? that limited us in our geographic ability to go anywhere inside Sadr City as well. So just the geopolitical climate at the time really cut us down at the last quarter of our deployment. So we became and just focused on training the entire Iraqi command system in psyop and IO. We not in psyop, but in IO.

Segerstrom: Do you have any concluding thoughts on this deployment?

Lawson: I don’t on this one.

Segerstrom: Thank you.

14. Darren Lee

Segerstrom: This is Lorne Segerstrom. It is November 6, 2011 and I am conducting a historical interview on tactical psyop with – please state your name.

Lee: Darren Lee.

Segerstrom: What was your assigned unit during the deployment?

Lee: I was with the 310 Psyop Company.

Segerstrom: What was your rank and position during this deployment?

Lee: Sergeant, ATL.
Segerstrom: What were the dates of this deployment?

Lee: February 22 or ‘06 to April 21 of ’07.

Segerstrom: What was the region of deployment?

Lee: First it was Baghdad and then after about 3 months we moved up to ?, Salaadin Province.

Segerstrom: What was your supported unit?

Lee: For 6 months it was with 133 CAV of the 101\textsuperscript{st} Airborne and then it was with the ? 187 of 82\textsuperscript{nd} Airborne.

Segerstrom: I am going to ask you several questions. Some of these I will qualify or quantify before I ask them. For the first question qualify with never, seldom, some of the time, usually or all of the time and please explain. Tactical Psychological Operations Teams (TPT) are used effectively (used in functional area and according to doctrine) in operations.

Lee: Yes, we always had something to do. Even when we weren’t out on missions we still had a radio station that we had to run.

Segerstrom: So you would say usually, all of the time, or…?

Lee: I would say usually. There are always dumb things that have to be done that have nothing to do with it.

Segerstrom: What percentage of your time while deployed did you spend working in your functional area?

Lee: It was over 75%.

Segerstrom: When you weren’t working in your functional area what types of tasks were you doing?

Lee: Filling sand bags, doing maintenance on vehicles, helping some of the other ? helping the CA do their job sometimes we’d hold the watch for other groups.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree or disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Doctrine played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Lee: That’s a hard one. I will agree with it but it’s kind of hard to quantify that. We got that question a lot from the supported units. Quantify what you’re doing. That’s always a big question with us. I guess if the tip line starts ringing then we’re doing our job, but we
pretty much stayed with face to face. What is the message we’re pushing? So we stayed pretty much within the doctrinal framework.

Segerstrom: How did doctrine affect or influence the employment of TPTs during your deployment?

Lee: It’s a good framework if you don’t have a lot of time to decide what you’re going to do, you don’t have time to get creative. So you’ve always got that to lean on, you can always go out and do face to face and hand out whatever fliers they’ve got there.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Education and/or training played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Lee: Definitely agree. You have to be pretty sharp to do that job well. We had a hard time getting through to the infantry types what it is exactly that we’re doing and they’d think it’s crazy that we would even be doing it. I probably met more college educated in psyop than in any other branch I’ve been in. We MOB’d out of Ft. Bragg so we got a lot more of the psyop specific training than we did when we were training at Dix under the ? deal.

Segerstrom: How did education and training affect the employment or influence the employment of tactical psyop teams during your deployment?

Lee: Partly the way we were trained. Everybody on the team knew everybody else’s job so if my team leader had to go do something else, I could take the team and it was just another day in the park. It was no big shock to anybody or if the psyop specialist had to write a sitrep it wasn’t a big deal. They just got written and he made sure he put his name on it so they’d know who was doing it. But we took most of that training on ourselves. I know a lot of teams didn’t do that.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement would you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree, and explain? Command relationships played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Lee: I’m not real clear on what you meant by the question. I was looking at it earlier. Are you talking about the fact that you have two masters?

Segerstrom: Yes, you can definitely speak to that if you want to.

Lee: Generally, our supported unit, I was under three different supported commands, and they generally asked us whether they could do something they wanted to do, or asked us for product. They didn’t task us an awful lot. Most of our tasking came from our Psyop Headquarters and even then it was, here’s basically what we want to have happen, you know, go skin the cat however you want. So it was good. They were good. We had good
repoire with both of them. Some units, the supporting unit is really heavy on them and they got conflicts. That’s the nice thing about being TACON if you have to have it then sorry sergeant major we can’t do that.

Segerstrom: Based on your experience, how did command relationships (supporting unit vs. supported unit, OPCON, TACON, ADCON, etc.) affect or influence the employment of TPTs?

Lee: We were TACON. That helps if there’s a conflict because you know you have two daddy’s, but you have big daddy and another daddy. Without being disrespectful to the battalion, we came here to support the brigade. But if anybody’s talking about changing that, they can leave that alone because the CA guys were OPCON and they owned them.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the success of TPTs?

Lee: Probably giving the team chiefs enough leash to do what they needed to do without just throwing them out there on their own; flexibility.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the failure of TPTs?

Lee: Any of them that I knew that had a really bad time was because the team chiefs had not been in the saddle long enough to really know what they were doing. There was one team chief who had just gotten out of the Marine Corps and came into the Army Reserve. You’re an E-6. You’re a Team Chief. He got some school and everything but it’s not the same thing as if you have a chance to gel. A secondary thing was all the cross that was going on all the time. I still have not gone anywhere with this company. I’ve been here six years, almost seven years, just ? So that was a big complaint and I think they addressed that pretty well. There’s still some but it’s not massive like it was.

Segerstrom: Do you have any closing thoughts about this deployment?

Lee: No, I had a good tour. None of our people got killed. A few got injured, but nobody died. Personally, my team, everybody who ever went with us never got blown up or got their vehicle smashed but it didn’t matter anywhere we were in the convoy we never got a scratch on that vehicle I still don’t know why but we were really lucky and part of it was the training that we did that don’t come out the way you went in, don’t be predictable, don’t get in a rut, and I think that had a lot to do with it, but that’s still training and that’s not really psyop training, that’s really tactical training. That’s it.

Segerstrom: Okay, thank you.
15. Timothy P. Rogers

Segerstrom: This is Lorne Segerstrom. It is December 2, 2011 and I am conducting a historical interview on tactical psyop with – please state your name.

Rogers: Timothy P. Rogers.

Segerstrom: What was your assigned unit during the deployment?

Rogers: 362nd Psyop Company.

Segerstrom: What was your rank and position during this deployment?

Rogers: Sergeant First Class, I was the NCOIC of the Tactical Det.

Segerstrom: What were the dates of this deployment?

Rogers: 17 April 2009 through 31 May 2010.

Segerstrom: What was the region of deployment?

Rogers: We were just east of Baghdad so eastern Iraq.

Segerstrom: What was your supported unit?

Rogers: It was split between 10th Mountain and the 82nd.

Segerstrom: I am going to ask you several questions. Some of these I will qualify or quantify before I ask them. For the first question qualify with never, seldom, some of the time, usually or all of the time and please explain. Tactical Psychological Operations Teams (TPT) are used effectively (used in functional area and according to doctrine) in operations.

Rogers: Some of the time.

Segerstrom: Can you please explain?

Rogers: As I will elude to in further questions, it depended on what was going on in terms of the supported unit’s needs or desires, on the brigade level and the teams’ performances, and also how psyop was put forward and fostered throughout the process.

Segerstrom: What percentage of your time while deployed did you spend working in your functional area?
Rogers: I would say 50 percent in terms of pure psyop because I was an administrator which could have been applied to any endeavor really.

Segerstrom: Outside of the 50 percent on other tasks, what type of other tasks besides admin were you doing when you weren’t conducting psyop?

Rogers: Well in true military fashion, just as a platoon sergeant, I would fly out and check on my teams, and take the place of team members who were hiatus for whatever reasons, health reasons or on leave, and just kind of take the pulse of where they were living, see what they were being fed, how the quarters were. It’s important to know how they’re living.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree or disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Doctrine played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Rogers: I would say neither agree or disagree on that. Would you like me to expand on that one?

Segerstrom: Yes, if you could expand that would be great.

Rogers: I guess because doctrine, in terms of discussion basis, didn’t really come up too much between myself and the teams. I think our captain at the brigade level probably talked about it a little bit, but in pure education of just trying to get the psyop missions, the teams had a hard time because of the SOF(?) agreement, just getting the tactical stuff out there and then dealing with some nuts and bolts and that.

Segerstrom: How did doctrine affect or influence the employment of TPTs during your deployment?

Rogers: Well in terms of guidelines, we tried to, my big thing is, tried to get the teams, on the lower end of the spectrum, and our OIC, on the upper end of the spectrum, to push and promote psyop throughout the whole process. So in other words, if it’s not promoted strongly and defended or championed at the brigade level, brigade’s needs, wants, desires, whether they understand the psyop process or not, will be pushed out to the teams. When the teams are trying to push back against that in a more pure psyop way by representing their companies or their battalions rather, with the pure psyop boots on the ground mentality, and that’s where the wash comes. Where doctrine is out there and you want to use it, but it’s a struggle, and if you don’t champion it as a psyop operative, it’s not going to work.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Education and/or training played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.
Rogers: Agree.

Segerstrom: Can you explain?

Rogers: Again, throughout our training, we tried to get the teams to understand that when they go out there use the basic tenets of the psyop. You don’t lie, you don’t make promises, you respect the culture that you’re in, you respect the battalion that you’re in. All those basic tenets on a lower level work to make that team respected by its supporting unit and by the people on the streets so they can do their job, and get out there and represent everybody, and report to that supporting command, and the education and training. They have to do everything. Even how they walk and talk is important too because every day walking the talk and someone with that talk will say what do you guys do? There’s an enigma about psyop or MISO(?). Psyop, the connotation of that word is a very nebulous and mysterious to a lot of people so you have to every day be prepared with a thumbnail sketch of what you do that’s not threatening to them and also have to sell psyop at the same time so that you can be better postured to help them, especially the E-7 at the top of the key at that time and then if you’re an officer at the brigade level doing the same thing, then it carves out more of a free hand role for you throughout the brigade.

Segerstrom: How did education/training affect or influence the employment of TPTs during your deployment, specifically maybe some examples from the training that you listed, how did that affect you once you were downrange?

Rogers: For us it was really clearly marked by the fact that, I mean I knew how my two team chiefs who were ? to me had been trained. Not their education outside of the Army, but psyop wise. Then we picked up two team chiefs and I found out pretty quick that while one was highly articulate with a master’s degree, he was not tactical. He was highly adept at all things reports, writing, analyses, but when it came to being tactical, he had his team white knuckled with fear most of the time. So I found a slot for him on the PDD and pulled out a guy that had a lot of tactical experience who was good at reports and good at those other things, but also tactically minded. The other thing is too I found out who was really culturally intune in terms of doing a little bit of homework before going over there to find out what some of the morays are of that culture and also anticipate some of the questions they’re going to get on the street in terms of why are you here, why do we need you, why’d you come here in the first place, things that can not an international incident but on a local level can say well these guys don’t know what they’re talking about and they falter.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement would you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree, and explain. Command relationships played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Rogers: Agree. And the reason I say that is, for this experience, for this most recent last deployment for me IO was a new thing, a new spector for everybody. They didn’t really
intend to run psyop. They just initially I believe it was designed so that we were one of
the advisors under their umbrella. Well depending on, we had two different IO majors,
and the first one gave us kind of a free hand. Since brigade had a very strong will in terms
of what they wanted, some of their psyop products they requested, weren’t really
conducive to psyop in terms of following the pure philosophy of it, being vetted properly.
If our officer championed the psyop aspect of it, it would be more of a fight, but if we
cave in then we try to force those ideas that are not appropriate for psyop on our teams
then there’s a lower fight, and then sometimes things get out there that’s really not good
in terms of creating that cohesion that we want with the locals, the little time we have
with the locals because it’s so ? So if you have a really strong command structure at the
brigade level that either doesn’t understand or care what psyop is doing and we don’t
champion it properly because they aren’t writing our officers’ OERs then it can really
affect what happens to the teams. At the same time, the teams are requesting things that
they are keenly aware of their local area’s needs and if we’re busy catering to the brigade
which is disconnected from the ground then we’re not servicing the teams the way they
should be serviced, if that makes any sense. That’s the big thing, command structure, yes.
It’s command structure, but we’re there as advisors to them. We’re on loan to them. We
don’t belong to them. I think they do that for a reason.

Segerstrom: Based on your experience, how did command relationships (supporting unit
vs. supported unit, OPCON, TACON, ADCON, etc.) affect or influence the employment
of TPTs?

Rogers: It’s pretty much the same thing too. For example, the second psyop IO major we
got was a late deploy. So even within his own brigade, he was kind of ? He was under a
lot of pressure and he leaned heavily on my psyop officer to clue him in to what was
going on. Not so much with PAO and all those guys, but with us especially in meetings.
He was under such tremendous pressure that he wanted to micromanage everything, and
psyop has to have a certain amount of free hand. Any operative in the field has to have a
certain amount of free hand to be creative to get things done for you, and they have to be
trusted a little bit so that they can go out there work all the corners, all the dark shadow
areas, come back with some information for you.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the success of TPTs?

Rogers: The team chiefs I had. They worked very, very hard. If they were in an urban
environment the SOF(?) agreement dictated that and the Iraqis took advantage of this.
They could not go out without an Iraqi escort. So that meant there were a lot of areas
where they couldn’t go out because the Iraqi escort either couldn’t be raised, or couldn’t
be available, or it couldn’t be arranged with the supporting unit at the same time. So the
guys in the more rural areas had a lot more things they could do. But even the guys stuck
in the urban areas found ways to talk to water delivery guys, vendors, to get at least a feel
for what was going on outside. One guy connected with the local Iraqi police department
right outside his base his FOB(?), ended up getting involved in that way. So if it wasn’t
for the team chiefs working really hard and the teams we created, we wouldn’t have had
any activity. We would have just been doing what brigade wanted and brigade was insulated from the reality because our teams couldn’t get out there as much as they wanted to and sometimes the listening the ear of the brigade is a lot smaller than it should be in terms of listening to what my teams had to say.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the failure of TPTs?

Rogers: The SOFA(?) was a real shackle for us, ball and chain. It had that phase of the war versus my first time over, we were outside the gate all day every day, my team was, my team chief. The other thing was, how to say this politically correct, when a war zone or a theater is winding down, there is a lot less kinetic activity and what happens to that is the same structure is out there in terms of NCOERs, OERs, and it’s really hard to build an OER when there’s not much going on. Same with NCOER. So everybody’s trying to do things that, number 1, get their jobs, get the mission done; but number 2, if there’s a vacumm of things going on people get creative sometimes not in the best way. I think that damaged the psyop mission a lot of times because I had team chiefs fighting guys who were good idea fairies just because they wanted to get a bullet. It wasn’t purely mission focused sometimes and basically that’s it. I think some of that translated into a lack of support for the teams. I tried to champion what the teams wanted and the brigade was trying to exit with a big explosion of information. Sometimes they’d be putting out or promoting upteen thousand types of product that my team guys were telling them they didn’t want or need in the area. It was pushed out because everybody had an interest in those bullets. For me I think it was detrimental to the morale of the teams and to the mission.

Segerstrom: Any concluding thoughts?

Rogers: For me I think that, I can’t drive it home enough, is that obviously the teams have to be prepared and the officers have to be prepared to lead those teams. But if psyop or MISO(?), it doesn’t really matter what you call it, a rose is a rose, regardless. It has to be championed in terms of the process of psyop. It has to be, they have to understand that we have another chain of command parallel to or aside from them that we’re helping. But we can best help them if they listen to us so that we try to keep them out of trouble culturally, off channel 8 in a negative way, off the world view in a negative way, and actually connect with the locals. Because that’s what the teams do best and it’s a very difficult thing because it’s an intangible. You can’t quantify it. It’s qualified. It’s a quality of information that comes out. Numbers sure, product is great, but these people have been inundated with product for ten years now, both theaters, and they’re jaded to it. So if it’s not backed up or the predecessor isn’t a human being talking to face to face, if you get an insurance thing your mailbox, or political ad in your mailbox at home, you’re just going to discard it. It means nothing to you unless you can actually talk to that person. That’s the big thing for me. They had to be allowed to get out there. The teams are tactical. Yes, it’s dangerous sometimes, but they have to get out there and do their job.

Segerstrom: Thank you.
Segerstrom: This is Lorne Segerstrom. It is December 2, 2011 and I am conducting a historical interview on tactical psyop with – please state your name.

Rogers: Timothy P. Rogers.

Segerstrom: What was your assigned unit during the deployment?

Rogers: 345th Psyop Company out of Dallas, TX.

Segerstrom: What was your rank and position during this deployment?

Rogers: Staff Sergeant, I was a Tactical Psyop Team Chief.

Segerstrom: What were the dates of this deployment?

Rogers: It was from January of ’04 to October of ‘04.

Segerstrom: What was the region of deployment?

Rogers: Just south of Baghdad in central Iraq.

Segerstrom: What was your supported unit?

Rogers: We started out briefly with Old Ironsides for one month and then we were with 1st Cav full-time.

Segerstrom: I am going to ask you several questions. Some of these I will qualify or quantify before I ask them. For the first question qualify with never, seldom, some of the time, usually or all of the time and please explain. Tactical Psychological Operations Teams (TPT) are used effectively (used in functional area and according to doctrine) in operations.

Rogers: Usually.

Segerstrom: Can you explain?

Rogers: We were not free reign, but we were given the opportunity to, actually, I designed my own schedule. I replaced a team that had had an adversarial relationship with Old Ironsides when I first got there. For whatever reason, it was a very rank heavy team, a major and two E-7s. I just went in and said to the battalion leader, how would you like me to schedule this? and we designed a time that fit them, fit me, and enabled me to accomplish my mission to the best of both our needs.
Segerstrom: What percentage of your time while deployed did you spend working in your functional area?

Rogers: 100 percent. I slept four hours a night and I had a blast. That was the best job environment of any endeavor I’ve ever been engaged in in my life. I’ve been a police officer, I’ve done sales, I’ve done management in the airline business, team chief psyop team. If you care about the locals and if you care about your supporting unit you can save lives and have a real impact on the theater.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree or disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Doctrine played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Rogers: I would say I agree to the extent that I had the ability to make sure that the doctrine was followed, that I was following doctrine correctly. It was my first time as a team chief. I was new to psyop. I’d been a paratrooper years ago and had a 12-year hiatus. I came in and went to the one-month reclass course and then got trained trained up by 345th. I went in there and then found out that that was my forte because I had the maturity to deal with all the personality traits of both the battalion and my team, and also the ? potentially threatening or feigning to threat actions of the people on the street because I was a police officer before. So I wasn’t intimidated. I had a good time. I was able to connect my team with the supporting unit very well.

Segerstrom: How did doctrine affect or influence the employment of TPTs during your deployment?

Rogers: I was fortunate in that both battalion commanders were well versed in psyop before I got there. The one that was only there for a month, even though they’d had an adversarial relationship with the previous team, opened up to me immediately. And the second group, LTC Bowman, he was brilliant but he was not arrogant in any way. So he was listening to me in my first case brief and he said what do you need? At then at the end of it he said what do you need? Basically at the end of my speech he said so you’re going to keep me out of trouble culturally aren’t you? Basically besides giving him ? So he understood the doctrine and that was key for me to be able to work within that framework.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Education and/or training played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Rogers: I would agree with that. Obviously, you have to have people that understand psyop before they go over there. But to segue a little bit into the next part, the 345th was really good about making sure that all the team chiefs were on board with the tactical side, the survivability side of it ? vehicle things like that. So that built up confidence and then the 362nd made sure before we left town that we had the 5-week course in Arabic.
So we were fairly confident going in and I was fortunate that I was much older than most of the soldiers so I had a lot of comfort zones. Going outside they were fine with me, going outside the wall, talking to battalion commanders that were sometimes younger than I was. It worked out really really well. But the training in terms of psyop was important because you had to be excited about what you were doing. You couldn’t just go out there and fake it because Iraqis, and I’m sure Afghanistan is the same way, they can sense weakness. They can sense if you don’t really believe in what you’re doing or what you’re talking about.

Segerstrom: How did education/training affect or influence the employment of TPTs during your deployment, specifically maybe some examples from the training that you listed, how did that affect you once you were downrange?

Rogers: Like I said the diligence and the training that was conducted by both the 362nd and the 345th. The 345th is an airborne unit and they took a lot of pride in their tactical side but they had a lot of team chiefs that were very well into sharing information because they had just come back from psyop team chief experience in Afghanistan. It was a more kinetic environment and I was able to cherry pick what they knew and apply it to a post invasion environment because Iraq was a lot, my impression of it was, it was much more developed in terms of a road network and a the society and the fact that they were expecting us to come and help rebuild. So I think they were aware of that and they passed that on through their training. They tempered their training that way. So I think that was very important. My team, I was able to develop my team to the point with my team that I could send all three of us in different directions and they could all do their own sitreps, all do their own face to face. So we instead of offering one mission per day, I could do three. So it worked out very well for our team.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement would you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree, and explain. Command relationships played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Rogers: It was crucial.

Segerstrom: Strongly agree?

Rogers: Strongly agree. I didn’t have a lot of time to establish a relationship with the one that was there for one month but even that battalion commander would be in briefings and I would be behind him and he would say where’s my psyop guy? when it came my turn. Lieutenant Colonel Bowman was always asking for me. In fact he called me in from a mission so he could ask my opinion on whether he should take a chaplain with him to meet a ?, a guy that I had arranged an appointment with, and he was a tough guy to get an appointment with. I said I would bring him in the truck and don’t introduce him until you get permission to. The fact that he asked me, an E-6, a lieutenant colonel asked me, that it meant that I cracked that envelope. It didn’t matter what rank we were. It didn’t matter what expertise we were.
Segerstrom: Based on your experience, how did command relationships (supporting unit vs. supported unit, OPCON, TACON, ADCON, etc.) affect or influence the employment of TPTs?

Rogers: It affected it in that he gave me free reign. I made a schedule and I submitted it to his S-3 and said this is what I’m going to do in the next two weeks for you and he never questioned it. I said obviously sir I’ll respond to anything that you need, any missions that come up? whatever. He basically gave me free reign because he trusted me because we established credibility right away and we delivered, constantly delivered. So that? rebuilding that wall of credibility and relationship so I always had free reign.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the success of TPTs?

Rogers: I think the biggest thing was that we had a lot of freedom. If I knew there was a hot spot and I started to report those. I kind of tracked that and would give it to them because they were too busy to catch on with it. I would advise the captain of the watch that was on the mission with me and they would pass it up. We shared credibility and shared information with the S-2 so we had a great relationship within that supported unit. I think relationships are key because you can’t function, if there’s animosity or “oneupsmanship”, you can’t function very well.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the failure of TPTs?

Rogers: In that tour I can’t really think of any. I heard of other teams that had difficulties with their supporting units. If you have a tough time, somebody that either totally discounts what psyop brings to the table or just has a character difference with team chief and the team chief isn’t wise enough to say hey ATL you get along with this guy better or I want you to take? If that doesn’t happen I can see how things could come around? because if you can’t get out you have nothing to report.

Segerstrom: Any concluding thoughts?

Rogers: I would just say I think it’s one of the best jobs the military has to offer. It beats being a pilot. They get insulated from the world. I had a nephew that was a captain and ended up in? ranger? delta force. But he didn’t get to work with the men as closely as I did. In a three-man team you work closely with your men. You can go out there and really have an impact as long as it’s a coordinated effort between teams across the theater, these teams can do really good things.

Segerstrom: Thank you.
Segerstrom: This is Lorne Segerstrom. It is December 2, 2011 and I am conducting a historical interview on tactical psyop with – please state your name.

Serpa: David Serpa.

Segerstrom: What was your assigned unit during the deployment?

Serpa: The 361st Psyop Company.

Segerstrom: What was your rank and position during this deployment?

Serpa: Specialist. I was a Psyop Specialist on the Tactical Team.

Segerstrom: What were the dates of this deployment?


Segerstrom: What was the region of deployment?

Serpa: Northern Iraq.

Segerstrom: What was your supported unit?

Serpa: 1st Special Warfare Group, 25th Infantry Division, and 172nd Striker Brigade.

Segerstrom: I am going to ask you several questions. Some of these I will qualify or quantify before I ask them. For the first question qualify with never, seldom, some of the time, usually or all of the time and please explain. Tactical Psychological Operations Teams (TPT) are used effectively (used in functional area and according to doctrine) in operations.

Serpa: Usually. I think it has a lot to do with operational constraints, rules of engagement, and the effectiveness of the individual team.

Segerstrom: What percentage of your time while deployed did you spend working in your functional area?

Serpa: 100%.

Segerstrom: Can you expand on that? What type of activities were you doing within your functional area?

Serpa: During this deployment we did all psyop spectrum of operations from key leader engagements to effectively supporting supported units and kinetic operations such as
raids and ? and things like that. We also did loud speaker broadcasts, media engagements through radio, the whole spectrum of operations.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree or disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Doctrine played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Serpa: I would disagree. Doctrine gives us a baseline or foundation to start from but psyop is really an attainable skill set learned through experience, ingenuity, and creativity.

Segerstrom: How did doctrine affect or influence the employment of TPTs during your deployment?

Serpa: I would say the same thing. It just kind of gave us a starting point and then through experience and past experiences and, I wouldn’t say making it up as you go, but just finding out what works at the time.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Education and/or training played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Serpa: I would neither agree or disagree. And I say that because it has to do with each individual team. Some teams have more training than others but some teams work together better than others. Tactical proficiency, I would say tactical proficiency directly related to effectiveness as far as mission capability. But as far as psyop training, I think that’s lacking, especially institutionally because after you come out of AIT there’s really nothing until you go ? Phase II. There needs to be some kind of team chief school to teach you exactly how to be a tactical psyoper other than the stuff they teach you at AIT.

Segerstrom: How did education and training affect the employment or influence the employment of tactical psyop teams during your deployment?

Serpa: Like I said, sir, it would have to be, it’s just depends on the team itself and what they need to be successful, but I would say that tactical training was the number one thing that made us successful especially in the operating environment we were in.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement would you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree, and explain? Command relationships played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Serpa: I would strongly agree.

Segerstrom: Can you expand upon that?
Serpa: Depending on your supported unit and what their mentality is about detachments or just personalities, that supported unit that the TPT is with needs to know their left and right limits on what they can or cannot do, either for or with that psyop team. Also and how they should support or what they have to give or expect from that TPT, and I think that’s laid out in the command relationship.

Segerstrom: Based on your experience, how did command relationships (supporting unit vs. supported unit, OPCON, TACON, ADCON, etc.) affect or influence the employment of TPTs?

Serpa: I would say greatly and ideally in the best command relationship would probably be OPCON and general support. And the reason I said that is this gives full flexibility to the psyop chain of command over their teams but allows the teams to get everything they need from the supported units, i.e. equipment if something breaks, gas, ammo, food, shelter, etc.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the success of TPTs?

Serpa: During this deployment it would have definitely been tactical prowess because this was a very kinetic environment and you could be the best psyopers in the world but if you don’t have the tactical skills to survive on the battlefield it doesn’t matter because those other skills are a moot point.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the failure of TPTs?

Serpa: I would say lack of experience, lack of teamwork, and failure of leadership over support.

Segerstrom: Any concluding thoughts about this deployment?

Serpa: There was a lot of operational restriction on this deployment for psyop just because it was so kinetic in that there were a lot of bullets flying around so the ability to get out and do certain key leader engagements and things like that just wasn’t there because there wasn’t that level of warfare and that wasn’t the focus.

Segerstrom: Thank you.

18. David Serpa 2

Segerstrom: This is Lorne Segerstrom. It is December 2, 2011 and I am conducting a historical interview on tactical psyop with – please state your name.

Serpa: David Serpa.
Segerstrom: What was your assigned unit during the deployment?

Serpa: I was with the 361 Psyop Company.

Segerstrom: What was your rank and position during this deployment?

Serpa: I was a Staff Sergeant, Team Chief.

Segerstrom: What were the dates of this deployment?


Segerstrom: What was the region of deployment?

Serpa: Iraq.

Segerstrom: What was your supported unit?

Serpa: I worked with 1st CAV and 4th ID.

Segerstrom: I am going to ask you several questions. Some of these I will qualify or quantify before I ask them. For the first question qualify with never, seldom, some of the time, usually or all of the time and please explain. Tactical Psychological Operations Teams (TPT) are used effectively (used in functional area and according to doctrine) in operations.

Serpa: I would say all of the time.

Segerstrom: Can you please expand on that?

Serpa: Being that this was a little later in the war, we experienced the Status of Forces Agreement implication during this deployment so the optempo slowed quite a bit per my previous deployment. So instead of going out 3 times a day and on over 300 combat missions you go out like once, twice a week, and just because of partnership and different things like that constraints on the deployment. I would say that the slow optempo definitely affected how many times we went out, but when we did go out we were utilized as a tactical psyop team in that capacity.

Segerstrom: What percentage of your time while deployed did you spend working in your functional area?

Serpa: I would say 50% just because of the slow optempo.

Segerstrom: What activities were you doing when you weren’t conducting psyop?
Serpa: When we weren’t conducting psyop out in sector we were either preparing for operations or just equipment maintenance, team training, as a team chief, attending different battle staff meetings and planning and just helping out the supporting unit any way I could.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree or disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Doctrine played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Serpa: I would disagree.

Segerstrom: Can you expand upon that?

Serpa: For psyop doctrine is intangible, or I mean doctrine and psyop is an intangible thing. I mean a lot of times measures of effectiveness are hard to obtain especially for a supported unit because psyop a lot of times takes place over a long amount of time, and that maneuver commander wants things that he can see happen now, things that he can touch, like a product or some kind of backpack or something that he can hand out as a quantitative number. I would say that doctrine for psyop kind of gives you kind of a baseline, but you have to kind of be creative and have the ingenuity to kind of figure it out as you go.

Segerstrom: How did doctrine affect or influence the employment of TPTs during your deployment?

Serpa: I would say that the only time that it really played a part in this deployment was with command relationships and that’s a different question.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Education and/or training played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Serpa: I would agree.

Segerstrom: Can you expand upon that?

Serpa: Obviously, being a soldier, any training is going to help you out no matter what you do so the more training you have hopefully the better at your job you’re going to be. For this deployment specifically it would have to be cultural awareness training, language training that I didn’t really get my first tour and it was tailored to the battlespace that I was going to take over so when I hit the ground running I knew I had a lot more cultural awareness and some situational awareness of what was going on.

Segerstrom: How did education and training affect the employment or influence the employment of tactical psyop teams during your deployment?
Serpa: Yes, it made me more situationally and culturally aware and I think that was just because this deployment I was a team chief and my prior deployments I wasn’t. I was brand new to the Army before so I didn’t think of it like that so I did a lot more to prepare myself and my team.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement would you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree, and explain? Command relationships played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Serpa: I would agree.

Segerstrom: Can you expand upon that?

Serpa: This deployment, we had a lot of problems with our supported unit. It was a field artillery unit working in an infantry capacity with battlespace and so a field artillery unit isn’t really designed to be utilized as a maneuver unit and those soldiers aren’t trained to do that mission so it made it kind of hard on us, not only trying to integrate with personality conflicts but the capacity in which they wanted to use the team.

Segerstrom: Based on your experience, how did command relationships (supporting unit vs. supported unit, OPCON, TACON, ADCON, etc.) affect or influence the employment of TPTs?

Serpa: I would say greatly. The psyop command needed full control over the teams and with this instance they weren’t utilizing us properly as they should have so I ended up because of our command relationship being general support our detachment was able to pull us from that battalion and that battalion did not get follow up support.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the success of TPTs?

Serpa: Being experienced and situationally and culturally aware of what was going on and then also tactical prowess.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the failure of TPTs?

Serpa: Integration issues with supported battalion and lack of experience.

Segerstrom: Do you have any closing thoughts?

Serpa: No, I don’t.

Segerstrom: Thank you.
19. James Spears

Segerstrom: This is Lorne Segerstrom. It is November 5, 2011 and I am conducting a historical interview on tactical psyop with – please state your name.

Spears: James Spears.

Segerstrom: What was your assigned unit during the deployment?

Spears: 399th Psychological Operations Company

Segerstrom: What was your rank and position during this deployment?

Spears: E-4, Specialist, Assistant Team Leader

Segerstrom: What were the dates of this deployment?

Spears: May 2010 to February 2011.

Segerstrom: What was the region of deployment?

Spears: North Iraq, Salah Ad Din(?) Province, Mozul

Segerstrom: What was your supported unit?

Spears: 2/3 ID and then 4/1 CAV

Segerstrom: I am going to ask you several questions. Some of these I will qualify or quantify before I ask them. For the first question qualify with never, seldom, some of the time, usually or all of the time and please explain. Tactical Psychological Operations Teams (TPT) are used effectively (used in functional area and according to doctrine) in operations.

Spears: Some of the time in my opinion. It all depends on your supported unit and also their previous relationship with psyop. If you come in and they don’t know what you do, you’re not going to be used. If you come in and you’re replacing a team that didn’t know what to do, didn’t know what they were doing, you’re not going to be used because they are just going to think all psyopers are just stupid and don’t know what they’re doing. But on the other hand, sometimes they have had good experiences with psyopers, or just have never had any or just are really interested in it, and you get used really well.

Segerstrom: What percentage of your time while deployed did you spend working in your functional area?

Spears: About 75 % I would say, or more.
Segerstrom: During the times that you weren’t working in your functional area what kind of tasks were you doing? Security, guard duty, absolutely nothing?

Spears: Well when I wasn’t being used, it was basically absolutely nothing. When I wasn’t being utilized, I just wasn’t.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree or disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Doctrine played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Spears: Neither agree nor disagree. Again, it all just depends on the supporting unit. If they don’t know your doctrine, it’s thrown out the window. I had an IO officer personally tell me to lie on a product because they thought they knew what they were doing when it came to psyop, but they had no idea what they were doing. I told them no, I wouldn’t do that and basically got a big middle finger. They went to my team leader who was pretty new to psyops so he just kind of rolled over.

Segerstrom: How did doctrine affect the employment of TPTs during your deployment?

Spears: Well it made some enemies for some teams like with that example earlier of that IO officer. He didn’t like me at all after that. They keep wanting you to do things. The supporting unit, for the most part, doesn’t care about the doctrine. They don’t care what you can do, or what you should do, or how you need to do it. They only care that you do what they want you to do. But that’s not how it should work. They need to basically ask you how to get this done. But they think they know what they’re talking about for the most part, so they tell you to do it this way, but you can’t. So a lot of the times it will get them upset at you and they’ll just stop using you, or they’ll just make your life even worse by doing logistical things, you know.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Education and/or training played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Spears: Strongly agree. I put agree, but I want to switch that to strongly agree. The only way a psyop team can be effective is if every single member of the team knows exactly what they’re doing, knows psyop well. Even people that come straight out of AIT and have no real experience still know what they’re doing. As long as they’re passionate about it, it’s great. On the other hand, if they have no idea what they’re doing, you’re not going to make a change at all. You’re just a waste of space. You should have never been deployed.

Segerstrom: How did education/training affect or influence the employment of TPTs during your deployment?
Spears: We had teams from a brand new unit, the 399th. It was their first deployment. During the deployment, it actually got disbanded, so it was their only deployment. Most of the team leaders were all reclass. Most of the teams total were all reclass or just straight out of AIT, so none of them really had any experience. They had knowledge, but they didn’t have as much as they probably should have per team, so a lot of them were kind of streamrolled by IO or by the psyop planner at the supported unit. On the other hand, there were some that did have good experience and knew how to talk to the supported unit, and knew how to get them to do what they wanted to do. If you’ve got the right training and the right education as a psyoper, you’re going to do great things. If you don’t you’re going to do nothing.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement would you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree, and explain. Command relationships played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Spears: Like relationships between supported and supporting?

Segerstrom: Right.

Spears: Strongly agree. If my company commander doesn’t get along with 2/3’s commander, I’m not going to be used. Not only is the TPT reflecting well or poorly on the commander if the commander isn’t a good commander, that looks poorly on us. They’re going to think we’re the same. If they don’t get along, we’re not going to get along with that unit. We’re not going to get used well at all.

Segerstrom: Based on your experience, how did command relationships (supporting unit vs. supported unit, OPCON, TACON, ADCON, etc.) affect or influence the employment of TPTs?

Spears: With 2/3 the PDDO IC had a lot of contact with the psyop planner for 2/3. They e-mailed a lot. They had a lot of input back and forth, a lot of mutual respect. When I came in there it was a great environment. They were letting me do what I needed to do, giving me all kinds of responsibility, taking my input on what we shouldn’t do. When they were replaced by 4/1, the new psyop planner, the new IO, didn’t really know our command until a few months later. Once they had met our command - they didn’t meet our PDDO IC - I’m not going to say any names, but our PDDO IC was awesome. He was a great officer, but the commander lacked a lot of people skills. I’ll put it that way. He had come to watch us conduct some training for ISF. We were teaching them how to do information dissemination operations, basically teaching them how to do psyop without teaching them how to do psyop, He made kind of a bad impression for the psyop planner and the IO officer. We got looked at from that point on as kind of – not poorly - but like oh you’re actually doing well since you come from that. I would say that it plays a really big role.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the success of TPTs?
Spears: Good command and strong team leader. If your command knows what they’re doing and they’re able to block all kinds of dumb product… There would be a lot of good idea products; like the good idea fairy would come down and say let’s make a product saying cigarettes are poisonous, if you smoke one you’ll die. I’ve had that. If your leadership up at the top level can go no, that’s a lie we can’t do that. If they can block a lot of stuff from coming down; they can’t block everything. They still allow a product to come down that really shouldn’t have, that doesn’t pertain to AOs, that’s just not good product, not good psyop product to begin with. If they’re allowed to block it, if they’re able to block it, do a good job, that makes team’s life much easier. If they’re not, it just puts so much more strain. The team leaders, the same thing. If he can run interference with the supported unit and also be able to convey what we need to do, or what we can do for certain missions, or what we can do for the province or the town, it’s great. Also a good team leader can help with cultural barriers. The cultural barriers are just ridiculous for Iraqis. But at least if you’ve got a good team leader you can really get even an Iraqi on board. He knows how to talk to one. Without strong leadership the team would be nothing.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the failure of TPTs?

Spears: Bad leadership. In Mozul, we were collocated with another team. There were two teams. It started off as a 3-man and a 2-man and ended up as two 2-mans. I don’t know why they did that. They thought they needed more help. They really didn’t. The second team leader, the one that wasn’t on my team, was pretty fresh out of AIT. He was made corporal when we went into country just because that unit was basically giving all of their people corporal who were on teams. Then the commander decided they needed another team there and instead of pushing out an experienced NCO, they battlefield promoted this guy who had less time in service than my psyop specialist. He had no idea how to do psyop. He had no passion for psyop. We would be teaching a class and I would be trying to do a good job. Me and one of the other soldiers that was with me, we were trying to do a good job for the students because we want to do our jobs. There was one instance where we needed to wrap up class kind of early. We could have gone farther the next day. We had time the next day to do more classes but this team leader decided that finishing the class it wasn’t as important as a graduation ceremony. We could have gotten both in. He thought the graduation ceremony was so important it needed to last so long. So they were missing out on some useful information because he decided that they didn’t care, that they were only there for snacks and food, and they did not care what we were talking about. In my experience, some of them are like that because they just get picked by a general or a captain or something - they just go you, you, you, we need this many people so you guys are going. Some of them were medics, some of them were never going to be psyop, but some of them worked at a media cell, some of them were basically starting new psyop companies - IDO companies. They had made product themselves, passed out product, some of them really good, actually better than some of the stuff that we put out a few years ago. So he looked at some of the people who didn’t care to be there and decided that all Iraqis just didn’t care, they were just there for the snacks. He just didn’t
care about the education they got which that didn’t sit right with me. I think that was a failed team and I’m glad I was not on it.

Segerstrom: When you spoke of leadership earlier for great leadership or good leadership you were speaking of the supported command or your internal psyop chain of command?

Spears: My internal, well, both actually. Mainly it’s internal with psyop leadership because you have to fight a lot of struggles. Coming in, maybe your highest ranking guy’s an E-6. With mine it was an E-5 and two E-4s so you don’t get a lot of respect sitting at the table with the big boys. If you have an IO officer, psyop is not a part of IO - you never know what’s going to happen with the changes - IO always seems to think that it is. IOs job is basically just to put information out there. My understanding of it is that they don’t care about the effect, they don’t care about making change or anything. They just care about the information. If you have someone who doesn’t understand what we do, won’t give us the chance to explain what we do, we’re going to be absolutely useless. I did have some IO officers who knew somewhat we did and still wanted to try to mix in some IO missions. It was helpful to have at least someone who would allow input. They’re not going to allow input if you don’t have a good team leader, so it’s both.

Segerstrom: Well, thank you.

20. Alex F. Speck

Segerstrom: This is Lorne Segerstrom. It is December 3, 2011 and I am conducting a historical interview on tactical psyop with – please state your name.

Speck: Alex F. Speck.

Segerstrom: What was your assigned unit during the deployment?

Speck: 362nd Psyop.

Segerstrom: What was your rank and position during this deployment?

Speck: I was a Sergeant. I was a Team Chief
Segerstrom: What were the dates of this deployment?

Speck: March 2009 to March 2010

Segerstrom: What was the region of deployment?

Speck: Baghdad, Iraq.

Segerstrom: What was your supported unit?
Speck: That would be 1st CAV.

Segerstrom: I am going to ask you several questions. Some of these I will qualify or quantify before I ask them. For the first question qualify with never, seldom, some of the time, usually or all of the time and please explain. Tactical Psychological Operations Teams (TPT) are used effectively (used in functional area and according to doctrine) in operations.

Speck: All of the time. Would you like me to explain?

Segerstrom: Yes.

Speck: It’s that psyop knows so much about the area that we’re working in. For them to not use us would be kind of stupidity on the supporting unit.

Segerstrom: What percentage of your time while deployed did you spend working in your functional area?

Speck: 100%. We’re always in our functioning area. We work 24/7. We’re always around our computers. Even where we were at, from where we were billeting, the next office over was our office, so we were always there.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree or disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Doctrine played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Speck: I put neither agree nor disagree. Having a standard SOP for psyop, how you work with your team is good, but when you work with a supporting unit, the way they run their operating procedures could differ a little bit, so you just kind of have to intermingle the way you work with your supporting unit.

Segerstrom: How did doctrine affect or influence the employment of TPTs during your deployment?

Speck: I would have to say, the way we do stuff like sitreps or something like that, certain guidelines like how we control key leaders, the way we do our tactical questioning, the way we do all of our product basically too. So we always stick to the same guideline on that.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Education and/or training played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.
Speck: Strongly agree. Having an education, knowing your area of operation is key to the success of the psyop team. Knowing your supporting unit, knowing their history, working with them, all factors in the role of working as a cohesive team.

Segerstrom: How did education and training affect the employment or influence the employment of tactical psyop teams during your deployment?

Speck: Well the training we do a lot of, specifically getting you used to talking to people that you might not be used to, people that are hostile, or when you go into an area where you don’t know whether they’re hostile or not, just getting that kind of education or training is good for anyone on the team to have, to get used to dealing with people you might not ever deal with in normal life I guess, or civilian life I should say.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement would you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree, and explain? Command relationships played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Speck: Strongly agree. Your relationship with your supporting unit is like your bread and butter. They have to trust you, you have to trust them. They are your security and it goes vice versa. They’re the ones who let you go out of the gate. They’re the ones who feed you and house you so having a good, strong relationship with them is good.

Segerstrom: Based on your experience, how did command relationships (supporting unit vs. supported unit, OPCON, TACON, ADCON, etc.) affect or influence the employment of TPTs?

Speck: Having a strong relationship with supporting units. If you needed anything they were willing to help you if you had a good relationship like we did. We didn’t really have any bad relationships so I can speak to any of that, but mainly just getting beans and bullets I guess. So they really helped out there.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the success of TPTs?

Speck: I put team cohesion, working as a team with your group is probably the best way to have success.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the failure of TPTs? Speck: The interpreters, I guess, maybe the different dialects. We had an interpreter who was previous psyop so he had been used through psyop again and again and again and he got to the point where he could fill in blanks, but he would do that without us. He would have his own conversation going trying to fill in the blanks and we would say hey don’t do that we want to fill in the blanks that’s why we’re here. You’re paid to interpret. So I guess the interpreters on that. I’m trying to think of the biggest failure. Yeah, I would just have to say interpreters.
Segerstrom: Do you have any closing thoughts about this deployment?

Speck: No, I do not.

Segerstrom: Okay, thank you.

21. Matthew Todd I

Segerstrom: This is Lorne Segerstrom. It is November 5, 2011 and I am conducting a historical interview on tactical psyop with – please state your name.

Todd: Matthew Todd.

Segerstrom: What was your assigned unit during the deployment?

Todd: I was assigned to the 308th Tactical Psyop Company.

Segerstrom: What was your rank and position during this deployment?

Todd: I was a Sergeant and I started out as an ATL and then during the deployment got bumped up to a Team Leader.

Segerstrom: What were the dates of this deployment?

Todd: The dates were January of 2007 and we got home in February of 2008.

Segerstrom: What was the region of deployment?

Todd: We were in Bayji, Iraq. All the area governing around Bayji. It’s smaller villages and towns as well.

Segerstrom: What was your supported unit?

Todd: We supported two different units when we got there. The 82nd Airborne, first the 1-505th Parachute Infantry Regiment was there. They were there for nine months so we worked with them for nine months. In November the 101st the first of 329 Air Assault came in and replaced them.

Segerstrom: I am going to ask you several questions. Some of these I will qualify or quantify before I ask them. For the first question qualify with never, seldom, some of the time, usually or all of the time and please explain. Tactical Psychological Operations Teams (TPT) are used effectively (used in functional area and according to doctrine) in operations.
Todd: It was all the time for my team.

Segerstrom: Can you explain that?

Todd: We did everything that I remembered learning in the school house. We did tactical call outs. We did civil disturbances. We did all kinds of different missions that we were always told about in school, to include, there was a large group of people and they said, hey psyop, take care of it. So we went and we took care of it. The crowd dispersed and then we got down to the root of the issue and took care of it and the village loved us.

Segerstrom: What percentage of your time while deployed did you spend working in your functional area?

Todd: I would say about 75% of the time because the thing about being in the TPT is you have other tasks that you have to do that are outside of the psyop job field. There’s administrative stuff because you don’t have a headquarters there. You have an S-1 that you can ask questions about, but you’ve got to do a lot of that stuff. Like if you need bullets, stuff like that, you’ve got to go through and do all the paperwork. That to me is not really psyop related. It’s more like supply, admin, all the stuff that to me is not really psyop.

Segerstrom: Were there other duties, guard duty, or security functions, or just the admin functions?

Todd: We just did the admin functions because they needed us so badly? ourselves and they really like us and wanted to use us. Every operation they would ask, what’s psyop doing, what can you do for us? We’d say, well sir, we can do this and this and this.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree or disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Doctrine played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Todd: I believe it did play a strong role in what we did. We were basically advisors to the commander and he listened to us and it really helped us to gather the information that he wanted for his information requirements. That really developed a mission for the battalion too. We were able to roll up a lot of HBIs, get a lot of IED cells, because of the information we were able to gather from the villages, because he was listening to us and letting us do what we needed to do to get him what he wanted.

Segerstrom: How did doctrine affect or influence the employment of TPTs during your deployment?

Todd: Doctrine always helped us. It was kind of our right and left limits. If it was something that was questionable or could violate some sort of laws we would refer back to doctrine. Well sir, we can’t do this and here’s the reason why. It’s a violation of the
Geneva Convention. For example, dead bodies and stuff like that on product. It’s not allowed. It’s a violation of the Geneva Convention. So we would refer back to that and it was kind of right and left limits and it kind of helped keep us on target.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Education and/or training played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Todd: I strongly agree with that. We conducted most of our training. It’s not like now where you’ve got the Psyop Training Battalion at Ft. Dix or RTCs around the country. Basically, what we did was we conducted all of our psyop training. We ran all of our lanes for mounted loud speaker operations, IED lanes. We did everything at Ft. Bragg and that was done pretty much internally with our company or sister companies that were deployed as part of our task force. Everything we trained I saw or had to use in some capacity while I was overseas.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement would you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree, and explain? Command relationships played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Todd: I put that I strongly agree. We had a really good relationship with our supported unit. Like I said earlier, they would ask us, hey psyop, what are you doing for this, what can you do for me. Well we can do this. Hey I got this mission. I need you guys to come up with something. Alright sir. We’d go and we’d bring it back and say, what do you think about this. I like this. Let’s go with this. No, that one, I don’t like that. Well, change it to this. Alright sir, we’ll tailor it to however you need it to be done. We had that working relationship. There was no extra duty or anything like that. They just wanted us to be able to do our job and it worked out really well for us.

Segerstrom: How did education and training affect the employment or influence the employment of tactical psyop teams during your deployment?

Todd: We had all kinds of different things. Prior to actually deploying, we had a 3-week AT, my detachment did, where we were learning basic Arabic. We had instructors come in. They taught us how to read Arabic so it didn’t look like scribble marks, how to do the number system, and taught us some of the basic phrases. Things like that to prepare you, it really gains the people’s respect. Whenever you try or make a conscious effort to relate to them on some level, they really appreciate that. That’s part of our job is to understand the people and relate with them so we can get our job done and we can help them out.

Segerstrom: Based on your experience, how did command relationships (supporting unit vs. supported unit, OPCON, TACON, ADCON, etc.) affect or influence the employment of TPTs?
Todd: We didn’t really see it that much. I know we were TACON’d to one person, ADCON’d to another, and OPCON’d to somebody else, but we were close enough to the company at headquarters that if we needed something we could drive over there and get it. Say if our equipment broke, we were able to go directly there versus somebody that was hundreds of miles away. We just had access to everything we needed. If we needed something, we’d go to the battalion and say, hey, we need some supplies, or we need more ammo, or we need MREs. Like I said, we didn’t really see much of an issue with us because we were down at the lowest level pretty much on the food chain, so you don’t notice it as much as you would at the strategic level.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the success of TPTs?

Todd: It’s the knowledge of the job. If you know how to do your job and you’re able to sell yourself, you can pretty much do anything you want with psyop. You can influence people. For example, we had this guy that said, I hate you, I hate you, I’ll never work with you. This was at the start of our tour. By the end of it he said, I still don’t like you and that’s because my father’s father’s father’s told me not to like you, but I see that you people actually have my people’s best interests at heart. To me that speaks dividends for itself.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the failure of TPTs?

Todd: I would say a lack of knowledge or a supported unit that doesn’t really know how to use psyop. They know what it can do. The common misconception is, oh you guys are the speaker monkeys, or you got the truck with the speakers. That’s one component that we have, but we also have the ability to gather passive intelligence where you can order product that they want. We can set up radio stations to put out messages on a larger scale, television. There’s just so many things that supported units don’t know about us.

Segerstrom: Thank you.

22. Matthew Todd 2

Segerstrom: This is Lorne Segerstrom. It is November 5, 2011 and I am conducting a historical interview on tactical psyop with – please state your name.

Todd: Matthew Todd.

Segerstrom: What was your assigned unit during the deployment?

Todd: It was the 344th Tactical Psypop Company.

Segerstrom: What was your rank and position during this deployment?
Todd: I started out as a Sergeant and halfway through the tour I got promoted to Staff Sergeant. I was the Target Audience Analysis Team Leader and I also worked as the Tactical Psyop Development Detachment NCOIC as well.

Segerstrom: What were the dates of this deployment?

Todd: We started in April 2010 and we came home in February 2011.

Segerstrom: What was the region of deployment?

Todd: This was Baghdad, Iraq.

Segerstrom: What was your supported unit?

Todd: We started out with the 1st Armored Division as our strategic command level and then switched to the 25th ID.

Segerstrom: I am going to ask you several questions. Some of these I will qualify or quantify before I ask them. For the first question qualify with never, seldom, some of the time, usually or all of the time and please explain. Tactical Psychological Operations Teams (TPT) are used effectively (used in functional area and according to doctrine) in operations.

Todd: I would say some of the time. During the drawdown there was a disconnect on what’s our objective. It’s different from the previous missions. This is the one that’s supposed to get us to the end and so we were like what do the tactical psyop teams do? We don’t know. Well we know what we’re supposed to do, but that’s not what we’re supposed to do. So it became a training mission, it was to train the Iraqis. That’s what the tactical psyop teams became, they became instructors for the Iraqi army and the Iraqi police to teach them information dissemination operations.

Segerstrom: What percentage of your time while deployed did you spend working in your functional area?

Todd: I would say it was kind of 50/50 because of the drawdown there was less personnel which means that everybody had a second job, or a third job. So you’re trying to balance that. And you’re talking headquarters jobs here not other psyop jobs. This is admin, our S-1 was also 37F, and not only 37F, but he had to be admin as well. Same with our S-2 and 3. We were all 37Fs and we had to work second jobs on top of being psyopers.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree or disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Doctrine played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.
Todd: There was no real psyop process here. Everything came down from division on what psyop was supposed to do. It’s like, we want this. We want it tomorrow. There’s no one to pretest it. We don’t have enough people to pretest it anymore. We can’t get any personnel to assist us to go outside the wire to actually pretest. Pretesting is a big part of our utilizing of products, the hand bills the teams hand out and stuff like that and you don’t get the information you need you don’t necessarily get what works.

Segerstrom: So you would strongly disagree?

Todd: I would strongly disagree because like I said, we had little guidance on what the TPTs were supposed to do. We made it up as we went. It became the instructor role. It’s like teach these guys so that when we leave they’re not standing there, what are we supposed to do?

Segerstrom: How did doctrine affect or influence the employment of TPTs during your deployment?

Todd: I hate to say this, but this was a quote. Psyop doctrine does not mean anything when a general tells you, I want this. I was told that many times and I was always taught that you go by doctrine, you go by doctrine, there’s rules that we have to follow. And they said, no, the general wants this, the general’s going to get this. Okay.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Education and/or training played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Todd: I would say I neither agree nor disagree. Our company’s goal was to send soldiers to the TPTs who did not have any previous deployment experience. They put all the experienced people into the TPDD and they sent out the least experienced soldiers to the TPTs so that whenever we came home, there would be more seasoned veterans throughout psyop.

Segerstrom: How did education and training affect the employment or influence the employment of tactical psyop teams during your deployment?

Todd: There really wasn’t any training that could have prepared us for what our mission ended up being as instructors. You just have to remember the basics and remember what you were always taught in school, and how you can effectively train these people, but not give away all the information, not give away the things we know how to do, not delve too deep into specifics and really help another army be able to become as good as us, because psyop works and we’ve proved that time and time again.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement would you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree, and explain? Command relationships played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.
Todd: I neither agree nor disagree on this one. Like I said, our main goal became training; training the Iraqi army, the Iraqi police. The main command relationship we needed wasn’t with our Army or Marines, or anybody like that. It was the Iraqi army and the Iraqi police. We had to sell it to their command. This is how you should use it. This is what kind of results you’re going to get and have to educate the command. Until they buy into it to allow us to go and instruct their soldiers or them to allocate funds for a group of soldiers to become IDO.

Segerstrom: Based on your experience, how did command relationships (supporting unit vs. supported unit, OPCON, TACON, ADCON, etc.) affect or influence the employment of TPTs?

Todd: That’s a tough one. The thing about this was it was hard to continue a mission because TPTs were attached to battalions and the battalions would be leaving, as in leaving country, and there would be no one to replace them so they would float to another battalion, and then that battalion would be gone, and then the next thing you know, they’re supporting a brigade, and then that base closes, so they’ve got to move to another base. It’s hard to build repoire with the Iraqi army or the Iraqi police to be able to sell what you want to do if you don’t have a stable place to work out of.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the success of TPTs?

Todd: Smart young soldiers that are able to adapt to the mission, and that’s probably the biggest contributor to this mission.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the failure of TPTs?

Todd: I would say it would be poor communication from the strategic level down. They were trying to run the TPTs and decide what the TPTs should do, and they were telling the psyop planners at the brigade level, I want you to make them do this. And the psyop planners had a disconnect with the strategic level on, that’s dumb, we shouldn’t do that. There’s a better way to do this. Our job is to get these guys to do it so we don’t have to because we’re not going to be here someday.

Segerstrom: Do you have any closing thoughts?

Todd: There’s so much that psyop can do. I’ve seen the good, the bad, and the ugly on all of it. From a soldier who was there during the surge, and then I came back for the drawdown. I saw a big change in the country, in the safety, in the security, just the demeanor of the people. They were free and they felt free and they would tell you, I’m free, and they were happy to be free. It was nice to be able to see that because when I went there my first time, it was a war zone. It was crazy and when I came back, it was nice. People were happy. Businesses were opening, new shops, you name it. It really made me smile because it meant that what we were doing helped.
Segerstrom: Thank you.

23. Steven Welter

Segerstrom: This is Lorne Segerstrom. It is November 5, 2011 and I am conducting a historical interview on tactical psyop with – please state your name.

Welter: Staff Sergeant Welter.

Segerstrom: What was your assigned unit during the deployment?

Welter: Deployed with the 307th Tactical Psyop Company unit of St. Louis.

Segerstrom: What was your rank and position during this deployment?

Welter: At the time I started off as a Corporal. Late into the deployment I picked up Sergeant, Team Chief.

Segerstrom: What were the dates of this deployment?

Welter: It was about April 2004 to April 2005.

Segerstrom: What was the region of deployment?

Welter: Taji, Iraq.

Segerstrom: What was your supported unit?

Welter: We supported 2/7 CAV and then elements of the 39th Brigade Combat Team.

Segerstrom: I am going to ask you several questions. Some of these I will qualify or quantify before I ask them. For the first question qualify with never, seldom, some of the time, usually or all of the time and please explain. Tactical Psychological Operations Teams (TPT) are used effectively (used in functional area and according to doctrine) in operations.

Welter: I would same some of the time.

Segerstrom: Can you explain or expand upon that?

Welter: Yes. As far as tactical psyop teams, us knowing what we’re doing, if we’re given freedom of movement, security, yes, that question is we’re used effectively all the time. Now if we’re relying on a supported unit, my personal observations were that they didn’t know what to do with us, honestly. It was up to us to kind of clarify that. If we were able
to do that and we had a good working relationship then we were able to get out and do what we were supposed to do. If we didn’t have a good working relationship or that supported unit just didn’t know what to do with psyop, then we just ended up being a check in the box for them on their missions and we weren’t used effectively at all.

Segerstrom: What percentage of your time while deployed did you spend working in your functional area?

Welter: I would say 70% of the time, or more.

Segerstrom: When you weren’t working in your functional area, what types of tasks were you doing?

Welter: We were sitting, not doing anything, or we were doing functions for the IO or CA.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree or disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Doctrine played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Welter: I would disagree with that. The reason I would disagree with that is at that time, during that deployment, there wasn’t a whole lot doctrinally about psyop teams. I went through the 2 by 2 school, for example. I know that’s covered under the education piece but we learned a lot about the ? level, there’s a lot about PDDs. Seeing when we got out to those units, the doctrine that they had read was, we produce paper product, we do loud speaker broadcasts. They didn’t really see the importance of face to face communications or running a series of products instead of just throwing out random hand bills.

Segerstrom: How did doctrine affect or influence the employment of TPTs during your deployment?

Welter: Once again, I don’t think it did us a lot of good as far as the tactical level. Our PDD was very successful. They got a lot accomplished. It seemed like they had a lot of freedom. But as far as at the tactical levels, it just seemed that the supported units a) didn’t know what to do with us or how to use us effectively, and then b) they didn’t want to give up the assets to provide us with the security we needed to go out. I think that doctrine really hurt us during that deployment, just that lack of information.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Education and/or training played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Welter: I would disagree with that. The way that I understood that was as far as my
personal education and training as a tactical psyop team chief. It was very much on the job. I started out as an assistant team leader and that lasted about a month and then I was given a team. That team chief had just come off an Afghanistan deployment so I picked up a little bit from him. But as far as the 2 by 2 school, once again at that time, it seemed like it was a fairly new thing going on and they didn’t cover what tactical psyop was.

Segerstrom: How did education and training affect the employment or influence the employment of tactical psyop teams during your deployment?

Welter: Well the same thing again. Really tactical psyop teams weren’t covered. Personally, what I ran into with supported unit commanders was I went through the ? course, or I had two weeks of training, or three days of training on psyop on what you guys do, so I know all about you. But once again it was PDD level, ? level, ? level, psyop. Some of these commanders, tactical psyop teams were new to them. Others had a team before we got there. Depending on that working relationship, that greatly affected us. If they had a great relationship then their expectations were high of us which was great. If they had a poor working relationship, we were put on the back burner and we had to work really hard to prove ourselves with them. I would like to see a whole lot more focus on tactical psyop teams, especially with these infantry commanders or these line commander as far as what psyop is capable of at the tactical level as opposed to focusing on PDD, ? level functions.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement would you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree, and explain? Command relationships played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Welter: I strongly agree with that. I really do. Our command relationships, whether it be our own or the supported unit, once again, if we had a good relationship with them, times would come we’d have to scratch their back, provide a security truck for their missions or whatever. But then they would turn around and do the same for us. If we had a good relationship with them it was really good. Like everything else there were times when I didn’t feel like we were being supported the way we should have from our own command, ?, ?, all that. We weren’t getting a whole lot of support. We were running up complaints or issues that we were having with equipment, or getting out on missions, or the quality of missions. It just seemed like, toughen up, suck it up, do your best.

Segerstrom: Based on your experience, how did command relationships (supporting unit vs. supported unit, OPCON, TACON, ADCON, etc.) affect or influence the employment of TPTs?

Welter: With command relationships, it seemed, kind of went through being TACON’d, OPCON’d and general support. When we were general support it was great. We had a lot of freedom. When we went to the targeting meetings, the mission planning meetings, psyop what can you for this? When you start getting down to the OPCON and even the TACON level, you’re more or less told what you’re going to do, how you’re going to do
it. Despite you may tell them that’s not the most effective way for us to be used on this particular mission. Sorry that’s what you’re going to do. That’s what I’m telling you to do. A lot of that fell under IO, IO, what their perception of psyop was.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the success of TPTs?

Welter: The biggest contributor to our success was getting that command, that supported unit command, to understand what we do and also showing them results. They’re combat commanders. They want instant results. That’s how they measure their successes. As you know with psyop, sir, it’s long term. It could be six months, it could be years. That’s why we run and the series of plans and everything else. It’s supposed to be a continuous effort from team to team. So that command relationship is huge on the success of psyop. You know the capabilities brief, your introduction brief, whatever you want to call it, you know that is critical. The other thing that I noticed, personal experience, OICs and NCOICs that have tactical psyop experience can better support their team chiefs because they understand and know what they need to do to support them. But when you bring somebody outside of psyop, send them to the quick 2 by 2 school or orientation course, and then bring them in and put them in charge of psyop teams, it’s a little difficult for them, but it’s also difficult for us as team chiefs when we need them to support us with that supported unit when we’re fighting them, we need them to understand why we’re fighting that supported unit on certain issues.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the failure of TPTs?

Welter: IO. Putting the teams under IO. What happened with us particularly, and what happened with some of the other teams, I’m not saying all of them, most of the other teams. When we showed up we were put under IO. We were told, doctrinally we were told that we link up with and we work for the S-3, but when you show up and that S-3 or that battalion commander is telling you, you’re going to work for this fire support lieutenant over here who is now the IO, and this IO is trying to tell you what to do. He’s writing all your mission plans, and he writing all your appendices for the mission planning and everything else. It creates a lot of issues because once again, here I am talking to the lieutenant when I should be talking to the major, the S-3 level and trying to get things moving. A lot of times our optempo may be going so fast I don’t have time for this lieutenant to try to convince a major to okay something for us to go do, when I could just talk directly to that S-3 and get things moving a lot quicker and a lot smoother.

Segerstrom: Do you have any closing thoughts about this deployment?

Welter: Not really, sir, other than like I said, the two biggest issues that I had, that I experienced, was that supported unit concept. I understand we’re supporting them, but they also have to support us. I know that sometimes they’re overtasked, but I really feel that they should be mandated to provide us with some sort of dedicated security assets so we can get out there. If we can get out there and psyop wise, where we have the most effect is face to face communications. We can pass product out all day. We can hand out pamphlets all day. We can do loud speaker broadcasts all day, but
if we’re not talking to the people, we don’t know how they’re reacting to those things. We don’t know how they’re reacting to that maneuver element that’s out there working around them. Also it’s more difficult for us to gather atmospherics. A lot of what we do is reading body language and trying to pick up on all those things, so face to face is crucial. I understand that we work with IO, but we cannot work for IO.

Segerstrom: Thank you.

24. Steven Welter 2

Segerstrom: This is Lorne Segerstrom. It is November 5, 2011 and I am conducting a historical interview on tactical psyop with – please state your name.

Welter: Staff Sergeant Welter.

Segerstrom: What was your assigned unit during the deployment?

Welter: Deployed with the 307th Tactical Psyop Company out of St. Louis.

Segerstrom: What was your rank and position during this deployment?

Welter: I was a Staff Sergeant, a Team Chief.

Segerstrom: What were the dates of this deployment?


Segerstrom: What was the region of deployment?

Welter: We were in ? Province, specifically Haditha, Iraq.

Segerstrom: What was your supported unit?

Welter: Supported unit, we supported the 1st and 2nd MEF.

Segerstrom: I am going to ask you several questions. Some of these I will qualify or quantify before I ask them. For the first question qualify with never, seldom, some of the time, usually or all of the time and please explain. Tactical Psychological Operations Teams (TPT) are used effectively (used in functional area and according to doctrine) in operations.

Welter: I agree. Usually is what I marked for that, sir. We fell in on a command that knew what psyop was and what psyop could do, but they didn’t have enough of an
understanding so they really relied on us to do our mission, and fill them in on what we needed, and how to do it.

Segerstrom: What percentage of your time while deployed did you spend working in your functional area?

Welter: I would say probably 50% percent, sir. During that time the Marines were starting to stand down in the ? Province and hand it back over to the Iraqis, especially after the awakening and everything else. For example we had one battalion covering an AO that two battalions used to cover. So it wasn’t that they didn’t want to use us. They just had a difficult time getting us out. So we tried to make up for that by working with the Iraqi army, the Iraqi police. That’s who everything was being turned over to. Talking with them working with them on developing some of their own psyop type teams to go out and talk, how to talk to people, how to get atmospherics, how to really work with people instead of being a dictatorship and pushing people around.

Segerstrom: What kinds of tasks were you doing when you were not working in your functional area?

Welter: Well when we weren’t working in our functional area, a lot of what we were doing was once again helping CA with some of their missions, or CAG as the Marines called them I believe. Doing a lot of that stuff, helping them do area assessments, kind of psyop related but it was more geared towards the civil affairs side of things. Never had to pull gate guard or anything like that.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree or disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Doctrine played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Welter: During this deployment, I disagree with that. The reason I disagreed with that is there was a conflict in doctrine that we found out with the Marines. Under Army doctrine, IO was the central of the wheel and a piece of the IO, you know feeding IO, IO feeding us, we worked with IO. Under Marine Corps doctrine at that time, psyop works directly for IO and gets their taskings from IO because the psyop concept was something the Marines were looking at starting up. They weren’t even doing it at that time. So there was a big conflict there working with the Marines. Some of our counterparts who were working with the Army, my understanding is, doctrine had gotten a little better over the years as far as tactical psyop goes, but my personal experience was it was still a mess.

Segerstrom: How did doctrine affect or influence the employment of TPTs during your deployment?

Welter: I really thought about that one. As far as the doctrine went, us going to support Marines, and not knowing what the psyop doctrine for the Marine Corps was or what it
read. I asked for the manuals and the books to try to find that out. I couldn’t get access to those through the channels I had. So what it entailed was a lot of educating each other on what those doctrines were, and the differences, and finding the middle ground. So once I realized there was a conflict, I stayed with that command staff as much as possible through all their meetings and planning phases, and really worked with their doctrine, as far as working with their IO, cooperating with their IO. You know if they wanted me to report to IO, I reported to IO. I learned from my first deployment. I don’t care who you want me to report to. That’s who I’m going to report to if that’s what works for your unit, as long as I’m able to do what I need to do to facilitate your freedom of movement and your activities and your battlespace.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Education and/or training played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Welter: I disagree with that and I’m looking at that from a standpoint of the training and education that was given to me as a tactical psyop team chief. Once again, it seemed like everything was geared at the ? level or the PDD level you know and on up higher. There was very little guidance on how to do tactical psyop as far as our job, other than on the job training, past experience, or the experience of other team chiefs from previous deployments. Things that worked for them, didn’t work for them, how they did things and you’re really trying to take all those little pieces and then you got to get in there with that supported unit and to get in there and figure out what’s going to work with them and what’s not going to work and at times it’s really a struggle. When I was with 1st and 2nd MEF it was a lot easier. I’d had a deployment under my belt at that time. I had some experience. I knew what not to do, what to do, how to communicate with staff a lot better, particularly officers. You know I came up through the NCO you know the enlisted side obviously. I don’t know all the customs and courtesies that some of these officers learned. I was very fortunate that I had an IO and an S-3 that took me aside on a regular basis okay this is how you need to address officers it was particularly in the Marine Corps this is how we do things this is how we communicate with each other. This is going to be more effective than the way you’ve been doing it. So there’s been a lot of that in my opinion, a lot of egos that you had to be careful of, those sorts of things. Particularly if you’re supporting another country or another branch of service, a little bit of training on their customs and courtesies would go a long way for us because a lot of what we do relies on that supported unit, how they feel about us. The better we can integrate with them and show that we’re on the same page as them, that we respect their customs and courtesies, the more we’ll get to do as TPTs. I think that would have been a huge help if we would have known a little bit more about the Marine Corps other than what I could Google on the internet.

Segerstrom: Beyond that, how did education and training affect the employment or influence the employment of tactical psyop teams during your deployment?

Welter: You know it really came down to personal experience. I knew what worked with units, what they were looking for as far as our results. For example, instead of like on my
first deployment, I come back to the bubb the next day and say, yesterday we went to this area and we handed out x number of products and we talked to x number of people and this is how they feel about you sir and your troops. The second time around, I would go out to an area, I would preplan that. I would project out two weeks or as best I could what my plans were, what goals I was trying to accomplish, and then I would come in to those bubbs and I would say, okay sir, this is what we did. This is where we went, handed out x number of product. We followed up the product with these questions. These are the responses we got. This is how the people feel about us in general, the coalition forces. This is how they feel about your Marines in this AO. This is what we’re going to do to either improve that relationship or continue that relationship that you have with the local populace. That was very well received with that supported unit and then they couldn’t get us out there enough. Once we came back and showed them not only were we trying to get results, but what results we were getting. I learned to show them something measurable as opposed to coming in with an opinion or an assumption which is a lot of what we do.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement would you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree, and explain? Command relationships played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Welter: I strongly agree with that. There’s a couple of different levels there. There’s our unit that we’re deployed with, for example 307th ?, and brigade assets. That relationship has got to be good, but also more importantly is my relationship with that supported unit. That command relationship has to be flawless really for me to be able to do my job. If we’re not hitting it off well, I’m not working. I’m sitting in a room or in a chow hall or something like that which fortunately never happened. Like I said before sir, I learned from the first deployment how to develop that good working relationship and keep that good working relationship. You know it was hard work. You had to work on it every day, but as long as that relationship was good they were willing to do whatever we needed, provide us with whatever assets they could to get us outside the wire. A lot of times we had to follow on missions. If they had a patrol going out to a certain area, but then they would give guidance to that patrol leader that psyop is going with you, you need to give them time to develop their assets and those sorts of things, key leader engagements, and stuff like that. So that piece is stressed in the training. It’s stressed in the schools and they need to continue to stress that because that is the key piece.

Segerstrom: Based on your experience, how did command relationships (supporting unit vs. supported unit, OPCON, TACON, ADCON, etc.) affect or influence the employment of TPTs?

Welter: During this deployment it was a lot better than my first deployment even though we were OPCON’d and even TACON’d to some of these units as opposed to being general support to these units. Ultimately they would tell us what to do, how to do it, where to do it, but for the most part we were involved in the training process from the beginning. We would advise them. Never told the commander his decision was a bad
decision or a stupid decision. I would give him, based on my assumptions or what I knew about a certain area, I would give him my recommendations on how to conduct something or different courses of action. Either course of action he went with, I would make sure I was advising him of what to do, what we could do to help that course of action go more smoothly with the local populace. I’m a strong believer that we shouldn’t be any more than OPCON’d to these units. General support would be ideal in my opinion.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the success of TPTs?

Welter: Again, like I said sir, and I can’t say it enough, is that relationship with that supported unit. The other thing that would really benefit tactical psyop teams is dedicated security. You know it’s a term we hear a lot of. Very rarely does it happen and I know these unit commanders have got their taskings. They’ve got their AOs to control and everything else, but if we could have dedicated security or even teams in the larger cities where everything is close together, keep those teams at least collocated so they can at least run together, provide their own security. They’ve got three trucks. They have to get to their various AOs on schedule, but that dedicated security to allow us freedom of movement to get out to do what we need to do would be huge. When we were with the Marines, a lot of what they did was dismounted patrols, small villages. Everything is spread out so we weren’t getting the face to face time and frequency that we needed. We would go out on a four-hour patrol and maybe talk to 20 people. To me that’s not effective psyop because then I’ve talked to those 20 people but it may be a week to two weeks before I get back to that same area to follow up with that stuff. So we couldn’t really get any momentum built and anything really moving, as far as from a psyop perspective effecting changes or attitudes or behaviors in that sense. That dedicated security would be huge. And when we had it with the Marines, we had it from time to time, when we had it, we had tremendous results, very good results, pleased a lot of people.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the failure of TPTs?

Welter: Coming right back to IO, sir. I don’t know what’s taught at the IO level or in those IO courses. I have not taken one myself but it seems like, based on my experiences, with 1st MEF and 2nd MEF and previous deployment was to either have an IO officer who doesn’t know anything about psyop. I had a Marine lieutenant come to me, I don’t know anything about psyop. I had a Marine lieutenant come to me, I don’t know anything about psyop. I’m an IO. How do we work together? What do we do? That relationship was great. Second IO that came in, oh I know all about psyop, we discussed it in the course. This is what you’re going to be doing for me, and then it was a fight from there on out with them. We honestly spent a lot of time sitting in a room at the ? But once again, one of the contributing factors to that is they were starting to draw down forces in that area, so even the Marines themselves at that time weren’t really maneuvering a whole lot in their battlespace. So it’s really hard for me to say that the IO contributed to us sitting around, as opposed to our lack of good working relationship. It’s really hard to say. Once again, we were TACON’d to them so it wasn’t like we could pull up and
Segerstrom: Do you have any closing thoughts about this deployment?

Welter: My only final thought, sir, is to kind of sum everything up was, psyop as far as education and training goes, they need to continue to push that integration piece with these supported units, but that is really huge. The other thing is they really need to focus a little bit more on tactical psyop training, whether it’s at ALC, which is where it should really be taught at quite a bit. A lot of people know a lot about PDD, what functions of PDD are, paper product. These commanders go through the introduction course of what psyop is and then that’s what they’re demanding. We want loud speaker broadcasts. We want paper product printed. Go print it. I can’t print it. I’ve got an approval process, so on, so on. It’s not really what we do. I can request a product, but we’ve got to get out and talk to people. That would be huge if we could get them to understand that a little bit better. And then also within our own command do a better job with our team chiefs, NCOICs, OICs, as far as tactical psyop. I’ve done some time in the PDD. They do a lot of amazing things, a lot of great things. I’m one of the few team chiefs that doesn’t bad mouth the PDD. There just seems to be a little bit of a lack of understanding of the capabilities of the tactical teams. And when that falls on a team chief, somebody with experience can go in and explain these things very effectively. But if you’ve got a new team chief, like I was on my first deployment, I don’t know where to begin to explain these things and how to convince you that they should work this way, and they’re going to work this way, and why.

Segerstrom: Okay, thank you.

25. Jacob Williams

Segerstrom: This is Lorne Segerstrom. It is November 5, 2011 and I am conducting a historical interview on tactical psyop with – please state your name.

Williams: Jacob Williams.

Segerstrom: What was your assigned unit during the deployment?
Williams: I was in the 361st Psychological Operations Company.

Segerstrom: What was your rank and position during this deployment?
Williams: I started as a Corporal. I was promoted to Sergeant and I was an ATL and a Team Leader.

Segerstrom: What were the dates of this deployment?
Williams: It was January of ’07 to January of ’08.

Segerstrom: What was the region of deployment?

Williams: Diyala Province, Northern Iraq.

Segerstrom: What was your supported unit?

Williams: 5/73 of the 82nd Airborne Division.

Segerstrom: I am going to ask you several questions. Some of these I will qualify or quantify before I ask them. For the first question qualify with never, seldom, some of the time, usually or all of the time and please explain. Tactical Psychological Operations Teams (TPT) are used effectively (used in functional area and according to doctrine) in operations.

Williams: For this I put some of the time. In my experience with the 82nd, it kind of depended on the supporting unit commander. We had some good commanders and some bad commanders. Some were not open to it at all, and some were really open to it. So it seemed more like there were some people that were short term focused. They wanted that quantifiable results like how many KIA, how many wounded. They wanted numbers on products and hand bills and things like that, but I don’t think they’re as important as face to face psyop, so I put some of the time. I had some good success with some more open infantry commanders. It just kind of depended on the person who I was attached to at the time. Sometimes I was used as simply a speaker monkey on operations. I’d be sitting in the truck with the headquarters unit and just rolling down playing the command message, stay in your homes, we’re conducting operations. And other times I was actually employed effectively, used on the ground, talking to the people as we were going through and kind of smoothing things over or depending on what the operation was. Sometimes I was just used as another infantryman, just clear houses with your team, do what you do and we’ll be here. But other times I was actually used to do face to face psyop during the operations.

Segerstrom: What percentage of your time while deployed did you spend working in your functional area?

Williams: Like I said from the previous question, probably about 50% of the time. Sometimes I was doing speaker monkey stuff. Sometimes I was doing infantry stuff.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree or disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Doctrine played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Williams: I would agree with this. For my earliest tour, I think doctrinally we were used most of the time well, and we were TACON, so we were, I thought, assigned properly,
rather than being OPCON like we were my second tour. I felt that the doctrine helped us out there in our employment. It was something we could fall back on and use to kind of bolster our defense to where if they told us to do something that I didn’t think was appropriate like stick ? signs on the Koran and hand that out, no doctrinally we can turn stuff down like that. It’s hard as an E-4, a corporal, or a fresh E-5, to stand up to captains and majors. When they have really bad ideas it’s hard to say no to them when you don’t have something in paperwork backing you, or some doctrine backing you. So that doctrine helps.

Segerstrom: How did doctrine affect or influence the employment of TPTs during your deployment?

Williams: Like I said, we were TACON so ? had tactical control, but we were able to pass judgment on the psyop portion and we were able to kill a lot of bad ideas because of that. And on the other side of that, we were able to do a lot of good things because of the doctrine. It was kind of a while ago. It’s hard for me to think of examples. I can’t really expand further on that.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Education and/or training played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Williams: I would agree to a point. From the TPT perspective, I think TPTs need to focus more on face to face. Face to face is sort of like you either have it or you don’t, and it’s hard to train. I understand that but I think they need a lot more effort, focus on that in school. We have such a broad MOS it’s hard to condense that into 14 weeks and it is just kind of natural. If you can bullshit with a girl at the bar, you can bullshit with the Iraqi on the street. I think a little more emphasis needs to be placed on the face to face communication. If you know you’re going to be a tactical guy I don’t necessarily think you should go to the 4 or 5 weeks that they do in AIT if ? training that you learn. I think they should give you a quick run down and that’s about it. As far as the supported units, I have some guys that think I’m like super special forces and then I have other people who don’t think I do anything at all. From the supporting unit, they either don’t know anything about me or they think I do things that I don’t do. So I think the supporting units need to be trained on what we do. Even the guys that are supposed to be dealing with us, the IO guys and the FSO guys, have no idea of what our capabilities actually are. I think the supporting units need some training in what psyop is or something like that.

Segerstrom: So how did education and training affect the employment or influence the employment of tactical psyop teams during your deployment?

Williams: Like I said, the supporting units don’t know what psyop really is. They often destroy their own credibility in not knowing how to use psyop. For example, I had to do a
loud speaker broadcast one time after a ? and it was basically stay in your homes. If you come out, you’ll be captured or killed. I was like, okay you’re going to back that, right sir? If I say this, you’re going to actually capture them or kill them. He was like yeah, yeah, yeah. So I said okay. So I broadcast this message that says if you’re sitting outside we’ll shoot you or capture you and there’s people outside and they’re like what are you doing psyop, you’re not doing your job, there’s people outside. And I’m like, we’re telling them we’re going to capture and kill them and send someone to some QRF, capture them or kill them. You’re destroying my credibility. When I roll through with an actual psyop message and I’m face to face talking they’re like, I don’t believe you. You said you were going to capture us and kill us and you didn’t. I was wandering around all day. I don’t know why but they blamed me for that. I’m like what do you want me to do about it. Like I said TPTs just need more training in face to face, straight up. It’s hard to do. I understand the complications involved with doing face to face and the costs associated with it. It’s just hard to do, but maybe make some sort of selection. Have people screen make sure they can be sociable, personable. I think that’s more effective if you’re seen as truthful, even if you can bullshit your way through things.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement would you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree, and explain? Command relationships played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Williams: I would agree. The few successes we had were mostly due to the TACON relationship we had. We were able to do a lot of good things because we had control of our psyop capabilities. Under OPCON they’re able to like put this out over the speaker, exactly this. I want this over the speaker. I could see it’s not a good message, not consistent with the talking points and the psyop objectives, so if I’m TACON, I can shut that down. If I’m OPCON he’s like do it and shut up, this is what I want so, I don’t care what you think. When it came down to that it’s like well I’m the expert. It goes through my speaker. I’m responsible for it. I’m not going to do that. When you’re OPCON you have to.

Segerstrom: Based on your experience, how did command relationships (supporting unit vs. supported unit, OPCON, TACON, ADCON, etc.) affect or influence the employment of TPTs?

Williams: Basically everything I said in the other questions. Like I said previously, TACON is the right choice. If you’re a psyop commander, don’t go OPCON. You give too much away.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the success of TPTs?

Williams: I would say confident and competent team leaders that know psyop, that know their job and they have a natural talent for influencing people. I think that’s the strongest asset you can have on a psyop team. I didn’t have the best of team leaders, so I kind of got a messed up perception of what psyop was supposed to be. We were speaker
monkeys for the first 6 months of our tour. I thought wow, this is my job, this is stupid. An infantry guy could have a speaker on his truck and do the same thing I do. I didn’t really have any idea until I got some better mentors and actually learned what we did, because they don’t teach you in AIT. You have to have open minded, long-term focused commanders in your maneuver unit. If you have someone who’s just worried about measures of performance and not measures of effectiveness then you’re going to run into a lot of problems because you’re not really quantifiable at doing face to face tactical psyop. You have no things you can push in front of them and say here’s what I did today. And they have nothing that they can put on their OERs or their NCOERs so they don’t care about what you do unless you’re bringing some numbers to the table. I think if you get more commanders who are focused on the long-term, building relationships or building friendships, and it’s eventually going to pay off, then you have a better tour and you have a lot more leeway to do what you need to do as a psyoper.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the failure of TPTs?

Williams: I would say the measures of performance versus measures of effectiveness. A lot of times, I’m sure you hear this from every psyop guy who comes in here, or most of them, that you’re not psyoping the enemy. You’re actually psyoping your supporting unit. You’re worried about what they want and you’re not focused on psyoping, influencing the enemy. You’re focused on what the supported unit wants to hear from you. You’re getting caught up in not actually doing what you’re supposed to be doing. You’re not doing your mission. You’re doing random things that are all performance based and you’re not actually seeing any results. They’re not focused on the results. They’re focused on what they can tell their superiors what they’re doing.

Segerstrom: Any final thoughts on this deployment?

Williams: That’s about it.

Segerstrom: Thank you.

26. Jacob Williams 2

Segerstrom: This is Lorne Segerstrom. It is November 5, 2011 and I am conducting a historical interview on tactical psyop with – please state your name.

Williams: Jacob Williams.

Segerstrom: What was your assigned unit during the deployment?

Williams: 361st Psychological Operations Company.

Segerstrom: What was your rank and position during this deployment?
Williams: I was a Staff Sergeant. I was the PDT NCOIC.

Segerstrom: What were the dates of this deployment?

Williams: It was January of 2010 to February 2011.

Segerstrom: What was the region of deployment?

Williams: Salah Ad Din Province, Northern Iraq.

Segerstrom: What was your supported unit?

Williams: It was 3rd Infantry Division and then the 4th Infantry Division when they took over.

Segerstrom: I am going to ask you several questions. Some of these I will qualify or quantify before I ask them. For the first question qualify with never, seldom, some of the time, usually or all of the time and please explain. Tactical Psychological Operations Teams (TPT) are used effectively (used in functional area and according to doctrine) in operations.

Williams: I’ll say never on this deployment. TPTs were deployed. We were all supposed to be deployed as tactical psychological operators because we were told that’s what they needed. They didn’t need any PDD or headquarters elements. That wasn’t the case. About two weeks before we were supposed to arrive in theater, we were actually told we were going to be a PDD which none of us had experience in, and we were also going to be a company minus performing company duties. So every TPT became instead of a battalion level asset, they became a brigade level asset so they had to cover a lot of ground. They basically performed detachment functions as a TPT. So what would normally be 12 men doing their job, it was now 3 people doing the job. I don’t know why we had 45 ? PDD back here and they just didn’t deploy so all the tactical assets had to do the PDD job which didn’t make any sense to any of us.

Segerstrom: What percentage of your time while deployed did you spend working in your functional area?

Williams: If you count my functional area as psyop, probably 75% of the time. Like I said though, I didn’t have any experience in the PDD. So we just kind of had learn where we went and I’d say the other 25% of my time I was probably doing supply, commo, those issues. Because when we were company minus and our only MOS was 37F. So we had to cover down on areas like supply and S-6 and things like that.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree or disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Doctrine played a direct role in the effecti
employment of TPTs.

Williams: I would say disagree. Doctrine was pretty much disregarded due to force requirements. We had a certain area to cover and only a certain number of people due to the drawdown, so we had to make do with what we had. It wasn’t really doctrinally sound, but I think we pulled it together.

Segerstrom: How did doctrine affect or influence the employment of TPTs during your deployment?

Williams: It didn’t really.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement do you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree? Education and/or training played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Williams: Disagree. TPTs, I’m sure are not trained in doing PDD and TPD functions. Therefore, I don’t think they had the manpower to do what was required of them. They also had no training in what we call IDO courses, Information Dissemination Operations, basically, teaching the Iraqis how to do psyop. I’m sure there’s no, you can’t really, we didn’t prepare for that. We didn’t know that’s what we were going to be doing, but the TPTs had to end up bringing Iraqis onto their bases and training them. There was no guidance. There was no overarching like, this is what you will be teaching them. They just had to kind of come up with what they were going to be teaching based on not much guidance from our command.

Segerstrom: How did education and training affect the employment or influence the employment of tactical psyop teams during your deployment?

Williams: That being said, I think most of us in AIT and 2 by 2 courses, learned a little bit about PDD and what TPTs are supposed to be doing, so I think they were able to make do. The little training we had was employed. From my perspective on the PDD, I remembered a lot of the stuff from AIT, so I was able to do a somewhat effective psyop campaign up there. And the TPTs, they had varied success mostly based on their supporting units. Like I said in my other interview, a lot of people were concerned about the measures of performance and how many products they would push out, rather than what I thought was important, which would be the teaching of the Iraqis because it’s their ballgame now. Some of them were able to get a lot of IDO courses taught and some were not able to.

Segerstrom: Based on the following statement would you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree, and explain? Command relationships played a direct role in the effective employment of TPTs.

Williams: I agree. I think command relationship plays a huge role. We were OPCON’d
this tour so we were forced to make a lot of low quality product in reaction to events. We were employed as a reactionary force and we were not employed how we were supposed to be. I’m trying to think of the right words. We’re a long-term solution to something and we were employed reactively. The ? got bombed, so let’s go out and play a speaker message about it. That’s not good psyop.

Segerstrom: Based on your experience, how did command relationships (supporting unit vs. supported unit, OPCON, TACON, ADCON, etc.) affect or influence the employment of TPTs?

Williams: The OPCON situation forced us to do a lot of things that we didn’t need to be doing, especially with us being a company minus we didn’t have the manpower to do. Often times, the PDD, the headquarters, and even the tactical teams were forced to do menial tasks like guard duties and forced to participate in stupid barbecues and things like that. We had to provide soldiers for all these different sorts of details, various things. We had 30 people doing what 100 people usually do and it just didn’t work.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the success of TPTs?

Williams: I think good supporting commanders. The support of them and their IDO efforts. I think that was the biggest contributor, good supporting unit, talking and standing up for you really helps, as well as confident team chiefs being able to stand up for themselves.

Segerstrom: In your experience what was the biggest contributor to the failure of TPTs?

Williams: The command decisions. Why deploy tactical guys if you don’t need tactical guys. Don’t make us OPCON because it forces the TPTs to do what they know is wrong. Deploy the PDD if you need the PDD, I guess.

Segerstrom: Any other thoughts on this deployment?

Williams: That’s about it.

Segerstrom: Thank you.
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