THE PERILS OF BIPOLARITY:
SUBNATIONAL CONFLICT AND THE RISE OF CHINA

by

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Biography

Lieutenant Colonel Mark Owen Yeisley was born November 26, 1960 in Bourne, Massachusetts. After graduating with honors from Texas A&M University in 1990 with a degree in Meteorology, he was commissioned in the United States Air Force and assigned to Ramstein AB Germany. He then attended Colorado State University and graduated with honors with a Master of Science in Satellite Meteorology in 1996. After a series of advanced weather assignments, including combat support to Operations SOUTHERN WATCH and ENDURING FREEDOM, he attended Air Command and Staff College and graduated with honors with a Master of Arts in Military Operational Art and Science degree in 2004.

In 2006 he was selected to attend Duke University and in 2010 was awarded a PhD in International Relations. He was selected to attend Air War College after a brief assignment as an Assistant Professor at Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, Alabama. Lieutenant Colonel Yeisley’s awards include the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal with two Oak Leaf clusters, the Air Force Commendation Medal with four Oak Leaf clusters, the Army of Occupation Medal and the Military Outstanding Volunteer Service Medal. He has been an Officer of the Year at the Squadron, Group, Wing and Numbered Air Force levels.
**Introduction**

Intrastate conflicts, ranging from localized rebellions to civil war, increased linearly from 1946 through 1992 and then dramatically decreased in the post-Cold War era. This rise and fall of subnational conflict closely mirrors the “proxy” wars fought by or between the USSR and the US; the term refers to “(g)reat power hostility expressed through client states” and describes superpower use of these states to pursue strategic and ideological goals within the confines of nuclear deterrent postures extant during the Cold War.¹ This was done in large part to achieve strategic national interests and other political goals without risking nuclear war. In its waning years the USSR could no longer afford to fund these wars; America ended support to many of these commitments soon after.² With resources dried up, former client states and subgroups had little choice but to resolve these conflicts, either via negotiation or decisive victory.

The US emerged from the Cold War as the sole superpower in a unipolar international system. However, evidence suggests this unipolarity could soon change as a new bipolar system emerges with China as the next challenger superpower. Scholars debate the likelihood of future war with a rising China, each side arguing whether direct conflict is inevitable. Yet this debate does not consider what I suggest is the most probable future of US-China relations; while direct conflict with China is indeed a possibility, it remains remote. I offer a quite different theory, in which subnational conflict will rise once more as the US engages in proxy conflicts with China over resource access in Africa. These conflicts will place great demands on all US instruments of power, as involvement in counterinsurgency operations in Africa trends upward. Bipolarity and renewed proxy conflict will require rethinking of long-term national and military strategies

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¹ Although definitions of proxy conflict are varied, I find the one used by Dillon Craig “State Security Policy and Proxy Wars in Africa - Ultima Ratio Regum: Remix or Redux?” (Strategic Insights 9 (1), Spring/Summer 2010, pg. 2), which he cites and expands upon, to be most useful.
² See for example Alex Thomson’s *An Introduction to African Politics.* (New York: Routledge, 2000, pg 160).
focused primarily on large-scale interstate wars; this will impact defense acquisition and military doctrine as US strategic focus shifts from conventional conflict to counterinsurgency operations.

This paper is arranged as follows: Section Two defines subnational and proxy conflicts and explains why nuclear powers in a bipolar system make strategic policy choices to compete by proxy over contentious issues. It reviews the historical record of subnational proxy conflict conducted by both by the US and USSR from 1946 through the end of the Cold War era. The next section discusses the rationale for my claim that China will soon be poised to challenge the US within a new bipolar order, with a concomitant increase of proxy conflicts between the two. Section Four reviews the implications for US grand and military strategies, as well as for defense acquisition programs and development of future doctrine to meet this new order. The concluding section discusses recommendations for strategic planning over the next several decades.

**Renewed Bipolarity, Subnational Conflict and Proxy Conflicts**

The modern international system in which states compete for survival has historically assumed three primary configurations: unipolarity, in which a single state acts as a hegemon;\(^3\) bipolarity, in which two states control the majority of power with weaker states aligning with one or the other; and multipolarity, where three or more nations are powerful enough to act as poles in the system. Since the 1648 Treaties of Westphalia multipolarity has been the norm, in which great power states jockeyed for power on the European continent. While the fortunes of these powers have waxed and waned, war has typically been the ultimate result of perceived power imbalances among them. While there have been historical instances of bipolarity; each of these

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\(^3\) I define a unipolar system similarly to that in Christopher Layne’s “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise.” *(International Security* 17 (4), 1993, pg. 5) wherein a single power possesses sufficient military and economic resources to preclude any attempts to balance against it.
was regional rather than global in scope. They were an early example, as are Philip II’s Spain and France during the 16th century, and Great Britain and France during the late 17th and early 18th centuries. Kenneth Waltz, in “The Emerging Structure of International Politics.” (International Security 18 (2), 1993, pg. 44) similarly argues that this was the first case of international bipolarity in history.

4 Athens and Sparta are an early example, as are Philip II’s Spain and France during the 16th century, and Great Britain and France during the late 17th and early 18th centuries.


6 Kenneth Waltz, in “The Emerging Structure of International Politics.” (International Security 18 (2), 1993, pg. 44) similarly argues that this was the first case of international bipolarity in history.


9 Layne (1993, pp. 5-51).
Scholars have lauded bipolarity for the stability inherent in such a regime; however, these arguments focus on Cold War relations between states and reduced incidence of interstate war. Indeed, the Cold War bipolar era was arguably more peaceful than the era preceding it, as major wars between states were relatively rare and no militarized conflict ever erupted between the two superpowers. Yet the incidence of violent subnational conflict increased during the same period, peaking in 1992 and falling rapidly in the nearly two decades after. Was Cold War interstate stability truly an artifact of a bipolar system, or were additional factors responsible? What can explain the concurrent rise in subnational conflict observed during the same temporal period?

Bipolarity did not stifle interstate conflict between 17th century Britain and France when they were imperial superpowers, yet no Cold War militarized conflict broke out between the US and USSR. The reason lies in the unique conditions of Cold War bipolarity; each superpower possessed sufficient nuclear capability to make war too costly to consider. Some scholars place this absence of conflict on the success of US deterrence and containment strategies, such as were recommended in Kennan’s “Long Telegram” and subsequently employed in the Truman through Reagan administrations. Others cite the “stability-instability paradox”, wherein nuclear parity precludes the use of such weapons while still allowing limited conventional conflicts between nuclear-armed states. Others infer that nuclear weapons played no part in Cold War peace at all. I argue instead that the perceived high costs of war in nuclear parity within a bipolar

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11 There were 61 interstate conflicts between 1946 and 1990, yet most of these resulted in relatively few battle deaths and were of limited duration; data obtained from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Data Set, version v4-2009.
12 Other instances of regional bipolarity (Athens v. Sparta, 17th century Spain v. France, e.g.) were also conflictual.
international system prevented war between the two. The US and USSR chose instead to address ideological differences indirectly by proxy within client states. While these strategies arguably kept the Cold War cold, what prescriptive logic was responsible for these superpower decisions to engage in subnational conflict by proxy?

**Subnational Conflicts**

Just as interstate conflict takes many forms, from sanctions to militarized action, so too does subnational conflict cover a wide variety of cases. Civil wars often begin as grass roots organizing, followed by riots, rebellions and insurgent conflict prior to culminating in open war between insurgent groups and forces of the state. For the purposes of this paper I use conflicts occurring solely within the geopolitical borders of the state, though examples of those spanning state borders also exist.\(^{16}\) Thousands of interstate conflicts have occurred since the Treaties of Westphalia, yet they have become relatively rare in the post-WWII era. Sixty-one have been recorded since 1946, but only five have been initiated since the end of the Cold War. However, the number of ongoing subnational conflicts increased steadily during that period, some lasting fifty years or more (see Figure 1 below). Between 1946 and 2007 there were 225 incidences of subnational conflict between some insurgent group and the forces of the state.\(^ {17}\)

![Figure 1: Ongoing Subnational Conflicts, 1946-2007](image)

\(^{16}\) For example, see Jon Abbink, “Proxy Wars and Prospects for Peace in the Horn of Africa.” *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 21 (3), Sept 2003.

\(^{17}\) Conflict data were obtained from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Data Set, version v4-2009. For additional information, see [http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/](http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/)
The number of subnational conflicts peaked in 1992 and has rapidly declined over the last two decades; ongoing conflicts in 2007 were at the same level as those observed in the 1970s.\textsuperscript{18} This pattern of subnational conflict naturally produces two related questions: What caused the increase in ongoing subnational conflict during the Cold War, and why has it rapidly decreased in the two decades since? Both of these questions may be answered by examining the strategic foreign policy choices each superpower made during the Cold War era.

**Proxy Conflicts**

As stated earlier, proxy conflicts are those in which great power hostilities are expressed through client states rather than between great powers themselves. These proxy conflicts occur between nations that disagree over specific issues but do not wish to engage in direct conflict. A significant portion of Cold War-era subnational conflicts were proxy conflicts, supported by the US or USSR in support of geopolitical and ideological differences. It must also be noted that impressions of power were just as important as military equality; this resulted in strategies that depended on *perceptions* of a balance of power as much as the balance itself.\textsuperscript{19} Thus US policy treated any Soviet gains as a threat that had to be countered in a zero-sum *Realpolitik* game.

Cold War proxy conflicts usually took the form of aid provided to either insurgent forces or those of the state: cash transfers, provision of weapons/technology and advisory or combat support. While many instances of US and/or Soviet aid to states in conflict remain classified and are thus impossible to account for at present, there are still many instances where such aid was identifiable. During the Cold War dozens of subnational conflicts were proxy wars of the US or USSR, and their distribution is suggestive. Nearly half of these occurred during the Cold War’s first two decades, when US-USSR competition was on the rise; this percentage declined in the

\textsuperscript{18} All data on subnational conflicts were obtained from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Data Set, version v4-2009. For more information, see http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/

\textsuperscript{19} Gaddis (1982, pg. 90).
1980s as Soviet economic support dwindled and US aid to these nations quickly followed suit.20 Thus while the high cost of interstate conflict in the Cold War bipolar system wherein nuclear annihilation was possible led to peace between the great powers, it increased the incidence of subnational proxy conflict via two complementary mechanisms. It provided the superpowers a means to achieve geostrategic goals without the risk of nuclear war while also providing groups within client states the means to achieve their goals, through violence if necessary.

Why did the US and USSR engage in Cold War proxy conflict? Realists of the period warned against doing so; involvement in Third World conflicts was detrimental to US interests and did not enhance the all-important balance of power.21 One possible explanation is that great powers prefer to compete by proxy to achieve their strategic interests without direct conflict and engender goodwill via soft power strategies.22 But the historical record does not support this, as great powers have often fought with one another. A more credible explanation is found in the structural conditions that existed in the Cold War international environment. As the US and USSR reached nuclear parity, danger of nuclear annihilation successfully deterred both sides from direct conflict. Yet each was driven to spread its ideology to the greatest extent possible, both to maximize alliance pools and achieve Realpolitik goals of maximum security.23 Thus a combination of Realist political goals, coupled with the reality of nuclear parity, moved each away from direct confrontation and toward goal achievement via proxy conflict in client states.

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20 The US and USSR were involved heavily in proxy conflicts in the first two decades following WWII; by the 1980s their level of involvement had dropped to less than twenty percent. Sources include John Prados’ Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA. (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee Publisher, 2006).
Examples of Cold War Proxy Conflicts

The earliest Cold War example of subnational proxy conflict was the Greek Civil War, a communist uprising supported by Yugoslavia and Bulgaria and countered by the Greek Army, with support from the US and the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{24} The US also funded and equipped the 1954 coup in Guatemala that ousted President Guzman and ultimately led to the 36-year civil war that followed.\textsuperscript{25} Examples in the Western Hemisphere include the Cuban Revolution, the long civil war in El Salvador where the US supported Salvadoran government forces against the left-wing Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, as well as the funding of rebel Contras in Nicaragua.\textsuperscript{26} Following the end of European colonization of African nations in the 1950s and 1960s, many additional cases of Cold War proxy conflict began there as well.\textsuperscript{27}

Probably the most infamous of these was the Angolan civil war, which began in 1975 and continued until 2002; estimates of battle deaths exceed half a million. In this conflict the US provided monetary assistance to Angolan government forces while Cuban troops participated as a Soviet expeditionary force of sorts on the side of the communist rebels.\textsuperscript{28} Other examples

\textsuperscript{24} Cf Maria Nikolopoulou, \textit{The Greek Civil War: Essays on a Conflict of Exceptionalism and Silences.} (London: Ashgate Publishing, 2004). US policy for the conflict was first outlined in President Truman’s speech of 12 March 1947, when he stated the US should “make full use of its political, economic and, if necessary, military power in such a manner as may be found most effective to prevent Greece from falling under the domination of the USSR.” John O. Iatrides “Britain, the United States and Greece, 1945-9” from \textit{The Greek Civil War, 1943-50: Studies of Polarization}, David H. Close, ed. (London: Routledge, 1993, pg. 202).


\textsuperscript{27} Thomson (2000, pp. 152-53) describes the evolution of Soviet support in Africa in its goal of expanding socialism on the continent.

include the USSR’s provision of weapons to the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia, and US/USSR backing of the civil war in Mozambique. Examples in Asia include both the US-sponsored mujahedeen fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan and US involvement in the Vietnam War.

Although some of these conflicts persist, many ended with the dissolution of the USSR. Support for the Nicaraguan Contras ended after the scandal broke in the US; a negotiated peace followed two years later. Moscow ended all support for the Mengistu regime in 1990; it fell to rebels soon after. When backing for the Angolan conflict was withdrawn, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola and the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola soon agreed to a settlement. Many of the conflicts during this period were arguably initiated and certainly prolonged by external support from the two superpowers; it has been argued such external support is in fact vitally necessary for successful insurgencies. While neither side had direct stakes in these conflicts, desires to resolve ideological differences within the constraints of nuclear parity drove each to create national security policy that took Realpolitik and domestic security concerns to foreign battlefields and engage in conflict by proxy.

The rising incidence of subnational conflict during the Cold War and its decline in the current era were thus influenced by superpower policy decisions to pursue strategic goals by proxy within client states to avoid the high costs of nuclear war. As the USSR lost the ability to fund these proxy wars, it ceased such aid and the US followed suit. Although it is impossible to

30 This is not to say proxy conflict was not present in the Middle East – US cash grants to Israel, CIA support to the Afghan mujahedeen and the ouster of Mossadegh in Iran all supported US policies meant to disadvantage Western competition and forge a strategic alliance against the USSR, according to Beverley Milton-Edwards and Peter Hinchcliffe, Conflict in the Middle East since 1945. (London: Routledge, 2001).
32 Ibid, pg. 74.
33 Raymond W. Copson Africa’s Wars and Prospects for Peace. (Armonk, NY: M.E.Sharpe, Inc., 1994, pp.114-125). Although Soviet support was high through 1988, by 1990 the USSR no longer had the will to fund the conflict; both the US and USSR cut funding with the 1991 negotiated peace settlement.
prove the loss of aid was a primary causal factor in many conflict resolutions in the post-Cold War era, loss of support would likely have forced belligerents to search for alternative funding or prepare for peace. Since conflict resolutions since 1990 have occurred at nearly three times the Cold War rate, many seem to have chosen the latter.\textsuperscript{35} The current unipolar environment appears to be more peaceful in terms of relations both between and within states. However, several states now appear capable of achieving great power status; if one of these amasses a sufficient level of economic and military might to challenge the US, a return to international bipolarity is likely.

**Future Challenges to the Current Unipolar Order**

The so-called “BRIC” states – Brazil, Russia, India and China – arguably possess the potential to rise to great power status at some future point, yet only China has both the capability and the will to do so in the near term. In this section I offer the rationale for singling out China as the next US peer competitor and explain how and why this competition will occur in a bipolar international regime. In addition, I outline how US-Sino competition will lead to a resurgence in subnational proxy conflict, primarily focused in Africa, as both states compete for future access to scarce strategic resources in the region.

**A Modernizing China and the Return of a Bipolar System**

China’s economy has exploded in recent years, surpassing Japan to become the world’s second largest economy (behind the US) in the second quarter of 2010.\textsuperscript{36} This gap is likely to decrease in the ongoing economic crisis; US growth remains sluggish while China’s is again 9% per annum. China has embarked on an ambitious program of military modernization, acquiring

\textsuperscript{35} Data obtained from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Data Set, version v4-2009. For more information, see http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/

advanced offensive and defensive capabilities. US deficits are likely to result in reductions in defense expenditures, further decreasing the military capabilities gap. China’s economic and military might, coupled with a large population, point to its emergence as both a great power and a US peer competitor in the near future.

**The Rise of China and Implications for Regional Control**

Volumes of scholarly literature exist detailing China’s rise to great power status and the likely implications thereof; the discussion of this topic here will thus be brief. Given China’s prodigious economic growth, it is natural to question whether such a rise will be accompanied by US-Sino conflict. I agree with other scholars that such an outcome is unlikely, primarily because of a return of nuclear parity within a bipolar environment. There are, however, concerns over China’s increasing need for fuel imports to support its expanding infrastructure. For example, China shows little concern with the political ideologies of regimes with which it treats; yet its willingness to deal with states like Iran and Sudan could worsen relations with the US. China’s ongoing military modernization appears also designed in part to deny US ability to deter China in the near future through strategies that would focus primarily on interruptions of its oil supply through area denial or control of critical Eastern sea lines of communication.

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40 John Ikenberry “The Rise of China: Power, Institutions and the Western Order.” (same volume as above, pg. 92) shows how strengthening international institutions will force China to peaceably rise within them, rather than mounting a challenge to the international order. Jonathan Kirschner (same volume, pg. 239) claims that while Sino-US economic tensions will sometimes be high, war is also unlikely over this issue.
41 Robert Kaplan in “The Geography of Chinese Power: How Far can Beijing Reach on Land and at Sea?” (Foreign Affairs, May/June 2010, pg.2) states that such actions are also conflictual in that they are shifting the balance of power in the Eastern Hemisphere, which “…must mightily concern the United States.”
China is expanding its web of regional alliances via arms transfers and inducements that may result in a wall of allies the US will find difficult to penetrate in order to protect its interests in the Eastern Hemisphere.\(^{42}\) China is willing to protect its interests militarily where necessary; some aver the 1996 Taiwan Crisis indicates China may be prepared to take Taiwan by force in a preemptive attack.\(^{43}\) Yet evidence suggests its neighbors welcome the economic opportunities China presents to them, and believe its intentions are peaceful and focused on domestic stability and growth rather than regional dominance.\(^{44}\) Since it is unlikely that any regional attempts to balance a rising China are forthcoming, at least in the near term, it falls to the US as the peer competitor to do so. While US military preeminence is still clear, trends appear to indicate the US will find it increasingly difficult to compete with China over strategic resource requirements as China’s geostrategic influence continues to expand.

**Bipolarity, Nuclear Weapons and Sino-US Proxy Conflict in Africa**

It is likely China will achieve economic and then military parity with the US in the next two decades. China currently possesses 240 nuclear warheads and 135 ballistic missiles capable of reaching the US or its allies; it is estimated by the mid-2020s the number of nuclear warheads will double.\(^{45}\) As in the Cold War, a bipolar system in which war between the US and China is too costly will lead to policy decisions that seek conflict resolution elsewhere.\(^{46}\) But why will a rising China necessarily lead to geostrategic competition with the US, and where would this most

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42 Jacqueline Newmyer “Oil, Arms and Influence: The Indirect Strategy behind Chinese Military Modernization.” (*Orbis* Spring 2009, pg. 207) also shows how Chinese military modernization will soon make US efforts to protect Taiwan too costly to consider, and obviate the need for a Chinese use of force in such a conflict.

43 Andrew Scobell *China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March.* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 189-91) describes Chinese offensive capabilities during this incident.

44 David Kang *China Rising: Peace, Power and Order in East Asia.* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007, pp. 197-98) makes a strong case that regional balancing against China is thus unlikely.


46 Aaron Friedberg in “The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?” (*International Security* 30 (2), 2005, pg. 17-19) argues that the costs of such conflict will cause both sides to carefully avoid direct conflict.
likely occur? Unlike in the Cold War, access to strategic resources, rather than ideology, will lie at the heart of future US-Sino competition, and the new “great game” will be played in Africa.

The Race for Access to Strategic Resources

Despite Communist Party control of the government, China is uninterested in spreading its version of Communism and is much more pragmatic in its needs – securing resources to meet the needs of its citizens and improve their standard of living. Some estimates show that China will overtake the US to become the world’s largest economy by 2015, and rising powers usually take the necessary steps to “ensure markets, materials and transportation routes”. China is the leading global consumer of aluminum, copper, lead, nickel, zinc, tin and iron ore and its metal needs now represent more than 25% of the world’s total. In contrast, from 1970 to 1995 US consumption of all materials including metals accounted for one-third of the global total, despite representing only five percent of the global population. China is the largest energy consumer, according to the International Energy Agency, surpassing the US in its consumption of oil, coal and natural gas in 2009. As the two largest consumers of both global energy and materials, the US and China must seek foreign policy prescriptions to fulfill future resource needs. Since the majority of these needs are nonrenewable, competition will be of necessity zero-sum, and will be conducted via all instruments of power.

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47 Kaplan (2010, pg. 2) argues China is anxious to secure energy, metals and strategic minerals to meet these needs.
48 Friedberg (2005, pp. 17-19) also highlights China’s potential for economic growth and its implications.
49 Kaplan (2010, pg. 4) notes that resource acquisition is “the primary goal of China’s foreign policy everywhere.”
52 Friedberg (2005, pg. 19) shows how rising power states such as China will take necessary steps to ensure its access to required resources; he also states that disputes over these issues are “seldom resolved peacefully.”
China’s Strategic Focus on Africa

Africa is home to a wealth of mineral and energy resources, much of which still remains largely unexploited. Seven African states possess huge endowments of oil, and four of these equally substantial amounts of natural gas. Africa also enjoys large endowments of bauxite (used to make aluminum), copper, lead, nickel, zinc and iron ore, all of which are imported and highly desired by China. Recent developments in Africa serve to prove that China seeks greater access to natural resources; it has been avidly promoting Chinese development in a large number of African nations. South Africa, Africa’s largest economy, has recently allowed China to help it develop its vast mineral wealth; it is China’s number one African source of manganese, iron and copper. Chinese involvement in Africa is not wholly extractive; the continent provides China a booming export market for its goods and a forum to augment Chinese soft power in the region by offering alternatives to the political and economic baggage that accompanies US foreign aid.

Of primary interest is open access to Africa’s significant deposits of oil and other energy resources to feed its booming industrial base. For example, China has 4,000 military personnel in Sudan to protect its interests in energy and mineral investments there; it also owns 40% of the Greater Nile Oil Production Company. It has been estimated that within the next few decades China will obtain forty percent of its oil and gas supplies from Africa. Trade and investment in Africa have also been on the rise; trade has grown more than ten percent annually in the past decade. Between 2002 and 2004, African exports to China doubled; it now ranks third behind

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53 These states are Libya, Nigeria, Angola, Algeria, Egypt, Sudan and the DRC. Reserve information was obtained from the CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/.
55 Peter Lewis “China in Africa.” (The Bretton Woods Committee 2 (1), 2007, pg. 1).
56 Bill Emmott in Rivals: How the Power Struggle between China, India and Japan will Shape our Next Decade. (Orlando, FL: Mariner Books, 2009, pg. 53).
the US and France in terms of total trade with the continent. Chinese investment is also growing; there are more than 700 Chinese business operations across Africa totaling over $1 billion. Aid and direct economic assistance is increasing as well, and China has forgiven the debt of some thirty-one African nations.58

The Return of Proxy Conflict to Africa

Africa is thus a vital foreign interest for the Chinese and must be for the US; access to its mineral and petroleum wealth is crucial to the survival of each.59 The non-renewable nature of these assets means competition for them will be zero-sum. Nearly all African states have been independent entities for less than fifty years; consolidating robust domestic institutions and stable governments remains problematic.60 Studies show weak governments are prime targets for civil conflicts that prove costly to control.61 Many African nations possess strategic resources and weak regimes, making them both vulnerable to internal conflict as well as valuable candidates for assistance from China or the US to help settle their domestic grievances. Access to these resources will be of vital strategic interest to each side; competition in nuclear parity will occur by proxy via diplomatic, economic or military assistance to one (or both) of the parties involved.

Realist claims that focusing on Third World issues as I describe above is misplaced are thus fallacious; war in a future bipolar system between the US and China remains as costly as it was during the Cold War. Because of the fragile nature of many African regimes, domestic grievances are more prone to result in conflict; US and Chinese strategic interests will dictate an

58 Economic data from Peter Lewis (2007, pg. 12).
59 Stephen Burgess argues that the US has traditionally relied on free market forces in Africa and elsewhere for access to its strategic resource needs; however, China’s monopolistic practices Africa mean that future access to these materials is no longer guaranteed and may be in serious jeopardy in “Sustainability of Strategic Minerals in Southern Africa and Potential Conflicts and Partnerships.” Air War College Research Paper available at: http://www.usafa.edu/df/ins/ResearchPapers/2010/Report%20Burgess%20Southern%20Africa%20Strategic%20Minerals.pdf, 2010, pg. 4).
60 Note for example Tunisia’s recent ouster of President Ali and the recent anti-government rebellion in Egypt.
61 Steven R. David, in Catastrophic Consequences: Civil Wars and American Interests. (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), describes how such regimes provide fertile ground for civil wars.
intrusive foreign policy to be both prudent and vital. US-Sino proxy conflicts over control of African resources will thus become necessary if these great powers are to sustain their national security postures, especially in terms of strategic defense.\textsuperscript{62} What this means for the future of US grand and military strategy, foreign policy prescriptions, future defense acquisition priorities, and military doctrine and training will now be explored.

**Implications for the United States**

The Obama Administration released the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) last year; the NSS moved away from the preceding administration’s focus on preventive war and the use of the military to succeed in this effort. The new NSS focuses instead on international institutions and robust alliances to build a more peaceful world, a restructuring of the global economy, working to limit the spread of WMD and combating terrorism. To do this, the 2010 NSS argues the US must:

“…balance and integrate all elements of American power and update our national security capacity for the 21\textsuperscript{st} century. We must maintain our military’s conventional superiority, while enhancing its capacity to defeat asymmetric threats”\textsuperscript{63} (emphasis added).

All this is based on the assumption that the current unipolar international environment persists. If a new bipolar order arises in which Chinese competition for scarce resources represents the new status quo, future NSS submittals must reflect the nature of such competitive behavior.

The current US defense budget required approximately $680 Billion, more than those of all other nations on earth combined. To support the current NSS, the National Military Strategy must focus on maintaining conventional military superiority, requiring the acquisition of military

\textsuperscript{62} Burgess (2010) describes the US need for “defense critical materials”, primarily available only from Africa, which the US must have access to in order to maintain its national security. These include platinum, cobalt, chromium and manganese, each of which is vital to US defense and civilian industrial sectors and found primarily in African states and in Russia. The lack of these materials would represent a critical loss in US ability to manufacture weapons and other defense systems and thus conceivably weaken US national security.

\textsuperscript{63} The National Security of the United States, May 2010, pg 6.
equipment that supports traditional force-on-force military operations. Yet the US must ensure access to strategic resources as well, and as African subnational proxy conflict rises, national and military strategies must adapt to meet this future challenge. While I do not suggest maintenance of current capability is unnecessary, current conventional strategies focus overmuch on fighting the last war. If the US is to maintain access to the strategic resources it needs to sustain its place in the future global order, it must improve its ability to meet the asymmetric threats it will face in proxy conflicts in Africa, where counterinsurgency operations will dominate. The asymmetric nature of future conflict over African resources means defense acquisition must therefore focus on equipping and training military as well as civilian counterinsurgency teams. Both military and civilian doctrine must be altered to allow robust and effective interagency actions to meet the challenges of proxy conflict that will span the continuum of counterinsurgency warfare, from information as well as combat operations to peace enforcement and post-conflict stability efforts.

**Recommendations**

Current “conventional wisdom” suggests the US will benefit by ending its recent forays into counterinsurgency operations and returning to conventional warfighting preparation to meet a rising China head on. However, the likelihood of a direct militarized conflict between the US and China is low, and war between the two nuclear powers is unthinkable. It is thus imperative the US reduce its focus on maintenance of conventional force superiority; it already outdistances anything that could challenge it in the near future. Instead it should better fund acquisition and training programs to deal with future asymmetric subnational warfare. Advances in interagency support to counterinsurgencies have been substantial, yet doctrinal improvements such as those

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64 Examples include the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, *Virginia*-class submarines and Ballistic Missile Defense programs
covering Provincial Reconstruction Teams and interagency cooperation for combat and Phase IV operations must continue. While US military forces have proven invaluable in the post-conflict efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, resource constraints caused by the current financial crisis will undoubtedly force future defense cuts and require enhanced interagency involvement instead.

Reliance on conventional “business as usual” warfighting to meet the threat of a rising China will divert precious resources away from a looming crisis in US access to foreign strategic resources, especially in Africa. Tying financial aid to democratic institution-building is a failed strategy; instead, the US must employ its soft power to persuade African nations to work with us. The time to do so is now, before China’s inroads into African states become insurmountable. If the US is to secure its resource needs from Africa in the future, it must be prepared to employ all elements of hard and soft power to meet the demands of future proxy conflict on the continent.

**Conclusion**

The US currently enjoys a unique position as the sole global superpower, yet it is unlikely this unipolar moment will endure much longer. China is uniquely positioned to translate rapidly expanding economic might into sufficient military resources to achieve regional hegemony and spread its influence further abroad. To meet the needs of its growing population and burgeoning economy, China must focus on obtaining strategic resources abroad, and herein lies the challenge for future US foreign policymakers. In a future bipolar system where a nuclear-equipped China and US both require nonrenewable strategic resources, competition for such resources will be a vital strategic interest for each side.

Scholars debate whether such strategic interests will necessitate conflict between the US and China in the future; preparations for such conventional conflict now dominates US defense policy. I have offered an alternative future in which proxy wars with China for continued access
to strategic resources in African states will be strategically justified in the future. While I do not suggest the US drastically reduce current preparations for conventional warfighting dominance, I believe it prudent to also prepare for future proxy conflict management in Africa.

The ongoing financial crisis will undoubtedly force reductions in future defense spending if the US is to reduce its national debt load. This will necessitate further strategic, military and interagency doctrinal and training realignments if we are to be successful meeting the challenges of future counterinsurgency operations in Africa and elsewhere. Preparations must begin soon if we are to meet the looming challenge of strategic resource competition with China. A failure to plan for this proxy competition might make a future war with China inevitable; we have only to examine Japan’s reaction to its loss of strategic resource access in the early twentieth century to illuminate the consequences such a situation could easily produce.
Bibliography


