Rebalancing Army Civil Affairs: The Key to Military Governance

by

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### Rebalancing Army Civil Affairs: The Key to Military Governance

**Abstract**
The armed forces of the United States have been fully engaged in the task of nation building for more than ten years. History reveals military forces are required to bring stability and ultimately democracy to a region, a lesson repeatedly recorded and effectively implemented in the past. However, recent operations demonstrate that this capability has atrophied in the past few decades. This paper examines the Army’s role in modern military governance and makes recommendations to develop specific capabilities for military governance in the post hostilities phase of a campaign or operation. The Civil Affairs Branch is the proponent of this task for the Army. The proponent must publish doctrine and develop training to guide the force, establish a corps of Civil Affairs Governance Specialists, and rebalance the force structure to ensure the mission can be effectively accomplished.

### Subject Terms
Civil Affairs, Military Governance, Post-hostility, Post-conflict, Reconstruction
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The armed forces of the United States have been fully engaged in the task of nation building for more than ten years. History reveals military forces are required to bring stability and ultimately democracy to a region, a lesson repeatedly recorded and effectively implemented in the past. However, recent operations demonstrate that this capability has atrophied in the past few decades. This paper examines the Army’s role in modern military governance and makes recommendations to develop specific capabilities for military governance in the post-hostility phase of a campaign or operation. The Civil Affairs Branch is the proponent of this task for the Army. The proponent must publish doctrine and develop training to guide the force, establish a corps of Civil Affairs Governance Specialists, and rebalance the force structure to ensure the mission can be effectively accomplished.
The history of the United States offers an uninterrupted series of wars which demanded as their aftermath the exercise by its officers of civil governmental functions. Despite the precedents of military government in Mexico, California, the Southern states, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Panama, China and the Philippines, and elsewhere, the lesson has seemingly not been learned. In none of the service schools devoted to higher training of officers has a single course on the nature and scope of military government been established.

- Colonel Irwin Hunt

*Military Government*
U.S. Army Field Manual 27-5, 1940

The armed forces of the United States have been fully engaged in the task of nation building since it began its engagement in Afghanistan more than ten years ago. The nation’s public stance may be to avoid nation building, but history reminds us we will continue to use military forces to bring stability and ultimately democracy to a region. The creation of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan and Iraq are examples of our nation rapidly building an organizational structure to meet the nation building efforts we seemingly desire to avoid. This lesson is repeatedly recorded, but as Colonel Hunt pointed out in 1940, it remains to be learned. Public statements by President Obama indicate that nation building and related activities are preferred solutions if we are to defeat terrorism, but we still lack sufficient capacity to engage these concerns effectively, at least in the early stages of a campaign.¹

In 1942, a few years following Colonel Hunt’s observation, General Eisenhower expressed similar sentiments in a letter to General George C. Marshall, shortly after the beginning of World War II’s North African Campaign. Eisenhower was burdened by the
tasks derived from the administration of a foreign country which an army occupies, either under the rules of war or by international agreement.\textsuperscript{2} It is a problem that has troubled military commanders perhaps since the beginning of armed conflict itself. The challenge to execute complex mission sets that require soldiers to perform political and economic tasks in addition to their military ones at the tactical, operational and strategic levels is here to stay, and must be effectively addressed if we are to secure a lasting peace following the military victories our forces achieve.

Two assumptions have influenced this study. First, it is inevitable the military will be involved with civil governance during the course of a campaign and post hostilities. Considerable study has been devoted to whether post hostility governance should be the responsibility of civilian diplomats or soldiers. This paper suggests the answer is both. The military will be required to reestablish basic services immediately following the cessation of hostilities. Efforts toward this end begin in the planning of a military operation and continue on for years following its conclusion. While acknowledging the need for skills from the civil sector, the primary focus of this discussion is the development of organic capacity in the Department of Defense to accomplish governance in an occupied territory.

The second assumption is the Army should be DoD’s lead agency in this effort. The Army’s civil affairs capacity is the principle arm of the military to develop and maintain this capability. The Army has the largest number of civil affairs forces within the Department of Defense and has been the primary developer of doctrine. The recommendations of this paper assume the Army will use its civil affairs capacity as the primary means to address military governance.
If the previous two assumptions are true, then the Army must develop specific capabilities to execute military governance in the post hostility phase of a campaign or operation and educate leaders on its application. In order to accomplish this, the Army’s Civil Affairs Branch needs to embrace the requirement to conduct the military governance mission. The proponent must publish doctrine and develop training to guide the force, establish a corps of Civil Affairs Governance Specialists in addition to the current generalist now in the force, and rebalance the force structure to ensure the mission can be effectively accomplished.

**Diplomats or Soldiers**

American democracy places high value on civilian control of the military, which sometimes creates tension between the civilian leadership of the United States and the military. While history provides numerous examples of the military’s capability to effectively plan and execute the tasks of reconstruction, neither the military nor the elected civil leadership is comfortable with the task being a military one. The efforts to establish post hostility governance in Iraq are an example. The intent was to create a cadre of civilians capable of planning and coordinating the reconstruction and stabilizations efforts. Initially, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance or ORHA, led my retired Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner, was created to lead reconstruction efforts. ORHA was later absorbed into the Coalition Provisional Authority or CPA, led by Ambassador Paul Bremer. This plan aligned post-war governance functions with the State Department and the United States Agency for International Development, organizations traditionally charged with the promotion of democracy. This action theoretically placed post conflict governance efforts under civilian control, a long held national ideal.
This was not a new concept for the United States. Clearly, the civil sector has a much greater capacity to field the expertise required for successful post hostility governance. The military simply cannot maintain sufficient organic capacity to fully meet the needs. Post World War II military governments proved successful but never really had all the required experience to meet the requirements. In reality, they relied upon the use of additional civilian experts, often drafted into service. Unfortunately this only partially addressed the problem. The use of limited civilian expertise was important to the effectiveness of these military governments but it was the coupling of this civilian expertise with the hard work of the military experts that led to the ultimate success.

While the application of military governments in World War II was successful, the national leadership was initially resistant to the use of the military in this capacity. In a memorandum addressed to his Secretary of War in October of 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote, “The governing of occupied territories may be of many kinds but in most instances it is a civilian task…” This concept remains today as evidenced by the National Security Presidential Directive 44 issued by President George W. Bush on December 7, 2005. This directive designated the State Department as the lead agency for stabilization and reconstruction operations.

The concept behind the directive was embraced by then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice who led the department’s effort to create transformational diplomacy. Unfortunately, the concept never fully came to fruition. In her remarks to diplomats on February 8, 2007 concerning the idea, Secretary Rice praised the department’s efforts to push diplomacy forward from the capital cities in Afghanistan and Iraq by using newly formed American Presence Posts and reiterated that these Foreign Service personnel
were often serving in harm’s way alongside the military. She also pointed out the shortfall in the skills of the State Department.\(^8\) It does not have agricultural specialist, engineers or city planners on their staff, so such personnel would have to be recruited or contracted from outside. Furthermore, when agencies such as the Department of Agriculture or Commerce can fill the personnel requirement, the individuals have significant institutional and legal barriers to assisting foreign countries.\(^9\) Therefore the State Department often must rely on support from military reservists who in their civilian lives have the required skills.\(^10\)

This reliance on the armed forces reserve component demonstrates a symbiotic relationship between our nation’s diplomats and its soldiers. The recent conflicts have produced an overstretched military conducting tasks previously reserved for Foreign Service staffs and aid workers, while the civilians required for the tasks are completely reliant on the military for security. It is increasingly difficult to distinguish between the two.\(^11\)

War fighting has also evolved; it now requires a wide variety of tasks that have little to do with combat. These include providing basic services, building or repairing infrastructure, encouraging the development of a civil society and democratic governance - activities traditionally considered as civilian tasks but ones military officers have engaged in, often successfully.\(^12\)

Analysis prior to the United States actions to remove Saddam Hussein’s regime indicated the task would require a considerable amount of manpower and money.\(^13\) Many believe that there was little to no planning by either the military and or their civilian counterparts for the transition to a new Iraqi government. This simply is not true.\(^14\) It
appears the senior leadership chose to believe the transition from Saddam Hussein’s Regime to a new Iraqi government would be a rapid one. When Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld met with Jay Garner to discuss the development of ORHA on January 17, 2003, Garner, comparing the task to the World War II experience, commented, “Marshall had two years – you are giving me two months.”

Post hostilities in World War II and Iraq are among the numerous examples to support the idea that the military will inevitably be involved with civil governance, both during the course of a campaign and upon the cessation of hostilities. The military will either provide protection for civilian diplomats or actually execute tasks previously considered “civilian” responsibilities. The reality is both diplomats and soldiers are required to successfully provide governance in a post hostility situation. While one must acknowledge the requirement for mutually supporting efforts from the civil sector, the remainder of this paper will focus on the military aspect of post hostility governance, primarily from the perspective of the United States Army.

Training and Doctrine

By the 1940s the United States Army had been conducting civil affairs operations for nearly a century; yet American military government was usually established reluctantly as an afterthought. This was often a result of the ever present tension between the civilian and military leadership. Nevertheless, while understanding that policies guiding how the United States would govern an occupied territory would be determined by other agencies, such as the State Department, the Army would be responsible for administrating most governmental tasks in occupied areas. Furthermore, the need for civilians with skills in administration would likely exceed what could be rapidly recruited. In an effort to fill the resulting gap, the Secretary of War authorized the
creation of the School of Military Government in December 1941 and six months later it opened in Charlottesville, Virginia. The school’s mission was to train officers to be detailed for civil affairs activities and military government. The curriculum included administration, legal affairs, finance, natural resources, agriculture, industry and commerce, utilities, transportation, communications, public health and sanitation, public safety, education and public welfare - all areas a commanding general would be required by the laws of war to care for in an occupied area.

Training approximately one hundred students at a time and producing about 450 graduates a year, the school’s capacity was inadequate. In 1942, an estimated 6000 trained officers would be required to meet military government obligations worldwide. To meet the demand Yale, Harvard, Princeton, Stanford, the University of Michigan, the University of Chicago, Boston University, the University of Wisconsin, Western Reserve College and the University of Pittsburgh established programs of instruction. Though each was required to adhere to the basic military tenets of the Charlottesville course, the program directors were free to mold the learning environment as they saw fit. The School of Military Government evolved through time, closing and reopening, changing its name, focus and location before settling in its current location, Fort Bragg, North Carolina as part of the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJKFWCS). Table one below illustrates the major changes in the school from its start through to its current form. Today, USAJKFWCS trains approximately 600 civil affairs operators annually through a course that is vastly different from the roots established in 1942. This current output is targeted at meeting
the force structure increase authorized in the Army Structure Memorandum 10-15 published in March 2010.\textsuperscript{20}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>School of Military Government, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943-1945</td>
<td>Civil Affairs / Military Government Classes, classes taught in 10 universities across the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>School of Military Government moves to Carlisle, Pennsylvania and becomes the School for Government of Occupied Areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Military Government School established at Fort Gordon, Georgia. Renamed U.S. Army Civil Affairs School in 1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>U.S. Army Civil Affairs School is assigned to the U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance and relocates to Fort Bragg, North Carolina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance is combined with the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Center for Special Warfare making the U.S Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1\textsuperscript{21}

Civil affairs is a non-accessions branch; there are no authorizations for entry level soldiers or officers, with the exception of the United States Army Reserve (USAR) which has authorizations for junior soldiers. Training for army civil affairs forces has moved through a variety of phases, with significant improvements in the past several years as a result of the war on terrorism. The current course for both officers and NCOs is approximately 48 weeks long with instruction in language, regional analysis, and CA core tasks. The USAR qualification may occur in a variety of fashions. Initial entry soldiers may enlist for civil affairs, officers and NCOs may attend the active duty course, or they may attend training conducted by one of the reserve training battalions under the direction of the Total Army School System (TASS). USAR soldiers and officers are considered fully trained once they have credit for CA core task training. They are not required to have or maintain a language or the regional analysis training. This has resulted in a differing capability between the active army and the USAR.\textsuperscript{22}
In the 1960s it was determined military governance was mainly a requirement for an occupation force, something the United States did not intend to do, or at least not publically declare. Therefore it was effectively and intentionally dropped from civil affairs doctrine. However, the Army realized requirement for the capability remained and the USAR Civil Affairs force structure retained functional specialty teams to meet the need.23

Department of Defense (DoD) Directive Number 2000.13, Civil Affairs, issued June 27, 1994, establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for conducting civil affairs activities DoD wide. This document recognizes the need for the services to maintain some form of military government capability and directs them to do so. Though a number of paragraphs in the directive allude to military governments, paragraph 4.1.7 clearly states, “Establish and conduct military government until civilian authority or government can be restored.”24 However, there is very little in doctrine that explains how to meet this requirement.

USAJFKSWCS published Field Manual 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations, on October 31, 2011. According to the Army doctrine, “The mission of CA forces is to support commanders by engaging the civil component of the operational environment to achieve CMO or other stated U.S. objectives and ensure the sustained legitimacy of the mission and the transparency and credibility of the military force before, during, or after other military operations. CA forces plan, prepare for, execute, asses, and transition CAO at all levels of war.”25

FM 3-57 acknowledges five core tasks for civil affairs. These are populace and resources control (PRC), foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), civil information
management (CIM), nation assistance (NA), and support to civil administration (SCA). SCA are military operations that help stabilize or continue the operations of a governing body or civil structure of a foreign country. This is accomplished by either assisting an established government or by establishing military authority over an occupied population. SCA most often occurs in stability operations.

There are two categories for SCA; civil administration in friendly territory and civil administration in occupied territory. The permissiveness of the environment is the difference between the two. SCA in a friendly territory includes the geographic combatant command’s (GCC) support to governments in friendly territories during peacetime, disasters, or war. Examples include advising friendly authorities and performing specific functions within the limits of the authority and liability established by international treaties and agreements. This support is likely to involve interagency partners from the civilian sector of the United States government. SCA in an occupied or liberated territory requires the establishment of a temporary government, as directed by the Secretary of Defense, to exercise executive, legislative and judicial authority over the populace of a territory that United States forces have taken from an enemy by force. Such a government remains in place until an indigenous civil government can be established. This is closer to the former definition of military governance.

The term military governance is notably absent from the civil affairs mission statement and its core tasks. This may be due to political pressure to avoid the idea of an “occupation force”, substituting the similar concept and more benign term SCA. The cost of this absence is a lack of emphasis and reduced capability to conduct military governance when required.
Force Structure

The Army maintains CA forces in both the Regular Army and the United States Army Reserve (USAR). These units are designed to support joint and multinational forces, special operations forces, conventional forces and interagency organizations at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Regionally aligned units and elements provide support to the GCCs, sub-unified Commands, army service component commands (ASCC), the theater special operations commands (TSOC) and the maneuver force.31

In March 2010, the Army authorized an expansion of its CA force. This increase more than doubles the CA capacity of the Regular Army. Once complete the distribution of civil affairs forces between the active army and the army reserve will be approximately 20% to 80%. The active army will maintain two brigades; one under the control of the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) dedicated to support for special operations forces, and one (the newly activated brigade) will be dedicated to the army’s conventional maneuver forces under the control of the Forces Command. Each brigade has five regionally aligned battalions and thirty companies.

The USAR structure has one operational and functional command (United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command or USACAPOC) which controls the army reserve civil affairs force.32 This force is comprised of four regionally aligned Civil Affairs Commands (CACOM), nine brigades, thirty-three battalions and one hundred thirty-four companies.33 Since this is a discussion concerning military governance, this paper will not examine specific force structure differences between the army reserve and active army in detail. However, it is worth nothing that differences
similar to the previously noted qualification requirements between the active army and USAR soldiers exist and can be a hindrance to operations.

CA force structure is designed to have expertise in six functional specialty areas. These are rule of law, economic stability, governance, public health and welfare, infrastructure, and public education and information. CACOMs, brigades, and battalions field functional specialty teams comprised of technically qualified and experienced individuals called CA functional specialists. These specialists advise and assist the commander and they may advise, assist or direct civilian counterparts. They possess critical skills required to establish capability within their specific area. They are also expected to understand the regional and local impact of culture as it relates to their specialty. These functional specialists are employed for general support to interagency operations and direct support to military operations. CA functional specialists may fill key planning, operational, or liaison roles when civilian expertise from other governmental agencies is not available.  

The allocation of functional specialty areas and make up of specific teams varies. There are differences between teams at the CACOM, brigade and battalion levels. There are also differences between the Regular Army and the Army Reserve. This variance is intentional to account for operational needs as well as the ability of each component to maintain the skills required for specialized CA operations.

There is only one functional specialty team in the active army. It is assigned to the CA brigade allocated to support the conventional army. None of the officers assigned to this team are Civil Affairs officers, but rather officers with areas of
concentration centered on each of the doctrinally recognized functional specialty areas. This team provides a modest capability at best.\textsuperscript{36}

The USAR functional specialty teams are different by design.\textsuperscript{37} Similar to its regular army counterpart, the reserve team is comprised of officers with areas of concentration centered on each of the functional specialty areas, but it also has CA officers and noncommissioned officers who possess one or more of eleven special skill identifiers, as noted in table 2 below.\textsuperscript{38} In theory, these are personnel with highly technical capabilities and expertise in their civilian occupations such as doctors, lawyers, engineers, emergency management specialists, agriculturalist and educators.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functional Specialty Area</th>
<th>Skill Identifiers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Stability</td>
<td>6C Economist, 6U Agricultural Officer, 6E Civil Supply Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>6G Public Facilities Officer, 6F Public Transportation Officer, 6R Public Communications Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>6H Public Safety Officer, 5Y Civil Defense Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Health and Welfare</td>
<td>6V Cultural Affairs Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Education and Information</td>
<td>6D Public Education Officer, 6W Archivist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2\textsuperscript{39}

The army has established guidance which is monitored and approved by the proponent, USAJKSWCS for the award of these skill identifiers.\textsuperscript{40} The process is to ensure personnel possess the actual expertise the identifier says they do. However, these billets have proven hard to fill with the appropriate personnel in the past and often have personnel placed in a capacity beyond their skill level. For example, a reserve CA officer who has a Bachelor degree in fire science and serves as a fireman in civilian life
may hold the skill identifier 6H Public Safety Officer, but may not have sufficient experience to help establish a regional emergency management system in another country. Qualifying CA officers and NCOs serving in the active army may also be awarded these additional skill identifiers, but with no billets in the active army force there is little reason for them to do so.

**Challenges**

Any recommendations to address the lack of military governance capacity will have to overcome some challenges. Among these are current fiscal constraints in DoD, the natural tension between civilian and military governance, and the current divide between active and reserve civil affairs forces.

First, budget constraints are a reality in today’s military. Fiscal constraint has become a constant consideration for any planning effort and will continue to be for the foreseeable future. Any effort to rebalance the force must either demonstrate a cost savings or clearly demonstrate an essential new requirement, since any increase would come at the expense of another program. Changes will have to be measured against personnel end-strengths, modernization efforts, and readiness.

The second challenge will either resolve itself or prove to be insignificant. Increasing the Army’s capacity to conduct military governance will not reduce the nation’s reliance on its diplomatic corps. In fact, current events demonstrate an increased cooperation between the army and its interagency partners in recent years are evidence of this. PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Joint Task Force under the direction of the State department conducting relief efforts following the Haitian earthquake of 2010, and the increased number of interagency personnel on the GCC staffs are good examples.
Perhaps the greatest challenge is the divide that exists between the USAR and the active army. In the past ten years CA has struggled because of force realignment and most recently a debate over who should maintain the proponent responsibilities for the force. The problem manifests as an active army versus USAR issue, but at its heart is the question of whether or not CA forces are special operations forces (SOF). Army CA had been under the oversight of the SOF community since the US Army Institute for Military Assistance merged with the USAJFKSWCS in 1983. This arrangement was codified by Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger in 1987.

The performance of civil affairs in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm clearly validated this concept. In 1991, USAJFKSWCS sponsored a symposium entitled “Civil Affairs in the Persian Gulf War.” The transcripts provide numerous references to the positive impact of aligning CA with SOF. The commanding general of USASOC, General Wayne Downing voiced one of the strongest endorsements for keeping CA in SOF, General Downing went on to also command the U.S Special Operations Command, prior to his retirement in 1996.

This question was raised again by then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in 2003 and resulted in the realigning of USAR CA forces outside of USASOC in 2006. Colloquially referred to as the divorce, this new arrangement complicated training and equipping of the reserve component. The loss of access to SOF funding was never fully offset by funding from the USAR. This shift created an environment of distrust inside the CA community that continues to hinder cooperation between the two components. This distrust is evident in the negative reaction from much of the CA community to the Department of the Army decision to maintain USAJFKSWCS as the
proponent in 2009. This decision, developed through the Army’s campaign plan process, was determined to be the most cost effective way to meet the doctrinal and training requirements to accomplish documented CA force growth through 2014. The Army developed and funded force structure changes within USAJKSWCS to address the disparity between the reserve and active components of CA. In brief, the Army recognized the disparity between the components produced by the realignment of USAR forces outside of USASOC. To address this issue, the Army directed additional force structure be added to USAJKSWCS. The actual manning of this expanded force structure begun in the summer of 2011 is unlikely to reach full capability prior to the summer of 2012 or later.  

On June 1, 2011, before the Army’s plan was fully implemented, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) issued a letter describing this arrangement as “no longer tenable”. The Army reexamined the issue and maintained their original conclusion to keep the proponent aligned inside of USAJKSWCS in light of current budgetary constraints. The commanding general of USACAPOC remains openly against the current proponent arrangement.  

It is an unfortunate truth that the topic of this paper may be perceived as an attempt by the active army to reduce capability of the USAR. This is an idea that may cloud the judgment of the staff analysis over its feasibility and possible application of the concept.

Recommendations

Serious consideration given to the following recommendations will ensure the United States Army can man the appropriate specialists and organization to execute the military governance situation that history shows we will see again. The Army’s Civil
Affairs Branch must embrace the requirement to conduct the military governance mission and publish doctrine to guide the force. The proponent should take steps to establish a corps of Civil Affairs Governance Specialist in addition to the current generalists now in the force. Additionally, a change to the force structure is necessary to ensure the mission can be accomplished; a rebalanced force structure with a mix of active and USAR personnel specifically organized to achieve this purpose.

The Army’s Civil Affairs Branch, as the proponent must first publish specific military governance doctrine to guide the force. In 1947 the Army and Navy co-published FM 27-5 / OPNAV P22-1115, *United States Army and Navy Manual of Civil Affairs Military Government* to guide their forces in all aspects of establishing a military government. The few pages within our current doctrine remains too limited to provide overarching guidance for the force. There needs to be more written on the how to accomplish the tasks rather than a vague reference. This does not require a separate field manual or even a technical manual. It does however demand additional guidance to the force. Training the force should be twofold. First, some familiarization training concerning the use of military governments must be included in all levels of officer professional military education from pre-commissioning to senior service schooling. Second, the training and qualification standards for both active army and USAR CA officers and NCOs should be the same. All need language and regional analysis training. This will ensure all CA forces provide the supported commander the same capability.

This issue really should not be open for discussion in light of Department of Defense (DoD) Directive Number 2000.13, *Civil Affairs*. The services have been
directed to maintain some form of military government capability. Sufficient doctrine must be developed that explains to the force how to meet this requirement.

Another recommendation is to expand the breadth of the Civil Affairs Corps. Currently the branch is single tracked. Officers have a single Area of Concentration (AOC) of 38A. NCOs have a single Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) of 38B. The basic skills required for most civil affairs operations are encompassed in the qualification and general career development of these individuals but this singular track system lacks the breadth necessary for military governance. The previously discussed skill identifier system is an attempt to meet the requirement but it is limited at best. Shortages still remain and the qualifications are too broad to be effective. The purpose of this recommendation is to develop civil affairs specialists who are completely immersed in one of the functional specialty areas as their job. For the purpose of this discussion, call it a 38G, Civil Affairs Governance Specialist.

Creating a new AOC / MOS and developing a specialist track within the CA branch provides an avenue to specifically recruit personnel with the required skills to do those jobs not normally associated with the military. Additionally, this Civil Affairs Governance Specialist career field could be a tiered system. Some officers could be recruited off the street due to the specific civil based skills they possess while others would require the proponent develop training to provide these skills. Initial entry officers could serve in battalion level functional specialty teams under the tutelage of the brigade level specialist above them. By making them a specialist career field rather than the generalist, these individuals could be direct commissioned at a higher rank to facilitate their interaction with civil counterparts. Previous attempts at filling the
functional specialist rank through direct commission have failed. In 2011 these direct commission officers could be commissioned at no higher rank than captain. The purpose was to ensure these individuals were fully immersed in the Army’s culture before they had the opportunity to become a field grade officer and possibly command. This limited the effectiveness the individual had when interacting with counterparts. Additionally, it proved to be too little a draw to be an effective recruiting tool. However, making this AOC /MOS a specialist prevents these individuals from commanding; they are selected and promoted for the unique skill sets. This idea is not without precedent. The Medical Corps or Judge Advocate General Corps provide two examples of where this has been done within the Army.

The final recommendation may be the most controversial. The Army must develop an organization specifically dedicated to accomplishing the task of military governance. There is likely to be hesitation to explore this recommendation in light of the increasing budget constraints. However, there is sufficient civil affairs capacity to accomplish this task without requiring an increase in the Army end strength. One possible way to do this is to reorganize USACAPOC, trading tactical CA capacity for military governance capacity.

The four regionally aligned CACOMs could be taken out of the USACAPOC chain of command and assigned directly to the geographic combatant command for which they are currently aligned. Currently, USAFRICOM is supported by the same CACOM that provides support to USEUCOM; however, USACAPOC is already working a Force Design Update to meet this need. This shift would provide the GCCs with
assigned capacity and immediate access to the expertise to engage the civilian components inside their AORs.

The CACOM has the most robust functional specialty capability of the teams maintained within the army reserve. This concept would relieve the CACOMS of their Title X responsibilities for subordinate brigades and battalions. This responsibility could be transferred to USACAPOC or the regional commands within the USAR structure. USACAPOC would no longer need a deployable capacity inside its headquarters and would become solely a force provider and USAR functional command. Removing the Title X responsibility from the CACOM frees the commander and staff to place additional emphasis on military governance preparation along with orchestrating the CA support to the GCCs.

This concept could be implemented by a rebalance of the force within both the regular army and the army reserve. This is not to suggest new headquarters need to be created, since the need for a CACOM aligned to USAFRICOM has already been acknowledged. However, there is sufficient capacity at the tactical level that could be reallocated. The number of battalions and companies assigned to the USAR are based upon the number of Brigade Combat Teams fielded by the army. The initial rules of allocation for CA support were developed with two critical factors in mind, the dwell restrictions on the USAR and at the time, the USAR was the sole provider of CA support to the conventional army. The active army only maintained one CA brigade which supported Special Operations Forces. New force structure authorized in 2010 provided the addition of a second active army brigade.
The recently announced defense budget reductions will result in a reduced number of brigade combat teams fielded by the army. Couple this with the increased capacity in the active army and the USAR could reduce the number of brigades, battalions and companies it fields. This reduction of flags would yield a surplus of personnel positions which could be used to increase the governance functional specialty teams in the remaining brigades and battalions.\textsuperscript{52}

Another aspect of rebalancing the force is to reunite the regiment. The impact of the 2006 realignment or divorce would be mitigated and CA units would be more capable if they were made multi-compositional. The Army has experimented with this concept over the years in an attempt to develop units with personnel from both the active and reserve components assigned to it. The concept is to provide a more cost effective total force. The 13\textsuperscript{th} Corps Support Command, Fort Hood, Texas provides an example of this concept working well. This unit provided successfully integrated support to the Army’s III Corps starting in 1999.\textsuperscript{53}

This multi-composition rebalancing could be accomplished in two ways. The first would occur immediately upon placing the CACOMs directly under the command of the GCCs. This would immediately give them operational control of the active army regionally aligned conventional CA battalions. Additionally, brigades in both components could have battalions from each component assigned or OPCON. The second element to rebalancing the force is to rewrite Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE) to include some active army soldiers on reserve unit staffs and some reserve soldiers on active army unit staffs. This should occur at the CACOMs and brigades at a minimum, but could be done down to battalion level. Developing a multi-composition approach will
more closely align the components and will support the standardization qualifications across both the active Army and the USAR.

Conclusion

The past decade has provided new historical examples of our nation’s need to use military forces to bring stability and democracy to a region. Yet it remains clear that post-hostility governance will remain a shared responsibility between civilian diplomats and soldiers. The military will always be required to reestablish basic services immediately following hostilities and provide for a military government until civilian authority or government can be restored. Despite the public position of our national leadership to avoid the task of nation building, there must be deliberate planning and preparation to use military governments in occupied territories if we want to both succeed rapidly and secure the victories our combat forces achieve.

The Department of Defense must develop and maintain specific capacity to accomplish these tasks. The Army, as the largest provider of civil affairs forces, should be DoD’s lead agency in support of this effort. The three recommendations put forward in this paper (the publication of specific doctrine, the establishment of a Civil Affairs Governance Specialist, and developing a rebalanced force structure) would be a good start toward preventing a scholar in 2040 from repeating Colonel Hunt’s observations of 1940.

Some of the recommendations may be considered extreme, but by suggesting them, perhaps the members of the Army’s Civil Affairs community, USAR and active, may begin legitimate conversation aimed at actually solving the problems associated with the military governance mission. Such conversations will likely result in all sides
finding more common ground than anyone realizes exist. More importantly, these conversations may lead to a reunited Regiment.

Endnotes


4 Coles and Weinberg., 9-10.

5 Ibid., 340-345.

6 Ibid., 22.


9 Patterson, Revisiting a School of Military Government, 5.


12 Ibid., 81.


14 Rudd, Reconstructing Iraq: Regime Change, 29.

15 Ibid., 381.

16 Patterson, Revisiting a School of Military Government, 6.


26 Ibid., 1-3.

27 Ibid., 3-17.

28 Ibid.

29 Patterson, *Revisiting a School of Military Government*, 8.

30 Charlebois, telephone interview by author, January 24, 2012.


32 Operational and Functional Commands are deployable elements which command units of the same or similar functional capabilities regardless of the unit's geographic location. Operational and Functional Commands are fully deployable as headquarters, individual units or both, see The United States Army Reserve Home Page, [http://www.usar.army.mil/arweb/organization/commandstructure/USARC/OPS/Pages/default.aspx](http://www.usar.army.mil/arweb/organization/commandstructure/USARC/OPS/Pages/default.aspx) (accessed January 27, 2012).
Mapley-Brittle, telephone interview by author, January 24, 2012


Ibid.

Mapley-Brittle, telephone interview by author, January 24, 2012


Ibid.

Mapley-Brittle, telephone interview by author, January 24, 2012


The author served at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School from August 2010 to July 2011 as the Chief, Civil Affairs Division Personnel Proponent. He worked closely on the implementation of the force structure changes outlined in the Total Army Analysis Army Structure Memorandum 10-15.


DoD Directive 2000.13 "Civil Affairs"


The USAR has nine Civil Affairs Brigades seven assigned to the U.S. Army Civil Affairs Psychological Operations and two separate brigades, one in Hawaii and one in Germany. The separate brigades provide tactical capacity but were not considered as available for the purposes of this paper.