Regional Solutions for Regional Problems: East Timor and Solomon Islands

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14. ABSTRACT The post Cold War era offered unprecedented opportunities for collective security responses, and yet the international response to the security crises of the 1990s and early 2000s proved disappointing. An exception was in the Asia-Pacific region where a regional middle power, Australia, led several multi-national regional interventions to halt humanitarian crises and prevent state failures. This paper argues that where certain conditions pre-exist or can be created, regional solutions, as conceived under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, offer the greatest likelihood of enduring success. The paper analyzes the Australian-led interventions in East Timor in 1999 and 2006, and the Solomon Islands in 2003, identifying factors that enabled regional cooperation, coalition building, and the exercise of national power. The paper concludes that the key factors underpinning effective regional solutions are: a regional state willing to take a leadership role and committed to achieving a successful outcome; legitimacy through host nation request and/or an international mandate; a deep understanding of stakeholder interests; competent, expeditionary-capable security forces; and diplomatic and enabling support from major powers such as the United States.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
REGIONAL SOLUTIONS FOR REGIONAL PROBLEMS: EAST TIMOR AND SOLOMON ISLANDS

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The post Cold War era offered unprecedented opportunities for collective security responses, and yet the international response to the security crises of the 1990s and early 2000s proved disappointing. An exception was in the Asia-Pacific region where a regional middle power, Australia, led several multi-national regional interventions to halt humanitarian crises and prevent state failures. This paper argues that where certain conditions pre-exist or can be created, regional solutions, as conceived under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, offer the greatest likelihood of enduring success. The paper analyzes the Australian-led interventions in East Timor in 1999 and 2006, and the Solomon Islands in 2003, identifying factors that enabled regional cooperation, coalition building, and the exercise of national power. The paper concludes that the key factors underpinning effective regional solutions are: a regional state willing to take a leadership role and committed to achieving a successful outcome; legitimacy through host nation request and/or an international mandate; a deep understanding of stakeholder interests; competent, expeditionary-capable security forces; and diplomatic and enabling support from major powers such as the United States.
REGIONAL SOLUTIONS FOR REGIONAL PROBLEMS: EAST TIMOR AND SOLOMON ISLANDS:

Swift and effective international action often turns on the political will of coalitions of countries that comprise regional or international institutions.

—President Barack Obama

The post-Cold War era provided unprecedented opportunities for collective responses to security crises. No longer were crises perceived through the lens of the global competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. When the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait erupted as the first major crisis of the post Cold War era, it was resolved with an extraordinary degree of cooperation between the United States, Russia and former Soviet client states. After the US-led coalition decisively defeated the Iraqi Army in Operation DESERT STORM, President George H. Bush declared his vision of a “new world order” in which the rule of law governs the conduct of nations and “a credible United Nations can use its peacekeeping role to fulfill the promise and vision of the U.N.’s founders.”

Unfortunately, the global responses to humanitarian crises of the 1990s and early 2000s failed to meet President Bush’s ideals. The United Nations’ (UN) response to the Bosnian conflict of the early 1990s was chronically under-resourced, and was marred by a series of humiliating failures before the United States and NATO intervened decisively in 1995. In Somalia, the UN and US-led missions saw some brief successes before a series of tactical setbacks led to a failure of political will and troop withdrawal in 1995. While the Rwandan genocide unfolded in 1994, the global community debated the problem but took virtually no action until more than 800,000 Rwandan citizens had been slaughtered in intercommunal violence. For the United States and the major European
powers, none of these crises represented threats to vital national interests, and so drew relatively unenthusiastic responses.

In the Asia-Pacific region, by contrast, there was a middle power which viewed regional instability as a direct threat to its national interests and acted decisively within the region to halt humanitarian crises and prevent state failures. Between 1999 and 2006, Australia led three major multi-national security interventions into neighboring states. The first, and most widely known, was the 1999 intervention by the International Force East Timor (INTERFET) to halt the violence that followed the Timorese vote for independence from Indonesia. The second was a civilian-led, military-supported, stability operation in the Solomon Islands to halt intercommunal violence and prevent state failure. The third was a rapid re-intervention into East Timor when power disputes within the Timorese Defense Force threatened to escalate into civil war. All three interventions had several factors in common: they were all led by a regional middle-power (Australia); they all drew legitimacy from host government requests and United Nations Security Council consent; they all involved coalitions of willing regional nations, including the host nations; they were all broadly successful in achieving their political objectives; and all were achieved without significant direct involvement by the major powers.

This paper contends that, where certain conditions pre-exist or can be created, regional solutions to regional security problems, as conceived under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, can offer the greatest likelihood of enduring success and that the major powers, particularly the United States, can leverage the unique characteristics of regional solutions through capacity-building and enabling support. The paper will
analyze the Australian-led interventions in East Timor in 1999 and 2006, and the Solomon Islands in 2003, identifying the factors at the strategic and operational level that enabled regional cooperation, coalition building, and effective use of national power. The paper will then outline the high-payoff policies and supporting behaviors that the United States and other major powers can employ to enable regional security solutions.

**East Timor 1999: A Coalition of the Willing Under Regional Leadership**

Following its popular vote for independence from Indonesia and the chaotic violence that followed, East Timor emerged as the first major post-Cold War security crisis in Southeast Asia. Portugal had established a colony in East Timor in 1702 but by 1974 the Portuguese people had grown disillusioned with the sacrifices involved in maintaining their colonial empire. In April 1974, a group of left wing military officers overthrew the government of Oliveira Salazar and announced their intention to grant independence to Portugal’s overseas colonies, including East Timor. In anticipation of gaining independence, the various East Timorese independence factions coalesced into political parties, with the dominant party, FRETILIN (Portuguese: Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente; English: Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor), espousing a Marxist ideology. President Suharto of Indonesia, who had previously shown minimal concern with Portugal’s de-colonization plans, became increasingly worried at the possibility of a Marxist state on Indonesia’s border. Consequently, the Indonesian military began a de-stabilization campaign along the West Timor/East Timor border and developed plans for invasion and occupation of the Portuguese colony. Both the Australian and US governments were aware of Suharto’s plans and were supportive of his vigorous anti-communist stance.
In December 1975, with the tacit approval of the United States and possibly Australia, Indonesian military forces invaded East Timor, defeated the disorganized resistance forces and incorporated the Portuguese colony into the Republic of Indonesia. For the next 24 years, the Indonesian military fought a counter-insurgency campaign against FALINTIL (Portuguese: *Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste*; English: *The Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor*), the military arm of FRETILIN, which sought to create an independent East Timorese state.

By 1998, several factors combined to create an opportunity for resolution of the East Timor problem: the Asian economic crisis of 1997-98 had crippled Indonesia’s economy and many Indonesians no longer saw value in expending lives and resources to retain East Timor, President Suharto lost power to President B.J. Habibe in Indonesia’s first truly democratic election, and the Australian government adopted a new policy supportive of East Timorese self-determination. In January 1999, under pressure from Portugal and Australia, President Habibe offered the people of East Timor a referendum to choose between *special autonomy for East Timor within the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia* or *East Timor’s separation from Indonesia*. While most of the East Timorese population responded to the offer with enthusiasm, those segments of society with a significant stake in Indonesian leadership were strongly opposed to independence. Violence broke out almost immediately, with pro-Indonesian militia groups intimidating individuals and communities to force a pro-integration vote.

The referendum, conducted on 30 August 1999, resulted in a resounding 78.5% in favor of independence. As the referendum results became known, the violence
escalated dramatically, with more than 1,300 Timorese civilians killed and 300,000 displaced in the following weeks. In response to this violence and under intense public pressure, Australian Prime Minister John Howard sought and gained a UN Security Council Chapter VII mandate (UNSCR 1264) to establish a “a multinational force under a unified command structure . . . to restore peace and security in East Timor [and] to take all necessary measures to fulfil this mandate”. The Australian Government began to build a coalition of nations willing to contribute military forces to what would ultimately become the International Force East Timor (INTERFET).

As a regional middle-power, Australia was uniquely placed to respond to the security crisis in East Timor. Australia’s geographic proximity to East Timor, deep understanding of regional issues, hard won relationships with regional states, and its capable military forces made it a logical choice to lead a multi-national stabilization operation. Australia also perceived regional stability as a core national interest; second only to defense of the homeland. As Prime Minister Howard began to assemble a ‘coalition of the willing’ in August and September 1999, Australia’s position as a regional middle-power allowed it to build an unprecedented degree of international cooperation, including political support from China, financial commitments from Japan, and comprehensive support from ASEAN member states. Prime Minister Howard also understood and carefully managed the competing interests of the major stakeholders: Australia, Indonesia, Portugal and the United States.

Beyond humanitarian motives, Australia had significant geo-strategic, historical, and economic interests in East Timor. Australia perceived that it was vital to have stable, friendly states on its northern maritime approaches; hence Australia’s support for
a strong, stable Indonesian state. This perception had led, during WWII, to Australia’s decision to forward deploy troops in East Timor as a bulwark against Japanese encroachment. These troops had fought alongside the Timorese people against the Japanese and formed strong bonds. Consequently, there was a widespread sense of national ‘guilt’ over Australia’s lack of response to the Indonesian invasion of December 1975. Although both the United States and Australia gave tacit support to the Indonesian invasion, to the Australian populace this had always been an extremely unpopular stance, with a general feeling that the East Timorese people had been betrayed in the name of cold war expedience. As Prime Minister Howard build the case for an Australian-led intervention, the historical relationship between Australia and East Timorese people manifested as bipartisan political support and broad-based domestic support for intervention.

As the occupying power, Indonesia was the second major stakeholder. Despite the Indonesian government’s declared support for East Timorese independence and the multi-national force, the Indonesian military was reluctant to evacuate East Timor and handover security responsibilities to a western-led intervention force. After a brutal 24-year counter-insurgency campaign and the loss of about 3,600 of its soldiers, the Indonesian military had made a significant ‘blood and treasure’ commitment to East Timor. For Prime Minister Howard, the tension between the popular demand for military intervention and the need to manage the relationship with Indonesia (Australia’s largest neighbor) was the most significant factor in National Security Committee considerations leading to the intervention.
The third major stakeholder was East Timor’s former colonial master, Portugal. At the time of Indonesia’s invasion in December 1975, East Timor was considered a ‘non-self-governing territory under Portuguese administration’ and, from the United Nations’ perspective, remained so until it achieved full independence on 20 May 2002. Portugal maintained an active interest and a generally anti-Indonesian stance throughout the Indonesian occupation. In 1999, Portugal’s principal objectives were to foster East Timor’s development into a viable state, foster the adoption of Portuguese language as the official language of East Timor and to counter-balance Australian and Indonesian influence.

The United States played a small but extremely significant role in the intervention. The most important contribution was the diplomatic support provided by President Bill Clinton and Secretary of Defense William Cohen, both of whom engaged directly with the Indonesian government to encourage cooperation and discourage interference, covert or otherwise. Militarily, the United States was unwilling to commit significant ground forces to the East Timor operation, particularly given its ongoing commitments to Bosnia and Kosovo. On 29 September, 1999, Secretary of Defense Cohen declared that the United States had “assigned some 260 people directly to INTERFET”, plus strategic lift, helicopter support, and strategic communications support. The United States also made available the USS Mobile Bay (CG 53) and the USS Belleau Wood (LHA-3), which stood offshore in Dili Harbor as a highly visible American presence, alongside warships from nine other coalition nations. While the limited offer of United States ground forces was somewhat disappointing to Prime
Minister Howard and other coalition partners, the American diplomatic effort had a profound influence on the successful outcome of the intervention.\(^{30}\)

One of the factors that can undermine regional security cooperation is fear and suspicion of the stronger regional states; especially those states with the military capacity to lead a multi-national intervention. Several Asia-Pacific states perceived Australia in this light and were openly opposed to Australian leadership of the multi-national mission. Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad of Malaysia, in particular, viewed Australia as an aspiring regional hegemon and was suspicious of Australian motives in supporting East Timorese independence.\(^{31}\) However, the concept of an Australian-led multi-national intervention had already gained broad international legitimacy from UNSCR 1264, the UN Secretary General had requested Australia’s leadership, and the Indonesian government had requested an intervention by an international stabilization force. The United States was able to support Australia’s leadership offer through its influence in the Security Council and through its bilateral relations with Indonesia and other regional states; thereby creating the necessary conditions for a successful regional security solution.

Under the title *Operation STABILISE*, INTERFET commenced deploying into East Timor on September 20, 1999. The force commander, Major General Peter Cosgrove, was acutely aware of Indonesian sensitivities towards foreign troops entering East Timor and chose a ‘soft’ entry option, with the first troops entering the country via Dili Airport rather than more aggressive amphibious and airmobile methods of entry.\(^{32}\) To reduce the likelihood of misunderstanding, staff from the Australian Embassy Jakarta, all Indonesian speakers, engaged with Indonesian military commanders and
troops around the airfield to convince them that Australian troops were coming to Timor at the invitation of the Indonesian Government and would work in cooperation with the Indonesian troops.\textsuperscript{33}

The first three weeks of the intervention were extremely tense as approximately 26,000 Indonesian troops were withdrawn and INTERFET built up to what would ultimately become an 11,500 man multi-national force.\textsuperscript{34} As Indonesian troops withdrew from East Timor, many units deliberately destroyed the barracks, facilities and infrastructure they had built and occupied over the previous 24 years. There were numerous tense situations as Indonesian troops, who provided at least tacit support to the militia forces, confronted Australian troops who were attempting to neutralize the militia and quell the violence.\textsuperscript{35} Although there were some small-scale firefights, most of the confrontations were defused by junior leaders who were able to talk-down the situation and thereby avoid unwanted conflict. In what must be considered one of the great achievements of the INTERFET operation, all 26,000 Indonesian troops were withdrawn from East Timor without significant clashes with Australian or other international forces. If Indonesian and Australian troops had clashed, the strategic relationship between the two nations and the newly independent East Timor would have been severely damaged.

Following the Indonesian withdrawal and the suppression of the anti-independence militias, the United Nations Transitional Authority East Timor (UNTAET) undertook the administrative governance of the East Timorese state and institutional mentoring of Timorese staff until the Timorese themselves assumed these responsibilities in May 2002. INTERFET provided the security framework for East Timor
until February 2000 when a ‘blue helmet’ United Nations force assumed security responsibilities. Over a period of five months, from September 1999 to February 2000, INTERFET had halted the militia violence, facilitated the Indonesian military withdrawal, disarmed the warring factions, and assisted approximately 200,000 displaced persons to return to their homes.\textsuperscript{36}

Why had the western-led intervention in East Timor been so successful when the West had responded inadequately, or had failed to respond at all, to other humanitarian crises in the previous decade? Several factors contributed to this highly successful outcome. At the strategic level, Prime Minister Howard of Australia and President B.J. Habibe of Indonesia had formed a solid working relationship that allowed a frank exchange of ideas, even on issues as sensitive as East Timorese independence. The Australia-Indonesia relationship had fluctuated dramatically in the previous half century, reaching a low during the Konfrontasi of the early 1960s, and achieving its high point in the mid-1990s through the efforts of Labor Party Prime Minister Paul Keating to re-orient Australian foreign policy towards Southeast Asia in general and Indonesia in particular.\textsuperscript{37} Australia’s active support to Indonesia during the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 had also built a reserve of goodwill between the two nations; a reserve that would be severely tested during the East Timor crisis.\textsuperscript{38}

The United States played an extremely important diplomatic and military role in the East Timor crisis. President Clinton and senior Whitehouse staff engaged closely with the Indonesian Government to provide incentives for cooperation, and disincentives for obstructing the INTERFET operation. President Clinton declared: “My own willingness to support future assistance [to Indonesia] will depend very strongly on the
Similarly, Admiral Dennis Blair, Commander United States Pacific Command, engaged directly with General Wiranto, Commander of ABRI (Indonesian: *Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia*, English: *Indonesian Armed Forces*), to urge restraint by the militias and to ensure Indonesian forces would not obstruct INTERFET operations. The diplomatic and military enabling support provided by the United States established the pre-conditions for the intervention, and persuaded the Indonesian Government and military leadership that their interests were best served by withdrawing peacefully from East Timor.

At the operational level, the personal relationships cultivated over decades between Australian and Indonesian diplomats and military leaders provided a basis for peaceful cooperation in the transfer of security responsibilities. Likewise, Australia’s close military relationships with other regional states such as Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines provided a basis upon which a multi-national force could be formed. The ASEAN contingents, culturally close to the Timorese and Indonesians, provided security in the less violent areas of East Timor and were able to shift quickly to nation building activities; a role for which they proved extremely adept. At the lowest tactical level, INTERFET junior leaders and their Indonesian counterparts were aware of the strategic implications of their actions and were generally able to defuse hostile situations.

Perhaps the most significant factor that distinguished East Timor from other multi-national operations was Australia’s willingness to lead the multi-national force in a forceful Chapter VII mandated intervention; a willingness derived directly from Australia’s perception of its national interests. Without a capable and willing lead nation, the international force could not have been formed and deployed in time to halt the
violence. The Australian Defence Force (ADF), which comprised the largest contingent in INTERFET, deployed into East Timor within days of gaining Security Council and Indonesian approval. Enabling this response was the investment by previous Australian governments in the combat capabilities, enablers and ‘expeditionary mindset’ that allowed the ADF to rapidly deploy into a foreign country, form the framework for a multinational force of 21 countries, and take aggressive action to suppress the militia forces. Lead nation willingness and capability are likely to be critical ingredients in any regional security solution.

**East Timor 2006: A Tough Australian-led Response to Prevent Civil War**

East Timor was recognized as an independent nation on May 20, 2002, and the UN military contingents were largely withdrawn by May 20, 2005, when the UN peacekeeping mission transitioned to a governance capacity-building mission under the United Nations Office in East Timor (UNOTIL). Several nations, particularly Australia and Portugal, also provided bilateral capacity building assistance to the F-FDTL (English: FALINTIL-East Timorese Defense Forces; Portuguese: FALINTIL-Forças de Defesa de Timor Leste) and the PNTL (English: National Police of East Timor; Portuguese: Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste). Unfortunately, without the dampening effect of the international military and police presence, residual political tensions resurfaced to threaten the fledgling state.

One of the key problems East Timor faced after its independence was how to deal with hundreds of veteran FALINTIL fighters who had resisted the Indonesian forces for 24 years and now demanded recognition and compensation for their efforts. Both the F-FDTL and the PNTL comprised ‘Easterners’ who had actively resisted Indonesian
occupation and provided most of the resistance manpower, and ‘Westerners’ who had played a minimal role in the resistance and had largely worked alongside the Indonesians. The Westerners felt that they were being discriminated against in terms of promotion and influence within the security forces. On April 28, 2006, violence erupted as protesting Westerners and their supporters attacked Government House and other government centers, resulting in five civilian deaths. The protesters abandoned their barracks and began to engage the still loyal elements of the F-FDTL in open conflict. The violence reached its peak over May 23-25, 2006 as rebel soldiers, loyal soldiers, police, Westerner gangs and Easterner gangs clashed throughout the country resulting in more than 38 deaths, 1600 houses destroyed and approximately 150,000 displaced persons as the population fled from the urban areas. As the violence escalated, the Timorese government split into factions based around President Xanana Gusmao and Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri.

Australia again took on the leading role in the political and military responses to the crisis in East Timor. Both the problem and the solution were somewhat simpler in 2006 than they had been in 1999. Without the complicating factors of the Indonesian occupation and the requirement for a UN Security Council Resolution, Australia’s military response was even more rapid and forceful than the earlier intervention. Pending a request for assistance from the East Timorese government, Australia raised its military forces to a high state of readiness, including prepositioning of an Amphibious Task Group in North Queensland. In a modern form of gunboat diplomacy, Australia’s highly visible military preparations were fully intended to intimidate the warring factions to cease the violence and resolve their disputes through peaceful means.
The violence of May 23 convinced the East Timorese Government that they could no longer control the situation and on May 24, 2006, East Timor's Foreign Minister, José Ramos-Horta, requested assistance from Australia, New Zealand, Portugal and Malaysia to "disarm renegade troops and police rebelling against the state." Within hours, under the title *Operation ASTUTE*, pre-positioned Australian forces arrived in Dili and other key entry points. With the presence of the Australian military forces, followed shortly afterwards by military and police contributions from New Zealand, Portugal and Malaysia, the threat to the East Timorese state rapidly diminished. The UN also raised a new mission, the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor Leste (UNMIT), to assist East Timor in maintaining law and order. The mutinous elements of the F-FDTL, comprising approximately 500 soldiers and key leaders, withdrew to remote mountain strongholds and sought a negotiated solution to their perceived injustices. Intercommunal and gang violence continued to plague East Timor through 2007 and 2008, culminating in a February 11, 2008 assassination attempt on President Gusmao and Prime Minister Jose Ramos Horta, during which the rebel leader Major Alfredo Reinado was killed. The assassination attempt against the two national heroes shocked the East Timorese people and the violence levels diminished. On August 27, 2008, the main protagonists signed a peace agreement that has been largely successful in limiting further violence.

In 2006, as in 1999, American diplomatic support was critical in allowing an effective Australian-led response. Providing more than 80% of the military intervention force, the Australian Government sought to retain the Australian military contribution under a unified command in support of, but not under command of, the UN Mission.
This allowed the Australian-led Combined Task Force to work on a bilateral basis with the East Timorese Government, rather than working directly for the UN Special Representative. Portugal, Brazil and some regional states vigorously opposed this position and sought a fully-integrated UN mission like the earlier UNTAET and UNMISET missions. The United States and Great Britain supported Australia’s position in UN Security Council deliberations. Independent reporting on UN Security Council deliberations in August 2006 observed: “uncompromising firm support by the US and the UK for the Australian position, which is opposed to UN command and control”. 49

Rather than a UN-mandated multi-national intervention as INTERFET had been, the 2006 intervention was largely a bilateral arrangement between Australia and East Timor. Perceiving a national security threat far beyond its ability to control, the government of East Timor had turned to its neighbor, Australia, for assistance. When President Gusmao decided to invite a foreign military intervention, he must have done so fully aware that the foreign troops would employ force against East Timorese citizens. That he was able to make this request, with the support of the East Timorese people, reflects a confidence that doing so was in the best interests of his nation, although key members of his government, including Prime Minister Alkatiri, initially opposed foreign involvement. 50 From Australia’s perspective, instability in East Timor represented a threat to vital national interests and, more pragmatically, a threat to the vast investment of political, economic and military effort already committed to the new nation. Australia’s close ties with East Timor, declared commitment to regional stability, and deep understanding of Timorese political culture and political personalities left it well placed to lead a regional security intervention.
Another major regional security concern for Australia in the early 21st Century was the potential for state failure in the Solomon Islands. In June 2003, with the hard lessons of the INTERFET operation still being digested and significant portions of the ADF already committed to East Timor, Iraq, and Afghanistan, Australia was faced with an escalating civil war and pending collapse of law and order in the Solomon Islands.

Since gaining independence from the Great Britain in 1978, the Solomon Islands had suffered from tensions between its two major tribal groups, the Malaitans from the island of Malaita and the Gwales from the main island of Guadalcanal. The Malaitans were attracted to the superior economic opportunities offered on Guadalcanal, particularly around the capital, Honiara, and Henderson Airfield, the Solomon’s main international airport. The Gwales resented the Malaitan intrusion into their traditional lands and, in particular, resented the Malaitan patrilineal inheritance culture that ensured a steady transfer of Guadalcanal land to Malaitans.51

By 1998 the tensions had escalated to widespread organized violence between rival militia groups. Several peace negotiation attempts had failed to produce results. In June 2000, the ‘Malaitan Eagle Force’ seized power in Honiara and deposed Prime Minister Ulufa‘alu. A new Prime Minister, Manasseh Sogavare, was elected on 30 June 2000 and was, in turn, replaced by Sir Allan Kemakeza in 2001. Australia attempted to broker an indigenous peace settlement by hosting talks on Australian soil, resulting in the Townsville Peace Agreement of October 2000.52 A small multi-national civil-military Peace Monitoring Team was deployed to the Solomon Islands to oversee the implementation of the agreement but, without international backing, the peace process
broke down. By 2003, the Solomon Islands had deteriorated into violent lawlessness with hundreds of people killed and more than 30,000 displaced.53

Prime Minister Kemakeza made an initial request for Australian assistance in April 2003. Again perceiving regional instability to be a threat to vital national interests, Australia took the lead in building regional consensus for a comprehensive intervention, resulting in the Agreement between the Solomon Islands, Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa and Tonga concerning the operations and status of the Police and Armed Forces and Other Personnel deployed to Solomon Islands to assist in the Restoration of Law and Order and Security.54 The agreement was signed on the 24 May, 2003 with its primary goal being to:

...assist in the provision of security and safety to persons and property; maintain supplies and services essential to the life of the Solomon Islands community; prevent and suppress violence, intimidation and crime; support and develop Solomon Islands institutions; and generally to assist in the maintenance of law and order in Solomon Islands.

As The Facilitation of International Assistance Act 2003 (No.1 of 2003), the agreement was passed into Solomon Islands law on July 23, 2003.55 On July 21, 2003, Prime Minister Kemakeza formally requested assistance from Australia and New Zealand in restoring peace to the Solomon Islands. In justifying an Australian-led intervention, Prime Minister John Howard declared:

If we do nothing and the country slides into further anarchy, and then it becomes a haven for evildoers, whether they're involved in terrorism, or drugs, or money laundering, or anything else, we will rightly be condemned, not only by the Australian people, but also by countries around the world.56

From Australia’s perspective, a failed state in the Solomon Islands was an unacceptable threat to its national interests.
Under the Pidgin-English title *Operation HELP EM FREN D* (Operation Helping a Friend), the Regional Assistance Mission – Solomon Islands (RAMSI) was established in July 2003. Almost uniquely among western-led peacekeeping missions, RAMSI was intended from the outset to be a nation-building mission; for a country that some commentators considered to be an ‘unformed state’ that rather than a ‘failed state’, given that it had never really developed effective governance institutions.\(^57\) RAMSI was also conceived as a civilian-led mission in which the police contingent provided the primary security presence, backed up by a strong and highly visible military task force. RAMSI comprised civilian and military contributions from Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Papua-New Guinea (PNG), Tonga, Cook Islands, Kiribati, Nauru, Samoa, and Vanuatu under the leadership of the RAMSI Special Coordinator, Mr Nick Warner, an Australian diplomat from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). A crucial element of RAMSI’s effectiveness was the strategic level RAMSI Inter-Departmental Committee (IDC) that brought together the Australian government departments and their counterparts from other RAMSI participants to ensure that the deployed element of RAMSI was fully supported with resources and timely policy decisions.

The RAMSI Participating Police Force (PPF) had the leading role at the tactical level and comprised police contingents from Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, PNG, Tonga, Cook Islands, Kiribati, Nauru, Samoa, and Vanuatu. The PPF was headed by Assistant Commissioner Ben McDevitt of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) who was also appointed as the Deputy Commissioner of the Royal Solomon Islands Police (RSIP).\(^58\) The AFP had, over the previous decade, developed a fledgling expeditionary police capability that proved extremely useful for the RAMSI deployment which, at its peak,
involved more than 300 AFP officers. The RAMSI military component initially comprised approximately 1800 troops, with Australia providing the headquarters and support elements, reinforced by significant contributions from New Zealand, Fiji, PNG and Tonga. The police, military and civilian contributions from the Pacific Island nations, although small, demonstrated a genuine regional commitment to the mission.

Arriving in overwhelming force on July 25, 2003, RAMSI police and military forces rapidly stabilized the security situation in the Solomon Islands and probably forestalled the complete disintegration of governmental authority. The early negotiated surrender of rebel leader Harold Keke and a comprehensive gun buy-back program substantially reduced the violence level and intercommunal tensions. The police-led security effort was so effective that the RAMSI military component was able to draw down from 1800 personnel to 700 personnel within six months and to 400 personnel within 12 months. In 2004, 2005, and 2006, resurgent bouts of violence threatened to de-stabilize the RAMSI effort but in each case, Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific Island rapidly deployed additional police and military forces to preempt or respond to the security threat. Concurrent with the security effort, civilian specialists and aid agencies commenced a comprehensive partnering effort with Solomon Islands government departments and financial institutions to rebuild effective governance.

Some observers have argued that RAMSI imposed an artificial veneer of law and order without dealing with the underlying causes of conflict, and that the embedding of expert staff within Solomon Islands institutions created a culture of dependence on RAMSI’s presence. Yet, despite the imperfections inherent in any attempt at nation-building, RAMSI’s strategy has broken the chain of intercommunal violence, restored a
sense of civil order, and created opportunity for an indigenous resolution. Significantly, the three ‘pillars’ of RAMSI’s mandate (Machinery of Government, Law and Justice, Economic Governance) do not include peacebuilding; rather, they are focused upon creating a stable, rule-of-law based state in which indigenous peace solutions may be pursued.  

RAMSI represents a sharp contrast with the Australian-led INTERFET operation in East Timor in 1999, and with the later Australian-led intervention in East Timor in 2006. The operations in East Timor were military-led operations with a heavy focus on security. RAMSI, by contrast, represented a bolder nation-building approach with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (equivalent to the US Department of State) in the lead, supported by the AFP (broadly equivalent to the Federal Bureau of Investigation), and a military component in a highly visible but supporting role. RAMSI gained its legitimacy through comprehensive regional consultation, and inclusion of the *Facilitation of International Assistance Act* into Solomon Islands law. While RAMSI had the enthusiastic support of the UN Secretary General, it did not require active involvement by either the UN or the United States and therefore represented a comprehensive regional solution to a regional security threat. 

**Conclusion**

In both East Timor (1999 and 2006) and the Solomon Islands (2003), regional security solutions, led by a willing lead nation, succeeded in circumstances where many similar multi-national interventions had failed. While aspects of these three interventions were unique, success factors common to all three may be identified and leveraged to support future regional security initiatives.
Perhaps most importantly, the regional response in each of these crises was led by a single nation, Australia, which provided the bulk of the forces and a unified command structure under which other willing nations could contribute military forces. Australia also perceived regional instability as a threat to its vital interests and was willing to lead the interventions with a substantial commitment of military, police, civilian and logistic capacity. With a regional nation willing to take the lead and provide the framework military forces, the security interventions were implemented far more quickly than has historically been possible with ‘blue helmet’ UN forces.

Australia derived international legitimacy and a mandate for regional leadership from host nation requests for support, UN Security Council Resolutions, and endorsement by regional fora such as ASEAN and the Pacific Islands Forum. While some individual statesmen, such as Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir, expressed concern over Australia’s forceful responses, regional leaders were broadly supportive and appreciative that a nation was willing to accept the leadership role. This support was facilitated by Australia’s previous efforts in regional relationship building, and supporting diplomatic efforts by other major powers, particularly the United States, in building international consensus for the security interventions.

Regional understanding proved essential in framing the problem for each of the interventions. In the 1999 East Timor crisis, Australia’s long engagement with Indonesia and deep understanding of the developing situation in East Timor allowed Prime Minister Howard and Major General Cosgrove to craft appropriate strategic and operational approaches, whilst minimizing potential for conflict. In the 2006 East Timor crisis, a deep understanding of the issues at stake and a strong relationship with the
new nation allowed a robust military response that rapidly terminated a potentially catastrophic conflict within the Timorese security forces. In 2003, Australia’s deep understanding of the situation in the Solomon Islands and mature relations with Pacific Island Forum partners allowed it to craft an unprecedented civilian-led, military supported comprehensive solution that could form a model for other nation-building efforts.

Australia’s regional leadership role was underpinned by a range of military capabilities that allowed it to command and control, deploy, and logistically support multi-national joint forces in regional expeditionary operations. Australia’s investment in these military capabilities was the result of well-considered defense policy, appropriate equipment acquisition programs, and a focus on training the force for the types of joint operations subsequently undertaken in the region. The United States and major powers can assist regional middle-powers in building expeditionary capacity through training and joint exercises.

Diplomatic and enabling military support, such as the United States provided in the 1999 East Timor crisis, proved critical to the success of the mission and avoidance of inadvertent conflict between INTERFET and Indonesian forces. American diplomatic support also played a smaller but important role in garnering international support for the 2003 RAMSI mission in the Solomon Islands and the 2006 intervention in East Timor.

Regional security solutions can work because the level of understanding, national commitment, political will, and public support are likely to be significantly higher when the problem is local and directly threatens the national interests of regional actors.
In the case of East Timor and the Solomon Islands, Australia was well-placed to lead the regional effort and was committed to a successful outcome. Genta Hawkins Holmes, United States Ambassador to Australia, reflected this concept in her April 2000 speech to the United Services Institute, observing that: “East Timor is on Australia’s doorstep and Australia has strong emotional ties to the territory. Under such circumstances, it was entirely appropriate for Australia to take the lead.”

Endnotes


2 The term ‘New World Order’ was used by President George H. Bush in his speech to the American people on January 16 1991, approximately two hours after the commencement of Operation DESERT STORM.

“This is an historic moment. We have in this past year made great progress in ending the long era of conflict and cold war. We have before us the opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future generations a new world order -- a world where the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations. When we are successful -- and we will be -- we have a real chance at this new world order, an order in which a credible United Nations can use its peacekeeping role to fulfill the promise and vision of the U.N.’s founders.”

3 The UN’s own assessment of the UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force) mission reflects a series of humiliations such as the Srebrenica massacre, peacekeepers taken hostage, violations of UN-guarded heavy weapon storage sites, and military operations undertaken by all sides in flagrant disregard of UN-brokered agreements. The report also reflects an under-resourced, under-supported mission that could not possible enforce the task it been given. Department of Public Information, *Former Yugoslavia – UNPROFOR*, as of September 1996, http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unprof_b.htm (accessed March 15, 2012).

4 The July 1993 killing of 24 Pakistani peacekeepers by Mohammad Farah Aideed’s militias, the October 1993 ‘Battle of Mogadishu’, and the protracted negotiations for the recovery of US Army Aviator Michael Durant all undermined US and international resolve to continue the original humanitarian mission in Somalia.

5 Estimates of the numbers killed in the Rwandan Genocide range from 500,000 to 1,000,000. UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon used the phrase “more than 800,000 innocent people who lost their lives” in his speech to open the Rwanda Genocide Memorial in January 2008. Ban Ki Moon, United Nations Secretary General, *Remarks to the press at the Rwanda Genocide Memorial*, Kigali, Rwanda, January 29, 2008.

7 Major Powers are those powers with the political, economic and military power to exert global influence. This category certainly includes the United States of America, Russia, China, Great Britain and France. Germany and Japan wield great economic influence but generally refrain from exerting military influence. Middle or Regional powers are those powers which exert economic and military influence on a regional scale; such as India, Canada, Australia, Brazil, South Africa and Nigeria.


*Article 52*

1. *Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.*

2. *The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.*

3. *The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.*

4. *This Article in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35.*
Article 53

5. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.

6. The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.

Article 54

7. The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.


10 The main political parties were:

- UDT (Portuguese: União Democrática Timorense; English: Timorese Democratic Union), was the party of the East Timorese elites who desired an ongoing association with Portugal.

- FRETILIN (Portuguese: Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente; English: Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor) FRETILIN was the most radical of the three main parties, and was viewed by many states, including the United States, Indonesia and Australia as being a Marxist party. FRETILIN’s armed wing was FALINTIL (Portuguese: Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste; English: The Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor).

- APODETI (Portuguese: Associação Popular Democrática Timorense; English: Timorese Popular Democratic Association) supported integration as an autonomous province of Indonesia.

11 Pre-knowledge of Indonesian intention to invade East Timor:

United States pre-knowledge of the invasion is revealed in:


Australian pre-knowledge of the invasion is revealed in:

In their meeting on December 6 1975, President Gerald Ford, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Indonesian President Soharto discussed the possibility of an Indonesian intervention in East Timor to stabilize the highly volatile security situation. President Ford advised Soharo “We will understand and will not press you on the issue. We understand the problem and the intentions you have”. Kissinger added that: “It is important that whatever you do succeeds quickly”. On the following day, Indonesia invaded East Timor. Department of State, *Telegram from US Embassy Jakarta, SUBJ: Ford-Soharto meeting, December 6, 1975*


In 1975, immediately post the Vietnam War, both Australia and the United States feared the de-stabilizing influence of a left-wing government in an independent East Timor. With communist insurgencies underway in Malaysia and Thailand, the possibility of Indonesian action to suppress the left-wing forces in East Timor was appealing to both countries. In September


24 Cao Huhua and Elizabeth Morrell, *Regional Minorities and Development in Asia* (London and New York: Flinders University, Australia, 2010), 127.

25 Ibid.

26 Secretary of Defense, William Cohen described the American force elements assigned directly to INTERFET as: airborne reconnaissance, intelligence capabilities, a Civil Military Operations Coordination Center, logistics specialists, heavy lift transportation, four CH-53 Heavy-Lift Helicopters, a special communications team, and additional planners.

27 Brigadier-General John Castellaw (USMC), USPACOM, quoted in David Connery, *Crisis, Policymaking: Australia and East Timor Crisis of 1999* (Canberra, Australian National University press, 2010), 89.

“If you look at that period there we are talking about, 1999, we had come out of Desert Storm and we were still doing no-fly zones in Iraq. We’d done Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. ... So [Deputy Secretary of Defence] Hamre said, quite frankly, we were tired by this time in the decade and the Clinton Administration was [tired] too. It became apparent to me, as we were getting pressure to reduce the numbers involved that the policymakers and senior leadership were very reluctant to get involved in the effort.”


29 The following nations provided naval vessels for the INTERFET operation: Australia, Canada, France, Italy, New Zealand, Portugal, Singapore, Thailand, United Kingdom, United States. David Stevens, *Strength Through Diversity: The Combined Naval Role in Operation STABILISE*, (Canberra, Australia: Seapower Centre – Australia, 2007), 14-15.


Major General Peter Cosgrove was at that time the Commander, 1st (Australian) Division. Headquarters 1st Division was also the framework organization for Australia’s Deployable Joint Force Headquarters (DJFHQ), which had been trained to run joint and multi-national operations. During Operation STABILIZE, DJFHQ was the framework organization for Headquarters INTERFET. Major General Cosgrove was later appointed Chief of the Army and then Chief of the Defence Force.

Brigadier Ken Brownrigg, formerly of the Australian Defence Staff Jakarta, discussion with author, Banda Aceh Indonesia, January 2005.


The militia forces that rampaged through East Timor in 1999 had their origins in local auxiliary forces raised by the Indonesians during the long counter-insurgency campaign against FALINTIL. This ‘armed citizenry’ approach had also been employed by the Dutch and Portuguese during the colonial period, and by Timorese rulers before that, so was not an unusual phenomenon. A parallel can be found in the ‘Sons of Iraq’ employed by the US and the Iraqi government to combat the Iraqi insurgency, and in the Village Stability Program employed by the US and Afghan governments to combat the insurgency in Afghanistan.


Peter Chalk, Australian Foreign and Defense Policy, 37-38.


Admiral (Ret) Dennis Blair, former Commander United States Pacific Command, discussion with author, Carlisle PA, March 27, 2012.

Prior to 1987 the Australian Defence Force had maintained a forward defence posture whereby the nation’s security was largely achieved by forward deployments of troops in concert with Australia’s major allies, Great Britain and the United States. The 1987 Defence White Paper established a more independent policy of ‘self reliance within the alliance’ whereby Australia would develop joint forces with the primary role of defending the homeland, but also with significant expeditionary capability for projecting force into the near region, or operating further afield in concert with allies. Key enablers for the East Timor operation included the
fighter and strike bomber fleets, amphibious platforms, highly capable army helicopter capabilities, light armored vehicles, new secure communications equipment, deployable logistics capabilities, high readiness joint headquarters capabilities.


43 Ibid, 165.


Prime Minister Jose Ramos Horta suffered three gunshot wounds to the torso and was regarded as being in critical condition. He was initially treated at the Australian Military Hospital in Dili and was then transferred to the Darwin Hospital where he was maintained in an induced coma until his release on March 19, 2008.

48 The figure of 80% is derived from the letters provided by the Permanent Representatives of Australia, New Zealand to the UN, and media reporting on the Malaysian Portuguese contributions. Australia was providing 2,650 troops, New Zealand 190, Malaysia 209, Portugal 120.

Letter from the Australian Permanent Representative:


Letter from the New Zealand Permanent Representative:


Malaysian troop announcements:


Portuguese troop announcements:


51 Russell W. Glenn, Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube: Analyzing the Success of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007), 15.


55 Ibid.


57 John Braithwaite, Sinclair Dinnen, Matthew Allen, Valerie Braithwaite and Hilary Charlesworth, Pillars and Shadows: Statebuilding as Peacebuilding in Solomon Islands, (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 2010), 1.

58 Russell W. Glenn, Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube, 39.


60 Ibid, 29-30.

61 The following articles highlight the potential weaknesses of externally-initiated attempts at state-building. In particular, the articles focus on RAMSI’s lack of attention to the social issues underlying the Solomon Islands conflict, and the ineffectiveness of employing foreign experts in line positions in the Solomon Islands government.


62 Braithwaite, Dinnen, Allen, Braithwaite and Charlesworth, Pillars and Shadows, 76-83.
