The Evolution and Implementation of the Logistics Officer Corps

by

Colonel Samuel L. Russell
United States Army

United States Army War College
Class of 2012

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT: A
Approved for Public Release
Distribution is Unlimited

This manuscript is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.
It has been four years since the Secretary of the Army created the LG branch, and now is the right time to reflect on this new branch. How did the logistics community get to where it is today? Has the Army's implementation of the LG branch gone as planned? Has the advent of the LG branch created any unintended consequences? If so, what are they, and what has been their impact? Should the Army address these unintended consequences, can they be corrected, and what is the next logical step?

The Army's implementation of the LG branch in 2008 was not an end state, but rather the latest milestone in an ongoing evolutionary process to improve how best to sustain our fighting forces and develop our logistics leaders. The implementation required detailed planning that was able to capitalize on an impressive body of scholarly work. However, the implementation had some unintended consequences that require attention. Overall, LG branch implementation has been successful, widely accepted, and provided great benefit to the Army. There is always room for improvement, and the history of sustainment evolution indicates that more change is on the way.
THE EVOLUTION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LOGISTICS OFFICER CORPS

by

Colonel Samuel L. Russell
United States Army

Colonel David D. Dworak
Project Adviser

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Colonel Samuel L. Russell

TITLE: The Evolution and Implementation of the Logistics Officer Corps

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 3 April 2012 WORD COUNT: 7,261 PAGES: 34

KEY TERMS: Logistics, Sustainment, Personnel Development, Quartermaster, Transportation, Ordnance, Officer, LG, OD, QM, TC, Multifunctional Logistics

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

It has been four years since the Secretary of the Army created the LG branch, and now is the right time to reflect on this new branch. How did the logistics community get to where it is today? Has the Army's implementation of the LG branch gone as planned? Has the advent of the LG branch created any unintended consequences? If so, what are they, and what has been their impact? Should the Army address these unintended consequences, can they be corrected, and what is the next logical step?

The Army's implementation of the LG branch in 2008 was not an end state, but rather the latest milestone in an ongoing evolutionary process to improve how best to sustain our fighting forces and develop our logistics leaders. The implementation required detailed planning that was able to capitalize on an impressive body of scholarly work. However, the implementation had some unintended consequences that require attention. Overall, LG branch implementation has been successful, widely accepted, and provided great benefit to the Army. There is always room for improvement, and the history of sustainment evolution indicates that more change is on the way.
As Logistics officers progress through their careers, and the more senior they become, the more time they spend planning and executing missions that involve all aspects of logistics. When an officer reaches the field-grade level, from major to colonel, they not only participate in logistics activities at the tactical and operational levels but also at the joint and strategic levels. These joint and strategic levels involve coordination with the Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and even other countries. Officers must have a wide range of logistics expertise and knowledge in order to be effective.

Commanding General
U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command

Following the creation of the Logistics (LG) branch in 2008, MG Stevenson gave the above answer in an interview with Army Logistician when asked why the Army needs multifunctional logistics officers. The implementation of the LG branch, which merges all Quartermaster, Ordnance and Transportation officers into a single, multifunctional logistics career field, was the latest step in an ongoing evolutionary process to improve not only how the Army sustains its forces, but perhaps as importantly, how it trains and develops the logistical leaders that manage its sustainment processes. It has been four years since the Secretary of the Army created the LG branch, and now is the right time to reflect on this new branch. How did the logistics community get to where it is today? Has the Army’s implementation of the LG branch gone as planned? Has the advent of the LG branch created any unintended consequences? If so, what are they, and what has been their impact? Should the Army address these unintended consequences, can they be corrected, and what is the next logical step?
The methodology to researching and answering those questions in this paper is four fold. Firstly by framing in a historical context the past century of Army reforms, this paper will demonstrate that changes to sustainment and logistical leader development are evolutionary. Secondly the author will review the development and planning that led to the implementation of the LG branch. Thirdly by analyzing from a personnel management perspective the changes to the force structure within the officer logistics community and by examining how officers are assigned within this force structure, this paper will demonstrate some unintended consequences, particularly on how our most junior officers are employed. Finally the author will examine elements of the professional military education system within the logistics community and present recommendations on how to better develop our multifunctional logistics officer corps.

There are a number of other aspects pertaining to the future of the logistics corps that merit additional scholarly research. Should the logistics community create multifunctional noncommissioned officers, and if so at what grade? Should the Army go beyond a logistics corps and create a single sustainment branch, as articulated in 2003 in the white paper *The Army in 2020*? While these questions are worthy of further study, they are beyond the scope of this paper.

When reflecting on the evolutionary development of the logistics officer corps, one finds it useful to establish a starting point for this evolving change. Did it begin with the Army’s modular transformation in 2004, or perhaps the 1999 implementation of three separate active component category career fields under the third iteration of the Officer Professional Management System (OPMS XXI)? Would it be more useful to begin with the establishment of the Functional Area 90 Logistics Program in 1993, the
creation of multifunctional support battalions a decade earlier, or perhaps in the late 1960s with the first serious discussions of merging several of the technical branches into a single logistics branch or corps? Each potential starting point examined reveals that it was merely another step in an ongoing process of change to improve the way in which we sustain our forces and develop our leaders. Following is a timeline of more than a century of these evolutionary steps that help to frame the historical context of change to our sustainment structure and officer development, all of which has contributed to the formation of the LG branch.

**Timeline in Evolutionary Changes to Army Sustainment**

- **1900 - 1903 Root Reforms**: Secretary of War Elihu Root created the New General Staff, and made significant changes in the various Army Bureaus following the abysmal record of deploying and sustaining forces during the Spanish American War.³

- **1917 – 1918 the Bureau Period**: Traditionalists within the Army were able to undermine many of the reforms that Elihu Root had emplaced. By the end of 1917 the Army was almost in crisis with the inability to sustain itself during World War I.⁴

- **1918 – 1919 the March Period**: Secretary of War Newton D. Baker instituted the War Industries Board under the leadership of MG Peyton C. March as Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), who unified the Army’s supply system under the Service of Supply and brought effective centralized control over the bureaus under the purview of the General Staff.⁵
• **1919 – 1939 the Technical Services:** Congress rejected the principle of centralized control of sustainment as soon as the war ended and restored autonomy to the bureaus. At the onset of World War II, there were seven Technical Services: the Quartermaster Corps, the Corps of Engineers, the Medical Department, the Ordnance Department, the Signal Corps, the Chemical Warfare Service, and after July 1942, the Transportation Corps.  

• **1942 Marshall Reorganization:** Among the many reforms that CSA GEN George C. Marshall instituted was the creation of the Army Service Forces under the management of his G-4, LTG Brehon B. Somervell. Somervell’s centralized control over the Technical Services mirrored that of the Service of Supply instituted two decades earlier during World War I. Initially it even shared the same name.  

• **1946 the Eisenhower Reorganization:** Following the recommendation of the Patch-Simson Board, the reorganization of the Army under CSA GA Dwight D. Eisenhower effectively eliminated the Army Service Forces and returned to the antebellum Technical Services, which successfully retained their autonomy through the Korean War.  

• **1954 – 1956 the Slezak Plan and the Palmer Reorganizations:** Army G-4 LTG Wiliston B. Palmer believed that the G-4 either required substantial control over the Technical Services or the Army Service Forces needed to be resurrected. As part of his reorganizations, and with the support of Secretary of Army John Slezak, the G-4 created the Logistics Officer Program, the Army’s first attempt to create a corps of field grade officers experienced and
educated to fill critical logistics positions at the senior levels across all the Technical Services. It would be another six decades before the logistics officer corps would come into being.

- 1962 – *Technical Service Chiefs eliminated*: Among the many reforms that Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara instituted were the elimination of the Technical Service Chiefs in 1962, the transfer of their statutory positions to the Secretary of the Army, and the creation of the Army Materiel Command (AMC).

- 1967 – *the Brown Board*: A board of inquiry headed up by LTG Frederic J. Brown recommended the creation of a logistics center with a Logistics Staff College for providing a Command and General Staff College “level course for logistics personnel in lieu of their attending the Fort Leavenworth school.” This board led to the creation of the Army Logistics Center, now known as the Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM) and eventually the Army Logistics Management College (ALMC), now called the Army Logistics University (ALU) at Fort Lee, Virginia.

- 1970 – *the Lockhart Report*: The Report of the Department of the Army Review of Responsibilities and Logistics Doctrine, Personnel, and Training Functions, better known as the Lockhart Report, detailed the requirement for both specialists and generalists within the officer career fields. This report also proposed the concept of one Logistics Corps, a notion 38 years ahead of its time.
• **1972 – 1974 Officer Personnel Management System II:** The Army's first real consideration of consolidating the various logistics branches into a single Logistics Service came under OPMS II. For the first and only time until 2007 Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3: Officer Professional Development and Utilization, grouped all logistics functions under a single “Logistics Specialties” chapter with no mention of the basic branches Ordnance, Quartermaster and Transportation. This period also marked the end of the Logistics Officer Program and introduced the Logistics Management Specialty code 70 for colonel positions with the responsibilities for more than two logistics functions.¹³

• **1982 – Army of Excellence Reorganizations:** Beginning in 1982 the Army made significant unit structure changes in order to support the new Air Land Battle Doctrine. The Army reconfigured functional battalions within divisions into multifunctional battalions. By the end of the decade the Army applied this new structure to corps support commands and their subordinate units. These new organizations called for multifunctional logisticians at the tactical level that could apply their management skills across all of the logistics functions.¹⁴

• **1983 – Logistics Development Program:** The Army eliminated the Logistics Management Specialty code 70 as it was not meeting requirements and created in its place the Logistics Development Program with the Logistician additional skill identifier (ASI) 7Z. The Army’s purpose for this program was to create a development path for educating and training field grade officers across all logistics functions.¹⁵
1993 – *the Logistically Program*: Realizing that ASI 7Z was not meeting the Army’s requirements for multifunctional logisticians, the Logistically Program, Functional Area (FA) 90, was created in 1993. This new functional area coincided with the formation of the Combined Logistics Officer Advanced Course (CLOAC), a new concerted effort to develop and educate logistics captains now required to work across the varied logistics functions.  

A general theme over this century of reform is ebb and flow between what James E. Hewes in his book, *From Root to McNamara*, describes as traditionalists versus reformers. Moving into the post Technical Services era the question became one of specialists versus generalists. Was the Army better served by officers with a depth of experience in one particular specialty or by officers with a breadth of knowledge across multiple fields? The answer in the 1960s and 70s was the same as today; the more senior in position the officer, the more broad they become and need to be. The multifunctional units at the tactical level placed a new demand on the logistics community to broaden its officers earlier in their careers. The establishment of FA 90 and the formation of CLOAC were two ways of getting at this dilemma. They were also significant and deliberate steps by the senior logisticians at moving the Army toward a single logistics officer corps.

By the early 1990s the senior officers in the logistics community could already envision a single logistics corps and were articulating this end state to the field as expressed by LTG Leon E. Salomon, Commanding General (CG) CASCOM in 1990, “I envision the evolutionary progression to an Army Logistics Corps with Quartermaster, Ordnance and Transportation ‘regiments’ oriented on the basic tasks of fueling, arming,
fixing, moving and sustaining soldiers.\textsuperscript{18} The 1999 implementation of OPMS XXI moved all logistics officers into the Operations Support career field. However, this change had minimal impact on management and development of these logistics officers. Theoretically they remained on a dual track system rotating between jobs within their primary specialty—Ordnance (OD), Quartermaster (QM), or Transportation (TC)—and their functional area—Multifunctional Logistics (FA 90).

Planning and Implementation of the Logistics Branch

Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s there was a plethora of scholarly examination of the move toward a logistics officer corps in professional magazines like \textit{Army Logistician} and at intermediate and senior level officer professional military education such as the Logistics Executive Development Course (LEDC), the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), and the Army War College (AWC) as well as other academic environments. As this collection of academic works is indispensible to logistics officers interested in studying the evolution that led to the formation of the LG branch, a brief listing of these works follows. In 1993 James S. Emery, a Combat Developments analyst at the Quartermaster Center and School, proposed in an article in \textit{Army Logistician} “Is There a Logistics Corps in Our Future?”\textsuperscript{19} Four years later upon graduation from LEDC, CPT Michael T. Dandridge posed the same question in another article of the same title.\textsuperscript{20} In 2000, MAJ Martin S. Wagner examined the topic in a SAMS monograph entitled “Multifunctional Logistics Officer Corps: should the U.S. Army consolidate the officer corps of Transportation, Quartermaster and Ordnance Corps into one multifunctional branch?”\textsuperscript{21} That same year MAJ Gerhard Schröter published “The Logistics Corps Model”\textsuperscript{22} in \textit{Army Logistician} while he was attending the College of Naval Command and
Staff. The following year LTC Paul Wentz published an AWC strategy research project titled “Ready for Change: establish a logistics officer corps.” In 2002 MAJ David C. Dusterhoff wrote a SAMS monograph entitled “Breaking the Logistics Branch Paradigm: should the U.S. Army combine current logistics officer branches of Ordnance, Quartermaster, Transportation, and Medical Service into one branch?” One year later MAJ Christopher L. Day tackled the professional military education of logisticians while he was attending CGSC in a thesis entitled “Training for Transformation: when should the U.S. Army train multifunctional leaders?” Finally, in 2004 while completing studies at Georgetown University as part of an internship with the Army Staff and Joint Staff, MAJ Kent A. D. Clark wrote a thesis titled “Should there be a Logistics Corps.”

All of these works are not only useful for academic research; they were instrumental in the Army’s planning and implementation of a logistics branch. In 2004, the CG CASCOM, MG Terry E. Juskowiak, directed his personnel proponent, LTC Robert L. Shumar, to draft a white paper on the formation of a Logistics Corps that was then circulated through the senior logistics leaders. LTC Shumar compiled this paper largely from the aforementioned body of scholarly work. MG Juskowiak and LTC Shumar published an article at the end of that year that posed this question to the field, “should we and can we move to one Army logistics corps?” During the same period, MAJ Clark as part of his internship with the Joint Staff briefed the results of his thesis to the CSA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). The move toward a single logistics officer corps seemed to have irreversible momentum. The topic was taken up by the OPMS Council of Colonels as the Logistics Corps Initiative with the Chief of the Combat Service Support Division (CSSD), Army Human Resources
Command (HRC), COL William Curl, in the lead. Throughout the first half of 2005, a
working group comprised of representatives from HRC, CASCOM, AMC the Army G-4,
and the Acquisition Support Center, took this initiative on the road briefing senior
logistics leaders to include the AMC Deputy CG, LTG Richard A. Hack, the CG
CASCOM, MG Ann E. Dunwoody, the Deputy G-4, MG Jan Edmunds, and the CG
AMC, GEN Benjamin S. Griffin, culminating with a decision briefing to the Vice CSA,
GEN Richard A. Cody, in August 2005. The CSA, GEN Peter J. Schoomaker, approved
the initiative and directed the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
develop an implementation plan for a logistics officer corps. 30

CASCOM took up the lead for the implementation plan by creating an Integrated
Concept Team (ICT) with representatives from HRC, TRADOC, Army G-4, Army
Medical Department (AMEDD) Center and School, U.S. Army Forces Command
(FORSCOM) and various CASCOM elements. From November 2005 through April
2007, this group conducted analysis of current and future logistics requirements,
surveyed and solicited input from the officer corps and Army leaders, developed and
refined five courses of action for possible implementation, and examined how to
integrate the changes across the Active and Reserve Components. Briefly the courses
of action were 1) ‘Status Quo’ – no change to the current way of managing and
educating officers as detailed in DA PAM 600-3; 2) ‘The Big Three’ – a logistics officer
corps comprised of OD, QM, and TC branches; 3) ‘The Big Three with Capstone 90A’ –
officers accessed into the OD, QM or TC branches and later merged into a capstone
branch of 90A with possibly a few officers remaining in their basic branch; 4) ‘The
Logistics Branches’ – officers accessed into the 90Z branch, then at some point
transferred into one of the three functional branches (OD, QM, TC) or remain in the 90Z branch; and 5) ‘The Logistician’ – officers accessed into the 90Z branch with opportunities to gain various specialty and skill identifiers (e.g. aerial delivery, explosive ordnance, traffic management). These five courses of action were later refined into three, ‘Status Quo,’ ‘The Big Three with Capstone 90A,’ and ‘The Logistician.’ The three courses of action were ultimately briefed to the CG TRADOC, GEN William A. Wallace, in April 2007 with a recommendation of ‘The Big Three with Capstone 90A.’

On 2 May 2007 the CSA, GEN George W. Casey, Jr., approved the establishment of the Logistics branch and Secretary of the Army Pete Geren signed General Order 2007-06 on November 27, 2007 establishing the LG branch effective January 1, 2008. With this implementation, all QM, OD and TC officers in the rank of captain and above who were graduates of a captain’s career course or advanced course transferred to the LG branch. Following this initial transfer, all captains would integrate into the LG branch upon graduation from the Combined Logistics Captain’s Career Course (CLC3). Officers desiring to transfer into the LG branch who were already graduates of another captain’s career course would need to graduate from the Support Operations Course (SOC). The Army would continue to access lieutenants into one of the three logistics basic branches (OD, QM, and TC) and attend the Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) of their respective branch. How the creation of the LG branch and its evolution from FA 90 affected the logistics officer structure is worth looking at in detail.
Analysis of Logistics Officer Structure and Assignments

Since August 2005 when the CSA directed the formation of a logistics officer corps, and more significantly since the implementation of the LG branch in January 2008, there has been a steady increase in the number and percent of positions coded as logistics versus functional, that is, those coded LG (90A00) versus OD (89E, 91A, 91B, 91D, 91E, 90A91), QM (92A, 92B, 92D, 92F, 90A92), or TC (88A, 88B, 88C, 88D, 90A88). Figure 1 depicts the change in the number of officer positions from captain to colonel coded LG, OD, QM and TC from Fiscal Year (FY) 2002 to 2013.

![Figure 1: Logistics officer positions (CPT – COL) from FY02 to FY13](image-url)
In 2002, there was a fairly even distribution of officer positions from captain through colonel that were multifunctional versus functional: specifically 31% were 90A, 20% were OD, 25% were QM and 23% were TC. There was little change by 2005 when the CSA directed the formation of LG branch: 33% were 90A, 19% OD, 25% QM and 23% TC. Once CASCOM began work in earnest to develop a logistics officer corps, they continually reviewed officer positions in The Army Authorization Documents System (TAADS) to determine if the positions met specific criteria to be coded multifunctional. By 2008 when the LG branch was implemented 44% were coded LG, 20% OD, 19% QM and 22% TC. According to the FY 2013 approved force structure, this trend has continued as 54% of logistics positions from captain through colonel are coded LG versus 11% OD, 15% QM and 20% TC. When looking at each rank individually, the upward trend of LG positions versus functional logistics positions is more striking. Captain positions coded multifunctional logistics increased from 20% in 2002 to 43% in 2013, major positions grew from 37% to 64% over the same time period, lieutenant colonel positions similarly increased from 51% to 68%, and colonel positions grew from 65% to 81% coded LG.

Figure 2 depicts the visual change in the logistics officer structure of captain through colonel positions from FY02 to FY13. The area of each pie graph is proportional to the respective branch populations. The total number of captain through colonel logistics positions increased from 11,630 in FY02 to 12,877 in FY13, thus the FY02 graph is proportionally smaller than the FY13 graph. Even though the total authorizations increased by 1,247 positions, or 11%, over that eleven year period, LG added 3,285 positions for a 91% increase from FY02 to FY13. All three functional
logistics branches decreased in captain through colonel authorizations over the same time period with TC experiencing the least decrement of 161 positions, or a 6% decrease. Both OD and QM decreased more significantly during that time by 894 positions, or 38%, and 983 positions, or 33%, respectively.

![Figure 2: Logistics officer authorizations (CPT – COL), FY02 versus FY13.](image)

The Army’s transformation to modular units accounts for a significant portion of the substantial increase of multifunctional logistics (LG) positions as compared to functional logistics (OD, QM, TC) positions. As the Army converted functional logistics headquarters into multifunctional logistics headquarters, the proportion of LG positions to OD, QM or TC positions correspondingly increased. As an example, if through modularity the Army converts or replaces a QM Petroleum (POL) Battalion (BN) with a Combat Sustainment Support Battalion (CSSB) headquarters, there is a decrease in QM positions and a disproportionate increase in LG positions. A QM POL BN HQ has one QM lieutenant colonel, two QM majors, and two QM captains. A modular CSSB HQ
has one LG lieutenant colonel, two LG majors, five LG captains, and one each OD, QM and TC captains. Thus, converting a QM POL BN HQ to a CSSB HQ changes five QM positions into eight LG and one OD, one QM and one TC positions.  

The conversion of positions from functional to multifunctional was a painstakingly deliberate and iterative process. MG Juskowiak articulated the purpose of this intensive process in his 2005 article when he stated that it was “to assist career managers in assigning officers across the Army.” Essentially, CASCOM was identifying what skills and experiences—either functional (QM, OD, TC) or multifunctional (LG) —each position required, so that HRC would be able to identify the right officer (QM, OD, TC or LG) for each position. In theory, CASCOM identified the requirements of each “space” and HRC identified the “face” with the requisite skills and experience. Army G-4, LTG Stevenson, touched on this process when he stated in an article in Army Logistician in 2010 that “we’ve rescrubbed this three times in the past 4 years, honing it to a pretty good reflection of the skills each job really requires.”

However, an unintended consequence of the implementation of the LG branch was a loss of functional identity of positions as coded in TAADS versus the personnel requisitions as built by units and validated by HRC. The Logistics Branch Implementation MILPER message did not specify how unit Human Resource (HR) managers should build requisitions or how HRC would validate requisitions for captain through colonel positions once the entire population transferred to LG branch. After there were no longer any OD (91A), QM (92A) or TC (88A) officers at those grades, as they were now all LG, HRC stopped validating 91A, 92A and 88A requisitions. Beginning in January 2008 HRC validated all logistics requisitions for captain through
Thus, career managers lost visibility of which positions still required functional logistics skills and expertise even though CASCOM was still identifying those requirements and the U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency (USAFMSA) was still documenting them in TAADS. To the assignment officer, the graphs in Figure 2 would appear solid black with every LG captain through colonel position coded 90A. In the light of generalists versus specialists, career managers could no longer see any positions requiring specialists. When building a requisition for personnel, unit HR managers could specify in a remarks block a functional logistics requirement if they really wanted a particular type officer. Only then would HRC have visibility of the functional requirement. However, few HR managers realized they needed to do this, being that the authorization documents still showed the functional requirement. HRC essentially was managing functional, or specialist, positions by exception only.

To be sure, Force Sustainment Division (FSD) at HRC was postured in the most efficient manner to ensure they assigned the right officer, to the right job, at the right time. FSD had already realigned the assignment branches from OD Branch, QM Branch and TC Branch to Logistics Field Grade Branch and Logistics Company Grade Branch prior to the LG branch implementation. An LG major with a QM functional background would still talk to and be assigned by an LG assignment officer with a QM functional background. However, the concern with the assignment officer’s loss of visibility of positions requiring functional expertise could, and sometimes did, lead to the career manager assigning that same LG major with a QM functional background to a position requiring TC or OD specific skills and expertise. LTG Stevenson addressed this loss of
functional identity in his 2010 article when he stated, “Of more concern is the notion that any logistics officer can do any job, so why pay attention to an officer’s functional area of expertise?” He went on to say, “every LG officer is required to have a functional area of expertise.” More specifically, he stated:

If you look at how we coded the positions for logistics officers on tables of organization and equipment and tables of distribution and allowances… they are not all coded 90A! We could have done that, but we deliberately did not because we recognize the fact that jobs remain out there that are more functional than multifunctional and thus require a particular skill and experience.

The Army G-1 provided a solution to this unintended consequence when it published a Notification of Future Change (NOFC) to electronic smartbook DA PAM 611-21Military Occupational Classification and Structure (MOCS) in September 2010. This NOFC was the approved version of the original MOCS proposal submitted to the Department of the Army as a result of the 2008 LG branch implementation and would go into effect on the first day of FY12, October 1, 2011. It essentially approved the sorely needed implementation guidance, albeit 33 months after the Army implemented LG branch. The NOFC deleted the Primary Military Occupational Specialty (PMOS) for OD (91A), QM (92A) and TC (88A) for captains through colonels and replaced them with LG (90A), basically putting into place what HRC had been doing since January 2008. However, to ensure visibility of functional logistics requirements the NOFC added codes for Secondary Qualification Indicators (SQI), 91 for OD, 92 for QM and 88 for TC. Thus, the Army would now code a functional OD position 90A91, a QM position 90A92, and a TC position 90A88. The authorization documents in TAADS and the personnel requisitions would both reflect these codes thereby providing the units and the career
managers with visibility of positions still requiring functional logistics skills and expertise.44

In the spring of 2011, the CG CASCOM, MG James L. Hodge, met with leaders from the Quartermaster School, and the topic of the NOFC implementation came up in discussion. When the Chief of QM Personnel Development indicated that the lynch pin to the NOFC implementation was HRC validating functional logistics requisitions using the respective SQI, MG Hodge indicated that he was comfortable with HRC doing the right thing with assignments and their ability to get the right officer into the right job. After all, the CG HRC, MG Gina S. Farrisee, had concurred with the NOFC and assured the senior logistics leadership that HRC would be able to incorporate SQIs into the requisition process. What MG Hodge was concerned with were units in the field losing visibility of their functional logistics positions now that the authorization documents would only identify functionality in a separate ‘SQI’ column. This was neither a column nor codes with which units were familiar.45 As late as April 2012, a full six months after the specified changes went into affect, assignment officers at FSD and Senior Leader Division state that they still only receive 90A00 valid requisitions.46 For the LG branch to function as conceived and approved, the Army must fix the requisition process so that every functional position is properly coded. This would appear to be a simple automated process that populates the proper codes into the requisition.

MG Hodge’s concerns with units misaligning assigned logistics officers with their functional logistics positions is perhaps warranted, as analysis of logistics lieutenant assignments indicates that units have been regularly assigning OD, QM and TC lieutenants to positions outside of their basic branch at much greater rates then logistics
lieutenants from two decades earlier. To gain an understanding of how the Army’s evolutionary move to a logistics officer corps has effected lieutenants accessed and trained in one of the three functional logistics officer basic branches—OD, QM and TC—the author analyzed the lieutenant positions held by recently promoted captains in cohort year group (YG) 2008 that served their lieutenant years after the LG branch was implemented and compared that data to cohort YG 1989 lieutenant colonels who served their lieutenant years two decades earlier. It is important to note that officers twenty years ago spent more time as lieutenants than officers over the last four years. The YG 1989 lieutenant colonels served as lieutenants in an average of 4.2 positions over an average of 41.0 months for an average of 9.8 months per position. The YG 2008 captains served in an average of 3.0 positions over an average of 27.0 months for an average of 9.0 months per position.

The lieutenant colonel population consisted of 66 LG officers that accessed into one of the three functional logistics basic branches: 23 were OD, 22 were QM, and 21 were TC. Of these 66 officers, six, or 9.1%, had served in a logistics branch other than their basic branch as a lieutenant. Five of these six officers served in one logistics position outside of their basic branch for an average of 13.2 months, and one had served in two positions for a total of 24 months. Additionally, four officers, or 6.1%, served in at least one position outside of the logistics field for an average of 17.3 months. The nine officers that served in positions outside of their basic branch did so for an average of 39.5% of their months in lieutenant assignments. All of these officers served in at least one assignment in their basic branch for an average of 60.5% of their time in lieutenant assignments. Overall, the 66 year group 1989 officers spent 94.6% of
their months in lieutenant assignments working in their basic branch, and 97.7% of their months in logistics related positions.

Included in the YG 2008 population were 100 recently promoted logistics captains: 30 were OD, 39 were QM and 31 were TC. Of these 100 captains, 44 had served in a logistics branch other than their basic branch. These officers averaged 1.6 logistics jobs outside of their basic branch for an average of 13.2 months. 18 of these officers had served in two or more positions outside of their basic branch for an average of 19.6 months. Two had served in four and one in five logistics positions outside of their basic branch for an average of 28.3 months. Of these 18 officers, seven had never served in a position within their basic branch. In addition to these 44 officers there were five officers that served in non-logistics related positions for an average of 1.4 jobs over an average of 12.2 months making it a total of 49 of the 100 officers that had served in at least one position outside of their basic branch. Of these 49 officers that served outside of their basic branch, they did so for an average of 50.2% of their time in lieutenant assignments. Eight of the captains had not served in any position within their basic branch as lieutenants, and one officer had not served in any logistics related assignment. Overall, the 100 YG 2008 officers spent 75.3% of their months in lieutenant assignments working in their basic branch, and 96.9% of their months in logistics related positions. The most significant conclusion of this comparison is that one in two logisticians in YG 2008 served outside of the branch in which they were accessed and trained versus one in ten logisticians twenty years earlier. Additionally, every YG 1989 logistician served at least one assignment in their basic branch where as two in 25 YG 2008 officers spent no time in their basic branch.
As part of CASCOM’s planning process for implementing the logistics branch, the Integrated Concept Team canvassed logistics officers from across the Army for comments on the proposed courses of action and the overall concept. Many officers provided detailed responses to the surveys, and some of the feedback brings to light why units frequently employ so many logistics lieutenants outside of their basic branch. The comments from recent battalion and brigade commanders reflected the realities of a high OPTEMPO Army engaged in counterinsurgencies in two separate theaters. The realities of manning shortfalls have necessitated placing officers in the most critical vacancy regardless of their basic branch. One senior officer commented about management of lieutenants during his command of a main support battalion, “I used every junior officer regardless of branch across all specialties. I had a TC officer who was a Tech Supply Officer. I had an OD Accountable Officer. I had a QM Shop Officer. I made each LT develop competencies in tactical distribution.”\textsuperscript{49} Another former brigade commander stated, “I’ve never had the right balance of lieutenants to meet my requirements by branch. The aggregation of officers into a single branch will reduce my personnel manager burden.”\textsuperscript{50} He further commented that:

I want [all logistics lieutenants] to understand how an SSA [supply support activity] operates, I want them to understand basic shop management, and I want them to be able to conduct combat logistics patrols. We should develop our [Officer Basic Courses] so our new lieutenants can rapidly step into any one of these responsibilities in their first assignment.\textsuperscript{51}

These comments suggest that whether or not CASCOM identifies functional logistics positions, and regardless of whether HRC career managers assign officers by their functional SQI—or in the case of lieutenants their PMOS—many units will employ all logistics officers as multifunctional regardless of their basic branch or initial entry training. Such a model looks more like the Integrated Concept Team’s course of action
5, ‘The Logistician’ – officers accessed into the 90Z branch with opportunities to gain various specialty and skill identifiers (e.g. aerial delivery, explosive ordnance, traffic management). If the historical context has shown anything it is that the implementation of the logistics officer corps is merely the most recent step in an ongoing evolutionary process. Perhaps ‘The Logistician’ model is the next logical step in the evolution of our logistics officer corps.

**Logistics Professional Military Education**

The incremental evolutionary changes that had already occurred in the previous decades in many respects facilitated implementing the LG Branch. More than a decade of FA 90 utilization had provided multifunctional logistics experience—and in many cases functional logistics experience outside of an officer’s area of expertise—to a generation of officers. The creation of CLOAC and its successor, the Combined Logistics Captains Career Course (CLC3), throughout the 1990s introduced captains to logistics functions outside of their basic branch and provided much need multifunctional skills. However, there are courses within the logistics professional military education that could better serve the logistics officer corps with some modifications.

The manner in which the Army implemented the LG branch left unchanged how the Sustainment Center of Excellence (SCOE) trains lieutenants. All logistics second lieutenants are accessed into one of the three functional branches (OD, QM, TC), and all attend their respective functional Basic Officer Leader Course. As demonstrated in the aforementioned logistics lieutenant assignment analysis, twenty years ago fewer than one in ten OD, QM or TC lieutenants served in a position outside of their basic branch. Today units are assigning one in two logistics lieutenants to a job for which they have no formal training. In the light of this continued, and perhaps increasing, utilization
of functional logistics lieutenants in positions that cross all logistics functions, we must relook how we train these junior logistics leaders at their Basic Officer Leader Courses.

Currently officers attending BOLC receive training from two sources. The first is a common core task list established by TRADOC’s Deputy Commanding General for Initial Military Training. This task list is common to all BOLCs regardless of branch. The second source is a branch specific task list created by CASCOM Training and Doctrine and approved by each branch Commandant, that is the Chief of Ordnance, the Quartermaster General, and the Chief of Transportation. The Chairman of the BOLC Division at ALU indicates that there is no “cross pollination” among the functional logistics BOLCs. That is not to say that ALU has not done considerable analysis on whether to train new lieutenants on multifunctional logistics. It is interesting to note that some of the BOLC Chairman’s comments echo those of the former commanders surveyed by the Integrated Concept Team, “Our thought process was to use that data to show that there is a need for teaching shop officer duties to TC [and] QM officers or SSA [operations] to an OD or TC [lieutenant].” The challenge for ALU is in trying to add additional tasks from outside the course’s basic branch in an already time-compressed and resource-constrained environment. Regardless of the limitations, the manner and frequency in which units are employing their lieutenants mandates that our junior officers receive at least introductory training in the other logistics functions outside of their basic branch before arriving at their initial unit of assignment.

As previously mentioned in the historical timeline, the genesis for the Army Logistics University was the 1967 Brown Board. The report stated that “a Logistics Staff College be established within the Army Logistics Center by 1970 to provide... a
Logistics Staff Officer Course designed as an advanced degree-awarding career course for selected majors [and] lieutenant colonels.\textsuperscript{54} It is perhaps ironic that 45 years after this report ALU still does not provide a masters degree producing course. That is not to diminish from the outstanding courses of instruction offered at the Army’s premier logistics university. The new Theater Logistics Studies Program (TLOG) course is an updated version of the Logistics Executive Development Course. The SCOE has geared the course primarily toward senior captains, as one of the prerequisites is that applicants have no more than nine years commissioned service. TLOG like its LEDC predecessor is still a cooperative degree program in that graduates have the option of obtaining at their own expense a masters degree in Logistics Management from the Florida Institute of Technology.\textsuperscript{55} ALU has also established an education outreach program with the College of William and Mary where by officers can obtain a Masters of Business and Administration through a fully funded Advanced Civil Schooling (ACS) opportunity. The program, titled the MG James Wright MBA Fellowship, will include up to 20 slots in academic year 2012-13. The target population again is senior captains and junior majors who have not yet attended Intermediate Level Education (ILE).\textsuperscript{56} However, both of these programs fall short of the Brown Board’s vision of majors and lieutenant colonels obtaining advanced degrees from ALU.

While ALU has established a blended ILE course for majors, it too does not rise to the level articulated by the Brown Board. The course until recently was not open to logistics majors in the Force Sustainment career field; it is now but only in limited numbers.\textsuperscript{57} Officers in the Wright MBA Fellowship at William and Mary have the opportunity to attend blended ILE at Fort Lee following completion of the MBA program.
While this opportunity will produce a Military Education Level 4 officer with Joint Professional Military Education Phase I credit and an advanced degree, it comes up short of an ALU awarded advanced degree. By contrast, the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) at Monterey, CA has been awarding advanced degrees for over a century. Its MBA program includes logistics management with curriculums in transportation management, supply chain management and material logistics support. Under the auspices of the Army’s ACS program, HRC regularly sends Army logisticians to NPS for advanced study. Graduates of the program have the opportunity to attain certification as a Certified Professional Logistician, an Army recognized certification that officers can annotate on their Officer Record Brief. The Air Force Institute of Technology at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH also is an advanced-degree awarding military graduate school. Included in its degree programs are a Master of Science degree in Logistics and Supply Chain Management and a Doctor of Philosophy degree in logistics. TRADOC and the SCOE could better serve the logistics officer corps if they were able to establish similar advanced degree programs for field grade officers at ALU.

**Conclusion**

The Army’s implementation of the LG branch in 2008 was not an end state, but rather the latest milestone in an ongoing evolutionary process to improve how best to sustain our fighting forces and develop our logistics leaders. The implementation required detailed planning that was able to capitalize on an impressive body of scholarly work by officers who spent the previous decade contemplating if and how best to establish a logistics officer corps. The implementation plan was able to capitalize on earlier evolutionary changes such as the dual-track FA 90 Logistician Program that provided multifunctional experience to officers at a time when new tactical formations
placed a greater demand on logisticians having a breadth of experience across all logistics functions. The revised Combined Logistics Officer Advanced Course and later Captains Career Course similarly provided timely multifunctional skills and education to a generation of captains. With the Army’s modular transformation adding additional FA 90 positions to the force structure, and with CASCOM converting more and more functional positions to FA 90 positions, logistics officers were ready and waiting for change by the time the Army implemented the LG branch. However, the implementation had some unintended consequences. Due to vague initial implementation guidance the personnel requisition process created an environment where career managers lost visibility of logistics positions that required functional skills and experience. The Army’s FY 2012 change to DA PAM 611-21 solves this problem provided personnel requisitions display the newly established functional logistics Secondary Qualification Indicators, and units recognize the functional requirements as annotated on their authorization documents. Another unintended consequence is that some unit commanders now view all logistics officers as multifunctional and regularly employ basic branch OD, QM and TC lieutenants in positions for which they have no institutional training. The SCOE can solve this problem by revising the program of instruction of each of the OD, QM and TC Basic Officer Leader Courses to ensure lieutenants arrive at their first duty assignment with an elementary understanding of all the logistics functions. Finally, TRADOC and the SCOE would better serve the logistics officer corps if they redesigned the Army’s premier logistics university to provide advanced degree-awarding programs as was originally articulated 45 years ago at its inception. LG branch implementation has been successful, widely accepted, and provided great benefit to the Army. There is always
room for improvement, and the history of the evolution of how we sustain our fighting forces indicates that more change is yet to come.

Endnotes


5 Ibid., 31-49.

6 Ibid., 50 and 97.

7 Ibid., 68.

8 Ibid., 150-161.

9 Ibid., 227-231.

10 Ibid., 348-357.


17 Hewes, *From Root to McNamara*, 1-12.


21 Martin S. Wagner, *Multifunctional Logistics Officer Corps: Should the U.S. Army Consolidate the Officer Corps of the Transportation, Quartermaster and Ordnance Corps into One Multifunctional Branch?*, Monograph (Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, March 3, 2000).


24 David C. Dusterhoff, *Breaking the Logistics Branch Paradigm: Should the U.S. Army Combine the Current Logistics Officer Branches of Ordnance, Quartermaster, Transportation, and Medical Service into One Branch?*, Monograph (Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, May 14, 2002), 1.


27 Robert L. Shumar, e-mail message to author, November 8, 2011.


29 Kent A. D. Clark, e-mail message to author, November 21, 2011.

30 Victor S. Hagan, email message to Rufus N. Montgomery, Sr., August 1, 2005. This email included an attached seven-slide briefing titled OPMS 3 Logistics Corps Initiative.

31 U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command, Archival files of the Logistics Officer Corps Integrated Concept Team, (Fort Lee, VA: U.S. Army CASCOM). These archival files include the minutes and briefings of nine meetings that occurred from November 17, 2005 to February 16, 2007 and end with the April 30, 2007 memorandum from GEN William S. Wallace, to the Army Chief of Staff, to establish the Logistics Branch.


35 Ibid.


41 Ibid.

42 Ibid. Italic emphasis is shown as published in the original article.


44 Ibid.

45 Samuel L. Russell, notes from meeting with MG James L. Hodge, April 2011.

46 Shannon C. Cox, email message to author, April 2, 2012.

47 U.S. Army Human Resources Command, Electronic Total Officer Personnel Management Information System: eTOPMIS, accessed 23 Jul 2010. Data for cohort year group 1989 Lieutenant Colonels was obtained from Officer Record Briefs that were pulled from eTOPMIS on 23 Jul 2010.


49 Combined Arms Support Command, Archival files of the Logistics Officer Corps Integrated Concept Team.
50 Ibid.

51 Ibid.


53 Ibid.


