Improving Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Enterprise Management

by

Lieutenant Colonel Ryan Rogers
United States Air Force

United States Army War College
Class of 2012

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT: A
Approved for Public Release
Distribution is Unlimited

This manuscript is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.
Over the past decade, the U.S. defense budget grew at an extraordinary pace to support two wars in the Middle East. It was also supplemented by Overseas Contingency Operations funds. This abundance of resources diminished the need for scrutinized requirements and acquisition oversight. Today, the tide of war and defense spending is receding while the U.S. strives to renew its economic strength. The new Defense Strategic Guidance broadly outlines force structure cuts, and sets the stage for increased investments in ISR, space, and cyberspace capabilities. These investments will require a joint approach to eliminate duplication and redundancy, and strong management practices to ensure efficiency. This paper examines the Joint Requirements Oversight Council’s role and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System’s process that is used to identify, validate and prioritize joint military requirements. It also describes the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence’s responsibilities in managing and overseeing the ISR Enterprise, and provides potential options to improve ways to minimize gaps, shortfalls, and redundancies in ISR programming, planning and operations across the Department of Defense.
IMPROVING INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE ENTERPRISE MANAGEMENT

by

Lieutenant Colonel Ryan Rogers
United States Air Force

Colonel Jon Peck
Project Adviser

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Lieutenant Colonel Ryan Rogers
TITLE: Improving Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Enterprise Management
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 22 March 2012 WORD COUNT: 5,242 PAGES: 26
KEY TERMS: Oversight, Requirements, JROC, JCIDS, Capability
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Over the past decade, the U.S. defense budget grew at an extraordinary pace to support two wars in the Middle East. It was also supplemented by Oversees Contingency Operations funds. This abundance of resources diminished the need for scrutinized requirements and acquisition oversight. Today, the tide of war and defense spending is receding while the U.S. strives to renew its economic strength. The new Defense Strategic Guidance broadly outlines force structure cuts, and sets the stage for increased investments in ISR, space, and cyberspace capabilities. These investments will require a joint approach to eliminate duplication and redundancy, and strong management practices to ensure efficiency. This paper examines the Joint Requirements Oversight Council’s role and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System’s process that is used to identify, validate and prioritize joint military requirements. It also describes the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence’s responsibilities in managing and overseeing the ISR Enterprise, and provides potential options to improve ways to minimize gaps, shortfalls, and redundancies in ISR programming, planning and operations across the Department of Defense.
In January 2012, the White House and Department of Defense (DoD) released new Defense Strategic Guidance. The guidance was influenced by two primary issues: (1) “large increases in defense spending” associated with a decade of war; and (2) serious national deficit and debt problems that are “squeezing both the defense and domestic budgets.” Specifically, the Budget Control Act of 2011 requires a reduction in defense spending of $487 billion over the next 10 years. The resulting constrained fiscal environment and the complex and uncertain nature of the global security environment will force the DoD to make hard decisions concerning future capabilities, force size, and force structure.

Defense Secretary Leon Panetta has stated that “we (DoD) absolutely cannot allow budget pressures to force the services into parochialism and program survival mode.” He also stressed that budget pressures should not “set off an inter-service resource war that undercuts a decade of Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force combat cooperation and war-fighting lessons.” The military services and agencies must continue to think and act “joint” to weather the budget storm. In fact, today’s fiscal environment highlights the importance of a whole of government approach to national security in which partnerships across the interagency must be leveraged to find efficiency improvements and eliminate duplication and redundancy at all levels.

Efforts to save defense dollars by identifying efficiency improvements and eliminating duplication and redundancy are not new to the DoD. In 2005, the DoD adopted Joint Capability Areas (JCAs) as a framework to provide the military enterprise
with a "common lexicon for discussing and debating how to define needs; to analyze gaps in capability…and excess capability; and to determine where one set of capabilities can be cut…to shift resources to another area." \(^4\) JCAs set the stage for major changes to DoD's weapon system procurement practices and support capability analysis, strategy development and investment decision making. Currently, there are nine Tier One JCAs.\(^5\) The Battlespace Awareness JCA encompasses Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) activities and investments, and is aligned with the Intelligence Joint Function. The Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) is designated as the civilian lead office and portfolio manager of Battlespace Awareness/ISR activities and investments, and the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) is designated as the military lead command.\(^6\)

In 2008, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) reported that the Department of Defense (DoD) "can better assess and integrate ISR capabilities and oversee development of future ISR requirements."\(^7\) Three years later, a 2011 GAO report suggested the DoD needs to do a better job of managing ISR systems, and identified DoD's ISR Enterprise as "fragmented" concerning its procurement, accounting and oversight.\(^8\) The GAO reports and the requirement to cut defense spending by $487 billion over the next 10 years certainly underscore the need for changes in DoD's ISR Enterprise Management policies.

This paper discusses the authorities provided to the USD(I) to manage the DoD's ISR Enterprise, and the associated roles of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System process. Three options are examined that change policy and structure to effectively integrate and coordinate ISR
activities across DoD’s military departments, intelligence agencies and combatant commands. In today’s fiscally constrained environment, the DoD must display proper stewardship of American tax dollars to maintain internal jurisdiction of its processes, while maintaining its operational effectiveness in the current fight and structuring the joint force for potential future conflicts.

Background

The USD(I) is charged with managing and overseeing the full scope and cost of the ISR Enterprise. This includes minimizing any gaps, shortfalls, and redundancies in programming, planning, and operations for ISR. “The role and authorities of the USD(I) are limited to two primary advisory functions: (1) reviewing and participating in service and DoD agency budget deliberations on proposed ISR capability investments, and (2) recommending alternatives to service or agency spending to the Secretary of Defense.”

Current policy simply requires the USD(I) "to have access to pertinent information and processes required to advise," but provides no independent decision-making authority. The ISR Enterprise is extremely complex with multiple agencies and organizations, and multiple funding sources. The USD(I) requires more than an “advisory” role to properly integrate ISR activities and realize true efficiencies throughout the enterprise that in turn benefit the DoD and the National Intelligence Community.

The ISR enterprise and associated activities are a critical joint function, and consist of multiple intelligence organizations within the DoD and the Intelligence Community (IC) that “individually plan for, acquire, and operate manned and unmanned airborne, space-borne, maritime, and ground-based ISR systems.” The intelligence function is fundamental to understanding the strategic, operational and tactical
environments and supports all aspects of government in developing policy and strategy. ISR provides “integrated, evaluated, analyzed and interpreted information” concerning foreign nations’ intent, capability and potential future operations.\textsuperscript{12} Military intelligence activities and national strategic intelligence activities continue to supplement one another as “tactical ISR supports strategic decisions and national intelligence collection informs military operations.”\textsuperscript{13} Consequently, ISR activities may be funded through several sources, to include the Military Intelligence Program (MIP), National Intelligence Program (NIP), Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding, and service appropriations. The complex nature of funding for ISR activities, coupled with the fact that the USD(I) does not have full visibility into all budget sources, makes DoD’s ISR Enterprise management a difficult problem.\textsuperscript{14}

The USD(I) utilizes three primary entities to obtain pertinent information to integrate and coordinate ISR activities: the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC); the Joint Capabilities Board (JCB); and the Functional Capabilities Board (FCB). The JROC’s primary functions are to oversee the processes and methods to be used in identifying, developing, validating, and prioritizing joint military requirements; determine the joint military requirements necessary to achieve joint force interdependence and interoperability; and review, validate, and approve joint military requirements.\textsuperscript{15} The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the JROC Chairman. Other members of the council are officers in the grade of general or admiral from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, typically the service chiefs and the Marine Corps Commandant. Combatant Command representatives, normally the Commander or Deputy Commander, can act as voting members on the JROC, and are encouraged
to participate when matters related to their area of responsibility or functions are under consideration by the council. Several other officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, defense agencies and organizations, and interagency organizations with equity in defense capability requirements serve as advisors to the JROC on matters within their authority and expertise, but are not voting members. Advising officials from the DoD include representatives from: the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; the Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation; the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation; the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness; the DoD Chief Information Officer; the National Security Agency; the National Reconnaissance Office; the Defense Intelligence Agency; and many other defense organizations. Interagency representatives can include advisors from: the National Security Council; the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; the Homeland Security Council; the Office of Management and Budget; the Department of State; the Department of Homeland Security; and other departments or agencies. The JROC is the final validation authority of capability requirements that are identified with a Joint Staffing Designation (JSD) of “JROC Interest.”

The JCB is a board below the JROC, and assists the JROC in carrying out its duties and responsibilities. The JCB reviews capability documents prior to validation by the JROC, and is the validation authority for capability requirements identified with a JSD of “JCB Interest.” The Deputy J-8 serves as the JCB Chairman. JCB membership includes general or flag officers, or government civilian equivalents, from the Services or
Combatant Commands that are designated by their respective permanent JROC member. \textsuperscript{19} Similar to the JROC, Combatant Command representatives are encouraged to participate as voting members and advisors from the DoD and interagency are welcome to attend meetings.

The FCBs are boards below the JCB and are advisory bodies to the JROC and JCB for capability initiatives assigned with JSDs of “JROC Interest” and “JCB Interest.” \textsuperscript{20} The FCBs are aligned with the Joint Capability Areas (JCAs) and are tasked with reviewing and assessing documents within their designated portfolios prior to review by the JCB. The FCBs have authority to task the Services, Combatant Commands and DoD agencies for information and support from subject matter experts. There are currently seven FCBs that are sponsored by different Joint Staff Directorates. The Joint Staff J-2, Intelligence Directorate is the sponsor for the Battlespace Awareness FCB. The FCB Chair is a general or flag officer designated by the sponsoring organization. FCBs are comprised of representatives in the grade of O-6, or government civilian equivalent, from the Services, Combatant Commands, and other DoD agencies with equity in the associated FCB’s portfolio. \textsuperscript{21}

The JROC owns and utilizes the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process to support the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) in advising the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) in identifying and assessing joint military capability needs. \textsuperscript{22} JCIDS was created in 2003 to support the statutory responsibility of the JROC and as part of a capabilities-based planning process to drive a “top-down” requirements process. Previous processes were “bottom-up” and driven by requirements often developed by the services as solutions to capability gaps associated
with specific threats. The resulting systems or capabilities were service-focused that lacked joint interoperability. “The JCIDS process is designed to identify the broad set of capabilities that may be required to address the security environment of the 21st century.”23 The framework and structure of JCIDS is sound and is initiated through the execution of a Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA). The initial CBA is accomplished by a sponsor and establishes the mission, capability definition, gaps, desired solution type (materiel or non-materiel), and sets the conditions for an Initial Capabilities Document (ICD), if the recommendation is a materiel solution. Sponsors can be any Service, Combatant Command or other DoD component or agency.24

After the sponsor develops a CBA, the CBA is reviewed by the Gatekeeper. The Joint Staff J-8/Deputy Director for Requirements serves as the Gatekeeper for JCIDS proposals. Upon review of the CBA, the Gatekeeper assigns JCIDS proposals a JSD based on Acquisition Categories (ACATs), which are determined by the expenditure amounts associated with research and development, and procurement costs.25 High dollar joint initiatives (ACAT I) are designated as “JROC Interest” and therefore must be validated by the JROC. Lower dollar joint initiatives (ACAT II & III) requiring a broader joint review can be designated as “JCB Interest” and validated by the JCB. The Gatekeeper can also designate JCIDS proposals (ACAT II & III) a lower JSD that are validated by their respective sponsoring organization.26 These designators, in priority order, are “Joint Integration” for proposals requiring joint certifications, “Joint Information” for proposals with multi-component interest, and “Independent” for proposals that are service or component unique.27 After assigning a JCIDS proposal
with a corresponding JSD, the Gatekeeper appoints lead and supporting FCBs to assist the sponsor through the JCIDS process.

The issue associated with the Gatekeeper review of a sponsor crafted CBA is that the sponsor can shape the CBA to its advantage based on whether or not it desires JROC or JCB consideration, validation and approval for its recommended capability or system within the JCIDS process. If the sponsor would rather acquire the capability or system through JCIDS as the validation authority, the CBA can be constructed in a way that supports a service or agency unique mission or role and bypass increased scrutiny of the JROC and JCB. Thus, the initial step in the JCIDS process relies on honest brokers that prefer doing what is best for the joint force, and not what is best for their own service or agency. ISR initiatives not meeting the ACAT thresholds for “JROC Interest” are worked at the sponsor level and acquired through appropriations at the service or DoD agency level, which can include NIP funding from the Intelligence Community through the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). All of this increases the complexity and likelihood that the USD(I) will not obtain full visibility into ISR programs and acquisitions because not all initiatives are classified as “JROC or JCB Interest” within JCIDS and validated through the JROC or JCB, which are two of the three primary entities in which the USD(I) obtains pertinent information to integrate and coordinate ISR activities.

A 2008 GAO study determined 12 of 19 (63%) JCIDS proposals submitted to the Battlespace Awareness (BA) FCB did not complete a CBA, and the remaining 7 initiatives varied in completeness and rigor. The study also found that the BA FCB did not coordinate with the sponsors during their assessments process, and did not review
the assessments once they were completed.\textsuperscript{28} The CBA is a critical component of JCIDS and identifies (1) warfighter skills and attributes for a desired capability, (2) the gaps to achieving this capability based on an assessment of all existing systems and (3) possible solutions for filling these gaps.\textsuperscript{29} If CBAs are not accomplished appropriately, DoD cannot be assured ISR capabilities approved through the JCIDS process are solutions that adequately minimize inefficiency and redundancy, nor provide joint solutions to ISR capability needs.\textsuperscript{30} As mentioned above, the CBA is a critical document reviewed by the Gatekeeper at the start of the JCIDS process. The Gatekeeper determines if the proposal is joint interest worthy and establishes the JSD. The proposals not identified as JROC or JCB Interest do not receive the same level of attention and are validated and approved at the sponsor level. These proposals can bypass JROC, JCB and FCB oversight; and consequently get lost in the shuffle with respect to USD(I) management and oversight. ISR activities are a joint function, not just joint between military departments, but between DoD and the national intelligence community. Thus, all ISR proposals should obtain a “JROC or JCB Interest” designator, be reviewed, prioritized and managed by the Battlespace Awareness Functional Capability Board, and validated at the highest level with various views and interest represented by equity stakeholders within the DoD and interagency.

A recent ISR acquisition blunder concerning the U.S. Army’s attempt to acquire the Enhanced Medium-Altitude Reconnaissance and Surveillance System (EMARSS) is one example of JCIDS failure and sponsor parochialism that highlights the need for changes in DoD’s ISR Enterprise Management policy. The Army EMARSS platform is an enhanced Hawker Beechcraft Super King Air 350 with intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance sensors installed. Each of the twin-engine turboprops costs $17 million and was going to be the Army’s replacement of its RC-12 Guardrail fleet. The EMARSS project, an ACAT II initiative, was started in early 2010 prior to existing budget issues.\textsuperscript{31}

In January 2008, the Air Force launched a program fulfilling an urgent operational requirement to bolster the Air Force’s intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions associated with Operations IRAQI and ENDURING FREEDOM by adding a new low-cost, low signature platform to the ISR inventory. This platform is known as the Project Liberty MC-12W, and is the same aircraft the Army attempted to procure under the EMARSS initiative. The Air Force MC-12W’s first operational mission was flown in Iraq in June 2009, and currently provides critical tactical ISR to battlefield commanders in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{32}

Since the MC-12W was rapidly acquired and employed to fill urgent operational requirements, the Air Force did not have a manning structure (billets or funding) or basing for the new Mission Design Series (MDS). The MC-12W mission has been accomplished by pilots and sensor operators “borrowed” from other MDSs across the Air Force. The Air Force finally transitioned the program to the current baseline budget, established a dedicated crew force and training pipeline structure, and announced a basing decision in April 2011; all of which are in early stages of execution. Thus, the Air Force is adding the MC-12W to its permanent force structure during a time of declining budgets and while planning to reduce the Active, Guard, and Reserve components by 9,900 personnel.\textsuperscript{33}

Somehow the SecDef, USD(I), CJCS, Joint Staff, JROC, JCB, FCB, Gatekeeper, services and combatant commanders all missed the striking similarities between the Air
Force’s MC-12W and Army’s EMARSS aircraft and failed to identify the redundant capability. The DoD at large may have failed, but Congress did not. In June 2011, the Senate Armed Service Committee recommended the Air Force’s Project Liberty MC-12 program be transferred to the Army as a potential provision to the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2012. The Army already has an RC-12 crew force, training pipeline, and dedicated facilities for basing, and the transfer of the MC-12W to the Army seemed to be a win-win for both services. But the recommendation didn’t open the eyes of the CJCS or break the services free of their respective parochialism. In fact, the Secretary of the Air Force and Secretary of the Army crafted a joint letter on 20 September 2011 to the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee explaining why the transfer was a bad idea and how it would negatively affect warfighter support. Although the Secretaries agreed and acknowledged that “scenarios exist which may create an environment favorable for aircraft transfer,” they “strongly recommended continued operation of the MC-12W within the Air Force.”

Apparently, the “environment” referred to in the letter came to fruition a month later when the Army announced it would transfer the first four EMARSS aircraft to the Air Force and cancel the rest of the program. The announcement was made on 11 October 2011, when U.S. Army Lieutenant General Robert P. Lennox, G-8 Deputy Chief of Staff, stated, “we (Army) have to find the best uses for our money, and it doesn’t make sense to buy similar things.” This case is clearly cause for alarm and just one data point concerning the fragmented state of ISR management and oversight. Congressional intervention and an ensuing budget crisis should not have driven DoD strategic leaders to make decisions on what is best for the joint force and nation. If the DoD wants to maintain
internal jurisdiction of its ISR activities and investments, changes to policy and processes need to be considered and implemented.

Options

The EMARSS example and the SecDef’s guidance to the military services to bury their parochial budget perspectives and work as a team to find $487 billion in savings through 2021, shows the DoD should change its approach to integrating ISR capabilities and coordinating the developmental activities of the DoD’s military departments, intelligence agencies, and combatant commands. In this section, three potential options are provided to improve ISR Enterprise Management. The options focus on changes in policy associated with authorities, existing process, and creating a new joint-interagency process for ISR capability initiatives. A brief risk, feasibility, acceptability and suitability analysis is provided for each option.

*Enhanced USD(I) Role.* The first option centers on authorities the USD(I) requires to fulfill oversight and management duties of the ISR Enterprise. The ISR Enterprise is much too complex for the USD(I) to manage by simply having access to information. Unfortunately, service parochialism is alive and well in the military departments and to some degree at the Joint Staff level. There needs to be a “big brother” that can objectively make decisions that benefit the joint force and national security, while simultaneously eliminating duplication and redundancy. As the civilian lead office and portfolio manager of the Battlespace Awareness JCA, the USD(I) is best positioned to be that “big brother.”

The USD(I) requires the decision-making and appropriations authority concerning ISR programs and acquisitions. Therefore, the USD(I) should be provided validation
authority as JROC and JCB Chairman for ISR initiatives with associated JSDs of “JROC and JCB Interest.” These initiatives are typically the high dollar capability gap proposals that require joint consideration and solutions. Additionally, the USD(I) should be the appropriations authority for ISR initiatives not meeting the threshold for “JROC or JCB Interest.” Sponsors would maintain validation authority of ISR proposals with JSDs of “Joint Integration and Information” and “Independent”, but would be required to obtain USD(I) approval to utilize appropriations to acquire the ISR capability. The combination of the two policy changes will enable the USD(I) to achieve a highly integrated ISR investment strategy and provide for full visibility into the operational use and capabilities of ISR assets. These changes also support the USD(I) in his role as Director of Defense Intelligence within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. In this capacity, the USD(I) is to ensure “the investments of both the DoD and IC are mutually supportive of each other’s roles and missions.”

The USD(I) requires more than an advisory role to properly utilize this relationship by ensuring DoD’s ISR activities are integrated and balanced with national intelligence capabilities and requirements.

The risks with this option are twofold and speak to the acceptability of the option. First, potential political and statutory conflict may be encountered because of the perception that responsibility and authority will be taken from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). The CJCS could view the USD(I)’s role as validation authority for “JROC and JCB Interest” ISR initiatives as an infringement on CJCS functions within Title 10 of U.S. Code. Specifically, Section 151 designates the CJCS as “the principle military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense;” and Section 153 charges the CJCS with
“assessing military requirements for defense acquisition programs,” and advising the SecDef on requirements, programs, and budget. The policy change can certainly be viewed this way, but can also be viewed in light of a check and balance through more informed advice to the SecDef from the USD(I). The VCJCS will still be a member of the JROC and provide dissenting opinions to the CJCS. Thus, the JROC will still assist the CJCS to identify, assess, and validate joint military requirements to meet the national military strategy and advise the SecDef accordingly, but the USD(I) will also be able to provide advice from a more informed point of view concerning ISR Enterprise Management. In the end, the SecDef is the approval authority concerning acquisition programs as they are tied to the DoD budget, and he will benefit from multiple recommendations that will enable him to make better informed decisions.

The second risk with this option concerns considerable pushback from the military departments concerning appropriations for dual use assets that fulfill both ISR and non-ISR missions. Technological advancements enable lightweight ISR sensors to be integrated into multiple air, land, sea, and space systems whose primary mission is not ISR. The additional policy change of providing the USD(I) appropriations authority for ISR related systems is needed because multiple ISR initiatives are not reviewed and approved by the JROC or JCB. While serious debate may arise in identifying initiatives that clearly fall into the ISR category, the debate itself will better inform the USD(I). However, a drawn out debate with no resolution could potentially decrease ISR capability integration required for the future force.

This option is feasible and suitable, but will likely meet substantial acceptability challenges stated above. Providing USD(I) validation authority as JROC Chairman for
ISR initiatives will force the military departments, agencies, and Joint Staff to work together to produce capabilities based assessments in which real joint solutions are constructed and forwarded to the JROC or JCB for validation and approval. The USD(I) acting as the JROC/JCB Chairman, coupled with the responsibilities and knowledge as Director of Defense Intelligence within the ODNI, can validate and approve initiatives that are balanced with the capabilities and requirements of the national intelligence community. This type of ISR integration and coordination will better serve the DoD and IC by providing a less redundant and potentially larger defense intelligence capability. Cost savings, from not producing redundant systems, may enable the DoD to shift funds and acquire other needed ISR activities. There are no resource requirements associated with making the USD(I) the JROC and JCB Chairman for ISR initiatives and the discussion above explains how the option adapts policy and structure to effectively integrate and coordinate ISR activities across DoD’s military departments, intelligence agencies, and combatant commands.

*JCIDS Process Change*. The second option involves changing aspects of the JCIDS process. As stated previously, ISR activities are intrinsically linked to the Intelligence Joint Function that supports military and national strategic intelligence, and the USD(I) requires greater visibility into ISR capabilities, programs, and budget sources to provide an integrated ISR investment strategy. As the owner of the JCIDS process, the JROC can mandate all DoD ISR initiatives, regardless of ACAT classification be categorized with a JSD of “JROC Interest”. The CJCS can amend the JROC membership to allow USD(I), ODNI, National Security Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, and Defense Intelligence Agency representatives to act as
voting members on the JROC when matters related to the ISR Enterprise are under consideration by the council. The military lead command for the Battlespace Awareness JCA, USSTRATCOM, already acts as a voting member. These two process changes will ensure the USD(I) is properly informed through the JROC, JCB and FCB; and provide a greater perspective to the council in the form of casted votes. These changes also negate the Gatekeeper’s power in assigning JSDs for proposals concerning ISR activities. The collective civilian, military, and interagency council will better inform and advise the JROC Chairman and ensure compliance with the overarching USD(I) ISR investment strategy. Together these modifications will allow USD(I) to receive, collect, and consolidate the information necessary to carry out its oversight responsibilities, and integrate the opinion of the IC.

The risk with this option is increased workload and manning associated with the Battlespace Awareness FCB and the JROC Secretariat, Joint Staff J2/J8. This option is feasible, acceptable and suitable. The broad scope of ISR activities makes it difficult for the USD(I) to be fully informed of existing programs, new initiatives, and funding sources. The USD(I) already has access as a JROC advisor, but is not an official voting member and all ISR initiatives are not validated through the JROC. This option fills the information gap and places the USD(I) at the table to openly show approval or disapproval for ISR activities in which he is charged with managing and overseeing. The USD(I) can also ensure national intelligence capabilities and requirements are addressed and balanced with those of the DoD. The additional resources required for the option are minimal and will require manpower adjustments within the Joint Staff, Combat Commanders, and services to properly man the FCB. The changes within the
JROC and JCIDS do not substantially disrupt existing processes and procedures established by the CJCS, and can be implemented with simple changes to the CJCS Instructions 5123.01F and 3170.01H.

**Joint-Interagency ISR Council.** The third and final option entails establishing a new joint-interagency ISR Enterprise requirements oversight council that brings aspects of the JROC and JCIDS process together with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s (ODNI) Mission Requirements Board. The ODNI’s Mission Requirements Board serves as the approval mechanism for future national requirements and provides input on DoD’s intelligence acquisitions that may support national intelligence capabilities. The combined council could be comprised of representatives from the ODNI, USD(I), Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, Services, military intelligence agencies and national intelligence agencies; and be the validation authority for all strategic, operational and tactical ISR programs and initiatives. This whole of government approach will bring together defense and national requirements and provide more concise capabilities based assessments in which solutions minimizing inefficiency and redundancy can be realized.

The risks associated with this option include time, funding, a potential loss of internal jurisdiction pertaining to the DoD’s ability to acquire the ISR capabilities required to support military operations, and potential cultural biases. Establishment of the joint-interagency council will take time to coordinate, set up agreed upon processes, and work through cultural differences. It will also require funding for personnel and facilities. The current fiscal environment provides little room for maneuver concerning either of the later requirements.
This option has feasibility concerns due to the resources required to form and consolidate an ISR council comprised of military intelligence and national intelligence offices/agencies. Due to the size of the IC, multiple bureaucratic processes may limit the acceptability of the option. However, the option meets the suitability test by establishing a structure that could effectively integrate and coordinate ISR activities across DoD and the IC. The Senate Armed Services Committee has stated concerns that the effectiveness of United States ISR capabilities has been hampered by “capability gaps as well as parallel systems across the services and intelligence agencies that do not fully complement one another and may duplicate some capabilities.”

The joint-interagency ISR council would combine the DoD’s JROC structure and JCIDS process with the ODNI’s Mission Requirements Board and require all new intelligence capabilities being developed by the military services and the defense intelligence agencies be conceived as part of a larger system of systems. This unified investment management approach for ISR would allow decision makers at multiple levels to weigh the relative costs, benefits, and risks of proposed investments using standardized criteria and methods established and agreed upon by the DoD and the IC at large. Although this option has challenges, it is likely the best option for a future whole of government approach for ISR Enterprise Management.

Conclusion

The “DoD faces a complex and challenging environment in supporting defense requirements for ISR capabilities.” The USD(I) has been charged with integrating ISR activities across the department and to a large degree across the National Intelligence Community. This is a tall order considering the broad spectrum of military intelligence
and national intelligence agencies within the ISR Enterprise, and the multiple funding sources that can be utilized to acquire ISR capabilities. Capturing all the information needed to adequately minimize gaps, shortfalls and redundancies in programming, planning and operations for ISR is nearly insurmountable. Current policy and processes place the USD(I) at a disadvantage in performing this arduous task.

Status quo in today’s complex security environment with a shrinking defense budget is not a viable option. If the DoD is to effectively deal with the growing cost of defense, it must be willing to rethink how it operates. Service or agency parochialism has no place in the Intelligence Joint Function arena, and teamwork will be required to develop and acquire the ISR capabilities required to safeguard the nation and provide U.S. combat forces the tactical edge on the battlefield. ISR is fundamental to understanding the strategic, operational and tactical environments and supports all aspects of government in developing policy and strategy. Thus, improvements in management of the ISR Enterprise are imperative.

There are multiple ways to alleviate the challenges faced by the USD(I) in managing and overseeing the ISR Enterprise. This paper presented three such options that provide the USD(I) with more than an advisory role to effectively integrate ISR capabilities across DoD and potentially the IC. The primary methods that can be utilized to empower the USD(I) are increased participation and authority in the JROC and JCIDS process changes concerning ISR capability initiatives. While all the options should be further studied to discern their broader implications, the author recommends the JCIDS Process Change option. This option supports the objective, can be
implemented quickly, does not substantially disrupt existing processes and procedures established by the CJCS, and can be controlled and implemented within the DoD.

Endnotes


2 Ibid.


6 Ibid.


9 Ibid., 6.


14 Ibid., 7.


17 Ibid., A-10.

18 Ibid., A-4.

19 Ibid., A-5.

20 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council*, CJCSI 5123.01E, A-10.


25 Ibid., C-2.


27 Ibid.


29 Joint Staff J-8, Requirements Management Division, “JCIDS Overview.”


35 Ibid.


38 U.S. Code, Title 10 – Armed Forces, sec. 151, 153.


40 Ibid., 2.

41 Ibid., 1.