Installation Management Command – Flattening or Flat-lining?

by

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United States Army War College
Class of 2012

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In 2002, the Secretary of the Army initiated the centralization of installation management, realigning base operations support missions from various Army commands under one organization, the Installation Management Agency (IMA). The intent of this centralization was to improve and standardize operations and delivery of services to Army installation personnel and organizations. IMA has since transformed into the Installation Management Command (IMCOM) and is now the United States Army’s single largest organization employing over 73,200 personnel. IMCOM, through its regions and garrisons, has developed common levels of support, streamlined processes/created efficiencies, upgraded facilities, and improved overall service to its customers. However, internal hierarchical structural shifts and changes in management roles and responsibilities are creating a span-of-control too large for leadership to provide effective oversight, resulting in the degradation of IMCOM’s programs and processes. Therefore, this paper will review the history of IMCOM and decision points that turned it into an unmanageable flat organization, as well as provide solution sets to re-establish control, re-energize capabilities, and generate additional efficiencies.
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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Ms. Linda M. Groat
TITLE: Installation Management Command – Flattening or Flat-lining?
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 21 March 2012  WORD COUNT: 5,428  PAGES: 34
KEY TERMS: IMCOM, Base Operations, BASOPS, Hierarchy, Span-of-Control
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

In 2002, the Secretary of the Army initiated the centralization of installation management, realigning base operations support missions from various Army commands under one organization, the Installation Management Agency (IMA). The intent of this centralization was to improve and standardize operations and delivery of services to Army installation personnel and organizations. IMA has since transformed into the Installation Management Command (IMCOM) and is now the United States Army’s single largest organization employing over 73,200 personnel. IMCOM, through its regions and garrisons, has developed common levels of support, streamlined processes/created efficiencies, upgraded facilities, and improved overall service to its customers. However, internal hierarchical structural shifts and changes in management roles and responsibilities are creating a span-of-control too large for leadership to provide effective oversight, resulting in the degradation of IMCOM’s programs and processes. Therefore, this paper will review the history of IMCOM and decision points that turned it into an unmanageable flat organization, as well as provide solution sets to re-establish control, re-energize capabilities, and generate additional efficiencies.
INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT COMMAND – FLATTENING OR FLAT-LINING?

The Installation Management Command (IMCOM) is the United States Army’s single largest organization,¹ employing over 73,200 personnel – civilians, contractors and military.² IMCOM, through its regions and garrisons, provides base operations (BASOPS) support to Army soldiers and their families, interservice and intragovernmental organizations, as well as non-governmental businesses on Army installations. BASOPS support includes facilities maintenance, utilities, police and gate guards, fire and emergency services, range planning and training, transportation, dining halls, laundry facilities, daycare centers, gyms, and the list goes on. IMCOM has diligently worked toward standardization of these services and to ensure the level of support is commensurate with a soldier’s selfless duty to our country. However, in recent times there have been mistakes made with regards to IMCOM’s progress. These mistakes could cripple or potentially break a command that was engineered solely to strengthen the quality of life for our soldiers and their families, as well as other tenants. Therefore, this paper will research the history of IMCOM and its centralized installation management role within the Army, look at its downfall with regards to the reduction of a hierarchical layer and changes in management roles and responsibilities, and provide recommendations to re-energize IMCOM’s successes and counter its problems.

IMCOM Background

IMCOM was originally created as the Installation Management Agency (IMA) on October 1, 2002. Its mission was to provide an “equitable, efficient and effective management of Army installations worldwide to support mission readiness, enable the well-being of soldiers, civilians and family members, and improve infrastructure and
preserve the environment.” The informal reason for its creation is that Army installation facilities were in complete disrepair and services were not uniformly consistent. Some may remember notable videos on YouTube showing barracks and bathrooms in deplorable conditions. It was time to address quality assurance and customer support – improving and standardizing operations and delivery of services. Hence, the BASOPS mission was pulled from the installation senior commanders from 15 various Army organizations and consolidated under one agency – IMA. This transformation also allowed the organizations to focus on their own missions of materiel support, troop readiness, training, research and development, and so forth.

The organizational structure of IMA involved three levels: (1) headquarters (HQ) which handled policy (strategic), (2) seven regions that handled control and oversight (operational), and (3) 87 garrisons that provided the actual services (tactical) on Army installations. The IMA Commanding General (CG) was a major general (two-star) position working out of Crystal City, Virginia. The region directors (RDs) were senior executive service civilians (one-star equivalent) who reported to the CG. These regions were located geographically – four within the Continental U.S. (CONUS): Northwest, Southwest, Northeast and Southeast, and three overseas: Europe, Korea and Pacific (figure 1).
The garrisons were commanded by Colonels/Lieutenant Colonels (O-6s/O-5s) or civilian General Managers (GS-15s/GS-14s) who reported directly to the RDs, and were senior rated by the installation senior commanders. Below is an organizational chart depicting the chain-of-command authority (figure 2).\(^5\)

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**Figure 1:**

IMCOM CONUS Structure - 2002

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**Figure 2:**

Installation Management Agency (IMA) Structure
During the next few years, IMA went through its forming, storming and norming stages. Through diligence and intense working group sessions, IMA teams developed products and procedures that redefined BASOPS and set the path toward standardization. The first product was that of the standard garrison organization (SGO) which demonstrated how the garrison staff elements should be labeled and configured in the hierarchical structure (figure 3).  

![Standard Garrison Organization (SGO)](image)

In accordance with SGO, installations were categorized small, medium, large or most optimized strategically responsive (MOSR) based upon a variety of factors such as population size, diversity of tenants, and missions supported. Garrison staff senior level grades were determined from these size designations. This allowed for leadership
uniformity, and ensured no one command could siphon applicants away from others during periods of recruitment. Additionally, SGO allowed for overall functional unity of effort, ease of reporting requirements, and strong information and training dissemination.

The second product was Common Levels of Support (CLS). CLS consisted of all BASOPS services that were provided on an Army installation by the garrison staff. These main services, listed numerically, were made-up of supporting functions called Service Support Programs (SSPs), listed alphabetically. Each SSP had defined capability levels that instructed the customer on the level of service to expect based upon funding. By FY10, there were 77 services (figure 4)\(^7\) broken out into 349 SSPs. An example of a CLS service would be 40: Maintenance – Improved Grounds. A corresponding SSP would be 40A: Provide Grass Cutting and Trimming Services. Funding levels would determine if all planned lawn-care would be provided or only a percentage (capability level).
Common Levels of Support (CLS)

<table>
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Figure 4:

In addition to the development of products, processes were also improved upon such as the management and execution of the Army’s Installation Status Report (ISR) Program. This program (a database really) assists Army leadership to make appropriate and responsible decisions required to sustain or improve the management of state or base facilities, natural infrastructure, and services. For instance, *ISR Infrastructure* documents and displays the condition of Army facilities by comparing the quantity of facilities available to the base requirement for each facility type, and the quality of base facilities to established Army standards. *ISR Services* evaluates service delivery performance (cost, quality and quantity) for base support services provided at each Army base.\(^8\) A depiction of the entire program is at figure 5.\(^9\)
Another process that implemented IMA’s concept throughout was the Army military construction (MILCON) and nonappropriated-funded construction program development and execution. The scope includes planning, programming, designing, budgeting, and execution of projects, acquisition of real estate, and demolition requirements related to MILCON, and other supporting activities. More importantly, through strict regional operational control and assessment, MILCON projects were finally coded and prioritized based upon need, and not want.
Through the utility of standardized products and processes, the appropriate facilities were being improved or built at installations, and customers were beginning to realize a certain level of support would be provided at each and every base. Indeed, customers could expect CLS at every installation. Another positive, although anticipated, side effect was the efficiencies that this sameness created. If all garrisons use the same key code system for lodging or the same maintenance work order software system, then product pricing could be reduced through bulk purchases. Garrisons also created efficiencies through the communication and use of best business practices such as recouping funds through the selling of coal dust to the local cement company or using recycled water (effluent) from municipal sewage treatment facilities to irrigate the local golf course. These incredibly positive impacts are important to note as the regions are the mechanism that foster and promote this environment of good stewardship of Army resources.

IMA regions served a valuable purpose. They directed garrisons to transform into the SGO structure all the while monitoring any deviations, as well as provided oversight of the execution of CLS, making certain garrisons are in conformance with CLS standards. Regions also ensured garrisons are in compliance with all regulatory guidance, assisting and conducting inspections and site visits. In the event of extreme personnel shortages or vacancies of key positions, garrisons could reach back to region personnel to temporarily fill critical personnel gaps. Regions solved problems and issues, worked intergarrison agreements, and handled disputes. They conducted trend analysis and determined enterprise problems and corresponding solution sets.
Regions were the resource managers for HQ; they were the eyes and ears for planning, programming and budgeting. RDs had autonomy over their billion dollar region budgets. They adjusted money amongst the garrisons within their area of responsibility to handle various unplanned finance requirements such as the state of New Jersey raising its utility rates by 15.5 percent,\(^{11}\) or a roof blowing off a warehouse at Rock Island Arsenal, or a bridge collapsing at Adelphi Laboratory Center. If a crisis arose, it was normally handled internally unless the cost far outweighed the amount of a region’s withhold allotment.

These directors spoke frankly with the senior commanders on the installations (the customers) to address their BASOPS concerns and needs. The senior commanders could identify special projects of which the RD would then prioritize. Regions had on-the-ground knowledge of the inner workings of the installation. Since they are geographically aligned, travel was relatively simple/quick and with minimal cost to conduct garrison site visits.

Bottom line – the regions handled operational control of the garrisons, which then allowed HQ to develop policy and oversee overall execution of the installation management program. *At least, that is what the regions used to do...up until about two years ago.* They were a viable integral part of a command that is in direct support of our soldiers and their families. Now they are key account managers with no funds control and no authority over certain BASOPS functions such as information technology, which was moved to the Network Enterprise Technology Command (NETCOM), or public affairs (which was pulled to HQ), and will lose control over the logistics function to the Army Materiel Command (AMC) next (figure 6).\(^{12}\) The original SGO concept and CLS
standards have been shelved by the CG. The regions have been reduced to a skeleton force with no focus. So what is the reason for the changes in a command that has seen only goodness in its efforts?

IMA Change

The first big change came with the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Act that specified, “The Installation Management Agency (IMA), the Network Enterprise Technology Command and the Army Contracting Command collapse their regional headquarters structures into Eastern and Western Region Commands at Fort Eustis, VA, and Fort Sam Houston, Texas. Headquarters, IMA is also relocated to Fort Sam Houston.” Hence, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM)
and the IMA CG initiated the merger of Northwest and Southwest Regions to form West Region. Shortly thereafter, leadership realized that one RD for 21 garrison commanders was too great a span of control. The appropriate amount of mentorship and guidance could not be given from the director to his commanders, as well as from his staff to their garrison counterparts. Therefore, ACSIM/IMA leadership realigned geographical boundaries upon which Northeast and Southeast picked up oversight of five garrisons from the West (see figure 7). This was only the beginning as BRAC implementation seemed to be the catalyst for future change to IMA structure and hierarchies.

**Figure 7:**

The second big change, concurrent with other Army Transformation initiatives, was General Order 38 – the activation of the Installation Management Command
(IMCOM) on October 24, 2006 (assimilating IMA). This order changed the organization from a two-star field operating agency to a three-star command. Quickly after, in December 2006, the Secretary of the Army charged the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for Business Transformation to conduct an Army-wide study leading to recommendations that will enable the Army to meet its goal of providing responsive, effective, innovative, and efficient institutional support. Utilizing civilian business practices and management theory, the resulting IMCOM Work Analysis Study (IMS), better known as the Dr. Clement Study, included a review and recommended changes of IMCOM organizational structure and design, and the underlying system of roles and relationships. The Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army approved the IMS recommendations on January 23, 2007.\textsuperscript{16}

The third big change was the ACSIM/IMCOM immediate implementation of the IMS recommendations. Two most important items to note are that of (1) pulling functional capabilities from the regions and placing them at HQ and the garrisons, and (2) restructuring the regions by employing a civilian business model called Key Account Management to create Region Installation Support Teams (RISTs) that provide direct support to garrisons using reachback to HQ for functional support. Key account management is a concept used in the corporate realm, with companies such as Pepsi Bottling Group, International Business Machines, and Procter and Gamble. Typically, a key account manager serves as the primary point of contact and advocate to the customer by the supplier. This relationship fosters genuine involvement, knowledge sharing, and low-level issue resolution, as well as provides faster access to resources, quicker decisions, and higher levels of customer service.\textsuperscript{17} To put it in layman’s terms,
the regions were losing their command and control role to HQ, while gaining a reduced role as a customer service representative. Most technical oversight functions would be transferred to HQ in San Antonio, Texas.

It is rather unusual for corporate practices to be applied against Department of Defense (DOD) entities, in particular those practices that pertain to the customer service field as DOD is not in the business to generate profits. In fact, in accordance with the Quadrennial Defense Review, the DOD mission is to “...protect the American people and advance our nation’s interests.” The interpretation is that although customer service is an important function, it is not a priority. This is particularly true in the installation management business, as a great percentage of customers are the very same DOD employees. Therefore, one can surmise that customer service is unnecessary and uses valuable resources (time, people and money) – resources that were split out from BASOPS functional fields that provided critical direction and guidance to garrison staff (such as assistance and coordination on security issues, child and youth services accreditation, environmental stewardship, etc.), as well as inspection and validation mechanisms (organizational inspections, workload modeling, etc.). Yet, the RIST concept was put into practice in September 2009.

Soon thereafter an IMCOM Change of Command Ceremony was held on November 2, 2009. The new CG determined the IMS recommendations needed to be retooled to better suit his strategic vision of IMCOM. The RIST concept was already initiated, but he placed functional realignment on hold. In the interim, the CG brought about major modifications to garrison structure and BASOPS standards. He signed off on the reconfiguration of SGO from size designation of small through MOSR to alpha
categories of A, B, C and D which utilize more specific scoring criteria. The altered SGO categories/criteria had second and third order affects that impacted years of work in establishing staffing models and grade standards.\textsuperscript{20} The CG also insisted on bringing in operational Army concepts such as lines of effort (LOEs) to establish service standards rather than use CLS. CLS was last applied in FY10.

After approximately a year of additional assessments and modeling, the IMCOM CG ordered the merge of Northeast and Southeast Regions to form Atlantic Region, and Pacific and Korea Regions to form Pacific Region (West Region would be renamed as Central Region) (figure 8).\textsuperscript{21} His ultimate goal was the termination of CONUS regions – with regional workload transitioned to HQ and the 52 CONUS garrisons reporting directly to the two IMCOM Deputy Commanding Generals (DCGs). It is important to note the deputies already perform valuable roles as the Operations DCG and Support DCG. Hence, to realign command and control of 52 garrisons under these two HQ positions will repeat, and worsen, the span of control problem that emerged during BRAC implementation.
To begin the transition of functional and garrison realignment, the CG also directed the transfer of specific functional capabilities from the region to HQ (such as Resource Management, Public Affairs, and the Alcohol and Substance Abuse Program). Furthermore, he directed a pilot of 12 garrisons to report to the DCGs. Both of these actions started on August 11, 2011. The execution of these changes brought about major shifts in the IMCOM business model...shifts that an already flat organization could not handle. HQ did not have the capacity to combine policy AND operational functions in support of 52 CONUS garrisons. Case in point, fiscal matters were quickly pushed back down from HQ to the regions to resolve with their dwindling budget staffs, or a pilot garrison resource manager had to coordinate with 11 different cost account
managers at HQ vice contacting his single counterpart at the region. Another example is with strategic communications (STRATCOMMs) among public affairs officers. Weekly teleconferences were held between the region public affairs officer and her garrison counterparts to ensure timely collaboration and consistent guidance on community relations STRATCOMMs. HQ cannot initiate the same mass collaboration/notification because the phone system cannot support linkage of 52 lines at one time. Even so, 52 parties cannot dialogue synergistically within a timeframe of a few hours (whether telephonically, via the Internet, or by other means). This is a major problem if there are media events and community relations information that must be disseminated quickly. Plus, do not forget the time zone difference amongst all the regions. These and other emerging issues lead to the question WHY the change? Why are the CONUS regions being eliminated?

Region Elimination

Unfortunately, a sound justification for the reorganization and region elimination was never clearly articulated to the RDs and garrison commanders. Although, the CG did espouse a message early in his IMCOM career that “IMCOM had too much funding and too many people.”23 Other venues carried alternate messages such as IMCOM Operations Order 12-032 which gave a more definitive declaration of the CG’s intent that IMCOM “become more streamlined, agile, and efficient in conducting installation business.”24 He continued on by stating the mission is complete “when the migration of IMCOM managed CONUS garrisons report and receive direct support from HQ, IMCOM staff not later than (NLT) FY14.”25 This statement begs the question – were there indicators that IMCOM was NOT operating as a high performance organization? If there were indicators, none were presented. Furthermore, never did the regions or garrisons
see the analysis supporting the claim that the transfer in the reporting chain would cause IMCOM to become more streamlined, agile, and efficient. Metrics were also never developed or demonstrated that could measure the level of efficiencies gained. So, perhaps the reason for the change was not necessarily to create efficiencies, but to reduce costs and manpower (and address the CG’s earlier assertions)?

The reason for region termination could be as simple as there is not enough money to sustain that level of overhead. The IMCOM Executive Summary of August 10, 2011 affirmed it was to reduce the civilian workforce and find ways to garner $2.5 billion in additional efficiencies. This nests within Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta’s plan to put “...DOD on the path to save $259 billion over the next five years and $487 billion over the next 10.” Proposed budget cuts beginning FY13 will require a force reduction of active Army to 490,000 soldiers, and a strong relook at the institutional Army civilian positions (potentially cutting as many as 30,000). However, in reviewing IMCOM overhead data, it seems the regions are already composed of a limited amount of personnel and associated operating budgets.

In accordance with the U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency, IMCOM HQ is authorized 987 personnel spaces in FY12. The regions are authorized much less: Central Region – 115, Atlantic – 108, Europe – 400, and Pacific – 231. These numbers add up to 1,841 authorized spaces out of 80,296 which equates to a low 2.29 percent of management overhead (personnel); CONUS regions in particular amount to under one eighth of that overhead. The budget executed in FY11 to support IMCOM HQ and the region HQs was $598,199,519. Compare this to the overarching IMCOM budget of approximately $12.375 billion, and overhead cost was also low at 4.83 percent. A
further breakdown reveals the CONUS regions expended $45,615,832 which equates to just one thirteenth of those overhead costs. (Note: FY11 execution numbers were utilized for better accuracy as FY12 planning numbers are difficult to validate).

Whereas, in a study conducted of nonprofit groups, overhead rates ranged between 17 to 35 percent. This information reveals that the IMCOM management workforce appears to be at an already depleted state, and leadership should reconsider further reductions or suffer the consequences of significant operational failure. Unless the CG believed the outcome was one of efficiencies gained by transferring both workload and personnel to HQ in Texas. Yet, such a move may be regrettable as regional dispersion has great merit that will be lost upon consolidation.

**Regional Design**

A command-wide regional framework serves several purposes. Region subcommands can focus on geographical, climatic, political and social issues within their lines of demarcation. This focus allows each region to become more knowledgeable on the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats that exist in their area of responsibility (AOR). In turn, this knowledge provides a strong baseline in their development of strategies to influence or achieve their ends. The regions become subject matter experts in their AOR which allows them to: (1) act on the behalf of the CG and keep him informed on pertinent actions/issues which frees him to deliberate on strategic command-wide BASOPS policy and fiscal matters, (2) better tailor their support/service delivery efforts to customers, and (3) provide specific guidance and direction to their subordinates that is suitable to that AOR. There are many corporations and Federal agencies that have taken this approach and are structured to ensure operational regional synergy: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), to name a few. FEMA has 10 Regions, EPA has 10 Regional Offices, and USACE has eight Divisions and three (overseas) Districts.

At one time, IMCOM’s regions served the purposes mentioned above. For instance, snow removal in the Northeast is of greater importance than in the Southwest. So when CLS capability levels were determined or funding priorities set, the appropriate regional experts participated in the working groups to ensure conditions were set appropriately. Or take as an example the socio-political atmosphere around the Military District of Washington compared to that of the “shaka brah” attitude of Hawaii in the Pacific Region. Expectedly, the housing of 43 general officers at Joint Base Myer-McNair, Virginia becomes a greater concern than housing at Fort Shafter, Hawaii. Another benefit to a regional framework is the regions served as a single point of contact for individual Army Command (ACOM) Commanding Generals. The West Region was the conduit for AMC issues, Northeast for TRADOC, and Southeast for FORSCOM.

There is much to be said about geographical alignment, but there is also a benefit from geographical proximity. Proximity allows the RD and his staff to quickly perform site visits, inspections and assessments, coach/teach/mentor, as well as participate in important community events acting on behalf of the IMCOM CG. A plane trip from San Antonio, Texas to Fort Drum, New York would take twice as long and double in cost when compared to a plane trip from Fort Eustis, Virginia to New York. Proximity also helps in relating to cultural influences and understanding social norms. This is imperative when providing strategic communications to the public at large,
whether it is on the closure of a base, the change in gate access, attendance at or sponsorship of events, or constructing a new child development center. Building effective relationships and partnerships helps strengthen Army installation resiliency. Finally, proximity helps to keep time zone challenges to a minimum when planning meetings and conferences (be it over electronic media or onsite). Still, many would debate the need of a regional approach claiming that knowledge can be obtained and relationships built through other means, that the regional operational role can be performed from Texas. If the prospect of maintaining regions in CONUS can no longer be supported, then at a minimum, the hierarchical structure should remain intact. A large company with a shallow or flat hierarchical structure is an organization doomed for failure.

Hierarchies

Over the last 25 years, corporate rhetoric suggests the fewer hierarchical structures in a company, the better. Fewer layers mean less salary to pay, more efficient processes, and more timely products. Business theorists posit that reducing organizational layers in a company is best when the organization is small. However, when the organization is big, hierarchies remain the most workable and effective structures humans have yet invented for performing large, enduring, complicated tasks.32

Take for example British Petroleum (BP). The BP Chief Executive Officer, Tony Hayward, announced in October 2007 that while having the right strategy and resources, BP is not consistent and the organization has grown too complex. Therefore, BP planned to adopt more standardized procedures and shed up to four layers of management.33 No one would argue that simplification is more efficient, but is it more
effective? Recall that BP was responsible for a deep water explosion and gusher into the gulf that erupted on April 20, 2010. Harold Leavitt, professor emeritus of organizational behavior at Stanford University and author of *Top Down: Why Hierarchies are Here to Stay and How to Manage Them More Effectively* highlights one inescapable fact about flatter organizations – the more you flatten, the less you control.  

Effective control within IMCOM is vital to ensuring the U.S. Army reconstitutes its force and continues to build resilience into its formations and people. IMCOM shares this responsibility with three ACOMs in an enterprise approach toward management and execution of Army Force Generation. Each ACOM and IMCOM has lead of a core enterprise: (1) materiel– Army Materiel Command (AMC), (2) human capital – Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), (3) readiness – Forces Command (FORSCOM), and (4) services and infrastructure – IMCOM. A comparative assessment of the management structure of these commands demonstrates that IMCOM’s overhead may well be too shallow.

AMC maintains 73,039 manpower spaces and is structured into three hierarchical layers: HQ, major subordinate commands (MSCs), and ammunition plants/depots. Even though AMC only has three layers, it is broad in its structure with nine MSCs and three agencies/elements. TRADOC has 43,457 spaces and four layers: HQ, MSCs, centers of excellence, and schools. FORSCOM has 17,129 spaces and also has four layers: Corps, Divisions, Brigades, and Battalions. Whereas IMCOM currently manages 80,296 spaces and will soon have only two layers in CONUS: HQ and garrisons. It is perplexing and almost alarming that the U.S. Army’s largest
organization is the flattest. As a matter of fact, the Installation Management Reform Task Force (IMF-TR) drafted a report on this matter, sharing its own assessment.

IMF-TR opines that IMCOM has reached a critical tipping point by recommending that, "ACSIM/IMCOM reconsiders further reductions of CONUS Regions and undertake additional analysis while the Army is moving towards newly established end strength numbers and locales." The report discusses command and control (C2) roles and the need for garrison support. It further states that:

With today’s span of control as great as it is, it is unclear whether eliminating CONUS regions makes the C2 roles easier or more complex and thus jeopardizes the value a professional IM (installation management) community brings to implementing services and standards across our Army.

This position provides the perfect opportunity to reflect on the latest transformation decisions/actions and think over their necessity. The IMCOM CG always asked three questions of his workforce: (1) Are we doing the right things? (2) Are we doing things right? (3) What are we missing? These questions are ideal in framing a final assessment of the aforementioned transformation initiatives.

Are We Doing the Right Things?

IMCOM is not doing things right given that it altered SGO and shelved CLS. SGO and CLS were the foundation of standardized BASOPS, and since efficiencies are gained through standardizations, these concepts need to be re-energized and held true to their basic premise. CLS standards will then need to be revalidated to ensure the level of support is adequate and does not exceed average U.S. norms. There needs to be a point in time when CLS will drive all BASOPS expectations, with garrison commanders no longer yielding to senior commanders’ requests (even though they are in their direct rating chain). Tenant-funded support above CLS, if not approved by the
Secretary of the Army, will be pulled from their budget baselines and offered up as cost savings for DOD. The importance of IMCOM in its fiscal stewardship of Army resources will escalate as it becomes the junk yard dog of safeguarding installation funding.

Are We Doing Things Right?

Again, the answer is no. After careful review of region relevance, budget and manpower data, region design (geographical alignment and proximity), and organizational hierarchies, it appears a shift in chain-of-command and region dissolution may cripple IMCOM. The right thing to do would be what IMR-TF proposes and that is to rethink further reductions of CONUS regions and undertake additional analysis to determine IF any efficiency can be gained through this undertaking. Another action that makes no sense is the dissection and transfer of BASOPS functions from IMCOM to other commands (like information technology to NETCOM). This includes the planned transfer of the logistics functions to AMC. Currently public works and logistics personnel share vehicles, equipment/tools, and administrative staff. If the split were made, the U.S. Army is expected to fund for a separate set of resources to support the newly stood-up logistics function under AMC. Consequently, instead of creating efficiencies we are creating redundancies.

The U.S. Army needs a sole source BASOPS provider for U.S. Army installations – a one stop shop if you will. By harnessing various BASOPS functions under the C2 of one organization (IMCOM) it can consolidate contracts, advertise and implement best business practices worldwide, provide centralized oversight of military construction projects, act as the single conduit for installation tenants on all BASOPS issues, and initiate the most effective use of other Army programs and processes. Through these
consolidation efforts, scales of efficiencies will be realized resulting in further cost savings.

**What are We Missing?**

The answer is simple. We are missing opportunities to seek cost avoidance and savings in other avenues. One such opportunity is to uncover tenant shadow workforces and assimilate them into IMCOM garrisons. An example is the quasi-BASOPS staff found at the Army Research Laboratory (ARL) located at Adelphi Laboratory Center, Maryland. ARL has been known to keep its own logistics, information technology, public affairs, and other BASOPS-type personnel that should be under the C2 of the garrison. The assimilation of personnel would again create scales of efficiencies resulting in reduced expenditures.

Then there are functions that IMCOM should no longer be performing because they are redundant, or that force the command to supplement with funds from other programs. Take for instance the running of libraries at installations in townships, counties, or cities that already have their own libraries. Is it fiscally responsible to maintain these facilities on an installation when a resident can easily obtain a local library card? Then there is the re-opening of various Family, Morale, Welfare and Recreation clubs throughout the world, many of which were previously closed because their expenses exceeded their revenue and thus needed to be supplemented with other money-making ventures (such as from golf courses). This can be problematic as non-appropriated funded program expenses include civilian pay, benefits and retirement. Therefore leadership needs to act accordingly – whether revamp the venue to gain an increased customer base or just say “no” to an arbitrary leadership desire/want.
Lastly, the defense budget request calls for additional base realignment and closure (BRAC) rounds. With the removal of two U.S. Army brigades from Europe as cost cutting measures, it is only practical to support the reduction of bases. As for base realignment, DOD may want to first monitor the results of the 2005 BRAC Act, as those initiatives were only just completed in September 2011, before suggesting further moves.

IMCOM Future

The intent of IMCOM and its centralized installation management was to improve and standardize operations and delivery of services to Army installation personnel and organizations. However, decisions and actions over time have eroded the functionality of IMCOM. This can, and should be, fixed. Now is the time when IMCOM will need to be the junk yard dog of installation management – when consolidation of services under one sole source provider is key to efficiencies in this constrained environment...when we have to start saying “no” to customer demands as control and standardization of services is tantamount to good resource stewardship. SGO and CLS must be brought back in their original forms and in full force. Various BASOPS functions will need to be reviewed for redundancy and potential cuts, and prescribed levels of service will need to be re-established. Shadow workforces need to be uncovered and assimilated into IMCOM to create additional scales of efficiencies. Another round of BRAC should also be considered. To do this, functional capability will need to be restored at the regional level for strong lines of oversight, direction, communication, training, and mentorship. Regional relevance is at a critical stage in the livelihood of IMCOM; if you maintain their reduced status or deactivate them altogether, an already streamlined flat IMCOM could very well mean a flat-lined IMCOM.
Endnotes


13 From this point forward, “CG” directed actions are during the timeframe of November 2, 2009 to November 17, 2011.


20 Information is based upon author’s personal experience working as a Senior Management Analyst, Manpower Chief, Senior Region Installation Support Specialist, and Region Installation Support Team Chief for the U.S. Army Installation Management Command-Northeast Region, from November 2006 to July 2011.


22 Laurie Gibson, “Direct Reporting Garrisons VTC,” Executive Summary, Fort Sam Houston, TX, August 10, 2011, 1.

23 Ibid.


25 Ibid.

26 Laurie Gibson, “Direct Reporting Garrisons VTC,” Executive Summary, Fort Sam Houston, TX, August 10, 2011, 1.


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