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NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE

JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL



A CALL FOR NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM TRANSFORMATION

by

Michael Allen Brown

Lieutenant Colonel, United States Marine Corps Reserve

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.


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
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ABSTRACT

Throughout U.S history, change has been a constant aspect of its development. As the success story for democracy continues to unfold, the United States has identified reasons for institutional change that transforms the way the government functions. Sometimes change is embraced, while other times it is shunned.

In the national security structure, it is the author's view that an authority above the Cabinet level, yet below the President, is required to direct the planning, coordination and implementation of Presidential policy decisions between all federal government departments to integrate the interagency in support of the U.S. National Security Strategy. This authority once emplaced and empowered, would lead planning, coordination and implementation efforts ensuring an integrated interagency approach from across all respective government agencies. This entity would serve as the output mechanism for the nation's national security system balancing it against the current system's input mechanisms.

This thesis conducts an exploration of the subject: a historical review of key governmental organizational changes was conducted, current national security system and structure was analyzed, strategic guidance emanating from the interagency was reviewed, and recent operational examples of successes and failures were analyzed. This led to identifying the nexus within our national security structure requiring a transformation. Given the dramatic changes to the strategic environment, including new threats, fiscal constraints and global interdependence, protecting our national interests going forward requires a new approach and it starts with a transformation of our national security system structure.

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INTRODUCTION

SETTING THE STAGE

Interagency and the National Security System

Overview

Throughout U. S. history, change has been a constant aspect of its development. As the success story for democracy continues to unfold, the United States has identified reasons for institutional change that transforms the way the government functions. Sometimes change is embraced, while other times it is shunned. Identified needs for change are led through governmental processes with focused engagement until change is invoked or sequestered. The United States has been waging a war on terrorism since the horrific attacks on September 11, 2001, and has identified many facets of government requiring change from that time to the present. One such facet requiring change is the way the interagency is used to implement the National Security Strategy (NSS) and Presidential policy. An integrated interagency approach is required to achieve success, which depends “upon the effective use and integration of different elements of American power.”¹ These elements of American power are represented by the interagency.²

The current national security system and structure is where the interagency obtains its direction. With its organizational hierarchy of committees and sub-committees, requirements of the interagency are levied, vetted and prioritized to support the NSS and Presidential policy decisions. In the national security structure, it is the

¹ U.S. President, *National Security Strategy* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, May 2010), 11.

² The context of “interagency” is the governmental departments and agencies that make up the President’s Cabinet to include its subordinate elements. In some contexts, the interagency can be expanded to include non-government organizations and other entities required to support interagency efforts.

author's view that an authority above the Cabinet level, yet below the President, is required to direct the planning, coordination and implementation of Presidential policy decisions between all federal government departments to vertically and horizontally integrate the interagency in support of the U.S. NSS. This authority, once emplaced and empowered, would lead planning, coordination and implementation efforts across a broad spectrum of requirements ensuring an integrated interagency approach across all respective government agencies.³ This is where change must occur to transform our national security system.

In order to arrive at this end, a review of past governmental changes that created and formed our national security system and structure is required. This will show that the U. S. government can significantly transform how it functions to better meet new and existing challenges in an ever changing strategic environment. Secondly, an analysis of the current national security system and structure will identify its strengths and weaknesses in achieving or not achieving an integrated interagency approach. Third, reviewing and analyzing the strategic guidance that emanates from the interagency will demonstrate that the interagency itself knows that integration is needed in order for it to be successful individually and holistically. Each department provides guidance on ways to achieve synergy and integration with other departments. Lastly, examining recent successes and failures within the interagency, using military operations as examples will identify the nexus where the national security structure changes can be focused.

We have been successful in the past using the current national security system, but given the dramatic changes to the strategic environment, including new threats, fiscal

³ "Interagency approach" is meant to identify the means by which the interagency creates unified action and purpose in the pursuit and achievement of national security strategic objectives.

constraints and global interdependence, protecting our national interests going forward requires a new approach. As the nature of how the U.S. secures its vital interests changes, a requirement to efficiently and effectively use all elements of national power promulgates changes at the highest level facilitating a top-down approach to interagency integration.

The range of operations in which the interagency operates to achieve strategic objectives is vast. From counterinsurgency to humanitarian assistance, security cooperation to disaster relief; and from counterterrorism on our borders and abroad to foreign aid, the interagency lives and breathes in all governmental operations. Enacting this transformational change will ensure synchronization across the government agencies with a newfound accountability in supporting the NSS and effectively improving our ability to harness the elements of national power in that effort.

CHAPTER ONE

Historical Perspective on National Security

Post World War II to Present

National Security Act (NSA) of 1947

After World War II, the United States entered into a new realm in the international community. Once content with focusing on the internal matters of the nation, the United States was now thrust into the forefront of international matters. This newfound position brought on a newfound sense of responsibility as well. The U. S. leadership realized it needed to take a formal, in-depth look at national security, organize government structure accordingly, and provide resources to ensure national security matters were appropriately identified and addressed. Between this newfound responsibility and the state of international affairs in which the United States would take a leading role, the National Security Act of 1947 was enacted to “provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States.”¹ With this Act, Congress created a formal national security structure under the belief that the structure could provide better coordinated policy-making using the vast experience represented throughout the interagency leading to improved intelligence and clear policy.² Events following World War II made this change necessary to ensure U.S. national security concerns were properly vetted to the President for consideration in forming policy decisions. Upon ratification of the Act, the changes contained therein were put in place to facilitate the new approach to national security.

¹ United States Congress, *National Security Act of 1947* (Public Law 253, 80th Congress, July 26, 1947 (61 Stat. 496)) as Amended through August 3, 2007, (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, August 2007), 3.

² Alan G. Whittaker, Frederick C. Smith, Elizabeth McKune, and Industrial College of the Armed Forces, *The National Security Policy Process, the National Security Council and Interagency System* (Washington DC: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 2010), 7.

Changes resulting from NSA of 1947

The first significant change resulting from the Act was the forming of the National Security Council (NSC). The function of the Council was to “advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military Services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.”³ The original focus was on government cooperation with the military being the center of that focus, while the output of the Council was to provide advice to the President after considerations from the military and other governmental departments.

Secondly, the Act created the office of the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) to facilitate the military aspect of national security considerations. The SecDef was an advisory role to the President. While providing oversight of the military Services, there was no authority vested in the SecDef to direct any military Service action. The civilian SecDef would also provide supervision of the military Services budget process.

Additionally, it gave statutory authority to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which had been functioning throughout the period of war. It also established the Air Force as a separate Service with equal authority and status within the departmental structure as the Navy and Army had long enjoyed. Finally, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was a product of the Act and played an integral part in developing the national security strategy.

These changes transformed the National Military Establishment (NME) and initiated a broader national security transformation with the NSC as the conduit to advise

³ United States Congress, *National Security Act of 1947*, 3.

the President on all matters pertaining to national security, while facilitating interagency cooperation to meet that advisory capacity. The Act designated the Secretaries of Defense and State and the three Service Secretaries as permanent members of the NSC.⁴ With a somewhat contested unification of the NME and using the NSC as a fulcrum for implementation, President Truman laid the foundation for a national security organization and structure that would stand for nearly 40 years with only periodic changes. It did not take long for the key actors within this new national security framework to realize where changes were needed for success to be more readily achieved, and the first changes occurred in 1949.

1949 Amendments to the NSA of 1947

Within the first two years of implementing the NSA of 1947, the key leaders and legislators realized the need to make additional fundamental changes in order to achieve the desired effects of the Act. Most knew that “the effort to establish unified direction, authority, and control over the armed forces” would cause the most challenge, consternation and controversy.⁵ This unification was born out of relationship issues between the Services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Needing simplicity in providing advice to the President on military matters pertaining to national security, the Secretary of Defense’s role was elevated from a simple advisor to the President to a full Cabinet-level Secretary. The SecDef would now exercise authority, control and direction over the individual Services as the “nebulous National Military Establishment was

⁴ Douglas Stewart, “Constructing the Iron Cage: The 1947 National Security Act,” In *Affairs of State: The Interagency and National Security* (Carlisle, PA: U. S. Army War College, 2008), 73.

⁵ Steve Rearden, *The Formative Years 1947-1950, Vol I*, ed. Alfred Goldberg (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1984), 16.

converted to the Department of Defense.”⁶ This change was met with significant resistance but implemented, nonetheless, with positive impacts within the national security framework.

In conjunction with this change, the amendment of 1949 established the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) as a formal position presiding over the military Services. This newly appointed role gave the President another senior advisor representing the uniformed perspective. Couple this with the SecDef’s new Cabinet-level role, and the President had a broader military perspective on national security strategy matters. “The real significance of the amended law was the removal of impediments that experience over the first two years had demonstrated to be obstacles to unification” and the military was now positioned to play a pivotal role in the formulation and implementation of national security strategy.⁷ With amendments completed in relatively short order, the Department of Defense (DOD) had a foundation upon which to build strategic insight into the national security structure.

As the DOD matured and the range of military operations expanded through the Korean War, Vietnam War and Cold War, unification of the military Services under a single department also led to operational transformation. Although this transformation was not without friction between the Services, the lines of operation were no longer executed solely along traditional service lines; rather, the Services operated with one another to accomplish strategic and operational objectives. This was facilitated by using specified and unified combatant commands led by their respective designated geographic combatant commander (GCC). These new lines of operation were somewhat blurred and

⁶ Robert J. Donovan, *The Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1949-53* (New York, Horton, 1982), 63.

⁷ Rearden, *The Formative Years*, 55.

the next chapter in the DOD story would be transformation to a clearer joint capability allowing the military Services to better serve the needs of the joint force commanders working for the GCC. This transformation would be spawned into motion by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.

Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 (GNA) was legislation (1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act) born out of dissatisfaction by congressional leaders who saw a lack of unified direction and action from the military. The GNA sought to achieve a clearer picture of relationships between the key components of the Defense establishment, particularly the leaders of each. This included the SecDef, Service Secretaries, the JCS and its chairman, along with Commanders-in-Chiefs (CINCs)⁸, military service components and the Service Chiefs.⁹ The Service culture had not been penetrated deep enough by “unification” instituted by the NSA of 1947. The GNA reorganized the DOD both administratively and operationally and sought to achieve a balanced approach for organization, resource management and strategic planning and execution. In summary the GNA was originated in order to:

- (1) Reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian authority within the Department;
- (2) Improve the military advice provided to the president, the NSC, and the Secretary of Defense;
- (3) Place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands;
- (4) Ensure that the authority of the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands is fully commensurate with the responsibility of those commanders for the accomplishment of missions assigned to their commands;
- (5) Increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning;
- (6) Provide for more efficient use of defense resources;
- (7) Improve joint officer management policies; and

⁸ CINCs are now called Combatant Commanders (CCDR).

⁹ Douglas C. Lovelace, *Unification of the United States Armed Forces: Implementing the 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1996), 15.

(8) Enhance otherwise the effectiveness of military operations and improve the management and administration of the Department of Defense.¹⁰

In effect, this aligned DOD functions to organize, train, equip and operate as a joint force across strategic and operational requirements. The intended result was integrated coordination across the military Services to better support national security strategy. This transformation would occur at a slow pace from enactment to the present, achieving joint capability only after significant changes occurred throughout the DOD. Since the GNA, there have been periodic national reevaluations of the military and DOD leading to further adjustments within the institution.

Beyond the DOD, the act mandated action “to improve strategy formulation at both the NCA [National Command Authority] and CJCS levels.”¹¹ In effect, it levied upon the President a requirement for a national security strategy report, and what is now known as the National Security Strategy (NSS) was born. The NSS would contain a comprehensive description and discussion of the following:

- (1) The worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital to the national security of the United States.
- (2) The foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities of the United States necessary to deter aggression and to implement the national security strategy of the United States.
- (3) The proposed short-term and long-term uses of the political, economic, military, and other elements of the national power of the United States to protect or promote the interests and achieve the goals and objectives referred to in paragraph (1).
- (4) The adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to carry out the national security strategy of the United States, including an evaluation of the balance among the capabilities of all elements of the national power of the United States to support the implementation of the national security strategy.
- (5) Such other information as may be necessary to help inform Congress on matters relating to the national security strategy of the United States.¹²

¹⁰ United States Congress, *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986* (Public Law 99-433, 99th Congress, October 1, 1986 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, October, 1986), 7.

¹¹ Lovelace, *Unification of the United States Armed Forces*, 35.

¹² Cornell University, “U.S. Code,” Cornell University Law School, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode50/usc_sup_01_50.html (accessed 7 December 2011).

This requirement and the specific language it used hinted at the need for interagency synchronization when requiring an evaluation “of all elements of national power.” These instruments of national power have since been defined as diplomatic, information, military and economic and are used as tools to implement national strategic objectives.¹³ However, since the DOD was the primary conduit historically for national security strategy issues, this requirement was mostly disregarded by other Cabinet leaders and DOD took the lead in drafting and proposing national security strategy.

Post GNA National Security Change

In government bureaucracy, change never comes without much deliberation, debate and posturing. Inevitably, change occurs over time as institutional culture must be swayed to embrace change. As in the case of the DOD transformation, the pace of change may seem “tedious and contentious, but completely in line with the national tradition of deliberate government changes characterized by checks and balances.”¹⁴ Since the GNA of 1986, the national security apparatus has undergone change as well.

One of the early changes was incorporated into the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. After a push for “jointness” of the military, all government departments came under scrutiny based on widespread belief of inefficiency. One requirement of the act was for all agencies to provide “a description of how the agency is working with other agencies to achieve its goals and objectives”¹⁵ and was a subtle catalyst identifying the need for departments and agencies to coordinate with one another. This act brought to the forefront the presumption that interagency coordination was

¹³ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 20 March 2009), I-8.

¹⁴ Cynthia Watson, *Combatant Commands: Origin, Structure and Engagements* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2011), 7.

¹⁵ *Government Performance and Results Act of 1993*, U.S. Code 5, Ch. 3, Sec. 306.

required for governmental agencies to efficiently achieve their stated goals and objectives while supporting NSS objectives. No agency could function without interagency efforts incorporated into their strategy implementation construct. This led to the various Cabinet leaders taking a hard look at their departmental strategies to ensure they were in step with the NSS. However, as seems common with any bureaucratic environment, change was a long time coming and as the 1990s came to a close, little progress was made to integrate interagency efforts. Sometimes in order for change to occur, there must be a horrific catalyst. Unfortunately for the United States, that catalyst arrived in the form of the terrorist attacks on U.S. soil on September 11, 2001.

The tragic events that unfolded on 9/11 forced change in our national security posture and perspective. It forced a revamping of our intelligence community and how intelligence is shared. More importantly, the attacks created a requirement to ensure security within our borders. This requirement led to one of the most notable changes in our national security structure since the 1947 NSA: the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). DHS was created by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and in effect took twenty-two federal agencies and rolled them into one. Among the agencies placed under the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) were the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the United States Coast Guard, the Customs Service, and the United States Secret Service.¹⁶ This led to a significant transformation in our national security structure as this new Cabinet member brought an added perspective to national

¹⁶ Department of Homeland Security, "Brief Documentary History of the Department of Homeland Security 2001-2008," Department of Homeland Security, History Office, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/brief_documentary_history_of_dhs_2001_2008.pdf (accessed November 14, 2011).

security matters. The fact the DHS was created from existing agencies made it an interagency phenomenon, demonstrated the importance of an interagency outlook within the national security system, and set precedence for further needed changes.

Summary

Transformation within the U. S. Government can occur across any of its many facets. Identification of required change, actions to nurture change, and institutional cultures embracing change make transformation possible. As evident in the nation's recent history since World War II, transformation is a natural part of our landscape. The U. S. position in the global landscape has required transformation and reform to maintain its national security posture and secure its vital interests. From the NSA of 1947 and its amendments; through the GNA of 1986 and its transformational nature; to the present change after 9/11, the United States has been continually challenged to change its national security structure to harness more aptly the instruments of national power in a constantly changing strategic environment. History has demonstrated that when the environment changes, the United States has transformed itself to meet the challenges that arise. In the nature of the current global environment, the United States is compelled towards the next evolutionary change to meet the national security challenges of today and position itself for the future. The national security system is where the next transformation should be considered.

CHAPTER TWO

The National Security System

“Those who wish to understand the operations of the NSC and its NSS staff must recognize that regardless of organizational charts or procedural memos produced by each administration, the actual processes are shaped by what the POTUS [President of the United States] wants; the authorities he delegates to the various principals, staffs, and organizations; and how his staff conducts its business according to their judgments about what the President most needs in terms of policy development, implementation and decision support.”¹

Overview

In order for the President to receive appropriate advice and counsel on matters pertaining to national security strategy and policy, an appropriate supporting architecture—a national security system—is required. The current national security system is comprised of the National Security Council (NSC), Principals Committee, Deputies Committee, Interagency Policy Committee and the NSC staff. Additionally, the NSC statutory members are key elements of this system along with other subordinate committees addressing more specific matters appropriate for their level in the hierarchy.

From within the national security system, strategic guidance is developed to drive implementation of national security strategy and policy throughout the government departments. The national security system takes a vertical approach to national security strategy and policy development by providing policy input and recommendations up to the President for national security decisions. This chapter will discuss the current national security system, its mission, organization and functions and identify how the key elements of the system interact.

¹ Alan G. Whittaker, Shannon A. Brown, Frederick C. Smith, and Ambassador Elizabeth McKune, *The National Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and Interagency Process* (Washington DC: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, 2011), 12.

National Security Council

The NSC was established to provide advice and counsel to the President from across the government departments in the formulation of policies impacting national security to enable better cooperation between federal government agencies. With this mission, the NSC became the structural foundation and hub for national security strategy formulation. The statutory members are the President, Vice President, Secretaries of State, Defense and Energy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of National Intelligence. Other Cabinet Secretaries and special staff may attend whenever invited, when the agenda requires their participation, or if defined by a Presidential policy directive. While the NSC was statutorily created, the “President has great latitude in deciding how he will employ the Council to meet his particular needs” and “can use the Council as little, or as much, as he wishes.”² This has led the NSC to undergo numerous changes and nuances over the years to meet an individual President’s needs and mold to their personality. The NSC, in this construct, is a fluid entity changing from President to President depending on organizational and procedural changes directed when a new President assumes office. This gives the President a broad spectrum to employ and use the NSC in strategy development. Since its inception in 1947, the NSC has undergone refinements but has become the “vertically structured decision making system” first envisioned by its creators.³

² Karl F. Inderfurth and Loch K. Johnson, *Fateful Decisions: Inside the National Security Council* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 57.

³ Douglas Stewart, “Constructing the Iron Cage: The 1947 National Security Act,” In *Affairs of State: The Interagency and National Security* (Carlisle, PA: U. S. Army War College, 2008), 82.

This organizational makeup drives the NSC to adapt to the personality and perspective of the current President of the United States. It is designed, as indicated earlier, to function in a vertical manner, whereby the NSC provides advice and recommendations up to the President for decisions which reside in his authoritative capacity only. Over the past few Presidents, the employ of the NSC has seen vastly different uses. President Carter “found less reason to assemble his council than anyone since Harry Truman.”⁴ Conversely, President George H.W. Bush established an NSC considered “highly personalized” and “characterized by informality at the top” and meeting frequently in the early years of the administration and less so as the term progressed.⁵ Additionally, Bush established a Principals Committee and Deputies Committee after issuing his initial National Security Directive (NSD), creating a hierarchy that met his individual needs in this capacity. President Clinton adopted this construct and this structure remains in place today and provides the basis for policy decision making by the President both in a deliberate manner and in crisis.

As the NSC functions as the fulcrum for national security strategy development, it comes with its own limitations and challenges. One limitation is its vertical approach to national security strategy and policy. The NSC “plays a key role in the integration of all instruments of national power by facilitating mutual understanding and cooperation and is responsible for overseeing the interagency planning efforts.”⁶ This identifies the NSC’s role of planning across the interagency, but not implementation. Due to the NSC’s vertical approach to provide policy recommendation input, a corresponding

⁴ John Prados, *Keepers of the Keys* (New York: William and Morrow Company, 1991), 426.

⁵ Inderfuth and Johnson, *Fateful Decisions*, 98.

⁶ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, August, 11, 2011), II-8.

corollary for horizontal implementation does not exist to address the output once policy is decided upon by the President. This vertical approach to national security, coupled with the constant change that occurs as Presidents change, leaves the NSC without structure to direct an integrated interagency approach to implement policy decisions. The worth of the NSC “lies in being in an accustomed place where the President can join his chief advisers in searching examination and debate of the ‘great choices’ of national security policy.”⁷ This placement in the national security system has relegated the NSC’s role to a vertically-focused, policy recommending body only. This does not give the NSC the ability to direct policy implementation through an integrated interagency. The NSC is further challenged by the role the Secretaries play in this vertically focused policy recommendation construct. The Secretaries are part of the NSC “by virtue of their official positions in the Administration . . . they sit not as cabinet secretaries but as advisors to the President.”⁸ In this role, they provide vertical advice to the policy making apparatus without an equalizing function within the national security system to ensure the required policy implementation takes place once policy is set forth. As the NSC is vertically focused for policy recommendations, there is not an equal entity that is horizontally focused for policy implementation directing an integrated interagency.

National Security Organization and Functions

Within the national security system hierarchy, subordinate to the NSC is the Principals Committee (PC). This committee was originally established by President George H.W. Bush with the intent to “clarify issues and positions among the principals

⁷ Douglas T. Stuart, *Creating the National Security State* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 255.

⁸Inderfurth and Johnson, *Fateful Decisions*, 342.

before the issues were taken to the President.”⁹ Primarily created to save decision making time, this Committee remains in place today and functions in a similar capacity. By design, it exists to provide policy recommendations to the President after collaboration amongst the Principals. However, there is not a similar body that takes the policy decision and integrates implementation across the interagency. Additionally, as the Committee is often times chaired by the national security adviser, a Presidential appointee vice statutory position, any decisions made by the PC must be vetted to the President for final authoritative decision.¹⁰ This turns the PC into an administrative body unless it is chaired by the President with whom decision making authority rests.

Subordinate to the PC is the Deputies Committee (DC). The DC was created by President George H.W. Bush at the same time as the Principals Committee and was to function as “the senior sub-Cabinet interagency forum that would review, monitor, and make recommendations regarding the development and implementation of the NSC interagency process.”¹¹ Since that time, all successors to the presidency have kept this committee in place, although variations of its use followed each. The DC has been the “interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security” as well as ensuring “issues being brought before the NSC/PC or the NSC have been properly analyzed and prepared for decision.”¹² This forum allows Deputy Secretaries to work the details for policy recommendations to be forwarded up the chain of command to the PC and onward to the NSC and the President. In this manner, recommendations moving up

⁹ George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 31.

¹⁰ Whittaker, Brown, Smith, and McKune, *The National Security Policy Process*, 14.

¹¹ Cody M. Brown, *The National Security Council: A Legal History of the President’s Most Powerful National Security Advisers* (Washington DC: Project on National Security Reform, 2008), 58.

¹² Inderfurth and Johnson, *Fateful Decisions*, 126.

the chain of command may or may not receive the attention of the ultimate decision making authority, as the President decides if and when he chairs a meeting of the NSC. The DC may be a catalyst for interagency collaboration for policy input, but it is vertically focused and not designed to integrate implementing policy decisions across the interagency.

The Interagency Policy Committees (IPC) are the final piece of the NSC organizational structure. Their purpose is to analyze policy issues and develop policy options with recommendations that provide policy-makers with flexibility and a range of politically acceptable options that represent applicable governmental departments.¹³ Originally termed as the Policy Coordination Committee, then changed in name by President Obama, the IPCs are the workhorse at the lowest level within the formal NSC structure. It is at the IPC level that various agencies and departments articulate their respective positions and attempt to influence the policy recommendations that move upward for decision. This could be considered the action officer level of interagency coordination. It is designed and focused on vertical policy recommendations vice policy implementation. The IPCs have no statutory or executive authority other than to make recommendations on policy.

Beyond the NSC, PC, DC and IPCs, the last element of the national security system is the NSC Staff. The National Security Staff is the element which administers the daily requirements of the NSC. The prevailing functions it executes are the administration of policy coordination and integration, policy supervision, policy

¹³Whittaker, Brown, Smith, and McKune, *The National Security Policy Process*, 34.

adjudication, crisis management, policy formulation and policy advocacy.¹⁴ The NSC staff is led by the National Security Advisor and is the gatekeeper of information that flows to the President for national security decision making. The NSC staff has significant influence over what does or does not reach the President, to include the submission timing of any issues. The NSC Staff's role and position provides "powerful avenues available to influence the NSC and presidential decisions" and therefore is a pivotal actor within the national security system.¹⁵ However, the NSC Staff's capability is the bare necessity to work issues directly in support of the President and the NSC and "the staff is consumed by meetings on day-to-day issues . . . and trying to coordinate everyday operations"¹⁶ and could not therefore generate capacity to administer policy implementation for an integrated interagency approach. The NSC Staff has historically been kept relatively small ranging from as few as a dozen to just a little over 100. This bare bones capacity within the NSC Staff precludes it from administering policy implementation in addition to its current requirements.

Summary

The national security system comprised of the NSC, its subordinate committees, the National Security Staff and the National Security Advisor provides the President with an apparatus that gives advice, provides assessment, reviews strategic interests and makes policy recommendations. However, the NSC limitations to implement an integrated

¹⁴ Ibid, pg 28.

¹⁵ Christopher C. Shoemaker, *Structure, Function and the NSC Staff: An Officer's Guide to the National Security Council* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1989), 18.

¹⁶ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *The 9-11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004), 402.

interagency approach after Presidential national security decisions lies in its vertical focus, imbalance between policy input and output mechanisms, limited staff manning and potential for change between administrations.

First, the NSC structure facilitates a vertical process for policy decisions without a requisite capability for integrated horizontal implementation. What horizontal collaboration that does take place occurs at lower levels between Secretaries and through their Deputies. The current system provides for collaborative interagency advice and counsel *up* to the President via the committees, but not designed to ensure subsequent policy is implemented with the same interagency integration *down* and across the governmental departments.

Secondly, the policy implementation mechanisms necessary to ensure an integrated interagency approach do not exist within the national security structure. The system is unbalanced between the input mechanisms providing for national security recommendations and the output mechanisms for policy implementation. Input mechanisms available for use far outweigh the output mechanisms for policy implementation.

Third, the National Security Staff is resourced at levels allowing it to only manage the upward policy requirements/recommendations to the President. As currently organized, there is no authoritative body within the national security system which directs the necessary actions to ensure policy implementation. The National Security Staff has minimal staffing capacity to take on policy implementation administration tasks and policy implementation is left to the Cabinet Secretaries.

Finally, the ad/hoc nature of the national security system driven by Presidential personality and desires promotes suboptimal efficiency and effectiveness. As indicated earlier, each President has the latitude to employ the NSC as they deem appropriate. This facilitates a culture of inconsistent process within the national security system. Potentially, every four years the NSC could be employed in a vastly different manner while the rest of the government institution remains relatively stable. This causes the interagency to be in a reactive state to national security system changes that occur when administrations change.

CHAPTER THREE

Strategic Guidance Products

Overview

The national security system allows the President to have the advice and counsel necessary to make critical policy decisions and to publish the nation's National Security Strategy (NSS). Nested to the NSS are the various Cabinet-level strategies that direct the strategic and operational actions for the respective departments. This nesting of strategic guidance provides the framework by which national security strategy is put into action with objectives that support the United States' national interests. The significant actors within this framework are the Department of Defense (DOD), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Department of State (DOS), and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Within each individual department's strategic document, the call for interagency integration and collaboration is prevalent. The documents identify interagency coordination as a key ingredient to successful achievement of department goals and objectives. This strategic guidance approach within the U.S.' executive branch of government commences with the publishing of the President's NSS.

National Security Strategy

The NSS, as indicated in Chapter 1, meets the statutory requirement for the President to outline the national security concerns and how his administration plans to use the instruments of national power to address them.¹ The NSS is the strategic direction for our nation's governmental leaders to embrace and implement within their sphere of authority. From the NSS, the various government departments develop their

¹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, August, 11, 2011), xi-xii.

supporting guidance and provide direction to their respective organizations. The President identifies that to “craft and implement a sustainable, results-oriented national security strategy, there must be effective cooperation between branches of the government” and that “collaboration across the government . . . must guide our actions.”² Words are important and the use of the phrase “craft and implement” infers interagency involvement in the formulation and implementation of national security strategy and requires “collaboration” amongst all agencies. The President makes it clear in his strategy the importance of a whole-of-government approach and, similarly, subordinate strategies emphasize the same. In theory, this allows the President to put forth a strategy with advice from the Secretaries and other principal advisors. The result should be an executive branch presenting “integrated plans and approaches that leverage capabilities across its departments and agencies to deal with the issues”³ with success being determined by collaborative and synchronized implementation.

The National Security Council (NSC) promulgates recommendations for the NSS and the President is the final authority for its publication. Upon publication, the NSS allows subordinate departments to take the NSS strategic direction and develop departmental strategies. Within each department’s strategy, the call for interagency collaboration in order to achieve strategic objectives supporting the NSS is prevalent throughout. The DOD produces the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) to meet the statutory requirements levied on it by Congress to provide a review of defense capabilities and the strategy for the future.

² U.S. President, *National Security Strategy* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, May 2011), 51.

³ *Ibid*, pg. 51.

Quadrennial Defense Review

The QDR summarizes the Defense strategy and provides an overarching direction for the DOD. The Secretary of Defense (SecDef) begins his endorsement by stating the QDR brings into focus the “importance of preventing and deterring conflict by working with and through allies and partners, along with better integration with civilian agencies and organizations,”⁴ implying the interagency. As the document progresses, there are additional references to the importance of interagency integration. When the QDR refers to America’s global role within the international system and our national interests, it states “the United States will advance these interests by strengthening our domestic foundation and integrating all elements of national power”⁵ referring to diplomatic, information, military and economic instruments. The QDR addresses the need for interagency when defining one of the DOD key strategic objectives of preventing and deterring conflict. It reads, “Preventing the rise of threats to U.S. interests requires the integrated use of diplomacy, development, and defense, along with intelligence, law enforcement, and economic tools of statecraft”⁶ referring to multiple agency partners.

In the above context, diplomacy and development is the State Department, law enforcement is the Department of Justice, intelligence refers to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other intelligence agencies, and economic is the U.S. Treasury Department. This identifies the importance of interagency integration for the DOD to successfully operate in the strategic environment. Throughout the QDR, references to the interagency are made, referred or implied.

⁴ United States Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 2010), i.

⁵ Ibid, pg iv.

⁶ Ibid, pg v.

The importance of interagency integration highlighted by the QDR drives home the point that DOD success in the pursuit of strategic objectives has a dependence on the interagency. This aspect is emphasized when the CJCS provides his QDR assessment and states his full support of “the QDR’s increased emphasis on the important roles of our interagency and international partners in achieving our desired endstates” while also pointing out that the DOD must come to a better understanding of all interagency elements.⁷ In writing as such, both the SecDef and the CJCS note the requirement for interagency integration. The CJCS writes his recommendations to the Armed Forces through the National Military Strategy (NMS) and presents his strategic guidance emphasizing the means by which the military Services will execute. In theory, the NMS is nested to the NSS and synchronized with the QDR to provide appropriate strategic guidance to the Armed Forces.

National Military Strategy

The CJCS publishes the NMS to fulfill part of his statutory role as the senior uniformed military advisor to the President by providing guidance and direction to the military Services. The NMS guides and directs the Armed Forces in their endeavor to provide for the defense and security of the nation. “The NMS defines the national military objectives (i.e., ends), how to accomplish these objectives (i.e., ways), and addresses the military capabilities required to execute the strategy (i.e., means).”⁸ The NMS is nested in the strategic goals of the NSS and provides guidance from the CJCS to the Services on the manner in which they will execute actions in support of the NSS. The

⁷ Ibid, pg 104.

⁸U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, August, 11, 2011), p. xiii.

NMS addresses the strategic environment in which the military will operate and the threats therein. It provides linkages between stated objectives of the NSS and QDR.

Peppered throughout the NMS are references to the interagency. Within the preface of the document, the Chairman states that “military power is most effective when employed in support of and in concert with other elements of power as a part of a ‘whole-of-nation approach’ identifying the need for interagency collaboration and coordination.”⁹ When discussing the military’s role in securing our nation’s enduring national interests, the Chairman points out that military power alone is not enough to accomplish our strategic objectives given the myriad of complex security challenges that exist in today’s environment, acknowledging the need for an interagency approach. The NMS abounds with comment, perspective and direction of the military to pursue and achieve interagency coordination. The CJCS knows and understands that within the strategic environment in which the military will operate the Services need to “be increasingly interoperable with other U.S. government agencies,”¹⁰ requiring a significant change in mindset and strategic approach from the military.

The CJCS recognizes that the DOD culture is deep rooted and the military has been the lead agent for national security since post-World War II. This deep rooted culture will require a new perspective to operate in the current and future strategic environment and that perspective must be through an interagency lens. The military Services have gone through a transformation since the Goldwater-Nichols Act, becoming more joint in their organization and function. However, “interagency cooperation between federal departments has superseded the ‘jointness,’ or cooperation among the

⁹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The National Military Strategy of the United States*, preface.

¹⁰ Ibid, pg 18.

military Services, as the key management challenge in national security”¹¹ and interagency integration is the next step. To that end, other agencies outside the military establishment have recognized the need to provide strategic vision to their organizations. The DOS has done this by publishing the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), its first strategic vision nested with the NSS.

Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review

The QDDR strategy is directly tied into the NSS and seeks to achieve the national objectives through its diplomacy and development channels. The QDDR emphasizes the need for interagency integration and collaboration as it is the very lifeblood for successful diplomatic and developmental operations. The QDDR provides the strategic direction to Chiefs of Mission and/or Ambassadors. These leaders work within an interagency framework (the Embassy country team) to achieve strategic goals specific to their respective country and synchronized between department and agency objectives.

The QDDR is DOS’ strategic vision and almost immediately emphasizes the importance of the interagency. It points out how “irrigation specialists from the Department of Agriculture, public health professionals from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, experts in the rule of law from the Department of Justice, and more”¹² enter countries to operate while supporting U.S. national interests. The QDDR articulates the requirement to achieve parity between civilian power and military power and identifies the role all elements of the interagency play in diplomatic and development operations abroad.

¹¹ Thomas P.M. Barnett, *The Pentagon’s New Map* (New York: Berkley Books, 2004), 372.

¹² U.S. Department of State, *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), i.

The QDDR acknowledges the nuances the interagency holds, knowing “agencies and departments have their own mandates and objectives, which makes coordination all the more important”¹³ to fostering an integrated interagency approach. Therein lays the fulcrum that balances interagency integration, the ability to ensure implementation across the interagency focused on NSS strategic objectives despite individual department or agency mandates. The QDDR notes “the entire range of U.S. agencies work overseas, promoting U.S. interests and building relationships that facilitate cooperation”¹⁴ and that utilizing the various capabilities within each is paramount to efficiently using valuable resources to achieve national objectives.

In a broader context, the State Department understands the importance of partnership within the strategic environment in which it operates and includes interagency integration in that partnership. The QDDR articulates this interagency collaboration requirement throughout its pages and identifies that the twenty-first-century landscape demands it. The QDDR defines that “Department of State has an essential role to play in bringing about the coordination and coherence of the interagency in advancing U.S. foreign policy priorities abroad within a unified framework that makes the most of the federal government’s combined civilian power.”¹⁵ As previously stated, the DOS exercises this role through its Chief of Mission (COM) and Ambassador. Oftentimes they are one and the same.¹⁶

¹³ Ibid, pg v.

¹⁴ Ibid, pg 20.

¹⁵ Ibid, pg 27.

¹⁶ If a country does not have an Ambassador assigned, then a Chief of Mission is designated to lead the country team. By default, an Ambassador is also the COM, however the authorities vested in an Ambassador are significantly greater than that of a COM. The title Ambassador has the weight of the President behind it, whereas the COM does not.

An Ambassador or COM “directs and supervises all activities in country and coordinates the resources and programs of the U.S. government through the Country Team, with the exception of employees under the command of a United States area military commander and other exceptions consistent with existing statutes and authorities.”¹⁷ Herein lays the rub within the interagency. A divide is created between DOD, DOS and other federal agencies represented on the country team that can potentially hinder synchronized and integrated approaches to national security objectives within a country. The area military commander receives his direction from his chain of command and other agencies’ representatives on the country team likewise from theirs. Therefore, the Ambassador, as the President’s representative within a country, has a significant challenge in guiding their country team in a synchronized manner towards the achievement of U.S. national interests. The Ambassador does have, however, ample authority to direct and execute his responsibilities in this approach despite any ambiguity in the QDDR or directives from the President.

Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created shortly after devastating attacks on September 11, 2001. It was created in November of 2002 as a result of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. Its mission is to “prevent and deter terrorist attacks and protect against and respond to threats and hazards to the nation . . . and securing national borders while welcoming lawful immigrants, visitors and trade.”¹⁸ In order to do this, the department published a roadmap to guide its subordinate elements to

¹⁷ U.S. Department of State, *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 28-29.

¹⁸ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *One Team, One Mission: Securing our Homeland* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007), 3.

achieve strategic objectives. That document is the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report (QHSR) published in February 2010. This was the first QHSR and strategy published since the Department's inception and it was put together through interagency collaboration "to ensure that the QHSR represents the whole-of-government approach to national security envisioned"¹⁹ while providing the strategic framework for subordinate elements to follow. The DHS was created after aligning capabilities resident in over twenty separate government departments and agencies and therefore is inherently interagency by its composition. Its reliance on the interagency approach to perform its wide array of responsibilities is resonant within the QHSR.

DHS takes a holistic approach on its requirements by focused involvement with government and non-governmental organizations as well as public and private sector actors with common homeland security interests and responsibilities. DHS views its environment as an enterprise and the interagency a vital component. DHS strives to cooperatively engage challenges to meet desired strategic objectives and continues to navigate through the multi-faceted strategic environment in which it operates.

Recognizing the DHS role is not confined within the U.S. borders and that threats emanate from the international scene, the department emphasizes it "will advance these interests by strengthening our domestic foundation and integrating all elements of national power, engaging abroad"²⁰ to meet strategic objectives at home. Within the outline of strategic objectives, the need for interagency integration avails itself. The DHS recognizes that homeland security has a broad operational spectrum and to be successful across that spectrum requires an integrated approach with all of the various actors that

¹⁹ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 2010), iv.

²⁰ Ibid, pg 5.

share in homeland security responsibilities. In this operating environment, the need for interagency integration is paramount for success and the challenge remains to find a balance amongst the interagency partners while mitigating competing interests. Knowing this, the DHS identifies success as a direct corollary to its engagement within the enterprise it has defined, including the vital interagency component.

As the QHSR outlines the DHS mission goals, one is preventing terrorism and enhancing security. In this light, DHS recognizes that “the nature of the homeland security enterprise demands that these goals are executed in the context of extensive collaboration at every level of the homeland security enterprise.”²¹ When discussing securing the nation’s borders, the QSHR takes a three-pronged approach using air, land and sea capabilities. DHS emphasizes the approach “can only be achieved by cooperative efforts among Federal departments and agencies, our international partners, and global transnational private-sector partners to establish secure and resilient global trading, transportation, and transactional systems that facilitate the flow of lawful travel and commerce. This approach also depends on partnerships with Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial, and international law enforcement agencies to share information and conduct coordinated and integrated operations.”²²

Regardless of the mission goals within the responsibilities levied on the DHS, interagency integration plays a pivotal role. A collaborative and integrated interagency working environment enables DHS to harness the capabilities resident within its 20 various subordinate agencies and bring them to bear to achieve national security strategic goals in support of U.S. vital interests. The nature of the DHS mission necessitates that

²¹ Ibid, pg 22.

²² Ibid, pg 25.

this type environment stretch across and into associated departments and agencies U.S. government-wide. The critical fulcrum is achieving a balance between DHS strategy and other government agency strategies to allow convergence on common objectives with functional capabilities resident within the interagency architecture.

Summary

Each respective department's strategy highlights the importance of interagency collaboration and integration. Throughout the government departments, the interagency is a stated key component for success in achieving strategic goals and objectives. There is not a single strategy that does not emphasize the requirement to conduct interagency coordination in some way, shape or form directly tied to strategic objectives. These strategies, however, take a vertical approach with little to no formal horizontal collaboration between departments in developing their strategies. There is no codified or formal directive authority driving horizontal collaboration between Cabinet-level departments. This horizontal collaboration, if directed by appropriate authority vice the current ad-hoc approach, would achieve interagency integration and foster a common line of effort across the interagency. If integrated, the various government departments could achieve synchronous execution of their individual strategies thus ensuring efficient use of the instruments of national power and reducing duplicative efforts.

Regardless of the strategic guidance available that emphasizes the importance of interagency integration, when operational action must be taken to achieve strategic results, the interagency has shown both success and failure. There are a host of operations, predominantly military, but resonant throughout the interagency, in which the

interagency component has had a substantial role. The next chapter highlights some recent operational examples.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Interagency in Action

Overview

This chapter highlights examples of success and areas of improvement in interagency integration striving to implement a whole-of-government approach to national security. Throughout history securing U.S. vital interests has frequently been tied to military action. However, all instruments of national power are put forth to achieve U.S. national interests. If the United States is to achieve national security objectives using a more integrated interagency approach, it must then continue “improving the integration of skills and capabilities within our military and civilian institutions, so they complement each other and operate seamlessly.”¹ The interagency functions in different ways, some better than others, while in some cases, not at all. This chapter highlights past and current military operational examples where interagency opportunities exist for greater integration.

Joint Doctrine

Just as Departmental strategies provide direction and a starting point for the interagency, the military uses joint doctrine as a roadmap for integrated military operations. Since the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986, the military has transformed itself from a stove-piped, individual Service-focused organization into a more synchronized joint warfighting construct in which each military branch understands its role within the larger joint force. In order to plan, coordinate and operate jointly, doctrine has been written to capture the essence of joint warfighting. Throughout this doctrine, the role of

¹U.S. President, *National Security Strategy* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, May 2010), 14.

the interagency in joint command functions is prevalent and guides military operations. Joint doctrine is the “doctrinal basis for interagency coordination”² for the U.S. military. This doctrine points out the importance of the interagency in achieving strategic objectives. When articulating the nature of the interagency, it directs “JFCs (Joint Force Commanders) and planners [to] consider the contribution of other instruments of national power and recognize which agencies can best contribute toward achieving objectives.”³ This implies strategic and operational level engagement with the interagency is important to achieving a Combatant Commander’s objectives. This operationalizes interagency integration and compels incorporating it into the phases of planning. However, the joint strategic guidance is directed at the Combatant Commander’s staff and subordinate units, but has no directive authority for interagency partners and therefore, interagency participation falls to the individual department’s determining its level of involvement. This will impact the planning process as any plan’s depth and breadth can only reach as far as the interagency degree of involvement.

Joint doctrine breaks down planning into six phases commencing with Phase 0 and ending with Phase 5. The “use of phases [shape, deter, seize the initiative, dominate, stability, and enable civil authority] provides a flexible model to arrange combat and stability operations.”⁴ The following is a summary of each phase used in joint operational planning:

² U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-0, *Personnel Support to Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 16, 2006), i.

³ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), I-11.

⁴ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, August, 11, 2011), xxiii.

-Shape (Phase 0). Joint and multinational operations—inclusive of normal and routine military activities—and various interagency activities are performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies.

-Deter (Phase I). The intent of this phase is to deter undesirable adversary action by demonstrating the capabilities and resolve of the joint force. It includes activities to prepare forces and set conditions for deployment and employment of forces in the event that deterrence is not successful.

-Seize Initiative (Phase II). JFCs seek to seize the initiative through the application of appropriate joint force capabilities.

-Dominate (Phase III). The *dominate* phase focuses on breaking the enemy's will for organized resistance or, in noncombat situations, control of the operational environment.

-Stabilize (Phase IV). The *stabilize* phase is required when there is no fully functional, legitimate civil governing authority present. The joint force may be required to perform limited local governance, integrating the efforts of other supporting/ contributing multinational, IGO [International Government Organization], NGO [Non-Government Organization], or USG [United States Government] agency participants until legitimate local entities are functioning.

-Enable Civil Authority (Phase V). This phase is predominantly characterized by joint force support to legitimate civil governance in theater. The goal is for the joint force to enable the viability of the civil authority and its provision of essential services to the largest number of people in the region.⁵

Throughout these phases, it is evident interagency integration and collaboration is necessary. From the shaping operations that take place during day-to-day operations, through actions to stabilize and enable civil authority, the requirement for the interagency to be deeply rooted in the planning, coordination and execution effort is prevalent. For this integration to occur, an overarching interagency authority is needed to direct the involvement of the required agencies. This will allow the instruments of national power to most efficiently bring their respective capability to bare in all aspects of an operation, from planning to execution. The need for interagency integration is paramount for success and it starts with the planning effort. An interagency collaborative planning effort ensures all participating agencies and departments have a say and are vested in the

⁵ Ibid, pg xxiii-xxiv.

plan. The key to all of this is getting the right agencies with the right representation into the planning effort.

Joint doctrine takes interagency requirements even further by advocating “when direct participation by departments other than DOD [Department of Defense] is significant, the Task Force (TF) establishing authority may designate it as *a joint interagency task force*. This might typically occur when the other interagency partners have primacy and legal authority and the JFC provides supporting capabilities.”⁶ This demonstrates the military’s ability to transition from a solely military operation to a supporting role within an interagency operation. The Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander can advocate this change based on operational progress using the phased approach. The JTF has a variety of tools to use in this effort. Joint doctrine provides the JFC with the ability to use a Joint Interagency Control Group (JIACG) to facilitate interagency integration.

The JIACG is a subordinate element of a joint force command, either at a JTF or Combatant Command headquarters. For a JFC, a JIACG:

- Promotes interaction and cooperation among diverse agencies
- Builds interagency consensus building and understanding of each agency’s capabilities, limitations and constraints precluding the use of a capability
- Promote the development of unity of effort needed to accomplish a specific mission by establishing an atmosphere of trust and cooperation⁷

As indicated above, the JIACG pursues consensus building between the interagency partners conducting operations with or alongside the military. This relationship building apparatus is required to find a balance between military goals and

⁶ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, IV-7.

⁷ Ibid, pg V-18.

the various interagency goals, which may be at odds with one another. Effectively, the JIACG seeks to attain unity of effort amongst all participants of an operation.

The JFC's goal of obtaining unity of effort by integrating the interagency into military operations is at odds with the military's construct of using unity of command. Unity of command is a hierarchy used to achieve unity of effort where a single commander has the directive authority over forces assigned to conduct an operation. Unity of effort "is accomplished by collaboration, synchronization, and coordination in the use of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power."⁸ This is where interagency integration friction currently exists. If there are differences in direction, goals or objectives within the interagency, unity of effort cannot be achieved. Authority to direct action to pursue common objectives is paramount to achieving unity of effort. Mitigating this disparate authority gap is critical to making the interagency work. In joint military operations, unity of effort is achieved through unity of command. Conversely, in joint interagency operations, unity of command does not exist and therefore unity of effort must be obtained to effectively achieve objectives.

Although the military has joint doctrine to guide its planning, coordination and execution efforts to achieve strategic objectives, the doctrine alone does not ensure interagency integration. The challenge is no authorities exist within the interagency to direct or guide unity of effort. Guidance is typically promulgated via Presidential directive and established relationships, oftentimes a coalition of the willing. In this construct, a need to better codify a formal requisite authority to achieve unity of effort in

⁸ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operation Planning*, xiv.

future operations is required. Without this authority, the guarantee of interagency integration is questionable at best.

One such entity within the military that strives to achieve interagency integration is the joint special operations community. Inherent in the way special operations are conducted by the military, the requirement to integrate the interagency in every aspect is critical for success.

Joint Special Operations

The special operations forces (SOF) community is a diverse capability group comprised of various components not only from across the military, but throughout the government. The SOF community is taught that the “interagency process is a fluid interaction involving U.S. Government organizations and processes”⁹ and relies on this interagency process to facilitate successful execution of special operations to achieve strategic objectives. It highlights that “the USG interagency process represents a demanding exercise in relationship building, cooperation, and coordination” while maintaining “the successful achievement of national security objectives is not possible without the skillful navigation of the USG interagency process.”¹⁰ Relationship building must occur due to a lack of authority vested in any entity over another operating within the interagency unless specific Presidential direction has been given.

The SOF community has embraced the interagency process knowing its value to successful operations supporting national strategic objectives and interests. It navigates this interagency realm defining it as “a loose and often undefined process of multiple

⁹ Charles W. Ricks and Joint Special Operations University, *Special Operations Forces Interagency Counterterrorism Reference Manual* (MacDill AFB, Fla.: JSOU Press, April 2011), v.

¹⁰ Ibid, pg 4-1.

structures and cultures that is often personality and situational dependent for its success.”¹¹ This fosters an environment requiring skillful diplomacy measures between involved agencies to obtain consensus in action to achieve strategic objectives. The SOF community instructs working “within the USG interagency process requires a difficult balancing act between loyalty to one’s own home agency and allegiance to the objectives of U.S. policy.”¹² Additionally, for self-preservation within a department, the loyalty to an individual’s department or agency may override adherence to U.S. policy and is a powerful motivator when navigating the interagency maze.

While conducting SOF operations in Afghanistan, a relationship was established between the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Both agencies were working parallel lines of effort but for completely different ends. USAID and CJSOTF-A formed a partnership to work together for their respective agency ends, USAID for developing impoverished communities to increase stabilization and CJSOTF to shape operations in the counterinsurgency battle. These two entities collaborated to find common ground to enable them to pursue their individual agency objectives while working together in the same operating environment. This forged relationship allowed SOF forces access to previously unavailable resources (funding) by nominating projects through their USAID representatives while USAID gained access to previously remote and insecure communities.¹³ This interagency partnership reaped rewards from the

¹¹ Ibid, pg 1-3.

¹² Ibid, pg 4-6.

¹³ Small Wars Journal, “Taking Interagency Stability Operations to a New Level,” Small Wars Journal LLC, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/79-mann.pdf> (accessed 14 Dec 2011)

tactical level to the strategic level by finding common mission objectives and pooling available resources.

The fact that the interagency does not have a singular entity guiding and directing actions within it demonstrates an authoritative gap. An authority driving synchronized and integrated action in implementing national strategic policy “would quickly boost the effectiveness of the USG interagency process. Establishing responsibility within any context enables the reform of relationship building, coordination, and work flow shortfalls”¹⁴ that currently exist within the interagency environment. The bottom line question the SOF community asks when working within the interagency construct is “Who’s in charge?” The answer is no one and everyone depending on the perspective taken. Until a leader of interagency execution is identified, the SOF community must “continue to navigate through a situational and personality dependent environment, with all its attendant uncertainties and frustrations”¹⁵ to accomplish assigned missions. And yet, the SOF community has enjoyed measurable success in the last decade achieving goals of its global counterterrorism mission by engaging the interagency on the common ground upon which they operate.

Another entity that has incorporated an interagency mission approach is the Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S). JIATF-S has evolved over its nearly 20-year history into a successful model of interagency cooperation in its counterdrug mission.

Joint Interagency Task Force-South

JIATF-S has been in existence in some form or another since 1989. A complete history is not appropriate for this thesis. A general background of its evolution, however,

¹⁴ Ricks and JSOU, *SOF Interagency Counterterrorism Reference Manual*, 4-6.

¹⁵ Ibid, pg 4-6.

is required to lend perspective to JIATF-S and its mission. JIATF-S was born as Joint Task Force-4 (JTF-4) when the DOD was designated the lead agency “for the detection and monitoring of drug trafficking into the United States.”¹⁶ As the mission evolved during the war on drugs, additional legislation and Presidential directives were issued. New authorities were given to the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and in 1994 ONDCP issued its first National Interdiction Command and Control Plan (NICCP) creating the use of a joint interagency task force as the model for conducting counter drug operations. JTF-4 was now JIATF-East and remained in Key West, Florida. JTF-South in Panama City became JIATF-South. After the Panama Canal treaties were signed in 1999, JIATF-South had to leave Panama City, Panama and it was relocated to Key West and joined JIATF-East. The two JIATFs operated as separate entities, but still closely associated until the Commander of United States Southern Command completely merged the two in 2003 to form the present day JIATF-S. This evolution has produced “an unparalleled network of law enforcement, intelligence, and military assets to focus on detecting the movements and shipments of narcoterrorist organizations.”¹⁷

JIATF-S, operating in support of national strategic direction in counterdrug operations, is “the National Task Force that serves as the catalyst for integrated and synchronized interagency counter-illicit trafficking operations, and is responsible for the detection and monitoring of suspect air and maritime drug activity in the Caribbean Sea, Gulf of Mexico, and the eastern Pacific. JIATF South also collects, processes, and

¹⁶ Evan Munsing, Christopher J. Lamb, and National Defense University, *Joint Interagency Task Force-South : The Best Known, Least Understood Interagency Success* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, June, 2011), 10.

¹⁷ Richard M. Yeatman, “JIATF-South: Blueprint for Success,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, issue 42, 3rd Quarter, 2006, 26.

disseminates counterdrug information for interagency and partner nation operations.”¹⁸

In this capacity, JIATF-S works within the interagency through a myriad of partnerships and relationships. However, it does this differently than most other interagency entities. Its perspective, established relationships and organizational infusion make it able to more seamlessly harness the interagency capabilities available to achieve strategic objectives.

JIATF-S embraces a team perspective acknowledging “some higher authority usually determines what it should accomplish (purpose), whether it will be subordinate or superior to other parts of the organization, and from whence its resources will come (empowerment).”¹⁹ This perspective levels the playing field and attempts to focus the team on the mission at hand vice the competing department or agency loyalties potentially hindering success. JIATF-S has created a team with representatives from DOD, Homeland Security, and the Justice Department, along with U.S. Intelligence Community liaisons and international partners. A team purpose to focus efforts, empowerment with authority and resources, and organizational support from within define JIATF-S and their method of operating as an interagency entity. The NICCP defines their strategic mission, while also defining the authorities to obtain necessary resources. The JIATF-S internal organization, structure and command relationships offer the internal organizational support using consistent processes and procedures allowing the interagency to work effectively within the JIATF-S command structure.

¹⁸ United States Southern Command, “Counter Illicit Trafficking,” United States Southern Command, <http://www.southcom.mil/ourmissions/Pages/Counter-Illicit%20Trafficking.aspx> (accessed December 28, 2011).

¹⁹ Munsing, Lamb, and NDU, *Joint Interagency Task Force-South*, 34.

Throughout its evolution, JIATF-S has used various means to achieve interagency integration. Early on the liaison concept was introduced where agencies with a vested interest in planning, coordination and operations would send a liaison to staff the necessary capability. JIATF-S experienced that supporting agencies “routinely failed to fully fill their designated staff billets.”²⁰ This promoted an unpredictable manpower capability hampering planning, operations and continuity. JIATF-S had no control over what agencies provided personnel, when they would be provided or the duration of their tour. This led to an inconsistent manpower flow that could not sustain operations to meet strategic objectives. The command then pursued and eventually attained a fully integrated interagency command by filling positions with members representing the entire interagency to include key leadership positions throughout the command. Using the weight behind the national policy and command and control plan as the forcing function, JIATF-S achieved manpower stability by shoring up support based on common interests shared within the interagency.

Besides personnel, resourcing challenges persist within the interagency construct at JIATF-S. The command must “assemble an appropriate ‘force package’ of ships and aircraft from different interagency and international partners for every mission,”²¹ presenting a significant challenge in and of itself with the planning involved in all task force operations. Additionally, if there are competing requirements for resources based on myriad external operational circumstances that may have priority over JIATF-S, it poses an even greater challenge. However, JIATF-S overcomes these resource challenges by forging partnerships throughout the interagency and international

²⁰Ibid, pg 20.

²¹Ibid, pg 37.

community that have a vested interest in the mission JIATF-S conducts. The support from a willing voluntary coalition allows JIATF-S to gain vital resources to conduct operations based on common strategic objectives.

JIATF-S achieved success due to its organizational mindset within the command and the empowerment of the interagency elements within it. One would surmise that the issuance of the NICCP would provide all the authority needed to achieve interagency integration in word and deed. However, neither the ONDCP nor JIATF-S defines the authority necessary to direct interagency support to operations. With little authority derived from the NICCP and its implied interagency approach, JIATF-S continues “to work out cooperative agreements for resource sharing . . . carefully negotiated to maximize voluntary participation”²² from the interagency. Without the requisite authority vested into the command structure, JIATF-S operations are based on strong partnerships, coalitions of the willing, and trusted working relationships.

JIATF-S attributes its success primarily to the fact that required support from the national security system was gained over time and with it came an ability to reach across the interagency to achieve integration. This support allowed JIATF-S to expand its joint operations using multinational and interagency capabilities to accomplish common objectives important to all participating organizations. This achieved an interagency approach in direct support of national security strategic objectives. This support evolved over a significant time period commencing in the early 1990s until the present. Currently, JIATF-S “enjoys a routine if not highly directive support from Washington”²³ in the form of the ONDCP, for one. The ONDCP created a U.S. Interdiction Coordinator

²² Ibid, pg 41.

²³ Ibid, pg 42.

whose chief responsibility was to coordinate detection, monitoring, and drug interdiction activities amongst the interagency and supervise the allocation of resources to JIATF-S. Through this top-down approach, vice a lead agency approach, JIATF-S was able to navigate the interagency and capitalize on available resources. The NICCP, driven by the ONDCP engine, directs the interagency integration achieved by JIATF-S along common operational lines of effort across participating departments and agencies. “JIATF-South’s success is wholly dependent upon its interagency partnerships”²⁴ and they have utilized those partnerships to achieve results. This evolution has spanned over two decades but currently serves as a successful interagency model of efficient and effective use of all instruments of national power.

As JIATF-S exemplifies, forming partnerships internal and external to an organization is a vital ingredient for success. As the U.S. pursues security of its vital interests, building international partnerships is equally important. Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) are directed to incorporate security cooperation activities into their Theater Campaign Plans (TCPs) to build partnerships with other nations. In building these international partnerships through security cooperation, the use of interagency partners sharing common goals and objectives within a country or region assists in building relationships. Interagency integration is critical for synchronized and congruent efforts within a country or region.

Security Cooperation

Security cooperation is a resident tenet of a GCC’s TCP, subordinate campaign plans and Phase 0 planning. “Security cooperation activities include bilateral and

²⁴ Ibid, pg 69.

multilateral training and exercises, foreign military sales (FMS) and financing (FMF), officer exchange programs, educational opportunities at professional military schools, technical exchanges, and efforts to assist foreign security forces in building competency and capacity.”²⁵ Within this construct, the DOD engages partner nations by forging relationships that will build partner security capacity. As a key component to a theater strategy, security cooperation efforts will benefit from “close cooperation with the Department of State (DOS), embassies, and other federal agencies as ways to achieve theater objectives.”²⁶ Due to the very nature of security cooperation activities being executed by a variety of U.S. government agencies, the integration of an interagency approach is critical to ensure interagency synchronization.

The Caspian Guard Initiative, undertaken by U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), uses the interagency to its fullest extent. “This interagency program is an integrated counter proliferation, counterterrorism, and illegal trafficking effort to help secure the Caspian Basin”²⁷ and utilizes multiple capabilities belonging to the interagency from the Department of Energy and DOS. This initiative provides immediate strategic outcomes across the interagency that operate in the region and was initiated by the Commander, USEUCOM to meet strategic objectives. The DOD has additionally established Regional Security Centers for Security Studies²⁸ that “have been successful in harmonizing views on common security challenges, education on the role of security in

²⁵ United States Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 2010), 26.

²⁶ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operation Planning*, II-7.

²⁷ Gregory J. Dyekman, *Security Cooperation: A Key to the Challenges of the 21st Century* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, November 2007), 5.

²⁸ There are five such centers all of which have as part of their purpose to become testbeds of interagency jointness with the Department of State and other agencies. (See DISAM journal article referenced in bibliography.)

civil societies, and building long term relationships with foreign military and civilian leaders.”²⁹ Likewise, the DOS takes a similar approach “by establishing regional embassy hubs as bases for experts in cross-cutting issues such as climate change or conflict resolution.”³⁰ These hubs are located at existing embassies and focus on a particular regional concern and work closely with related non-governmental organizations, local governments and other U.S. agencies. For example, there are 12 hubs for environmental concerns and six hubs for security assistance.³¹ These actions between the DOS and DOD highlight the necessity for integrated interagency efforts to synchronize individual agency actions seeking common strategic objectives.

In a fiscally-constrained future security cooperation programs would benefit from a streamlined approach maximizing resources across federal agencies while reducing duplication of effort. Many security cooperation programs executed by the military are funded from other than DOD funding streams. “Up to 30 sources of funding regulated by various authorities and guidelines are required to implement GCC security cooperation strategies.”³² Most of the security assistance programs affiliated with the military, such as the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program and the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program are funded through the DOS with little influence from DOD. With Combatant Commands (CCMDs) also having limited security cooperation funding, the Services have paid the bill to support the Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) strategy by providing training personnel to execute mobile training teams, subject matter

²⁹ Ibid, pgs 5-6.

³⁰ U.S. Department of State, *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), viii.

³¹ U.S. Department of State, www.state.gov/countries (accessed March 27, 2012).

³² Dyekman, *Security Cooperation*, 6.

expert trainers and other security cooperation requirements. This complex budget system begs for reform in order to consolidate and simplify funding support, aptly capture all investment and expenditures, and facilitate expedient access to appropriations.

While current security cooperation activities are imperative for successful execution of a CCDRs theater campaign plan, benefits of security cooperation approach conducted by integrated, interagency collaboration could be immeasurable. While the DOD takes internal steps to increase its security cooperation capacity, it has identified that the interagency planning and coordination has problematic challenges without a U.S. government forcing function to comprehensively integrate security cooperation plans and strategies. The Quadrennial Defense Review points this out by noting that “working in conjunction with other U.S. government agencies and allied military forces to strengthen the security institutions of partner nations will be a crucial part of U.S. and allied efforts”³³ to achieve U.S. national security strategic objectives.

Security cooperation efforts would be enhanced by an integrated interagency approach consistently applied by a directive authority over the interagency. The U.S. approach to achieve interagency integration is currently reactive to events and only achieves short term interagency solutions. Various departments operating with international partners all seek to achieve their respective strategic objectives, which support NSS objectives and U.S. vital interests. Economy of force can be obtained by synchronizing and integrating these efforts in planning, coordination, budgeting and implementation if appropriate directive authority is created to drive greater interagency integration.

³³ United States Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, 27.

Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa

Nowhere is security cooperation more desired nor needed than in the East African region. Specifically, the Horn of Africa (HOA) region “with its fragile governments, abject poverty, and seemingly incessant political and social turmoil, is increasingly seen by the United States as the next major battleground in the global struggle against terrorism.”³⁴ The United States deployed a JTF to the region in 2002 in order to deter and defeat transnational terrorism

JTF-HOA became Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) after its original mission grew and expanded. Since its inception in 2002, the mission “has evolved into a two-pronged effort: humanitarian operations and military instruction.”³⁵ After initial deployment and subsequent counterterrorism operations, the CJTF-HOA mission has grown into a civil-military effort involving significant interaction with interagency partners. The regional security initiative has also evolved from a military centric strategy to a civil-military strategy to more aptly address the myriad of issues resident in the region.

Within the CJTF-HOA area of operations, the command has implemented shaping activities to mitigate the use of safe havens by terrorist in countries that are not adequately governed. These shaping activities traverse the interagency by capitalizing on all elements of national power available in the region. This pursuit with an interagency flair has the military conducting traditional kinetic operations to deter and defeat terrorism, while also performing non-traditional and non-kinetic operations.

³⁴ Stephen A. Emerson, “Regional Security Initiative: Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa,” In *Shaping the Security Environment* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2007), 73.

³⁵ David J. Danelo, “Around the Horn”, In *U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare, 1898-2007: Anthology and Selected Bibliography* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2008), 293.

CJTF-HOA seeks to gain access to countries within the region in order to conduct its kinetic operations. There are challenges working in the interagency realm to conduct military operations. Access is one of the more prevalent challenges as CJTF-HOA requires permission from countries and the State Department for entry to conduct operations. Difficult access requires CJTF-HOA to resort to other means to influence regional issues and promote progress towards U.S. strategic objectives. Due to access restrictions into Somalia imposed by the State Department, CJTF-HOA has resorted to “flanking and enveloping with the combat power of veterinarians, host nation military partnerships, and new village wells.”³⁶ This civil-military line of effort has seen positive results as CJTF-HOA “renovated thirty-three schools, eight clinics, and five hospitals; dug nearly a dozen wells; and conducted nearly forty medical and veterinary visits”³⁷ within the first two years and currently continues this civilian-military effort. These efforts have seen gains in the way the U.S. is viewed by long-standing adversaries in the region. Even Somalis have heard of the CJTF-HOA efforts and are interested in similar support.

While these efforts have gained significant ground to enhance security and build partnerships, there is more that can be done in the region to achieve long term U.S. strategic objectives. The current efforts obtain short term gains of security but “Washington must move its engagement paradigm away from a U.S. military-dominated approach designed to address hard security issues toward one aimed at achieving greater human security through nonmilitary actors and civil organizations.”³⁸ A guided approach using other than hard power by military means can achieve a broader scope of success.

³⁶ Ibid, pg 297.

³⁷ Emerson, “Regional Security Initiative,” 79.

³⁸ Ibid, pg. 81.

The military focuses its civilian-military efforts on those activities that meet military strategic objectives, some of which complement other agency objectives. An integrated effort using the full spectrum of capabilities represented throughout the interagency will facilitate achieving efficiently common objectives while supporting our partner nations.

For CJTF-HOA, the challenge to overcome is transforming itself into an interagency engagement construct, while still projecting military presence and capability when required. For example, to increase maritime security against piracy, CJTF-HOA partnered with DOS and DHS to obtain four refurbished patrol boats. The refurbished patrol boats were obtained through the FMS program and the U.S. Coast Guard provided training to the Djiboutian Coast Guard.³⁹ Along a different line of effort, CJTF-HOA engaged the Ethiopian Department of Veterinary Services and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to launch a Veterinary Civic Action Program (VETCAP). The VETCAP treated over 17,000 animals, which consequently improved the livelihood of a large portion of the population.⁴⁰

CJTF-HOA is influencing this interagency transformation by coordinating actions using the interagency and has had success in demonstrating its merits so much that former Ambassador Yamamoto stated “CJTF-HOA has changed how we look at foreign relations among U.S. agencies. In the past, embassies focused on bilateral issues. CJTF-HOA brought our ambassadors together to discuss regional issues and broadened

³⁹ U.S.Navy, “U.S. Coast Guard Trains Djiboutian Navy, Coast Guard,” U.S. Navy, http://www.navy.mil/search/print.asp?story_id=23467&VIRIN=&imagetype=0&page=1 (accessed March 27, 2012).

⁴⁰ United States Central Command, “U.S Vaccinates Animals, Trains Veterinarians in Ethiopia,” United States Central Command, <http://www.hoa.africom.mil/getArticleFresh.asp?art=2092&lang=0> (accessed March 27, 2012).

our perspective.”⁴¹ This broadened perspective needs to be achieved at an even higher level to establish policy that directs an integrated interagency approach in all national security environments.

While CJTF-HOA has operated effectively within its scope as a military organization, other military organizations were established that worked within the realm of the interagency. As CJTF-HOA supported the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) have been two significant military operations in which the interagency played a significant role. OEF is dominated by operations within Afghanistan, although it expanded to other regions throughout the world as it progressed. OIF (renamed in 2010 as Operation NEW DAWN/OND) is the named operation for military operations in Iraq. Each in their own right have seen the nuances associated with conducting operations requiring an interagency approach to fully achieve national strategic objectives.

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM

In preparation for combat operations in Afghanistan in late 2001, the Commander, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), Army General Tommy Franks, realized the importance the interagency would play in the execution of OEF. Although mainly concerned with intelligence sharing and planning integration, General Franks sought a host of capabilities across the interagency to provide breadth and depth to the planning and coordination effort. To formalize his interagency approach, the CDR requested and received approval from the Secretary of Defense to form a Joint Interagency Task Force-Counterterrorism (JIATF-CT).

⁴¹ Danelo, “Around the Horn”, *U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare*, 298.

Upon approval from the SecDef to have direct liaison with other agencies, a push to get personnel and resources to form an interagency hub to facilitate operational planning and coordination was made. Within a relatively short time, an interagency team was formed and began operations in the mountains of Afghanistan. Members included the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Diplomatic Security Service, U.S. Customs Service, National Security Agency (NSA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Defense Human Intelligence Service, New York's Joint Terrorism Task Force, and the Justice, Treasury, and DOS.⁴² Unfortunately, this operational level initiative was stalled at the strategic level.

When the official proposal was finally routed through the NSC and to other government departments, even though some of the agencies had already sent personnel down range, the NSC would not provide direction or levy requirements on the requested agencies outside the DOD to provide personnel to support this interagency effort. This led the JIATF-CT to reduce its scope to a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG). The JIACG “developed a modus operandi based on five core principles concerning planning, staffing, information sharing, liaison, and reporting.”⁴³ Instead of the authority typically vested in a JIATF, the JIACG served as a coordination entity working under the CDR's command authorities. It then facilitated actions across the interagency, although the CDR had no authority over the non-DOD agencies represented. Additionally, the agency representatives did not have authority to act on behalf of their department, but rather provided a coordination conduit for the CDR and his staff's use to obtain interagency support.

⁴² Colonel Matthew F. Bogdanos, “Interagency Operations: The Marine Specialty of the Century,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, March 2006, 60.

⁴³ *Ibid*, pg 61.

As OEF progressed over time and the eradication of Taliban and other terrorist cells occurred, a transition was required to facilitate reconstruction and stabilization efforts. National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-44) was published as a forcing function to ensure a government agency was designated the “lead agency” to facilitate interagency efforts for reconstruction and stabilization. The DOS was identified in 2005, nearly four years after initial military operations in Afghanistan, as the lead agency for reconstruction and stabilization efforts with a mandate to “coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict.”⁴⁴

However, the CJTF operating in Afghanistan “remained focused on combat operations in the country, to the detriment of implementing an integrated U.S. military effort to help rebuild Afghanistan.”⁴⁵ Just as the military has no authoritative control, the State Department’s authority per the NSPD-44 was to “harmonize” with DOD operations. This initially caused an ambiguous relationship at best. Even the physical locations of military leaders in Bagram versus the location of political and international leadership in Kabul shackled the integration of interagency efforts. This was eventually rectified with the establishment of Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A), but delays in interagency operations were hindered in the mean time. The individual authorities vested in both DOD and State Department structures led to “extensive efforts at consensus building to develop and implement coherent, cohesive plans and policy”⁴⁶ to function as

⁴⁴ U.S. President, “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization,” NSPD-44, December 7, 2005.

⁴⁵ Tucker B. Mansager, “Interagency Lessons Learned in Afghanistan,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, First Quarter 2006, 81-82.

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, pg 82.

an integrated interagency. A coalition of the willing was formed without the top down cover of authority driven from the highest level.

The interagency interaction effort in Afghanistan elevates two critical concepts. One is authority and the other is integrated planning. First, appropriate authority must be granted to direct all elements of the interagency to work as an integrated team focused on achieving national objectives within their respective departmental strategies. An authority must be identified who can put it all together and make it work. Second, the interagency must come together for planning and be directed in the planning effort to achieve synergy using a collaborative approach. The days of departmental stove-piped planning are gone and must be replaced with collaborative, detailed deliberate planning that is inclusive of all agencies involved.

Shortly after OEF kicked off, OIF was in the planning stages. As evidenced in Afghanistan, similar interagency issues would surface in OIF. The two military operations, although similar in scope, were significantly different in execution. Not only was geography different, but demographics, politics and diplomatic efforts were different as well. This led to a different interaction amongst the key interagency actors in OIF.

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM

The invasion of Iraq commenced in the spring of 2003 when U.S. military forces crossed over from Kuwait into Iraq, quickly crushed the Iraqi military and toppled Saddam Hussein's regime. One of the key flaws with the OIF strategy was that it focused on the military aspects of operations and did not incorporate an integrated interagency approach from planning through execution, especially Phases IV and V. As a result, the U.S. government was unprepared to deal with the overwhelming success

quickly achieved after Phase III (dominate) combat operations. Despite the lack of a complete plan, OIF planners slogged their way through the myriad requirements to set the conditions for stability and enabling civil authority for reconstruction efforts.

Commanders on the ground implemented their best efforts to achieve stability while strategic leadership was stuck in a quagmire of competing political interests, realization that no post-combat plan was available and DODging political stabs and salvos from all directions as a result of the stagnation of progress.

No action was taken to mitigate the lack of progress until a 2006 study revealed the status of operations from a combined military and political. The operational environment was painstakingly heading to a transition from Phase III to Phase IV (stabilize) and preparing for Phase V (enable civil authority). The study revealed that “coordination of assistance programs by the Defense Department, State Department, United States Agency for International Development and other agencies has been ineffective. There are no clear lines establishing who is in charge of reconstruction.”⁴⁷ This scathing revelation identified the disconnected planning that resulted in ignoring the requirement for interagency integration to effectively plan and execute OIF from cradle to grave.

Nearly two years after the report in 2008, the Joint Interagency Task Force-Iraq (JIATIF-I) was created to integrate interagency capabilities to support strategic objectives in Iraq. JIATF-I was born out of a consensus bottom-up effort between two leaders on the ground in Iraq. A staffing request, representative of the interagency conducting

⁴⁷ James Addison Baker, Lee Hamilton, and Lawrence S. Eagleburger, *The Iraq Study Group Report* (New York: Vintage Books, 2006), 23.

operations in Iraq, was sent to the National Security Council (NSC) Deputies Committee for review. It was endorsed by the Commanding General and Chief of Mission leading the effort in Iraq and proposed the JIATF-I construct to synchronize interagency efforts. In weeks, this proposal was turned around by the NSC and JIATF-I was born. JIATF-I then developed an integrated interagency joint campaign plan (JCP). The JCP provided the organization “with access to intelligence, knowledge of U.S. programs in Iraq and reachback to most American agencies, [allowing] the JIATF [to work] with Embassy Baghdad and MNF-I (Multinational Force-Iraq) to report on progress in achieving national security goals.”⁴⁸

OIF pointed out the many flaws in policy implementation represented in our stove-piped departmental national security system. The success of JIATF-I demonstrated what can occur at the operational level when strategic decisions are made that facilitate an integrated interagency approach. Only after a bottom-up approach was taken by leaders operating in the field were strategic decisions made in kind. The military, and to a lesser degree other government agencies, had been on the ground in Iraq since the spring of 2003. It took nearly five years for strategic leadership to implement action integrating the interagency, and that was accomplished only after the leaders operating in Iraq proposed a solution. This solution once approved by the strategic leadership within the national security system, paved the way to the achievement of synergy between the instruments of national power.

⁴⁸ Ibid, pg 30.

Summary

Joint doctrine drives military operations and emphasizes interagency coordination throughout the campaign planning phases. Coordination is the pinnacle of interagency interaction as standing authorities above and beyond coordination/collaboration do not exist in our national security system. The military uses a JIACG construct to mitigate this lack of authority. The JIACG provides a formal structure for interagency coordination/collaboration to achieve a higher level of integration in the pursuit of common strategic objectives during contingencies and crises. Relationship building, creating partnerships and gaining consensus are the methods advocated by joint doctrine.

The Joint SOF community “navigates” through the interagency process and strives to understand the labyrinth that exists. The prevailing obstacles within the interagency are mitigating conflicts of interest and loyalties between departmental and national policy, which may be misaligned. These obstacles are prevalent because an interagency integrating authority does not exist to direct interagency support for special operations. This leaves the SOF community wondering “Who’s in charge?” and hoping for a decisive entity to take leadership over the interagency to facilitate their efforts in achieving strategic objectives.

A success story of sorts is JIATF-S. Through determined leadership and numerous evolutions, interagency integration was achieved after nearly twenty years of effort. The end result is a JIATF facilitating successful accomplishment of strategic objectives through an integrated interagency approach. This success was catapulted by employing an approved national strategic policy (the ONDCP) with an implementing

authority (the NICCP) having directive leadership within the interagency whereby uniting the instruments of national power toward common strategic objectives.

Security cooperation and assistance conducted by combatant commands requires the interagency to be successful in achieving strategic objectives. CCDRs achieve interagency support for security cooperation by building relationships between involved agency actors. These efforts seek to achieve integrated processes where none currently exist. The DOD and DOS established regional centers for strategic studies to facilitate interagency collaboration over regional issues. The CCDRs have identified a maze of budget streams used for security cooperation initiatives that cross interagency lines of effort. There is room for budget reform to gain efficiencies and reduce duplicative efforts within security cooperation operations while an interagency integrated approach would synchronize these efforts. This requires national level reform of budget initiatives that cross over departmental lines while identifying an authority to lead and manage interagency actions.

OEF and OIF/OND have been enduring military operations that transitioned to civilian-military operations after initial combat operations were complete. In Iraq, the transition to a civilian-led effort is complete. In Afghanistan, the civilian-military effort continues. In each, the need for national level policy implementation authority was identified. Inclusion of the policy guidance and authorities up front would have added synergy to the overall interagency civilian-military efforts. Both operations required a bottom-up approach to achieving interagency integration. Only when national strategic leaders empowered the interagency with unified policy and implementation authority was interagency integration achieved.

CHAPTER 5

Analysis and Recommendations

Analysis

As history has shown after World War II, transformation within the United States government is required when the strategic and international environment changes to the extent where old ways of doing business are no longer applicable or relevant. Just as the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) served as a catalyst for military transformation, so too can a similar legislative act spawn needed transformation of the current national security system. After the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security was an example of transformation invoked by changes in the strategic environment. The United States is now at an inflection point in history where national security transformation must occur to posture advantageously for the pursuit of U.S. national interests within a new and emerging international system. The interagency needs unified direction and leadership when implementing whole-of-government strategies that support the National Security Strategy.

The national security system hub is the National Security Council (NSC). It remains relatively unchanged since its inception in 1947. It is vertically focused to provide policy recommendation input without a corresponding policy implementation output mechanism. It has a staff organized to only fulfill its current role and lacks the capacity to manage policy implementation across the interagency. The NSC is the most fluid part of the national security system as it can change to varying degrees between administrations thereby fueling inconsistent and undependable application. The national

security system requires an output balancing mechanism to mitigate these internal limitations.

The guidance that emanates from each Cabinet level department overwhelmingly acknowledges the need for interagency integration. The interagency currently achieves it by forming willing coalitions, working through lead agencies or simply building informal relationships founded on common ground. These methods are resource intensive in time, people, and energy. The current organizational construct does not foster horizontal strategic collaboration in the development of strategies that ultimately are intertwined in implementation.

The military operations reviewed as examples can serve as an overlay across the entire interagency of federal Departments and agencies. The operations are civilian-military focused in their approach and inextricably linked between federal government agencies. Success or failure is predicated by having, or not having, a national-level authority acting as a forcing function for interagency integration. When the authority is present, unity of effort within the interagency is achieved. Without it, the agencies develop willing coalitions, create partnerships or enact an ad hoc approach. When authority is granted empowering integrated interagency action, the elements of national power are synchronized. This interagency authority should be driven by a top-down approach.

The government must create an authoritative entity between the President and his Cabinet to direct and lead integrated interagency efforts in implementing national strategy and policy decisions. This will posture the United States for success in the new strategic environment, expand the national security system to achieve a balance between

policy input and policy output mechanisms, provide a conduit for horizontal interagency integration and ensure strategic unity of effort. In order for this to be effective, the following recommendations are offered.

Recommendations

First, and perhaps most importantly, there must be legislation drawn and passed that clearly defines the authorities for this entity. A “Goldwater-Nichols Act for interagency” is a nice buzz phrase. This would allow for appropriate statutory authorities to be spelled out, responsibilities levied and define an organizational construct. This would create authoritative direction for an integrated interagency approach in support of Presidential and national strategic policy decisions. By enacting legislation, allowing the President to appoint the leader of the new organization, and having the leader confirmed by the Senate, both the legislative and executive branches of government are vested and represented in this transformation. It ensures a balance of power is maintained within the government, as the leader of this new entity would have tremendous authority, which must be clearly defined by the legislation.

Second, this new entity should be titled the “National Interagency Integration Council (NIIC)” and its leader assigned the title “Assistant to the President for National Interagency Integration.” The NIIC will achieve horizontal strategy integration between Cabinet level departments by creating a balancing mechanism between policy input (the NSC) and policy output mechanisms (the NIIC). Both the entity title and leadership title mirror that of the NSC and National Security Advisor, respectively, and will facilitate parity within the national security system. These two entities, the NSC and NIIC, would be co-equals and work closely together facilitating policy implementation and policy

recommendations. They would be complementary of one another as they worked hand-in-hand to work national strategic policy from inception through implementation. The NIIC would also be tasked to manage and review departmental strategies ensuring the individual department strategies are linked to the NSS and mutually supporting one another across the interagency. This may reveal efficiencies to be gained by synchronizing the interagency strategic planning process. In order for this to occur, strategic guidance would require a more rigid cycle. If strategic guidance commences with the NSS, then the publishing timing would need closer synchronization to allow for horizontal integrated interagency planning and strategy development.

Third, the NIIC staff should come from throughout the interagency with proportionate contributions from the departments. As each department will have a vested interest in the actions of the NIIC, the initial personnel sourcing should be those with proven interagency experience. The military created a professional military education pipeline to develop joint professionals after the GNA transformation. Similarly, long term staffing of the NIIC would require a professional development pipeline to nurture interagency professionals. Military professionals are encouraged to accept joint billet assignments to broaden their development with joint environment exposure and experience. Likewise, interagency billet assignments, along with formal interagency education opportunities, would facilitate an interagency professional corps from across government departments and agencies. If done correctly, this interagency development pipeline could produce future government leaders with broad knowledge, experience and understanding of the interagency. In lesser form, this is already happening as professionals from throughout the interagency attend educational opportunities offered by

other agencies. However, a truly integrated interagency education and training pipeline should be developed.

Fourth, as common strategic interagency objectives are identified, an interagency resourcing process should be created to ensure the means to achieving common strategic objectives. For example, security cooperation initiatives could be programmed with funding streams that cross Department and agency boundaries. This may require a complete analysis and review of departmental budgeting systems to achieve an interagency budget process. As the fiscal constraint is significant in the current and foreseeable economic environment, an interagency budgeting process or system is paramount to efficiently appropriate funding. Additionally, this interagency budgeting process could lead to identifying capabilities and resources that could be redistributed or realigned across all federal departments and agencies. There is significant persuasive argument for a complete review of resource allocation throughout the interagency to better align resources with strategic missions having some departments discontinue certain missions and other departments absorbing them.

Finally, a review of how the U.S. organizes itself at the nexus of strategy and operations is required. There is merit in forming interagency organizations above, beyond or replacing the country teams and Combatant Commands to better integrate interagency capabilities. An integrated joint interagency organization with authoritative relationships tied to national strategic guidance is a place to start. In the strategic planning process, establishing a joint interagency task force (JIATF) from the onset of a contingency or crisis may be a prudent practice. A standing JIATF command construct

for conducting military planning and operations seems imperative to ensure strategic interagency integration in operations.

CONCLUSION

This recommended transformation is a major shift in the way the United States views a strategic problem and develops approaches and solutions. It creates a new lens from which to gain an integrated perspective on the strategic environment. This transformation requires a top-down approach to better integrate all instruments of national power for efficiencies and effectiveness. Leadership from all branches of government must embrace this revolutionary requirement to transform the way the United States views and functions in the new strategic environment. The current national security system has been in place for over sixty years and is not suited for today's globally interdependent and connected strategic environment. The United States cannot afford to wait until another cataclysmic event occurs to provoke revolutionary transformation. This transformation will not be easy or quick, but it is necessary and requires strong leadership to take action and courage to steady the course for effective change.

The need for unified direction and action within the Armed Forces drove transformational change after World War II through the National Security Act of 1947. Korea, Vietnam and other contemporary military operations brought about military transformation in the form of the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA), which served as a catalyst for creating joint military capability and conducting joint operations. This same type of transformational change must now occur within the larger national security system. The interagency needs unified direction and leadership when implementing strategies that support the National Security Strategy and ultimately U.S. interests.

Our current national security system design leverages the authority of the standing President subject to his personality and leadership style. It remains vertically-focused through policy recommendations via the NSC as there is no authority to direct policy implementation horizontally across the various departments and agencies. There is an imbalance between the policy recommendation input mechanism (the NSC) and policy decision implementation output mechanism that requires action to bring them into balance. Each individual Cabinet Secretary takes strategic guidance and implements it downward to achieve their respective department's objectives. There is no horizontal connection across the interagency integrating the individual department strategies, approaches and resources.

As indicated in Chapter 3, the various department strategy documents identify that an integrated interagency approach is necessary to achieve their respective strategic goals while also identifying that interagency integration is a key weakness in the current national security system. The instruments of national power are not efficiently synchronized by the current national security system or an emplaced process. Implementation friction between departments is resolved by interagency integration after the fact. But it does not have to be this way. Interagency integration can be achieved as a standing part of our national security system by designating a directive authority between the President and their Cabinet to direct and implement Presidential national strategic policy decisions.

Across a spectrum of examples in Chapter 4, the resounding theme was a call for policy decisions to come with directive authority and leadership to implement an integrated interagency approach. Starting at the top and working its way across and

through the interagency, our national security system must do better by developing a standing approach to interagency integration vice a reactive approach. Strategic operations do not have to be well underway to create a forcing function for interagency integration and synchronization in response to interagency friction. The result of integrating the interagency throughout planning and execution would be saving precious resources, blood and treasure.

To achieve the establishment of an authoritative and directive entity between the President and their Cabinet, there must be legislation drawn and passed to define the authorities. This would allow clear definitions of roles and responsibilities to create an organizational construct to direct integrated interagency actions. The organizational structure could be sourced from across the federal departments and agencies with adequate leadership and experience representing the entire interagency. This would require government departments to “ante up” personnel and resources. This redistribution of personnel achieves a zero-sum gain as it does not create additional structure requirements. It simply shifts them out of standing departments into the National Interagency Integration Council.

Additionally, a pipeline to create experienced interagency leaders would be a vital part of this transformation. When DOD went through its transformation into a more joint focused organization after the GNA, it created a development program to build joint leadership and experience. Similar to the joint qualified military officer who has earned the skill-set through education, training and experience, an interagency professional would have a similar career track. This would allow professionals from across the

interagency an opportunity to consistently achieve positions of increased scope and responsibility while professionally developing as an interagency leader.

This transformation recommendation offers a foundation of changes, many of which require additional analysis and assessment and was beyond the scope of this thesis. This transformation must start at the top and work its way down and through the interagency. It starts with strategic leadership deciding that transformation is necessary and implementing required actions to facilitate appropriate changes.

If the United States wants to maintain or advance its position in the international system, a national security system transformation of this magnitude is required. An authority between the President and their Cabinet to direct and implement policy and national security decisions will facilitate an integrated interagency and harness all instruments of national power. This allows national strategic policy to be implemented ensuring a greater whole-of-government approach in the pursuit of U.S. interests.

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