Growing Down—Increasing Diversity as the Army Gets Smaller

by

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Class of 2012

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As defense budget allocations get smaller and congressional mandates reduce the total number of active Army and Reserve Component Soldiers and civilians, this strategy research project (SRP) offers a comprehensive review of how the Army downsized in the 1970s after the Vietnam War and the subsequent drawdown following the Cold War arms race, which ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The lessons learned from previous military draw downs may be beneficial in effectively reducing the current number of Army personnel. In particular, this SRP considers the effect of downsizing on the Army's efforts to maintain diversity in the force.

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR:  Lieutenant Colonel Reginald G. A. Neal

TITLE:  Growing Down—Increasing Diversity as the Army Gets Smaller

FORMAT:  Strategy Research Project

DATE:  19 March 2012  WORD COUNT:  6,106  PAGES:  30

KEY TERMS:  Reduction in Force, End Strength, Demobilization, Downsizing

CLASSIFICATION:  Unclassified

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AS THE ARMY GETS SMALLER

We tend to think rather narrowly about diversity sometimes -- it's a black-white or it's a Hispanic-black-white issue. It's not. Diversity is a national security issue and one that every one of us should be concerned about, frankly, because it is a force multiplier for our Soldiers.¹

—LTG(R) Michael D. Rochelle
Army G1

Preface

The armed services, particularly the Army, have demonstrated their ability to rapidly increase their end-strength during times of crisis or national emergency to meet the Department of Defense’s (DoD) operational requirements. However, when civilian leaders determine there is no longer a requirement for a large standing force, the military’s ability to reduce in size has not been so effective. Strategic leaders must accomplish the military’s primary mission of keeping the nation secure by maintaining a high state of readiness within a congressionally established cap on the total number of personnel authorized to remain in the service.

This paper examines the challenges strategic leaders faced while reducing the Army after the Vietnam War along with the cutbacks that began in 1989. This paper assesses the impacts of Army downsizing on its efforts to maintain a diverse force, and addresses the strategic importance of nurturing a diverse culture. It concludes with recommendations to increase diversity in the Army as it undergoes yet another era of transformation. Army leaders are thus challenged to manage growing down the force—getting smaller while simultaneously building a capable and diverse force to meet the challenges of the future.
What is Diversity?

Defining diversity is difficult, and for the DoD, required an “act of Congress.” Under provisions of the FY2009 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 596, Public Law 110-417), Congress established the Department of Defense Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC). The purpose of this commission was to conduct a wide-ranging review of the diversity issues in the military services. The MLDC was the third major effort by a Presidential administration and the armed services to increase diversity in the military. In 1949, President Truman’s administration created the Fahy Committee, named after its chairman, Charles Fahy, which was instrumental in establishing policies that led to the desegregation of the Armed Forces. In 1963, President John F. Kennedy administration’s attempt to discern the effect of increasing diversity on military efficiency led to the formation of the Gesell Committee, named after its chairman, U.S. Federal Judge Gerhard A. Gesell.

Although the Fahy and Gesell committees were formed with the task of assessing and increasing diversity (then more commonly referred to as race relations), the two initiatives had little in common. Each served different a purpose. The Fahy Committee was created to carry out President Truman’s equal treatment and opportunity policy in both the federal government and the military. The Gesell Committee, on the other hand, was more concerned with developing a new equal treatment strategy than assessing the existing policies. In contrast, President Obama’s commission, the MLDC, under provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972, conducted a comprehensive evaluation of policies that provide opportunities for the promotion and advancement of minority members of the Armed Forces, including minority senior officers. The MLDC published a comprehensive diversity definition,
which the Army modified and adopted as its official policy statement on diversity, “The different attributes, experiences, and backgrounds of our Soldiers, Civilians, and Family members that further enhance our global capabilities and contribute an adaptive, culturally astute Army.”

The MLDC and the Army’s definitions reflect the military understanding that diversity includes more than differences in race and gender. It is important to realize that differences in attributes, experiences, and backgrounds are often borne out of characteristics directly related to racial and ethnic cultures. Recognizing those differences is an important first step in enabling other ideas, diverse thoughts and concepts to be fully integrated into our military culture. Therefore, the discussion and scope of diversity shall be limited to generally recognized minority races, and focus on black officers rather than other minority groups. Recognizing and developing this focal group will also establish organizational norms which will benefit women and other minority populations. Further, following the precedent of previous diversity studies, race and ethnicity will be referenced to as one group without any intent of lessening the significance of any other ethnic group or gender.

Reducing the Force

During the course of over four decades of engagement in the Cold War, U.S. political leaders have struggled to find the nexus between maintaining the right numbers for a ready and trained military force able to fight our nation’s conflicts and preparing to counter often ill-defined potential threats. George C. Wilson, former national defense correspondent for the Washington Post provided the following analogy:

The downsizing of the American military is an untold success story. Like back surgery, the operation has been...long, complicated, and painful...[But] the team of doctors—military leaders, Pentagon executives, and
lawmakers—have conducted the operation with great care. Their patient, the American military, has not been crippled or hollowed out as predicted, but will come out of surgery healthy.\(^\text{10}\)

The DoD defined end strength (ES) as the total number of personnel authorized by the Congress to be in the each armed service on the last day of September each year. This date, September 30th, is the end of the government’s Fiscal Year (FY). The authorized number of personnel is specified in the annual National Defense Authorization Acts. For the Army, the justification for this end strength is force structure allowance (FSA), which is the sum of all authorized personnel paragraph and lines (slots) contained in the Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE) and Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) units.

The military’s ability to justify material and personnel requirements to fight an existing war is significantly easier than making the case to sustain an ideal force structure and end strength desired by each of the services during times of peace. Congressional budget constraints, and other given political circumstances, the military is required to operate with less than it perceives to be ideal levels of personnel and equipment. In a January 2012 Duke University lecture, Joint Chiefs Chairman General Martin E. Dempsey acknowledged that the military must reset its priorities. For decades the military held the view that it needed the capacity to fight two simultaneous ground wars at once. “We (have) taken that language out,” Dempsey said, “it creat[ed] a tyranny of fiscal demands.”\(^\text{11}\)

Historically, these conditions have come about after the completion of a conflict in which the use of an expanded military was required, but subsequently is no longer needed to sustain combat operations. Army leaders must now determine how the Army can reduce its ranks in a way that maintains a vital and capable corps of professional
Soldiers. They must also take into account the potential of future crisis when allowing for the level of downsizing. And they must as well realize that our democratic society tends to lose its *military spirit* during peacetime.\textsuperscript{12}

According to Carl Builder, in his RAND study, the Army and Marine Corps are more severely affected by personnel reductions than the Air Force and Navy. This is due in part because these land-based services measure their health by the quality and number of people within their ranks.\textsuperscript{13} Thus, personnel cuts are more painful for the Army and Marine Corps than for the other services, and their actions during the downsizing debate [reflect] their different organizational priorities.\textsuperscript{14}

According to the American Military History Center, the political environment and the national *military spirit* following Vietnam was at an all time low:

The end of American ground forces’ direct participation in the Vietnam War in January 1973 left the U.S. Army a much weakened institution. Public trust in the Army was at a low point, with many blaming the military for the war as much as they blamed the civilian policymakers whose orders the military was carrying out.\textsuperscript{15}

The Army underwent several fundamental changes following Vietnam: transition to an all-volunteer force, implementation of its Total Force policies relating to the operational roles of the Active Component, Reserve Component, and the National Guard, and reforms in doctrine and training.\textsuperscript{16} The effects of conscription service and the unpopularity of the war led many Army personnel to leave the military as soon as they were eligible. However, prior to end of the conflict, the Army and the DoD had begun tentative planning to transition to an all-volunteer force. For most planners, this was new ground.\textsuperscript{17} For the first time these planners had an opportunity to shape the Army and designate resources and efforts towards achieving force structure goals. The active Army forces were reduced from over 1.3 million in 1970 to less than 785,000 in
A common assessment is that these cuts were achieved in a haphazard, wide-sweeping, and indiscriminate manner. As noted by McCormick:

Morale fell sharply among the officers who remained in the Army after Vietnam and witnessed the brutal manner in which the Army managed the RIF process. The Army informed officers of their imminent separation by means of pink slips sent through official channels, which gave them ninety days to depart, and provided minimal separation pay and little transition assistance. The Reduction in Force (RIF) implemented by the Army during the mid-1970s was designed simply to get the Army smaller as rapidly as possible. There was minimal regard for sustaining critical skills or military occupational status (MOS), for the retention of experienced leaders, or for diversity in either the officer or non-commissioned officer (NCO) ranks of those who remained in the service. Army leaders did not clearly articulate a strategic force reduction plan, or at least they failed to transmit such a plan down to the operational and lower levels. Many personnel remained uncertain about how or when the next wave of personnel cuts would come. They simply questioned the Army’s future and were skeptical about their own prospects. These unsure attitudes may have been factors in many leaders’ lack of enthusiasm or willingness to mentor and develop subordinates, particularly minorities. They were fearful of increasing competition for already scarce manning billets, and for opportunities for promotions and leadership positions. The result of these and other actions after Vietnam contributed significantly to the leaving the Army in a state commonly referred to as the Hollow Army.

General Howard “Bo” Callaway, who followed General Creighton W. Abrams as the Army Chief of Staff for the beginning of the transition to an all volunteer force.
General Callaway led the downsizing efforts to shape the Army and his main concern was to ensure that quality Soldiers were recruited and retained to fill the reduced ranks.

Recruiting for an all-volunteer force meant that Army could decide who was eligible for service and who was not based on the needs of the service. Thus [The Army] could reject those whom it deemed undesirable, and woo those it wanted.\textsuperscript{21} In addition, the 1970s were a time of social transition for the U.S., and the Army. In \textit{America’s Army, Making the All-Volunteer Force}, Beth Bailey aptly described the situation:

During the 1970s, the problem of race was inescapable. These were days of anger and mistrust and violence, of continued white racism and black separatists desires. During this decade Americans were forced, time and again, to confront the legacy of centuries of oppression and discrimination. This was as true within the military as in American society as a whole. In the 1970s, every discussion of “quality” and the Army was shadowed by assumptions about race.\textsuperscript{22}

The draft lottery simply provided the military with a raw number of required Soldiers. The military entrance examination was the primary measure of a candidate’s potential for enlistment in the service. This process allowed little consideration of individuals other valuable attributes, such as diversity. With the all-volunteer force, the Army had to begin to answer the questions of why given individuals were qualified to serve, and why certain individuals were promoted or retained in the Army.

After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989, the DoD and Office of the Secretary of Defense paid considerable attention to developing a post-Cold War downsizing strategy in order to avoid the errors of the 1970s. Those drastic reductions following the Vietnam War led to the decimation of the military and the ensuing \textit{hollow force}. In the Department of the Army, this \textit{kinder gentler} effort was commonly referred to as the \textit{build down}. The goal was to create a smaller force, but one with greater readiness and
capabilities. In 1990, the Secretary of Defense directed that the services maintain (and if possible, improve) the quality of their forces and the proper skill mix. His goal was to ensure readiness and the fair and equitable treatment of personnel.23

During the post-Cold War build down, Army leaders recognized the need to maintain a pipeline of qualified recruits, both officer and enlisted, to meet the demands of a smaller force that had to do more with less. Included in the efforts to recruit a quality force was an effort to recruit and retain women and minority officers in the ranks at a rate not less than that of the overall population.24 In August 1990, the Army Chief of Staff, General Carl Vouno, in his briefing to U.S. Army Cadet Command, stated that recruiting efforts “must maintain opportunities for minority and female applicants while meeting enlistment criteria.”25 He then directed that recruiting must bring minority enlistments back to 1981 levels while “maintaining the best quality mix ever.” General Vouno maintained that those levels were more representative of the national minority population, and at the entry level, recruiting more minority high school graduates equaled better minority representation. General Vouno closed his remarks on equal opportunity by saying that “continued quality improvements are entirely consistent with continued equal opportunity.”26

Along with focused recruiting of minority soldiers and officers, the military used other ways to avoid the capricious separation practices following Vietnam. Because the post-Cold War force consisted entirely of volunteers, the services were inclined to show more compassion in the separation process. The last thing the military needed was a population of disgruntled former service members negatively influencing the already tough to recruit population of potential applicants.
Drawdown in the National Guard and Reserve Component

In June 1990, General Gordon R. Sullivan noted that “After every war, we have built up the Guard and Reserve: [after] WW I, WW II, Korea, and [Vietnam].” Historically, the National Guard’s end strength has been based upon maintaining a strategic reserve for the Army. Even during the military draft, there were significant troop shortages during the height of the Vietnam and Cold War periods. However, in 1965 President Johnson, ignoring the recommendation of former President Eisenhower, and for political reasons, decided against mobilizing the National Guard and Reserves to supplement active duty forces. Beth Bailey outlined President Johnson’s assessment that:

Mobilizing the reserves also seemed a more disruptive option than extending the draft. Men in the reserves were, on average, older and more established than those in the draft pool. They were likely to have jobs and families. Deploying reserve units to Vietnam would strip small communities of their fire-fighters and police officers and take fathers away from young families. There would be an immediate tangible effect. People would pay attention.

Subsequently the National Guard did not increase its strength to mobilize for Vietnam, and therefore, did not experience downsizing following Vietnam. In fact it gained some force structure (units) as a result of the Army moving some of its support and sustainment capability to the reserve component and its combat capabilities to the National Guard.

The National Guard managed its downsizing in much the same way as other services. The National Guard Bureau designated the total a number of authorized personnel (end strength) for each state, based upon its force structure, and their ability to recruit, retain, and fill the valid vacancies for each unit within the state. Relying on the National Guard Bureau’s (NGB) as an honest broker, states may compete for
additional force structure in order to justify increasing their authorized end-strength. However, when one state gains or increases an authorized number, another state or combination of states loses the same amount.

As previously noted, the National Guard, as a component of the total force, did not play a significant combat role in the Vietnam War. Its operational role was also very limited during the Cold War and Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The National Guard round-out and round-up Brigade concepts were tested with mixed results during the mobilization phase of Operation Desert Shield. The Reserve Component, including the National Guard, did in fact face cutbacks during the 1990s to achieve the end strength of forces authorized by Congress. Because of its role as a national strategic reserve, General Sullivan referred to the problem of reducing the reserve component and the National Guard as a “tough nut.”

The National Guard also provided a place for Soldiers to transition out of active service and allowed the Army to maintain access to experience uniformed service members. Worried about maintaining a quality reserve component, General Sullivan wrote “How do we find a home for our folks if we take the ARNG down?...RIF in the ARNG makes no sense.” At the end of the Cold War in 1990, the authorized end strength for the National Guard was 444,193. By the year 2000 this had been reduced to 353,006. McCormick wrote that:

Unlike the other services, the active Army competes for resources with extraordinarily influential and politically astute National Guard and Reserve forces. As post-Cold War cutbacks progressed, reserve and National Guard leaders lobbied heavily for an expanded role in national defense, at the expense of the active force.

The indicators for the 2012-2017 rounds of reductions show that the reserve component may be just as vulnerable as the active forces during this drawdown. As of November
2011, the Army Guard was manned at 361,511 Soldiers, which is about 3,300 Soldiers above its congressionally mandated end strength of 358,200. Therefore, the Reserves and particularly the National Guard must also answer the same questions as the Army, “What should we look like when we have reached our desired end strength?” More importantly “How are we going to get there?”

Managing Diversity, a Leadership Challenge

Managing diversity and the issues that arise from ineffectively or simply not addressing the lack of organizational diversity is a leadership challenge. Military leaders have grappled with diversity or race relations within the force since its existence, beginning with the first militia units formed in 1636, and in the subsequent wars which both founded and preserved our nation. More recently, General George W. Casey noted in a speech, that understanding the diversity issue would be an important part of his new role as Chief of Staff for the Army.

Chief, how are we doing on diversity?" It struck me like a ton of bricks that in the 60 days of transition preparation and the four months of going around the Army, all over the Army, no one had ever used that word. I had never heard the word used. That spoke volumes to me. Then, through a couple of other data points, I kind of got the feeling that we were too busy. We were all fully engaged and committed to the war...minorities weren't getting the mentoring, and care and feeding that they needed. Since President Truman ordered the complete integration of the military in 1948, “Military regulations had insisted on the equal rights and opportunities of Soldiers regardless of race,” according to Beth Bailey. She further observed that “It was never so simple, and racism marred institutional culture as well as individual lives.” Each branch of service has attempted to manage diversity through various programs of Equal Opportunity, Diversity or Sensitivity training. However, many of these efforts attempted to address issues that arose because diversity efforts which were either ineffective or
nonexistent, which lead to the discontent of many service members. Bailey outlined the Army’s acknowledgement of the importance of maintaining diversity:

During the 1970s, the Army learned that strong and visible Black leadership improved racial comity within the ranks. So in its own self interest, the Army worked hard to increase the number of Black commissioned officers…In 1975, only 3% of commissioned officers were Black; that figure was 11.4% in 1995. The senior NCO ranks had no lack of Black representation; by 1990 almost a third of first sergeants and sergeants major were Black (up from 14% in 1970). Army policies were explicitly race-conscious, and the Army judged them a success.\(^3\)\(^4\)

Clifford Alexander played a key role in guiding the Army transition to an all-volunteer force and a diverse force following the Vietnam era. As Secretary of the Army during the Carter Administration, he directed the military’s promotion boards to review the process by which Army Colonels are recommended for selection to Brigadier General. His strategy for increasing diversity among senior officers advocated considering much wider populations of eligible officers than the historic pool of eligible candidates. In fact, many promotion slates often contained no minority or female candidates, especially for promotion to Brigadier General, many due to poorly written evaluation reports or omission for selection to the requisite assignments. Secretary Alexander directed that the records of more top-tiered eligible Colonels be scrutinized for possible biases in previous ratings, selections, and assignments. In a 1997 New York Times editorial, he noted that such a comprehensive review yielded more minority promotions and enabled some who may have been otherwise overlooked to flourish and contribute significantly to the Army, and the military as a whole. Secretary Alexander reported “If such inconsistency was found, the board was instructed to eliminate the unfair rating and judge the people, both black and white, only by fair and equitable
This increased inclusiveness resulted in the selection of Colin Powell to Brigadier General, who eventually became the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Army is continuing to benefit from the lessons learned from the 1970s RIF. Accordingly, the Army reviewed the potential impact of the post Cold War build down on minority and female Soldiers. Despite impending budgetary reductions and political pressure to reduce the end-strength as rapidly as possible, the Army wanted first to identify the positions minorities were occupying in the force. Army leaders assessed whether the planned reductions would be proportionate to minority representations within the various career fields. Then-Brigadier General (BG) Theodore Stroup, as the Army Director of Military Personnel Management, noted that certain reductions “may be perceived as over representative because of the distribution and the density of minorities in the Army today.” He added that Army leaders were focused on “Keeping the best Soldiers and Officers for this period of transition, and for the future of the Army.” He cited a 1989 Equal Opportunity Assessment that identified where women and minorities were represented in the Army, relating to planned cuts identified by career field. If these cuts had been implemented as planned, tooth to tail, minorities would have been separated from the service at disproportionate rates due to their representation in career fields that were scheduled to take the lion’s share of reductions. Those career fields were primarily supply and services, combat support and combat service support—each heavily populated by women and minorities. BG Stroup discussed the impacts of this as, “The spillover to America’s hometown will certainly impact in a most negative sense on the propensity of young women and men to join the Army, or even re-enlist.” Thus, reductions within those identified career fields were not
as deep as originally planned. Similarly, other force reduction models were revised, adjusting by shortening the tours of Obligated Volunteer (OBV) and Other Than Regular Army (OTRA) Officers, both also heavily populated by females and minorities. These and many other Army efforts greatly reduced the negative impacts of downsizing on women and minorities. In the final analysis, the Army managed to retain a diverse corps of officers during the build-down immediately following the Cold War.

**Why is Maintaining A Diverse Force Relevant to the Army Today?**

Army leaders have a tremendous base of knowledge from lessons the last 40 years—findings from numerous reports and studies affirm the importance of maintaining a diverse and ready force. The Army has made earnest attempts to embed the values of diversity and inclusion into the current service culture and its policies and practices. It continues to refine organizational policies to prevent a climate that reflected racial divisiveness following the end of the Vietnam era during the transition to an all-volunteer force.

As current military budgets decrease, the foremost obligation of our civilian and military leaders is to assure that our military services retain the personnel, equipment and resources to fight and win our nations wars. Diversity initiatives however, must not be sacrificed in the name of fiscal conservatism. The Army was faced with similar conditions in the 1990s. BG Stroup recounted, “As the Army downsizes, equal opportunity programs will become a candidate for bill-paying.” Strategic leaders are obligated to establish policies and command guidance that enables a much smaller military to be ready and able to carry out its national security obligations.

Why should the Army be concerned with diversity when it is fighting for its very existence with the other services during inevitable drawdowns? A report by the
Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute explained how diversity enhances readiness. Accordingly strategic leaders must ensure that leaders at the organizational and tactical levels can convey the relevance and importance of effective diversity programs to Soldiers at all levels.

The Defense Equal Opportunity Management report cited the following as Ways Diversity Can Improve Readiness:

1. A military organization with a mission of innovation should profit from the enhanced knowledge resources that diversity brings.

2. Diversity improves the organization, regardless of the mission. In order to truly embrace diversity, an organization must be fair in its policies, evaluations, rewards, and development opportunities.

3. Diversity proactively points the organization towards the future.

4. Diversity management removes barriers to individual success in the organization. To allow all members to reach their potential, organizational barriers to holding positions, personal and career development, and promotion opportunity must be eliminated.

5. Diversity management reinforces continuous improvement in the organization.

6. Coping with diversity creates constant challenges such as potential conflicts among members of diversity groups, misunderstandings, and miscommunications.

7. Diversity makes the organization flexible. A flexible organization can more rapidly adapt to changes in mission, environment, competition, and customer needs.

The MLDC cited ways that barriers to career advancement can be overcome at all stages of a military career for both underrepresented demographic groups and for people with the requisite backgrounds and skill sets.

The National Guard and Diversity

As each service struggles to maintain diversity and meet diversity goals, the National Guard faces even greater challenges. As Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Shawn
Harris noted, based on the somewhat autonomous nature of each of the states and territories, “the ARNG diversity goals are much different from those of the Active Component.” Likewise, the MLDC report specifically addressed diversity concerns within the National Guard. The unique features of the National Guard require specific attention in terms of implementation and accountability. Most of the time, however, the National Guard is not on active duty, therefore—that is, not under federal control (U.S. Code Title 10).

LTC Harris further stated that “the 54 states and territories have different demographics; they need different strategies for creating the right environment for a diverse Guard.” This undoubtedly presents a significant leadership challenge because Guard leaders, under Title 32, are accountable only to their respective state governors. National Guard policies are often state-specific and devoid of oversight or accountability unless the governors or states adjutant generals (TAGs) take an active interest in improving diversity. President Obama’s appointment of General Craig McKinley, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff significantly increases the expectations that the National Guard becomes more accountable to certain institutional norms, such as maintaining a more diverse and ready force. This much sought after appointment significantly elevated the stature of the National Guard as a service component while also increasing its responsibility to meet the same expectations as the other services for organizational accountability.

Conclusion

So now what? How does the Army take the valuable lessons learned from both successful and not-so-successful downsizing experiences? How can Army leaders balance creating a smaller force that leaves the nation with a more diverse and ready
The critical factor is finding a dynamic solution that will position the Army as better prepared to meet its foremost obligation—to provide a land force capable of protecting our nation and its interests. Embracing diversity at all levels of leadership will only enhance the ability of all members within the force to reach their potential and thereby improving the capability of the entire force.

Leaders must become committed to diversity. Ensuring diversity is the senior and strategic leader’s responsibility. Leaders at each level must take a personal interest in the success or failure of programs designed to develop all members of the organization to their fullest potential. To this end, the Army must make an effort to fully disclose the intent of any diversity initiatives. Army leaders must clearly explain that espousing diversity does not give any particular group an advantage over another group.

Secretary Alexander was clear about this when he directed Army promotion boards to go back and identify additional officers qualified for promotion to Brigadier General. If the boards found any evidence that those officers who were initially excluded were subjected to previously unfair practices and ratings, “the board was to only eliminate the unfair rating and judge the people, both black and white, only by fair and equitable criteria.”48 As a result of his directive, a board found that “Colin Powell was like his white fellow generals -- no better, no worse. He did not get anything extra - - but more important, his white colleagues did not get anything extra either.” And the Army got something extra—an extraordinary leader.

The Army must make its diversity policy known throughout the force. The metrics must be clear and easily understandable. The MLDC noted that while the
military has historically captured accurate demographics for each service, its leaders have not “systematically tracked other aspects of diversity, such as cultural expertise and ability, and they do not explicitly evaluate the inclusiveness of the environment.”

The MLDC report then asserted that “relying entirely on the traditional metrics can send the wrong signal about diversity, suggesting that Armed Forces, to meet diversity standards, need to reach a quota of certain people regardless of their qualifications.”

Effective leaders should identify those Soldiers with considerable potential. The leaders then develop those Soldiers by taking a personal interest in their development. General Sullivan envisioned how the Army should look as he orchestrated its transformation following the Cold War:

> Quality people, military and civilian, will keep the Army great, regardless of downsizing and reposturing. We cannot compromise on quality. Throughout this period of turbulence, the CSA/SMA must exert personal leadership and stay on the high ground when communicating with the force on the drawdown of the Army. This must be “We still be a great Army”. We must watch equal opportunity and the issue of minorities (specifically Black males) being forced to leave disproportionately. ODCSPER must manage this issue carefully.

Army leaders, particularly those in the National Guard, should increase efforts to cast a wide net when considering Soldiers for promotion and selection for positions of greater responsibility with an increased emphasis on potential for performance for junior NCOs and company grade officers. Leaders will gain an appreciation for the skills and abilities that may be realized from those given an opportunity for consideration from a wider selection pool.

The way ahead for the National Guard is somewhat more problematic. To validate improvements in diversity, especially in the officer corps, require that senior Guard leaders are willing to hold individual states accountable for lack of progress.
Although the percentage of minority officers in the National Guard has not gotten worse, the National Guard has shown no improvements in almost 9 years (Figure 1). Army researchers should monitor recruiting and retention trends within each state and territory, along with statistics on selection, promotion, and assignment of minority officers. National Guard senior leaders must implement and follow-up on plans to improve diversity within the force. Perhaps current efforts to make the Guard a fully operational reserve force, and the appointment of a National Guard General to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, indicate DoD recognition of the National Guard’s significant role in our national defense. There may also indicate an expectation that Guard leaders be held just as accountable as their active duty commanders for meeting the challenges of growing diversity within their service.

The Active Army and the National Guard must reinforce mentoring at all levels and place command emphasis on mentoring mid-level officers and NCOs. Adopting such a catch-phrase as “Mentor someone who doesn’t look like you” will encourage cross-racial and cross-gender mentoring. This endeavor will also foster the mindset among service members that mentors need not share the same ethnic background as the person being mentored. What counts is the career and professional development of the mentee. Leaders should seek to mentor those who may need it and don’t realize it, or those who may be somewhat cautious, due to institutional norms, about approaching a senior ranking NCO or officer seeking personal guidance.
Leaders must be approachable and they should know how to discuss diversity and related issues as a habitual component of exercising their leadership. As previous stated diversity is not limited to race and gender based issues; however, a leader who can speak openly and honestly about race and gender issues will be more equipped to address concerns about all members of the organization. General of the Army George C. Marshall believed that “A decent regard for the rights and feelings of others is essential to leadership.”

The Army has placed new emphasis on achieving the ideals of equal opportunity and diversity, including the forming the Army Diversity office in 2006. Commanders and leaders must utilize the tools, systems, and processes already available to develop their diversity programs. There is no need to reinvent the wheel on diversity. Among others,
the MLDC report clearly outlined what needs to be achieved to improve diversity. Each unit and command has Equal Opportunity personnel whose expertise, as the result of extensive training and certification, should be used by the commanders to create a climate of diversity within the organization.

The Army has led the nation in fulfilling the promise of equal opportunity since President Truman signed Executive Order 9981, which officially ended segregation in the U.S. Armed Forces. BG Stroup summarized:

In the 1950s, while the nation grappled with Brown vs. the Board of Education, the Army already had integrated units. In the 1960s, while the nation dealt with the issues of the Civil Rights Act, the Army already had full participation by minorities. In the 1970s, while the nation faced quota challenges and reverse discrimination, the Army’s policies weathered all that. They were fair and understood, and most of all supported. In the 1980s, the nation witnessed higher level leadership and participation at all levels such as the election of L. Douglas Wilder as Governor of Virginia. For the nothing new, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, was expected, by most, when he was selected (sic).

As the military prepares to undergo another era of downsizing, both Army and National Guard senior leaders must take a hard look at what the force looks like now and how we want it to look when we reach the directed end strength. This paper analyzed previous Army draw downs, noting the impacts on minorities after the effort was achieved. Following the Vietnam War, the Army was left disjointed and hollow. However, the build down of the late 1980s and 1990s sought to shape the smaller Army for improved readiness and diversity. The results, though not ideal, were a significant improvement from the previous downsizing. As the Army prepares to draw down once again, strategic leaders must ensure that the force is fully prepared to meet the challenges of the future. And they must realize that a service in which all its members are allowed to realize their fullest potential and in which they are developed to achieve
their greatest potential, is a force that will be well-prepared to protect the nation, and when called upon, fight and win its wars.

Endnotes


5 Ibid.


12 McCormick, 1-2.


14 McCormick, 57.


17 Stewart, 270.


19 McCormick, 104.


21 Ibid, 89.

22 Ibid, 89.

23 McCormick, 75.

24 U.S. Department of the Army, Memorandum For the Secretary of the Army, Instructions for the Fiscal Year 1990 Regular Army (RA) Probationary and Conditional Voluntary Indefinite (CVI) Selection Board. February 17, 1990.


26 Ibid.


28 Bailey, 15.

29 Sullivan.

30 Ibid.

31 McCormick, 57.

33 Bailey, 89.

34 Ibid.


37 John J. McGrath (explanatory note), The Other End of the Spear: The Tooth to-Tail Ratio (T3R) in Modern Military Operations: This ratio is called the Tooth-to-Tail Ratio (T3R). By definition, the T3R refers to the number of troops in a military organization employed in combat duties versus the number functioning in noncombat roles. The Long War Series Occasional Paper 23, (Combat Studies Institute Press, Ft. Leavenworth, KS), 2.


39 Ibid.


44 MLDC, 95.


46 MLDC, 121.

47 Harris, 11.
48 Alexander, 1.

49 MLDC, 103.

50 MLDC, 104.


