Airborne Joint Forcible Entry: Ensuring Options for U.S. Global Response

by

Colonel Kyle E. Lear
United States Army

United States Army War College
Class of 2012

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT: A
Approved for Public Release
Distribution is Unlimited

This manuscript is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.
After a decade of fighting counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. Joint Force’s capability to conduct Joint Forcible Entry has atrophied. Although the military skills to exercise this option are out of practice, Joint Forcible Entry provides the U.S. with an essential capacity to deter conflict, project power and defeat opponents. Armed with a proliferation of new technology brought about by globalization, hostile state and non-state actors are becoming increasingly capable of limiting U.S. access to the global commons and to their territories. If unchecked, these impending infringements on our nation’s global freedom of movement will injure our national credibility, diminish our national power and threaten our national security. The U.S. must sustain a credible Airborne Joint Forcible Entry capacity as an option for the President. Airborne Joint Forcible Entry is a vital national capability that will dissuade our adversaries, reassure our allies and continue to assure U.S. global access and influence.
AIRBORNE JOINT FORCIBLE ENTRY: ENSURING OPTIONS FOR U.S. GLOBAL RESPONSE

by

Colonel Kyle E. Lear
United States Army

Professor Leonard Fullenkamp
Project Adviser

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Colonel Kyle Lear

TITLE: Airborne Joint Forcible Entry: Ensuring Options for U.S. Global Response

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 20 January 2012  WORD COUNT: 8,028  PAGES: 40

KEY TERMS: Joint Forcible Entry Operations, Joint Operational Access, Force Structure

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

After a decade of fighting counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. Joint Force’s capability to conduct Joint Forcible Entry has atrophied. Although the military skills to exercise this option are out of practice, Joint Forcible Entry provides the U.S. with an essential capacity to deter conflict, project power and defeat opponents. Armed with a proliferation of new technology brought about by globalization, hostile state and non-state actors are becoming increasingly capable of limiting U.S. access to the global commons and to their territories. If unchecked, these impending infringements on our nation’s global freedom of movement will injure our national credibility, diminish our national power and threaten our national security. The U.S. must sustain a credible Airborne Joint Forcible Entry capacity as an option for the President. Airborne Joint Forcible Entry is a vital national capability that will dissuade our adversaries, reassure our allies and continue to assure U.S. global access and influence.
When the USA loses the ability to forcibly enter another’s terrain, we’ve surrendered our influence in a world where that surrender won’t play well.¹

—GEN James N. Mattis

The United States is currently the world’s preeminent power. It boasts the world’s largest and most vibrant economy and it possesses an unmatched military. Its representative government, although imperfect, is a source of democratic inspiration around the world.

As the world’s dominant superpower, U.S. interests span the globe. In order for our military to reinforce these national interests, the U.S. Joint Force must maintain global freedom of movement, or Operational access, both in the global commons² and the sovereign territories of other nations when required.³ Operational access supports U.S. freedom of movement and our global interests by providing access to commerce, the ability to project military force globally to manage crisis, prevent war, or defeat enemies of the nation in war.⁴ In concert with national diplomatic, informational and economic efforts, our Joint Force provides operational access that secures Assured access for the nation. Assured access is the “unhindered national use of the global commons and sovereign territory, waters, airspace and cyberspace.”⁵ When adversaries of the U.S. or our coalition partners seek to limit or deny us access and influence in any region, the Joint Force is prepared to provide access using Joint Forcible Entry.

The rising power of potential adversaries, both states and non-state actors, are again threatening our access to the global commons, much as Germany threatened the
sea lanes in World War II. Our adversaries are also acquiring and implementing technologies that challenge our military dominance and seek to limit our access and operational maneuver. These impending infringements on our nation’s global freedom of movement can injure our national credibility, detract from our national power and threaten our national security.

Our credible capability to conduct Joint Forcible Entry Operations (JFEO) underwrites our global freedom of movement. JFEO provides operational access for our joint military forces and our coalition partners, which in turn provides assured access for our nation and our partnered nations. The U.S. ability to project force over strategic distances and forcibly enter other nations’ territories is unmatched among the world’s powers and it must be preserved. Our distinctive JFEO capability not only ensures U.S. access, it assures our allies and deters those adversaries that would otherwise challenge us. Sacrificing our JFEO capability will dramatically relegate the U.S. stature, influence and power worldwide. The U.S. cannot realistically accomplish the objectives outlined in the National Security Strategy without the real power to deter and defeat currently provided by our creditable JFEO capability.

This paper will demonstrate that the U.S. airborne JFEO capability is a vital national enabler to extend combat power, deter our adversaries and assure our allies. First, the paper will provide an examination of select historical examples that illustrate the benefits that a JFEO capability provides the nation. Next, it will examine emerging political, technological, fiscal and other environmental challenges that our nation and military must overcome to retain a credible national JFEO capacity. Finally, the paper will outline recommendations for the nation and the Joint Force to best organize, train
and sustain the force to maximize the deterrence and defeat potential provided by our JFEO capability.

**Joint Forcible Entry Operations Doctrine**

The military community recognizes the importance of assured and operational access and its symbiotic relationship with our national power and our national security. Understanding the potential negative impacts of an increasingly complex environment on our global national freedom of movement, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) has directed a thorough update of joint doctrine to ensure continued U.S. global access. Joint Publication 3-18 (Joint Forcible Entry Operations) outlines the Joint Force methodology that will enable sustained operational access in the most challenging scenario-contested environments.

Joint Publication 3-18 defines Forcible Entry (FE) as a “joint military operation conducted against armed opposition to gain entry into the territory of an adversary,” typically to seize a lodgment and enable follow on operations. JFEO doctrinally seeks to achieve one of three operational purposes: establish a lodgment for continued operations, establish multiple, linked lodgments to support a campaign, or to conduct singular operations.

Although Forcible Entry Operations (FEO) are inherently joint, requiring USAF and USN lift and other enablers and resources, the Army and the Marine Corps provide the core maneuver formations. The Army contributes airborne or air assault formations to JFEO, while the USMC typically provides amphibious forces. The Joint Force can employ Army and Marine JFEO formations independently or in unison. The contributions of the USMC and the U.S. Army to our national JFEO capability are
equally important. However, this paper will limit the scope of study to Airborne JFEO, which is a capability uniquely provided by U.S. Army formations.

As noted above, the amphibious, air assault and airborne forces that contribute to our national JFEO capability are equally important. Each unique JFEO capability provides the President and the Secretary of Defense with possible solutions for distinct JFEO problem sets. Sacrificing any of the three types of formations would limit our national flexibility and delete a range of strategic options available to the President.

For example, Airborne JFEO may be the preferred option when the nation requires forcible entry in a territory where distances exceed the power projection capability of carrier or ship-based units (Marines or Army). JFEO target areas may be located in the deep interior of large land regions, such as Africa, China, or Russia, too far for carrier-launched rotary wing forces to access. Airborne JFEO might also be a preferred course of action for strategic objectives where larger numbers of troops and heavy equipment are required, versus an operational or tactical objective requiring a smaller footprint without armored vehicles. Army JFEO can insert a brigade-sized formation with heavy equipment by airdrop, over multiple drop zones and landing zones, and then quickly introduce additional armored vehicles and follow-on forces. Airborne JFEO provides unique options for the National Command Authority to introduce significant combat power into both uncontested and contested environments.

The main component of an Airborne JFEO formation is an airborne-capable Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), supported by USAF transport aircraft and a wide variety of joint enablers. Given their usual heightened readiness status, airborne forces can alert and deploy rapidly across considerable distances, airdrop and mass quickly on
enemy objectives, achieving tactical or operational surprise. Additionally, as outlined in JP 3-18, “Airborne forces can secure and/or destroy critical installations, facilities or terrain; reinforce U.S. and multinational forces; and conduct a show of force or attack an adversary in isolated areas.”

Historical Significance of Forcible Entry Operations

The U.S. and our coalition allies have relied on JFEO to accomplish strategic, operational and tactical objectives since World War II. Serving the same purposes they provide today, JFEO provided the allies with the capacity to rapidly extend combat power and to deter and defeat enemies. U.S. forces have used JFEO to establish lodgments for continued operations, to establish multiple, linked lodgments to support a campaign and to conduct singular operations. JFEO have contributed to U.S. success in almost every major conflict since World War II.

JFEO were critical to the success of coalition and U.S. objectives in both the European and Pacific Theaters in World War II. As an essential component of the allied coalition, the U.S. led and provided the bulk of the combat power in several large scale, coalition airborne JFEO. Some of the most heralded JFEO were Operation Torch into Northern Africa in 1942, Operation Husky into Sicily in 1943, Operation Neptune into Normandy, France and Operation Market-Garden into the Netherlands in 1944. Although smaller in scale and less publicized, U.S. and coalition forces also conducted JFEO in the Pacific theater. U.S. Joint forces conducted FEO into New Guinea in 1943 and 1944 and onto the island of Corregidor, Philippines in 1945.

In the Korean conflict, the U.S. employed JFEO at the strategic level in Operation Chromite, an amphibious assault at Inchon on the west coast of South Korea. The U.S. also employed airborne FEO to achieve operational and tactical objectives. U.S.
airborne forces parachuted into North Korea in 1950 and into South Korea in 1951 to block the movement of North Korean forces and accomplish other tactical and operational tasks. In Vietnam in 1967, U.S. forces conducted Operation Junction City into North Vietnam, an airborne JFEO with the operational objective of locating and destroying North Vietnamese field headquarters.

Although smaller in scope than World War II operations, airborne JFEO during the period spanning 1981 to 2003 have been just as strategically important for the United States and our coalition partners. In the surge of U.S. deployments around the globe following the end of the cold war, the President often chose to rapidly and clearly demonstrate U.S. force using airborne JFEO. In fact, with the exception of Kosovo, every U.S. combat operation since 1981 has incorporated a forcible entry mission. Notable U.S. airborne JFEO from this period include the 1980 invasion of Grenada for Operation Urgent Fury, the 1989 invasion of Panama in Operation Just Cause, the 2001 airborne assault into Kandahar, Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, and the 2003 JFEO into northern Iraq as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Each of these critically important JFEO opened lodgments and introduced follow-on combat power in contested territories far from the U.S. homeland. Most importantly, each of these highly successful JFEO reinforced a lesson to the world—that the U.S. can introduce large quantities of ground combat power at a place and time of its choosing. This indispensable national capability deters nation states and even non-state actors from taking actions that would counter U.S. interests. Secondly, this JFEO capability assures and strengthens relationships with those nations that share our ideals and common interests.
Even though the U.S. has not employed airborne JFEO since Operation Northern Delay in 2003, this essential national capability remains a viable means of rapidly delivering military combat power in support U.S. policy goals and objectives. Two operations that occurred within the last 20 years clearly demonstrate the strategic deterrent and power projection capabilities inherent in airborne JFEO. The operations are the 1994 JFEO in Haiti to initiate Operation Uphold Democracy and the 2003 JFEO into northern Iraq supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom.

**Operation Uphold Democracy, Haiti, 1994**

In concert with the diplomatic, informational and economic elements of national power, airborne JFEO are a powerful military policy tool on the President’s menu of options. Given the strategic reach provided by the USAF and our global military force posture, the U.S. can project robust military forces into territories worldwide and on relatively compressed timelines. As such, JFEO are an essential component of the U.S. capacity to deter and defeat adversaries, react to crisis or restore peace. The September 1994 Haiti show of force supporting Operation Uphold Democracy serves as an excellent example of the deterrent effect of JFEO. In September 1994, President Clinton approved Operation Uphold Democracy to forcibly remove Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras from power. Lieutenant General Cedras had been the leader of Haitian military forces and had taken control of the Haitian government from Jean-Bertrand Aristide by coup in 1993.

When the President directed the removal of Lieutenant General Cedras from power, airborne JFEO provided a viable solution. Airborne JFEO offered the nation a rapid, powerful and widely visible demonstration of U.S. national power. As stated by Anthony Tata, “With no friendly lodgment or [U.S.] forces in country, the concept for
Haiti called for a genuine forcible entry plan” and distributed almost 4,000 paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division over two drop zones to achieve 40 assault day operational objectives. In total, 32 C-130 aircraft with paratroopers and 28 C-130s with heavy equipment departed two air bases in the United States, while 53 C-141 aircraft staged to take off from 3 separate bases. The pending airborne invasion was the largest since Operation Market Garden in World War II.

A large U.S. force such as this one provides the nation with significant deterrent power and an ability to shape the political environment to achieve its objectives. Lieutenant General Cedras was likely intimidated by the deterrent factor of the impending U.S. airborne JFEO. When he was notified that the 82nd Airborne Division was in the air and on the way to conduct a JFEO into the capital city of Port-au-Prince and other locations, Lieutenant General Cedras gave way to diplomatic proposals and surrendered control of the government. As proposed by William Allen, “General Cedras only agreed to leave after tough negotiations and perhaps the realization that he faced an approaching force similar to that of the airborne invasion of Panama in 1989. The airborne JFEO had provided the U.S. administration with immense deterrent power, and in concert with diplomatic, information and economic means, was the decisive instrument that contributed to Lieutenant General Cedras’ decision to step down and relinquish power to President Aristide.

Operation Northern Delay, Northern Iraq, 2003

One of the most recent examples of airborne JFEO occurred in March of 2003, eight days after the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. In this operation, the 173d Airborne Brigade conducted an airborne FEO onto Bashur Airfield in northern Iraq as part of Operation Northern Delay. CENTCOM’s strategic intent was to open the northern
front of Iraq to "hasten the Iraqi regime’s rapid collapse, protect critical Iraqi oil fields, and protect the Kurdish population from atrocities." The operational intent was that the 173d Airborne Brigade would support special operations forces in order to prevent Iraqi operations against the Kurds, reduce factional fighting among the Kurdish tribes, and deter Turkish intervention in Iraq.

This operation is noteworthy as a JFEO for at least three reasons. The airborne JFEO was conducted in response to anti-access issues, it demonstrates strategic responsiveness, and it demonstrates the unique capacity of airborne JFEO to secure a lodgment and rapidly build combat power in a landlocked and remote territory.

When Turkey denied the U.S. military ground transit rights from European bases through Turkey into Iraq, JFEO again provided the nation with a feasible option. Although Turkey is an ally of the United States and eventually agreed to overflight of its territory, political pressure and other cultural factors led the Turkish government to deny the U.S. ground access to Iraq through Turkey. The Bashur airfield was a landlocked objective, far from coastal waters and ship-based support, located in hostile Iraq, and strategically distant to the continental U.S. Given that U.S. maneuver forces in Europe could not access northern Iraq by ground, the problem required an airborne JFEO solution.

This operation also highlights the strategic responsiveness provided by a forward-based airborne brigade. The 173d Airborne Brigade is based in Italy, and was able to quickly project ample combat power into northern Iraq given the approximate six hour one way flight time by C-17. Had European-based airborne forces not been
available, a CONUS-based airborne brigade would have taken significantly longer to arrive in the objective area.

Finally, the Bashur Airfield operation is a textbook example of an airborne JFEO that seized a lodgment by airborne assault and then secured, improved and opened the lodgment for aircraft to land and offload much larger amounts of personnel and equipment. Following the airborne operation, C-17 flights landed at Bashur and delivered the USAREUR Immediate Ready Force (IRF). This heavy force consisted of Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles and M1113 armored personnel carriers, as well as organic fire support assets and elements of a forward support battalion. The delivery of mechanized forces into the lodgment demonstrates that airborne forces can lead the way for the introduction of medium and heavy forces. These heavy forces can counter enemy armored formations or other threats that might challenge the capabilities of an airborne capable IBCT. Additionally, this JFEO was the first C-17 combat airborne assault, included the largest C-17 formation to date, and incorporated the largest single-pass nighttime drop since the Normandy invasion. These factors provided the nation with strategic and operational surprise, further enhancing the deterrent factor of the operation. Combining airborne, airdrop and air land JFEO capabilities, this 5 night operation allowed 62 C-17 sorties to deliver 2,175 passengers, approximately 3,060 short tons of cargo and 408 vehicles into Iraq. This historical example demonstrates that JFEO are useful even when the objective areas reside far from the U.S. at distances where carrier-launched Marines or Soldiers are a sub-optimal choice, where no close friendly airfields exist, and even in anti-access environments.
Although there are many excellent historical examples where the President chose JFEO to achieve national objectives, these two operations clearly demonstrate its capacity to rapidly deliver overwhelming combat power and its corresponding deterrent power. Airborne JFEO provides a clear and decisive military option to strategic problems and complements our national diplomatic, information and economic efforts. Our military’s JFEO capability is one of the most visible and vital contributions to the nation’s deterrent power. When put into action, JFEO also powerfully assure our allies and demonstrate explicit U.S. resolve and commitment. Using our history as the greatest predictor, U.S. leadership will continue to rely on the Joint Force to provide JFEO as an essential element of our national power.

**National Security Strategy and Joint Forcible Entry Operations**

Each of our national security strategy documents published since 2008 contains a common thread that underlines the importance of maintaining our national JFEO capability. The common theme describes deterring and defeating the aggression of our adversaries in increasingly sophisticated operating environments around the globe. Although the nation will employ diplomatic, informational and economic means to deter and defeat our enemies, it cannot expect to achieve its objectives without military power. One of the most visible and effective deter and defeat mechanisms provided by our military is our JFEO capability. JFEO allow the rapid and overwhelming projection of U.S. combat power to locations across the globe, both in uncontested and contested environments. President Obama underscores this requirement in the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) when he states, “The United States remains the only nation able to project and sustain large-scale military operations over extended distances. We maintain superior capabilities to deter and defeat adaptive enemies.”20
The 2008 National Defense Strategy serves as the bridge between the NSS and the National Military Strategy (NMS). In this capstone document, the Secretary of Defense outlines two critical areas that support the requirement to maintain our JFEO capability. The first echoes the President’s words on our ability to deter, which he defines as “influencing the political and military choices of an adversary, dissuading it from taking an action by making its leaders understand that either the cost of the action is too great, is of no use, or unnecessary.”21 Our long history of employing effective JFEO advertises credibility and therefore deterrence. Our deterrence credibility also serves to assure our Allies and the American public of the nation’s ability and intent to defend them.22 Conversely, an inability to perform JFEO would signal a national inability to deter, and would therefore gravely weaken our national capability to deter and dissuade our adversaries. The second proposition supporting the maintenance of our national JFEO capability is that “The U.S. requires freedom of action in the global commons and strategic access to important regions of the world to meet our national security needs.”23 By definition, JFEO provides a military solution to this requirement in the most challenging condition, which is against armed opposition to entry.

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) unites the guidance outlined in the NSS and the NDS, with the purpose of rebalancing the capabilities of our military forces to win wars and to build the capabilities to counter future threats.24 This important document stresses the fact that the U.S. is the only nation that can project and sustain major operations over extended distances.25 It then links this unique, unmatched capacity to our ability to deter our adversaries and reassure the U.S. public and our allies. Secretary Gates states, “In the absence of dominant U.S. power projection
capabilities, the integrity of U.S. alliances and security partnerships could be called into question, reducing U.S. security and influence and increasing the possibility of conflict.” 26 Although our nation’s JFEO capability only represents a portion of our capacity to project power, JFEO provide the only military tool available to the President to rapidly project ground combat power into contested regions around the world. Projection of overwhelming combat power across strategic distances is challenging enough in an uncontested environment, but in the face of armed opposition, only JFEO rise to this challenge. Recognizing the complexity of the current and future threat environment and the importance of our power projection capacity, the QDR directs the DoD to continue the development of JFEO as one of several critical capability areas, along with ISR, fighters and long-range strike aircraft, and information networks and communications. 27

The 2011 NMS also provides national level guidance reinforcing the requirement to sustain a national JFEO capability. This document describes the ways and means that the U.S. Joint Force will employ to implement the directives and intent of the NSS and the QDR. Then CJCS Admiral Mullen notes the U.S. role as the global guarantor of security and outlines the necessity for the Joint Force to deter and defeat aggression. He notes that our ability to deter is paramount, stating that “Preventing wars is important as winning them, and far less costly.” 28 With respect to deterring adversaries and defeating aggression, Admiral Mullen notes that our core military competencies must include JFEO and the ability to ensure joint assured access to the global commons when they are contested. 29
Recently, in January 2012, the President published a national level document titled *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*. In this document, which will guide national and military strategy for the foreseeable future, President Obama notes that the nation must “…continue to invest in the capabilities critical to future success…” including “…operating in anti-access environments.” This statement further highlights the pressing nature of maintaining our formidable JFEO capability, specifically to preserve operational and assured access for the nation.

It is evident that our JFEO capability is an essential ingredient of our national security strategy, our national defense strategy and our national military strategy. The U.S. government cannot rely on diplomatic and economic means alone to deter conflict or defeat aggression. Military means are an indispensable element of our national power and JFEO are the only genuine means for projecting U.S. ground combat power into contested environments. Without a credible JFEO capacity, U.S. access, influence, and therefore U.S. power would be significantly diminished. Highlighting the required capabilities of our JFEO formations, SECDEF Rumsfeld stated that the U.S. must maintain “rapidly deployable, fully integrated joint forces, capable of reaching distant theaters quickly…to strike adversaries swiftly, successfully and with devastating effect.”

**Globalization, Anti-Access and Area Denial Challenges**

When diplomacy fails to resolve international differences, maintain peace or meet the President’s intent, the U.S. must be capable of rapidly projecting decisive military combat power worldwide. Although the U.S. remains fully capable of projecting power worldwide and on relatively short notice, a changing global environment continues to erode our once dominant capabilities. Globalization continues to provide both state and
non-state actors with access to information and technologies formerly only available to the most powerful nation states. Open economic markets and the free exchange of technology have provided potential adversary states with unprecedented access to advanced weapon systems that are now eroding traditional U.S. military advantages. Globalization is leveling the playing field and in the process diminishing U.S. national power relative to the remainder of the world.

Together, the increasingly complex operating environment and the gradual growth of capable adversaries threaten U.S. global access. Our adversaries’ power is no longer limited to the strength of its military, but now resides in its “interconnected political, military, economic, social, informational, and infrastructure systems.” Adversarial governments, once deterred by the military overmatch wielded by the U.S., now openly challenge our freedom of movement. These strategies, commonly referred to as anti-access (A2) and area-denial (AD), seek to prevent entry of military forces into a theater of operations (A2) and further seek to limit military freedom of action in the areas under a nation’s direct control (AD)."32

Globalization and the Proliferation of Technology: Empowering Our Adversaries

For several decades, U.S. ability to project military force to regions around the globe has been essentially unopposed.34 However, as outlined above, the forces of our current complex environment threaten to diminish this capability. Admiral Jay Johnson, as the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), predicted over ten years ago that our enemies would eventually strive to counter U.S. might. He anticipated that enemy nations would target concentrations of U.S. troops and materiel on the ground, in the air and at sea. Additionally, he projected that the U.S. ability to counter the area-denial threat would stand as the “single most crucial element in projecting and sustaining U.S. military
power where it is needed.” To describe the multitude of technologies now widely available to U.S. adversaries falls beyond the scope of this paper. However, as an example, weapons such as the Russian-made S-300 missile now have the potential to destroy U.S. airborne aircraft, cruise missiles and even ballistic missiles. The Russians have sold thousands of these weapons to countries across Asia, Europe and the Middle East. These weapons are slowly narrowing the large technological advantage that the U.S. has enjoyed since the end of World War II and are placing our operational and assured access at heightened levels of risk.

Potential adversary nations also possess and continue to improve enhanced integrated air defense systems (IADS) and some even possess the ability to target satellites that provide U.S. and coalition forces with global positioning, communication and mapping services. The increased availability of precision, long range weaponry to our adversaries provides them with a capability not only to target U.S. and coalition ships, aircraft and satellites, but also U.S. bases and staging areas. Unprecedented advancements in enemy capabilities now threaten our service members, their equipment and U.S. infrastructure at previously unopposed staging and transit locations around the world. These vulnerabilities to our power projection capability further accentuate the requirement for a credible national JFEO capacity.

The diffusion and proliferation of technology is not limited to advanced weapon systems. Both states and non-state actors can now communicate across strategic distances and even access satellite imagery and sophisticated mapping resources using the internet, satellite communications and cellular technology. Each of these communication mediums was birthed in the U.S. and provides positive benefit to the
world daily, yet each can be utilized by our adversaries to limit access and diminish the effectiveness of our JFEO. Our adversaries are hijacking the technologies that support increased prosperity and stability for the majority of the world to reduce freedom of movement of the U.S. and our allies. The national leadership must recognize that these threats are destabilizing the global environment, eroding our JFEO capacity, and diminishing U.S. assured access. The U.S. must take prudent steps to limit or reverse these negative effects and preserve our ability to project power and maintain global freedom of movement. To accomplish this task, the Joint Force must continue to improve its JFEO capacity in anti-access environments, in concert with other DoD and Joint initiatives such as Air-Sea Battle\(^37\) and Long Range Strike\(^38\). The President’s goals to maintain U.S. global freedom of movement and global influence are among the most important outlined in the recently published “Priorities for 21st Century Defense.” The requirement to maintain our JFEO capability is clear when President Obama says, “The United States will continue to lead global efforts with capable allies and partners to assure access to and use of the global commons, both by strengthening international norms of responsible behavior and by maintaining relevant and interoperable military capabilities.”\(^39\)

**A Shifting Global Military Force Posture**

In addition to the diffusion of technology and weapons, there are also more routine changes taking place in the global environment that equally threaten our traditional global ease of access. Adjustments in U.S. basing policy are another changing condition that could restrict our global freedom of movement if they are not properly managed. When the U.S. possesses rapidly deployable JFEO forces in forward-deployed locations, it retains decisive maneuver advantage. Not only do these
forces demonstrate a strong U.S. commitment to the country or region where they are stationed, they are also extremely strategically responsive when required for JFEO. Forward deployed, land-based JFEO forces can be combined with strategically launched land or sea-based JFEO elements to overwhelm enemy defenses and achieve national objectives.

A calculated U.S. overseas defense posture supports the nation’s freedom of movement through pre-positioning forces and materiel and maintaining bases that contribute to U.S. global reach. How and where we choose to array our military forces overseas determines the level of ability to rapidly project power and thereby the level to which we can deter and defeat our adversaries. Our leadership recognizes that U.S. overseas basing strategy is directly linked to our national JFEO capability and subsequently to U.S. operational and assured access. As affirmed by Admiral Mullen in the 2011 NMS, “Global posture remains our most powerful form of commitment and provides us strategic depth across domains and regions.”

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, the U.S. has continued to adjust overseas basing strategy to keep pace with the National Security Strategy and adjust its global forces to counter perceived and potential threats. However, fiscal pressures resulting from an increasing national debt and related changes in national security strategy and military transformation are demanding rapid change in our global military force posture. Today, because of this fiscal stress and the political pressures to reduce spending after major conflicts, the U.S. is closing overseas bases, returning units to the homeland and downsizing its military. It is projected that by 2013, 90% of the Army will be CONUS-based.
As the administration continues to direct reductions in military force structure and withdraw forces to the continental U.S., it is essential that we maintain the right combination of forward-deployed forces and staging and transit support locations to facilitate our national JFEO capacity. U.S. Global force posture must support the objectives of National Security Strategy and must support a viable JFEO capability. Failure to maintain critical bases for staging and transit support or removal of sufficient forward-deployed rapid reaction forces that can quickly respond to crisis would constitute strategic error and could dramatically diminish our national JFEO capacity.

As an example of supporting a forward-deployed airborne JFEO structure, the Joint Force should strongly consider leaving an airborne capable IBCT in both Europe and in Alaska. Although these two IBCTs are probably two of the most expensive IBCTs because of their basing costs, these brigades support the EUCOM and PACOM Commanders with JFEO-capable airborne rapid reaction forces. In two extremely important unified command areas of responsibility, these brigades demonstrate U.S. resolve, dissuade and deter our adversaries, and provide the President and the combatant commanders with a creditable, versatile and viable JFEO capability.

The U.S. government must ensure that it retains the right combination of JFEO-capable forces at CONUS and OCONUS bases. Our senior military leadership must ensure that the military force is drawn down responsibly, so that our national JFEO capability is not sacrificed in the impending cuts to military force structure and overseas basing.

International Political Pressure and Restrictions on U.S. Basing and Transit Rights

In addition to the fiscal pressures and force structure and basing issues mentioned above, political issues are also challenging our operational and assured
access. Restrictions on U.S. access and transit rights are both a strong reason for the U.S. to maintain a JFEO capability and a challenge to our current capability.

Familiar examples that demonstrate an increasing resistance to U.S. access are abundant: Saudi Arabia and Turkey refusing to allow U.S. air strikes on Iraq to originate from their countries (1998), Greece refusing to permit U.S. forces to operate from its bases (1999), and Turkey refusing to allow U.S. ground forces access to Iraq (2003).\textsuperscript{42} The latest examples include political pressures to limit U.S. air basing rights in Kyrgyzstan and Pakistan's withdrawal of ground transit rights closing the major U.S. supply route into Afghanistan after a U.S.-Pakistani fratricide incident. As other nations' relative power continues to increase in comparison to our own, political pressures will increasingly threaten U.S. basing and transit flexibility, and thereby limit our global access. The U.S. government, in concert with the military, must continue to use diplomatic, informational and economic means to sustain and improve our global national access. Successes in this pursuit will not only deter our adversaries and reduce the likelihood that we will have to employ JFEO, it will enhance the success of JFEO when diplomacy fails. As outlined in the 2009 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, “Diminished access will complicate the maintenance of a forward presence…this challenge may require forcible-entry capabilities designed to seize and maintain lodgments in the face of armed resistance.”\textsuperscript{43}

Increased Frequency and Uncertainty of Global Military Conflict

A third factor that both complicates U.S. global access and simultaneously necessitates a JFEO capability is the increased frequency of deployments and the corresponding uncertainty in destination. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, U.S. interests followed the shift from a bi-polar to a multi-polar global perspective.
Corresponding security strategies encouraged increased U.S. commitments to newly found “hot spots” around the world. During the relatively stable Cold War period from 1947 to 1989, U.S. military units deployed 16 times, but in the increasingly unstable and multi-polar post-cold war period of 1989 to 1997, the U.S. military deployed 45 times. Military deployments since the late 1990s have continued on an upward trend, tempered only by major combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. If this trend of increasing military deployments follows the projected decline in global stability, then predicting the location of future military deployments will continue to be difficult. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates espoused to Cadets at West Point in 2011, “…when it comes to predicting the nature and location of our next military engagements… our record has been perfect. We have never once gotten it right.” Although the increasing pace and uncertainty of military commitments exacerbate issues with U.S. access and freedom of movement, it clearly reinforces the fundamental requirement for a responsive, versatile and viable national JFEO capability.

In reviewing these factors that presently challenge our freedom of maneuver and our global access, it is both readily evident and paramount that the U.S. retain the capability to rapidly project decisive military ground combat power into contested territories worldwide. JFEO provides the U.S. with a capability to deter and defeat our adversaries, respond to crisis, or promote peace and stability. Sacrificing our national JFEO capacity diminishes our national power, our preeminence on the world stage and ultimately undermines our national security. As eloquently summarized by the Honorable Robert Work:
Any perception that American forces might not be able to gain or sustain access or influence in regions of national interest could severely undercut American diplomacy and deterrence. We must never concede limits to our own strategic and operational freedom of action in the global commons where we and our allies have vital interests.46

Reduced Force Structure and the Potential Negative Impact on U.S. JFEO Capability

Given the nation’s current fiscal crisis and the impending military budget cuts, a very real threat exists for the U.S. government to inadvertently destroy or limit vital military capabilities when cutting force structure and closing U.S. bases. This possibility undoubtedly increases in concert with the depth of the cuts. In attempting to balance the budget and “right-size” the Joint Force, it is possible that the U.S. could reduce or eliminate its own vital JFEO capability. Nathan Freier from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) warns, “Capabilities in…strategic responsiveness…and forcible entry—are particularly important, and either are or may become areas where, should they be cut back too far, U.S. options to meet key threats would be severely constrained.”47

Historically, the U.S. has cut military resources after the termination of major conflicts and has cut even deeper during election years. As the U.S. withdraws from Iraq and Afghanistan and as it approaches a Presidential Election in 2012, the government must responsibly draw down the military to prevent sacrificing critical national capabilities. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta recently described the potential future mismatch of forces and resources to missions and responsibilities, and noted that this process typically results in a weaker, rather than a stronger national security. Mr. Panetta stated that he is “determined not to repeat the mistakes of the past.”48 We must not sacrifice our national JFEO capability for budgetary reasons.
LTG (Retired) David Barno, a senior advisor and fellow at the Center for a New American Security, outlines four possible options for making responsible cuts to the DoD budget in his October 2011 “Hard Choices” study. Even in his fourth scenario, which outlines the deepest budget cut of almost $822 billion dollars, LTG (Retired) Barno recommends that the Army not forfeit its JFEO capability. He recommends that after cuts, remaining active-duty Army forces focus on rapid response and forcible entry, notably airborne and helicopter assault.\textsuperscript{49}

Another key point that highlights the necessity to retain our JFEO capability is that the U.S. capability is unique among our allies. Although our most capable allies in NATO (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) can conduct airborne operations, only the U.S. possesses sufficient aircraft and the required enablers to conduct large scale JFEO in a contested environment. JFE is one military capability where the U.S. cannot depend on a NATO contribution or for our allies to conduct independent JFEO. In this respect, the U.S. JFEO capability is analogous to an endangered species. The risk of losing this national capability could be catastrophic to our national security strategy.

In today’s globalizing economy, the fiscal pressures currently facing the U.S. are also impacting our allies. Our NATO allies are downsizing their militaries and like the U.S., potentially divesting capabilities in the process. As U.S. partners like Australia begin to consider cutting their expensive JFEO capabilities,\textsuperscript{50} it becomes even more critical that we retain our unique JFEO capacity. In an increasingly complex and globalized international environment, it is likely that the U.S. will become more
dependent on the contributions and capabilities of our allies. If our allies cannot readily contribute to JFEO, it is essential that the U.S. safeguard its unique JFEO capability.

A further threat to our national JFEO capability is organizational threat—that is, requirements and resourcing are not properly aligned in some of the military’s principle guiding documents. Although the requirement for global force projection in anti-access environments is clearly articulated in the NSS and the NDS, and JFEO are clearly directed in the QDR and the NMS, the JFEO requirement is no longer addressed in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The JSCP provides Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) guidance to the CJCS and the Combatant Commanders (CCDRs), but more importantly, it apportions forces and resources to the CCDRs to assist them in accomplishing their directed tasks. Because the SECDEF does not assign JFEO as a specified capability to the CJCS or CCDRs in the JSCP, the Presidential budget does not allocate military resources to JFEO. Even though our Airborne Brigades still conduct JFEO-supporting Mission Essential Training List (METL) tasks in conjunction with Air Force units, there are no funding lines in the Department of Defense (DoD) budget that resource the Joint Force to remain proficient on the JFEO task. As a result, joint forces are not required by Presidential or SECDEF directive to sustain the JFEO capacity.

A good example of the problems this mismatch creates is the Joint directive for a CJCS-directed Joint Airborne/Air Transportability Training (JA/ATT) program. Although the JA/ATT program still exists, it does not adequately support its JFEO training support function as it once did when the JSCP included the specific JFEO requirement. Because the JSCP no longer directs JFEO, the JA/ATT program is now ad hoc, unfunded and competes with other joint priorities. Because 18th Airborne Corps and
senior USAF leadership understand the national need to maintain a capable JFEO “community of competence,” the Joint Community cooperates to maintain JFEO training proficiency. However, as the JFEO requirement is not codified in national-level documents or directives, JFEO supporting relationships, like the training, are also informal. In the absence of unifying national and joint documents and resources, supporting military units must approach JFEO proficiency on an improvised basis. As stated by GEN Carl Stiner, U.S. Army (Retired), “Thus we now find a divergence of approaches being taken unilaterally to what are probably the most complex and complicated joint operations [JFEO], and no comprehensive statement of the requirement in DoD documents.”

Without a codified national-level JSCP requirement for JFEO, the training and resourcing of this vital national task will continue to take a back seat to other priorities.

Given the increasingly critical necessity for the U.S. to sustain and demonstrate its JFEO capability, the SECDEF must codify the JFEO requirement and restore it in the JSCP and other appropriate defense-level documents. Reincorporating the JFEO capability to the JSCP and other “gold standard” DoD documents will validate the nation’s JFEO capability and allocate appropriate resources for JFEO training and readiness.

One more threat to our JFEO readiness concerns our Joint Force’s level of training proficiency in this critical task. After 10 years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. military’s capacity to conduct airborne JFEO has atrophied. Rightfully so, the American military has been preoccupied with its wartime tasks, specifically counterinsurgency operations, security force assistance and nation-building. As
highlighted by General James Mattis, “In many cases, there are now joint war-fighters who have never assaulted a beach or hit a drop-zone by parachute. Because of this, we are seeing a decline in our ability to conduct forcible entry operations, operations that can reassure our friends and temper our adversaries’ designs.”

The training shortfalls, however, extend well beyond the Soldier or Marine jumping onto a drop zone or assaulting a beach. Within the Army’s airborne capable brigades, entire units, to include the staffs and key leadership, have experienced substantial loss of proficiency in JFEO. Likewise, the USAF has fewer aircrews that are trained to satisfactory levels of proficiency in JFEO-supporting tasks, such as formation flying, airdrop, flying in night vision goggles or landing on unimproved airfields. The lack of directed and sustained JA/ATT training and JFEO exercises over the last 10 years of persistent conflict has naturally resulted in a degraded national JFEO capacity. It is important that the Joint Force immediately reinstitutes the codified requirements, the command relationships and regular joint training exercises to regain national JFEO proficiency. Given the increased urgency for a credible and viable national JFEO capability, JFEO proficiency is fundamental to providing the nation with reliable deterrent power and the ability to strategically project U.S. ground forces into hostile territory.

Recommendations

The 2011 U.S. NMS directs that the military “retain the ability to project power into distant, anti-access environments.” This instruction is much easier issued than accomplished, in light of the numerous external and internal challenges described in this paper. Despite abundant challenges, however, the Joint Force must swiftly mitigate both external and internal issues that currently undermine our JFEO capability.
Force must also concurrently continue to develop doctrine that aligns requirements to resources and adequately trains the Joint Force in JFEO. The Joint Force must continue to demonstrate proficiency in this vital and difficult task to ensure it remains a credible deterrent to our adversaries. The deterrent power of JFEO is more critical now than ever before, given the likelihood that increasingly capable adversaries will challenge us. As GEN Mattis acknowledged in the 2010 JFCOM *Joint Operating Environment*, "While the most important mission of the American military has been to fight and win the nation’s wars, the ability of U.S. forces to deter conflict has risen to equal footing...The ability to deter a potential adversary depends on the capabilities and effectiveness of U.S. forces to act across the full range of military options." Finally, as President Obama recently outlined in his *Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, “In order to credibly deter potential adversaries and to prevent them from achieving their objectives, the United States must maintain its ability to project power in areas in which our access and freedom to operate are challenged.”

The U.S. must responsibly draw down the military over the next five years without sacrificing the Joint Forces’ current JFEO capacity. This risk of inadvertently, or even purposefully reducing or eliminating our national airborne JFEO capability is imprudent and irresponsible given the current nature of the global environment and the places U.S. national security at risk. This study demonstrates that our senior military leadership fully understands the importance of JFEO; however the CJCS must ensure that our civilian leadership acknowledge and confirm its value. As Nathan Freier advises, “...if an under-appreciation of the potential demand leads to reductions in forcible entry capabilities,...future decision makers’ options could be greatly reduced”.


Given the condition of our nation’s growing deficit, most military and civilian leaders agree that we must make cuts to Joint Force structure and personnel. However, these reductions must be accomplished in a responsible manner with full recognition and alignment of national ends, ways and means.

After ensuring the nation’s leadership understands the criticality of our JFEO capability, the SECDEF and CJCS must align doctrine, force structure, and basing to sustain and grow our JFEO capability despite all of the challenges. In restructuring the total force, the CJCS should retain all six of the airborne-capable IBCTs, to include the airborne brigades in Italy and Alaska that provide a rapid reaction JFEO capability for the EUCOM and PACOM combatant commanders. In the ongoing restructuring and realignment process, the CJCS should also ensure that at least three Army Corps HQs are appropriately resourced and structured to serve as Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters to provide mission command for Airborne JFEO. The SECDEF and CJCS should ensure that the national JFEO requirement and the Global Response Force (GRF) requirement and task organization are codified and included in applicable national-level and DoD capstone documents, such as the JSCP and the Unified Command Plan (UCP). Including the JFEO and GRF requirements into these defense-level documents will validate the JFEO capability at the National Command Authority (NCA)-SECDEF and CJCS-CCDR levels. Validating JFEO at these levels will initiate the appropriate alignment of resources to requirements, the development of refined doctrine and capabilities, apportionment of forces and renewed procedures for joint training and readiness IAW the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model.
Conclusion

In the 2010 National Security Strategy, President Obama called for the military to rebalance its capability and be prepared to provide a full range of military operations, including the ability to defeat our enemies in an anti-access environment.\textsuperscript{60} To assure U.S. access to the global commons and to any foreign sovereign territory in support of national objectives, the U.S. military must remain ready and able to provide rapid, global operational access in both uncontested and contested environments. The capacity of the Joint Force to conduct JFEO meets the challenge of this Presidential directive. In the recently published “Joint Operational Access Concept,” which describes how the U.S. military will gain entry and ensure access in emerging Anti-Access/Area Denial environments, Joint Forcible Entry is one of thirty vital capabilities to ensure U.S. access.\textsuperscript{61}

This paper demonstrates that airborne JFEO are an essential component of the nation’s complete JFEO capability and that a credible JFEO capacity is vital to U.S. security strategy. It further demonstrates that an increasingly complex international environment and the emergence of exceedingly capable adversaries will challenge our operational access and national security in the near future. We can no longer take for granted our capability to project combat power into contested environments. As Nathan Freier cautions, “…the very real prospect of numerous short-notice contingencies occurring in any of several far-flung locations, possibly simultaneously and potentially requiring thousands of ground forces in response, indicates that the capabilities to project forces over great distances will be broadly relevant and important going forward.”\textsuperscript{62}
Endnotes


4 Ibid., i.

5 Ibid.

6 Joint Publication 3-18: “A lodgment is a designated area in a hostile or potentially hostile territory that, when seized and held, makes the continuous landing of troops and materiel possible and provides maneuver space for subsequent operations (a lodgment may be an airhead, a beachhead, or a combination thereof). Lodgment requirements depend upon the objective(s) of the overall operation or larger campaign. A lodgment may have established facilities and infrastructure. Forcible entry planning must consider the political, military, economic, social, informational, and infrastructure realities.” Joint Publication 3-18, “Joint Forcible Entry Operations,” June 16, 2008. http://www.dtic.mil/drctrine/new_pubs/jp3_18.pdf (accessed November 25, 2011), vii.

7 Ibid.


12 Ibid., 89.


17 Ibid.


19 Ibid.


22 Ibid., 12.

23 Ibid., 13.


25 Ibid., iv.

26 Ibid., ix.
27 Ibid., 41.


29 Ibid., 8-9.


37 “DoD is taking steps to ensure that future U.S. forces remain capable of protecting the nation and its allies in the face of this dynamic threat environment. In addition to ongoing modernization efforts, [the] QDR has directed …enhancements to U.S. forces and capabilities.” One concept to maintain U.S. preeminence in projecting power and support JFEO is the concept of Air-Sea Battle. DoD is working to “Develop a joint air-sea battle concept. The Air Force and Navy together are developing a new joint air-sea battle concept for defeating

In addition to the Air-Sea Battle concept, DoD is also working to increase future long-range strike capabilities: “Enhanced long-range strike capabilities are one means of countering growing threats to forward-deployed forces and bases and ensuring U.S. power projection capabilities. Building on insights developed during the QDR, the Secretary of Defense has ordered a follow-on study to determine what combination of joint persistent surveillance, electronic warfare, and precision-attack capabilities, including both penetrating platforms and stand-off weapons, will best support U.S. power projection operations over the next two to three decades.” Robert M. Gates, 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf (accessed November 25, 2011), 32-33.


The Australian Army, under economic fiscal pressures similar to those in the U.S., is considering divesting its expensive airborne forces: “FEDERAL budget pressure and strategic changes in Defence have the Army ready to ditch its only parachute-ready infantry group, with senior Army officers warning their ability to intervene in sudden crises could be "severely undermined." Rafael Epstein, “Army May Axe Airborne Infantry Team,” The Age National, April 21, 2011. http://www.theage.com.au/national/army-may-axe-airborne-infantry-team-20110420-1dovk.html (accessed October 25, 2011).


Author's Note. The Global Response Force is a brigade-sized rapid reaction force that is staged to rapidly and globally respond to the orders of the National Command Authority. The brigade dedicated to this mission is typically an airborne-capable Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) because of its increased readiness and inherent ability to conduct Joint Forcible Entry Operations under the control of a JTF headquarters, with the addition of enablers.

“The ARFORGEN process is the structured progression of unit readiness over time to produce trained, ready, and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment in support of (ISO) the combatant commander (CCDR) and other Army requirements. The ARFORGEN process is the Army's core process for force generation, executed with supporting-to-supported relationships, that cycles units through three force pools: RESET, Train/Ready, and Available. Each of the three force pools contains a balanced force capability to provide a sustained flow of forces for current commitments and to hedge against unexpected contingencies.” Army Regulation 525–29, Army Force Generation, March 14, 2011. http://www.forscom.army.mil/graphics/r525_29.pdf (accessed December 29, 2011), 1.


