Developing Ministerial Collaborative Planning Capacity

by

Colonel Francis L. Holinaty
United States Army

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Colonel Francis L. Holinaty
United States Army

Professor Raymond A. Millen
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
In the aftermath of combat operations in Iraq, United States training and advisory teams initiated full-scale efforts to develop capacity within Iraq’s police forces. From the outset, the U.S. went straight to the task of training indigenous police officers. Left behind were advisory efforts to enhance and reform capabilities within the Ministry of Interior (MoI) at the national and operational command levels. The imperative to produce sufficient quantities of police officers providing for Iraq’s internal security took priority over developing the bureaucratic institution that would lead these forces. The result was a dysfunctional Ministry headquarters charged with sustaining a growing professionalized police force. In its June 2010 report to congress, the United States Forces-Iraq documented its end state for the MoI as being a self-reliant ministry, with sustainable and enduring systems, enabling the manning, training, and equipping of police forces. This paper evaluates whether the U.S. failed to achieve this objective by not fully investing in developing a ministerial collaborative planning capacity capable of integrating ends, ways, and means. This determination facilitates an assessment of U.S. strategy on reconstruction and stability operations for future changes to consider.
DEVELOPING MINISTERIAL COLLABORATIVE PLANNING CAPACITY

At the end of major combat operations in Iraq, the United States and its Coalition partners shifted their operational focus into Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations (RSO). The RSO objectives included the critical reform and reconstitution of crucial capacity throughout Iraq at the national, provincial, and district levels, to include the Iraqi security sector comprised of the country’s military services and all directorate agencies of the Iraqi police. With the creation of the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) in 2004, coalition forces undertook a mission to train, equip, and advise the Iraqi security forces. U.S. military training teams, working in partnership with other interagency principals and coalition advisors, took the lead to develop Iraq’s Ministry of Interior (MoI) and professionalize its police forces.¹

From the start of the MNSTC-I mission, a fundamental challenge hindering security sector reform was the lack of an overarching national level strategic document to provide a framework for the subsequent identification and integration of ends, ways, and means by Iraq’s MoI. As David Bayley and Robert Perito noted, the United States went straight to the task of training indigenous police officers with little or no thought given to the institution charged with leading the police forces.² The imperative to produce sufficient quantities of police officers charged with security of Iraq’s cities and rural areas took priority over the capacity development of the ministry that would assume the massive responsibility to supervise, manage, equip, and support a police force of over 500,000 personnel. The outcome was a dysfunctional ministry headquarters, incapable of establishing unity of effort across its provincial and national agencies that struggled to utilized and sustain effectively newly trained police officers.³
Despite this oversight, United States Forces-Iraq reported to the U.S. Congress its end state for the MoI as being a self-reliant ministry, with sustainable and enduring systems, enabling the manning, training, and equipping of police forces by the end of 2011. By not fully investing in the development of a ministerial collaborative planning capacity capable of analyzing the environment, establishing ends, determining ways, and identifying means, did the United States fall short of achieving this objective? 

This paper explores the advisory and training efforts during the MNSTC-I era and, its successor organization the Iraq Training and Advisory Mission for the Ministry of Interior (ITAM-MoI) that focused on the implementation of a collaborative planning process within Iraq's largest national ministry. The paper is formed on three main ideas. The first section of this paper provides background on MoI's initial planning endeavors through the publication of the ministry's first strategic plan along with an analysis of the plan. The second section provides an overview of partnered actions designed to enhance the ministry's planning capacity while fostering ownership and senior leader support of the process from within the MoI. The third section explores the MoI initiative to facilitate collaborative planning throughout the ministry in order to promote the integration of threat analysis, end, ways, means, and corresponding risks. The conclusion provides a final assessment of the U.S. ministerial planning capacity development efforts and a recommended change to the U.S. overall RSO strategy.

To start, RSO is not a new role for the United States. The U.S. has engaged in stability operations dating back in its history to the New World. However, it was during Reconstruction in the aftermath of the U.S. Civil War that led the U.S. government to engage in its first sustained post conflict RSO mission. During the Vietnam War, the
U.S. government advanced the concept termed the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program. The CORDS program represented the first large scale teaming of US military and civilian advisors to collaborate in counterinsurgency operations during an armed conflict. The program’s principal premise was that the safety and security of the population was the fundamental requirement before pacification efforts could work in South Vietnam. While the concept of civil-military organizations has evolved over time, the premise of proving for the basic security of a nation’s population remains a central pillar of current U.S. RSO strategy.⁵

As evident in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military experienced a significantly expanded role in RSO. In both countries the U.S. military, in coordination with interagency and coalition partners, began efforts to build capacity within the security sector ministries. The subsequent release of National Security Presidential Directive-44, *(Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization)*, coupled with the publication of articles, handbooks, and doctrinal manuals by multiple agencies within the US Government, described the importance of RSO. In support, the Department of Defense published DoD Directive 3000.05 instructing the military services actively to plan and prepare for RSO.⁶

As part of the current strategy, RSO seeks to build capacity and legitimacy within a host nation’s security sector. Providing a safe and secure environment founded on the rule of law is the foundation for this strategy. In doing so, the security forces play a vital role in supporting stable governance and promoting social well-being within the country. This in turn, can earn the security ministries the trust and confidence of the populace. Fundamental to implementation of successful reform is that the host nation takes control
of security sector functions as soon as it is capable. Despite the fact that the MoI had a rapidly growing professionalized police force, the ministry lacked a ministerial planning capability that would enable it to sustain training, equipment, and infrastructure funded by the U.S. and coalition partners.⁷

Nevertheless in January 2009, with the expiration of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1790, the U.S. transferred the security responsibilities to the Government of Iraq. The resolution did not contain any provision that necessitated Iraq’s security ministries had to have sustainable and enduring systems in place enabling self-reliance. Thus, a dysfunctional MoI headquarters had to assume the lead for providing internal security to Iraq’s citizens.⁸

**Historical Background and Early Planning Efforts**

Prior to 2006, there was no formalized planning or organizational practices within the MoI to identify missions, assign command and operational roles and responsibilities, and determine resource requirements because the Government of Iraq (GoI) did not require such planning. The first rudimentary approach to planning did not emerge until after the 2006 national election cycle. The impetus for ministerial planning began with the implementation of an extreme “top-down” approach towards budget formulation by the GoI Ministry of Finance – minimizing the acceptance of input from the ministries during the federal budget formulation process. Internally, the MoI faced persistent challenges in accomplishing its security mission and executing its annual budget due to poor enterprise communication, inability to break down organizational stovepipes at the executive and management levels and a lack of capacity at the institutional level.⁹

To address these challenges, the coalition began to advise a group of MoI staff officers in an effort to plan and develop budget estimates. While the product of these
initial advisory efforts were the 2008 and 2009 annual plans for the MoI, the General Directorate Planning & Tracking (i.e., the ministry’s directorate chartered with developing a planning system for the MoI and its directorate agencies), viewed these plans as basic in nature with a one year operational focus not tied to a multiyear strategic vision for the ministry.¹⁰

In hindsight, these operational plans did little to drive the identifications of resources and methods to achieve established ends. From a critical eye, these plans attempted to justify the allocation of funds across the ministry. This was evident given the fact that the development of these plans took place after the MoI received their budget authority from the Ministry of Finance. Moreover, budget expenditures were the central component of the performance matrices established vice the accomplishment of security objectives. As a result, the ministry’s year-end planning conference designed to assess mission performance essentially became a budget execution review. In doing so, the MoI fell short of implementing a feedback system to promote a learning environment. This capability is essential in the development of a ministerial planning capacity that effectively integrates ways and means to achieve national level security ends.¹¹

Consequently, coalition advisors led by the British Department for International Development (DfID), worked to develop a multiyear strategic planning framework. The result was a three-year strategic plan, spanning 2010-2012.¹² To the ministry’s credit, the MoI attempted to create a collective identity by institutionalizing the ministry’s vision and mission statement in a published document.
Vision: A highly efficient ministry capable of providing security and stability for all components of society, applying the rule of law and transparency always, and making the citizens of Iraq our principal partner.

Mission: Protecting Iraqi citizens from the threat of terrorism and crime, while adhering to the rule of law.\textsuperscript{13}

Additionally, the plan annotated four goals designed to unite the ministry towards a common purpose.

- Provide security, counter terror, and prevent crime
- Develop the operating capacity of the MoI
- Enhance legislative, financial, and administrative processes within the MoI
- Build public confidence in the MoI and strengthen community relations\textsuperscript{14}

From a policy perspective, the plan annotated the basis to guide ministerial planning founded on fighting terror; resolving sectarian, ethnic, and political disputes; reducing crime; building a professional police force; and protecting the borders from illegal entry and illicit trafficking.\textsuperscript{15}

Although the document represented a significant leap forward in the Ministry’s attempt to align operational objectives within strategic goals, what the planning process left out was equally significant. According to strategic theorist Harry R. Yarger, the complexity surrounding strategic planning at the national level requires implementing a process to appraise the environment and determine the necessary effects for success, and then to articulate appropriate ends, ways, and means that lead to those effects. Planning is then bounded and can set about solving the problem of achieving strategy’s ends within the confines of the provided ways and means.\textsuperscript{16}

The lack of a comprehensive analysis of the ministry’s environment, as viewed by the MoI leadership, was a fundamental shortfall in the coalition advisory approach.\textsuperscript{17}
This crucial step could have facilitated the development of ends that reflected strategic national interests instead of objectives that were operational in nature. Additionally, the plan did not direct roles and responsibilities for the various police agencies or the headquarters’ staff leading to the realization of the ministry’s vision. Last without integrated ends and ways, the plan was insufficient to drive the identification of future resources required to achieve the objectives.

A common, often fatal, weakness in strategic planning is the inability to link strategic direction to organizational requirements and to resource decision-making processes. Without improvements, coalition advisory efforts would fall short in developing a ministerial capacity that enabled the MoI to identify manning, equipping, training, and sustainment requirements needed to resource the ministry’s missions in addition to jeopardizing the MoI’s ability to maintain the significant investment in equipment and infrastructure funded by the Coalition.

In the end, by externally imposing a planning process rather than nurturing an internally grown capability, coalition advisors failed to achieve the desired effect. The rush by coalition advisors to have the MoI publish ministerial level plans failed to take into account the ministry’s culture in regards to planning. By not appreciating how indifferent the MoI was towards collaborative planning, coalition advisors failed to appreciate a significant weakness impeding the MoI’s willingness to embrace strategic and operational planning. Additionally, coalition advisors blithely ignored the lack of knowledge within the ministry towards resource based planning. In doing so, coalition advisory efforts focused on a small group of MoI staff officers who developed ministerial plans in a vacuum. The outcomes were two-fold. First, the plans published were top-
down driven plans with no input from the field and thus, lacked creditability or alignment with subordinate plans. Second, the planning process failed to break through barriers inhibiting communication and cooperation throughout the MoI. As a result, the advisory approach initially employed by the coalition hindered more than helped the MoI’s ability to develop a ministerial planning capacity.

Expanding Planning Capacity While Fostering Ownership

With the British DfID ending their advisory mission in the summer of 2009, advisors from the newly formed Iraq Training and Advisory Mission-Ministry of Interior sought to capitalize on the positive aspects of the MoI’s initial planning efforts. U.S. advisors renewed efforts to educate the ministry’s leadership on the criticality of collaborative planning that integrated ends, ways, and means. The essential objective was to institutionalize a planning process developed and owned by the MoI and supported by the ministry’s leadership.

The cornerstone for implementing sustainable RSO concepts and programs intended to professionalize security forces is the ability to transfer ownership of the development process to the host nation. However, transferring ownership requires institutional capacity among the security ministry’s leaders and staff. Although the MoI focused initially on its own functions, its span of control went far beyond the headquarters in Baghdad. It needed to incorporate in its planning all policing and law enforcement agencies within the country’s borders. Thus, essential to the MoI’s ongoing capacity building process was the maturation of the ministry’s planning capability in order to unite the ministry’s various police forces towards a common mission.19

Following a U.S. advisory recommendation in early 2009, the MoI created the Joint Review Committee (JRC) to provide a forum to manage and synchronize the
Ministry’s planning processes. Chartered by the Ministry’s senior leadership, the JRC’s principal purpose was to establish business rules to assimilate annual budget requirements to resource the annual operational plans in order to achieve the goals outlined in the strategic plan. The JRC’s first task was to collect the budgets of all the ministry [directorates and agencies] and the strategic plans for 2010 within one folder, study and discuss this folder according to the good modern scientific (technical) planning to achieve a standard implementation of the ministry budgets formulations and put a mechanism to ensure this implementation.\(^\text{20}\)

As noted by the JRC participants, this effort marked the first time MoI planners and financial managers collaborated in preparing the ministry’s budget. Directed by the MoI leadership, all federal and provincial level police directorates submitted an operational plan that identified budget requirements. The products represented the ministry’s first significant attempt at bottom-up planning. This task led to the JRC’s first notable accomplishment which was the committee’s report estimating the Ministry’s 2010 budget requirements.\(^\text{21}\) Approved by the Senior Deputy Minister and endorsed by the Interior Minister, the report served as the source document for the MoI’s 2010 budget submission to the Ministry of Finance.\(^\text{22}\)

Despite the accomplishments and steps toward a collaborative planning process, systemic shortfalls still persisted. Most notability was the lack of a mission and resource validation process. No methodology existed to ensure tasks and resource requirements proposed by the various police agencies supported a larger effort partly due to the lack of a unifying strategic plan. As such, the Ministry’s 2010 budget estimate denoted a loose grouping of ministerial activities vice a plan that integrated ways and means to achieved established ministerial ends. This fact was not lost on the JRC. The committee’s findings documented the challenges confronting the MoI as the ministry
strived to build institutional capacity designed to integrate internal planning and resource allocation processes. Two observations summarized the difficulties that the MoI still faced:

There is a weak level of coordination between most of the planning and tracking sections and budget directorates, and there are no agreed procedures of applying strategic plans to budgets... The General Directors of the ministry general directorates which have separate budgets have no experiences concerning the planning importance and the necessity of connecting the planning with budget to establish scientific planned budget based on what the ministry strategic plan ask as duties from these directorates.23

With the JRC exerting ownership for the MoI’s nascent planning process, endorsed by the ministry’s senior leadership, the advisory focus shifted to training. While the prior DfID approach focused on a core group of MoI officers, the JRC recognized that a large scale investment in human capital offered the best chance of building a ministerial capacity that supported planning. Based on the counsel from U.S. advisors, the JRC entered into a strategic partnership with the US Naval Postgraduate School’s Defense Resource Management Institute (DRMI) to implement a training program that would further develop the Ministry’s emerging planning capacity. A training analysis led to the determination that tailoring existing DRMI courses offered the best method to meet MoI’s capacity development needs. Foremost was the training of the ministry’s planning and financial management leaders and staff officers across the MoI. However, the JRC’s concept also included training officers from the ministry’s Human Resources, Logistics, Infrastructure, and Contracting communities. In doing so, the JRC led the first sustained cross-functional training effort within the MoI designed to promote cooperation and trust among the ministry’s resource managers and providers.24
As noted by DRMI, the subsequent tailored courses encompassed facets of strategic resource management with a curriculum focused on capabilities and resource-based planning, economic reasoning and cost effectiveness. To enhance the learning experience, the DRMI modified training scenarios to incorporate pertinent law enforcement challenges identified by the MoI. The DRMI incorporated the Strength, Weakness, Opportunity, and Threat (SWOT) analysis as a central tool and technique in all scenarios. By doing so, MoI students gained fundamental knowledge of an internationally accepted and proven methodology for assessing an organization. The SWOT model provides practitioners with a flexible tool to learn about an organization and its environment. Effectively used, SWOT offers an understanding of the internal and external factors that an organization can exercise influence over.

The training partnership between the DRMI and the MoI was one of the few success stories in ITAM-MoI’s efforts to develop institutional capacity within the MoI. Over a nineteen-month period, the DRMI, MoI JRC, and ITAM-MoI partnered to host 14 training events that trained over 425 members of the MoI. Although the effects were not evident to those outside the MoI advisory circle, ITAM-MoI advisors observed the professional development growth participants of this training achieved. MoI planners and resource managers endorsed the concepts of environmental scanning as part of an integrated approach to link planning to resource allocation. These advancements enhanced MoI’s ability to further ministerial processes throughout the resource manager and resource provider communities.

The year 2010 was critical as the JRC committed to educating the ministry on the value of planning with the aid of ITAM-MoI advisory teams. By year-end, the JRC’s
professional development program coupled with internally promulgated ministerial processes gave planning a measure of creditability. In effect, the JRC was leading a cultural change within the MoI—acceptance of strategic and operational planning. In doing so, the JRC realized a central tenet of RSO—instilling internally generated programs to promote legitimacy, increase the likelihood for long term sustainment, and facilitate ownership of the development process.

The results became apparent early in 2011 as the JRC led the ministry through a series of milestones and large-scale accomplishments. During the first two months, the JRC was in the forefront of three notable actions pertaining to ministerial planning capacity, setting the conditions for a final partnered collaborative planning initiative.

First, to facilitate a closed loop planning and feedback system the JRC hosted the 2010 operational plan year-end review conference. The conference’s purpose was to institutionalize a feedback mechanism to foster a learning organization environment. The conference focused on execution compared to performance measures contained in Ministry’s 2010 Operational Plan. The JRC’s deliverable, a report that contained recommendations designed to improve future operations, received the endorsement of the GoI Prime Minister for implementation.

Second, the JRC distributed the Ministry’s 2011 operational plan achieving the earliest release date for the Ministry’s annual operational plan up to that point. Of significance was the plan’s introduction signed by the Prime Minister which captured the importance of 2011 by remarking that the MOI is on the verge of a true test to prove its readiness. Iraqi military units will go back to [their] barracks . . . Moreover the remaining US forces will withdraw totally this year. . . . This requires MOI to rally its activities and powers and to activate its capabilities and to improve its competences and
expertise inside or outside Iraq in ways that lift up to an excellent and pro-active level preparing for the battle against terrorism.\textsuperscript{31}

Third, the JRC initiated a comprehensive training program in conjunction with the 2012 operational planning cycle. Targeting the ministry’s organizational reporting units, the JRC met in small group settings with the individual planning teams to provide guidance on how to articulate the reporting unit’s mission responsibilities and resource requirements. The JRC also introduced a management information reporting tool to aid reporting units in developing directorate-level operational plans. The use of an automated solution demonstrated the emerging confidence of the JRC to implement modern practices designed to link planning and resource allocation decision making. To expand participation, the JRC proposed a new missions and resources validation process that extended JRC participation to include representatives from Planning & Tracking, Financial Affairs, Contracting, Human Resources, Logistics, and Training.\textsuperscript{32}

The Final Advisory Push - Facilitating Collaborative Planning

Despite these incremental improvements to Mol’s planning capabilities, one critical capacity still lagged throughout the ministry–cross-ministerial collaborative planning focused on the integration of ends, ways and means. Heading into 2011, the U.S. advisory approach still focused heavily on functional lines. This approach did little to break long-standing stovepipes or promote cooperation among the various elements within the Mol. The need for a collaborative planning process was essential as 2011 marked the beginning of a projected leveling of Mol’s budget. From 2006 to 2010, the Mol enjoyed a 227 percent increase in its annual budget from 1.8 billion to 6.1 billion U.S. dollars and in doing so, had access to more resources than the Ministry was capable of executing. During this period, the Mol was also the recipient of several billion
dollars more in “gifts” from the Coalition which in effect supplemented the MoI budget. However, in 2011 the Ministry’s budget growth slowed to 5.8 percent ($6.5 billion) with the Ministry of Financing projecting a 3.3 percent decline for 2012 ($6.3 billion).

Simultaneously, U.S. funding support to the MoI significantly declined as ITAM-MoI prepared to end its training and advisory mission.  

Compounding this challenge was the growing labor budget requirement. Prior to the U.S. invasion in 2003, the MoI’s total workforce numbered approximately 60,000. In contrast, heavily influenced by U.S. and coalition RSO efforts, the MoI by 2011 employed over 600,000 full time police officers and contractors. As a result, labor commitments consumed approximately 75 percent of the MoI’s annual operational budget during 2006 to 2011. This fact was not a high concern of the MoI while the U.S. and coalition partners funded training, equipment, maintenance and infrastructure programs and projects. Conversely, facing a projected reduction to its annual budget in 2012 coupled with the end of U.S. support, the JRC started to convey apprehension within the MoI’s resource management community. The JRC noted the prevailing perception that U.S. goals and objectives drove the size of the ministry’s workforce and not the desires of the MoI leadership. Brewing within the MoI was the growing concern that the ministry could not sustain nor required a 600,000 person workforce over time.  

U.S. advisors leveraged this feeling of apprehension to make a final push at developing a ministerial collaborative planning capacity. Accordingly, the JRC recommended an initiative to conduct a comprehensive review of the MoI. This ambitious project approached the challenge of integrating ends, ways and means in a manner not previously undertaken by the MoI. Proposed was a ministry-wide, cross-
functional approach that would research, analyze, and develop recommendations to complex questions that reflected national and ministerial interests such as:

- What are the enduring threats to Iraq’s security?
- What are the weaknesses that hinder the execution of counter-terrorist and traditional law enforcement functions?
- What is the appropriate mix of police forces along with their roles and responsibilities to address security threats and provide police services?
- What are the required of resources to support the police forces?
- What are the requisite educational programs to maintain a competent and professional police force?

An order signed by the Prime Minister directed the formation of nine focus groups. Each group’s charter mandated a collaborative and cross-functional approach as illustrated by the team’s designated members. Through greater participation in the planning process, the JRC sought to leverage the DRMI training program while enhancing planning capacity within the ministry. Common to each group’s deliverables was a detailed SWOT analysis as it related to the group’s focus area. Specific to each group’s deliverables were recommendations supporting a five-year outlook (2012-2016) germane to the groups focus area.35

The lead for the integral tasks of determining security threats, weaknesses in executing counter-terrorist and law enforcement functions, along with roles and responsibilities fell on the following focus groups: Terrorist Threats, Information (Intelligence), and Infiltration, Smuggling and Border Reinforcement. The lead for recommending and documenting manning levels, equipment and infrastructure
requirements, and funding levels to resource the various federal and provincial police forces fell on the focus groups: Human Resources and Future Recruitment Plan, Infrastructure Readiness, and Financial Support. The lead for recommending educational requirements to train new recruits and programs to maintain a professional police force fell on the focus groups: Training and Qualification, and Anti-Crime, Corruption, Human rights, and Rule of Law. Finally, the lead for recommending programs to promote community relations belong to the focus group on Public Relations and Community Partnership.  

US advisors actively participated with the JRC in a series of In-Progress Reviews held to facilitate the first deliverable – detailed reports from each focus group that would form the basis for a draft five-year strategic plan. The JRC’s second deliverable was to host a forum for the leaders and strategic planning stakeholders from Iraq’s Security and Justice Ministries, along with selected representatives from Parliament, to ensure the Ministry’s actions were in alignment with other national security initiatives. The final deliverable tasked was the publication of the MoI’s 2012-2016 strategic plan.  

Simultaneous to the comprehensive review, U.S. advisors engaged in an initiative with the MoI Financial Management staff to develop model budget programs. Leveraging the outputs of the automated management information reporting tool, the JRC chose two directorates for this pilot. Utilizing historical budget expenditures, the JRC established rudimentary cost factors. The JRC then applied the cost factors against the resource requirements identified by the two directorates in their 2012 operational plan. The product was budget programs annotating funding requirements for six main cost categories—labor, goods, services, maintenance, compensation, and
procurement–that would drive the 2012 budget allocation for the two directorates. This endeavor represented the most in-depth analysis of ways and means undertaken by the MoI. However, the process did not include a mechanism to validate that ways and means identified and resourced supported strategic or operational ends. Questions on the legitimacy of the resource requirements established negated the achievements of creating budget programs. Thus, the development of valid budget programs that drive the allocation of resources can only occur after the MoI establishes and prioritizes desired ends.38

Falling Short – Conclusion

While the completion of the focus groups' detailed reports demonstrated a level of planning capacity within the MoI, the ITAM-MoI’s advisory mission ended with the MoI still straining to institutionalize a collaborative planning capability throughout the ministry. The decision not to invest fully in developing a ministerial planning capacity leaves in doubt the MoI’s ability to sustain the advances made over the seven-year partnership. In this regard, MNSTC-I’s and ITAM-MoI’s advisory mission fell short of obtaining the end state reported to the U.S. Congress of a self-reliant ministry, with sustainable and enduring systems, enabling the manning, training, and equipping of interior forces by the end of 2011. As a result, the 8 billion dollars spent to train, equip, maintain and sustain MoI’s police forces by the United States might wind up a wasted investment. More importantly, if the MoI reverts back to the days when the ministry was incapable of providing for the basic security needs of Iraq’s citizens, the United States risks not obtaining its overarching strategic objective of

  a sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq with a just, representative, and accountable government; a state that is neither a safe haven for, nor sponsor of, terrorism; and an Iraq that is integrated into the global
economy and is a long-term US partner contributing to regional peace and security.

The RSO experience in Iraq is illustrative of the idea that building a law
enforcement institution requires developing a ministerial planning capacity. A ministerial
capacity capable of deciding on objectives at both the national strategic and ministerial
operational perspective to identify what needs to be done; selecting concepts to explain
how objectives are to be achieved; and programming and allocating resources to
accomplish strategic and operational objectives. As ITAM-MoI transferred the police
development program to the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, it
remained unclear if the MoI embraced the necessity to institutionalize a planning system
that linked missions to resources. Evidence of a successful effort manifested in the
introduction of the focus groups consolidated report which states

 Strategic Planning is essential to a ministry attempting to achieve its goals
and strong strategic planning will make it possible for the ministry to reach
its desired vision. Strategic planning will move the ministry beyond its’
present challenges that it is facing into a stronger and more secure
posture for the future. The basis of planning will be performed by
evaluating internal organizational factors (the strengths and weaknesses)
and by evaluating external factors (opportunities and threats). The ministry
needs to further develop its planning capability given the dramatic
changes and challenges the nation is facing in terms of the prevailing
political, economic issues, and social upheaval. Strategic planning is more
important than ever for the MoI and the ministry cannot lose important
ground gained from previous planning efforts.

Nonetheless, comments made by the MoI’s Senior Deputy Minister, in an
interview with the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, left in doubt
the efficacy of transferring the training and assistance mission:

 What tangible benefit will Iraqis see from this police program? With Most
of the money spend on lodging, security, support, all the MoI gets is a little
expertise, and this is if the program materializes. The training discussed is
more focused on secondary issues. Like administration, finance,
information technology, and planning. I do not need it. I will not ask for it. But if you provide it, it will be a benefit and will add to our Ministry.\textsuperscript{42}

The lesson to take away from Iraq is that the United States must change its fundamental RSO strategy as it pertains to building ministerial capacity. Future advisors must appreciate that while transferring ownership of development programs to the host nation is a core principle of RSO, ownership without a capability for collaborative planning that integrates ends, ways, and means places the long term viability of these programs in doubt. As pointed out by Bayley and Perito, building a ministerial planning capacity will “require the full commitment of those involved as well as adequate resources.”\textsuperscript{43} Thus, U.S. RSO strategy must make developing a ministerial planning capacity a top priority, and leaders must invest fully in fostering this essential capability in order to prevent advisory efforts from falling short of obtaining the desired strategic effects in forthcoming operations.

Endnotes

\textsuperscript{1} Dr Donald P. Wright, Colonel Timothy R. Reese, with the Contemporary Operations Study Team, \textit{On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign}, (Washington D.C., US Government Printing Office, 2008), 175-176. In January 2004 National Security Council (NSC) decided to increase the scope and pace of Iraqi Security Force Training. In doing so the NSC also decided to take the mission of training Iraqi Security Forces away from the Coalition Provisional Authority and to turn it over to the military. As a result, the Multi-National Security Transition Command was created as a new organization under the Multi-National Force-Iraq with LTG Petraeus taking command on 6 June 2004.

\textsuperscript{2} David H. Bayley is a distinguished professor in the School of Criminal Justice at the University at Albany, State University of New York. Robert M. Perito is a senior program officer at the US Institute of Peace. Perito previously served as the Deputy Director of the US Justice Department’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program.


(Section 9204, Public Law 110-252), (Baghdad, Iraq: United States Forces-Iraq, August 2010), 48.


6 National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44), Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, December 7, 2005. The purpose of NSPD-44 is to promote the security of the US through improved coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife; Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, 28 November 2005. As stated in Field Manual (FM) 3-07, Stability Operations, DODD 3000.05 is part of a broader US Government and international effort to establish or maintain order in states and regions while supporting national interests. In support of this effort, the Directive outlines DoD policy and assigns responsibility for planning, preparing for, and executing stability operations.


9 Key leader engagements were held between the leadership and advisors of Iraq Training and Advisory Mission-Ministry of Interior (ITAM-Mol) and Government of Iraq (Gol), Ministry of Interior (Mol) staff officers - Major General Waleed Khalifa Hadawi, Director General, General Directorate for Planning and Tracking; Major General Ala’a Hussein Ali, Deputy Director General, General Directorate for Planning and Tracking; Colonel Faris Faii Al Abed, Director Investment Plans and Projects, General Directorate for Planning and Tracking; Major General Haleem Jaweer Hassan, Deputy Assistant for Financial Affairs, General Directorate for Finance; Major General Abdul-Haleem Fahem Al-Farahood, Director General, Director for Salaries and Finance; Dr (Major General) Essam Hameed Dakhel, Director of Accounting; Major Safaa Abdul-Hussain Morjan, Director of Budget. The content and analysis for this paragraph is derived from the personal experiences of Jerome T. Sebastyn, Senior ITAM-Mol Strategic Planning Advisor to the Gol, Mol (April 2009-March 2010 and October 2010-September 2011), Michael D. Hanley Senior ITAM-Mol Budget Advisor to the Gol, Mol (March 2010-October 2011), and COL Francis L. Holinati, Senior ITAM-Mol Financial Management Advisor to the Gol, Mol (April 2009-May 2011).

10 Ibid.
Ibid.


14 Ibid., 6.

15 Ibid., 1.


17 Key leader engagements between ITAM-MoI leadership and Gol, MoI staff officers; personal experiences of Jerome Sebastyn, Michael Hanley and COL Frank Holinaty.


24 The content for this paragraph derived from the notes of Stephen Hurst, Senior Lecturer for the Defense Resource Management Institute (DRMI) and the personal experience of COL Frank Holinaty, Senior ITAM-MoI Financial Management Advisor to the Gol, MoI (April 2009-May 2011). Stephen Hurst oversaw DRMI’s Iraqi training program from 2009 through 2011 and was a key participant a joint training needs analysis conference held in September 2009 at the MoI Headquarters, Rusafa, Iraq.

26 Christine A. Lai and Julio C. Rivera, Jr., “Using a Strategic Planning Tool as a Framework for Case Analysis,” *Journal of College Science Teaching*, (October 2006): 26-30. In the early 1950s, two Harvard business policy professors, George Albert Smith, Jr. and C. Roland Christensen, proposed the SWOT model as a flexible management tool that provided a powerful technique to learn about an organization and its environment.

27 Personal experiences of Jerome Sebastyn, Michael Hanley and COL Frank Holinaty

28 Ibid.


32 Personal experiences of Jerome Sebastyn and COL Frank Holinaty. A more detailed explanation of the Mol’s Operational Planning process is outside the scope of this paper.

33 Key leader engagements between advisors of Iraq Training and Advisory Mission-Ministry of Interior (ITAM-Mol) and Government of Iraq (GoI), Ministry of Interior (MoI) Major Safaa abdul-Hussain Morjan, Director of Budget; Personal experiences of Michael Hanley and COL Frank Holinaty.

34 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

37 Personal experiences of Jerome Sebastyn, Michael Hanley, and COL Frank Holinaty.

38 Ibid.


