On Strategy: Integration of DIME in the Twenty-first Century

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As at the turn of the centuries of the last several hundred years, the twenty-first century finds itself embroiled in new kinds of war. Great world changes are taking place including the speed of communication and the impact of globalization. Old notions of war, while still valid and very useful, are no longer sufficient for how one must think about war in the new century. Force alone is not enough to break the will of an enemy and to advance the interests of the United States. War must include the use of all elements of national power, sometimes in addition to military force, sometimes as more effective alternatives. Indeed, effective integration of national power may prevent war in the first place. This paper examines the classical theory of war as well as notions of what peace looks like. An enhanced way of defining war, of looking at international relationships and a new vocabulary for discussing strategy is explored. Finally, this paper presents practical recommendations for integrating the elements of power in achieving America’s interests, preventing war, and fighting her wars in the twenty-first century.
ON STRATEGY: INTEGRATION OF DIME IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

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ABSTRACT

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As at the turn of the centuries of the last several hundred years, the twenty-first century finds itself embroiled in new kinds of war. Great world changes are taking place including the speed of communication and the impact of globalization. Old notions of war, while still valid and very useful, are no longer sufficient for how one must think about war in the new century. Force alone is not enough to break the will of an enemy and to advance the interests of the United States. War must include the use of all elements of national power, sometimes in addition to military force, sometimes as more effective alternatives. Indeed, effective integration of national power may prevent war in the first place. This paper examines the classical theory of war as well as notions of what peace looks like. An enhanced way of defining war, of looking at international relationships and a new vocabulary for discussing strategy is explored. Finally, this paper presents practical recommendations for integrating the elements of power in achieving America’s interests, preventing war, and fighting her wars in the twenty-first century.
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The turn of the last five centuries has been a time for change and new strategic thinking for the powers of the world. Four centuries ago, the advent of the Thirty Years War in 1618 followed by the Westphalia Treaty of 1648 established the balance of power model of international order. The next century brought the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 ending the wars of Louis the XIV. The Congress of Vienna concluded the Napoleonic wars in 1815 at the dawn of the nineteenth century. Nearly one hundred years ago the great powers of Europe began World War I in 1914. This war ended with the Treaty of Versailles and a failed attempt to establish a league of nations. All of these events were centered within the horrific devastation of war, each one more destructive than its predecessor.

In the twenty-first century, the United States is experiencing the Global War on Terror (GWOT) which has been amazingly limited in scope compared to those at previous turns of centuries. It does not appear that a major conference will follow or that there will be any tangible manifestation of its conclusion in the near term, if at all. We do not yet know what will follow. It could be that the seeds of the next war are being planted by this one just as the seeds of the GWOT can be argued to have been planted in both the Gulf War of 1991 and the Soviet war against Afghanistan in the 1980s. Will the next war be limited? Was the last total war the one ended in 1945? Are those terms relevant? World War II was followed by the Cold War. Was it really a war or a period of peace with intermittent war in places such as Korea and Vietnam? What can one expect for war in this new century? These questions are critical to determining how to fight and, better, to prevent war in this century.
We live in a different world with different threats. It is faster and more interconnected; different ideologies compete with liberty and democracy (fascism and communism replaced by various religious extremisms). It is a world unsure of itself – is the U.S. the global hegemon? Is the world multi-polar? Is the U.S. still strong while other nations are rising or is the U.S. in decline? Threats today are not only conventional but emanate from non-state actors and weak states as much as, or perhaps more than, from strong potential rivals – as well as within new domains such as cyberspace, not to mention natural and man-made disruptions to order. What is the role of the U.S. in today’s world – merely to survive in the world or to shape the world? Or both? These questions too are critical in determining a strategy for this century.

On the tenth anniversary of 9/11 and the start of the GWOT, retired Lieutenant General James M. Dubik charged that the United States had lost its ability at the strategic level. He said that strategists “cling to the notion that war is best defined conventionally” and that we lack “strategic imagination”. Dubik may be pulling away, perhaps unwittingly, from a classic definition of war as offered by Clausewitz. Clausewitz defines war as the use “of force to compel our enemy to do our will” and that the force to be used is military force. LTG Dubik’s challenge that the U.S. lacks strategic imagination and that American security professionals find themselves regularly “attempting to fit a round peg into a square hole” may be reflective of their being leashed to Clausewitz’s definition of war. Clausewitz’s definition may be insufficient, particularly for warfare today.

As at the turn of the centuries of the last several hundred years, the twenty-first century finds itself embroiled in new kinds of war. Great world changes are also taking
place including the speed of communication and the impact of globalization. Old notions of war, while still valid and very useful, are no longer sufficient for thinking about war in the new century. The use of force alone is not enough to break the will of enemies and to advance the interests of the United States. War must include the use of all elements of national power – diplomacy, information, military, and economics (DIME). Indeed, effective integration of national power may prevent war in the first place.

The purpose of this paper is to develop a strategic theory and framework that address the nature and conduct of war in the twenty-first century: the integration of DIME. This paper will examine the classical theory of war as well as notions of what peace looks like. It will present an enhanced way of defining war in today’s strategic environment, discuss why wars are fought, how to fight and how to win wars or even how to prevent them. Finally, this paper will present practical operational recommendations for integrating the elements of power in advancing interests, preventing war, and fighting wars in the twenty-first century. Indeed, the U.S. must have an integrated approach to all elements of national power to advance its interests in this century. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates put it bluntly that military success is not sufficient and that other elements of national power are indispensable to lasting success and victory.8

What is War and Peace?

Today’s GWOT is often referred to as a long war.9 The most recent long war for the United States was the Cold War lasting forty-five years from 1946 to 1991. In its entirety the Cold War does not fit into Clausewitz’s definition of war as there was no combat between the two primary belligerents, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialistic Republics (USSR), except through proxies in places such as Korea and
Vietnam. According to Clausewitz’s definition, the U.S. was not at war with the USSR. Yet the state of affairs between the US and the USSR during that period was described as a Cold War. It was a war, in fact, where other elements of power were brought to bear as much as or more than military force.

The Cold War was considered a “real war” from the very beginning. The democratic system was seen at war with the communist system as both systems sought to spread their influence around the globe and new countries chose the one they thought worked best or would survive. President Kennedy’s Cold War strategy included counterinsurgency warfare (from the military element of power) as well as a strategy to “win hearts and minds” by establishing the Peace Corps as well as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and other agencies. The strategy of winning hearts and minds of a population through the Peace Corps is an example of fighting an ideology outside of the military. Winning over a population is a core function of the information element of power in winning the battle of ideas. Kennedy further recognized that the US economic advantage over the USSR was the same as it was over Czarist Russia in 1913; his advisors began to sense that an arms race itself could lead to the capitulation of the Soviet economy bringing down the USSR and communism. Ronald Reagan saw this more explicitly during his presidency and went one step further by attacking the Soviet economy, not only through the arms race, but also by manipulating the price of oil in collusion with Saudi Arabia thus causing the oil revenues of the USSR to plummet. Many former Soviet officials credit this strategy of economic warfare with bringing down the USSR.
Thus, military force was a key aspect of fighting the Cold War providing a credible dynamic deterrent that enabled the effective use of all national elements of power. The entire strategy applied all elements of power in an aggressive, compelling way (examples of the use of information and economic elements have been described above; the element of diplomacy was also critical particularly in the breakthrough with China in 1971\(^1\)). The Cold War can only be understood in the context of employing all elements of national power to compel the Soviet Union to act in our interests. This leads to a modified definition of war: the use of all national elements of power to compel the enemy to act in line with U.S. interests. This definition is consistent with Clausewitz’s dictum that “war is an act of policy.”\(^18\) It is also consistent with B.H. Liddell Hart’s assertion that the best strategy achieves the end without having to fight;\(^19\) for, although the U.S. did not fight the Soviets directly with military force, they were at war. The fact the U.S. won that war without the horrific destruction that would have come from direct military confrontation is perhaps the great miracle of the last century.\(^20\)

There is another approach that helps to understand this definition of war and can lead to understanding why states enter a state of war. A pertinent question is: if nations/actors are not at war, then what state are they in? It stands to reason that the opposite of war is peace. John Garnett claims that peace is in fact “the absence of war, not the absence of conflict.”\(^21\) His premise is that the only difference between war and peace is violence and where there is no violence there is peace.\(^22\) Would those behind the Iron Curtain have agreed that because the Warsaw Pact and NATO were not engaged in combat with each other that they lived in a state of peace? Can one say there has been a state of peace between the U.S. and Cuba because they have not
been at arms with each other? The authors who described the U.S. strategy for the Cold War in NSC-68 would most likely disagree as they labeled the Cold War a “real war.” The Catholic Church describes peace as “…not merely an absence of war… [but] is the ‘tranquility of order’…is the work of justice and the effect of charity.” According to the Church, peace includes conditions such as the security of private property, free communication, and respect for others. If this is peace, then there are several states between war and peace that help to understand why states enter into war.

Why War

There is a continuum that better describes the state of affairs between nations than a simple dichotomy of peace and war.

![Peace – War Continuum](image)

This continuum includes peace, here defined as fully compatible interests (such as the U.S. experiences with England and Japan); cooperation, here defined as interests which converge (such as between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia or India); competition, defined as a split between interests which converge and those which diverge (such as the U.S. and Russia or China); conflict, defined as interests which are incompatible (such as the U.S. and Venezuela); and war, defined as where interests are opposed and one compels another to act in line with one’s interests (such as the U.S. and al-Qaeda in the application of force along with other elements of power; also with the U.S. and the Cold War USSR, pre-OIF Iraq, and possibly today’s North Korea,
Cuba, and Iran in applying the use of the other elements of power with military
deterrence).\textsuperscript{25}

A state of war exists when others can no longer cooperate, compete reasonably
or resolve conflicts. Why enter a state of war? One enters a state of war to compel
another to act in one's interests using a variety of means including, but not limited to,
military force. It is the need to compel that makes it war, not the element of power used
to wage it. In many cases, the other elements will be more effective and result in longer
lasting peace than the use of military force would achieve (or at least somewhere on the
continuum other than war).\textsuperscript{26}

This notion of why one must go to war is consistent with classical explanations of
why nations fight. Clausewitz says “the political object is the original motive for war”,\textsuperscript{27}
that the reason we go to war is based on political circumstances.\textsuperscript{28} Even though
Clausewitz’s definition of war is rooted in the use of force, his reasons for war do not
exclude the use of other elements of power to achieve the political object that drive us
to war. The litany of reasons to go to war presented by another classical theorist,
Antoine Henri Jomini, does not conflict with the notion of fighting wars with elements of
power other than military force; in fact, most of his reasons are broad enough that other
elements could be used effectively without having to visit the destruction of military
force.\textsuperscript{29} Both of these theorists illuminate why nations go to war, though they differ from
the definition of war asserted in this paper.

Modern theorist James Nathan suggests that nations go to war to pursue either
interests (Nathan does not define interests but they can be described as what benefits a
state or other actor) or passions (which he generally describes as religious or nationalist
purposes). He argues that since the Treaty of Westphalia, rational diplomats and soldiers work toward “the achievement of a favorable peace” which essentially consists of attaining as many of your interests as you can. Interests lend themselves to compromise, reason and mutual gain (whereas passions do not). Thus it can be said that a nation can be reasonably satisfied with any state on the continuum (peace, cooperation, etc.) that serves its interests. If the interests cannot be met through negotiation or compromise or other resolution then there may be a need to compel the other in order “to attain a better peace” somewhere on the continuum that better serves those interests. That is why there is war: the need to compel, through the use of any element of power, makes it war.

How To Fight

Hans Morgenthau wrote, “When we speak of power, we mean man’s control over the minds and actions of other men.” The more power one has, the more one can make others to act in one’s interests. States seek power, and use power to advance their own interests. The elements of power are applied to achieve interests in the relationship between states and actors along the continuum in Figure 1. All elements can be effective in achieving interests through effective persuasion, finding common ground or deterrence. Even military power can be effective in peace, as when the mere prospect of its use deters conflict or persuades a potential adversary so that force need not be applied. President Eisenhower was convinced that the other elements of power were “preeminent” when facing down communism. All elements of power can be wielded along any point of the continuum, whether persuading, influencing or compelling another to act in our interests.
Thus, nations fight with all the elements of power when they enter a state of war with an enemy. Each element is dependent on the other. Sun Tzu’s description of how to fight a war is very illustrative of how to understand this. He states that “to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.” He then prescribes ways to do this followed by a warning about attacking civilian populations. These prescriptions can be met with elements of power other than military force; indeed, Sun Tzu argues that force should be used last, only if the enemy cannot be compelled by other means. Sun Tzu, like Clausewitz, saw the use of force as essential to the definition of war. Yet his prescriptions for how to fight war remain just as plausible to a definition of war inclusive of the other elements of power. The use of the other elements might protract the war (for example, the Cold War did last 45 years) conflicting with both his admonition against protracted wars and his prescription to win them quickly. However, wars inclusive of diplomacy, information and economics are likely to be consistent with his prescriptions for the least cost in lives and without having to resort to fighting as previously stated above.

Nations therefore should fight with all elements of power sometimes in succession or simultaneously. The elements are interdependent in how they are applied. A strong military gives teeth to diplomacy. Diplomacy strengthens information warfare and economics strengthens all the other elements. This framework can guide strategists in which element to apply when and to what degree (one can say that strategy is choosing the appropriate elements of power and determining their application to achieve certain interests). This is an alternative to thinking about applying power and force in terms of limited and total (or all-out) war. Even Clausewitz stated
that one uses force that is “sufficient” and that maintains “proportion.” Clausewitz was speaking in terms of the use of force but this guidance can be applied to the use of the other elements as well. Even better, economic warfare or diplomacy or information warfare may be sufficient to compel an enemy to act within one’s wishes and render the use of force unnecessary.

Colin Powell stated that all war is limited. Thus, an approach based on proportion is more relevant than a false dichotomy of limited and total. Proportionality helps to think in terms of determining what it takes to accomplish policy whether it is selecting the appropriate elements of power or determining to what extent (i.e. proportion) to apply them when compelling another to act in one’s interests. Determining the strategic schema (see Figure 2) one desires to use may be more useful in applying the elements of power than using terms such as total and limited. A vocabulary consisting of strategic schema such as annihilation (cause the other party to cease to exist), regime change (forced transition from one regime to another), unconditional surrender (the other party remains extant but yields completely), or compliance (yielding to specified terms) might be more useful in selecting the elements of power to use to advance interests in a state of war.

![Figure 2. Strategic Schema Continuum](image)

In other words, what interest is being advanced, what element (s) will be most effective to advance it, and to what proportion does the element(s) need to be applied to
advance the interest? Does one state need to annihilate another state or actor to advance its interest? Will compliance by another advance one’s interests? Which elements in what proportion does it take to achieve annihilation or compliance or something in between? This vocabulary can more effectively guide how to fight than thinking in terms of total or limited. The terms total and limited are distractions from what is really trying to be achieved with sufficient – proportional - application.

How To Win

Clausewitz explains how to win war with his description of the center of gravity.\textsuperscript{45} While he thought of the center of gravity as being an object for military force this is not necessarily always the case. In the current GWOT, ideology has been described as al-Qaeda’s strategic center of gravity.\textsuperscript{46} It takes more than military force to defeat this center of gravity. Other elements, such as information warfare, may be more effective just as certain uses of military force may actually be ineffective in targeting a center of gravity of ideology.

One must look at fighting the enemy’s capabilities and will when examining how wars will be won. Clausewitz, again, is helpful in this understanding as he describes the necessity of reducing the enemy’s capacity to resist, including both resources and will.\textsuperscript{47} Generally, military force is applied to destroy an enemy’s resources and capacity to continue the fight. But the enemy may still have the will to fight another day. So to destroy the enemy’s capacity to fight may be insufficient for the long term. Nazi Germany, for example, rose from the ashes of the Treaty of Versailles. The allies eliminated the Germans’ capacity to fight, but not their will. Better yet is to win the enemy over. Winning hearts and minds as the U.S. did in Germany and Japan following World War II is what has really brought peace with those nations over time. Israel
destroyed Egypt's capacity to wage war which along with other factors led to the peace treaty signed at Camp David. But hearts and minds of Egyptians are still very hostile toward Israel and the world is now seeing what may be the unraveling of their formal peace.48

Beyond ideology, capacity and will one must also consider how to set the conditions to win. In the last long war it appeared the U.S. might be going down the same road as it did following the First World War and the Versailles Treaty. Before there was a Marshall Plan there was the Morgenthau Plan embodied in JCS 1067. This directive was signed into law in 1945 and required repatriations from Germany and the dismantling of their industry.49 It was, in short, punitive by design. Secretary of State George Marshall realized in his travels of Europe in 1947 that Europe’s economy, social structure and political institutions were deteriorating – the conditions for lasting peace were crumbling. He determined that Europe needed a plan, and contrary to the Morgenthau plan in place, the new plan needed to include the restoration of Germany.51 Thus, the Morgenthau Plan embodied in JCS 1067 was replaced by the Marshall Plan linked to JCS 1779 signed in 1947.

JCS 1779 prescribed the need for German economic recovery, development of German democracy, civil rights and courts.52 The Marshall Plan, through this directive, set the conditions of justice and functioning services while the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ratified in 1949 met the condition of security so desired by Germany and Europeans at large.53 The conditions of security, justice and functional services were set so that the U.S. could win the idea war over communism and the hearts and minds of Germans. Thus the seeds planted by the Marshall Plan were very different from the
ones planted by the Treaty of Versailles twenty years earlier and very nearly replanted by the Morgenthau Plan.

In the last long war, the Cold War, U.S. strategists realized that the fundamental conflict was in the world of ideas and that even a military victory would only delay final resolution in that war of ideas.\textsuperscript{54} That was not a foregone conclusion. Indeed, while the U.S. and its allies destroyed the German capacity to wage war in World War II, the Allies were on the verge of seeding the German will with the Morgenthau Plan for a future fight and possible European defection to the communist camp. Secretary Marshall realized this and perhaps just in time to avert disaster. It may take many years but the information element of power (supported by the others such as military deterrence and the economics of the Marshall Plan as an example) may be the most effective instrument in winning hearts and minds and influencing the popular will of the enemy and thus winning the war.\textsuperscript{55} That takes strategic imagination, an imagination that includes devising the effective cohesive integration of economic action, strategic communication, and public and closed-door diplomacy supported by a strong military that deters or contains the enemy, strikes precisely when and where needed and provides stability to render an enemies’ ideology as not credible and impotent while providing a better alternative. That is how war is won.

Strategy in The Twenty-First Century

To project the future of war and strategy in this new century, it is important to determine where and how the current war and future wars will be fought. This process must start with an examination of the current environment. It is clear that for now the world of the Westphalian balance of power model, whether as a congressional system such as the Concert of Europe born at the Congress of Vienna\textsuperscript{56} or the bipolar world
(plus the Non-Aligned Nations as a bloc) of the Cold War, is gone at least temporarily. Fareed Zakaria describes three great power shifts over the last 500 years positing that the third shift is taking place now. He refers to this third shift as “the rise of the rest.”

Stewart Patrick describes a world of transnational threats from weak states while Patrick Nye describes not only a rise in the power resources of other states but also of non-state actors. The international order of the twenty-first century continues to evolve with no static or cookie-cutter template. Indeed, it is an unbalanced multi-polar world of state and non-state actors who operate in multiple systems.

The dynamics of our world continue to change as well. The greatest changes in this new twenty-first century may be the speed of communication and globalization. Speed such as the world-wide-web provides allows states and non-state actors alike to communicate directly to people over the head of governments and allows indigenous populations to do the same with each other. The Arab Spring is a manifestation of this dynamic as well as al-Qaeda’s ability to communicate with its audiences across the world. The war of ideas – known today as the battle of the narratives - has long been a part of war to some degree; that is not new. What is new is the speed of direct access to ideas. Globalization increases our economic interdependence and has increased the importance of financial relationships. It has been said that globalization advances prosperity throughout the world and it is imperative that globalization continues. These dynamics place increased emphasis on the information and economic elements of power whether in waging war or preventing war.

While this environment has the potential to hold great opportunity and hope throughout the world it is also a volatile and dangerous one of transition. The U.S. is in
the midst of a GWOT that has included both irregular and traditional conventional warfare. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continues. Conflict and war can come from any number of places. Thomas Barnett sees the future of conflict and war in regions of the world where there is economic and social instability. Samuel Huntington posits that future conflict and war will occur along fault lines of civilizations. A senior American military official expressed recently what many think - that future war may be shifting to the Pacific region and the threat of China. The challenges to the U.S. diplomatic and military community are tremendous.

The National Security Strategy of the United States recognizes the multitude and complexity of threats in today’s environment. The two cornerstone agencies of America’s national security, the Department of State and the Department of Defense, both outline today’s environment and potential threats. This integrated recognition of the world as it is today culminates in the identification of two dangerous and important categories of threat with nuclear and major regular war the most dangerous yet least likely and irregular war just as important and the most likely. Indeed some combination, or hybrid, such as a non-state actor using WMD or a state using irregular proxies is very possible. This environment demands a strategy that is creative just as LTG Dubik challenged and as comprehensive as Secretary Gates insisted.

Robert Zoellick, President of the World Bank, deals with the ever increasing issues of fragile states, both those in danger of breaking down and those in post-conflict such as in the GWOT. He refers back to the post World War Two period and the Cold War when national strategists had “one big idea: the nexus among economics, governance, and security.” Sixty years later he recognizes the conditions necessary to
win the war of ideas that his Cold War predecessors did. Zoellick calls for “securing development” as a “framework of building security, legitimacy, governance and economy.” This “securing development” is an integration of DIME. It is a strategy of essentially winning hearts and minds and the war of ideas – possibly the center of gravity in this century – and is a strategy that could advance U.S. interests in the world and bring lasting peace from conflict.

Strategy is the relationship between ends, ways and means. In a national security context ends can be identified as national interests, ways as the elements of power and means as specifically how the elements of power are applied. In essence, strategy in the national security realm is selecting the appropriate elements of power to advance national interests. This paper has laid out the theoretical framework for such a strategy in the twenty-first century environment to both win wars and to prevent them. That strategy is a deliberate and coherent integration of DIME. Such a strategy is referred to in the current U.S. National Security Strategy, described as a “whole of government” approach in the context of “engagement” to advance the enduring national interests of security, prosperity, universal human values, and international order and stability.

Recommendations for a Twenty-First Century Strategy

The whole of government approach hits the mark of what is needed in this century – a unity of effort integrating the application of the elements of power to both prevent war and to win wars. This approach must transcend future administrations just as containment did during the Cold War. While it is critical to recognize the value and necessity of integrating DIME in addressing security challenges it is also important to think about how that integration looks, about the “means” of such a strategy. That is
beyond the scope of this paper and worthy of further research. However, the interagency 3D Planning Guide addressing diplomacy, development and defense is an example of a worthy effort to integrate the planning of the Department of State, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of Defense.\textsuperscript{79} This integrated planning must take into consideration not only current means of strategy but also possible future capabilities and focus. Several recommendations for future thought and research are presented below based on the thinking that for any theory to have credibility and substance, developing a theory of strategy must address how that strategy might be implemented.

**Diplomacy/Economic/Information.** Both the Department of Defense and Department of State have recognized the need for civilians to work alongside the military in conflict environments.\textsuperscript{80} The State Department has developed a foundation for such a group of civilians known as the Civilian Response Corps (CRP).\textsuperscript{81} This Corps is a sound beginning but may be more effective if designed based on the models of Sister Cities International\textsuperscript{82} and of the National Guard. Sister Cities International is a private initiative dating back to the 1950s catalyzing cultural, educational, government and business exchanges between cities. Institutionalizing this concept within the CRP as a tool of public diplomacy and pooling of experts in various realms of development could have tremendous impact on preventing war and resolving war. Organizing the CRP along the lines of the National Guard develops nationwide public buy-in and support of foreign development\textsuperscript{83} prior to conflict (through engagement) and in Phase IV operations (as a surge development capacity such as was needed in Iraq and Afghanistan). Though organized similar to the National Guard, this institution would be civilian and not
military. This institution would work across the elements of power in its diplomatic, economic and information impact.

**Military.** Our Armed Forces must be designed and trained to operate along the full spectrum of operations to include “securing development” (with emphasis on “securing” when performing that mission). The broad range of potential threats requires a dominant military capable to perform across that range. However, the military does not need to become a development pool. It is not good at that. Whether it is through digging wells in southern Afghanistan to provide jobs and win hearts and minds but inadvertently lowering the water table in the process and harming long term agriculture\(^\text{84}\) to other projects that are either unwanted, ineffective or become targets, the military does not have the expertise to identify and administer development.\(^\text{85}\) That is a distraction from its mission and thus where an organization such as CRP comes into play. The military’s mission is to prevail in today’s war, prevent and deter conflict and to prepare to win future wars by applying the military element of power.\(^\text{86}\) To do that it must be robust, expeditionary and consist of a competent, well trained operational active force and operational reserve with strategic assets.\(^\text{87}\) It must be large enough and lethal enough to be feared and thus serve as a credible dynamic deterrent that gives teeth to all elements of national power.

**Information.** During the Cold War, the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) served as steward and proponent of winning the war of ideas between democracy and communism. As part of the “peace dividend” it was abolished and its functions rolled into the State Department. The Obama Administration reviewed the U.S. approach to strategic communication at the direction of Congress in 2010. It found that there is no
need to change direction in how the U.S. implements the information element of power.\textsuperscript{88} That may be the case however it needs further investigation. There exists a strong argument that an agency responsible for its own element of power should not be responsible for integrating others.\textsuperscript{89} It stands to reason that if ideas are often the center of gravity in today’s wars and the key to affecting an enemies’ will, the element of power most relevant to that center of gravity and enemies’ will should have its own institutional steward and appropriate prominence.

**National Security Education.** The U.S. national security establishment (Department of Defense, Department of State and USAID particularly) needs to provide for a comprehensive and interagency education for security professionals in today’s complex security environment bolstering the integrative approach necessary to prevent and win this century’s wars. The Department of Defense has such a system with its network of War Colleges and the Department of State has its Foreign Service Institute. Private universities and colleges offer a variety of educational degrees which impact on security education. The National Security Education Program (NSEP) was established by the National Security Education Act of 1991 to educate students in language and cultures but to date just over 2,000 students have participated in the program.\textsuperscript{90} American security professionals need a more comprehensive security education that covers the security establishment, theory, strategy, and leadership in addition to language and cultural studies. This level of education along with frequent agency exchanges must be required of more security professionals earlier in their careers to assure success of effective integration of DIME today.
These recommendations are not all encompassing; indeed more can be addressed in the area of economics which was so vital to winning the Cold War and has been such a key part of the strategy of the GWOT. But these recommendations are a starting point for further research in implementing a strategy of integrating DIME for preventing and winning wars in the twenty-first century.

**Conclusion**

Both B.H. Liddell Hart and Sun Tzu are probably correct that the best strategy to win war is without fighting. An integration of DIME within a whole of government approach of engagement and “securing development” may best advance U.S. interests along the continuum of peace thru conflict (see Figure 1, page 6). Diplomacy, information and economic elements of power can be waged in these spheres effectively without using military force. In fact, the best use of military force may simply be its strength behind the other elements as they are applied along these points of the continuum (as Al Capone famously said, “You get much farther with a kind word and a gun than with a kind word alone.”)\(^9\). However, as history shows even today in the GWOT, the U.S. will find itself in the necessary position to compel other actors to act in its interests wherever that threat comes from. Military force alone will not accomplish this.

U.S. security professionals need to think precisely about the nature of the U.S. relationship with states and non-state actors who threaten its interests and think creatively about how to compel them to act in its interests if their threats cannot be otherwise resolved. The U.S. often cooperates with other nations. It can even compete with other nations without hostility or compulsion. When there are conflicting interests the U.S. can resolve them peacefully as long as all parties seek such resolution. But
there are times when its enemies will not seek compromise. There are times when the U.S. will be compelled to compel them to act in its interests. That is when the U.S. is at war with them. Sometimes the U.S. will need to act with proportional force (that is, of sufficient and no less amount), sometimes proportionally with other elements of power and, at times, with all the elements. It is not a matter of using soft power or hard power; it is a matter of wielding all power available effectively.

This paper has presented a modified definition of war that expands the options in developing creative strategy for this century both to prevent and to win wars. Classical theorists such as Clausewitz, Sun Tzu and many others help to understand why nations fight, how they fight and how war will be won in this century. Their logic applies within the modified definition of war asserted in this paper, which includes the use of other elements of power in addition to military force. The international order is in transition and the dynamics of today’s world are volatile and ever changing. Clearly, this analysis only scratches the surface of war in the twenty-first century. In a world that is becoming more interconnected more quickly it is ideas that matter most; those are often the center of gravity. That is the war that will in the end advance the interests of the United States. The only way to win that war is with an integrated approach to using all elements of power to advance U.S. interests. Several lines of future thought have been presented in this paper for making this integration effective. These are lines of thought worth pursuing in the attempt to think more imaginatively about strategy. Not only must the U.S. integrate DIME, it must do so effectively.

Endnotes

1 For a thorough discussion of the place of the U.S. in the international order of the 21st century, see both Fareed Zakaria, “The Future of American Power: How America Can Survive


4 Ibid., 22.


6 Clausewitz states specifically that “there is only one means in war: combat.” Ibid., 96.


9 There is even an online journal by this name dedicated to reporting on and analyzing the GWOT. See the mission statement linked from The Long War Journal Home page at “About The Long War Journal,” http://www.longwarjournal.org/about.php (accessed September 10, 2011).


12 Ibid., 69.


14 Reeves, *President Kennedy: Profile of Power*, 231.

also pages 118-132 and 156-163 regarding the deliberate plan to bring down the Soviet economy and the National Security Decision Directives which laid out those plans.

16 Ibid., 309.


20 Without doubt there are significant differences between the GWOT and the Cold War. In the Cold War we fought a monolithic state. In the GWOT we fight a dispersed group of committed ideologues with financial backing and an appealing ideology. But there are similarities – the ideology and lines of financing to name two. Moreover, we are applying force more directly against al Qaeda in the GWOT than we did against the Soviets in the Cold War.


22 Ibid., 85.


24 Ibid., 554.

25 The examples are open to interpretation, of course. For example, Iran and North Korea could be placed on the continuum as conflict and not yet war. It depends on the policy of the United States towards those countries. It is arguable that even the USSR would have been placed as conflict during the Nixon era of détente. Kennedy vacillated between coexistence (see his Peace speech of June 10, 1963 which implied coexistence with the USSR, in Reeves, *President Kennedy: Profile of Power*, 514) and defeating them (see Reeves, *President Kennedy: Profile of Power*, 231) so either placement may have been applicable. Reagan was committed to winning the Cold War and thus the USSR would be placed on the continuum during that time as war. For Reagan’s commitment to victory see Kengor, *The Crusader: Ronald Reagan and the Fall of Communism*, 74. This is why the clarity of policy is so crucial. Knowing where we place other nations along the continuum will help give clarity and imagination to developing effective strategy.

26 See Hart’s concern for planting the “germs” of the next war when applying exhaustive violence, B. H. Liddell Hart, “Grand Strategy,” in *Strategy*, 2nd rev. ed. (New York, NY: Penguin, 1991), 353. One can also see some of the seeds of the GWOT in post-Desert Storm Iraq as James Nathan described the state of affairs in Iraq following Desert Storm not to mention Osama Bin Laden’s reaction to the presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia. For the description of post-Desert Storm Iraq, see James Nathan, “Conclusion” in *Soldiers, Statecraft and History*:

27 Clausewitz, On War, 80.

28 Clausewitz, On War, 86-87.

29 Jomini’s list of reasons for war is comprehensive though his final reason of a “mania for conquest” is the only one that could be argued to require the use of force to be achieved. See Antoine Henri Jomini, The Art of War (London: Greenhill Books; Novatio, CA: Presidio Press, 1992), 12.

30 Nathan, Soldiers, Statecraft and History: Coercive Diplomacy and International Order, 15-17.

31 Ibid., 17.

32 Ibid., 16.

33 Hart, Strategy, 353.


38 Ibid., 77-78.

39 Ibid., 63-65.

40 Ibid., 41.

41 Ibid., 39.

42 Ibid., 39.

43 Clausewitz, On War, 585.


47 Clausewitz, *On War*, 77.


51 Ambrose and Brinkley, *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938*, 86.


53 George Kennan described the overriding desire of Europeans for security even more than freedom in his famous Long Telegram. Stephen Ambrose describes how NATO met this need. See both George Kennan, “Long Telegram”…..12 and Rise to Globalism…..105-106.

54 The Executive Secretary, “NSC-68: A Report to the National Security Council,” 11.


56 Nathan, *Soldiers, Statecraft and History: Coercive Diplomacy and International Order*, 94.


58 Patrick, *Weak States and Global Threats*, 27.


60 “For example, the United States and the European Union are operating in a cooperative security system, but the United States and Iran are operating in a competitive security system.” Deborah L. Hanagan, “International Order,” U.S. Army War College, Department of National Security and Strategy, *National Security Policy and Strategy Directive and Course Readings*, AY - 12 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2012), 259. Hanagan’s emphasis is on the multi-system dimension of today’s world, she does not characterize it as unbalanced – that is the interpretation of this paper’s author.


From a discussion conducted under the policy of non-attribution. Date not included in compliance with the status of non-attribution.


Ibid.

Ibid., 69.


Ibid., 11.

Ibid., 7.


The 3D Planning Group (3DPG) is an effort to integrate the planning for diplomacy, development and defense capabilities, see United States Government, “3D Planning Guide: Diplomacy, Development, Defense - Pre-Decisional Working Draft,” September 15, 2011.


The organization of the National Guard based on the states would serve as an effective template for this institution. Moreover it would provide a deep pool of expertise and particularly tie the population to the success of these efforts. Army Chief of Staff, General Creighton Abrams recognized the benefit of such a model of a direct link of popular support to the military when he integrated the National Guard and Army Reserve into the Total Force structure in 1972. As a result of his vision, the U.S. does not go to war without the support of the population as the population is more integrated into the war effort through its “home town” soldiers. See, Department of the Army, Michael Doubler, I Am the Guard, Pamphlet No. 130-1, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2001), 280.

Through discussions of non-attribution in a classroom environment at the US Army War College. This example took place in southern Afghanistan in 2004.


BG Jeffrey Buchanan uses a similar argument with regard to the Department of Defense integrating use of all instruments of power in Iraq, see Jeffrey Buchanan, Maxie Davis and Lee Wight, “Death of the Combatant Command? Toward an Interagency Approach,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 52, (1st Quarter 2009): 93. This same argument could be applied to how the Department of State, as responsible for the Diplomatic instrument of power, is called upon to integrate the Information element of power. This argument can be extrapolated to mean that each instrument of power should have its own institutional representative (i.e., the USIA for the Information element of power) and integrated with other elements at a higher level such as the National Security Council.


There are times when force is required and that use of force must err on the side of being too much as opposed to too little. That is what is meant here by proportionality – that enough
force is used: not so little that it drags out the fighting and suffering unnecessarily but overwhelmingly enough that it completes the mission as effectively and efficiently as possible.

\[93\] This may raise our ideas of “jointness” to a whole new strategic level of interagency cooperation of planning and execution in a synthesized effective process.