Civil-Military Governance: Sustaining Lessons from a Decade of Conflict

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**Civil-Military Governance: Sustaining Lessons from a Decade of Conflict**

One of the most significant lessons of the last decade of war is that the United States must optimize its ability to synchronize military and civilian operations and activities in nation building, through coordinated civil-military governance assistance. The U.S. military has been required to perform civil-military governance activities in each of our nation’s conflicts dating back to the American Revolution. However, the absence of formal training or education in these activities resulted in a significant deficit in civil-military governance knowledge and skills within the U.S. military in the aftermath of 9-11. The past decade of conflict has “reset” the U.S. Government’s point of reference in this area – so much so that senior military and civilian leaders now require “whole-of-government” perspectives when providing guidance for both routine and contingency operations and activities. This SRP examines the U.S. experience in administering civil-military governance and makes recommendations for institutionalizing lessons learned in this area over the past decade of conflict in order to ensure critical knowledge, skill sets and capabilities are sustained for the future.
CIVIL-MILITARY GOVERNANCE: SUSTAINING LESSONS FROM A DECADE OF CONFLICT

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**ABSTRACT**

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One of the most significant lessons of the last decade of war is that the United States must optimize its ability to synchronize military and civilian operations and activities in nation building, through coordinated civil-military governance assistance. The U.S. military has been required to perform civil-military governance activities in each of our nation’s conflicts dating back to the American Revolution. However, the absence of formal training or education in these activities resulted in a significant deficit in civil-military governance knowledge and skills within the U.S. military in the aftermath of 9-11. The past decade of conflict has “reset” the U.S. Government’s point of reference in this area – so much so that senior military and civilian leaders now require “whole-of-government” perspectives when providing guidance for both routine and contingency operations and activities. This SRP examines the U.S. experience in administering civil-military governance and makes recommendations for institutionalizing lessons learned in this area over the past decade of conflict in order to ensure critical knowledge, skill sets and capabilities are sustained for the future.
We are and will remain responsible to provide our leaders with options to defend this Nation. The tension between winning the present and winning the future will require hard choices and principled leadership. Transitioning out of a constant combat posture to being ready to fight across all domains will require deep thinking—about the capabilities we need and about who we are.¹

—General Martin E. Dempsey, 18th CJCS, 2012

**Background**

After a decade of conflict, U.S. military commanders and their units that have "owned" battle space, have developed and refined new skills in civil-military governance. These skills include promoting good governance, reconstruction and administration of basic services. Critical among these skills is providing basic services such as sewage collection, ample potable water, reliable electrical capacity, appropriate educational capacity, satisfactory trash collection, and basic medical services. Sewage, water, electric, academic, trash, and medical (SWEAT-M) assessment has become second nature for units conducting initial observation and framework development for restoring and sustaining civil infrastructure and basic services. Historically, the U.S. military – primarily the Army – has performed these kinds of tasks in every war dating back to the American Revolution. We must ensure we sustain and enhance the civil governance skills, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) we have learned at such great cost over the past decade of war.

The 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) reaffirmed America’s commitment to retaining its global leadership role and articulated the nation’s enduring national interests. Those interests include the security of the U.S., its citizens, and U.S. allies
and partners; a strong, innovative and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity; respect for universal values at home and around the world; and an international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges. Taking its cue from the NSS, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) informs the development of our National Military Objectives - Counter Violent Extremism; Deter and Defeat Aggression; Strengthen International and Regional Security; and Shape the Future Force.

Because it is a professional, values based organization, Department of Defense (DoD) dutifully seeks ways to contribute to solutions that optimize the Joint Force’s ability to perform assigned roles and missions that sustain and enhance national security. As part of this effort, DoD continuously analyzes potential efficiencies and associated structural and organizational changes. In light of current fiscal constraints there is a need to examine the prioritization of national military objectives and reevaluate the level of risk the nation is willing to assume. This is particularly important in an era of fiscal austerity that will increasingly impact the DoD.

Great effort is being exerted within DoD to formulate viable solutions to this complex issue. A question that frequently frames individuals’ thought processes are whether resources (means), objectives (ends), or the strategic operating environment - or a combination of the three - drive strategy. Military and civilian strategic leaders will have to establish priorities and decide where and how much risk to assume. Additionally, in addressing any complex issue, those seeking substantive solutions and
approaches will look to the past for perspectives and examples to help grasp the depth, breadth, and scope of the requirements of the future environment.

As an organizing framework, the 2010 QDR used risk definitions, which have been operative since 2001. These definitions are:

- **Operational risk**: DoD’s ability to execute strategy successfully within acceptable human, material, financial, and strategic cost parameters. Consideration of operational risk requires assessing the DoD's ability to execute current, planned, and contingency operations in the near-term.²

- **Future challenges risk**: DoD’s capacity to execute future missions successfully, and to hedge against potential shocks. Key considerations here are the Department's ability to field superior capabilities and sufficient capacity to deter/defeat emerging threats in the mid-, and long-term.³

- **Force management risk**: DoD’s ability to recruit, retain, train, educate, and equip the total force, and sustain its readiness and morale. This requires the DoD to consider its ability to provide trained and ready personnel in the near-, mid-, and long-term.⁴

- **Institutional risk**: DoD’s capacity to apply management and business practices to plan for, enable, and support execution of DoD missions. It should consider the ability to develop effective and efficient organizations and processes over the near-, mid-, and long-term.⁵

Benjamin Franklin said, “An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.” With the NMS objectives and risk definitions listed above, there might be a corollary to Franklin’s admonition; “Strengthening International and Regional Security Capacity will
result in long term savings.” In operationalizing this corollary, DoD will require capabilities to perform security assistance activities and operations. These activities include strengthening regional security, providing assistance to improve civil control of security forces and providing or improving basic services – all in support of good governance. These activities are critical to enabling people to live and prosper in their environment.

The 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) suggested that other USG agencies – not just DoD - are also critical to enabling good governance and security.

With the right tools, training, and leadership, our diplomats and development experts can defuse crises before they explode. Creating new opportunities for advancing democracy, promoting sustainable economic growth, and strengthening the rule of law in fragile states are all overlapping and mutually reinforcing endeavors. They cut across bureaus and offices and agencies. They demand not just the skills of our State Department diplomats and USAID development experts, but also the expertise of civilian specialists across the U.S. Government.6

The key is to identify the “right” tools and establish the right training, doctrine, and leadership to ensure the conditions are set to provide opportunities where those executing civil-military governance activities can develop their skills and establish interagency relationships. The 2010 QDR also reflects this approach:

Strengthening Relationships - Achieving the Department’s strategic objectives requires close collaboration with counterparts at home and with key allies and partners abroad. Through its foreign defense relationships, the United States not only helps avert crises but also improves its effectiveness in responding to them. Moreover, by integrating U.S. defense capabilities with other elements of national security—including diplomacy, development, law enforcement, trade, and intelligence—the nation can ensure that the right mix of expertise is at hand to take advantage of emerging opportunities and to thwart potential threats.

Improving unity of effort - The Department remains committed to further improving a whole-of-government approach to national security
challenges. From improving our partnership with the Department of State in conflict zones, to our enduring relationship with America’s intelligence community, to supporting civil authorities at home through our partnership with the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense will closely cooperate with other U.S. departments and agencies to better protect and advance America’s interests.

Over the last ten years, in both Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. military commanders have learned the criticality of designing campaigns to include security and governance as lines of effort. Success in these lines of effort has been key to U.S. exit strategies for each theater - the creation of a capable government able to provide security for itself. For operational and tactical units deployed over the past ten years, learning to operationalize these lines of effort has consumed the majority of their focus, resources, and efforts.

The 2010 NSS, devotes an entire section to describing the President’s strategic approach to strengthening national capacity – a whole of government approach. This concept of balancing and integrating all elements of American power is not new. However, over the past decade, significant progress has been made in coordinating and synchronizing these elements of power. Cooperation between multiple agencies, civilian and military to achieve unity of effort in Afghanistan and Iraq has proven a useful and effective capability that DoD should sustain as we prepare for an uncertain future. In preparing for that future though, there appears to be at least one thing that is certain. No matter what senior leader one listen’s to, military or civilian, there is consensus that the United States must retain the lessons learned in civil governance during the last decade of war. Institutional leaders, pundits, academics, think tanks and journalists almost all agree that we must retain lessons learned to leverage all agencies and elements of national power to conduct security assistance, nation building, and major combat
operations to defeat future threats to our national security. The President, Congress, and U.S. Government agencies confirm this consensus through direction, legislation, resources and initiatives in multiple contexts.

Employing a whole of government approach, the DoD can continue to prepare military forces for major combat operations (core competencies) and perform security assistance while at the same time support critical nation building requirements of good governance, reconstruction and development. In order for the U.S. military to be better postured to support the attainment of future national objectives, it must sustain – and expand upon – the civil governance capabilities it has acquired. This particularly applies to the Army. To do this we must capitalize on the lessons learned over the last ten years, and, in accordance with the guidance from the NSS, QDR, NMS, and the 2009 Quadrennial Roles and Missions (QRM) review report and 2012 priorities for the 21st century- institutionalize these capabilities in the organization, training, equipping, and education of the future force.

In order to institutionalize these capabilities, DoD will be required to integrate professional development, training and education in the tenets of good governance, civil-military governance and essential basic services critical to the establishment and sustainment of good governance – typical sewage, water, electric, public education, trash disposal, medical care, transportation. Based on recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, the capability to conduct operations supporting good governance and development of essential services should be a mission essential task for brigade level units. Instruction in the fundamental concepts and technical aspects of good governance and essential services should be included in established professional
military training and education. Complementing this training and education, key leaders within brigade combat teams should conduct annual training exercises and activities with local – municipal, county, or state - governments in the United States to highlight key concepts and improve understanding of practical issues and concerns of civil-military governance. An additional benefit of this training and education process would be that both military personnel and local government officials would improve their understanding of each other’s organizational culture, thus enhancing civil-military relations across the U.S. at multiple levels while simultaneously sharing skills.

Colonel Richard Whitaker in his 2006 US Army War College paper, “Military Government in Future Operations,” suggests that America’s recent experience with planning for the establishment of civilian-led governments in the immediate aftermath of hostilities has met with failure for a variety of reasons. He cites confusion, and poor performance on the part of those involved as key factors in this failure. Colonel Whitaker contends that while transitioning from military to civilian control as soon as practicable is desirable, doing so too soon is a recipe for disaster. The United States government generally, and the US Army in particular, should expect and plan for extensive and prolonged military governance requirements in future military operations.

We have learned over the past decade of conflict that there are many organizations, agencies, and departments - internal and external to the U.S. government - that need to retain and improve their ability to conduct synchronized activities and operations in pursuit of policy objectives. “Interagency” and “whole-of-government approach” are the buzzword concepts of the day. As the President stated in the National Security Strategy,
We must also build and integrate the capabilities that can advance our interests, and the interests we share with other countries and peoples. Our Armed Forces will always be a cornerstone of our security, but they must be complemented. Our security also depends upon diplomats who can act in every corner of the world, from grand capitals to dangerous outposts; development experts who can strengthen governance and support human dignity; and intelligence and law enforcement that can unravel plots, strengthen justice systems, and work seamlessly with other countries.  

Long-term security can only be sustained by speaking to people’s hopes for their future. Accomplishing this will require a whole of government effort. The entire nation will have a role to play.

Historical Precedent

The U.S. military has conducted operations that involve military governance, reconstruction, stability and support operations in every war from the Revolutionary War to the Global War on Terror – most prominently Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Such operations are not a new phenomenon. In every war since the War of 1812, the U.S. military has been required to establish military control over the civil government in occupied territories. This was the case during the Mexican War in parts of Mexico, the Southwest and California; in the southern states during and after the Civil War; and during the Spanish American War in the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico. And, more recently, during and after WWII in Germany and Japan.

Experience in each of these conflicts has shown that often, effective civil-military governance contributed materially to the achievement of military objectives. More often though, American military government followed in the wake of military operations and had a political, rather than military, purpose.

During the Mexican War, General Winfield Scott published a theater-wide code of conduct (General Order 20). That code specified the rules under which both service
personnel and the local population would be governed. More than ten years later during and after the American Civil War, the experience of the soldiers that operated under General Order 20 paid dividends. Between 1861 and 1865 Union forces routinely established and maintained local governments in “confederate” territory. In some cases, professional military officers assumed the role of military governors. In others, civilians were appointed as military governors and given a direct commission in the Army.

During the Civil War, both by policy and necessity, advancing Union forces found themselves responsible for a broad range of governance tasks. In 1863, President Lincoln made all Union forces subject to General Order 100, the Lieber Code. Based on the exigencies of the situation, the experience of serving officers and the success of General Scott’s General Order 20, this order focused on martial law, military jurisdiction over civilian property and activities, and treatment of spies, deserters and prisoners of war. The intent was to impose order and respect for the constituted military authority.23 In 21st Century operating environments, the requirement to establish, promote and sustain a relationship of respect between local populations and their government remains no less important. By 1903 almost all US Army officers had experienced one or more campaigns involving a requirement for and application of civil-military governance. This trend was continued following the WWI Armistice in Nov 1918 when American commanders governed parts of Siberia, Dalmatia, and the Rhineland. Despite this extensive experience the US Army did not adopt civil-military governance a core mission essential task, either culturally or doctrinally. The US Army War College, seeking lessons learned during the interwar period, periodically examined
the topic of military governance. This examination resulted in publication of Field Manual (FM) 27-10, The Rules of Land Warfare, and FM 27-5, Military Government. Additionally, the idea of creating a school of military government gained serious consideration. The preeminent lesson drawn from the WWI occupation experience was that officers needed to possess the requisite skills required to assume responsibilities of administering civil governance. It was also determined that officers required a baseline level of knowledge regarding the technical aspects of services provided for the people by local and regional governments. This knowledge would ideally help establish a relationship promoting respect between the people, the governing body, and the military and civilian force serving on the ground.

The School of Military Governance

The British established a civil-military governance school in 1940 to prepare their officer’s to deal with populations in what today we call “failed states.” The British school’s curriculum focused on general history, geography, and economics. There was no specialized training in military governance. U.S. Army officers who attended the course espoused its value and an American course was established. This course incorporated additional focus on military governance. Building on the British model curriculum, the U.S. curriculum added principles of public administration (municipal and county governments), parks and recreation, public finance, public health and sanitation, communications, utilities and public works, education, libraries, public safety, public welfare and economic development.

In 1941, the U.S. Army established the School of Military Governance (SOMG) in Charlottesville, VA. It produced 100 graduates per session who were prepared to serve as the administrative and advisory assistants to military governors. The
curriculum was thorough and included instruction in government and administration, legal affairs, government finance, currency and banking, natural resources, agriculture, industry and commerce, labor, public works and utilities, transportation systems, communications, public health and sanitation, public safety, education, and public welfare. As World War II continued, the “demand signal” for SOMG graduates increased significantly. To meet this demand, the school was expanded to other universities including Harvard, Stanford, Princeton, Yale, Northwestern, Boston, Chicago, Pittsburgh, Michigan, and Wisconsin. Today, as during WWII, the demand for personnel with military governance skills far exceeds the supply. In current conflicts, personnel with these skills would be useful anywhere a unit is deployed and “owns battle space.”

As was the case during WW II, it would appear at first glance that today’s civilian agencies or organizations (e.g., the Department of State or contractors with training in municipal or county government) would be better suited than military personnel to conduct civil governance activities and operations. In addition to American cultural institutionalization of civilian control of the military, many would argue that these civilian organizations and agencies possess a greater degree of technical expertise in the functions essential to “restarting” failed governments than does the DoD. In WW II, civilian agencies did not have the capability or capacity for governing occupied territories. As the war progressed, those agencies became increasingly doubtful of their own ability to meet steadily growing requirements. However, it remains as true today as it was in the 1940s that the national interest demands a civil-military
governance capability – personnel and resources - and the means to deploy it when and where needed. DoD, particularly the Army, has this capability and capacity.

The Vietnam Experience

During the 15 years following WWII, the civil-military governance challenge was addressed in terms of numbers of personnel but not in terms of coordination and synchronization across agencies. By 1960, a Military Assistance Advisory Group’s (MAAG) had been established in Vietnam to assist in the training of conventional armed forces. Over time, the scope of this organization’s mission grew to include civil and military assistance. “Those Americans who visited South Vietnam for the first time were stunned by the sheer enormity of the U.S. effort – a huge, sprawling, many-faceted military-civilian apparatus, generally uncoordinated, in which all too frequently the various components worked against rather than in support of each other.”

The MAAG commander called for increases in both Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) troop levels and the U.S. military commitment in both equipment and men. During project “Beefup” the number of American “advisers” increased from 3,205 in December 1961 to more than 9,000 by the end of 1962.

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), was created in response to this significant increase in U.S. military assistance to South Vietnam.

In a mission statement from Admiral Felt, [MACV] immediate superior [Commander in Chief Pacific], was twofold. As senior United States military commander in South Vietnam, he had “direct responsibility for all US military policy, operations and assistance in that country.” In that capacity, he was to exercise “operational command” of all U.S. military forces and agencies assigned to him, including the military assistance group.

It was designed to assist the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) but ended up subsuming it to avoid duplication of effort between the two headquarters.
In Vietnam, the fundamental problem was the absence of security. The U.S. military was preoccupied with the shooting war and gave little attention to what became known as “the other war” (this phrase suggested the absence of coordination between pacification and military operations). In many cases, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) was incapable of providing security – in others it was part of the problem. Often, district or provincial development teams would make progress, only to have it nullified when American aircraft bombed the villages in which they were working. Lack of communication and coordinated and synchronized operations prevented ARVN and U.S. forces from providing effective support to one another. In an effort to enhance the coordination between U.S. military, South Vietnamese Government (GVN), and civilian efforts, the Office of Civil Operations (OCO) was established in November 1966. Its purpose was to unify all civilian agencies, except the CIA, under Deputy Ambassador William J. Porter. Robert W. Komer, President Johnson’s special assistant for pacification efforts in Vietnam, believed that the single manager of pacification efforts should be the MACV commander since security was central to effective pacification and MACV controlled more manpower and security resources than any other agency. General Westmoreland also advocated a single management authority. His perspective was that military and nonmilitary efforts must be completely integrated. He called attention to the extensive involvement of his command, particularly the 1,100 MACV district advisers in civilian as well as military components of the overall effort. Anticipating confusion, General Westmoreland established a Revolutionary Development Support (RDS) Directorate under the staff supervision of his Director of Operations, J3. In spite of OCO’s success in unifying civilian pacification
activities, it could not produce the desired change in the balance of influence between the South Vietnamese Government and Viet Cong control in the countryside.\textsuperscript{50}

In May 1967, by direction of the President, OCO and RDS were merged to form the Office of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (OCORDS)\textsuperscript{51}. Robert Komer was selected to lead the merged agency (now named CORDS) and was assigned as General Westmorland’s civilian deputy. CORDS’ mission was to coordinate the U.S. civil and military pacification programs in South Vietnam. Komer argued that the President’s desired pacification objectives could only be achieved by integrating three tasks: establishing security; weakening the insurgent force in the field; and implementing the CORDS strategy nation-wide.\textsuperscript{52} The first had to be security. Once achieved, the second task was that insurgents’ forces had to be weakened both by destroying their infrastructure among the population and by developing programs to win the people’s support for the GVN and U.S. forces.\textsuperscript{53} The third task was that the new strategy had to be applied on a large scale in order to have a positive effect.\textsuperscript{54} CORDS advisory teams were dispatched throughout South Vietnam’s 44 provinces and 250 districts.\textsuperscript{55} Ironically, although this new structure was designed to facilitate coordination between military and civilian operations and activities, Komer routinely bypassed MACV by coordinating directly with the White House – exercising what amounted to a separate chain of command for pacification.\textsuperscript{56}

\textbf{Afghanistan and Iraq}

The U.S. government introduced Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan and Iraq. Theoretically similar to CORDS, the PRTs consisted of military personnel, diplomats, and reconstruction subject matter experts, all working to support reconstruction efforts. While the concepts used by PRTs are similar to those used by
CORDs in Vietnam, PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq have different compositions and missions. In Vietnam, CORDS’ authority emanated from multiple U.S. Government agencies through a “separate” chain of command with authority for directing civilian activities vested in the Office of Civilian Operations (OCO) in Saigon. The PRTs fall under the overall authority of the military commander, usually a regional commander responsible for the same geographic area in which the PRT operates. Like CORDs, the PRT’s objectives are to improve security, extend the authority of the central government, and facilitate reconstruction.

Synchronizing and coordinating the security assistance line of effort must be a priority for the Commander. The most significant difference between the Vietnam era of MAAG, MACV, and CORDS and the Global War on Terror (GWOT) era of Joint Task Forces (JTFs) and PRTs is the coordinated unity of effort achieved by the PRTs. While JTFs and PRTs were not adequately synchronized in the early years of the GWOT, 2001-2005, a significant effort was made to apply lessons learned and by 2011 synchronization between JTF and PRT efforts was vastly improved. PRTs were task organized under either Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) or Regional Commands (RC) to support the commander of the region in which they were located. This “supporting” relationship led to enhanced joint planning between the PRT and battle space commander. At a minimum, each command was more aware of the other’s actions and could identify potential activities or actions that could impact or support the operations of the other. This is a level of coordination and synchronization that U.S. commands, MAAGs, and CORDS in Vietnam never achieved, even when they operated in the same area. While in both era’s, commanders received guidance to “put an indigenous force
face” on operations, GWOT forces did a better job executing this intent - though not without challenges. In the GWOT era, there have been instances when joint U.S. and host-nation combat forces directly supported PRT operations which has contributed significantly to the achievement of campaign objectives.

When the commander in the field abdicates responsibility for supporting the governance line of effort, the effects can be detrimental for two principle reasons.57 First, despite any advantage in technical knowledge they might possess, civilian government agencies usually possess neither the staff nor the resources to support governance activities and operations with sufficient depth, breadth and scope.58 Second, for any successful governance and reconstruction effort, in both the short and long term, the ability to provide and sustain area security is a must.59 Operating alone or with contractors, civilian agencies have not been able to ensure security in the current operating environments. This is not to suggest that the military has to be in the lead. Another agency can lead with the military in a supporting role.

**NSPD-44**

In order to coordinate reconstruction efforts between the military and civilian elements, President Bush signed into law National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44 on December 7, 2005. In NSPD – 44, the President articulated the requirement to create a cohesive and permanent mechanism by which the US government could address stabilization and reconstruction challenges abroad.60 The Defense Department had identified the importance of integrated civilian and military environments as essential to stability operations. 61 Additionally, other agencies and organizations had identified the preference for civilians over military actors.62 The 2009 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) reinforced the role of the military in
reconstruction and stabilization by listing ‘relief and reconstruction’ as one of the four basic military activities.\textsuperscript{63}

The Civilian Response Corps (CRC) was created as an interagency mechanism to interface with DoD in reconstruction and stabilization operations. In this concept, the Secretaries of State and Defense coordinate and integrate stabilization and reconstruction responsibilities to maintain clear accountability for leadership of supporting operations.\textsuperscript{64} The CRC is a group of civilian federal employees from nine federal agencies who are specially trained and equipped to deploy rapidly to provide conflict prevention and stabilization assistance to countries in crisis or emerging from crisis.\textsuperscript{65} The expertise encompassed within the CRC includes diplomats, development specialists, public health specialists, law enforcement and corrections officers, engineers, economists, lawyers and others who can assist fragile states in restoring stability and rule of law and achieve economic recovery. The CRC leverages the diverse talents and expertise of members of the Department of State (DoS), Department of Justice (DoJ), Department of Agriculture (USDA), Department of Commerce, Department of Health and Human Services (DoHHS), Department of Transportation (DoT), Department of Energy (DoE), Department of Homeland Security, and U.S. Agency for international Development (USAID).\textsuperscript{66}

The Joint Staff J7, Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA) Division was directed to collect, aggregate, analyze, and disseminate joint lessons learned and best practices across the full spectrum of military operations in order to enhance joint capabilities.\textsuperscript{67} A division of the Joint Staff J7 Deputy Directorate for JCOA recently published a case study from Afghanistan in support of the Chairman’s Joint Lessons
Learned Program. The conclusions of the study found that although Special Operations Force (SOF) and Conventional Force (CF) partnership has proven successful, Foreign Internal Defense (FID) is not a habitual conventional force (CF) mission. Missions like village support operations/ Afghan local police (VSO/ALP) are nuanced, requiring a high degree of individual service member maturity and experience.\[^{68}\] Longer-term aspects of governance and development associated with VSO/ALP and similar FID-like programs rely on familiarity with and understanding of interagency and NGO capabilities.\[^{69}\] SOF typically has greater experience than CF in working with diverse interagency partners on the ground. However, if the trend of increased reliance on CF persists, preparing select numbers to assume greater roles in such missions implies the individual Services and even the US interagency will have to address larger doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) considerations to ensure success in future operations.\[^{70}\] During his tenure as COMISAF, General David Petraeus referred to VSO/ALP as a “potential game changer”\[^{71}\] focused on important objective areas such as security (including support of ALP), provision of basic services, economic development, and support for the government (both local and national). Survey results indicate a slow but steady increase in positive trends where VSO sites have been established.\[^{72}\] Such positive survey results were a contributing factor to the Government of Afghanistan’s decision to expand the program.\[^{73}\]  

**Recommendations**

Civil-military governance should be established as a core mission essential task for Conventional Forces. Such action would include routine professional military education (PME) requirements and integrated training exercises with ‘heartland’ America municipal and county, or state governing bodies. Training and education for
officers and NCOs would occur in two separate parts. First, an academic portion taught at established military schools such as the basic and advanced non commissioned officers course (BNOC and ANOC), the officers basic and captain’s career course (OBC and CCC), intermediate level education (ILE) and the Senior Service Colleges (SSC). Second, units would conduct ‘field training’ exercises embedding officers and NCOs with municipal, county, and state government organizations and agencies to observe and learn methods of administering civil governance functions.

No one should doubt that good governance in the twenty-first century also requires more than just character and firm leadership – the complexity of our modern world demands comprehension, analysis, evaluation and application of a myriad of activities across a broad spectrum of functions. The concepts taught in the School of Military Government should be updated and integrated in current PME programs and curriculum to provide the basis for a well-trained and appropriately educated commissioned and non-commissioned officers corps capable of effectively utilizing all available resources – military, interagency and non-governmental – in stabilizing areas both before and during combat operations and in the first critical weeks and months of the post-hostilities phase. Establishing a tiered curriculum in PME institutions can achieve similar educational effects at a fraction of the cost of establishing a new School of Military Government as a separate institution. Additionally, by integrating this type of instruction into established PME, more officers and NCOs could be trained and educated.

The Education Concept. The academic portion of this training would focus on fundamental principles of governance including municipal and county government,
public administration, public finance, public health and sanitation, utilities and public works, parks and recreation, education, libraries and internet access, public safety, public welfare and economic development. DoD agencies would coordinate with DoS, USAID, and the CRC to develop an appropriate curriculum. Likewise DoS, USAID, and CRC personnel would be eligible to attend instruction in DoD PME programs pertinent to civil-military governance. DoD should coordinate with Department of State (DoS), USAID, and the Civilian Response Corps (CRC) to synchronize training curriculums, plan training exercises and prepare, plan, and execute contingency operations to help harmonize civilian and military activities.

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), with support from Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and National Guard Bureau (NGB), would coordinate the field portion of the training that would include embedding units, or, at minimum, select officers and enlisted leaders, with ‘heartland America’ municipal, county and state governments to enable them to observe subject matter experts and gain knowledge and experience in requisite civil governance skills and services. Unit commanders would tailor their ‘field training exercise’ (FTX) based on time available and capacity of the municipal or county government agencies to participate. By focusing unit training interaction with local governments in the vicinity of their home station, these training events would have the added benefit of helping to close the gap between the nation and the military that fights its wars. Ideally, these exercises would constitute a whole of government endeavor and further develop interagency skill sets and relationships.

Establishing military governance as a Mission Essential Task List (METL) task with routine PME requirements and an annual training requirement would also
demonstrate DoD’s commitment to a whole of government approach to reconstruction and stabilization operations. This approach would allow commanders to train their units in mission essential tasks down to the individual level and sustain that training throughout a career. Relationships built during training would serve the unit during contingencies and provide individual military leaders opportunities to continue to develop skills that would serve the nation in future contingencies and operations.

In implementing this concept, the following key questions will have to be addressed for the education and field training concept; who, what, when, where, and how education and training would occur.

**Who**: All officers and NCO’s would receive academic instruction.

**What**: Education would be based on a coordinated civil-military curriculum on governance and essential services commensurate with the service member’s skill level.

**Where**: Service members would receive training at established PME institutions.

**When**: Service members would attend PME in accordance with their routine career managers scheduling and career timelines.

**How**: PME institutions would integrate a block of instruction on governance and essential services into their curriculums.

All officers and NCOs should receive education relevant to their grade, specialty, and billet. Additionally, DoD should invite interagency government and non-governmental civilian personnel to participate in appropriate portions of the curriculum. Civilian personnel would join both as instructors and as members of the class. Participants would include all ranks, officer and enlisted.
DoD in coordination with DoS, USAID and their respective subordinate agencies would develop a curriculum. The curriculum would focus on general civic administration, leadership skills, and fundamentals of administration of essential services – the latter of which would focus on SWEAT-MT. Key DoD contributions to the curriculum would focus on SOF, Civil Affairs, and civil engineering courses. The level of instruction would be tailored to the experience and level of responsibility of the students in each course. The learning objectives would be established with expected tasks that the student population might encounter. The curriculum would include instruction based on the eight principles of good governance; participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive and follows the rule of law.76 These principles help set governing conditions in which corruption is minimized, the views of minorities are taken into account and the voices of the most vulnerable are heard in decision-making.77 They also support a government’s ability to be responsive to the present and future needs of society.78

Aligned with these principles, students would also receive instruction on government structures, administration, quality control, and other services focusing on the local level. The purpose of this instruction would be to develop a uniform “body of knowledge” across the force. Students would be able to identify, understand and develop the requirements for critical functions and services required to support good governance.

Upon achieving the learning objectives, students would be able to make better informed assessments and plans in future operating environments. This education would prove beneficial not only for post conflict operations, but also in contingency
planning as well. Informed by the requirements for civil governance, military and civilian personnel will have a better understanding of the desired endstate and the requirements necessary for achieving that endstate. Conrad Crane and Andrew Terrill provided a detailed example for Iraq in their monograph “Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for military forces in a post-Conflict Scenario.” This document provides a good framework for planning tasks and activities required to stabilize and transition governance and services from military to civilian control.\textsuperscript{79}

The curriculum would also include an overview on structure, administration, operations, and key node identification in basic services, focusing on sewage, water, electric, public education, trash disposal, medical care, and transportation (SWEAT-MT). The intent is not to make every student as an engineer, but rather instill in every student a better understanding of the key components of SWEAT-MSO assessments as described in Field Manuel (FM) 3-34, page170.

\textit{The Field Training Concept.}

\textbf{Who:} Brigade or Battalion sized units would conduct this training based on the capability of municipal or county governments to host them.

\textbf{What:} Commanders would embed elements of their command in municipal or county government administration offices and essential service organizations that correspond to the responsibilities that will be assigned to the Soldiers.

\textbf{Where:} Training would occur at municipal and county governments, ideally, governments that have limited or no exposure to military installations or personnel.

\textbf{When:} Commanders would schedule embedded field training exercises in accordance with their units training and readiness cycle calendar.
How: DoD would coordinate a menu of municipal and county governments willing to support/host a 12-14 day brigade or battalion size exercise, through the National Guard Bureau and U.S. Northern Command.

Critical to the success of the field training exercise, would be unit staffs capable of facilitating coordination and execution of the event. Because of this, the lowest level unit to conduct the training should be the battalion. The battalion level will best match up to the capacity and size of most municipal or county governments. The ideal situation would be to conduct the field exercise with a brigade combat team embedded into key functional areas of a municipal or county government.

For the field training portion, NGB would lead with support from NORTHCOM in arranging a menu of municipal or county governments and 10-14 day time periods that would be suitable for the respective local government. DoD would coordinate with the services which would ultimately grant direct authorization (DIRLAUTH) for units to coordinate directly with the local government to finalize scheduling, planning, and conduct the training. Battalion size units would deploy and embed with municipal or county governments and associated agencies.

This Embedded Training Concept. Day 1-2 would include arrival of the unit and introduction of the vision of the local leadership. This would include an overview of their organization, general scope of their area of responsibility, basic methods of administration, and methods of receiving, identifying and dealing with issues from the population.

Days 3-7 would include the unit breaking down into identified sections to directly embed into the various subordinate agencies as well as with the leadership’s staff.
These sections would observe agencies’ overviews on structure and organization, scope of responsibility, method of operations, and methods of identifying and addressing issues.

Days 8-13 would include a rotation of subordinate units to different agencies.

Day 14 would include the unit’s presentation of an after action review (AAR) to the host government. This AAR would include lessons learned and observations that may be useful for future military operations and redeployment of the unit.

The field training exercise should be integrated in to unit training cycles. The exercise would include civilian USG personnel for staff planning assistance and execution of the exercise.

**Issues, Concerns, and Skeptics Point of View**

Institutional military culture, particularly in times of fiscal austerity, will likely resist efforts to allocate scarce resources to train a large portion of the operational force in good governance and basic services. Consideration of opportunity costs, limited time and information, and resource constraints will present senior leaders with difficult choices. The depth, breadth and scope of this initiative might make it infeasible under current fiscal circumstances and some might argue that we already possess civil affairs capabilities. Finally, some might suggest that observing municipal and county governments and supporting agencies is not a good model due to the significant differences in potential operating environments - culturally, economically, and politically.

Yet another military concern might be that if U.S. society and the military do become more familiar with each other, the mystery and admiration of the military could lose some luster. In comparing the current civil-military gap with the Vietnam era, Richard Cohen writes:
I was on active duty as a reservist, not for very long but long enough for the Army to have lost all its mystery. I found the Army to be no better and no worse than other large institutions. Some of its leaders were fools, and some soldiers were thieves, and everyone wasted money like there was no tomorrow. This is the truth and everyone once knew it.

No more. I sometimes think I am the only person around who has been in the military. This is because most people I know are college-educated professionals, many of them writers. But if I throw in politicians and even the White House staff, nothing much changes. Lots of people know the expression "lock 'n load" but very few know how to do it.80

From the civilian perspective, there are many concerns as well. While most local governments would love to have an opportunity to spend time with their nations’ military members, their own fiscal constraints may be such that they cannot afford the distraction of a unit embedding for that period of time. Additionally, many governments may see the training as overly intrusive.

Similarly, there is risk that the two organizations may have a difficult time getting past cultural differences in such a short period of time. As with any human endeavor, personalities matter. There is always the possibility that the groups may not be able to move beyond stage two of Bruce W. Tuckman’s 5 stage model of group dynamics - form, storm, norm, perform, adjourn – in such a short period of time. This could be detrimental to the desired endstate of establishing relationships. Any lasting sentiments of distaste or resentment, even by a few, could be detrimental to long term efforts. However, the informational, instructive, and experience - sharing nature of the endeavor, may make the Trackman’s model less relevant.

Conclusion

Educating and training combat units and service members in the civil-military skills of good governance and administration and technical knowledge of basic services by including key concepts in routine PME, establishing them as a METL task, and
conducting training through an embedded FTX that brings combat units and local
governments together to establish relationships and share experience and ideas holds
numerous potential benefits. Most importantly, while the services and agencies that
conduct these operations may not be perfect, continuing to educate and train our forces
will only lead to more thought and better, more efficient future operations as we sustain
and build upon what has been learned over the last ten years regarding civil-military
governance.

Military personnel that have deployed can share and mentor our future leaders
that have not and may not be able to conduct such operations on the battlefield.
Additionally, those who have learned hard lessons while deployed will have time to
reflect on their experience and expand their ideas while planning for the next
deployment. By conducting this training iteratively - across a service member’s career -
relationships will be forged and fostered over the long term. As service members
become senior leaders, this network of new relationships will enhance understanding
between the military and the citizenry which it protects. Finally, the exposure to civilian
culture will deepen military understanding and decision making in future reconstruction
and stabilization operations.

Richard Cohen argues “the all-volunteer military has enabled America to fight two
wars while many of its citizens do not know of a single fatality or even of anyone who
has fought overseas… [the all-volunteer military] enables [the United States] to fight
wars about which the general public is largely indifferent.” Establishing this concept
will also, inherently add value to the nation. Getting more service members out to
communities that typically have less interaction with the military will help close the civil-
military gap in the U.S. Similarly, the education the service member gains from the experience will make them better citizens with better understanding of their local communities leading to better participation and ideally more positive involvement for the future.

Having a wide array of military officers and strategists trained and educated in civil-military governance and capable of advising commanders throughout the planning process will contribute to more complete plans for future contingencies by ensuring intellectual diversity is optimized, risk is minimized and achievement of national objectives assured.

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