Military Police, The Answer to the Stability Operations Gap

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MILITARY POLICE, THE ANSWER TO THE STABILITY OPERATIONS GAP

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Difficult lessons learned during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have caused the U.S. Government (USG), the Department of State (DOS) and the Department of Defense (DOD) to re-assess procedures during Phases IV and V: stability and nation building, post combat operations. Current policy and doctrine fail to adequately identify a lead agency with the capacity to effectively bridge the gap between combat operations and the commencement of stability and nation building operations. This paper will examine current policy, doctrine and previous operations and proposes that the Military Police Corps, due to its history and current efforts in re-establishing policing as a core competency and professionalizing the Military Police Corps Regiment is the answer to the Stability Operations gap.
MILITARY POLICE, THE ANSWER TO THE STABILITY OPERATIONS GAP

The United States Government (USG), the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of the Army (DA) and other Governmental Agencies have garnered extensive lessons learned in the Global War on Terrorism. Unfortunately, many lessons regarding tenets necessary in stability operations and nation building were re-learned from past combat operations in World War II, Vietnam, Korea and Kosovo. During this era of persistent conflict, U.S. interests have grown and using the military as an element of National Power, due to its capacity and ease of use, is the default solution. According to the Department of State’s initial Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review,

The mandate of the U.S. Department of State (DOS) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to lead U.S. stabilization and reconstruction efforts is marked by an inability to field a viable civilian response capable of managing in the absence of the military leadership or of leading an integrated civil-military team.¹

Service component competencies remain the same despite the high operation tempo (OPTEMPO) experienced over the last 10 years and the impending restructuring of the national budget which will require respective services to reassess their core competencies and their ability to execute those competencies in the interests of national policy and strategy. Many of the lessons learned during this war on terror will have an impact on agency and service core competency assessments and may impact the DoD’s ability to meet strategic requirements to achieve national interests.

With impending budget cuts impacting respective services, the question begs asking, who should be accountable for planning, managing, and executing those phases in post-combat operations; stability and nation building operations? The USG’s
current policy and directives fail to provide clarity without any clear cut answer. Responsibilities for stability and nation building operations are directed toward the DOS, DOD and the USAID. Responsibility, accountability and lines of effort are not well-defined as stated in the Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction Report (SIGIR) dated February 2010. The multilateral approach with collaboration efforts on behalf of the multiple agencies contributing to post combat operations and nation building has proven to be a bridge too far.

Unfortunately, this is not a new challenge for the USG. In May 1997, Presidential Decision Directive 56 was written to establish a useful framework for stability and nation building effort reform in response to disjointed contingency operations in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. This new approach was specifically designed to assist the USG in managing complex contingency operations. Unfortunately, the effort failed to effect institutional change. After a subsequent policy shift away from “nation-building,” the reality of continuing engagements abroad forced renewed reform efforts, yielding new presidential directives and concomitant congressional actions seeking to improve Stability and Reconstruction Operations planning, management, and oversight.

Framing the Problem

The current National Security Strategy and policy fail to adequately identify the critical means to achieve stated requirements necessary for achieving success during phases IV and V: stability operations and nation building post combat operations. Critical to a nation achieving sovereignty after combat operations is the establishment of security in order to further establish and institute national rule of law.

The rule of law is the cornerstone for all other elements of democracy. A free and fair political system, protection of human rights, a vibrant civil society, public confidence in the police and the courts, and economic
development all depend upon accountable governments, fair and accessible application of the law, and respect for international human rights standards. In post-conflict settings, reestablishing the rule of law is the first step in the rebuilding process. Establishing peace and security and rebuilding justice institutions can help to develop the necessary climate for reconciliation, public confidence, and subsequent economic growth.5

According to both the Rule of Law Handbook 2010 published by the Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and Law School and U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24 Counterinsurgency, the foundation to achieve the successful implementation and execution of a nation’s rule of law are the establishment of security, a law enforcement capability and a corrections capability. Fundamental to peace and stability is the rule of law and the rule of law exists when a law enforcement system operating under the guise of internationally accepted standards with respect to human right and freedoms maintains a safe and secure environment.6 Further, legitimacy is crucial to achieving good and positive governance. Good governance equates to the positive control over those activities that exercise power such as the military, the police, the judicial system (prosecutor and defense) and corrections and the establishment and enforcement of the rule of law.7

Dennis Keller reaffirmed the importance of effective local policing to the success of counterinsurgency (COIN) and stability operations. He noted that these two efforts are what the USG is least prepared to handle but absolutely necessary to reform the security and justice sectors and in order to transition back to the Host Nation. But, though absolutely necessary, the USG does not have the institutional capacity “to provide an immediate and coordinated civilian police training and advisory effort, particularly in a failed or fragile state.”8
Unfortunately, in recent operations (to include current operations), there has been a push to establish policing more suited to secure environments and the preferred method to train the host nation has been to bring in contractors with “community policing experience.” As noted by Karen Finkenbinder, “Community policing has been the model advanced by the U.S. Department of Justice for over twenty years.” She further noted that it is a model that promotes “partnerships, problem-solving, and proactivity to address social disorders and crime.” She believes that policy makers have this vision of policing as community policing, something that is probably not possible in less-secure environments. The contracts that have been written for police trainers often require contractors with “community policing experience” and she questions the necessity for that skills set in post-conflict environments. She believes that “military police are well-suited to policing in such environments.”

This paper will examine historical perspectives and current national security policy in concert with the doctrinal capabilities and the vision of the Military Police Corps Regiment with respect to the establishment of stability operations. Likewise, this paper will examine the technical capabilities of the Military Police Corps as the DOD’s means to assist in the establishment of security; train and build capacity for a law enforcement capability; and train and build a corrections capability, all necessary to ensure success in stability operations and nation building.

Strategic Failures

Stability operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) commenced in June 2004; however, due to the lack of a detailed strategy identifying a single or an interagency lead, efforts conducting stability operations and nation building floundered. The mismanagement of “treasure” soon became the “black-eye” of the Coalition Provisional
Authority, Iraq, as it struggled to gain an upper hand in an out of control and volatile situation. Reconstruction in Iraq was plagued by poor management, mishandling of reconstruction funds, inadequate coordination with Iraqis and widespread attacks on construction sites and contractors. What was assumed and sold as a quick win and short term operation quickly spun out of control resulting in catastrophic failure due in large part for failing to secure the country and further the commencement of stability operations. Colonel Joseph J. Collins, a professor of the National Security Strategy at the national War College, and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations in 2001-2004, concluded the most serious planning short comings connected with Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) as: Ineffective planning and preparation for stability operations; Inadequate forces to occupy and secure a country the size of California; Poor military reaction to rioting and looting in the immediate post-conflict environment. The failure of leadership to implement a plan for post combat operations led to the slow civil and military reaction to a growing insurgency. Further, the de’Ba’athiciation decree implemented by the CPA exacerbated the ability to make effective use of the Iraqi military forces and further develop Iraqi security forces to assist in establishing security and stability across Iraq. The US’ lack of planning for phase IV and V operations likewise added to the inability to provide enough trained civilian officials, diplomats, and aid workers to conduct effective stabilization and reconstruction activities. The lack of stability across the region slowed the creation of an interim Iraqi authority that could have minimized the perception of occupation and enhanced the perception of liberation.¹²
Due to the findings of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), Congress authorized the State department to stand up an organization to gain control and manage reconstruction operations in Iraq and abroad. The USG requires a more robust capability to manage stabilization and reconstruction operations in countries emerging from conflict or civil strife.

On January 20, 2003, less than 60 days before the invasion of Iraq, President Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 24 on post-war Iraq reconstruction. At the urging of Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, NSPD-24 placed the Defense Department in exclusive charge of managing Iraq’s post-war relief and reconstruction, supplanting the ongoing Interagency planning process. The directive created the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), charging it with planning, overseeing, and executing relief and reconstruction activities in Iraq. ORHA was never able to establish sufficient capacity to operate effectively, and, within six weeks of the March 20 invasion, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) had superseded and subsumed it.¹³

In addition to the changes in leadership, the stated directives and initiatives failed miserably due to the assumptions in the design methodology. The CENTCOM planning staff assumed the forces necessary to establish required security at the cessation of combat operations would come from Iraqi brigades previously identified by coalition authorities. From an historical perspective, the U.S. Military trained and empowered indigenous forces to stand up necessary security and policing forces at the conclusion of combat operations, unfortunately, the “de-Ba’athification” process implemented by the Coalition Provisional Authority, eliminated those resources that planners identified
for post conflict operations. Planners assumed they would be able to recall leaders in the Army and the Iraqi Government, however the policy changed removing senior level bureaucrats and officers in the Ba’ath party.\textsuperscript{14}

The chaos that issued after combat forces moved through Baghdad, military leadership attempted Phase IV and V operations with a meager handful of advisors, “Overmatched from the start, one [advisor] was sent to train a 4,000-officer unit to guard power plants and other utilities. A second was sent to advise 500 commanders in Baghdad.”\textsuperscript{15}

Further, in May 2004, President Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive 36, entitled \textit{United States Government Operations in Iraq}. Superseding NSPD-24, this new directive formally transferred responsibilities for relief and reconstruction operations in Iraq from CPA/Defense to the U.S. Department of State (DoS), placing the Chief of Mission (COM) in charge of the Iraq reconstruction program. It also established two new temporary organizations to manage ongoing programs and projects: the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO), within State, and the Project and Contracting Office (PCO), within Defense. IRMO was charged with facilitating transition in Iraq, while PCO provided acquisition and project management support. Ambiguities in NSPD-36 bred coordination problems among State, USAID, and Defense and, one level down, among IRMO, PCO, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division. Lines of command and communication became blurred and crossed, in part, because Defense continued to control most of the contracting for the reconstruction program and, in part, because State had neither the capacity nor the experience to manage so large a reconstruction effort.\textsuperscript{16}
Clearly, the PH IV planning efforts [security and stability operations] by ORHA, the Joint Staff, and CENTCOM attest to the fact that many within the U.S. Government and the DOD community realized the need to plan for operations after the fall of the Saddam regime. CFLCC’s ECLIPSE II [stability operations and nation building] represents the most detailed of these efforts. Nonetheless, as in the planning process for Operation JUST CAUSE, the emphasis within the major U.S. commands, as well as within the DOD, was on planning the first three phases of the campaign. Although a plan did exist, the plan lacked the specific guidance and responsibilities detailing who would conduct Phase IV operations. The implication was that units would conduct a “rolling” transition to Phase IV operations; however, that too posed a problem as, At some point in the campaign tactical units conducting combat operations would transition to stability and support operations—few if any of the soldiers in these units seemed to understand what this meant or were aware of the general CFLCC concept for PH IV operations. Due to the collapse and inability of the United States Government to gain the upper hand in Phase IV operations, the DOS created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), endorsed by Congress in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005. Charged with promoting a “whole-of-government” approach to stabilization and reconstruction operations, S/CRS’s core mission was to “lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy, and a market economy.” Unfortunately, this office failed to achieve the “whole of government.” According to the report conducted by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) in 2010, the S/CRS had yet to realize its
potential. Among the causes for S/CRS’s lack of progress, according to the report, included the “failure to receive adequate funding, the lack of timely and sufficiently strong authority, the lack of interagency acceptance, its early decision to not focus on Iraq and Afghanistan, and its marginalization State’s bureaucracy.”

Further, the report found that “State commented that the development of S/CRS, like Defense’s Goldwater-Nichols reform in the 1980s, would take years to implement.”

In November, 2011, the Department of State subsumed the S/CRS under the umbrella of the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations with a mission of focusing on conflict prevention, crisis response, and stabilization activities as mandated by the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR). The list of agencies to lead Phases IV and V operations, like the list of failings, goes on and on. Repeated attempts to find the solution set to the stability operation gap got caught up in the quagmire of governmental bureaucracy. The reality is there is no real clear cut solution on who should lead the efforts transitioning into stability operations and nation building.

Current Operating Environment

Due to the continued and extensive lessons learned, stability operations have become articulated in all U.S. strategies and an entrenched necessity to succeed and pursue U.S. national and foreign interests. The Defense Department outlines six missions, two directly related to stability operations in its 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Key Mission Areas outlined in the QDR, *Succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations*:

The United States must retain the capability to conduct large-scale counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations in a wide range of environments. In order to ensure that America’s Armed Forces are prepared for this complex mission, it is vital that the lessons from
today’s conflicts be further institutionalized in military doctrine, training, capability development, and operational planning.\textsuperscript{21} U.S. forces have been training, advising, and assisting Afghan and Iraqi security forces so that they can more effectively uphold the rule of law and control and defend their territories against violent non-state actors. In these contested environments, partnered COIN, in which Afghan and Iraqi units operate in tandem with U.S. forces, is an effective way to train and advise forces while conducting combat operations against insurgents.\textsuperscript{22} The security situation in such environments ebbs and flows. It is, at best tenuous. At worst it reverts back to conflict. The military police are best suited to policing and well-suited to supporting rule of law efforts, particularly in the policing and corrections realms.\textsuperscript{23}

In a June 2010, the former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates posited, this strategic reality demands that the U.S. Government get better at “building partner capacity”, helping other countries defend themselves or, if necessary, fight alongside U.S. forces by providing them with equipment, training, or security assistance.\textsuperscript{24} This goal takes on renewed urgency in light of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates predicting such security assistance operations will be a core U.S. military job for years to come.\textsuperscript{25} Likewise, the newly appointed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey stated in a blog, “Tactical commanders will have a security force assistance mission to train, advise and assist tactical host nation forces.”\textsuperscript{26} This comment further articulates the Army’s way ahead on seeking stability operations as a core competency was we continue to train and build capacity in the Afghanistan Police Force, Corrections Officers, Army, and local infrastructure.
Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3005.05 Stability Operations reasserts stability operations as a core U.S. military mission, which will be given priority comparable to combat operations and will be explicitly addressed across all DOD activities. As stability operations are now a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations.

The Department of Defense shall be prepared to...Lead stability operations activities to establish civil security and civil control, restore essential services, repair and protect critical infrastructure, and deliver humanitarian assistance until such time as it is feasible to transition lead responsibility to other U.S. Government agencies, foreign governments and security forces, or international governmental organizations. In such circumstances, the Department will operate within U.S. Government and, as appropriate, international structures for managing civil-military operations, and will seek to enable the deployment and utilization of the appropriate civilian capabilities. The Department shall have the capability and capacity to conduct stability operations activities to fulfill DoD Component responsibilities under national and international law....Establish civil security and civil control.27

The concept of stability operations and nation building are further nested in the Army at the operational and institutional realms articulated in both the Army Action Plan for Stability Operations and the Army Campaign Plan. Objective 8-3; Adapt the Army for Building Partner Capacity28 outlines the responsibility of the Army, as a core competency, to build capacity and capabilities for stability operations across the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leader Development, Personnel, and Facility domains (DOTMLPF); those specified areas identified by the Department of Defense to be researched when building a new requirement to a need generated by a commander in the field.
The Challenge

According to Lt Col J. Porter Harlow, United States Marine Corps Associate professor at the Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School Charlottesville, Virginia, the tension between leading versus supporting stability operations ultimately derives not from the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) but from the President. National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) tasked the Secretary of State to "coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts" to stabilize and reconstruct post conflict countries. The President ordered all other agencies to "enable" and "assist" the Secretary of State. The tension lies in the fact that the agency with the mandate to lead does not have the resources, personnel, or the ability to project an effective amount of either into post-conflict countries like Afghanistan or Iraq. Though relatively significant for the interagency processes for those working in Washington, D.C., NSPD-44 did not have nearly as much impact on the operating forces as DoDD 3000.05 published about ten days before. The mandate of the U.S. Department of State (DOS) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to lead U.S. stabilization and reconstruction efforts is marked by an inability to field a viable civilian response capable of managing in the absence of the military leadership or of leading an integrated civil-military team. The DOS’s Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) outlines reforms to close this capacity gap. Even if implemented, QDDR reforms are unlikely to be sufficient to address the root problems of bureaucratic rivalries and strained resources or timely enough to ensure a seamless transition in Iraq [Afghanistan and future stability and nation building operations]. SIGIR observed that “the heart of the failures in the Iraq reconstruction program” lie in the lack of executive authority over interagency
coordination. And, because there was no unity of command, little unity of effort was possible. Instead, programs were agency-focused, designed for an individual agency’s goals, rather than the bigger goal, U.S. national interests. The issues were not just those related to civilian and military cooperation but of civilian to civilian cooperation and coordination. SIGIR concluded that weak interagency cooperation is “an endemic feature” of the U.S. national security system” and, because of this, “reform efforts should promote the development of unifying strategy with clearly delineated agency responsibilities and adequate authority to enforce its execution.”

Regardless of what agency’s core responsibility stability operations happens to fall into, the establishment and construct of a Theater Strategy and campaign plan fall into the realm of the Geographical Combatant Commander (GCC) as outlined in Joint Publication 5.0, Joint Operation Planning. The strategy and policy are the results of the efforts of the GCCs and their staffs, nesting these efforts with those of the NSC, QDR, Service Secretaries and the JCS. Historically, the results of theater strategy and policy have had an emphasis on the military element of national power because it is the military component that is ultimately responsible for researching, staffing and producing the policy and strategy documents. Likewise, history shows the input or lack thereof from the DoS also adds to the perceived heavy dose of the “M” as both the means and ways due to the lenses the GCC and his staff are looking through while developing the policy and strategy.

Another factor contributing to the military as a means of implementing national power is the lack of a Grand Strategy. The lapse of an overarching strategy for the nation, again, allows GCCs to shape and move the planning process to an “M” or a
The majority of the efforts on behalf of the Theater Strategy and campaign plan will fall into pre-combat operations, those phases referred to as *shaping the environment* with nonmilitary and military aid as well as *deterring the enemy*. Lessons learned in this era of persistent conflict have ensured current plans account for Phases IV and V.

According to Lieutenant General Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz a Prussian staff officer and Clausewitz subject matter expert, “He insisted that the planners must always look beyond the war to the question of enforcing the peace, for the inability to do that raises the possibility of having to fight another war; perhaps at a disadvantage.”35 So even as early as the nineteenth century, planners, strategists and leaders understood the significance of planning for operations post combat and into stabilizing and rebuilding nations. Unfortunately, we failed to implement those lessons learned!

**Current Doctrine**

According to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), guaranteeing security is not simply a military or police objective, but a political one that promotes the state as the guarantor of that security. This is the very first step in rebuilding shattered legitimacy. USAID recognizes that the rule of law is the “cornerstone for all other elements of democracy.”36 Accountable governments give life to “a free and fair political system, protection of human rights, a vibrant civil society, public confidence in the police and the courts, economic development, fair and accessible application of the law, and respect for international human rights standards”37 Rule of law is so essential that the first step toward rebuilding a state after conflict is to establish the rule of law.38 By doing so and allowing for the establishment of peace, security, and justice institutions, it is possible to develop the necessary
climate for “reconciliation, public confidence, and subsequent economic growth” which, in turn, will create popular support for later democratic reforms.\textsuperscript{39}

Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 "dramatically changed"\textsuperscript{40} DoD policy towards nation building. The change came with the declaration that stability operations are a "core U.S. military mission" on par with combat operations.\textsuperscript{41} This created another tension as soldiers and marines compared the amount of training their units spent preparing for combat with what they realized the actual mission to be: building police stations and prisons, recruiting and training police officers, mentoring judges and corrections officers, and working with tribal councils.\textsuperscript{42}

Soldiers and marines are expected to be nation builders as well as warriors. They must be prepared to help reestablish institutions and local security forces and assist in rebuilding infrastructure and basic services. They must be able to facilitate establishing local governance and the rule of law. The list of such tasks is long; performing them involves extensive coordination and cooperation with many intergovernmental, host-nation, and international agencies.\textsuperscript{43}

The publication of Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, articulated this change in mission set. FM 3-0 states, “Winning battles and engagements is important but alone is not sufficient. Within the context of current operations worldwide, stability operations are often as important as-or more important than- offensive and defensive operations.”\textsuperscript{44} This evolution of warfare at the tactical level has expanded how service members must think, train and act in the execution of orders from superiors. “In summary, the broadening definition of war has changed the way individual soldiers and marines conceive of their role on the world stage.”\textsuperscript{45}
In the recently published Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0 Unified Land Operations, stability operations are defined as:

Military missions, tasks, and activates conducted outside the United States to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and to provide essential government services, emergency infrastructure, reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.46

The publication further identified five tasks critical to stability operations and nation building. These tasks are: establish civil security, establish civil control, restore essential services, support to governance, and support to economic and infrastructure development. They are all “all necessary to ensure success in post combat operations; stability operations and nation building.”47

The trend in the number of stability and broader peacekeeping operations, from 1948 to 2010, supports this conclusion. In particular, there has been a significant increase in the number of these operations since the end of the Cold War. Starting in 1989, the U.S. has played a major role in stability operations in Panama, Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq. Shilling stated, “Barring genocide, no recent major war has led to lasting peace without a significant period of reconstruction and stabilization – stability operations – following a peace agreement.”48 U.S. Army doctrine clearly states that the deployment of military force is important to provide a secure environment for civil authorities to achieve their goals.49

The Army and Joint doctrine nests succinctly explaining Stability operations are conducted outside of the United States. These activities are executed to re-establish or maintain a safe and secure environment enabling the establishment of government services, infrastructure reconstruction and humanitarian relief.50
In conducting stability operations, the cost of failing to deal effectively with internal security threats is high. It can undermine the legitimacy of the government; undercut efforts to reconstruct the political, economic, and infrastructure systems; and provide rationale for the insurgency. Ultimately, failing to defeat internal threats may lead to the same problems that led to intervention in the first place.\textsuperscript{51}

**Pillars of Stability Operations**

Rule of law is a central focus and critical underpinning of post-conflict reconstruction. Though no two conflicts are identical, many situations share a number of common attributes with regard to the breakdown of the rule of law and the impact it has on society.\textsuperscript{52}

When indigenous military or security forces are dismantled and new civilian police forces have not yet been recruited, trained, and deployed, international peacekeepers (United Nations (UN) International Civilian Police (CIVPOL), military personnel, or other types of monitors) frequently exercise temporary control over the immediate security situation until new police, trained by internationals, begin their deployment. This period is always the most dangerous both for order and security and for state legitimacy. It is frequently characterized by rioting, looting, abductions, ransom seeking, retaliation, and other types of citizen-on-citizen violence. Unchecked, these environments are the perfect soil for spoilers with strong incentives and means to destabilize and discredit new governments.\textsuperscript{53} Frank Miller, a former National Security Council official who coordinated the American effort to govern Iraq from 2003 to 2005, conceded in an interview that the Administration did not put enough focus on the police. "More attention should have been paid to the police after the fall of Baghdad," said Mr. Miller, one of the officials who objected to the original proposal to deploy thousands of
advisers. "That is obvious. Iraq needed law and order established."54 Iraq was simply a hard lesson we already learned from Kosovo. Mr. Mayer said that two lessons had emerged from the Balkans, "Law and order first," a warning that failing to create an effective police force and judicial system could stall postwar reconstruction efforts. Second, blanketing local police stations with foreign trainers also helped ensure that cadets applied their academy training in the field and helped deter brutality, corruption and infiltration by militias, he said.55

According to the USAID, the past two decades have seen the evolution and measured increase in the involvement of military forces at the cessation of combat operations. Recent stability operations such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan have likewise seen an increase in other U.S. government agencies. Due to the involvement of the military and those other government agencies, decisions made by senior diplomatic leaders; the Ambassador, the Mission Director and the Democracy & Governance Officer as well as military leaders will have to grasp the whole of government process sharing critical information to ensure success during the critical stability and nation building phases of an operation.56

History

From a historical perspective, the USAID was preceded by the International Cooperation Administration from 1954 to 1974. The purpose of the administration was to provide technical advice, training and equipment for both civil and paramilitary organizations. In 1961, USAID took on the duties of training indigenous police forces and in 1963, established the International Police Academy in Washington D.C. The highly successful academy graduated 5,000 students from 77 countries. Unfortunately, the academy was closed due to concerns torture techniques were being taught as part
of the curriculum tarnishing the image of the United States. The result was detrimental to the future training of local police forces as legislation was passed preventing the future assistance or funding of law enforcement agencies outside of the United States. The impact of this historical perspective is evident today as the United States lacks the capacity to support the training of fragile or failed states in the early stages of stability operations.\(^\text{57}\)

In mid-2003, the U.S. government undertook a massive reconstruction mission—much larger than planned and now exceeding $53 billion—with an \textit{ad hoc} management system. Some projects met contract specifications, but the many unacceptable outcomes stemmed chiefly from the lack of a clear, continuing, and coherent management structure (as opposed to a paucity of resources or poor leadership).\(^\text{58}\)

Like so much that has defined the course of the war, the realities on the ground in Iraq did not match the planning in Washington. An examination of the American effort to train a police force in Iraq, drawn from interviews with several dozen American and Iraqi officials, internal police reports and visits to Iraqi police stations and training camps, shows a cascading series of misjudgments by White House and Pentagon officials, who repeatedly underestimated the role the United States would need to play in rebuilding the police and generally maintaining order.\(^\text{59}\)

On November 28, 2005, the Defense Department issued Defense Directive 3000.05, entitled \textit{Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations}. The directive committed the Pentagon to developing robust stability operations doctrine, resources, and capacities, defining stability operations as military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to war and designed to
establish and maintain order. Significantly, Directive 3000.05 provided that such operations are a “core U.S. military mission” that must receive emphasis comparable to offensive and defensive operations. Since its issuance, the directive has bred the development of a substantial stability operations capability within the military; but the integration of this capability with the civilian side of Stability Reconstruction Operations remains insufficient.60

Defense Instruction 3000.05 replaced Defense Directive 3000.05 as Defense policy on stability operations. It provided that, during SROs, the military shall support establishing civil security, restoring essential services, repairing and protecting infrastructure, and delivering humanitarian assistance “until such time as is feasible to transition lead responsibility to other U.S. governmental agencies, foreign governments and security forces, or international organizations.” Defense Instruction 3000.05 emphasized the importance of integrating civilian and military efforts in preparing for and executing SROs. General Stanley McChrystal, former Commander, ISAF concluded in his initial assessment in Afghanistan that, “We must significantly modify organizational structures to achieve better unity of effort.”61 The disjointed efforts on behalf of agencies committed to the fight were leading to an operation that was deteriorating with a potential of failure. The consequences of not having a coherent SRO management system in Afghanistan were underscored in December 2009, when Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, made the following observation about the Afghanistan SRO, into which more than $38 billion has already been invested: “The whole thing was uncoordinated and did not get us very far. The upshot is that in the ninth year of the war we are starting from
The lack of a clear policy, the inability of organizations to work as part of a government as a whole concept, the lack of capacity and the lack of a clear cut lead agency to perform stability operations and nation building have all added to the UGS’s failure in effectively conducting post combat operations.

The Answer Built on History

In the short 70 year history of the Military Police Corps, like many other branches, the MP Corps struggled to find an identity and to prove relevant, viable, and contributing to the Army’s mission. Throughout the Army’s history, policing forces were created, only to be disbanded at the conclusion of the conflict. Finally, in World War II, on September 26, 1941, the Military Police Corps became a recognized branch in the Army, with the distinct duties of Law Enforcement, limited maneuver and mobility support, and area security operations. Post Viet Nam and the drawdown of the Army again, raised concerns that, once again, the MP Corps would be disbanded. Justifiable arguments stated that law enforcement and access control on posts, camps, and stations could be, as it is today, contracted out. This led to the Military Police Leadership asking themselves, “What does the MP Corps bring to the Army and how will it contribute to the next war?” The result was a study of rear area combat operations (RACO) by the Military Police School.

In the late 1970s the Combat Developments branch of the Military Police School conducted an analysis to determine how the Military Police Corps could contribute in the Army’s emerging doctrine. The analysis was on RACO and the centers of gravity for NATO forces proved to be securing and maintaining the air and sea ports in Western Europe ensuring rapid re-enforcements of combat power. The Army leadership accepted the conclusion of the analysis that the Military Police could secure and
maintain the air and sea ports. This concept proved to be the foundation for Rear Battle tactics and operational concepts stated in the Air-Land battle doctrine.63

The emphasis on RACO operations was a change in paradigms for the MP Corps resulting in huge transitions in teaching and training at the MP School and across the Regiment.64 Over time, the impact was the Regiment lost “policing” as a skill set and instead emphasized combat operations and survivability. Soldiers were trained to shoot, move, and communicate instead of police patrol, respond to criminal incidents and conduct police investigations. MP leadership quickly realized the over emphasis on combat operations and the lost skill set of policing would have an impact on the future of the MP Corps. The conclusion of the Cold War and smaller non-total wars such as JUST CAUSE generated a new vision from the MP Leadership. Operations in Panama bought critical lessons learned to the forefront and likewise foreshadowed the challenges of future conflicts and, more importantly, asked the question of “What happens at the conclusion of combat operations?” The real lesson of Operation JUST CAUSE might have been ”what happens on the morning after?” What happened in Panama was a breakdown in civil order with no police force to intervene. This situation drove U.S. troops into the uncomfortable role of de facto police force. This role was not difficult for military police units, but the transition for some combat arms units was more problematic, and this led to a longer period of unrest than might have resulted if planning for the post - conflict period had been more creative.

What we had in Panama was a classic stability operation where military forces are required to maintain law and order, sustain or restore basic services and nurture the development of new domestic civil institutions until they are prepared to take over these roles. Performing this mission puts a premium on the ability of military police soldiers to be more "police" than "military".65
So, during the 1980s and 90s, the MP Corps balanced their respective skill set in both combat operations and law enforcement operations in order to maintain both relevancy and viability in an ever evolving environment. Ironically, in the mid 90’s, the Army and DoD were restructuring due to budget cut as well. , and so the Commandant of the Military Police School and Chief of the MP Corps Regiment advised, “…don’t get caught up in worrying about the things that are not within your direct sphere of influence-let the SECDEF, SECARMY and the CoS of the Army worry about the Congressional budget process.”

Despite the turbulence, the MP Corps remained resilient on those vital assigned tasks. So successful were Military Police at adjusting and transitioning along the spectrum of operations, the Regiment was called upon for deployments ranging from combat operations to humanitarian assistance operations. In 1994, the Commandant of the Military Police School and Chief of the MP Corps Regiment stated, “The continuum of war and other than war missions demands and versatility and flexibility that we in the MP Corps have been demonstrating over the past decade.”

Grounded in the lessons learned after the cold war and as the Army ventured into smaller low intensity conflicts, MP leaders ensured the MP Corps remained viable, adaptable and prepared to conduct operations across the spectrum. Remaining relevant, MP Corps leaders refocused MP capabilities and competencies so as to remain an enabler to the combat arms commanders and devised the five MP functions. The five functions were more in line with the Army Doctrine as stated in Army Field Manual 100-5, Army Operations. The five functions are: Maneuver Mobility Support,
Area Security, Internee Resettlement, Law and Order and Police Intelligence Operations. The multifaceted and diverse role of the Military Police Corps coupled with the complexities of future operations required the Corps to evolve from the four battle field missions to the five military police functions. The five functions would focus efforts and capabilities nesting with Army doctrine, FM 100-5, Army Operations and likewise adhere to the complexities of future operations. The change also saw that other branches and services would better understand their operational mission support. The five MP functions continue and remain in the MP Corps inventory today serving as its foundation as it has been a vital part of both combined arms and the joint fights. These operations have likewise brought countless lessons learned with an
emphasis on some of the five functions versus others. The current operational environment has taught Military Police, at all levels, the necessity of mastering basic combat survival skills. What they have likewise learned is that any soldier in the Army no matter what career field can serve as an infantryman. The skill and proficiency all depends on the levels of training and experience. What we have likewise learned is that there is only one career field in the Army that brings with it the skill set of policing to include in-depth investigations, and a corrections knowledge base.

Policing and corrections are two legs of the rule of law, according to Field Manual 3-24 Counter Insurgency emphasizes that police are only one aspect of establishing the rule of law, which also depends on appropriate legal codes, an effective judicial system, and an adequate detention capacity and penal system. The emphasis on this special skill set was recognized by the Commandant and Chief of the MP Corps Regiment in 2006-08, then Brigadier General David Quantock, now Major General Quantock, who currently serves as the Provost Marshal General. MG General Quantock’s insights to the establishment of policing capabilities during Operation Iraqi Freedom II, along with the insights of Brigadier General David Phillips, Deputy Commanding General of the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team and senior military policeman in Iraq in 2006, served as the catalyst for the changes in training and leader development in the MP Corps ensuring Military Police meet the needs of the Army in this “new” environment. Both general officers bought back personal lessons learned from initiating changes in training at the Military Police School. The changes in both initial entry training and professional military education have proven instrumental in the increased police and corrections training adding, on average, 30 hours to programs of instruction and
lesson plans in the Noncommissioned Officers (NCO) Academy and the Military Police School. In remarks to the Leadership of the Military Police Corps Regiment, General Chiarelli, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army stressed the significance of the mission carried out by the men and women of the military police community further stating, the men and women of the Office of the Provost Marshal General, the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, Army Corrections Command have been extremely busy; and have done a phenomenal, phenomenal job."

The change in the emphasis at the Military Police School was not merely on the training aspect. MP Corps leaders understood the significance of the training being acknowledged both inside and outside of the Army. Therefore, MP Corps leaders sought to have the training institutions accredited. The Military Police School has been awarded Federal Law Enforcement Training Accreditation, American Council on Education, and American Correctional Association accreditation over the course of the last few years bringing credibility to the training institute.

The Answer

Recognizing the significance of putting the “P” (Police) back into Military Police, the office of the Provost Marshal General has initiated an assessment on the strategic environment and the role of the MP Corps with regard to combined arms maneuver and wide area security. Current MP Doctrine restricts MP abilities as it proves to be security centric and less effective in this current volatile and complex environment. Recognizing the gap in executing police specific operations to restore civil control and the rule of law after major combat operations and, likewise, develop both police institutions and a corrections capability, the assessment on the strategic environment will identify the means to ensure the MP Corps contributes to the Army’s mission sets of
combined arms maneuver and wide area security. This arrangement still might make sense if we were convinced police assistance in Afghanistan were an anomaly, a onetime requirement that won't recur. But that's hard to swallow, given the string of interventions over the past decade - Iraq, Kosovo, East Timor, Bosnia, Haiti - all of which have required some sort of ambitious police-building. Major General David Quantock, Provost Marshal General and Commander, Criminal Investigations Command, who proved to be the catalyst in the initiatives of professionalizing the Military Police Corps Regiment and putting the “P” back into Military Police states, “what we found in over 10 years of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan is that the foundation of a fully functional Country is its Rule of Law foundation. Without a functioning correctional system, a professional police institution, and a judicial system that weaves it all together, you have nothing. The Military Police Corps has provided valuable developmental assistance to all three parts of the judicial triangle which has been/ will be indispensable for the Army’s successful resolution of both conflicts”, thus, the efforts on behalf of the Military Police Corps Regiment to improve the technical aspect of the profession.

In spite of the initial efforts to add capacity to the policing capabilities, MP leaders know the training focus will require greater depth to the training process. The goal of the efforts on behalf of the Office of the Provost Marshal General is to “professionalize” the MP Corps so as to bring credibility to the Regiment and the Army. The Vision for the MP Corp is, “Military Police are recognized for police professionalism and relevance across all Army operations.” Police are likewise crucial for democracy. Far more than soldiers or parliamentarians, they are the representatives of state power with whom
ordinary citizens have regular contact. Rule of law, civil liberties, human rights—all presuppose the existence of a certain kind of police.\textsuperscript{74}

According to those who have studied and written on this topic; Keller, Schilling Finkenbinder and many others, policing is a developing and evolving process that is keenly aligned with those steps necessary to commence and ensure successful nation building. For every 1 step forward, a developing host nation may take 2 back - particularly so in the security situation. Military Police can serve as that stabilizing force coupled with a “P” to ensure stability and security in a fluid and complex situation.\textsuperscript{75}

The collective efforts on behalf of the MP leadership are the foundation for a more viable and relevant force capable of answering the Nation’s and the Army’s call. As the Military Police Corps continues forward in improving the quality and quantity of training, accreditations and professionalizing the Regiment, it will only confirm it has the technical capability and capacity to serve as the answer to the Stability Operations gap.

Endnotes


\textsuperscript{3} Ibid., 3.

\textsuperscript{4} Stability Operations occur in all phases of operations, though most often associated with Phase IV. DA FM 3-07 provides an overview of offense, defense, and stability operations and how they occur, in varying degrees, across the spectrum of conflict. For this paper, they will be most often discussed in efforts associated with Phase IV.


8 Dennis Keller, PKSOI Paper U.S. Military Forces and Police Assistance in Stability Operations The Least Worst Option to fill the U.S. Capacity Gap (Carlisle Barracks, United States Army War College, August 2010), 1.


10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.


13 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons, 5.


16 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons, 6.


18 Ibid.

19 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons, 6-7.

20 Ibid., 6-7.


22 Ibid., 27.


Ibid.


27 Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05, Stability Operations (Washington, DC: September 6, 2009), 2.


Ibid.


33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.


36 USAID Rule of Law Home Page.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

40 Harlow, “Publishing Doctrine on Stability Operations.”

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.


45 Harlow, “Publishing Doctrine on Stability Operations.”

47 Ibid.


52 Dr Corbin Lyday and Jan Stromsum, United States Agency International Development Building the Rule of Law in Post Conflict Environments Development (Washington D.C., May 2005), 1.

53 Ibid., 6.


55 Ibid.

56 USAID Rule of Law Home Page.


58 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons, 23.


60 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons, 7.


64 Military Police Corps Regiment – In the early 1980’s senior Military Police leaders wanted to establish the “Regimental” concept as an essential part of the Military Police Corps in order to promote and institutionalize traditions, customs and esprit within the Corps. IN 1986, the Military
Police Corps Regimental system concept was approved by the Chief of Staff of the Army, and General Orders No.22 dated 30 May 1986 states “The Military Police Corps is placed under the US Army Regimental System effective 26 September 1986.”


67 Ibid.

68 Ibid., 6.


73 Ibid.
