Examination of National Policy to Build Partner Capacity

by

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ABSTRACT

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Current U.S. National Security Strategy states: "But in a world of transnational challenges, the United States will need to invest in strengthening the international system, working from inside international institutions and frameworks to face their imperfections head on and to mobilize transnational cooperation." In an era of decreasing defense spending and federal budget scrutiny, every effort to conduct strategic engagements should receive careful attention and conscientious design. The increased security complexities posed by transnational actors, for example, further compound an already ambiguous international security environment. This effort examines policy formulation to assist in long term resource decisions using ground breaking integration of operations research personnel and methods supporting conventional and special operations forces engaged in security cooperation related mission areas. It will propose a policy approach to enhance the design of security cooperation efforts through conscious integration of data collection, assessments, and data analysis aimed at informing resource decisions that can advance overall capacity to counter security threats such as those posed by transnational actors.
EXAMINATION OF NATIONAL POLICY TO BUILD PARTNER CAPACITY

On 31 January 2012, the Center for Army Analysis (CAA) welcomed the return of the initial operations research analyst deployed in support of the U.S. Ambassador and the Country Team mission in the Philippines and the commander of the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P).¹ This event marked a significant milestone that is an operational paradigm shift of placing a military operations research analyst in theater to perform analytical design of an approach to support lasting assessment of security cooperation efforts aimed at building partner capacity. Given the current National Security Strategy’s statement, “But in a world of transnational challenges, the United States will need to invest in strengthening the international system, working from inside international institutions and frameworks to face their imperfections head on and to mobilize transnational cooperation,”² there exists impetus to create U.S. governmental approaches to realize the aim of strengthening partner capacity. In an organizational environment that closely teams the U.S. military commander in support of the U.S. diplomatic mission, this paper will consider ongoing efforts by proposing policy that supports making that National Security Strategy statement a reality. This paper begins with a discussion about national security interests that favor strengthening partner capacity. It will then examine a policy proposal related to organizational policy alignment that enables long term evaluation of building capability and capacity through cooperative efforts that aligns the efforts of existing agencies and organizations of the U.S. executive branch of government, further enabling current national strategy policy statements. This proposal outlines analytical assessment frameworks as part of the proposal that the U.S. government could adopt.
which leverage existing deliberate analytical approaches with existing operational methodologies from the Department of State (DOS) and the Department of Defense (DOD). Combining these analytical approaches with the organizational policy alignment can assist the executive branch in realizing National Security Strategy objectives as stated in strategic documents and current policy.

The National Security Challenge

The challenges posed by security threats from transnational actors exemplify the elements that can contribute to conditions that may produce war such as extensive lawlessness, lack of security, criminality, and lack of recognition of international norms and laws. For the purpose of this discussion, war is a conflict between nations involving armed forces employed seeking resolution of a grievance that was not resolved diplomatically. In dealing with the role of building partner capacity, for example dealing with a transnational actor-based security threat, the military must work as part of an integrated governmental effort. Ideally an integrated interagency effort enables the establishment of criteria to employ, assess, change, or terminate the application of all elements of national power; diplomatic, informational, military, and economic capabilities that combined to meet objectives required to achieve stated national strategic ends. The U.S. military is responsible for leading application of military means in conjunction with and often in support of a broader, balanced application of diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power. Integrating the military instrument of power into building partner capacity, however, is not a new endeavor.

Throughout the decades preceding the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. continued to call upon its military in a variety of contingencies and operations short of war, which provided security to U.S. interests and citizens, including
participation in international coalitions, and military to military training. These operations became known by a collection of terms such as Lesser (than war) Contingencies (LCs), Operations Other than War (OOTW), or Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Each of those terms, LCs, OOTW, and MOOTW, address the commitment of armed forces, forces designed principally to conduct war against a conventionally equipped adversary, to an operation that is not, or is considered something less than, war. While these types of commitments proliferated, the U.S. continued its postured stance to conduct war in defense of allied countries against the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War. These same military forces also conducted the Gulf War to reestablish the sovereign government of Kuwait. While posturing and conducting the Cold War for decades and the Gulf War as a relatively short duration conventional ground campaign, the U.S. continued to conduct military to military training and other efforts with partnered nations to build partner capacity in security matters.

After the attacks of 9/11, however, the U.S. committed its defense formations to protracted military force operations in two distinctly different campaigns, Iraq and Afghanistan. These precipitated intellectual changes within the executive branch that manifested a series of policy changes. Within the DOD, experience in Iraq and Afghanistan invigorated a review of policy. DOD Directive (DODD) 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations* in November 2005 (later republished as a DOD Instruction, *Stability Operations*, in 2009)\(^3\) was the first in this endeavor. The DODD 3000.05 along with President George W. Bush’s issuance of National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, Subject: Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, in December 2005,
named lead agency secretary for U.S. government efforts by stating “The Secretary of State shall coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts….”\textsuperscript{4} Additionally, NSPD-44 charges the Secretary of State to “…ensure harmonization (of efforts) with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict.”\textsuperscript{5} It also directs the Secretary of State “…to build partnership security capacity abroad….”\textsuperscript{6} These policy statements along with the continued demand for military forces to support ongoing operations influenced the strategic emphasis on building partnership capacity as put forth by the DOD in the \textit{2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)}.\textsuperscript{7} President Barack Obama’s administration sustained these policies and continued to learn from ongoing operations. The QDR 2010 Report included a dedicated section to “Build the Security Capacity of Partner States.”\textsuperscript{8} Here too, the national civilian leadership realized Clausewitz’ statement of “War is merely the continuation of policy by other means.”\textsuperscript{9} The above policy documents maintain that civilian leadership through the National Security Staff and Department of State (DOS) have responsibility of deciding what types of capabilities the U.S. military forces will employ to enable achieving increased partner capacity. The DOS, in its first \textit{Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR)} in 2010 acknowledges that it intends “…to give our military the civilian partner they need and deserve, (starting) by clearly defining the civilian mission and identifying its leaders.”\textsuperscript{10} The President supported the statements in these reviews with the National Security Strategy in May 2010, reinforcing the importance of enhancing partner nations’ capacity and capabilities.\textsuperscript{11} With the desired end states focused on assisting partner nation capabilities, the government should align efforts to attain these goals.
A Policy Alignment

The U.S. has been engaged through application of a variety of approaches designed at increasing partner nation capabilities across a range of conflicts. Over the last ten years, while engaged in combat operations and counter insurgency campaigns, the U.S. has continued to seek coalition partners to deal with international security challenges. The major operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq provide well known examples of U.S. partnering in order to build security and governance with a host nation in order to provide regional stability to counter potential safe havens for transnational terrorist organizations. Not as widely known or understood by the public are the activities conducted by the U.S. government with many nations under the broad title of security cooperation. The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02, defines security cooperation as

All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.\(^{12}\)

A subset of security cooperation activities, collectively known as security assistance, is part of the options for engaging with foreign governments. Security assistance is defined as a Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Security assistance is an element of security cooperation funded and authorized by Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency.\(^{13}\)
Within this definition, the DOD acknowledges the funding and authorizing role of the DOS and relationship with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). The DOD, under Title 10, U.S. Code, conducts security cooperation through Geographic Combatant Commands. However, the DOS, under Title 22, U.S. Code, performs diplomacy and development in support of National Security Strategy objectives through bilateral activities and their U.S. Embassy Country teams. Both departments have mutual interests and acknowledged interrelationships, but their approaches do not share responsibility to a single secretary nor common methods of evaluation, assessment, and resource allocation. The DOD has issued several policy documents in the form of DOD Directives (DODD) or DOD Instructions (DODI) that address security cooperation and supporting activities. Of note, after 2005 publication of the DODD 3000.05 and NSPD-44 and the QDR Report in 2006, in 2008 the DOD published DODD 5132.03, *DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation*, cancelling the 1981 DODD on the same subject.\(^\text{14}\) This document states that it is DOD policy that “Security cooperation activities shall be planned, programmed, budgeted, and executed with the same high degree of attention and efficiency as other integral DOD activities.”\(^\text{15}\) It also states that “security cooperation planners shall consider complementary U.S. Government activities and shall coordinate as appropriate.”\(^\text{16}\) These DOD policy statements provide language that supports formulation of methodologies for data collection, assessment, and analysis that enable common focus and unity of purpose for the executive branch of government. In response to NSPD-44, the DOS created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). Following the Department of State’s initial Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR)
in 2010, the Department formed the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO), which assumed the roles and functions of the S/CRS. Despite having these policies and organizational designs within each department, neither the DOS nor the DOD has been designated as the lead department that is responsible for all U.S. security cooperation efforts.

The Department of State is the lead agency for all diplomatic and development efforts as acknowledged in the previously mentioned policy and doctrinal documents. In support of this lead role, the government should create policy to resource and enable DOS to routinely incorporate security cooperation information for long range plans of engagement. Just as outlined in NSPD-44, this would provide a lead organization for security cooperation. The National Security Staff, as is currently the case, should continue to serve as oversight for the entirety of national security strategy formulation by providing guidance and formal review of actions put forth by the various executive departments by leveraging existing organizations. In support of a DOS lead agency role, the DSCA within the DOD could conduct assessments of all security cooperation activities as part of their functions as the implementing organization for the U.S. government. Requiring and resourcing the DSCA to conduct integrated analysis to support assessment and planning of all security cooperation activities would enable the DOS and the DOD to review, assess, and adjust bilateral and geographic application of security cooperation resources with a “high degree of attention and efficiency.”

Presently, the focal point for execution of all security cooperation activities resides within the U.S. Embassy team for each country. Although the DOS maintains regional bureaus in Washington D.C., which primarily assist in formulating policy approaches for
the department, the U.S. Embassy country team executes engagements bilaterally through their Mission Strategic Resource Plan (MSRP). Conversely, with the DOD maintaining regional alignment through its Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs), the geographic commanders have responsibility for developing and maintaining Theater Campaign Plans (TCPs) that include military security cooperation efforts, which address employment of U.S. military capability in support of DOD policy. Collectively the aim of all of these plans and activities, with both the DOS and the DOD, is to enhance partnered nation’s capability and capacity to conduct combined or unilateral operations that meet bilateral U.S. national security objectives and end states. Requiring centralized reporting and assessment of all security cooperation activities would necessitate the integration of all DOD GCC executed activities and U.S. Embassy plans into a holistic reporting system that would enable global synchronization by the DSCA. The approval for implementation would remain reserved for the secretaries of the DOD and of the DOS. Generally the GCC staffs coordinate and plan with the Embassy Country Teams in their respective geographic area. However, the GCC maintains and develops TCPs, which include theater security cooperation efforts, as part of their directed planning activities in response to DOD guidance. These TCPs provide the foundational basis for other directed plans and engagements for the GCC within its geographic region of responsibility. The GCC must coordinate and report on plans to the DOD, but there is not a requirement to report to the DOS. Currently, U.S. Country Teams at the Embassies create plans for their bilateral efforts and they report to their regional bureaus at DOS with security assistance reports going to DSCA. There is no holistic policy that requires the DOD and DOS to create integrated plans and to report
all activities into a single system. The lack of an integrated system prohibits the development of long term data collection and assessments required by the National Security Strategy.

Within the DOD, acting in conjunction with the DOS, the DSCA monitors security cooperation, most particularly security assistance activities, conducted with allied nations in order to “build relationships that promote specified U.S. interests; build allied and friendly nation capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access.” This includes tracking financial assistance, sales of equipment, categories of training activities and missions involving trainers and U.S. forces. The security assistance efforts monitored by DSCA consist of “programs, authorized by law, through which the U.S. Department of Defense or commercial contractors provide defense articles and services in support of national policies and objectives.” Training missions involving U.S. forces, while deployed, however, fall under direct control of the U.S. Ambassador or senior DOS official in country with military command responsibility residing through the GCCs. Without integrated holistic systems for identifying targeted engagement opportunities and for tracking progress of the totality of all security cooperation efforts, the U.S. government does not have the ability to formally assess and monitor progress of the benefits and developments provided by these activities over an extended period of time.

Implementing a Holistic Analytical Approach

Both the DOS and the DOD have developed approaches to conducting assessments that can assist in operational evaluation of and decisions about resource application in a security cooperation setting. Recognizing the value of methodologies in contributing to understanding the nature of conflict, the DOS began an interagency
effort aimed at assisting in the coordination of efforts for the U.S. government. In support of fostering an approach to examine sources of conflict, the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO), formerly known as the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in DOS, undertook an interagency effort that “seeks to: get ahead of change; drive an integrated response; and leverage partnerships.” To enable in an examination of conflict that might require an interagency response, S/CRS developed the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) for the DOS. The DOS ICAF is a tool that enables a team comprised of a variety of U.S. Government agency representatives (‘interagency’) to assess conflict situations systematically and collaboratively and prepare for interagency planning for conflict prevention, mitigation, and stabilization.

In order to initiate an assessment of sources of conflict within a host nation, the U.S. Ambassador or senior DOS official within the U.S. country team would request CSO support for the creation of an ICAF for their mission. This interagency assessment becomes a focused effort that yields a product for the country team to use in development of its U.S. engagement plan with the host nation, the MSRP. The DOS pamphlet on ICAF also offers that “the State Office of Political/Military Affairs or DOD may lead a team conducting an ICAF analysis to bring an interagency perspective to its theater security cooperation planning.” According to Cynthia Irmer, S/CRS co-chair of the interagency group that created ICAF wrote,

The ICAF assists participants in jointly examining a complex, adaptive system from a complex, non-linear, systems perspective. In this way, it assists participants in analyzing a complex, adaptive social system from an appropriate frame of reference; it does not take a linear, problem/solution approach.
This assessment tool provides an approach “to inform the establishment of U.S. government goals, design or reshaping of activities, implementation or revision of programs, or re/allocation of resources.” The ICAF tool provides the participants with an approach that aids in understanding the environment in which planners will consider application of resources.

The ICAF analysis contains two major tasks: diagnosis of conflict conditions and planning of interagency response to avoid conflict. Conflict diagnosis consists of four steps. These are:

1. Evaluate the context of the conflict.
2. Understand core grievances and social/institutional resilience.
3. Identify drivers of conflict and mitigating factors.
4. Describe opportunities for increasing or decreasing conflict.

The steps aid the interagency participants in their consideration of the complexities of the environment. This includes a systematic approach that enables better understanding of human social interactions, societal group interactions, sources of tension or potential sources of tension between groups, and openings to engage to aid in mitigation of the sources of tension. Armed with a common framework, an interagency group may begin the second task of planning. Ideally the planners will prioritize resources available towards relieving the drivers of the conflict in some lasting fashion that accounts for the nature of the core grievances within the context of the conflict that is in conjunction with the opportunities identified during the analysis. Despite the efforts of conducting this ICAF analysis, the users of the product should consider that the information within is only truly valid at the time collected and that the
complexities of the environment are dynamic. The DOS authors also conclude their publication on ICAF by stating “Optimal use of this tool provides for review of the situation using the same methodology on a regular basis.” Regardless, this analysis provides an analytical framework from the perspective of the interagency partners involved that serves as a structured approach to develop insights that can enable planning for allocation of security cooperation resources. This planning input is evident in an application of the ICAF in the Philippines that also has close linkages to the application of military resources through an interagency working group.

In September 2010, at the request of the U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, the DOS initiated an assessment led by the CSO (then S/CRS) using the ICAF to examine conflict in the Philippines. In January 2011, the participants from the interagency team completed their assessment that focused attention on examining conflict conditions on Mindanao. This report included four main findings of the team’s efforts that were reported to both the U.S. Ambassador and to DOD’s Pacific Command in November 2010. In particular these findings are: the people perceive that others are preventing them from meeting basic needs of security, recognition, vitality, and identity; there exist interests in keeping a condition balanced between peace and war creating unstable conditions that hamper resolution of conflict and development; there is social resilience present among leaders, businesses, and entrepreneurs, and there are opportunities for local, national, and international actors to strengthen the resiliencies in the area to protect against increase in conflict and instability. In response to these findings in 2011, the U.S. Embassy in the Philippines created an interagency working group, the Mindanao Working Group (MWG).
The MWG is an interagency effort created by the U.S. Embassy to focus U.S. assistance in Mindanao. The group integrates efforts to provide resources in support of the Government of the Philippines while supporting the U.S. Ambassador’s priorities for the country. Considering the recommendations contained in the ICAF report on Mindanao, the MWG effort encompasses good governance, economic growth, and stability by considering all aspects of Diplomacy, Development, and Defense (3D). The interagency efforts, integrated by the MWG, are designed to work with the Government of the Philippines to address the findings in the ICAF assessment. To enable resource planning decisions and monitor progress through time, the MWG developed an assessment framework to enable evaluation of qualitative, quantitative, and polling data, which it put into place in the summer of 2011. This framework contains focus areas for countering terrorism, economic growth, law enforcement and justice, governance and rule of law, and social justice and conflict mitigation. Within the 3D framework, U.S. Defense contributions to the security efforts on countering terrorism also include increasing host-nation capacity to deal with terrorism in Mindanao. These security contributions come from the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P). The MWG accounts for the contributions of the JSOTF through development of security related efforts for military assistance that are assessed and reported by the JSOTF’s assessment cell.

In 2011, during pre-deployment preparation activities, the CAA deployed two operations research analysts to assist in constructing the security related measures for the JSOTF-P commander. This effort included Special Forces employed in the Philippines as part of the JSOTF-P to address countering terrorism and assisting in
capacity building. In order to assist in the overall assessment effort, leveraging lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan, the CAA analysts integrated into pre-deployment training and planning with 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne).  

The analysts benefited from the collective experiences gained within the CAA from ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The broader body of work and analytical approaches CAA developed to assist in campaign assessments offered a foundation for adaptation within this initial effort in support of the JSOTF-P staff. The analysts integrated into the JSOTF-P staff, worked with the MWG during planning, and assisted in developing an assessment plan to support the JSOTF-P commander, the MWG, and the U.S. Embassy staff. The deployed analysts were able to adapt the approaches developed in supporting conventional forces for integration into the headquarters of the JSOTF-P and were able to coordinate with the U.S. Embassy in the Philippines in order to gain understanding of the integration effort with the MWG. This close interagency partnership yielded an extensive data collection and analysis plan to enable the JSOTF-P commander and the MWG to conduct assessments of progress in Mindanao.

One important consideration for the deployed operations research analysts was how to create a database that could support long term assessments and evaluation of resource allocation. For this they again called upon the years of experience from supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Army operations research analysts from the CAA have been providing support to operational commanders throughout the last decade of ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The early years in Afghanistan did not have direct support from operations research analysts. In the months prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, however,
the analysts conducted campaign analysis and assessment of force structure requirements to achieve the campaign design, to include stabilization operations for the country. After the conclusion of major combat operations, the focus of the analysts turned to developing assessments of infrastructure capacity, data base requirements to enable assessments, and tracking of significant hostile action reporting. These efforts provided support to lines of effort for the campaign planners and established the early data bases of the operation. Those data requirements have now become formalized in acquisitions such as that of the Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE). The assessment frameworks incorporated both qualitative and quantitative measures to assess temporal change in effectiveness of applied resources. Generally, a collection of measures combine to provide overall progress assessment on a line of effort for the operational planning staff and commander. As national leaders became interested in campaign progress and development of the Afghanistan National Security Forces, operations research analysts deployed to support the effort.

The analysts supporting the commanders in Afghanistan leveraged the experiences in Iraq and developed methodologies to assess the forces required to support the Afghanistan government. Again, in order to provide the commanders with insight, the analysts worked with planners to understand lines of effort to develop appropriate qualitative and quantitative measures. Generally, they decomposed each line of effort into what the planners and analysts believed were the necessary and sufficient information needed to understand progress. Then they worked to identify the appropriate data required to assess those measures. As a result, the supporting analysts have created a body of work that contains analytical approaches to assist in
campaign assessments, data collection about ongoing operations to support evaluation of measures for lines of effort, and includes experience incorporating operational polling methods to aid in assessments of planned progress.

For the operations research analysts deploying in support of JSOTF-P, aside from qualitative assessments and comments from the former commanders and Special Forces soldiers with experience in the Philippines, there existed no ability to track progress of the application of military assistance in building security capability. Despite the fact that DOD operations in the Philippines have not been a new endeavor, progress remained one of subjective assessment as offered by this evaluation:

…it is too early to truly judge or evaluate the effectiveness of the JSOTF-P’s indirect approach….the true measure of the effectiveness…as it stands in 2009 lies in the fact that since 2002, (terrorist groups Jemaah Islamiyah and Abu Sayyaf Group) have been essentially neutralized in the Philippines.37

Drawing upon the lessons learned in supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the operations research analysts understood the importance of data structures and maintaining a data collection plan. They were also able to propose how to maintain the information to support the mission in the Philippines. While the efforts of the analysts continue as of the writing of this paper, the approaches developed by these analysts and the interagency team could serve to provide a template for the operational design for those engaged with theater security cooperation efforts.

The operations research analysts, working in conjunction with the MWG interagency team, developed a framework around the six focus areas of the plan. Each focus area, similar to lines of effort from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, were decomposed into measures of merit, indicator (description of the measure), method of collection (quantitative data, qualitative expert judgment, or polling), frequency of
collection, and measure “owner” from the interagency team. This framework supports collection plans, data management, assessments, and resource allocation decision for the MWG, JSTOF-P commander, and U.S. Ambassador. It also enables discussion with the Government of the Philippines about progress in U.S. assistance in developing host-nation capabilities and capacity in Mindanao.\textsuperscript{38}

The current JSOTF-P commander provided comment that the new systematic approach to data collection and polling has enabled his ability to clearly demonstrate progress to the U.S. Ambassador and his superior commanders in U.S. Pacific Command.\textsuperscript{39} This assessment approach is an example that leverages the experience of the DOD analysts and the DOS ICAF process. The creation of the interagency MWG provides an example of how to implement these to realize temporal assessment of the application of U.S. resources to build partner capacity. Given the early indications of the effective impact of having an assessment plan, data to conduct analysis in support of ongoing operations, and the level of interagency coordination, this case provides further example of the potential dramatic impact of having one authoritative source for all security cooperation efforts. In this case, the U.S. mission through the MWG provides that focal point for U.S. efforts. Prior to the ICAF assessment for Mindanao and the creation of the MWG, both the commander for JSOTF-P and the U.S. Embassy team had only qualitative judgment to assess progress of efforts. By capturing the practices employed by the U.S. mission to the Philippines, the MWG, and the JSOTF-P staff, the DOD and DOS could shape policy that synchronizes the collection of information for all security cooperation activities. By placing the collected information in one data warehouse and combining these analytical approaches with the organizational policy
alignment proposed earlier, the DOS and DOD could assess progress across the efforts aimed at increasing partner capacity and capability thereby enabling prudent allocation of resources to meet National Security Strategy objectives.

Conclusion

While the U.S. has conducted security cooperation activities for decades, the DOD and DOS have not had a consolidated approach for assessing progress. Given the current National Security Strategy’s end states that include emphasis on temporal commitment to building partner capacity through time: “...long-term, sustained efforts to strengthen the capacity of security forces...”;40 and “…investing now in the capable partners of the future...,”41 the DOD and DOS should leverage the interagency experiences developed over the past decade. The operational example of the security cooperation efforts ongoing in the Philippines discussed in this writing is an approach that provides the U.S. Ambassador, the interagency efforts of the MWG, and JSOTF-P with a methodology to evaluate, assess, and shape resource decisions aimed at achieving the building partner capacity end states of the National Security Strategy. Conducting an interagency effort in support of the country team can provide the detailed plans, assessment approaches, and data collection necessary for long term evaluation of the security cooperation efforts. The DOS effort to develop the ICAF methodology combined with the detailed integration of DOD assessment experience from Iraq and Afghanistan provides a template for conducting planning for and application of security cooperation activities with other host countries. The effort also demonstrates that conscious application of the interagency approaches of the ICAF and of the MWG for interagency planning can produce a plan that enables temporal assessments of partner capability and capacity development. With this approach, however, the DOS and DOD
still require policy alignment that enables centralized data collection and maintenance. By formerly resourcing and tasking DSCA with responsibility to warehouse information on all security cooperation activities conducted by the DOS through their country teams and by DOD through the GCCs, the U.S. would have a focal point for the interagency community to reference for conducting temporal analysis of the efforts to build partner capacities. As discussed in this paper, the application of existing analytical efforts in the Philippines is aiding decision makers to make data-informed choices about allocation of resources that enables progress towards achievement of U.S. and partner nation security interests. The DOS ICAF assessment of 2010 in the Philippines leveraged broad interagency participation, included detailed input from the people of the nation, and enabled the U.S. country team in their formulation of integrated plans. This included a revision of the U.S. Embassy’s assistance plan and information that enabled the MWG to conduct continued security cooperation engagements. Additionally, the DOD, through the JSOTF-P, employed operations research analysts in support of building assessment plans in their preparation for ongoing operations from 2011 through the present. These assessment plans included an array of inputs that leveraged polling of the local population in the area of responsibility, incorporation of qualitative operational assessments by the U.S. partners, and recording of operational information from subordinate military elements actively engaged in working with the Philippine security forces. While the operations continue, the JSOTF-P conducts data collection and management in order to support assessments. The collection and maintenance of security cooperation data for all of the DOS and DOD security cooperation activities in the Philippines, by way of example, will remain as knowledge and experience of those
carrying out the activities today. In order to incorporate the observations from this practical execution, the DOS should work with DOD to declare and resource a lead agency to hold a data warehouse for all of U.S. government access. By creating a focal point agency for security cooperation data, the DOS and DOD policy makers would have authoritative information needed to assess and prudently plan policy for future resource commitments with better understanding of the implications for progress in the attainment of stated National Security Strategy end states. If in the grand interest and pursuit of U.S. National Security Strategy, the U.S. continues to emphasize building partner capacity through security cooperation activities, the combination of assessment applications and data collection can enable realization of planned objectives supporting desired end states. Without adopting a policy for collection of information and learning from the insights of the recent decade, the U.S. will continue only with capability to qualitatively evaluate the effectiveness of security cooperation efforts.

Endnotes

1 COL Steven A. Stoddard, U.S. Army, Center for Army Analysis, e-mail message to author, January 30, 2012.


5 Ibid, 2.

6 Ibid, 4.


13 Ibid.


15 Ibid.

16 Ibid, 2.


18 Ibid.


21 Ibid, 1.

22 Ibid, 5.


26 Ibid, 17.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid, 5.


32 COL Steven A. Stoddard, U.S. Army, Center for Army Analysis, multiple telephone interviews and conversations with author, October-December, 2011.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.

35 COL Steven A. Stoddard, U.S. Army, "JSOTF-P Assessments v0.1," briefing slides, Fort Belvoir, VA, Center for Army Analysis, October 5, 2011.

36 This portion of the paper draws upon the author’s personal experience from assignments to the Center for Army Analysis and the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization during which he led, conducted, supported, or reviewed studies for analysts and operational commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan. The experience spans the periods 2002-2006 and 2009-2011 as well as a range of conventional and special operations headquarters.


38 COL Steven A. Stoddard, U.S. Army, Center for Army Analysis, multiple telephone interviews by author, February-March, 2012.

39 Ibid.

40 Obama, National Security Strategy, 27.

41 Ibid.