

Using Social Influence Theory to Increase the Effectiveness of Influence Operations

**A Monograph
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
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
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
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Abstract

Using Social Influence Theory to Increase the Effectiveness of Influence Operations by Lieutenant Colonel Barrett A. Burns, U.S. Army, 61 pages.

Since its inception in 2001, the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) has been a geographically limited force addressing a problem that is not geographically constrained. ISAF operations were limited to Kabul initially. In 2003, the United Nations Security Council approved a resolution, UNSCR 1510, that expanded the ISAF mandate from Kabul throughout Afghanistan, but did not provide for operations external to Afghanistan. Recognition of Afghanistan's border by ISAF as a constraint on operations has provided a logistical and operational safe haven for insurgent Taliban forces and their allies working against security and stability in Afghanistan. Social influence operations provide a method for ISAF contributing nations to use existent relationships and non-kinetic operations to influence Taliban decision-makers and constrain Taliban resource providers located outside of Afghanistan.

Design of a social influence operation requires consideration of cultural and moral characteristics of the target population to maximize the effectiveness of the chosen social influence techniques. The cultural characteristics developed by Geert Hofstede and refined by the GLOBE project provide a cultural framework to analyze a target population. Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral development provides a moral framework to analyze the spectrum of moral development in a target population. Bertram Raven's expression of the levers of social influence as bases of power provides the structural framework to develop an influence strategy. When developing social influence operations, integration of cultural and moral characteristics can maximize effects on specific target populations.

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Introduction

Since its inception in 2001, the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) has been a geographically limited force addressing a problem that is not geographically constrained. ISAF operations were limited to Kabul initially. In 2003, the United Nations Security Council approved a resolution, UNSCR 1510, that expanded the ISAF mandate from Kabul throughout Afghanistan, but did not provide for operations external to Afghanistan. Recognition of Afghanistan's border by ISAF as a constraint on operations has provided a logistical and operational safe haven for insurgent Taliban forces and their allies working against security and stability in Afghanistan. Social influence operations provide a method for ISAF contributing nations to use existent relationships and non-kinetic operations to influence Taliban decision-makers and constrain Taliban resource providers located outside of Afghanistan.

Taliban and leaders allied with the Taliban, resources, and forces located outside the borders of Afghanistan cannot be targeted legally by ISAF with conventional kinetic means.¹ The restrictions of the ISAF mandate provide a geographic asymmetry with respect to opposing combatants and civilian populations. Combatants from ISAF contributing nations are concentrated within the borders of Afghanistan, where they have authorization for the conduct of combat operations. Civilian populations of the ISAF contributing nations are concentrated in parent countries, exposed to combat operations conducted by Taliban and their allies. Attacks such as the 2002 Bali bombings, the 2004 Madrid train bombings, the July 2005 London bombings, and multiple attacks in Pakistan show the ability of the Taliban and their allies to conduct combat operations that influence populations outside of Afghanistan. The Taliban are able to conduct combat operations inside and outside of Afghanistan, unconstrained by political boundaries. Taliban combatants are only exposed to ISAF combat operations within the political

¹ United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1510 (2003)," under "United Nations Security Council: Resolutions 2003," <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/555/55/PDF/N0355555.pdf> (accessed January 3, 2011).

borders of Afghanistan. Taliban supporting populations are not exposed to ISAF combat operations, whether inside or outside Afghanistan, because of their non-combatant status. This asymmetry in exposure and risk of combatant forces and supporting populations has created a positional advantage for the Taliban, which they have exploited in their conflict against the numerically and economically superior ISAF forces. To counter this positional advantage, ISAF must find a method of influencing Taliban forces and leadership outside of the physical political boundaries of Afghanistan without violating the intent of the UNSCR which limits ISAF operations to Afghanistan.

Social influence operations provide a method for ISAF contributing nations to use existent relationships and non-kinetic operations to influence Taliban decision-makers and constrain Taliban resource providers located outside of Afghanistan. Due to the distributed nature of the Taliban command and control structure and the inherent scarcity of technology and industry within Afghanistan, interdiction of lines of communication and support between insurgent forces in Afghanistan and safe havens in neighboring countries would impair Taliban capacity to conduct operations in Afghanistan. The military doctrinal basis for the conduct of influence operations is found in the nested Information Operations (IO) concepts of Joint Publication 3-13 and Field Manual 3-13. Joint Publication 3-13 defines the information environment in three dimensions; physical, informational, and cognitive. The cognitive dimension, identified as the most important, encompasses perceptions, emotions, awareness and understanding of decision-makers and the target audience.² Field Manual 3-13 defines 'influence' as an offensive IO technique that uses perception management to affect the target's emotions, motives, and reasoning.³ Neither of these manuals restricts the effects of IO, influence,

² Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 3-13: Information Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, February 2006), 1-2.

³ U.S. Army, *Field Manual 3-13: Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, November 2003), 1-16.

or perception management to a geographically defined area. These manuals provide the doctrinal basis to build an operational social influence campaign that supports ISAF operations, but is executed by non-ISAF assets of troop contributing nations. The nature of non-kinetic operations and the distinction between military forces designated for ISAF and governmental agencies conducting influence operations external to Afghanistan meets the intent of the physical restriction of UNSCR 1510 even though the efforts are fully integrated in support of ISAF operational objectives. In order to build effective social influence campaigns, the design must be supported by fundamental tenants of social influence theory.

Three theories are instrumental in the development of effective social influence campaigns: Bertram Raven's bases of power, Geert Hofstede's cultural characteristics, and Lawrence Kohlberg's stages of moral development. Bertram Raven's bases of power concept outlines the overarching mechanisms through which social influence can be exercised. Geert Hofstede's cultural characteristics measure social norms and cultural values that can be used to predict the effectiveness of social influence attempts in a particular society. Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral development uses a moral framework to predict the effectiveness of social influence attempts that are based on moral reasoning. By integrating these three theories, an agent of influence, who wishes to change the beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors of a target population, can design an influence campaign using culturally and morally sensitive social influence tactics that leverage bases of power with a greater chance of affecting the target in a positive manner.⁴

Bertram Raven's bases of power are the logical and instinctual framework by which humans interact and influence one another. Each influence attempt can generate commitment, compliance, or resistance in a target. The most effective long-term base of power is information

⁴ Jing Zheng, "Cross-cultural Study on French and Chinese Managers' Use of Power Sources," *International Journal of Business and Management* 5, no. 5 (May 2010): 219-220; Bertram H. Raven, "Kurt Lewin Address: Influence, Power, Religion, and the Mechanisms of Social Control," *Journal of Social Issues* 55, no. 1 (1999): 178-180.

power, which operates by convincing the target that the proposed belief, attitude, or behavior is correct. This type of influence is self-perpetuating and requires no further interaction or surveillance by the agent of influence. Other long-term bases of power include referent power and legitimate power, which use social norms and social pressure to convince the target. More effective in the short-term are techniques such as coercion and reward power, which use incentives and consequences to change for beliefs, actions, and attitudes. Coercive power and reward power both require constant interaction by agent and target in order to monitor and provide the promised outcome. Many times, this type of influence will induce compliance over the short-term, but over the long-term target actions revert once interaction, surveillance, and incentives stop. The effectiveness of each base of power is affected by the cultural and moral framework, which structures the receptivity of a target audience to various techniques and bases of power.⁵

Geert Hofstede's cultural characteristics define the cultural framework for the social influence attempt. In order to conduct effective social influence of a population, one must be able to encode a message, transmit the message, and have the message decoded by the receiver.⁶ This is a complex task even when the sender and receiver are very similar. Cultural characteristics provide the cryptographic key. Culture provides the innumerable signals and perspectives that senders use to send the message and the innumerable different signals and perspectives that the receiver uses to decipher the message.⁷ While the precise encoding of a message using cultural cues can be the study and art of a lifetime, Hofstede's seminal study of the classification of cultures categorized broad cultural differences using four dimensions: individualism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity. Later, he included long-term orientation, a fifth

⁵ Raven, "Kurt Lewin Address," 164-165.

⁶ Alan R Freitag and Ashli Quesinberry Stokes. *Global Public Relations: Spanning Borders, Spanning Cultures*. (New York: Routledge, 2009), 3.

⁷ Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 9.

cultural dimension discovered by Eastern researchers.⁸ Subsequent studies by the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness research program (GLOBE), based on Hofstede's theory, developed nine cultural characteristics descriptive of a society, which refine and amplify Hofstede's findings. The GLOBE study confirmed that the effectiveness of influence attempts, which they classified as leadership traits and behaviors, is based on contextual cultural characteristics.⁹

Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral development presents another factor that affects the receptivity of the audience to social influence techniques. There are several gradations of moral development in Kohlberg's theory, beginning with a pre-moral model, which can develop into self-accepted moral principles. At each level of moral development, different bases of power are more effective since they depend on the moral framework to deliver the influence message. Influence attempts leveraging coercion and reward power are effective in societies at Kohlberg's pre-moral level with minimal moral development. As society matures, it develops a morality of conventional role conformity, Kohlberg's second level of morality. At this level, legitimate powers of position and equity increase in effectiveness. If society develops self-accepted moral principles, Kohlberg's third level of morality, informational power dominates, supported by the legitimate powers of reciprocity and responsibility. Cross-cultural influence attempts may be less effective if an agent of influence incorrectly assesses the moral development of a target population based on cultural artifacts that indicate a lack of moral development in the agent's own cultural framework.¹⁰

⁸ Colin P Silverthorne, *Organizational Psychology in Cross-Cultural Perspective* (New York: University Press, 2005), 9-13.

⁹ Robert J. House et al., eds. *Culture, Leadership and Organizations: The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies* (London: Sage Publications, 2004), 138-139.

¹⁰ Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Development of Children's Orientations Toward a Moral Order," *Human Development* 51, no. 1 (2008): 9; Raven, "Kurt Lewin Address," 179.

Developing a complete understanding of a target population through analysis of cultural characteristics and moral development is essential to the development of a social influence campaign that effectively uses bases of power as instruments for social changes in belief, attitudes, and behaviors. Operations that use bases of power not suited to the target's cultural or moral frameworks will generate resistance in the target population.

Methodology

This monograph will examine U.S. policy toward Pakistan using a structural model of cultural characteristics and moral development of target populations to predict the effectiveness of policies that leverage specific bases of power to change behaviors, attitudes, and beliefs. Cultural characteristics are defined and evaluated using Hofstede's model, supplemented by consideration and contrast of GLOBE definitions and measurements. Moral development is defined and evaluated using Kohlberg's model along with longitudinal and cross-sectional studies based on that model. Bases of power are defined using Raven's model, supplemented by the definitions of other prominent social influence theorists like Cialdini and Yukl. Once the theoretical models are established, relationships are developed between structural features of cultural characteristics and moral development in a target population and the effectiveness of various bases of power in instigating social change.

Pakistan is used as a case study due to its central role in ISAF operations in Afghanistan, the geographic constraint of ISAF operations in Pakistan, and the ongoing large-scale U.S. policy efforts in Pakistan. Cultural characteristics and moral development in Pakistan, evaluated through cultural surveys and an analysis of the cultural characteristics of Pashtunwali, are used to predict the effectiveness of bases of power that can be leveraged by U.S. policymakers. The U.S. Enhanced Aid to Pakistan Act of 2009 is analyzed using bases of power and the initial results are compared against theoretical predictions of policy effectiveness. Finally, the operational significance of using cultural characteristics and moral development to determine the use of bases of power in developing influence operations is examined and recommendations are made for future research.

Theory

Overview

The notion of social influence is rooted in prehistoric times, based in the social structures of men who gathered to hunt, live, and socialize. Today, advertising managers and political campaigns wield the science of social influence with precision. The tools have improved through the centuries, but the mechanisms of social influence have remained constant. The social levers used to modify beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors of individuals, groups, and even civilizations have remained constant, modified only in practice by current cultural norms.

The individual is the focus of any attempt to change or maintain beliefs, attitudes, or behaviors because the individual is the indivisible arbiter. Regardless of the number and proximity of influencers, the final decision and responsibility belong solely to the individual. The system that bounds an individual's potential decision today may be enormous, as the system includes all sources with a method of transmitting information to the decision maker. The sum of social influencers considered by an individual, consciously and subconsciously, and framed by the individual's social and moral framework guides the individual's ultimate decision.

When individuals are aggregated into groups, group behaviors, attitudes, and beliefs emerge from the summation and interplay of individual attitudes, behaviors, and beliefs. Social influence to change beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors within a group is a complex iterative process.¹¹ Every group is a combination of leaders, followers and bystanders – each with their own agendas. Each person within the group exercises personal social influence, to varying extents, on peers, subordinates, and superiors within the group.¹² Attempts to influence the group, evaluated individually by group members, can generate commitment, compliance, or resistance in

¹¹ Yaneer Bar-Yam, *Making Things Work: Solving Complex Problems in a Complex World* (Cambridge, MA: Knowledge Press, 2004), 33-37.

¹² Gary Yukl, *Leadership in Organizations*, 4th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1998), 214.

various individuals. In subsequent iterations of interaction between the members of the group, individuals who become committed (experience a change in beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors) may attempt to propagate their new beliefs within the group. Individuals who change their behavior without changing their beliefs or attitudes are compliant with the influence attempt, but experience cognitive dissonance¹³ due to conflicting actions and beliefs. To resolve the cognitive dissonance, compliant individuals will eventually gravitate to either commitment or resistance. Individuals who resist the attempt at social influence may attempt to influence other group members to resist the social influence. Iterations of the cycle of influence due to the agent and newly committed or resistant members of the group continue until the group reaches equilibrium. Examples of this type of iterative influence behavior can be seen in the computational models of Yaneer Bar-Yam that predict the spread of panic at a theater or the formation of spots and stripes in animal fur.¹⁴ In the same manner, individual outcomes of an influence attempt interact in the group setting in an ongoing and dynamic process.

The complex model of social influence on groups may be reduced, with reasonable approximation, to a complicated model of social influence, which represents the group as an individual. Modeling of the complex dynamics of social influence on groups is impossible without complete knowledge of the group. Even under controlled circumstances, complete knowledge of the group is impossible since many of the relationships and tensions are hidden or subconscious. The rationalization of the complex model leads to predictions of behavior and reactions by individuals in the aggregate. Instead of expressing the probability that an individual will experience commitment, compliance, or resistance, the group predictions express ratios of the numbers of people who are committed, compliant or resistant subsequent to an influence attempt. The equilibrium state of any given individual in a group is unpredictable, due to the

¹³ Anthony R. Pratkanis, ed., *The Science of Social Influence: Advances and Future Progress* (New York: Psychology Press, 2007), 117.

¹⁴ Bar-Yam, *Making Things Work*, 33-37.

complex nature of the iterative influence process, which is very sensitive to initial conditions¹⁵ and the social structure of the system. However, the group, in aggregate, exhibits predictable characteristics that are similar to a hypothetical average individual in isolation. The key difference is that where an individual can come to equilibrium in only one state, commitment, compliance, or resistance, the group will come to equilibrium with individuals in a normal distribution of resultant states, centered on the predicted outcome.

In order to maximize the effectiveness of an influence attempt, an agent should use an evaluation of the cultural characteristics and moral development of the group to develop an influence strategy that uses bases of power that are most likely to generate commitment in the target population. The cultural characteristics developed by Geert Hofstede and refined by the GLOBE project provide a structural framework to analyze a target population. Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral development provides a structure to objectively analyze the spectrum of moral development present in group members. Bertram Raven's expression of the levers of social influence as bases of power provides the model to develop an influence strategy. The integration of cultural analysis through cultural characteristics and moral development enables agents of influence to effectively predict the outcome of influence strategies using various bases of power in order to develop the most effective influence strategy.

System Definitions

Social influence is the change in beliefs, attitude, and behavior of a target of influence. Social power is the potential for change in beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. A system for social influence orients on a target, the object of influence efforts. Social control is the process of this system that influences members of a social group to adhere to social norms for that group. The group, defined as in-group versus out-group, is different for various cultures and may be different

¹⁵ John Lewis Gaddis, *The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 79-81.

for the same person at different occasions.¹⁶ Agents, who wish to influence the target, are present in the system at various social distances. Social distance is the proximity, in distance and knowledge, between the agent and influencer. Bases of power are the mediums, accepted as effective by the target, that form the fulcrum for transmission of influence. Influence techniques leverage the acknowledged bases of power in individual attempts to influence the target. The mode of communication is the means of transmitting the influence techniques. The effectiveness of influence techniques is dependent on the target's cultural characteristics, which are used to holistically evaluate the influence technique in the target's cultural frame of reference. The attempt at influence can result in commitment, compliance, resistance, or no change.¹⁷

Social Proximity

In order to present and integrate Raven's theory of Bases of Power, Hofstede's theory of Cultural Characteristics, and Kohlberg's theory on Development in Moral Thought, social proximity must be introduced as an independent variable that expresses the societal distance between actors based on several interwoven factors. These factors must be considered within the cultural framework created by the technological capacity of the target's society for communication and transportation. The first factor is the physical location of agent and target and the capacity for personal contact between agent and target. In societies with well-developed transportation frameworks and a culture that allows penetration by outsiders, the physical distance is immaterial since the agent can be brought face-to-face with the target at will. In societies with a rudimentary transportation framework and a closed social culture that is

¹⁶ Geert Hofstede, Gert Jan Hofstede, and Michael Minkov, *Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind* (New York, McGraw Hill, 2010), 16-18.

¹⁷ Bertram H. Raven, "The Bases of Power and the Power/Interaction Model of Interpersonal Influence," *Analyses of Social Issues & Public Policy* 8, no. 1 (2008): 1; Yukl, *Leadership in Organizations*, 176; Raven, "Kurt Lewin Address," 162.

distrustful of outsiders, an established physical presence is required to enable personal communication.

The second factor is the relative position of target and agent in the target's social hierarchy. In societies with rudimentary communications and transportation frameworks, an agent may need to be physically present in the society in order to occupy a position in the social hierarchy. Different bases of power are maximized at various relative positions in the social hierarchy. Agents who are socially superior, but close, can maximize the tendency of the target to identify with the agent. This increases the agent's ability to use referent power. Agents who are vastly superior in the social hierarchy can maximize expert power.¹⁸

The third factor is the amount and quality of interaction between target and agent. Relationships between target and agent with consistent, positive contact may enhance the agent's ability to use reward or referent power. Excessive interaction between target and agent, which causes familiarity, may degrade the effectiveness of expert power and the legitimate power of position.¹⁹

These three factors, each enhancing or diminishing a particular base of power, combine in the target's estimation to form an overall proclivity for the target to be influenced by the agent. Agents who are physically collocated with the target enhance their informational base of power because they are able to present arguments face to face. Referent power is dependent on social proximity since the target must be able to identify with the agent in order to model the agent's behavior. Social proximity also enhances the ability to effectively use coercion and reward power since the agent is close enough in the system to effectively conduct surveillance on the target.

¹⁸ Raven, "The Bases of Power," 14.

¹⁹ Ibid.

Bases of Power

Each theorist has a slightly different version of bases of power, but most can be subsumed in the six differential bases of power described by Bertram Raven: informational, reward, coercion, legitimate, expert, and referent. Each of these bases of power describes a potential for influence of an individual or group using different social levers.²⁰ Cultural characteristics of societies and in-groups can enhance the effectiveness of specific bases of power if those cultural characteristics reinforce that particular base of power.

These bases of power are categorized by social dependency and requirements for surveillance. Socially dependent bases of power require the target to evaluate actions based on social norms and future interaction with either the agent of influence or the social environment. Informational power, the only socially independent power, changes the mental paradigm of the target without further reference to social norms. Bases of power requiring surveillance, like reward power and coercion, use continuing interaction between the target and agent of change to cause the influence. Legitimate power is further differentiated by the source of the legitimacy.²¹

Informational Power

Informational power is the logical or ethical persuasion of the target by the agent of influence. Informational power subsumes Gary Yukl's defined influence tactics of rational persuasion (logical arguments and factual evidence) and inspirational appeal (leveraging target values, ideals, and aspirations) since the persuasion can be based either on factual evidence or on values and ideals. Informational power is enhanced when an agent is positioned as a

²⁰ Bertram H. Raven and John R. P. French Jr., "Group Support, Legitimate Power, and Social Influence," *Journal of Personality* 26, no. 3 (1958): 400.

²¹ Raven, "The Bases of Power," 1-4; Raven, "Kurt Lewin Address," 164-165.

communicator between organizations, with the power to select information available to a target and the ability to distort information.²²

Informational power is the only socially independent base of power.²³ The acceptance or rejection of the argument is internal to the target and is not dependent on further interaction with the social environment. The lack of social dependence makes informational power potentially the most effective base of power when the agent of influence is not socially proximate to the target. Surveillance and repetitive contact cannot affect this base of power except where it allows clarification of the logical or ethical argument. As a result, this base of power generally results in target commitment or resistance, directly attributable to target acceptance or rejection of the argument presented. Target compliance is a less common result since there is no subsequent or ongoing external inducement based on target action.²⁴

Reward and Coercion

Raven's reward and coercive bases of power stem from the credibility of the agent of influence to provide positive or negative incentive to the target based on a change in beliefs, attitude, or behavior. These bases of power are similar to Yukl's influence tactics of exchange (explicit and implicit offers of incentives) and pressure (demands, threats, and frequent checking).²⁵ Incentives offered can include both tangible and intangible benefits. Incentives should be commensurate with the desired change. All variants of reward and coercive power are socially dependent since the target will consider external factors in the decision to change attitudes, actions or behaviors. In cases of reward and coercion, the external factor is the

²² Yukl, *Leadership in Organizations*, 209.

²³ Raven, "The Bases of Power," 2.

²⁴ Cecilia M. Falbe and Gary Yukl, "Consequences for Managers of Using Single Influence Tactics and Combinations of Tactics," *Academy of Management Journal* 35, no. 3 (1992): 640-641; Raven, "The Bases of Power," 2; Raven, "Kurt Lewin Address," 179; Yukl, *Leadership in Organizations*, 183-184.

²⁵ Yukl, *Leadership in Organizations*, 223-229.

credibility of the agent of influence to provide the offered incentives. The promise to provide either positive or negative incentives leads to a requirement for surveillance of the target by the agent in order to ensure compliance. Surveillance in cases of reward or coercion is easier when the target outcome is compliance or commitment since the target has an interest in either gaining the positive incentive or avoiding the negative incentive. Similarly, surveillance is more difficult when the target outcome is resistance due to the targets desire to avoid either withdrawal of positive incentives or the imposition of negative incentives. Social proximity of the agent of influence to the target is not required, but can be useful in conducting surveillance to ensure compliance. Use of the reward and coercive bases of power is most likely to result in compliance or resistance rather than commitment, providing at best a fleeting change that is only present while incentives and surveillance continue.²⁶

Legitimate Power

Raven's legitimate power is based on the targets perceived obligation to obey or submit to a request from the agent of influence based on either their actual positions of responsibility within their social structure or their relative social positions.²⁷ Yukl focuses on the positional aspect of legitimacy and describes this power as stemming from formal authority that is based in society's perceptions about the prerogatives, obligations, and responsibilities of particular positions in organizations and social systems.²⁸ Acknowledging the effectiveness of overt legitimate power, Cialdini explores methods that subconsciously enhance the effectiveness of legitimate power, like titles, clothes, and artifacts of position, and can be used by impostors to

²⁶ Falbe and Yukl, "Managers Using Influence Tactics," 642; Raven, "The Bases of Power," 2-3; Yukl, *Leadership in Organizations*, 181.

²⁷ Raven and French, "Legitimate Power and Social Influence," 400.

²⁸ Yukl, *Leadership in Organizations*, 179.

present an unconscious perception of legitimacy.²⁹ Raven expands legitimate power by including differences of position induced by circumstances that draw power from social norms beyond the strict positional aspect of legitimacy.³⁰ In this manner, legitimate power is differentiated into legitimate position power, legitimate power of reciprocity, legitimate power of equality, and legitimate power of responsibility. Social proximity between agent and target is important in each case, but the required relationship is different for each form of legitimate power. For legitimate power, the most important aspect of social proximity is relative position in the social hierarchy. Yukl adds perceived legitimacy of the agent of influence as a critical factor in legitimate power. For the legitimate power of position, Yukl states that legitimacy is often based in the manner of selection (inheritance, appointment, or election) and the cultural sanction of that method.³¹ Raven confirmed this aspect of legitimacy in an early experiment designed to test the role of perceived legitimacy and its effect on the exercise of the legitimate power of position.³² In each form, legitimate power is socially dependent since the change is based on the target's self-comparison of beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors with social norms that the target has identified as legitimate. Since social norms are the catalyst for the influence attempt, the surveillance function in legitimate power is nominally filled by society as a whole and does not require surveillance by the agent. As noted by Cialdini, legitimate power is operant at both conscious and unconscious levels.³³ The social conditioning that makes legitimate power operant at the unconscious level is powerful and can generate significant changes in actions without changing consciously held beliefs and attitudes.³⁴

²⁹ Robert B. Cialdini, *Influence: Science and Practice*, 3rd ed. (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), 180-187.

³⁰ Raven, "Kurt Lewin Address," 166.

³¹ Yukl, *Leadership in Organizations*, 180.

³² Raven and French, "Legitimate Power and Social Influence," 409.

³³ Cialdini, *Influence: Science and Practice*, 177-180.

³⁴ Raven, "Kurt Lewin Address," 166-167; Raven, "The Bases of Power," 4.

Legitimate power of position is the expectation of compliance with requests of agents of influence who are superior in a formal or informal social structure.³⁵ This power is based in expectations created by social norms and does not include coercive or reward power that is frequently inherent in superior social positions, even though reward and coercive power is often used in conjunction with the legitimate power of authority. Cialdini labels this base of power as authority and notes that people will tend to obey authority figures, even asked to perform objectionable acts. Both Cialdini and Raven cite incidents such as the Milgram experiments in the early 1960s as extreme examples of use of the legitimate power of position that induced compliance without commitment in targets of influence.³⁶ Social proximity may impede the ability of agents to use the legitimate power of position, depending on specific cultural characteristics. Agents must occupy a superior position in the social hierarchy. Capacity for personal contact and frequency of personal contact are not required and may create target familiarity of the agent that impedes the exercise of legitimate power.³⁷

The legitimate power of reciprocity is the obligation to act toward others as they have acted toward you. While normally thought of as returning good faith for good faith, reciprocity can also return harm for harm done. Reciprocity is differentiated from reward power in the order of providing the incentive and making the request. In reward power the incentive is provided subsequent to compliance or commitment. In the legitimate power of reciprocity, the incentive is provided to the target prior to the influence attempt. Like the legitimate power of position, the legitimate power of reciprocity acts at both the conscious and unconscious level. Cialdini defines reciprocity as people returning favors, even when the initial favor was uninvited.³⁸ The power of

³⁵ Raven, "Kurt Lewin Address", 166.

³⁶ Cialdini, *Influence: Science and Practice*, 173-176; Raven, "Kurt Lewin Address," 166.

³⁷ Cialdini, *Influence: Science and Practice*, 171-176.

³⁸ Raven, "Kurt Lewin Address," 166; Raven, "The Bases of Power," 4; Cialdini, *Influence: Science and Practice*, 19-20.

reciprocity can be seen in both individual and group interactions. In conferences, Cialdini often uses the example of Ethiopia providing humanitarian aid to Mexico after the 1985 earthquake, despite Ethiopia suffering from a crippling famine and civil war at the time. Ethiopia was reciprocating for the diplomatic support Mexico provided when Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935.³⁹ The legitimate power of reciprocity requires the least amount of social proximity of all the legitimate powers, but the requirement for social proximity increases as the time increases between the initial action and the intended response.

The legitimate power of equity and the legitimate power of responsibility are based in the circumstantial relationship between the agent of influence and the target. The legitimate power of equity is the obligation felt by a person who has done harm to make reparations. The legitimate power of responsibility is the social obligation to help the person who cannot help himself. Each of these powers requires a moderate amount of social proximity to establish the relationship that is the basis of the obligation, which causes a change of belief, attitude, or behavior.

Expert Power

Expert power stems from the target's assumption that the agent of influence has superior relevant insight. Raven states that expert power is similar to informational power in that the agent of influence communicates the desired change in belief, attitude or behavior to the target in a manner that is not coercive and does not induce obligation. The difference between expert and informational power lies in the understanding of the target. Targets influenced by expert power attribute superior insight and understanding to the agent and substitute the agent's expressed opinions and value judgments for their own during the decision-making process.⁴⁰ Yukl identifies credibility of the agent of influence as a key factor enabling the use of expert power. Agents who

³⁹ Cialdini, *Influence: Science and Practice*, 21.

⁴⁰ Raven, "The Bases of Power," 3.

demonstrate deceptiveness or carelessness lose the trust necessary for expert power.⁴¹ Credibility is one aspect of the moderate social proximity required for expert power. Credibility and trust are built on previous interactions between agent and target. However, excessive interaction can cause familiarity that interferes with the target's ability to blindly accept agent statements at face value without supporting evidence. Expert power is socially dependent on the influencing agent since the target substitutes the agent's stated beliefs and attitudes for his own.⁴² Ideal outcomes of expert power produce commitment in the target and subsequent beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors will be consistent, with the agent's opinions and values incorporated into the target's value system. Yukl notes that expert power alone is rarely sufficient to gain target compliance or commitment. In his experience, expert power is often integrated as one aspect of an influence strategy that combines several bases of power. Agents who use expert power in an arrogant fashion or attempt to use expert power exclusively without the requisite credibility will generate resistance in the target audience.⁴³ No surveillance is required in expert power since there is no subsequent interaction or incentive required between the agent and the target.⁴⁴

Referent Power

Referent power is based on target emulation of model behavior or group behavior. On an individual level, Raven's referent power is based on the target following the example or suggestion of the agent of influence.⁴⁵ At the group level, referent power includes the tendency of a target to emulate behavior of others in his social in-group. Cialdini expressed this concept as social proof, where people change their behavior, actions, and beliefs to conform to the norms of

⁴¹ Yukl, *Leadership in Organizations*, 199.

⁴² Raven, "Kurt Lewin Address," 164-165.

⁴³ Yukl, *Leadership in Organizations*, 199.

⁴⁴ Raven, "Kurt Lewin Address," 164-165.

⁴⁵ Raven, "The Bases of Power," 3.

people around them. In this construct, the greater the number of people who find an idea or behavior correct, the greater the likelihood that the target will also view that idea or behavior correct.⁴⁶

In the initial stages of influencing groups, agents of influence use referent power to change behaviors, attitudes, and beliefs on an individual basis by providing a model or suggesting characteristics for emulation. In later stages, referent power can cause the change in behaviors, attitudes, and beliefs to become self-perpetuating as members of the group see other demonstrating the new beliefs, actions, and behaviors.

Social proximity is critical for referent power. On an individual basis, agents should be socially superior, but familiar in order to provide positive identification of the target with the intended reference model. While referent power is socially dependent, the influence is dependent on target self-identification with the agent's model or the target's in-group. No surveillance of the target by the agent is required. However, referent power can be enhanced by target observation of the agent, which reinforces the modeled beliefs, attitudes, and actions. Lack of social proximity reduces referent power if the target is unable to identify with the agent or in-group.⁴⁷

Cultural Characteristics

Cultural characteristics of the target audience affect reception and interpretation of social influence attempts. The effectiveness of different bases of power and influence techniques varies according to target audience cultural characteristics. Bases of power and influence techniques supported by target audience cultural characteristics will be more effective. Bases of power and influence techniques not aligned with target audience cultural characteristics will not be as effective and may be counterproductive.

⁴⁶ Cialdini, *Influence: Science and Practice*, 95-96.

⁴⁷ Raven, "The Bases of Power," 3.

Cultural characteristics can also provide indicators useful in selecting a subsection of the target population that is most likely to induce societal change. Hofstede's individualism index, with its bipolar⁴⁸ measurement of individualism and collectivism, can focus social influence campaign development at the grassroots level for individualist societies or at the social leadership level for collectivist societies. The measurements of the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness Research Program (GLOBE) of collectivism at the in-group level and institutional level can indicate whether campaigns aimed at the local level or national level will be more effective. Power distance, as measured by both Hofstede and GLOBE, provide another indicator of effectiveness of social influence campaigns aimed above the grassroots level.

Cultural characteristic analysis begins with Geert Hofstede and his framework of five cultural dimensions of individualism/collectivism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity/femininity, and long/short-term orientation. Eastern, Western and African theorists and respondents developed these dimensions through multinational surveys to ensure global, cross-cultural applicability. GLOBE adapted and amplified this framework with nine dimensions. GLOBE definitions for power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and long/short-term orientation are roughly equivalent to Hofstede. GLOBE separated Hofstede's individualism/collectivism dimension into institutional collectivism and in-group collectivism to differentiate between national and sub-national affiliations. GLOBE also subdivided Hofstede's masculinity/femininity dimension into assertiveness, performance orientation, humane orientation, and gender egalitarianism dimensions. Each of the GLOBE dimensions, uniquely useful in cultural analysis, supplement Hofstede's five dimensions in the analysis of the effectiveness of cross-cultural social influence. These dimensions, from Hofstede and GLOBE, provide a cultural framework for

⁴⁸ The individualism index is bipolar because it evaluates societal groupings against a continuum with individualism and collectivism as polar opposites.

predicting effectiveness of various bases of power and social influence techniques on specific target audiences.⁴⁹

Individualism/Collectivism

Hofstede defines the cultural individualism index characteristic as a bipolar measurement with individualism at one pole and collectivism at the other. Individualist societies are composed of loose ties between individuals except within the immediate family. Collectivist societies contain strongly cohesive in-groups, which provide protection in exchange for loyalty to in-group values and beliefs.⁵⁰ The individualism characteristic is a leading indicator for a variety of individual and social behaviors. Individualistic societies support individual rights including equality under the law, human rights and the right to privacy. Individuals within collectivist societies draw values and the in-group rather than forming a personal opinion.⁵¹ Individualistic cultures use low-context, explicit verbal language. Collectivist cultures use high-context languages that rely on non-verbal cues. Collectivistic cultures base their identity within the framework of their social system, so avoiding loss of face is important. Collectivist societies tend to hold monolithic beliefs and opinions.⁵² The degree of individualism in a particular society is proportional to the amount of resources available to that society. Richer societies, as measured by per capita GNP, are more individualistic while poorer countries are more collectivist.⁵³

⁴⁹ Geert Hofstede and Michael Minkov, "Long- Versus Short-Term Orientation: New Perspectives," *Asia Pacific Business Review* 16, no. 4 (October 2010): 493-497; House et al., *The GLOBE Study*, 138-141.

⁵⁰ Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, *Cultures and Organizations*, 90-92.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 130.

⁵² Geert Hofstede, "The Cultural Relativity of Organizational Practices and Theories," *Journal of International Business Studies* 14, no. 2 (June 1983): 79; Marieke de Mooij and Geert Hofstede, "The Hofstede model: Applications to Global Branding and Advertising Strategy and Research," *International Journal of Advertising* 29, no. 1 (2010): 88-89.

⁵³ Hofstede, "The Cultural Relativity of Organizational Practices," 79-81.

GLOBE researchers examined the distinction between institutional collectivism and in-group collectivism. Institutional collectivism measures the degree that societal level constructs support collective action. In-group collectivism measured the degree of pride, loyalty, and interdependence inherent in families and organizations. Both of these types of collectivism are measured for “as is” current practices and “should be” ideal values.⁵⁴ The strength of in-group and institutional collectivism characteristics can represent the degree to which individuals draw beliefs and values from in-group and institutional sources. As sources of beliefs and values, these measures can also predict the efficacy of influence operations at in-group and institutional levels.

Hofstede’s data for individualism negatively correlates with GLOBE’s “as is” in-group collectivism and “should be” institutional collectivism. Neither “should be” in-group collectivism nor “as is” institutional collectivism correlated with Hofstede’s individualism. Hofstede’s individualism and GLOBE’s “as is” in-group collectivism also correlated with other similar large-scale studies, corroborating their measurement of an individualism cultural characteristic.⁵⁵

Power Distance

Power distance measures a society’s acceptance and endorsement of differences in the distribution of authority, wealth, power, and status privileges.⁵⁶ On a national level, central authority and autocratic leadership are characteristics of high power distance measurements. Both leaders and followers accept their social status in high power distance cultures without trying to change the social order. Social position can become hereditary, as power and wealth is concentrated in family groups. Low power distance cultures attempt to minimize inequalities in power and wealth. Common methods include variable tax rates for individuals and term limits for

⁵⁴ House et al., *The GLOBE Study*, 463-466.

⁵⁵ Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, *Cultures and Organizations*, 100-101; House et al., *The GLOBE Study*, 475.

⁵⁶ House et al., *The GLOBE Study*, 537; Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, *Cultures and Organizations*, 54-55.

politicians. The low individualism measurements typical of collective societies always correlate with high power distance measurements, but high individualism measurements do not correlate with either high or low power distance.⁵⁷

Hofstede and GLOBE both directly measured aspects of power distance. The Hofstede data correlated with the GLOBE's measurement of "as is" power distance, providing corroborating data on current power distance in various countries and cultural clusters.⁵⁸ GLOBE researchers also measured "values" power distance, which represents how societies visualize ideal power distance.⁵⁹ The "values" power distance data is negatively correlated with the "as is" power distance data in countries with either extremely high or low power distance measurements.⁶⁰ The existence of high "values" power distance measurements in extremely low "as is" power distance societies, as well as the opposite, may represent an opportunity to use influence techniques that leverage both high and low power distance characteristics in these societies.

Uncertainty Avoidance

Uncertainty avoidance measures how society and individuals within that society feel threatened by ambiguous or unknown situations. Societies with high uncertainty avoidance feel anxiety about unknown situations and try to control ambiguity with written and unwritten rules.⁶¹ The paradox is that high uncertainty avoidance societies have more rules but feel less compelled to follow the rules rigidly. Low uncertainty avoidance societies have fewer rules, but the

⁵⁷ Hofstede, "The Cultural Relativity of Organizational Practices," 81; Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, *Cultures and Organizations*, 103.

⁵⁸ House et al., *The GLOBE Study*, 543; Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, *Cultures and Organizations*, 63.

⁵⁹ House et al., *The GLOBE Study*, 537.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 541.

⁶¹ Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, *Cultures and Organizations*, 191.

tolerance for deviation is lower.⁶² High uncertainty avoidance societies also tend to extend the need for rules into social categorization that sharply differentiates between good and bad, including different ethnicities and even different ideologies.⁶³ Low uncertainty avoidance societies view differences as curious rather than bad.⁶⁴

Uncertainty avoidance also tends to characterize the relationship between government and the people. People in strong uncertainty avoidance societies are less likely to challenge governmental rules, feeling that rules and the structure that imposed the rules is proper.⁶⁵ Weak uncertainty avoidance societies feel empowered to voice their opinion and change rules to accommodate new situations. Many of those methods of control can be categorized as technological, law/social rule, and religion/ideology.⁶⁶

Comparison of the Hofstede and GLOBE data highlights the difficulty of categorizing and measuring social variables that may have contradictory second order effects. While both studies measured the same basic characteristic, the GLOBE methodology of measuring “as is” and “should be” separates first and second order effects of uncertainty avoidance. The GLOBE measurement of “should be” uncertainty avoidance correlates with Hofstede’s measurements of society’s intent to reduce ambiguity in future unknown situations. GLOBE’s “as is” uncertainty avoidance measurement negatively correlates with Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance, reflecting the tendency of societies with strong uncertainty avoidance to disregard rules as they deal with current situations.⁶⁷

⁶² Ibid., 209-210.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 201.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 215.

⁶⁶ Hofstede, “The Cultural Relativity of Organizational Practices,” 83.

⁶⁷ Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, *Cultures and Organizations*, 198-199; House et al., *The GLOBE Study*, 626-627.

Masculinity/Femininity

Emphasis on the distinction between traditional roles of males and females in societies characterize the masculinity/femininity cultural characteristic of a society. Hofstede uses emphasis on gender roles as an indicator for associated social characteristics. Masculine societies maintain distinct gender roles and emphasize traditional masculine values like assertiveness, accomplishment, and performance. Feminine societies, where gender roles overlap, value modesty, tenderness, and quality of life.⁶⁸ These baseline values extend into social interactions and governmental priorities. Masculine societies expect assertive leadership, boldly stating expansive goals and expounding on achievements as a basis for achieving those goals. Feminine societies expect modest leadership, establishing moderate, achievable goals and emphasizing value for all participants.⁶⁹

GLOBE researchers used two dimensions, gender egalitarianism “practices” and “values” and assertiveness “practices” and “values” to measure the characteristics in Hofstede’s masculinity characteristic.⁷⁰ The measured values showed relationships but did not always show significant correlation. The GLOBE measurement of assertiveness “practices” significantly correlated with Hofstede’s masculinity characteristic.⁷¹ Assertiveness “values” and gender egalitarianism “practices” weakly correlated and gender egalitarianism “values” did not correlate with Hofstede’s masculinity characteristic.⁷² The significant correlation of Hofstede’s masculinity and GLOBE’s assertiveness “practices” corroborates the validity of the societal characteristics Hofstede associated with masculinity, despite the weak correlation of gender egalitarianism.

⁶⁸ Hofstede, “The Cultural Relativity of Organizational Practices,” 84-85.

⁶⁹ Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, *Cultures and Organizations*, 136-137.

⁷⁰ House et al., *The GLOBE Study*, 344.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 413.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 377, 413.

Long/Short-term Orientation

Long/short-term orientation is the fifth cultural characteristic in Hofstede's framework. Originally developed in the Chinese Values Survey (CVS) by Chinese researchers examining cultural characteristics from an Eastern point of view, Hofstede used data from the World Values Survey (WVS) to extend long-term orientation measurements to include Western societies.⁷³ Long-term oriented cultures focus on the future and value thrift, persistence, and humility. Good and evil are questions of perspective, and functionality is more important than righteousness. Personal networks and contacts are essential. Short-term orientation societies focus on the past and the immediate present. The dual focus produces two sets of norms that occasionally conflict, possibly causing inherent social tension and cognitive dissonance. Short-term orientation norms focused on the past emphasize individual stability and respect for social traditions. Short-term orientation norms focused on the immediate present emphasize immediate gratification and conformity with current trends.⁷⁴

GLOBE researchers chose a different definition for future orientation, measuring the extent that societies believe that current actions and plans will influence the future.⁷⁵ GLOBE definitions of future orientation "as is" and "should be" are conceptually similar to Hofstede's definition for long-term orientation, but GLOBE's survey questions focus specifically on societies tendency to plan for the future while Hofstede's data focuses on second-order qualities like thrift and perseverance which are associated with a long-term orientation. Hofstede's measurements of long-term orientation and GLOBE's measurements of future orientation do not

⁷³ Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, *Cultures and Organizations*, 37-38.

⁷⁴ Hofstede and Minkov, "Long- Versus Short-Term Orientation," 496-497; Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, *Cultures and Organizations*, 239.

⁷⁵ House et al., *The GLOBE Study*, 285.

correlate⁷⁶ and should be considered separate facets of a characteristic that deserves additional study and refinement.

Moral Development

Moral development in the target audience is a major factor in the effectiveness of various bases of power and social influence techniques. While moral development is an individual attribute, the summation of these attributes can provide an indicator of a group's moral development that can predict group response to various bases of power. Lawrence Kohlberg developed a three level, six stage model of moral reasoning that evaluates decision-making processes, ranging from punishment avoidance to ethical principal, to determine an individual's moral development.⁷⁷ Raven used Kohlberg's stages of moral reasoning to draw parallels to bases of power that might be effective at each moral level.⁷⁸ The suitability of Kohlberg's model in a cross-cultural environment has been supported by separate surveys of information technology professionals in China,⁷⁹ villagers in Turkey,⁸⁰ and several multinational corporations.⁸¹

In Kohlberg's framework, development of moral reasoning is proportional to exposure to the specific moral topic.⁸² Farmers are likely to have more developed moral sense about issues that are common in agrarian societies than urban issues. Soldiers are likely to possess greater capacity for moral reasoning in issues of land warfare than farmers or other types of

⁷⁶ Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, *Cultures and Organizations*, 260; House et al., *The GLOBE Study*, 313.

⁷⁷ Kohlberg, "The Development of Children's Orientations," 9.

⁷⁸ Raven, "Kurt Lewin Address," 178-180.

⁷⁹ Robert Davison, "The Ethics of IT Professionals in China," *Communications of the ACM* 52, no. 7 (July 2009): 4.

⁸⁰ Mordecai Nisan and Lawrence Kohlberg, "Universality and Variation in Moral Judgment: A Longitudinal and Cross-Sectional Study in Turkey," *Child Development* 53 (1982): 865.

⁸¹ Andreas Falkenberg, "When in Rome: Moral Maturity and Ethics for International Economic Organizations," *Journal of Business Ethics* 54 (2004): 17.

⁸² Nisan and Kohlberg, "Universality and Variation in Moral Judgment," 866-867.

governmental employees. When evaluating a target population's stage of moral reasoning, agents of influence should consider the target populations exposure to similar issues. Farmers may use a different decision-making process to evaluate agrarian issues than they use to evaluate issues of armed conflict and violence. Soldiers trained for high-intensity conflict may use different decision-making processes in unconventional warfare.

In Kohlberg's typology, individuals progress through three levels of morality, expressing two developmental stages at each level. As progression occurs, the higher levels of moral reasoning replace, rather than add to, the lower levels of reasoning.⁸³ The first level of moral development, pre-moral, focuses on obedience to an external entity that enforces control through punishment and reward. At this level, reward power, coercive power and the legitimate power of position are most effective due to the structure of the control system. The second level of development, the morality of conventional role-conformity, extends beyond reward and coercion through social integration and the need to maintain good relations and seek approval of others. This level also includes the concept of morality established by social authority. Effective bases of power at this level of development include legitimate powers of position and equity, which are based around acceptance of an external moral authority. Referent power should also be considered at this stage due to the emphasis on social integration. The final level of moral development, the morality of self-accepted moral principles, is based on the morality of social contract and individual principles of conscience. Effective bases of power at this level of moral development include legitimate powers of reciprocity and responsibility and informational power.⁸⁴

When the base of power selected by the agent of influence does not match the moral reasoning development of the target population, resistance becomes a more probable outcome.

⁸³ Kohlberg, "The Development of Children's Orientations," 11.

⁸⁴ Raven, "Kurt Lewin Address," 179; Kohlberg, "The Development of Children's Orientations," 8-11.

Since the development of higher moral reasoning replaces lower moral reasoning, applying coercive power and reward power to a target operating at higher level of moral reasoning is more likely to generate resistance. Informational power and appeals to the legitimate power of responsibility are more likely to generate commitment in a target population operating at the highest level of moral reasoning in Kohlberg's moral typology, the morality of self-accepted moral principles. Including morality of contract and law as well as morality of conscience, this stage of moral development provides the basis for construct of a persuasive argument that is the foundation for informational power. If this type of moral reasoning is not present in the target or target population, the relative effectiveness of informational power is reduced in favor of other bases of power that appeal to other, lesser moral principles.⁸⁵

⁸⁵ Kohlberg, "The Development of Children's Orientations," 9.
Raven, "Kurt Lewin Address," 167.

Using Cultural Characteristics to Determine Effective Bases of Power

In all cultures, some bases of power are more effective than others regardless of cultural characteristics. The broad category of informational power is effective across all cultures, regardless of cultural characteristics. Ping Ping Fu, conducting research at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, used Gary Yukl's description of informational power as rational persuasion and found it to be the preferred and most effective base of power in both the United States and China.⁸⁶ GLOBE researchers described the leadership trait as charismatic/value based leadership and found it to be the most effective leadership model in eight of the ten societal clusters.⁸⁷ Informational power, also called inspiration and rational persuasion, was also found to be the most effective means of producing commitment, rather than compliance or resistance, in target audiences.⁸⁸ However, cultural differences can be seen even in the use of informational power. In the United States, informational power is a direct and effective method of arguing a point. In China, use of informational power can lead to direct disagreement, so it is less desirable. Other bases of power are much less universal than informational power.

Reward, coercive, legitimate, expert, and referent powers are all socially dependent powers that rely on social norms and interactions to cause the desired change in beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors.⁸⁹ The presence and strength of cultural characteristics in the target population that are closely identified with each base of power determines the effectiveness of that particular base of power. The measure of social support that cultural characteristics provide to the bases of power is a relative measure along a continuum of effectiveness. Each cultural characteristic can support various bases of power to differing extents and each base of power can draw support from more

⁸⁶ Ping Ping Fu and Gary Yukl, "Perceived Effectiveness of Influence Tactics in the United States and China," *Leadership Quarterly* 11, no. 2 (2000): 260.

⁸⁷ House et al., *The GLOBE Study*, 680.

⁸⁸ Falbe and Yukl, "Managers Using Influence Tactics," 647.

⁸⁹ Raven, "Kurt Lewin Address," 165.

than one cultural characteristic. The complexity of determining cultural support to bases of power lies in the interaction of characteristics present in each culture and the effect of those complex interactions on the base of power. The following linkages are based on broad cross-cultural studies by several groups, but they can only begin to describe the complex relation of culture and influence. The measure of effectiveness is arbitrary, based on survey trends and relative to measures for other bases of power.

Collectivism and Power Distance Support to Bases of Power.

The closely integrated in-group typical of collectivist societies increases the effectiveness of the referent base of power, where a member of the in-group models the desired behavior or belief.⁹⁰ Similarly, the interlinked responsibilities and obligations characteristic of collectivist societies increase the effectiveness of the legitimate powers of reciprocity, equity, and responsibility.

The GLOBE measurements of institutional collectivism and in-group collectivism indicate the level of society where beliefs and values originate. Influence operations targeting these social levels are more likely to propagate across the population. Societies with high measures of institutional collectivism can be influenced through national and societal structures. Societies with high levels of in-group collectivism require influence operations that target the in-group level. Individualist societies require influence operations at the person-by-person grassroots level.

The legitimate power of position is more effective in large power distance societies, where leaders and followers accept the unequal distribution of power and authority.⁹¹ The acceptance of unequal power implies the acceptance of unequal knowledge, which increases the

⁹⁰ Zheng, "Cross Cultural Study on French and Chinese Managers," 221.

⁹¹ Fu and Yukl, "Influence Tactics in the United States and China," 262; Zheng, "Cross Cultural Study on French and Chinese Managers," 221.

effectiveness of expert power. Large power distance societies are more likely to use reward power due to the unequal distribution of resources and coercive power due to the unequal distribution of authority.⁹²

Societies with collectivist cultural characteristics are invariably linked with larger power distance characteristics.⁹³ The combination of in-group modeling referent power, typical of collectivist societies, couples with the legitimate power of position, typical of large power distance, reinforces the effectiveness of expert power, which models behavior and knowledge from a position of authority.⁹⁴ The collectivist characteristic of in-group unity reduces the effectiveness of reward and coercive power typical in large power distance societies.

In societies with high individualism cultural characteristics, the transactional nature of business overshadows the importance of relationships, so the reward base of power is more effective.⁹⁵ This is tempered by the expectation of privacy in individualistic cultures that can impede bases of power, like reward and coercion, that require surveillance.⁹⁶ A high power distance characteristic reinforces the effectiveness of reward power in a highly individualist society.⁹⁷ In individualist countries with a low power distance, exploitation of unequal distribution of power and resources through reward power is less accepted and less effective. Instead, individualist countries with low power distance favor information and expert power.

Short/Long-term Orientation Support to Bases of Power

The bipolar drives of tradition and immediate gratification for short-term oriented societies support several bases of power. The emphasis on tradition, stability, and social status

⁹² Zheng, "Cross Cultural Study on French and Chinese Managers," 222.

⁹³ Hofstede, "The Cultural Relativity of Organizational Practices," 81.

⁹⁴ Zheng, "Cross Cultural Study on French and Chinese Managers," 222.

⁹⁵ Fu and Yukl, "Influence Tactics in the United States and China," 262.

⁹⁶ Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, *Cultures and Organizations*, 126.

⁹⁷ Zheng, "Cross Cultural Study on French and Chinese Managers," 222.

reinforce the effectiveness of the legitimate power of position. The follow-on tendency to default to previously accepted authorities support the use of expert power. The short-term cultural characteristics of concern with social status and obligation reinforce the effectiveness of the legitimate power of equity. The short-term oriented drive for immediate gratification from the target of influence and social pressure toward spending on the agent of influence both support the effectiveness of reward power.⁹⁸

Societies with long-term orientation characteristics of persistence and thrift tend to use longer-term bases of power, like referent power which leverages relationships. Personal and professional expertise is a nurtured virtue, valued by a long-term oriented society and supporting the effectiveness of expert power.⁹⁹ Instead of using reward power to consolidate short-term gains, long-term oriented societies are more likely to employ the legitimate power of reciprocity, presenting gifts to develop long-term contacts and friendships and personal networks.¹⁰⁰

Masculinity/Femininity Support to Bases of Power

Challenge seeking, achievement oriented masculine societies are less likely to respond to bases of power that leverage relationships.¹⁰¹ Instead, masculine societies will tend towards bases of power that leverage previous achievements, like expert power and informational power, in a competitive, argumentative manner.¹⁰² The challenging and competitive nature of masculine societies, similar to high individualism societies,¹⁰³ supports the effectiveness of reward and coercive powers that validate the targets achievement and the agent's position of power.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 221; Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, *Cultures and Organizations*, 243.

⁹⁹ Zheng, "Cross Cultural Study on French and Chinese Managers," 221.

¹⁰⁰ Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, *Cultures and Organizations*, 243; Fu and Yukl, "Influence Tactics in the United States and China," 262.

¹⁰¹ Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, *Cultures and Organizations*, 139.

¹⁰² Zheng, "Cross Cultural Study on French and Chinese Managers," 221.

¹⁰³ Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, *Cultures and Organizations*, 139.

Feminine societies use expert power and informational power in a non-competitive manner, providing expertise in a non-confrontational method that develops relationships and nurtures the working environment.¹⁰⁴ Feminine societies also nurture relationships with gifts, using the legitimate power of reciprocity to develop relationships for the future.¹⁰⁵

Uncertainty Avoidance Support to Bases of Power

Societies with high uncertainty avoidance cultural characteristics are more likely to leverage legitimate power of position and expert power.¹⁰⁶ Societies with low uncertainty avoidance are more likely to leverage expert power to adapt to changing circumstances.¹⁰⁷

High uncertainty avoidance societies are more likely to be distrust beliefs or actions that are radically different from status quo. They will also mistrust outsiders and different ethnicities. Rules may be made, but status quo actions will continue.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Fu and Yukl, "Influence Tactics in the United States and China," 255.

¹⁰⁶ Zheng, "Cross Cultural Study on French and Chinese Managers," 222; Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, *Cultures and Organizations*, 219-220.

¹⁰⁷ Zheng, "Cross Cultural Study on French and Chinese Managers," 222.

Pakistan Case Study

Evaluation of Bases of Power Using Cultural and Moral Characteristics

While Pakistan is a diverse country, with distinct rural and urban cultures, the measures of cultural characteristics are broad enough to draw conclusions generally valid across the country, modified as appropriate for specific in-groups categorized by social class and income or by regional subculture, like the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Hofstede's measure of the cultural characteristics of Pakistan show low values for individualism, moderately large values for power distance and uncertainty avoidance, and moderate values for masculinity, and long-term orientation.¹⁰⁸ GLOBE researchers measured different aspects of the same broad concepts in Iran and India, who are members of the Southern Asia cultural cluster that includes Pakistan. Their measures generally confirmed Hofstede's values. The GLOBE researchers measured moderately large values for power distance, moderate uncertainty avoidance, moderate values for masculinity (represented by low gender egalitarianism and moderate assertiveness) and moderately large values for long-term orientation (represented by future orientation). GLOBE researchers refined Pakistan's measure of low individualism (strong collectivism) into strong in-group collectivism and moderate institutional collectivism.¹⁰⁹

While GLOBE researchers did not survey individuals in Pakistan directly, they grouped Pakistan in the Southern Asia cultural cluster, along with India, Iran, and Indonesia. Pakistan is an integral part of the Southern Asia cultural cluster, which is oriented around culture beginning in the Greater Indus Valley.¹¹⁰ The span and defining characteristic of this cultural cluster is a good indicator of the pervasiveness of the cultural characteristics measured and their applicability

¹⁰⁸ Hofstede, "The Cultural Relativity of Organizational Practices," 80-86.

¹⁰⁹ House et al., *The GLOBE Study*, 622, 539.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 188-189.

to Pakistan. The large scale ensures the conclusions drawn will be generally valid, but reinforces the fact that refinements must be made for specific applicability to local in-groups.

Figure 1. Pakistan’s Cultural Characteristics as evaluated by Hofstede and GLOBE

Hofstede Cultural Characteristics	Hofstede measurements	GLOBE Cultural Characteristics	GLOBE (as is) measurements	GLOBE (values) measurements
Individualism	Weak	Institutional Collectivism	Moderate	Moderately Strong
Power Distance	Moderately Strong	In-group Collectivism	Strong	Moderately Strong
Uncertainty Avoidance	Moderately Strong	Power Distance	Moderately Strong	Moderate
Masculinity	Moderate	Uncertainty Avoidance	Moderately Weak	Moderately Strong
Long-Term Orientation	Moderate	Gender Egalitarianism	Moderately Weak	Moderately Weak
		Assertiveness	Moderately Weak	Strong
		Future Orientation	Moderately Strong	Moderately Strong

Source: Table is author created from data in Geert Hofstede’s book *Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind* and data published by the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness Research Program.

Pashtunwali provides one method for comparing the cultural characteristics surveyed by Hofstede and GLOBE to cultural norms of the Pashtun, a set of tribal groups that spans the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and predominates in the FATA, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa,¹¹¹ and southeastern parts of Afghanistan. In Pakistan, the Pashtun have a social subdivision between the “free tribes” who straddle the Durand Line, and the “settled tribes,” who have largely assimilated into Pakistani society.¹¹² Akbar Ahmed characterizes the free tribes as chivalrous, pastoral, and nomadic, hill Pashtuns and the settled tribes as urban and large land-owning Pashtuns.¹¹³ While

¹¹¹ In April 2010, the region of Pakistan known as the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) was renamed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which means “Khyber side of the land of the Pashtuns”.

¹¹² Eric S. Margolis, *War at the Top of the World: The Struggle for Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Tibet*, rev. ed. (New York: Routledge, 2002), 11.

¹¹³ Palwasha Kakar, “Tribal Law of Pashtunwali and Women’s Legislative Authority,” <http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/ilsp/research/kakar.pdf> (accessed 30 March 2011): 3.

each tribe emphasizes different Pashtunwali values, the universal acceptance of Pashtunwali as a social norm provides clear benchmarks for evaluating general cultural characteristics in this significant Pakistani in-group.

The overarching Pashtun characteristic that speaks to the measures of individualism and collectivism is the universality of Pashtunwali as the major social reference, which incorporates ideas of honor, justice, and rules for day-to-day behavior.¹¹⁴ The tribal nature of Pashtunwali further delineates the nature of the collectivism as in-group collectivism, although the enormous and international nature of the Pashtun in-group provides societal constructs, such as the concept of council (*jirga*), that can be used to support collective action and are characteristic of institutional collectivism. One measure of in-group collectivism is the extension of in-group protection in exchange for compliance with in-group rules. An essential component of Pashtun hospitality is the concept of asylum, which provides protection for guests for the duration of their visit.¹¹⁵ Insurgents fleeing ISAF, Afghan, and Pakistani forces on both sides of the border, including Osama bin Laden, have exploited this cultural characteristic.¹¹⁶ These characteristics point to a strong in-group collectivism orientation. However, Pashtunwali values of privacy and autonomy support individualist characteristics. The concept of the strictly gender-segregated society creates spaces reserved for either men or women. These spaces provide an expectation of privacy limited to persons of the same gender within the family.¹¹⁷ This expectation of privacy, while not limited to individuals, is characteristic of individualism. Another individualist characteristic is found within the concepts of self-respect and chivalry. Within Pashtunwali, these

¹¹⁴ Conrad Schetter, Rainer Glassner, and Masood Karokhail, "Beyond Warlordism: The Local Security Architecture in Afghanistan," *Journal for International Relations and Global Trends* (February 2007): 146.

¹¹⁵ Kakar, "Tribal Law of Pashtunwali," 4.

¹¹⁶ Major Richard Tod Strickland, "The Way of the Pashtun: Pashtunwali," *Canadian Army Journal* 10, no. 3 (Fall 2007): 49.

¹¹⁷ Kakar, "Tribal Law of Pashtunwali," 4-5.

concepts require not only martial ability, but also individual zeal and autonomy that are not typical in collectivist organizations. This individualist characteristic is stronger in rural areas and discourages rural Pashtuns from service in national organizations like the police and the army.¹¹⁸ Urban Pashtuns are more inclined to join the army, which indicates a stronger measure of institutional collectivism.¹¹⁹ The sum of these Pashtun characteristics points to strong in-group collectivism in both rural and urban settings, with individualist characteristics that are stronger in the rural settings and institutional collectivism characteristics that are stronger in the urban setting. These characteristics corroborate the survey results of both Hofstede and GLOBE and refine the cultural descriptions of rural and urban Pakistanis.

The power distance component of Pashtunwali centers around the ideal construct of chivalry, honor, and council (*jirga*). In the ideal form, Pashtunwali is a very low power distance construct. All Pashtuns are considered to have descended from the same ancestors and possess equal social and political status. Furthermore, no Pashtun should possess more rights and power than other Pashtuns. Disputes should be resolved through council and tribal gatherings to reach consensus.¹²⁰ The implementation of the *jirga* at the tribal level shows differences in individual status based on honor, which is dependent on the precise practice of Pashtunwali, ownership of land, and wealth. In rural areas, honor and chivalry contribute most to an individual's standing at the *jirga*. In urban areas, land ownership and wealth are prerequisite for authoritative decisions.¹²¹ The juxtaposition of the hierarchical tribal structure, the ideal egalitarianism of Pashtunwali, and the uneven practice of the tenants of Pashtunwali form an unstable political structure that allows individuals to accumulate power and resources.¹²² The in-group approves of this unequal

¹¹⁸ Strickland, "The Way of the Pashtun," 48.

¹¹⁹ Margolis, *War at the Top of the World*, 11.

¹²⁰ Schetter, Glassner, and Karokhail, "Beyond Warlordism," 146.

¹²¹ Kakar, "Tribal Law of Pashtunwali," 6.

¹²² Schetter, Glassner, and Karokhail, "Beyond Warlordism," 147.

distribution of power and resources based on the perfect practice of Pashtunwali. Where the unequal distribution of power is related to wealth, access to that power becomes hereditary. If moral authority is lost by not following Pashtunwali, the power is ceded to a relative. The uneven distribution of power coupled with the approval of the population and the hereditary nature of transferring power are all characteristic of a high power distance culture and corroborate Hofstede's measurement of power distance and GLOBE's measurement of "as is" power distance. The ideal Pashtunwali society is a very low power distance society, much lower than the GLOBE's measurement of "should be" power distance of moderate. This discrepancy is likely due to attitudes in Pakistan's non-Pashtun urban centers.

Uncertainty avoidance is a measure of the societal rules used to plan for and mitigate unknown events. Pashtunwali provides this set of rules. In comparison to other constructs, Pashtunwali is sparse, providing guiding principles with the details filled in by local customs, tribal laws, Islamic law, and state law.¹²³ The laws are not codified in terms of precedence and may provide conflicting guidance. The jirga is the council that resolves these conflicts and is the legitimate authority in the application and Pashtunwali. The jirga also serves as a consulting body to resolve unknown situations. The consultation function strengthens Pashtun solidarity and the maintenance of order in Pashtun society.¹²⁴ Pashtunwali, supported by the non-codified customs and laws, is a two level paradigm that Pashtuns use to deal with uncertainty. The core tenants of Pashtunwali are broad concepts that Pashtuns must follow, lest they suffer severe social sanctions. This model of few rules that must be followed is indicative of low uncertainty avoidance cultures. The detailed customs and laws that support the core tenants of Pashtunwali are comprehensive and govern all aspects of Pashtun life. However, the innate conflict of the laws, combined with mechanisms for avoiding sanction, like the intercession of a female family

¹²³ Kakar, "Tribal Law of Pashtunwali," 2.

¹²⁴ Strickland, "The Way of the Pashtun," 50.

member,¹²⁵ show that these detailed rules are not sacrosanct like the core tenants of Pashtunwali. This model of comprehensive and detailed rules that are not always followed is indicative of a high uncertainty avoidance culture. The summation of these two models is a society with moderately strong uncertainty avoidance with an ideal of moderately weak uncertainty avoidance. This matches Hofstede's evaluation and GLOBE's logic of opposing tensions between current and desired states for uncertainty avoidance,¹²⁶ but GLOBE's surveys found moderately weak "as is" uncertainty avoidance and moderately strong "should be" uncertainty avoidance. This may be the result of conflating first and second order effects of uncertainty avoidance and deserves additional study.

The basis for evaluating masculinity vice femininity in Pashtunwali lies in the concept of gender boundaries, which creates a strictly gender-segregated society.¹²⁷ Hofstede's definition of masculinity requires the distinctness of emotional gender roles. Societies are feminine when emotional gender roles overlap.¹²⁸ In the public eye, Pashtunwali seems strongly masculine. Men are aggressive, gaining honor through martial ability.¹²⁹ Women are modest, veiling to various extents throughout Pashtun society.¹³⁰ However, beyond the public eye are two homo-social societies where each gender works and socializes exclusively within that gender. Within the world of Pashtun women, there is a separate sphere of jurisdiction with female norms and laws.¹³¹ Many leadership and authority roles, which appear exclusive to men, are mirrored in the women's social order. Within villages, the senior women oversee female ceremonies, arrange marriages,

¹²⁵ Kakar, "Tribal Law of Pashtunwali," 4.

¹²⁶ House et al., *The GLOBE Study*, 621.

¹²⁷ Kakar, "Tribal Law of Pashtunwali," 4-5.

¹²⁸ Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, *Cultures and Organizations*, 140.

¹²⁹ Strickland, "The Way of the Pashtun," 48.

¹³⁰ Kakar, "Tribal Law of Pashtunwali," 5.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 6.

and can arbitrate conflicts for men and women.¹³² Within the family, women manage household resources, create and maintain female social networks, and resolve conflicts among females.¹³³ The separate social order for women moderates the fact that men remain dominant in the overarching Pashtun social order and characterizes Pashtun society as moderately masculine. This matches Hofstede's survey results of moderate masculinity. The GLOBE measurement of moderately weak gender egalitarianism is also supported, but the GLOBE measurement of moderately weak aggressiveness does not apply to the Pashtun in-group.

To examine long-term orientation characteristics of Pashtunwali, it is necessary to examine the Hofstede's long-term orientation and GLOBE's future orientation separately as they measure different aspects of the same characteristic. Pashtunwali supports key elements of Hofstede's long-term and short-term orientation equally, leading to a moderate measure of long-term orientation. Pragmatism, personal networks, and the accumulation of wealth and land are key elements in long-term orientation. The importance of tradition, family pride and individual stability are key elements of short-term orientation.¹³⁴ Pashtunwali and the Pashtunwali concepts of council, revenge, and hospitality support both orientations equally. In itself, Pashtunwali is a tradition and living in a steadfast manner by the concepts of Pashtunwali provides honor to the individual and to the family. The implementation of jirga is a pragmatic method of resolving problems between individuals and groups. Within the jirga, individuals can increase their authority either by increasing the size of their social networks through the Pashtunwali concept of hospitality or by increasing their land ownership and accumulation of wealth.¹³⁵ The concept of honor implicit in Pashtunwali is a short-term concept. The jirga is characteristic of long-term orientation with pragmatic methods and emphasis on thrift and land ownership.

¹³² Ibid., 8.

¹³³ Ibid., 9.

¹³⁴ Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, *Cultures and Organizations*, 275.

¹³⁵ Kakar, "Tribal Law of Pashtunwali," 4-6.

GLOBE's strong measure of future orientation in Pakistan is indicative of Pakistanis belief that present actions can influence the future. The Pashtunwali concept of revenge, or *badal*, is a long-term characteristic. While traditional Western definitions of revenge are oriented on a retribution for past actions, the Pashtunwali concept of *badal* is focused on regaining honor for the future. In pursuit of this honor, it is said that a Pashtun will pursue revenge if it takes 500 years.¹³⁶ so that the individual, family, or tribe will not be taken advantage of in the future.

Using the Pashtunwali lens, the cultural characteristics measured by Hofstede and GLOBE are supported by social norms central to both urban and rural populations of the Pashtun group of tribes concentrated in western Pakistan. Strong in-group collectivism is supported by the universality of Pashtunwali and the social focus at the tribal level. High power distance and moderately strong uncertainty are supported through the implementation of Pashtunwali. Moderate masculinity is supported by the rigid gender separation which results in two parallel gendered societies. Hofstede's measure of moderate long-term orientation is supported by the implementation of *jirga* and the Pashtun understanding of revenge supports GLOBE's measure of strong future orientation. Pashtunwali supports the cultural characteristics of Hofstede and GLOBE in the operationally important rural and urban Pashtun areas and suggest applicability throughout Pakistan.

According to the proposed links between Hofstede's cultural characteristics and Raven's bases of power, Pakistan, in general, should respond best to expert power and all types of legitimate power. Strong collectivism at the in-group level supports referent power along with the legitimate powers of reciprocity, equity, and responsibility. The strong values for in-group rather than institutional collectivism means that influence operations will be more effective across the population if they are targeted at the local and tribal levels. Pakistan's moderately strong values for power distance within a collectivist society and uncertainty avoidance both support legitimate

¹³⁶ Margolis, *War at the Top of the World*, 11.

power of position and expert power. External actors can best leverage expert power and legitimate power of reciprocity. Internal actors can best leverage the legitimate power of position.

An evaluation of the moral development of adults in Pakistan can be extrapolated from research conducted in Turkey by Mordecai Nisan between 1964 and 1976. Nisan's research examined the moral development of urban and rural Turkish children and adults, across a period years, to confirm the universality of Kohlberg's structural nature of moral development, which had been established in the U.S., Kenya, the Bahamas, India, and New Zealand.¹³⁷ This research followed a similar study conducted by Bindu Parikh in India and the United States that confirmed the structural nature of moral development, but revealed possible regional discrepancies in the rate of moral development and ultimate level of moral development attained.¹³⁸ According to Kohlberg's model and the study conducted by Nisan, moral development of Pakistani adults, modeled after Turkish results, is generally divided into two groups; people who live in villages and people who live in cities. In each group, moral development increases with age, following a fixed progression that culminates based on environmental factors and social experiences.¹³⁹ The correlation between moral development and social experience suggests that in-group leaders, who have greater social experience and interaction based in their position, will generally achieve greater moral development than the in-group average. Pakistani cultural characteristics of strong in-group collectivism and high power distance suggest that the majority of the in-group will look to and accept decisions and moral rational from in-group leaders, effectively increasing the moral reasoning of the group to the moral development stage achieved by the in-group leader.

According to Parikh, moral development of Indian adolescents in urban settings stabilized at the upper range of the second level of morality, typified by acceptance of a higher

¹³⁷ Nisan and Kohlberg, "Universality and Variation in Moral Judgment," 865.

¹³⁸ Bindu Parikh, "Development of Moral Judgment and Its Relation to Family Environmental Factors in Indian and American Families," *Child Development* 51 (1980): 1037.

¹³⁹ Nisan and Kohlberg, "Universality and Variation in Moral Judgment," 865.

moral authority.¹⁴⁰ Nisan found similar moral development in urban settings in Turkey. General moral development culminated with the acceptance of a higher moral authority, but leaders, with additional social experience and interaction continued to develop and could reach the initial stage of the highest level of morality, typified by morality of contract and democratically accepted law.¹⁴¹ The acceptance of a higher moral authority by the majority of adults in cities further reinforces the in-group collectivism cultural characteristics that look to in-group leaders for guidance. These in-group leaders, who are also moral leaders that accept the morality of contract and law, tend to be influenced by informational power and the legitimate power of reciprocity.

In Nisan's research results, moral development is slower in villages.¹⁴² In most village adults, moral development stabilizes at the lower stage of the second level of moral development, typified by the desire to maintain good relations and approval of others. Moral leaders in the villages can reach the upper stage in this same level, typified by acceptance of a higher moral authority, but do not reach the highest level of moral development. Similar to city adults, cultural characteristics of in-group collectivism and high power distance will reinforce the moral authority of village leaders. Legitimate powers of position and equity are reinforced in the village in-groups.

Summing the effects of cultural characteristics and moral development in Pakistan leads to separate approaches for influencing groups in cities and villages. Influence operations in cities should lead with expert power and transition to informational power. The source of aid and assistance used in expert power should be public knowledge, reinforced for subsequent influence attempts using the legitimate power of reciprocity. Influence operations in villages should also use expert power, but under the direction of in-group (tribal or village) leadership in order to

¹⁴⁰ Parikh, "Development of Moral Judgment," 1037.

¹⁴¹ Nisan and Kohlberg, "Universality and Variation in Moral Judgment," 872.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 869.

support the legitimate power of position. Heavy-handed influence attempts viewed as interference from outside the in-group will be less effective.

Bases of Power in the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009

The current omnibus legal basis for United States engagement and influence operations in Pakistan is the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (Public Law 111-73, 123 Stat. 2060) which authorizes and funds engagement activities from 2010 until 2014. This act supports democratic, economic, and development engagement with the government and people of Pakistan and security assistance with the Pakistani military.¹⁴³ Accelerated disbursement of funds under the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (also known as Kerry-Lugar-Berman funds) was accelerated concurrent with an additional \$500 million in flood relief due to the floods that ravaged Pakistan in 2010.¹⁴⁴ Oversight and assessment of program results is conducted by the Offices of the Inspector General for United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Department of State, and Department of Defense using the Quarterly Progress and Oversight Report on the Civilian Assistance Program in Pakistan. Other assessments of U.S. engagement in Pakistan were considered but not included due to distribution restrictions.

Within the social influence framework, the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 establishes several goals, which increase social proximity, support moral development, and support several bases of power. Social proximity between U.S. and Pakistani governmental agencies is increased through mutual trust and confidence created by a sustained, long-term, multifaceted relationship between the two countries. Increased frequency and duration of contacts between Pakistani and U.S. officials will increase the ability of U.S. officials to leverage referent

¹⁴³ Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, Public Law 111-73, 111th Cong., (October 15, 2009), 2.

¹⁴⁴ U.S. Department of State, "U.S. Announces Accelerated Disbursement of Kerry-Lugar-Berman Funds at Pakistan Development Forum," <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/11/151137.htm> (accessed 30 March 2011).

power, expert power, and the legitimate power of reciprocity. Increased contact also offers additional opportunity to use informational power. Finally, increased contact enhances U.S. ability to build relationships at the tribal and village level that can be used to leverage the legitimate power of position exerted by Pakistani in-group leadership.

The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act uses referent power by increasing social proximity at several levels and using in-group participation to model desired behaviors, attitudes, and beliefs. The act encourages contact and modeling at three levels: the public-private interface in Pakistani society, the professional contact between the Pakistani and Pakistani-American business communities, and the personal contact of Pakistanis and Americans through educational, technical and cultural exchanges. The U.S. is using this referent power to encourage and promote public-private partnerships, bolster ongoing development efforts, and build civic responsibility and professional skills of the people of Pakistan.

Increased social proximity also allows the U.S. to use expert power to support the democratic governance of Pakistan and strengthen Pakistani rule of law institutions including law enforcement, national defense, and judicial systems. Support for the democratic governance of Pakistan includes expert assistance for government officials, enhancing the capacity of governmental committees and the ability of members of parliament to respond to constituents, as well as support for voter education and civil society training. Expert assistance for building capacity in the national defense and law enforcement includes improvement of Pakistan's border security to prevent Pakistani territory from use as a base for terrorist attacks. In the FATA, the U.S. is using expert power to support for the implementation of legal and political reforms. Nationwide, U.S. support for the Pakistani judicial system includes expert assistance in police and judicial professionalization, including training regarding use of force, internationally recognized human rights, community policing, as well as independent and effective judicial and criminal justice systems. Each of these programs provides an opportunity for the U.S. to use expert power to influence their Pakistani partners to change their beliefs, attitudes and behaviors. Each program

also allows the U.S. to exercise referent power, by providing positive examples, and informational power by explaining the logic and theory behind U.S. policies and positions. Finally, each program should be approached in a manner that reinforces the legitimate power of position of Pakistani leadership in order to increase the chance that the people of Pakistan will commit to the ideals of the programs.

United States programs to develop local analytical capacity to measure program effectiveness and progress support local legitimate power of position and build the basis for the U.S. to exercise the legitimate power of reciprocity. Specific programs are funded to build Pakistani capacity to assess U.S. assistance and payments to Pakistan. Establishment of this capacity will promote internal Pakistani accountability between the assessment agency and the agencies receiving U.S. assistance and funding. Governmental accountability builds trust and reinforces the legitimate power of position for Pakistani officials who are receiving U.S. aid and are targets of U.S. influence operations. Pakistani tracking and accountability of U.S. assistance and aid also establishes, in the Pakistani government, a sense of debt which the U.S. government can leverage using the legitimate power of reciprocity.

As noted earlier, each of the U.S. initiatives in Pakistan should include an attempt to influence Pakistani officials and agencies using information power to persuade. The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act also funds specific education programs including initiatives to ensure access to public, modernized education and vocational training and a strengthening of core curricula and the quality of schools across Pakistan. These programs form the rational foundation for follow-on influence attempts using informational power.

United States efforts in the support and development of democratic rule of law in Pakistan also support Pakistani moral development and increase the effectiveness of informational power and the legitimate powers of position and reciprocity. The lower stage of the highest level of morality in Kohlberg's framework is typified by morality of contract and democratically accepted law. U.S. emphasis and engagement on democratic law also encourages

the acceptance of a higher external moral authority and assists Pakistani moral development. Pakistanis who commit to democratic government will also typically endorse informational power and the legitimate powers of position and reciprocity as part of the democratic framework.

Assessment of the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act

As noted in the Quarterly Progress and Oversight Report on the Civilian Assistance Program in Pakistan as of 31 December 2010, progress has been difficult to measure. Social proximity between Pakistan and the United States has increased in an uneven manner. The use of that proximity to leverage bases of power and achieve desired effects is an ongoing long-term effort measured in incremental changes against other possible futures. The easiest measure of progress is how much funding has been obligated. It is more difficult to measure whether the money was spent as intended and whether the funded programs have produced the desired effects. As of 31 December 2010, \$3.931 billion has been obligated across the fiscal years from 2009 to 2011.¹⁴⁵

In the implementation of the Act, the U.S. has fundamentally changed the method of delivering aid by envisioning a program that utilizes mostly host nation assets in order to build strong institutions and reinforce the reputation the Pakistani government.¹⁴⁶ This step obligates the Pakistani government and Pakistani agencies to their U.S. partners through the legitimate power of reciprocity while effectively accessing the Pakistani population through the legitimate power of position of the people and agencies used to execute the programs. In order to ensure that the Pakistani institutions were not overwhelmed by the volume of funds, the U.S. Special Representative to Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, placed accountants and experts through the

¹⁴⁵ U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Department of State, and U.S. Department of Defense, *Quarterly Progress and Oversight Report on the Civilian Assistance Program in Pakistan: as of December 31, 2010* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 1.

¹⁴⁶ U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Department of State, and U.S. Department of Defense, *Quarterly Progress and Oversight Report on the Civilian Assistance Program in Pakistan: as of March 31, 2010* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 8.

system, leveraging expert power to ensure Pakistani success.¹⁴⁷ This single change in the method of delivery of aid used two bases of power to which Pakistani culture is the most receptive, legitimate power and expert power. The teaching, guiding, and mentoring nature of the assistance also uses informational power, which will continue to produce results long after the current programs terminate and the U.S. advisors depart.

During the first year of this civilian assistance program, U.S. and Pakistani governmental agencies working through the aftermath of catastrophic floods, the compromise of information by WikiLeaks, and the distribution of \$3.9 billion of U.S. assistance in small programs have increased their social proximity through a sustained, multifaceted relationship between the two countries. Frequency and duration of contacts between Pakistani and U.S. officials have increased at every level. In October 2010, U.S. Secretary of State Clinton met Pakistani Foreign Minister Qureshi for their third strategic dialogue, guiding meetings of working groups focused on agriculture, water, energy, health, and women's empowerment.¹⁴⁸ In November, U.S. officials participated as part of a multilateral conference at the Pakistan Development Forum focused on business, academia, and civil society. These engagements are typical of the scope of engagement events, where each event increases social proximity at a certain level of governance and sector of society. The steady progress of these events was interrupted by the WikiLeaks incident in November 2010 and the death of Ambassador Holbrooke. The WikiLeaks incident decreased the social proximity of the U.S. and Pakistan by allowing the Pakistani media to question U.S. intent and disrupt the established Pakistani-U.S. social structure which frames engagement activities. The death of Ambassador Holbrooke decreased social proximity though the loss of a key, familiar

¹⁴⁷ U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Department of State, and U.S. Department of Defense, *Quarterly Progress and Oversight Report on the Civilian Assistance Program in Pakistan: as of June 30, 2010* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 5.

¹⁴⁸ U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Department of State, and U.S. Department of Defense, *Quarterly Progress and Oversight Report on the Civilian Assistance Program in Pakistan: as of December 31, 2010* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 3.

U.S. agent of influence. In the subsequent restructuring, new relationships are established and trust must be developed. Through these events, social proximity has increased albeit with several setbacks.¹⁴⁹

In April 2010, Pakistan began to decentralize government authority and improve transparency. President Zardari signed a landmark constitutional amendment balancing political power and increasing transparency in the Pakistani judiciary. At the national level, Presidential power was diminished, including the power to dismiss Parliament, in favor of the Prime Minister and other branches and levels of government. Provincial governments were mandated. Transparency is required in the appointment of judges and the chief election commissioner. This constitutional amendment closely followed strategic dialogue between U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi where the U.S. committed to upgrading the road network in northwest Pakistan and rehabilitation of three thermal power stations.¹⁵⁰

Success of the U.S. influence effort, which sums the success of individual programs, cannot be completely measured yet, but initial feedback is mixed. U.S. engagement efforts related to the flooding of July and August 2010 were rapid and significant. USAID provision of emergency food, shelter, and commodities, supplemented by Department of State funded shelter and nonfood assistance, and supported by Department of Defense air assets for rescue operations and delivery of relief supplies helped Pakistan address the floods and their aftermath. This operation supports the U.S. legitimate power of reciprocity and closely parallels the interaction cited by Cialdini between Mexico and Ethiopia where Mexican support of Ethiopia in 1935 was

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 4.

¹⁵⁰ U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Department of State, and U.S. Department of Defense, *Quarterly Progress and Oversight Report on the Civilian Assistance Program in Pakistan: as of June 30, 2010* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 3.

reciprocated after the 1985 Mexican earthquake.¹⁵¹ The performance audit of the USAID/Pakistan Family Advancement for Life and Health Planning Program has been the most successful program documented to date. The program improved family planning services and increased demand for services among the target population. In this case, the influence attempt to introduce family planning produced committed individuals in the target audience who reinforced the program's success.¹⁵² Other programs, specifically in FATA, have been challenged by security concerns raised by coercive influence conducted by local agents of influence with different objectives. USAID/Pakistan's Livelihood Development Programs for the Upper and Lower Regions of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas both made little progress in social and economic stabilization of FATA. In the lower region, the U.S. partner experienced harassment, kidnapping, and a chief official was murdered. This U.S. partner moved its offices to Islamabad, increasing security but decreasing the social proximity needed to administer an effective program. In the upper region, only half of planned activities were implemented. Program outcomes were weak and overshadowed by U.S. agent corruption. In both cases, the immediate, credible and ongoing coercive efforts by other agents in the target area reduced the effectiveness of the U.S. influence attempt.¹⁵³

Security programs training and supporting the Pakistani police and legal structure have enjoyed moderate success, run by the U.S. Embassy's Narcotics Affairs Section and the Regional Security Office. These programs measure success in the number of personnel trained, kilometers

¹⁵¹ U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Department of State, and U.S. Department of Defense, *Quarterly Progress and Oversight Report on the Civilian Assistance Program in Pakistan: as of September 30, 2010* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 1; Cialdini, *Influence: Science and Practice*, 21.

¹⁵² U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Department of State, and U.S. Department of Defense, *Quarterly Progress and Oversight Report on the Civilian Assistance Program in Pakistan: as of September 30, 2010* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 2.

¹⁵³ U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Department of State, and U.S. Department of Defense, *Quarterly Progress and Oversight Report on the Civilian Assistance Program in Pakistan: as of December 31, 2010* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 37-38.

of roads constructed, and the amount of equipment delivered. By these measures, the programs have been successful. However, the most important measure of success is the fact that the number of attacks on police headquarters in the last quarter of 2010 was lesser than previous quarters.¹⁵⁴

During the year of activities directed by the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, the U.S. and Pakistan have become more socially proximate. Pakistan has taken steps to decentralize authority and improve governmental and judicial transparency. In law enforcement and family planning, the social influence campaign has produced positive results, effectively using the social proximity to leverage the bases of power supported by Pakistani cultural characteristics; expert power, legitimate power of reciprocity and position, and informational power. In some areas, coercive influence campaigns by other regional actors have impeded or reversed U.S. progress. However, most programs have not matured, highlighting the long-term nature of social influence campaigns.

The best method for the U.S. to achieve policy goals in Pakistan is to continue to use informational power and expert power in a manner that reinforces the legitimate power of position of the governmental structure. The use of Pakistani institutions as an intermediary in aid delivery and program execution leverages the strong in-group collectivism to increase effectiveness in the wider target population. This method of aid delivery also imposes the legitimate power of reciprocity on the urban leaders who are the most morally susceptible to the obligation.

Use of coercive and reward bases of power is not recommended without a viable plan for ongoing surveillance and transition to other bases of power. Long-term coercive means are likely to generate resistance in a morally developed population and are not compatible with stated U.S. goals of democratic governance and support of law and order.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., 25-26.

Conclusion

The operational significance of using social influence theory to guide U.S. policy actions in Pakistan is increased effectiveness in achieving U.S. policy goals and increased support to ISAF through the denial of safe havens and logistical support to the Taliban in Pakistan. Analysis of cultural characteristics, moral development, and bases of power can increase the effectiveness of the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009. Each program within the Act should be targeted toward a specific in-group, using specific bases of power tailored to that in-group to achieve specific policy objectives within that in-group. Programs targeting the FATA and other border areas should be synchronized with military and civil operations on both sides of the Pakistani border. A combined interagency approach, which coordinates U.S. civilian assistance in Pakistan with U.S. and Pakistani military operations in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, has a greater chance of safely and effectively changing behaviors, attitudes, and beliefs in Pakistan, in accordance with U.S. government policy objectives. While specific programs in the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 directly support ISAF operational objectives, including rule of law and counter-narcotics, the cumulative effect of accomplishing social influence goals across all programs from education and energy development to judicial transparency and democratic governance creates an environment inhospitable to insurgency and terrorism. The development of this environment through programs that leverage social influence will deny safe haven and logistical support to the Taliban in Pakistan.

The design of a social influence operation requires consideration of cultural and moral characteristics of the target population to maximize the effectiveness of chosen social influence techniques. The cultural characteristics developed by Geert Hofstede and refined by the GLOBE project provide a cultural framework to analyze a target population and provide baseline measurements of cultural characteristics. Additional refinement of cultural characteristic measurements can be accomplished through analysis of in-group customs and traditions. Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral development provides a moral framework to analyze the

spectrum of moral development in a target population. Kohlberg's framework also provides a guide for programs that support moral development in a target population. Bertram Raven's expression of the levers of social influence as bases of power provides the structural framework to develop an influence strategy. Integration of cultural and moral characteristics when developing social influence operations can maximize effects on specific target populations.

The United States should avoid a coercive base of power as a primary means of influencing groups in future conflicts. Instead, the United States, and like-minded countries, should inoculate target populations from coercive influence by enhancing moral development through aid and education programs. In coercive insurgency and counterinsurgency operations, opponents of U.S. forces currently possess distinct advantages due to their willingness to use extreme coercion and their ability to execute long-term surveillance in targeted communities. When targets of influence reconcile the competing coercive threats of the United States and insurgents, insurgent coercion, which threatens extreme violence coupled with valid long-term surveillance, will guide target action. United States attempts to increase coercive measures and surveillance capacities are either counter to public policy or prohibitively expensive. However, morally developed societies, which use universal ethical principles to guide their actions, are naturally resistant to coercive measures. United States sponsored aid and education programs, leveraging expert power and informational power, are the best method to spur the moral development that enables target populations to resist coercive influence attempts.

In the execution of the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, most programs align with appropriate bases of power and leverage support of cultural and moral characteristics of target audiences. Ambassador Holbrooke's integration of Pakistani agencies in the distribution of aid greatly enhanced the structural support of cultural characteristics to bases of power used in the Act. In border regions, where program success has been limited by security concerns, program implementation must be synchronized with military operations on both sides of the border. Informational, expert, and legitimate powers are long-term powers that can be

overwhelmed in the short-term by coercive means. In these cases, U.S. and Pakistani military and security forces must counter Taliban coercion with overwhelming force and establish the relatively secure environment needed to allow informational, expert, and legitimate powers to take root.

Finally, it must be noted the use of cultural and moral characteristics in the construct of a social influence campaign is not a panacea and may actually be counterproductive to operational objectives. One example of cultural characteristics that are counter to operational objectives is the attempt to reconcile the strong in-group collectivism of the Pashtun tribes with U.S. and Pakistani policy goals of rule of law and democratic governance.¹⁵⁵ In this case, reinforcement of the cultural characteristic comes at the price of U.S. and Pakistani policy goals oriented toward strengthening institutional collectivism. In other cases, when the integration of cultural characteristics, moral development, and bases of power support operational objectives, the construct of a social influence campaign using bases of power supported by cultural and moral characteristics cannot guarantee success. External factors, unique characteristics in the target population, and chance events always play a role in the success or failure of an influence campaign. However, the use of this model can reduce the impact of external factors and minimize the cultural and structural contradictions inherent in many social influence campaigns today.

¹⁵⁵ Strickland, "The Way of the Pashtun," 53.

Recommendations for Future Research

In order to develop the theoretical underpinnings of designing social influence campaigns, especially in Pakistan, additional study is required to refine linkages between cultural characteristics, moral development, and bases of power, to confirm the validity of this structural framework in a distinctly different culture, and to refine the Pakistan study with additional data from eastern Pakistan. The current body of literature linking cultural characteristics with bases of power is focused on leadership in organizations and businesses. Research that evaluates the effectiveness of U.S. foreign aid in the achievement of policy goals, using the framework of cultural characteristics, moral development and bases of power, would be critical in the development of future aid programs that maximize the effect of the U.S. foreign aid budget. Additional studies are required to ensure the global applicability of the structural approach to designing social influence campaigns. These studies should examine distinctly different cultures that support different bases of power and require social influence campaigns that are unique from other social influence campaign designs. Finally, in Pakistan, additional study should be devoted to the non-Pashtun in-groups in order to ensure that U.S. aid to Pakistan is effective across all in-groups in Pakistan.

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