WINDOWS OF WAR: 
A VIEW ON AFRICAN PIRACY

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USAWC CLASS OF 2011

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Commander Thomas A. Scott

TITLE: Windows of War: A View on African Piracy

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 24 March 2011 WORD COUNT: 5,316 PAGES: 26

KEY TERMS: Pirates, Social Science, Barbary and Somalia

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

From the experience and knowledge of Colin Gray as a social scientist and his extensive usage and knowledge of Carl von Clausewitz and Admiral Sir Reginald Custance, this paper hopes to form a better theoretical base of the nature and conduct of piracy warfare in the twenty-first century. By applying Grays’ 13 principles in Modern Strategy to the Barbary pirates of the past, this paper will assist in the development of a better understanding of anti-piracy procedures, and assist in forming strategic options for countering the actions of the African pirates of today and tomorrow. A social science approach at environmental scanning may provide more insightful and informative lessons, which would lead to better recommendations for international maritime security around the Horn of Africa and the globe.
Modern strategy lends itself to analytical treatment according to the inspiration variably provided by at least thirteen different, but complementary, organizing principles. Any conflict can be studied in the light of this typology. These categories indentify real and important differences, even though these are differences within the essential unity of war and strategy. The nature, function, and way of working of strategy and strategic effect are permanent and ubiquitous. Nonetheless, the content of strategy must differ markedly within these categories.... Any war, conflict, or other episode involving strategic behavior can be analyzed according to the following discriminators:

—Colin S. Gray


Numerous military and political leaders, along with a majority of the American public, have stated or fully believe that “the United States is a country at war.” The United States is a country not in just one major war, but in one major war campaign plus several major and minor conflicts, against a vast array of physical and ideological enemies. One such enemy, found on the international high seas and the coastal waterways around the globe, is the Pirate. A Pirate is defined as one who robs at sea or plunders the land from the sea without commission from a sovereign nation.¹

Piracy due to the possible economic impact on trade and the importance of waterways as a line of communication is a basic and fundamental concern for all countries and especially their navies who have been chartered to defend and maintain the freedom of those waterways. Since the beginning of state-sponsored navies, piracy suppression has been one of their major responsibilities—when Julius Caesar was captured by pirates in 76 Before the Christian Era (BCE), the first thing he did after paying the pirates’ ransom and being released was to fit “out a squadron of ships to take his revenge.” ² From the tactical level of Caesars’ revenge, this paper makes the
time travelled leap into the United States theory of war and strategy against piracy, both along the Barbary Coast of yester-year and the present day Horn of Africa, and uses those examples to analyze and apply Colin Grays’ thirteen Windows on War theory. 

From the experience and knowledge of Colin Gray as a social scientist and his extensive usage and knowledge of Carl von Clausewitz and Admiral Sir Reginald Custance, this paper aims to gain a better theoretical base of the nature and conduct of piracy warfare in the twenty-first century by applying Grays’ 13 principles in Modern Strategy to the Barbary pirates of the past. This will form a better understanding of how strategic options for the African pirates of today and tomorrow can be created, and expressed in a more effective United States anti-piracy policy. A social science approach at environmental scanning may provide more insightful and informative lessons, which would lead to critical thought strategic recommendations for international and national maritime security forces to execute the anti-piracy policy around the Horn of Africa and the other waterways around the globe.

Current International and United States Policy Background

Generally, piracy is any illegal act of violence, detention, or depredation committed outside territorial waters for private (rather than political) ends by crew or passengers of a private ship or aircraft against another ship, persons, or crew. This definition emerged from customary international law, the 1958 Convention on the High Seas, and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which has become the de facto constitution for the world's oceans.

The UNCLOS, the United Nations Charter, and more broadly, customary international law, provide authority that may be invoked for seizing a pirate ship, boarding a ship on the high seas, conducting hot pursuit, and taking action in
furtherance of the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense. On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board. The courts of the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the rights of third parties acting in good faith. A seizure on account of piracy may be carried out only by warships or military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and authorized to that effect.

Since 2006, the United Nations and its agency for maritime matters, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), have aggressively confronted piracy. There has been a disturbing spike in piracy across the globe and especially in the ocean ways off the Somali coast with an intensity and frequency unmatched since the era of Caribbean buccaneers of the early 19th century. In 2010 approximately $238 million in ransom money had been funneled to organized criminal gangs in Somalia. Global energy markets are affected as approximately 30 percent of the world's daily oil supply is carried on tankers through the Gulf of Aden on their way to the Suez Canal. Sea lines running between Yemen and Somalia constitute the main link and strategic choke-point between Europe and Asia.

The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1816 (2008), which was decided under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and therefore in principal legally binding on all membership states, calling on them to cooperate in counter piracy actions off the coast of Somalia. With the consent of the Somali government, the
resolution authorizes operations inside Somalia’s territorial waters to deny that area as a safe haven for pirates who operate outside the 12 mile territorial water limit. Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines.\(^8\) Except where otherwise provided, the normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State.\(^9\)

The United States and other countries participate in Combined Task Force (CTF) 150 and 151, multinational coalitions that coordinate with the U.S. Fifth Fleet off the Horn of Africa. Ten European Union countries have agreed to contribute to an anti-piracy task force headed for the region. The policy and legal efforts that support these operations are essential to effective piracy repression.

The currently used United States policy was signed by President Bush in 2007 and was developed through the National Security Council by Navy judge advocates in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Strategic Plans and Policy, Joint Staff. It establishes seven goals, each an important component for addressing piracy.\(^{10}\)

Prevention. One of the most ambitious initiatives is the International Shipping and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. The code tightens security throughout the world’s commercial fleets and ports by obligating operators of ships and port facilities that handle ships of more than 500 gross registered tonnage to develop, implement, and evaluate security plans.\(^{11}\)
Deterrence. Coastal and maritime states leverage the deterrent value of presence at sea and in ports in the same way that a street cop walks through a neighborhood. Piracy tends to surge when it is ignored and recede when it is addressed by the international community. Several international initiatives in the straits of Malacca and Singapore have, for example, dramatically reduced the incidence of piracy.\textsuperscript{12}

Reduce the Maritime Domain's Vulnerability. The complex and ambiguous nature of contemporary maritime threats places a premium on collection and dissemination of actionable information. To anticipate and counter threats requires situational awareness that depends on the ability to monitor activities so that trends can be identified and anomalies differentiated. One of the most important tools in this effort is the Automatic Identification System (AIS), which is required on all ships over 300 gross tons or that carry 12 or more passengers on international voyages. The system broadcasts a signal, which provides pertinent information about the ship and its movement.\textsuperscript{13}

Hold Pirates Accountable. The present policy is an extension of 200 years of experience in prosecuting piracy. From 1815-23, for example, piracy cases—which are federal crimes under Title 18 of the U.S. Code—were among the most numerous reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court. Local action is particularly beneficial because it demonstrates responsible governments maintaining order and stability in their maritime neighborhood.\textsuperscript{14}

Preserve Freedom of the Sea. Freedom of navigation underpins global prosperity, peace, and security. Throughout world history the foremost powers achieved and maintained their position of leadership through preeminent seapower and reliance on freedom of the seas.\textsuperscript{15}
Protect Sea Lines of Communication. The initial rise of the global economy can be attributed in large part to unimpeded ocean transit. There is an interlocking and reinforcing quality to open sea lines of communication, as freedom and safety in the maritime domain generate stability and prosperity on land. Free trade and international investment help socialize non-democratic nations into an interdependent liberal world system. Today, shipping is the heart of the global economy with more than 80 percent of the world's trade traveling by sea.\(^{16}\)

Lead and Support International Effort. One promising means of achieving greater cooperation is the Global Maritime Partnership. The concept embraces a figurative 1,000-ship navy, representing the idea that no nation can do it alone. This approach is central to that adopted in *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* and is key to expanding maritime security cooperation.\(^{17}\)

Though a fairly well written policy and only three and a half years old, President Obama is reviewing the current policy and looking to update or re-focus strategies to meet the current economic situation within the United States. The current policy cannot be economically sustained, and the results of this policy have caused a change in the actions and area of operation of the Somali pirates. President Obama has strong desires for the US to grow and work within a global cooperative against piracy.

13 Principle Analyses\(^{18}\)

This paper aims to enforce that Colin S. Gray is one of the better strategic theorists and that his 13 principles or windows, are a useful tool to help explain and draw lessons learned into the nature and conduct of warfare in the twenty-first century. His thirteen principles are drawn and tested from the strategic leader greats like Clausewitz, Mao Tse-tung, Sun Tzu, Mahan, Luttwak, and Weinberg. By using his
windows on war to discuss and analyze the Barbary Pirate Wars of the early 1800s, a better understanding or theory of critical thought can be used in forming higher level creative strategic proposals towards policy, or in the execution of defeating or defending against the pirates of today and tomorrow.

Gray’s first principle is that of Commitment, Scope, and Aim or as he states war can be general or “total”, limited, or sub-limited. Based on Gray’s definition, the Barbary wars could clearly be defined as a sub-limited naval response that escalated to limited with the addition of the ground campaign. During the years of 1784 to 1816, the Mediterranean conflicts were the United States’ second priority behind those events occurring with the larger and better equipped power states of Britain, Spain and France within the northern Atlantic Ocean. As a new independent and confederate government with constrained resources, the United States was dependent upon the establishment of trade routes within the Mediterranean Sea to fuel future economic growth, and could not afford the tributes mandated and exercised by the Muslim Military Republics and Kingdoms of the North Africa Barbary states. Not all, but a few conditions still apply or can be translated into the environment of today. Today the United States is still looking towards trade for economic growth and working to understand and cooperate with countries composed of a Muslim majority. Though the American government coffers are much better today, they still cannot afford to stand-by and allow 80% of the world’s transshipped goods to be in jeopardy of capture or disruption. The United States is again focused on another war and conflict, but this time within the Middle East, and as a result is engaged in a sub-limited naval war with a possible growth to limited, due to the
nature of instability within the current Somalia government and other African government’s limitations.

Gray’s second principle is a variant to his first and is that of scale. His scale ranges from Clausewitz’s concept of ‘absolute war’ down to his own concept of ‘the troubles’. The Barbary wars should be labeled as a ‘minor regional conflict’ due to the limited numbers of actors and players. Had the United States not gained control and dominance of the North African sea region, this campaign could have changed to ‘major theatre war’ with the induction of the Spanish, French and English fleets. Today the war is also a minor regional conflict limited to the Horn of Africa area of responsibility (AOR) with one major caveat; the globalization of trade and the creation of over twenty regions vice one minor sea region to patrol. The vastness of ocean regions is definitely an area for enhanced theory and strategy within naval constraints. One navy is definitely not an option for victory in the future and the resources of the Combined Maritime Force must be fully furnished and applied.

The third principle is that of intensity defined in the context of low, medium, or high. In the late 1700s through the early 1800s, this principle was easy to categorize as high. The United States understood the importance of Sea Power; though physically limited at the time, the operational strategy was the application of a maintainable low intensity presence with available assets, all the while growing the fleet for future high-intensity warfare. Today, though the United States has stepped down from the great battleship fleets of the World Wars, and has become aircraft carrier and expeditionary strike group (CSG/ESG) based, navies are still geared towards high-intensity conflicts and may experience some difficulty dealing with the low and medium requirements of
regional pirates. Not from a quantity or capability perspective, but from the economical impact of using too large and costly a ship against a smaller enemy or threat.

The fourth view is that of Style I: Regular or Irregular opponents. Though considered pirates due to the nature of attacks, kills, enslavements, ransoms and tributes; the Barbary ships were fleets of Tunis, Algiers and Morocco assigned to attack the “infidels” in the name of Islamic “jihad”. They were regular forces of Kingdoms and Military Republics that the United States could assign responsibility to and declare war against. Not the case today, though there are some State-funded operations, most can be classified as irregular forces (non-state actors) working for warlords such as Mohamed Farrah Aidid, Yusuf Mohammed Siad or Musa Sudi Yalahow, and/or other non-state entities such as the terrorist group Al Shabaab\(^2\).

Style II or the discriminator used to cover the spectrum of combat styles is the fifth window. The three styles of strategic behavior include attrition, maneuver, and control of the enemy’s forces. As a young country with limited naval assets in 1801-1805, the United States could not adopt a war of attrition strategy. Therefore the United States strategy of the day was a combination between annihilating and paralyzing the Barbary fleets. The United States Navy’s successful theory and strategy, was to maneuver the Barbary pirate fleets away from supporting forts and harbors and then annihilate the forces with superior tactics and seamanship. When the Barbary fleets retreated to safe harbors, the United States Navy then controlled future movements with blockades of those harbors. This window used to discriminate the spectrum of combat style, today could be considered a possible strategic weakness on our part. None of the three styles may fit the pirates of the future. Due to the vastness of the ocean regions,
the low level technology on skiffs and mother ships, and the availability of sufficient watercraft for piracy, a war of attrition may be quite long and expensive to wage. Trying to maneuver and control vessels and fleets that are beginning to operate more than 400 nautical miles from their homeports, might also turn out indecisive results and burn valuable resources of the United States and other International Maritime Forces, which are required in other global maritime hotspots.

Principle six is that of Grand Strategic Instrument. Instead of the threat or use of force, the grand strategist may be tempted to wage political, psychological, subversive, diplomatic, economic, or cultural war….Strategic effect is generic. During the Barbary wars, Thomas Jefferson as Secretary of State and then President of the United States was one of the key players in the formation and execution of the Grand Strategy of the United States. Political and diplomatic efforts were offered and rejected, economic issues could not be afforded, and the cultural issue of the Barbary pirates enslaving white Christians could not be tolerated by the American public. These failed or rejected options only left the use of force provided by the Navy and Marines, to achieve political effect or a desired political end state. The same holds true today for the Navy and Marines. Until weak African governments such as the Somalia interim government of today, gain legitimate power and respected public influence over the controlling Warlords, our United States Grand Strategy for the future might still remain solely on the Navy and Marines to achieve the United States political end state of stability.

The seventh principle is that of environment, not only the physical properties of land, sea, air, or space, but also the terrain, urban/rural and the territorially boundaries of countries. During the Barbary wars it was a sea and land battle against the three
organized and established government bodies of the northern African coast. Today’s strategy will have to be considered more joint across the spectrum of military forces and regional specialist, and more coordinated and precise when dealing with terrorist/insurgents, vice the established government combatants. Though only dealing with one coastal failed state and its feuding warlords, the actions and perceptions of regional neighboring governments and insurgents, must also be considered within the phase planning.

Gray’s eighth window is that of battlespace, political geography, and geopolitical focus discriminators. During the wars on the Barbary Coast, the geopolitical area was the Mediterranean Sea and Northern African coastal areas. The political atmosphere was hostile and the Islamic governments of the area still viewed western cultures as a continuance of the Crusades. Today due to technology and social media networks, the battlespace is global and includes all the regions within Central and South America, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, East Asia and the Pacific rim.

Number nine is the principle of the Identity of Belligerents or the experience of particular polities or sets of polities.23 During the Barbary wars the history was dominated by the rivalry between the North African Muslims and the Christian Europeans and Americans. Today’s pirates with a lack of large organized controlling bodies will require extensive research and information gathering to identify the true power belligerents within the warlord and neighboring insurgent system. Instead of understanding the polities of just one Somalia interim government, research and understanding must be conducted across various regional zones and tribal identities to gain the required breadth of experience of those particular polities.
The tenth window of Colin Grays’ strategy is that of the character of the Belligerents or the fact or anticipation of alliances. Gray’s classifications ranged from the entire world community down to sub-state entity or faction. Thomas Jefferson as President of the United States was dealing with an alliance of the Northern African Muslim states and kingdom, but had he failed to gain maritime supremacy and enraged or expanded the wraith of the Barbary Pirates to the European countries, the United States might have had to change strategy to deal with a great coalition. Luckily, the belligerents of today’s pirates are only small clan type factions, and the risk of facing a larger, more organized, mob style alliance is minimal.

The eleventh principle is that of weapons in terms of the roles and contributions of particular kinds of weapon systems or weapon effects. In 1801, Lieutenant Andrew Sterett, of the 12-gun schooner, Enterprise, did not have weapon or capability supremacy and had to deal with the 14-guns of the Tripoli. After 210 years, the Pirates of today have lost the competitive and overpowering edge, and are equipped in outdated “mother” ships and skiffs, armed with small arms and shoulder rocket launchers. One strategic concern for the future could be the use of “dirty” bombs by expanding pirates/terrorist organizations or groups. The procurement and use of a dirty bomb by Somalia pirates would shift the supremacy marker in their favor and have a devastating effect on anti-piracy procedures, forcing an immediate international reshaping and resourcing of current policy and execution.

The twelfth principle is that of period or the discriminating category of historical specifics. The Barbary period was one of colonization and country expansion. The United States had just finished a quasi-war with France and was looking to extend trade
into Tunis. Today empires are gone, colonies are being returned to the sovereign nation, and economic times and social stability, are very hard and uncertain in the central regional area of Africa, adding to the growth and public popular notion of piracy.

The thirteenth window of war is the principle of Duration or the temporal dimension of modern strategy. During the Barbary wars, the United States did not have a decisive short term strategy and therefore had to develop a long term strategy for dealing with Algiers, and due to the duration of the war, had to fight on another war front with Britain in 1812. With the tactical size and non-centralized locations of modern pirates such as the Somalia pirates, a decisive strategy is again out of hand, but a strategy against causing a more protracted conflict, is still capable of being developed.

"The many ‘windows on war’ opened constitute complementary, non-competitive perspectives upon the single stream of phenomena that is modern strategic history. Every war, quasi-war, or other reasonably discrete passage of competitive strategies can be examined according to these categories. Although the strategic theorist is challenged to identify the factors, or categories, that most powerfully shape the character of a particular conflict, there is a parallel, indeed super ordinate, challenge not to succumb to an unduly essentialist urge."24

Options generated from analyses

Objective. Against the current national and global economic environment, it is necessary to reassess the current United States counter-piracy policy, looking for more effective resource deployment while working to narrow the focus of the seven principle policy goals of prevention, deterrence, reduced maritime domain’s vulnerability, hold pirates accountable, preserve freedom of the sea, protect sea lines of communication, and lead and support international effort.
Options. Based on this paper’s research and analyses to date, three major potential options present themselves, with respect to the effective use of current and future resources and assets deployed to combat piracy in international waterways. Each option is discussed in detail below, including a brief assessment of feasibility, acceptability, suitability and risk.

Option 1 the United States as the Lead With Primary Economic Burden. Maintain the current priority hierarchy amongst the established goals and allow the recently established USAFRICOM, Combined Maritime Force (CMF), United States Fifth Fleet and CTF 150 and 151, to bear the accountability and resource burden without outside domestic or international economical assistance or material support.

Feasibility. This option is feasible, but only in the short-term and not as a long-term strategic policy as it will achieve no decisive end. The windows of Commitment, Scale, Intensity, and Geopolitical battle space must be considered when weighing this option. With the United States national deficit being approximately $14 trillion\textsuperscript{25} and China holding approximately $281 billion\textsuperscript{26} of that debt, and with the European Union (EU) struggling to provide economical and budgetary stability to several members such as Greece and Ireland, economic resources are limited and declining. The recent election results and change of membership, within the House and Senate of the United States Congress, is another good indicator that future spending may see serious to severe cuts and reductions. Another example of this reality is President Obama’s 2012 budget proposals that plan spending cuts designed to slice the annual budget deficit by $1.1 trillion over the next 10 years with the Department of Defense cutting $78 billion through 2016.\textsuperscript{27} Along with budgetary restrictions this option is also heavily weighted
towards deterrence and interdiction, with the pirates increasing their threat range to 400 nautical miles or approximately eight hundred thousand square miles of operation, and the United Nations Security Council Referendum (UNSCR) constraining actions allowed by national navies, the results of this action produces very little prevention presence or Return On Investment (ROI) per engagement. This approach only allows repression when warships encounter or interrupt acts of piracy already on-going and will therefore keep the costs at its current level at least.

**Acceptability:** This option is acceptable to the United States Department of Defense (DoD) based on the currently released, Chief of Naval Operations, strategic vision guidelines for 2011 and is also acceptable to the twenty four allies and nations currently serving within Africom, the CMF, and CTF 150 and 151. However, United States public opinion and congressional support may not be acceptable to the budgetary requirements and other Grand Strategic instruments will have to be considered.

**Suitability:** This option is very suitable to maintain requirements for the armed services within the African area of responsibility (AOR), but is unsuitable in meeting a fair distribution of priorities among the seven initial goals of the current policy. This option favors heavily towards protecting the sea lines of communication and lead or support international effort, but does not provide enough prevention, deterrence, or reduction of maritime domain vulnerability.

**Overall Risk:** High. Like stated above this option can only be considered a short-term campaign within the current economic constraints and would remain a continually draw on resources and assets. Current aim, intensity and environment
could be redirected or reversed within a short duration of time, leaving only a receipt of sunken cost to continue the counter-piracy efforts.

Option 2 the United States shares Lead and Partial Economic Burden. Focuses more resources and assets towards the development and establishment of Global Military Maritime Partnerships.

Feasibility: This option is feasible and would require a greater strategic vision and grand strategy. The framework would require greater cooperation between armed services’ assets and working diplomats of all nations involved. The general understanding would be that one nation can’t do it alone or bear a lion’s share during poor economic times. The current footprint that AFRICOM and CMT provide would serve as a springboard for future development, and as an example of success the Maritime Security Cooperation agreement between the United States and India in 2006 could be referenced.

Acceptability: This option is very acceptable, all nations benefit from a stable maritime security environment, which in turn generates stability and prosperity on land, which would be largely appreciated and accepted by the current struggling Somalia interim government. One limiting factor to this option is the United States willingness to minimize contingencies placed on resource release. Current practice is to ensure that influence or shaping of future actions is maximized and agreed upon, before release of assets. The United States must be willing to give up partial control to allies for this option to be acceptable to all parties.

Suitability: This option would be very suitable to the United States, its allies and friends, but would not be seen as favorable by the current Warlords along the Horn of
Africa (HOA), who are currently earning millions through involvement with piracy. This is an option where the identity and character of the belligerents must be considered. Their ability to increase the scope, style and spectrum of the conflict, will affect the suitability and favor within the political circles of supporting nations. Another possible source of limited favor may be presented by the domestic programs and requirements of the general public within all countries. If the global economic conditions do not improve more countries will focus resources towards their domestic policies, reducing funds available for foreign policies.

**Overall Risk:** Medium high to high. Though the financial burden to any one nation is decreased, this option still requires a strong priority to international and foreign policy vice redirecting resources inwards towards national domestic issues. This option weighs heavily towards supporting an international effort which would provide an eventual long-term return on investment, but not without a very large short-term capital investment that is not available in the current defense budgets.

**Option 3 the United States is a Partner Within a Global Enterprise.** Divert not only physical assets, but also intellectual capital, towards building multi-layered regional partnerships similar to the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) and the Cooperative Mechanism of the Micro-Indonesia AOR.

**Feasibility:** This option is highly feasible if given the time required to develop both military and private industry relationships and pacts which serve as a prerequisite to greater coordination and growth. The roadmaps of success have already been written by the Japanese with the ReCAAP, and with the IMO involvement in the
Cooperative Mechanism. This option calls on the global maritime assets both commercial and state owned vice only the assets within military maritime coalitions.

Acceptability: This option would likely be acceptable to all credible parties involved. This option provides a better distribution of requirements across a broader spectrum of available assets. The strengths of both military and commercial industry would be combined and applied in a more focused and effective manner and the economical burdens would be placed more on the actual profiteers vice the second and third tier consumers.

Suitability: This option would be suitable to all players because it would be the most efficient use of limited resources, while showing the greatest ROI through a strategic strategy with both short and long-term effectiveness. As mentioned above with this option both acceptability and suitability go hand in hand because this is a global effort within the globalized market place.

Overall Risk: Moderate. The greatest risk is time to implement and the required continual commitment, scope and aim of the champions of this effort. Though successful applications are in place and recorded, a period of time is required for translation and implementation of those applications within very different cultural norms, traditions and expectations of the HOA AOR. A decade or more of time along with a rolling analysis may be required before any return on investment might be realized on a metrics benchmark.

Recommendation for policy

Option 3 should be the first choice to consider. It will allow the United States and all its international partners the most efficient and effective use of national resources and assets in achieving the directed seven goals of prevention, deterrence, reduced
maritime domain vulnerability, holding pirates accountable for their actions, preserving the freedom of the sea, protecting the sea lines of communication, and leading and supporting an international effort against counter-piracy.\textsuperscript{28} This option is also a force multiplier during times of force reduction and draw-downs due to the economic environment and needs of the domestic public. This plan not only draws on governmental owned assets of international partners, but also engages the powers of littoral and maritime states, the international shipping industry, and other private and non-governmental organizations. In conclusion, Option 3, based on the knowledge and lessons learned from Gray’s thirteen windows\textsuperscript{29}, and the application of that knowledge towards executing a balance policy of the United States seven goals towards counter-piracy, this option represents the most realistic and reasonable approach in the current International Maritime Security environment.

Endnotes


\textsuperscript{5} Ibid., article 107.

7 Oceans Beyond Piracy, “The Economic Cost of Piracy,”
(accessed February 26, 2011).

8 Preamble to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Part II, section 2,
article 3.

9 Ibid., article 5.

Magazine Vol. 134/12/1,270. Published on U.S. Naval institute website.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 For background on Windows of War, see Colin S. Gray, “Modern Strategy”, (New York:

19 Ibid.

20 Peter Chalk, “The Maritime Dimension of International Security,” (Santa Monica: Rand

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22 Gray, Modern Strategy, 162.

23 Ibid., 166.

24 Ibid., 174.

http://www.usdebtclock.org (accessed February 27, 2011)

26 Ibid.

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