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**THESIS**

**CREATION OF A HOMELAND SECURITY JAIL  
INFORMATION MODEL**

by

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March 2012

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**CREATION OF A HOMELAND SECURITY JAIL INFORMATION MODEL**

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## **ABSTRACT**

September 11, 2001, is a date that resonates in each American; not only lives but policies and security practices changed that day. The intelligence community expanded its scope to include first responders, private citizens, and private companies. However, the U.S. jail system remains almost entirely overlooked by the homeland security intelligence community. The jail system provides a unique opportunity to gather real-time actionable intelligence without the need of a warrant. Some of the most villainous and notorious terrorists have spent time in jail and might have been caught or thwarted by a well-trained jail information team intimately connected to the national intelligence community. The intelligence community has yet to take advantage of the wealth of homeland security information concentrated, and accessible, in the U.S. jail system.

Using qualitative research methods and Yin's case study analysis, the Intelligence Cycle, and Lowenthal's IC Functional Flow model in its analytical approach, this thesis explores three homeland security intelligence-gathering models to determine how best practices can be used to create a homeland security jail intelligence best practice model. The U.S. intelligence community will benefit from, and must act upon, the insights that emerged from this research.

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

9/11	September 11, 2001
ACLU	American Civil Liberties Union
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COPS	Community Orientated Policing
CSC	Correctional Services of Canada
CTEB	Counter-Terrorism Executive Board
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DOE	Department of Energy
DOJ	Department of Justice
FALN	Armed Forces of National Liberation
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
GEOINT	Geospatial Intelligence
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IAIP	Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
IC	Intelligence Cycle
INR	Intelligence Entities, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
JIS	Jam'iyyat Ul-Islam is-Sheeh (Authentic Assembly of Islam)
JIT	Jail Intelligence Team (a broad term describing any group of law enforcement personnel tasked with collecting information from jail inmates in order to help prevent or solve crimes of any kind occurring outside the confines of that jail)
JIT	Jail Interviewing Team (a pilot program led by Deputy Skyler Bryant, Deputy Clark Theodore, and Sgt. Jennifer Barsh)
JIT	Jail Information Team (the jail-based component of the hybrid model proposed in this thesis by Jennifer Barsh)
JTTF	Joint Terrorism Task Force
LAJRIC	Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center
LASD	Los Angeles Sheriff's Department
MASINT	Measurement and Signatures Intelligence
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding

NGA	National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NRO	National Reconnaissance Office
NSA	National Security Agency
NYPD	New York Police Department
OSINT	Open-Source Intelligence
OSJ	Operation Safe Jail
OSS	Operation Safe Streets
POST	Peace Officer Standards and Training
QHSR	Quadrennial Homeland Security Review
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
TEW	Terrorism Early Warning
TLO	Terrorism Liaison Officer
WCJIU	Webb County Jail Intelligence Unit

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I owe my deepest gratitude to my family, who always believed in me and encouraged me to dream big, and I dedicate this thesis to my loving family. To my mother, Jean, thank you for supporting me in my endeavors and for being an amazing mom and friend. To my brother, Rick, thank you for being a role model and encouraging me to follow God's plan for my life. To my fiancé, Joe, thank you for your love and for encouraging me to do my best and to live out my dreams. To my best friends, Leticia Garcia and Jennie Gieble, thank you for your friendship and support during these last 18 months. A special thanks to my classmates, Ben Chlapek and Sharon Watson, for the laughs, inspiring discussions, and weekend adventures in Monterey.

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true embodiment of a deputy sheriff. I am blessed to have created the JIT model with you—but more importantly to have you both as friends.

My partner and friend, Roy Burns, once said, “You may not be able to change the world, but you can change a person’s world.” This thesis program has changed my world, and I owe a debt of gratitude to my professors, classmates, and the CHDS staff who helped make my experience at CHDS life changing.

## I. INTRODUCTION

*In order to achieve results we need a law enforcement environment that views intelligence as a precondition to effective policing, rather than as a supplement.*

Robert Kopal

### A. PROBLEM STATEMENT

September 11, 2001, was a day that fundamentally changed the United States and, more specifically, the intelligence community. In the 9/11 Commission Report, the Commission listed 11 agencies that were responsible for intelligence gathering prior to 9/11.<sup>1</sup> During the commission's investigation, it determined that the intelligence community was too restrictive with information sharing and that it had failed to "connect the dots." One of the commission's recommendations was to expand the intelligence community by using unconventional entities and combining joint intelligence with joint action (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 407). Some of the unconventional entities include the private sector's information contribution to the intelligence community. Over 10 years after 9/11, and nearly seven years after the recommendations put forth by the 9/11 Commission, it is important to ask whether those recommendations were implemented. The FBI is the lead domestic agency in charge of investigating terrorism and protecting the homeland against terrorism. Prior to 9/11, the FBI's primary focus was law enforcement; its domestic security mission was secondary. Robert S. Mueller, director of the FBI at the time of 9/11, was quoted during a statement to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (2001), as saying, "Prior to the 9/11 attacks, the FBI's operations were heavily weighted towards its law enforcement mission" (Mueller, 2011). Today, 10 years after 9/11, the FBI's new mission "is to protect and defend the United States against terrorist and foreign intelligence threats, to

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<sup>1</sup> Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Military Intelligence entities, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), Office of Terrorism and Finance Intelligence of the Department of Treasury, Office of Intelligence and the Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence Divisions of the FBI and DOJ, Office of Intelligence of the Department of Energy (DOE), and Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP).

uphold and enforce the criminal laws of the United States, and to provide leadership and criminal justice services to federal, state, municipal, tribal, and international agencies and partners” (Mueller, 2011). The FBI now relies on local law enforcement as an essential part of the intelligence community, and this is one example of the profound changes in American intelligence gathering since 9/11.

The 9/11 Commission report recommended that local law enforcement take a more active role in domestic security intelligence. “A ‘smart’ government would integrate all sources of information to see the enemy as a whole. Integrated all-source analysis should also inform and shape strategies to collect more intelligence” (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 401). Local law enforcement officers are crucial to the intelligence community for a number of reasons. First, local law enforcement officers spend their entire career in a specific jurisdiction and thus become experts concerning the area they police. They know about the community they serve and often have a number of informants in the community who provide them with criminal information. Local law enforcement officers are often known by community members, and after a period of time, officers develop a rapport with people in the community. In contrast, FBI agents do not wear uniforms, do not respond to calls from citizens, and do not have the opportunity to develop rapport or insider understanding of any particular local community. The intelligence community realizes that local law enforcement officers are on the frontlines of detecting and preventing homeland security–related crimes and activities (USDHS, 2012).

When the strengths of local law enforcement are combined with the strengths of federal law enforcement, the resulting synergy achieves more than either kind of law enforcement could manage alone. In 1979, New York City experienced a spike in bank robberies (Anti-Defamation League, 2011). In response, the New York Police Department (NYPD) and the FBI joined the NYPD’s expertise in the community with the FBI’s expertise in bank robbery investigations and formed a task force. The success of the NYPD/FBI task force eventually led to the creation of the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) (Valiquette, 2010).

Since 9/11, local police agencies have been forming JTTFs and taking a larger role in collecting intelligence related to homeland security efforts around the United States (Velez-Villar, 2012). Prior to 9/11, local police agencies focused on gathering intelligence about gang members and narcotics violators who threatened their specific jurisdictions. Now, local law enforcement agencies serve as an integral part of the national intelligence community. However, there is one area within law enforcement's jurisdiction that could provide a wealth of homeland security information but that has been largely overlooked: the jail system.

Many local law enforcement agencies around the United States actively participate in joint terrorism task forces and their local fusion centers. However, there exists a void in intelligence gathering within the jurisdiction of local law enforcement. The United States has one of the largest jail systems in the world, but it lacks an organized approach or structure to gather homeland security information from the jail system to share with the intelligence community.

The 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) listed transnational criminal organizations such as drug cartels as a threat to the security of the United States. "Criminals, terrorist networks, and other malicious actors will seek to exploit the same interconnected systems and networks of the global economy for nefarious purposes, or create their own illicit pathways for smuggling and trafficking—of illegal drugs, illegal migrants, terrorists, or even highly dangerous weapons" (USDHS, 2010, p. 48). To combat transnational criminal organizations, the QHSR recommended that "working appropriately with domestic law enforcement partners, the Intelligence Community, and foreign partners, we must identify these illicit pathways, understand their nodes and conveyances, monitor their use, and effectively intervene to stop dangerous people or goods in transit and dismantle the pathways themselves" (USDHS, 2010, p. 51). The jail system is a prime environment to collect homeland security information.

For example, the county of Los Angeles is one of the largest ethnically diverse counties in the United States. According to the 2010 census, Los Angeles County has a population of nearly 10 million people; of that 10 million, almost 3.5 million are foreign born (United States Census 2010, 2011). The Los Angeles County jail system is equally

diverse and is the largest jail system in the free world. Within the confines of the Los Angeles County jail system, there have been cases of inmates who have radicalized and later formed terrorist groups among the inmate population. One such group was called Jam'iyyat Ul-Islam Is-Sheeh (JIS) or the "Authentic Assembly of Islam," at Folsom State Prison, near Sacramento, California. The members of this cell plotted to bomb several military bases, synagogues, and an Israeli consulate in California. The indictment indicated that several core members of the cell were arrested in Los Angeles County for robbery (America at a Crossroads, n.d.). "The effort to impact 'homegrown' terrorism in prisons, jails and society is a monumental task which requires the cooperation of local, state and federal agencies and the community at large" (Mead, 2007).

There are also members of Los Zetas, a violent Mexican drug cartel, who have recruited inmates who have recently been released from the Los Angeles County jail system (Pitts Report, 2010). Robert Killbrew from the Foreign Policy Research Institute wrote an article entitled *The New Threat: Transnational Crime*. There, Killbrew stated that transnational criminal activity such as criminal drug cartels is a major threat affecting the security of the United States.

Criminal cartels, gangs and other illegal armed groups are today spending billions of dollars annually to undermine governments worldwide, either by corruption or, when that fails, by intimidation and violence. From the US perspective, the impact of these developments is generally recognized in the growing violence along the U.S.' southern border, where the Mexican drug cartels fight their own government and one another for access to the lucrative drug markets inside the US. Defeating the rise of transnational crime—turning back the growth of the cartels and other criminal networks—will call for the US to integrate its efforts with allied countries to a much higher degree than previously, and to develop much smoother working relationships among law enforcement and governmental agencies within the United States itself.

(Killbrew, 2011, p. 2)

The U.S. jail system is a fertile ground of information and is ready to be cultivated. Jails around the United States have information concerning transnational criminal activity and terrorism-related crimes that can be gathered and turned into workable homeland security intelligence. A jail intelligence model needs to be created to

meet the needs of local, state, and federal agencies. This intelligence model must be cost effective, able to share information with the intelligence community, able to analyze information gathered from the jail system, and represent a model made up of personnel with the necessary training to spot and access potential homeland security information. There already exist a number of models in the United States that successfully collect information; three existing models will be analyzed for best practices, from which we can distill a homeland security jail information model. Despite all the years following 9/11, while the terrorist cell, Jam'iyyat Ul-Islam is-Sheen (JIS) formed in California's Folsom State Prison in 2005, while some of the world's most notorious terrorists have been in a jail facility, while criminal cartels perforate and permeate our southern border and our jail system, the U.S. intelligence community even now does not have a formal model to collect homeland security intelligence inside the U.S. jail system.

## **B. RESEARCH QUESTION**

How can homeland security information be collected from the jail system, using existing resources and successfully contributing to the intelligence cycle?

## **C. BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM**

The CIA and NSA used the term "failure to imagine" to describe the intelligence community's failure to prevent the September 11 attacks (Roemer, 2006). Since September 11, 2001, the intelligence community has expanded the role of local law enforcement as a key component in intelligence gathering (Velez-Villar, 2012). The first National Strategy for Homeland Security report, written in 2002, centered on the concept of uniting local, state, and federal departments to protect the homeland. "The Federal government must seek to utilize state and local knowledge about their communities and then share relevant information with the state and local entities in position to act on it" (United States Department of Homeland Security [USDHS], 2002, p. 12).

Many law enforcement agencies at the local and state levels have officers working on a joint terrorism task force (JTTF) or assigned to a counterterrorism assignment. "Since September 11, every state and many cities and counties are addressing homeland security issues either through an existing office or through a newly created office. Many

have established anti-terrorism task forces. Many have also published or are preparing homeland security strategies” (USDHS, 2002, p. 12). Major cities and counties in the United States published their affiliation with JTTFs and their counter-terrorism agendas. However, there is one jurisdiction at the local level with great homeland security intelligence potential that has received little attention: the jail system.

#### **D. JAILS VERSUS PRISONS**

For the purpose of this thesis, the term “jail” will be used to describe detention facilities and any correctional facility under city or county jurisdiction with offenders awaiting trial or serving short-term sentences. A “prison” will be defined as a state or federally operated correctional facility with offenders who are serving long-term sentences, typically more than two years. “Inmates” will be defined as offenders in the jail system, and “prisoners” will be defined as offenders in the prison system. This thesis is focused on the practical and strategic benefits of gathering intelligence from the jail system, which does not negate the fact that homeland security intelligence has a legitimate presence in the prison system. However, jails are distinct from prisons because the jail system provides very different and often better opportunities to cultivate informants and gather homeland security intelligence.

Jails and prisons are operated by very different law enforcement agencies. Jails or detention facilities are under city or county jurisdiction with an inmate population accused of committing a crime within that local jurisdiction. A prison is a state-operated facility housing prisoners from all over the particular state (Bureau of Justice Statistics, n.d.). Law enforcement or correctional officers at a state or federal level generally do not have personal knowledge of the community or the environment from which a particular prisoner comes; therefore, correctional officers are unlikely to be familiar with the homeland security potential of any individual prisoner. In contrast, law enforcement officers at a jail have a better gestalt understanding of homeland security threats and trends in the same jurisdiction where the inmate committed a crime.

The jail system provides a rare opportunity to acquire intelligence that is both current and time sensitive since the inmate is jailed directly after being arrested. Timely

intelligence describes activity, relationships, and situations that currently exist or that are ongoing at the moment the information is acquired. The jail system offers an opportunity to gather real-time information since the inmate was removed from the existing environment and placed directly in a jail. Inmates possess real-time information about criminal activity occurring in a particular jurisdiction because they recently were part of that environment. Prisons, on the other hand, house prisoners who have already been incarcerated for an extended time (in a jail) while waiting for their trial and/or litigating their criminal cases in court, and they have finally been remanded to a prison to serve their sentences (Bureau of Justice Statistics, n.d.). Prisoners are often disconnected from the environment or community with which they associated prior to their arrest. Prisoners rarely have first-hand or time-sensitive information about criminal activity occurring in a certain jurisdiction because of the months or years they have spent incarcerated in the jail system prior to being transferred to the prison system.

The jail system also provides strategically more leverage than a prison system. Law enforcement officers have a greater advantage when trying to gather homeland security information from an inmate who has recently been arrested than from a prisoner who has been convicted and sentenced. First, jail inmates are more willing to provide information to police in the hopes of winning a reduced sentence, knowing that a law enforcement officer can plead with the court for a reduced sentence and allow the inmate to work off the crime by providing information on other crimes.

Prisoners are less motivated to assist law enforcement because they have already been sentenced to a specified amount of time, and their hope for a shortened sentence is greatly diminished. Prisoners are reluctant to assist law enforcement because the communities they come from, as time goes on, are sure to know of their arrest. If the prisoner is released from prison early, he could be branded as a “snitch,” or one who provides information to law enforcement. However, an inmate is sent to a jail directly after his arrest. Sometimes law enforcement officers will immediately recruit the inmate as an informant, release him from custody, and place him directly back into the environment to gather time-sensitive intelligence without the knowledge of anyone in his sphere of influence ever realizing that the arrest and recruitment had happened.

As mentioned above, the jail system provides a fertile ground for intelligence collection, and the U.S. intelligence community has not exploited the homeland security intelligence in the U.S. jail system. The U.S. Patriot Act of 2001 was the first piece of legislature that encouraged and recommended that domestic intelligence agencies and local law enforcement agencies work together in collecting homeland security intelligence and improve coordination between both disciplines (Lowenthal, 2009, p. 25). The 9/11 attacks were the catalyst for the integration of domestic-intelligence agencies and local law enforcement agencies, but the U.S. jail system still remains an area untouched by the integration. A nationwide homeland security jail intelligence collection effort would be instrumental to the U.S. intelligence community by providing real-time actionable intelligence, but the intelligence community has yet to leverage the homeland security information in the U.S. jail system.

## **E. NOTORIOUS TERRORISTS INCARCERATED IN THE JAIL SYSTEM**

### **1. Richard Reid**

Just a few months after the attacks of September 11, Richard Reid boarded a flight from Paris to Miami. While in flight he tried to light a fuse protruding from his shoe, which was packed with enough explosives to blow a hole in the fuselage of the aircraft (Elliott, 2002). During the course of the investigation of that incident, it was discovered that Reid had attended al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan. European investigators eventually linked Reid to some of the best-known terrorist cells on the continent, but Reid's criminal days had started long before becoming a member of al-Qaeda (Elliott, 2002).

Richard Reid was not born into Islam, much less radical Islam. Reid's father, Robin Reid, was a career criminal, spending nearly 20 years inside London prisons. Robin converted to Islam in the 1980s. Richard dropped out of school at the age of 16 and followed in his father's footsteps, making a living as a criminal. He lived in South London and was involved in street crimes, including car thefts. Richard was arrested for the first time at age 17 for mugging a senior citizen. Over the next few years Reid was in

and out of prisons and lived the life of a criminal. After Richard's father converted to Islam, he began to urge Richard to convert to Islam as well. The next time Richard was incarcerated, he converted to Islam (Elliot, 2002).

When Reid first converted to Islam in prison, he did not have extremist views. It was not until his release from prison in 1994 that Richard started to become radicalized. He attended the notorious Finsbury Park mosque, which had a reputation for teaching a radical form of Islam. A number of suspected terrorists have worshipped there, including convicted 9/11 accomplice Zacarias Moussaoui (Weiser, 2011). Al-Qaeda operatives Djamel Beghal and Kamel Daoudi also attended the Finsbury Park mosque with Reid. Beghal and Daoudi were both convicted of terrorism for conspiring to destroy the U.S. embassy in Paris (Elliot, 2002). Richard Reid, at one time a common criminal who spent much time in jail, knew some of the most notorious terrorists in the world. Not only did Richard associate with these men, he eventually became one of them. It is highly likely that Richard Reid might have spoken about his growing radicalization or revealed information about Moussaoui, Beghal, or Daoudi to a trained jail officer, or that another inmate might have happily informed on Reid in a South London jail if given the chance. A jail officer might have recognized the significance of the information and have known what to do with it (Weiser, 2011). A jail is an opportune setting to gather intelligence and cultivate informants.

## **2. The "Toronto 18" Plot: Terrorists in the Canadian Correctional System**

The Correctional Services of Canada (CSC) is the federal correctional service with prisoners who have been sentenced to two years or more in a correctional facility. After 9/11, CSC expanded its intelligence unit to address terrorism-related concerns (Toews, 2011). Although CSC will not comment on its involvement in the foiled 2006 plot of an Al-Qaeda Islamic terrorist cell, one leader believed to have played a major part in orchestrating the plot was in a CSC correctional facility. Ali Dirie was arrested in 2005 for trying to smuggle two firearms into Canada from the United States. When Dirie was arrested he was traveling with another member of the terrorist cell, Yasin Abdi Mohamed. According to judicial hearings, Dirie continued to plan the 2006 plot with 17

other members of the Islamic cell. From a correctional facility, Dirie recruited fellow inmates to participate in the plot and spread radical Islamic messages within the jail system (Teotonio, 2011). The 2006 plot involved a plan to detonate truck bombs and an elaborate design to attack the Canadian Broadcasting Center, the Canadian Parliament building, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service's headquarters, and the parliamentary Peace Tower. The goal was to take hostages and behead the Prime Minister and other leaders. On June 2, 2006, a joint operation involving Canadian intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies arrested 18 people and stopped the plot (Teotonio, 2011).

### **3. Jose Padilla**

There are also examples in the United States of terrorists who have been incarcerated in the jail system prior to committing a terrorist act. Jose Padilla was born in Brooklyn, New York, but later moved to Chicago, Illinois, where he was first incarcerated. Padilla was a member of the Latin Kings street gang and was convicted of aggravated assault and manslaughter when he was a juvenile. According to Chicago police, Padilla was arrested five times between 1985 and 1991 (CNN.com, 2002). At the age of 20, Padilla was arrested in Sunrise, Florida, for brandishing a firearm during a road rage incident. Padilla spent 303 days in the Broward County jail. When Padilla was released from jail in 1992, he began traveling outside the United States (Saunders, 2004). In 2002, a senior al Qaeda official, Abu Zubaydah, told authorities that Padilla was planning a terrorist attack in the United States. Padilla was arrested in Chicago on May 8, 2002, on suspicion of plotting a radiological bomb attack in the United States (Saunders, 2004).

## **F. METROPOLITAN CITY EXAMPLE: THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY JAIL SYSTEM**

The county of Los Angeles is one of the largest and most ethnically diverse counties in the U.S. (United States Census 2010, 2011). Equally diverse is the Los Angeles County jail system, the largest jail system in the free world. The robust diversity within the Los Angeles County jail system contains a rich pool of current and timely

homeland security information that could be gathered, analyzed, and provided to homeland security agencies. However, the Los Angeles County jail system does not have an organized process to gather homeland security information.

Currently, the only information that is being extracted from Los Angeles jail inmates revolves around active gangs within the confines of Los Angeles County. A team of jail deputies, Operation Safe Jail (OSJ), is gathering information and supplying information to Operation Safe Streets (OSS), a law enforcement street gang unit, to fight Los Angeles County's gang problem. OSJ searches cells, recruits informants, monitors inmate mail, and records inmate phone calls and visits. Since the implementation of OSJ in the early 1980s, OSJ has successfully used innovative tactics to extract current and timely information from jail inmates and has employed technology to enhance the information it gleans about street gangs, gang members, and gang activity.

Beyond the scope of street gangs there exists untapped information regarding the counterfeiting of U.S. currency, illegal border-crossing activities, human trafficking, immigration fraud, terrorist activities (both domestic and in other parts of the world), and weapons smuggling. The preceding anecdotes of terrorists, who before their more deadly exploits, had been incarcerated in jails around the world, indicate the need for a homeland security intelligence team within the jail system. Large metropolitan police agencies like the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD) have been leaders in creating a homeland security strategy for the nation, but they have not yet gathered and cultivated homeland security information in their own jail systems. A U.S. homeland security jail intelligence model would enhance U.S. intelligence efforts by detecting and reacting to homeland security threats.

## **G. HOMELAND SECURITY THREATS**

The Department of Homeland Security was created in 2002 in direct response to the 9/11 attacks. In the first National Strategy for Homeland Security report, the following were listed as threats posed to the U.S. homeland: "Threats posed by terrorists, the implements of terrorism, international organized crime, illegal drugs, illegal migrants,

cyber crime, and the destruction or theft of natural resources” (USDHS, 2002, p. 22). To address these threats, federal, state, and local agencies need to work together and partner in intelligence efforts.

Successful counterterrorism efforts require that Federal, State, tribal, local, and private-sector entities have an effective information sharing and collaboration capability to ensure they can seamlessly collect, blend, analyze, disseminate, and use information regarding threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences in support of prevention, response, and consequence management efforts. (USDHS, 2005, p. 2)

## **H. CONCLUSION**

Jails provide a controlled environment to implement the intelligence cycle. One of the fundamental recommendations of the 9/11 Commission report was to integrate all sources of information, which can then be inserted into the intelligence cycle (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 401). The U.S. jail system provides an opportunity to collect information utilizing methods that are not available outside the confines of a jail environment. Inmate visiting logs, recorded phone calls, cell searches, inmate out-going and incoming mail are all unique jail methods to collect information, and all are done without the need of a search warrant. Also, the intelligence community can capitalize on the fact that when people are arrested they are sent directly to a jail. This allows the intelligence community to exploit the recently arrested inmate’s current and actionable homeland security–related information. The intelligence community must leverage the unique opportunities that the U.S. jail environment offers.

The Department of Homeland Security defines threats posed to the U.S. homeland. Those threats include drug cartels, organized crime, and illegal immigration, all of which are represented in a jail facility. The U.S. jail system is flooded with inmates who are charged with drug-related crimes, inmates who are connected to criminal organizations, and inmates who are illegal immigrants (Killebrew, 2009). Also, as mentioned above, there were a number of notorious terrorists who, at some point in their lives, spent time in a jail facility. If some of the most notorious terrorists spent time in a jail facility, then a jail facility is precisely where the intelligence community must collect

information. It is difficult to find an environment so rich in homeland security information as the U.S. jail system. This opportunity must be exploited.

There are many threats that plague the United States, and it is spending billions to thwart these threats, but we have failed to take advantage of the vast homeland security information in the U.S. jail system. The intelligence community needs to leverage homeland security information found inside jail facilities and turn that information into actionable intelligence.

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## **II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE**

Significant articles, empirical research articles, journals, books, government reports, academic studies, and research documents were reviewed through the Naval Postgraduate University library. Online databases also helped the search for pertinent literature. Bibliographic and reference listings were accessed from appropriate titles discovered in the review process. Approximately 75 current scholarly articles pertaining to jail, jail intelligence, intelligence cycle, U.S. intelligence, homeland security jail intelligence, jail information, terrorism and jail, and terrorism and prison, were reviewed.

What is intelligence? “The term intelligence refers to the steps or stages in intelligence, from policy makers [an intelligence consumer] perceiving a need for information to the [intelligence] community’s delivery of an analytical intelligence product to them.” (Lowenthal, 2009, p. 55) The U.S. intelligence community commonly has five phases that make up the intelligence cycle (Lowenthal, 2009). The five phases are 1) planning and direction, 2) collection, 3) processing and exploitation, 4) analysis and production, and 5) dissemination and integration (GlobalSecurity, n.d.).

### **A. THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE**

Successful counterterrorism efforts require that federal, state, tribal, local, and private-sector entities have an effective information sharing and collaboration capability to ensure they can seamlessly collect, blend, analyze, disseminate, and use information regarding threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences in support of prevention, response, and consequence-management efforts. (USDHS, 2005, p. 2)

The intelligence cycle is a process of turning information into intelligence and subsequently making it available to a consumer. There are a number of variants of the intelligence cycle, but the steps in the cycle seldom differ from the five phases listed above.

## THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE



Figure 1. The Intelligence Cycle (from Global Security, n.d.)

### 1. Planning and Direction

The planning and direction managers oversee the intelligence community's efforts by determining intelligence requirements, formulating specific collection, processing, analysis, and data dissemination. Planning and direction managers are homeland security members at a supervisory level, from FBI and DHS supervisors to local JTTF managers, who consider the needs of the intelligence consumer and direct the intelligence collection efforts. The intelligence managers must be in close rapport with their policy counterparts and take the initiative to build the momentum of the intelligence cycle (Johnson & Wirtz, 2011). "In the end, intelligence managers have to make decisions about the subjects that ought to be covered." (Johnson & Wirtz, 2011, p. 65)

### 2. Collection

The collection phase gathers raw information based on the directives and plans of the intelligence community (Iowa Department of Public Safety, n.d.). "Collection produces information, not intelligence." (Lowenthal, 2009, p. 55) The intelligence

community utilizes five methods to collect information: 1) human intelligence (HUMINT), 2) signals intelligence (SIGINT), 3) geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), 4) measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT), and 5) open-source intelligence (OSINT) (Lowenthal, 2009). Each of these methods will be discussed in depth in the next section.

### **3. Processing and Exploitation**

The processing-and-exploitation phase receives raw information from the collection phase and converts it into a form suitable for analysis. This process includes transcribing, translating, decrypting, and entering the data collected into databases where it can be exploited during the analysis and production phase (Iowa Department of Public Safety, n.d.).

### **4. Analysis and Production**

The analysis-and-production phase converts raw information into intelligence by integrating, evaluating, and analyzing available data. “Identifying requirements, conducting collection, and processing and exploitation are meaningless unless the intelligence is given to analysts who are experts in their respective fields and can turn the intelligence into reports that respond to the needs of the policy makers [the intelligence consumer]” (Lowenthal, 2009, p. 56). This phase puts the information into context and then produces an intelligence product. This phase also includes an evaluation of the intelligence that ensures development and improvement of intelligence collection efforts. The finished intelligence product is used to “connect the dots” by forming associations, drawing conclusions, and putting the information into context (Iowa Department of Public Safety, n.d.).

### **5. Dissemination and Integration**

The dissemination-and-integration phase distributes the intelligence products to the policy maker or the intelligence consumer. “These [intelligence] products include warning intelligence, in which consumers are alerted to ‘breaking news’; current intelligence to update consumers on world events on which they already have some

knowledge; in-depth studies on particular situations or issues; and forecasts of the future, the estimate.” (Johnson & Wirtz, 2011, p. 68) This phase also evaluates the value of the intelligence provided and provides feedback to the intelligence community.

This phase also solicits feedback from the policy maker or intelligence consumer to those who collect, process, analyze, and produce intelligence products for them. The feedback portion of the intelligence cycle is crucial because it provides insight for the intelligence community to refine and/or redirect its intelligence collection efforts.

Although feedback does not occur nearly as often as the intelligence community might desire, a dialogue between intelligence consumers and producers should take place after the intelligence has been received. Policy makers [intelligence consumers] should give the intelligence community some sense of how well their intelligence requirements are being met and discuss any adjustments that need to be made to any parts of the process. Ideally, this should happen while the issue or topic is still relevant, so that improvements and adjustments can be made. Failing that, even an ex post facto review can be tremendously helpful. (Lowenthal, 2009, p. 56)

The dissemination-and-integration phase is the last phase and logically feeds directly back into the planning-and-direction phase to begin the cycle all over (United States Military Information, 2012).

The FBI lists five intelligence collection methods, referred to as “INTs,” which collect information that is then implemented into the intelligence cycle (FBI, n.d.). The five intelligence collection INTs are 1) human intelligence (HUMINT), 2) signals intelligence (SIGINT), 3) geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), 4) measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT), and 5) open-source intelligence (OSINT) (Lowenthal, 2009).

## **B. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION METHODS**

### **1. Human Intelligence (HUMINT)**

Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is the use of human sources or informants to collect information. HUMINT is also referred to as the world’s second-oldest profession; it dates back at least to biblical times, when Moses sent spies into Canaan before leading

the Jews across the Jordan River (Lowenthal, 2009). Human sources are not CIA spies but are sources recruited by spies or members of the intelligence community to collect information (Johnson & Wirtz, 2011, p. 68). There are typically five steps to recruiting sources, known as the “agent acquisition cycle.” In his book *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, Lowenthal describes the steps (Lowenthal, 2009, p. 97):

1. Targeting and spotting: identifying individuals who have access to the information that the United States may desire.
2. Assessing: gaining their confidence and assessing their weakness and susceptibility to be recruited.
3. Recruiting: making a pitch to them, suggesting a relationship.
4. Handling: managing the asset.
5. Termination: ending the relationship for any of several reasons, e.g., unreliability, loss of access to needed intelligence, change in intelligence requirements.

## **2. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)**

Signals intelligence (SIGINT) refers to the information collected through electronic transmissions. This includes communications that travel via electronic and/or satellite means. Wiretaps, telephones, and personal computers are all examples of SIGINT (FBI, n.d.).

## **3. Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT)**

Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) is also known as imagery intelligence. This type of intelligence collection method refers to photography. In recent times, GEOINT has been used to photograph terrorist training camps in other countries (Johnson & Wirtz, 2011).

#### **4. Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT)**

Measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT) is an intelligence-collection discipline that consists of weapons systems and/or military capability (Johnson & Wirtz, 2011). MASINT uses data gathered by the GEOINT and SIGINT collection systems to provide information about other nations' military preparedness. For example, MASINT measures emissions of a factory to determine whether the factory is a pharmaceutical factory or a factory producing chemical or biological substances (FBI, n.d.).

#### **5. Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT)**

Open-source intelligence (OSINT) is any information obtained by public sources of information. These sources include newspapers, radio, television, and public information on the internet (FBI, n.d.).

The figure below depicts the manner in which the intelligence cycle (IC) is combined with the requirements of intelligence consumers and intelligence managers and the different ways to collect intelligence. "The flow is circular, going in endless loops." (Lowenthal, 2009, p. 35) Any jail intelligence model will fit into the "collection" box, on the execution side of Lowenthal's dotted line. For best results and most widespread implementation, however, a best-practice jail intelligence model must be birthed on the management side of the diagram (or at least in the "systems development" box). The rest of this thesis will review previous domestic jail intelligence models, offer a hybrid best-practice model, and present all the basic information needed for planning and direction managers to implement that hybrid model.



in the document fail to report any homeland security intelligence collected during the six-month course of the study (Matthews, 2006). This thesis will contribute new case study research to an area where virtually none exists.

This literature review examines different jail intelligence models within jails in the United States. The first section focuses on homeland security jail intelligence models, and the second section takes a broad look at jail intelligence models that focus on gangs, crime prevention, and the enhancement of public safety.

### **1. 2006 COPS Innovations Jail Model**

In 2006, the assistant chief constable for Dallas County, John Matthews, developed and authored the COPS (Community Oriented Policing) jail intelligence model. The model was designed to be applicable nationwide, with flexible parameters that allow the model to be implemented in any jail system. The jail intelligence model's mission is: "To develop a national model to collect jail-based intelligence and disseminate it to appropriate law enforcement agencies in order to solve and/or prevent crimes and improve public safety." (Matthews, 2006, p. 4)

The model has five steps: 1) gather the intelligence, 2) document the intelligence, 3) validate the intelligence, 4) disseminate the intelligence to appropriate agencies, and 5) request feedback from the agencies that received the intelligence.

A search of the literature about COPS reveals an incomplete and unbalanced discussion of whether there is a need for a homeland security jail intelligence model. One of the objectives of the COPS jail intelligence model case study was to collect homeland security intelligence; however, results do not report that it actually produced any homeland security intelligence. Also, the case study indicated that the COPS research of a jail intelligence model was funded by a grant, but it is unclear how the grant money was used to implement the jail intelligence models in the three jail facilities. These gaps in the knowledge about the COPS jail intelligence model have not been adequately studied, and further information would help create a more robust context in which other jail intelligence models can be compared and contrasted. It does seem clear, however, that the COPS jail intelligence model did not yield homeland security intelligence. There are gaps

in what we need to know to determine whether a homeland security jail intelligence model would be needed, and if so, what model would yield the most intelligence. Because of this, the COPS model contributes no insights toward identifying the traits of a successful homeland security jail intelligence model.

## **2. Gang/Jail Radicalization Jail Intelligence Model: Los Angeles County, Operation Safe Jail**

One of the best examples that the literature review yielded was based in Los Angeles, California. In the Los Angeles County jail system, Operation Safe Jail (OSJ) was created in 1985 in order to proactively collect gang intelligence and to disseminate the intelligence to appropriate gang units (Mead, 2007). Today, OSJ analyzes gang trends, interviews inmates who are identified as gang members, and maintains a gang intelligence file. What do other law enforcement officials and scholars think of OSJ? “Former police chief Bratton in a year-end report to the Los Angeles City Council noted that ‘OSJ simply rocks. I wish every special program were as awesome as this one.’” (Mead, 2007)

In July of 2005, a radical prison group, Jam’iyyat Ul-Islam is-Sheen (JIS), was discovered in California’s Folsom State Prison. After an intense investigation, homeland security intelligence revealed a direct correlation between gang members and tenets of radical Islam. OSJ noticed, documented, and reported a trend in the Los Angeles County jail system of hard-core gang member inmates converting to radical Islam. In direct response to radical Islam’s recruiting within the jail system, OSJ assigned two deputies to work full time to address the Los Angeles County’s jail radicalization problem.

Operation Safe Jails gang intelligence deputies monitor inmate population for radical activity. The deputies identify inmates who are spreading radical Islam, monitor their activities, and report the inmate to the appropriate agencies. According to OSJ’s mission, the model’s primary focus is gang activity and, most recently, gang members who have converted to radical Islam.

The literature reveals that two OSJ deputies are assigned to jail radicalization, but it does not mention how the two deputies obtain intelligence, have the intelligence

analyzed, or how they share intelligence with other agencies. Finally, the literature does not reveal how OSJ is funded or whether the federal government subsidizes the Islamic radicalization prevention efforts.

### **3. Webb County Jail, “Jail Intelligence Unit”**

Webb County is in Texas, nestled along the U.S.-Mexico border. The Webb County jail is full of violent drug offenders who are gang members affiliated with powerful Mexican drug cartels (Guerra, n.d.). In 2009, Sheriff Marin Cuellar asked the Webb County jail to formulate a strategic plan for a jail intelligence unit. The Webb County Sheriff’s Office applied for a grant and received \$763,615 to fund a jail intelligence unit for a two-year period (Guerra, n.d.).

The Webb County Jail Intelligence Unit (WCJIU) is made up of two full-time crime analysts, intelligence consultants, and an array of cutting-edge technology to further its efforts (Guerra, n.d.). The intricacies of the model were not published due to fear that, if the operational details were revealed, it could hinder the model’s effectiveness. Four months after the unit’s creation, the model discovered a murder plot in a Texas prison; discovered how inmates used chain clips to create weapons; and exposed a gang who was bringing narcotics into the jail by using the U.S. mail (Guerra, n.d.).

The literature about the WCJIU does not expound on its undergirding ideas or the intelligence dissemination protocol for the model. Furthermore, it does not say whether (or how) the Webb County jail model shared its drug intelligence with the Drug Enforcement Bureau or the U.S. postal inspectors. The literature does not specify how, after the federal funding of the Webb County Jail Intelligence Model runs out, the model might continue its work. The literature did show that the WCJIU yielded homeland security intelligence relating to drugs, but the Webb County jail model appears to focus on narcotic- and gang-related crimes.

#### **4. Jacksonville, Florida: Jail Intelligence Model**

The Jacksonville, Florida Sheriff's Office has an average inmate population of 3,800 (Tenah, n.d.). The Jacksonville Sheriff's Office created a jail intelligence model to collect jail-based intelligence on internal and external safety and security issues (Tenah, n.d.). The Jacksonville Sheriff's Office jail intelligence model consists of a specialized jail intelligence unit, a crime analysis unit, civilian jail personnel, and jail guards. The first inmate intelligence is collected during the intake process when inmates are initially arrested. Intelligence such as place of birth, address, next of kin, and tattoos are collected as potentially significant. Collectors also obtain intelligence through visiting logs, inmate phone calls, other inmates, and inmate property searches.

When intelligence is collected, the crime analysis unit then validates the intelligence. The crime analysis unit utilizes traditional databases, law enforcement databases, geography, and analytical software. Once the intelligence is validated by the crime analysis unit, the intelligence is disseminated to various internal representatives or external homeland security agencies. The Jacksonville, Florida's jail intelligence model documents the successful resolution of cases that involved gangs, narcotics, burglary, and identity theft (Tenah, n.d.) The literature reveals that Jacksonville's jail intelligence model is focused on crimes within its jail system and street-level crimes that plague Jacksonville. Jacksonville's model did not reference homeland security activity, homeland security training for personnel, or any formal attempt to analyze homeland security intelligence.

#### **D. CONCLUSION**

The United States has a wide variety of formal methods to collect information. These methods cover the gamut of intelligence collection. The intelligence cycle offers a formal model to direct, collect, process, analyze, and disseminate intelligence. The model has been incorporated at the local, state, and federal levels, domestically and internationally. Although the intelligence cycle is occasionally modified, the core practice remains the same and has proved to be successful. However, the U.S. jail system has been almost completely left out of the intelligence cycle until now.

Literature pertaining to jail intelligence models consists largely of correctional departments publicizing their policing efforts within their correctional systems. This literature focuses on departments forming jail intelligence models to obtain information about jail-related crimes, gangs, and narcotics.<sup>2</sup> Aside from the WCJIU, none of the U.S. jail intelligence models indicate how the models were funded, and the WCJIU's funding does not appear to be stable over the long term. The literature did not expand on how the jail intelligence models were formed or how the jail intelligence models operated, with the exception of two correctional systems: the Webb County jail system and the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office.

Based on the literature review, none of the extant jail intelligence models have intentionally incorporated any focus on homeland security. There is not a single proven homeland security jail intelligence model in America today. According to the Homeland Security Intelligence and Information Sharing Initiative, "important intelligence that may forewarn of a future attack may be derived from information collected by State, tribal, and local government personnel through crime control and other routine activities and/or by people living and working in our local communities" (USDHS, 2005, p. 3). The U.S. jail system possesses homeland security information, and the intelligence community can collect HUMINT and SIGINT in the jail system without a warrant and by leveraging the rapport that a custodial officer can build with an inmate. The information can then be contributed to the intelligence cycle, which will inform policy makers and direct homeland security collection efforts. Nearly 11 years after the attacks of September 11, 2001, a successful jail intelligence model to collect homeland security intelligence does not exist.

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<sup>2</sup> Because of the unhelpful and irrelevant nature of this common literature, none of it was included in this thesis, although much of it was reviewed.

### **III. RESEARCH MODEL**

The goal of this research was to seek an effective homeland security jail intelligence model able to gather real-time actionable homeland security intelligence from the jail system. The case study method was selected to compare and analyze homeland security intelligence models in the United States to create a “best practice” jail intelligence model. The case study method was selected for its use of empirical inquiry to answer the “how” question. Also, a case study focuses on a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, and boundaries between phenomenon and context are not always clearly evident (Baxter & Jack, 2008; Stake, 1995; Yin, 2009). The use of the case study method aids in the examination of best practices: in the present study, it is the most helpful approach to analyze current intelligence collection models at the federal and local levels. Examining both local and federal intelligence collection efforts in this niche will be particularly helpful to this study.

#### **A. SAMPLE DATA**

This research examines three intelligence models: the Terrorism Liaison Officer model (TLO), the Jail Information Team (JIT) model, and the Joint Terrorism Task Force JTTF (JTTF) model. These models were chosen because they collect information that could be used as actionable intelligence. They differ in their specific missions, but their overarching goal is the same: to collect intelligence. Each of these models is ongoing and considered successful. These case studies were limited in scope due to the sensitive nature of intelligence collection, the information available at the unclassified level, and the number of years that each model has existed. The sample data included in this research was selected because it offered an opportunity to explore intelligence models at the federal and local levels. Through a combination model of federal and local agencies, a “best practice” intelligence model is proposed. The sample data includes reports, articles, policy and procedure memos, and discussions I had during the course of employment with the LASD and a role in the creation of the Los Angeles County Jail Interview Team (JIT). Sample data was drawn from each of the following models:

### **1. Los Angeles County Jail Interviewing Team (JIT)**

The data samples include the model's policy and procedures, discussions with JIT members prior to the research for this thesis, and statistical data about the number of interviews conducted by the JIT during the specified time. The author was one of the three cocreators of the JIT at Los Angeles County's Men's Central Jail.

### **2. Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) Model**

These data samples include a published book, *Terrorism Early Warning: 10 Years of Achievement in Fighting Terrorism and Crime*. Los Angeles County Sheriff's Lieutenant, John P. Sullivan, was the primary author of the book and one of the cocreators of the Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) group. The data samples include articles and theses that describe this model. The Terrorism Early Warning program was not a case study; however, the TLO concept depicted in the TEW model can serve as a case study. I have been a TLO in Los Angeles County since 2009.

### **3. Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) Model**

These data samples are included in a document from the Rand Corporation (2003), *Intelligence, Police, and Counterterrorism: Assessing Post-9/11 Initiatives*. The samples also include articles, models, *The 9/11 Commission Report*, and a commentary by Brian Jenkins titled *Connect the Cops to Connect the Dots*. I worked on a JTTF in Los Angeles from 2007 to 2009 and worked at the Los Angeles Joint Intelligence Center (LAJRIC) from 2006 to 2009.

## **B. DATA COLLECTION**

Data was either collected during my normal course of employment, in my possession prior to this research, or available online and collected from the worldwide web.

## **C. DATA ANALYSIS**

The case study is an examination of three successful intelligence models, defined as "successful" by the manner in which each model contributes to the intelligence cycle.

Each case study was analyzed, and the positives and negatives of each model were extracted to answer “how” and “why” these intelligence models are successful in gathering intelligence. The study proposes to examine these three models as case studies, identifying the similarities and differences between them, analyzing why one model was more successful than the next, matching the insights thus gleaned, considering the phenomena that emerge, and finally, synthesizing the emerging patterns into a “best practice” jail intelligence model.

Yin’s case study design analysis was utilized for this study. “Research design links the data to be collected and conclusions to be drawn to the initial questions of the study—it provides a conceptual framework and an action plan for getting from questions to a set of conclusions” (Yin, 1994, p. 2). The case studies involving successful intelligence models in the United States were evaluated through pattern matching, success stories, and each model’s proven sustainable resiliency in relation to the intelligence cycle. The proposition was the starting point for data analysis. Also, observation and participation with each case model were other evaluation techniques utilized.

The distinctiveness of each intelligence model was extracted to reveal the rising fundamentals that made that model successful. The case study method provided insight to the development of an intelligence model that would perform well in a jail environment.

#### **D. THEORETICAL SENSITIVITY: ADDRESSING BIAS**

Bias is a form of systematic error that can affect data analysis during a case study research design. When a human evaluates research, there may be a bias or sensitivity that unduly influences evaluation. Some biases stem from religious, cultural, political, and professional perspectives and can profoundly shape a person’s analysis.

I worked in law enforcement for 15 years and have worked in a homeland security role since 2004. In 2004, I worked as a law enforcement security contractor in Iraq and Jordan. Also, I have been a TLO since 2009, worked at the Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center (LAJRIC) from 2006 to 2009, and was a task force member assigned

to the Los Angeles JTTF for three years. Since 2004, I have completed several different kinds of homeland security training and worked in an intelligence-gathering role.

Over the past 15 years, I spent four years working in the Los Angeles County jail system. From 2009 to 2010, I worked at the Los Angeles County's Men's Central Jail and codeveloped a pilot homeland security jail intelligence team. Based on personal and professional relationships with members of federal, state, and local agencies, I discussed strategy in intelligence gathering related to the jail system prior to the writing of this thesis. Because of my work experience in the intelligence community, my role in the development of a homeland security jail intelligence team, and my personal and professional relationships, I have a personal understanding of the intelligence community, the jail environment, and TLO and JTTF models. With this in mind, I was mindful during the analysis and synthesis to mitigate any bias while examining the data (Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Trochim & Donnelly, 2006). I worked closely with my thesis advisors to address biases during my analysis and synthesis.

## **IV METHODS AND PROCEDURES**

### **A. CASE STUDIES: INTELLIGENCE MODELS**

This thesis examines three successful intelligence models, examining them for parts and principles that can be used to synthesize a new jail intelligence model that combines the strengths of all three. These three models were selected due to their diversity from one another, their adaptability to a jail setting, and their ability to be successfully implemented by all large and small jail systems across the United States. Two of the models have been successfully implemented outside a jail environment, and one of the models was a pilot program similar to the COPS Jail Information Team program examined earlier. This one is focused specifically on discovering and developing homeland security intelligence and has experienced limited success in a jail setting in Los Angeles. Each case study will look at the model's history and purpose.

### **B. TERRORISM LIAISON OFFICER (TLO) HISTORY**

The Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) is a program developed through the California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) by Anthony Lukin. Lukin owns a consulting agency, Lukin and Associates, which does international consulting, offering specialized training in counterterrorism, security, and criminal activity. Lukin created the program in 2005–2006 to intersect first responders with each other and the intelligence community on a national basis, creating a domestic antiterrorism training program for first responders that would “improve the communication, cooperation and coordination between local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies” (Public Intelligence, 2010, p. 10). After 9/11, Lukin looked for ways for the law enforcement community to contribute to homeland security efforts put forth by the FBI. The program, which started in California, proved to be a success and has now been implemented all over the nation (Reyes, 2010). The chart below depicts how information flows to and from a fusion center and TLOs in different disciplines.




Figure 3. TLO Basic “First Responder” Model (from Public Intelligence, 2010)

The program was welcomed by the homeland security community and implemented nationwide, encompassing law enforcement, military, firefighters, and other emergency responders. The TLO program, although viewed by many law enforcement officers as a program strictly for law enforcement, includes many members of the private sector and the first-responder community. As of 2008, over 25 fusion centers across the United States have implemented the TLO program in their jurisdictions, and dozens of other states are reportedly preparing to implement the program. According to an article in the *Washington Post*, there are at least 181 TLOs in Colorado, and their employments range from paramedics to utility workers, all with a shared mission: in their normal course of duty, to report suspicious activity to the appropriate agency (Washingtonpost.com, n.d.). As TLOs, they have both the training and the communication channels to do so (Public Intelligence, 2010).

**Model.** The TLO program prepares designated law enforcement officers to act as liaisons between first-responder agencies, interdepartmental entities, and other law enforcement agencies. Law enforcement TLOs also connect with identified stakeholders

and the wide spectrum of the intelligence community. Stakeholders include members in the intelligence community, homeland security policy makers, first responders, and politicians. According the TLO mission, “the TLO is a collaborator, a coordinator, and a conduit, an instructor and facilitator, a person with the answers to questions concerning terrorism and the resources to retrieve those answers if not immediately known.” (Public Intelligence, n.d., p. 10) The TLO program provides counterterrorism training to local and state law enforcement officials. The TLO course curriculum was developed to give liaisons an understanding of their duties and responsibilities and a foundational knowledge of terrorism in the United States. There are two TLO courses of study, one basic eight-hour course and one advanced 24-hour course.

The TLO advanced course curriculum includes the following classes:

- The Terrorist Threat
- Force Protection
- Community Information Networking
- Fourth Generation Warfare
- International Terrorism
- Militant Islam
- Informational Terrorism
- Domestic Terrorism
- Critical Incident Stress Management
- Cross Cultural Communications
- Related Agency Roles and Responsibilities
- The National Emergency Management System
- Connecting and Working with the Private Sector
- The Role of the Office of Domestic Preparedness
- Developing Community Anti-Terrorism Awareness Progress

(Public Intelligence, n.d.)

The TLO model was designed as a collateral duty. Each liaison serves within its own role in the community, and therefore their employing agency does not incur a cost.

This model allows more agencies to participate in the program and thus maximizes TLO numbers and diversity of roles. The duties of a TLO are to educate coworkers and/or the agency to identify homeland security–related information. TLOs are not to investigate terrorism tips and leads but are to ensure that information is reported to the proper authorities, such as the FBI or the local fusion center. The TLO is the middle person, who is responsible to teach coworkers and/or the agency about potential threats and also to report terrorism-related information in a correct and timely manner. The TLOs also serve as a point of contact within their respective agencies, for fusion center detectives, agents, or directors and other homeland security personnel.

### **C. JAIL INTELLIGENCE TEAM (JIT)**

#### **1. History**

Los Angeles County Sheriff Department (LASD) Deputies Skyler Bryant, Clark Theodore, and myself, LASD Sergeant Jennifer Barsh, created the Jail Intelligence Team in 2009. Prior to being promoted to the rank of sergeant, I was a detective in the LASD Homeland Security Unit. During my three years in the unit, I worked as a case analyst at the Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center (LAJRIC), which serves as the local fusion center. I also worked part-time as a detective on a JTTF and had a top-secret clearance. When I was promoted to sergeant, I transferred to the Men’s Central Jail, which is the largest jail in the United States. Men’s Central Jail houses over 5,000 inmates, including low-level, medium-level, high-level, and maximum-security inmates. During my assignment to Men’s Central Jail, I worked as a line supervisor who supervised line deputies’ interactions with inmates. Over a short period of time, I started to develop a rapport with inmates from countries I have visited or inmates with whom I practiced my foreign-language skills.

During conversations with certain inmates, some of which involved practicing my Spanish or Arabic, I began to see in the jail system a wide range of information pertinent to homeland security but without an organized method to gather the information. Deputy Skyler Bryant and Deputy Clark Theodore also had the same experience as they came across inmates with information regarding drug cartels.

I supervised a number of deputies who had impressive military backgrounds in intelligence. Two deputies with prior military experience, Bryant and Theodore, expressed interest in the LASD's Homeland Security unit. As we talked, each of us became convinced of the need to create a homeland security intelligence-gathering team at Men's Central Jail. With the approval of Men's Central Jail Captain Daniel Cruz, we created the Jail Interview Team.

Email was sent to deputies at Men's Central Jail inquiring about their desire to be involved, their language skills, military background, and homeland security area of expertise. We used that data and those volunteers to form a JIT pilot program.

## **2. Model**

The JIT program is a collateral duty and utilizes jail deputies who already work directly with inmates in inmate housing. A duty post within inmate housing provided JIT members with the opportunity to spot, assess, and recruit inmates who potentially had homeland security-related information. For the JIT program to be successful, its members needed training to identify valid homeland security information. Each member was sent through the basic TLO course and a custom-tailored JIT training program. The JIT training program consisted of interview training, tours of the LAJRIC, learning how to send the fusion center a tip or a lead, and JIT policy and procedures (Los Angeles County, 2010). Although the JIT model includes a training component of the TLO model, the two are quite distinct. Beyond their obvious structural differences, they differ in their approach to collecting information. The JIT model is built on a proactive approach to collecting homeland security information, whereas the TLO model is reactive and abides by the DHS' concept that "if you see something, say something."

## **3. Analysis**

The Men's Central Jail consists of two inmate-housing wings of three floors each and a medical wing. The JIT program was designed to have a JIT member on every floor and on every shift. Each wing had a JIT leader on each shift who served as a liaison between the LAJRIC and the JIT members in his wing. Prior to each shift, the JIT leaders met with the JIT members of that wing, provided training, and updated them on requests

for information from homeland security agencies or the fusion center. The JIT members also updated the JIT leader about any homeland security tip or lead they had received from inmates and sent to the fusion center.

Once per shift the JIT leaders briefed the JIT sergeant on information from the fusion center, JIT members' inmate interviews, and any requests from JIT members. Once a month all JIT members met to discuss the status of completed interviews, strategies, tactics, upcoming training, and requests from the fusion center. Homeland security detectives, analysts, and fusion center members were invited to further the JIT's efforts. Figure 4 depicts the information flow. When a JIT member gathered homeland security-related information, he would send a tip or lead into the LAJRIC. If the JIT member had a specific homeland security detective with whom he worked, he would also send the tip or lead to that detective.

When a deputy sends a tip or lead to a homeland security detective, the deputy specifies that the fusion center has received the tip and needs to deconflict with the fusion center. For instance, if a JIT member sends the LAJRIC a lead about the Sinaloa Cartel, the JIT member also forwards the lead to the DEA detective working the Sinaloa Cartel. This redundancy was created because if a lead was sent in on a Friday and the fusion center had a small skeleton crew on the weekend, the detective might not receive the lead until Monday. Oftentimes, information received is time sensitive; forwarding information directly to the DEA detectives therefore provides a better opportunity for the DEA to act on the information.

An inmate can be released from jail at any time: therefore, the JIT maximizes the homeland security community's opportunity to act on real-time information by ensuring that the appropriate detective is immediately aware of the information. The redundancy ensures that the homeland security community is also receiving real-time actionable information. Figure 4 shows that information flows all three ways, and it must do so. It is imperative that the detectives and the fusion center continually evaluate the information, communicate with one another, and provide feedback to the JIT.




Figure 4. JIT Information flow

#### **D. JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE (JTTF)**

##### **1. History**

The JTTF concept initially started in 1979 in New York City. New York City had a surge in major bank robberies, which fall within the jurisdiction of both the New York City Police Department (NYPD) and the FBI. Federally insured bank deposits provide the jurisdictional grounds for FBI, and the crime of robbery is a state crime, which is the jurisdiction of the NYPD. The FBI's mission is to protect the citizens and the security of the nation, and the NYPD's mission is to protect the citizens in New York City. Therefore, the FBI and NYPD came together and formed a Joint Bank Robbery Task Force. The joint task force proved to be effective because it combined the NYPD's street knowledge with the FBI's resources; the bank robbery cases were solved.

In April of 1980, the FBI and the NYPD were in another predicament involving the jurisdiction of the FBI and the NYPD. New York City had an increase in terrorist attacks, so the NYPD and the FBI joined forces again to create the first Joint Terrorism Task Force. The team was made up of 10 special agents from the FBI's New York Office

and 10 New York Police detectives. As the JTTF grew, it pursued threats from the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN), the Croatian Independence Movement, the Weather Underground, the Black Liberation Army, and a number of other domestic and international terrorist groups. The JTTF focused on gathering intelligence from the community and using that intelligence to thwart or prevent attacks (Valiquette, 2010). The JTTF's recorded success stories spread throughout the nation.

## **2. Model**

There are 104 JTTFs across the nation, 71 of which were created after 9/11. According to the FBI, there are more than 4,400 JTTF members in the United States, encompassing over 600 state and local agencies and 50 federal agencies. The Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. military, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Drug Enforcement, Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, and the FBI are a few of the federal agencies that make up the 104 existing JTTFs in the nation (FBI, 2004)

The JTTFs consist of small cells from local, state, and federal agencies. Each cell is locally based and has experienced detectives, analysts, linguists, and tactical operators. Success stems from the diverse expertise and community awareness that frames each JTTF. When a JTTF is created, it recruits from a pool of talents, skills, and a diverse knowledge base to form one multiagency team with the ability to respond together with a cohesive approach. The JTTF has the ability to investigate, collect intelligence, share intelligence, and analyze intelligence. This model fortifies information sharing, intelligence gathering, and multiagency collaboration, so that when a multiagency approach is needed to address an incident, it is more likely to be handled in a fluid manner.



Figure 5. Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF)

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## V. PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS

### A. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS

The primary goal of this research effort is to develop baseline substantive theory and a conceptual systems framework for gathering homeland security information from the jail system. The research seeks to understand how and why certain intelligence collection models were successful in their specific environment and then use that data to examine how to create a homeland security jail intelligence model. As mentioned in the methodology section of this thesis, tools were used to reveal how the three case studies were developed in different contexts. Each case study was examined for its ability to continually maneuver through the intelligence cycle's five stages. The data collected for the analysis comes from literature, my observations, personal experience with each model in Los Angeles County, my professional relationships with a number of local, state, and federal agencies, and many discussions that I had with members from the Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO), Los Angeles County Jail Interview Team (JIT), and Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) programs.

The analysis of the case study uses the qualitative research method. This term broadly refers to “any kind of research that produces findings not arrived at by means of statistical procedures or other means of quantification” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 17). Quantitative research seeks to generalize, predict, and determine findings whereas a qualitative researcher seeks to examine, understand, and illuminate similar situations. My aim is to examine, compare, and contrast each program via the published literature, my professional experience, and my personal familiarity with each model.

In his book *Beyond the Two Disciplines of Scientific Psychology*, Lee Cronbach claims that quantitative research is not able to take full account of the many interaction effects that take place in social settings. He has stated that “the time has come to exorcise the null hypothesis” because it ignores effects that may be important but that are not statistically significant (1975, p. 124). Qualitative inquiry accepts the complex and dynamic quality of the social world. I used the expertise gained from working inside the

Los Angeles jail system, my experience as a detective assigned to a JTTF, my knowledge gained while working as an intelligence analyst at the LAJRIC fusion center, and my previous homeland security jail information team research to extrapolate the idiosyncrasies, as well as the pervasive uniqueness of each case study in a social world. Keep in mind that these case models vary between state and state. Organizational culture and personal relationships can increase or decrease the models' momentum as they proceed around the intelligence cycle. The analysis will generalize each model without taking into consideration all the various personal and professional relationships which may increase or hinder the movement around the intelligence cycle. "Moreover, personalities do matter. However much people like to think of government as one of laws and institutions, the personalities and relationships of those filling important positions affect agency working relations." (Lowenthal, 2009, p. 38)

### **1. Resources**

"Resources" refers to financial, personnel, physical, and available-time resources for each model to complete each phase. Personnel resources include the number of personnel and the number of hours those personnel can dedicate to the homeland security jail interview model. Physical resources include the technology, equipment, analytical databases, intelligence databases, and security clearances needed to view classified information. "The love of money is not only the root of all evil; money is also the root of all government. How much gets spent and who decides are fundamental powers" (Lowenthal, 2009, p. 50).

### **2. Training and Expertise**

"Training and expertise" refers to the knowledge combined with expertise and the availability for continual training required to maneuver the model through each phase.

### **3. Information Sharing**

"Information sharing" is the ability to share information with multiple agencies through relationships, intelligence sharing meetings, computer database platforms, email,

intelligence reports, and criminal reports. “The 2004 intelligence reform law puts a major emphasis on information sharing, which is an important aspect of all intelligence.” (Lowenthal, 2009, p. 257)

**4. Momentum to Continue to the Next Phase of the Intelligence Cycle**

The term “momentum to continue to the next phase of the intelligence cycle” means the ability to tactically maneuver to the next phase while supplying actionable information, to continue the intelligence cycle in a timely and efficient manner.

The presence or absence of each of these characteristics was assessed on a numerical scale between 1 and 5, with 1 being poorest quality and 5 being exceptional quality.

- 1 = Poor
- 2 = Mediocre
- 3 = Good
- 4 = High
- 5 = Exceptional

**B. HOW EACH MODEL MANEUVERS THROUGH THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE**

**1. Planning and Direction Phase**

Table 1. Model of the Intelligence Cycle

<b>Planning and Direction</b>	<b>Terrorism Liaison Officer</b>	<b>Jail Interview Team</b>	<b>Joint Terrorism Task Force</b>
Resources	1	1	5
Training/Expertise	1	1	5
Information Sharing	1	1	5
Momentum	1	1	5

*a. TLO*

**Resources.** The TLO program is commonly viewed as a supplement to counterterrorism efforts and does not have resources involved in the planning and direction phase.

**Training and expertise.** The intelligence cycle is used by a variety of public and government agencies, including the military, local police, private contractors, and federal agencies. The planning and direction managers, for the purpose of this thesis, are managers from local, state, and federal agencies that concentrate on homeland security efforts. Planning and direction managers are typically located in a fusion center or an interagency homeland security model like the JTTF. For example, at a fusion center the managers may include representatives of a city public-health department, a city fire department, a county law enforcement agency, a state transportation department, and a host of federal agency managers.

The Planning and direction managers can strategically plan to utilize TLOs when planning a course of action to collect information. The DHS has a terrorism information gathering campaign slogan: “If you see something, say something.” The TLO program incorporates this idea and provides basic training to first responders to further understand terrorism warning signs and indicators, resulting in better quality and quantity of tips and leads. However, the DHS can not solely rely on the “if you see something, say something” campaign to collect homeland security intelligence. The campaign is merely meant to maximize the government’s resources by encouraging citizens to report suspicious behavior in the normal course of life. The TLO concept is a further step in the same direction: TLOs report suspicious behavior during their normal course of employment (Public Intelligence, 2010, p. 10). TLOs also receive training to better identify suspicious activity compared to the DHS campaign. Therefore, when managers strategize their homeland security efforts for collecting intelligence, they can use TLOs because they have been trained on tip and lead reporting and terrorism signs and indicators (Reyes, 2010).

**Information sharing.** In the planning and direction phase, managers assess all avenues of information and intelligence collection. The TLO basic and advanced courses give TLO candidates a basic understanding of homeland security risks, common hints of terrorist activity, and instructions for submitting a tip or a lead to the fusion center or a counterterrorism unit (Public Intelligence, 2010, p. 10).

**Momentum to continue to the next phase of the intelligence cycle.** The planning and direction managers at fusion center levels who supervise the phases of the intelligence cycle do not include TLOs when they determine the intelligence requirements, formulation of specific intelligence collection, procession, analysis, and data dissemination. The TLOs are a resource to the planning and direction managers that they can utilize when forming strategy to collect information. Although the TLO model is generally not represented in the planning and direction phase, the mission and training of the TLOs ensure their progression to the collection phase.

***b. JIT***

**Resources.** The JIT program was a pilot program and not part of the local fusion center's planning and direction phase.

**Training and expertise.** One of the mandates of the JIT program requires JIT members to attend the basic TLO course. All JIT members must also complete a training course in which they watch five inmate interviews performed by seasoned JIT members and then perform five inmate interviews of their own, which are critiqued by a JIT supervisor. Once the JIT member finishes training, he must select a subject pertinent to intelligence gathering and study to become an expert in that subject. The subject may be a specific culture, terrorist group, country, language, drug cartel, or any homeland security-related subject. During the monthly JIT meetings, JIT members will educate the other members about that particular subject. Also, if an inmate has information about a subject which a JIT member has selected to study, then that JIT member will assist in the inmate interview (Los Angeles County, 2010).

**Information sharing.** Since JIT members are required to attend the TLO basic course, each member of the team must comply with the TLO information sharing policy for submitting a tip and lead (Los Angeles County, 2010).

**Momentum to continue to the next phase of the intelligence cycle.** The JIT program is a pilot program, and the planning and direction managers may not be aware of its existence. However, the JIT model is like the TLO model in that it collects terrorism-related information and shares the information with the fusion center or counterterrorism detectives. Although the JIT model is not primarily part of the fusion center's planning and direction phase, the JIT's proactive mission ensures progression to the collection phase.

*c. JTTF*

The JTTF is a vital component in the planning and direction phase of the intelligence cycle. As Director Mueller stated, "Today, we are focused on prevention, not simply prosecution. We have shifted from detecting, deterring, and disrupting terrorist activities to detecting, penetrating, and dismantling terrorist enterprises—part of the FBI's larger culture shift to a threat-driven intelligence and law enforcement agency" (Global Security, n.d.). The FBI has the primary responsibility for investigating terrorism matters in the United States, but as Director Mueller pointed out, the FBI has recognized that the best way to do this is in partnership with local, state, and other federal agencies. Director Mueller recognized that the FBI must incorporate local law enforcement as a key partner to detect, penetrate, and dismantle terrorist operations. The JTTFs take a multiagency approach to protect the national security interests of the United States, and they are a key component to the planning and direction phase strategy (Valiquette, 2010).

**Resources.** Because the JTTF is a multiagency task force, there are a number of agencies that participate in its planning and direction phase. The JTTF attempts to broaden interagency collaboration by eliminating duplicated effort and combines local, state, and federal resources. The JTTF is funded by the FBI and Congress, which alleviates the local and state apprehension to participate and fosters an interagency effort (Bald, 2005). There are also other resources available to a JTTF: direct

access to personnel and information pools and communication networks of every agency involved in that particular JTTF, for instance, and limited access to physical operational resources of every participant agency, from offices and labs to vehicles and gear.

**Training and expertise.** Since each fusion center has a JTTF component and the JTTF’s managers are part of the planning and direction phase, they can make good use of their knowledge of the expertise of each JTTF and plan and direct the mission (Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], 2004).

**Information sharing.** The JTTF’s fundamental mandate is to share information (Lowenthal, 2009). The JTTFs are organized and empowered in every possible way to share information quickly, efficiently, and accurately, in order to help homeland security managers including fusion centers and local, state, and federal agencies, to better strategize for future missions.

**Momentum to continue to the next phase of the intelligence cycle.** The JTTF is a core component of the homeland security efforts, tasked by the planning and direction JTTF or fusion center managers to move to the next phase. They are given clear missions, goals, and resources to move to the next phase: Collection.

**2. Collection Phase**

Table 2. Collection Phase of the Intelligence Cycle

<b>Collection</b>	<b>Terrorism Liaison Officer</b>	<b>Jail Interview Team</b>	<b>Joint Terrorism Task Force</b>
Resources	2	5	5
Training/Expertise	2	4	5
Information Sharing	1	4	5
Momentum	1	4	5

*a. TLO*

**Resources.** TLOs may not have sophisticated surveillance gear or career-quality training or broad peer networks of trained agents and analysts, but they do have the ability to use their legitimate professional roles as a guise to gather information,

whereas counterterrorism detectives or counterterrorism informants may not have the same opportunity (Joint Regional Intelligence Center, n.d.). There are only so many counterterrorism detectives, and they cannot be everywhere at once. The TLO program is therefore a significant enhancement to counterterrorism efforts, acting as another set of eyes and ears for intelligence collection.

**Training and expertise.** To become a TLO one must complete the eight-hour basic course and/or the 24-hour advanced course. These courses give TLOs an opportunity to meet counterterrorism detectives, tour the fusion center, and create relationships with a cadre of members from the intelligence community. During both courses, TLOs receive training to understand the needs of counterterrorism detectives in their area. Although TLOs at the minimum attend an eight- or 24-hour training course, they do not have the domestic or international experience or in-depth training to identify terrorism-related indicators. This is a required skill. “The TLO program is conceptually sound regarding the need to train local and state law enforcement officials in counterterrorism. However, its concepts lack recognition of the importance of knowledge dynamics and sustained knowledge flow.” (Burchnell, 2008, p. 36) Just because a person is of Arab descent, for example, does not make him or her an object of suspicion. Fusion centers receive such tips because untrained tipsters do not have the life experience, international knowledge, or skills to identify real terrorism-related information.

**Information sharing.** The fusion center or counterterrorism detectives cannot depend on the TLOs as a regular source of information since the TLO position is a collateral duty. The TLO members are seldom tasked to gather information and only submit a tip or a lead if they see suspicious activity during their normal course of employment. Frequency of tip or lead submissions also depends heavily on whether or not the fusion center or counterterrorism detectives maintain a relationship with that TLO. Many times TLOs will go through the basic TLO course but afterward will have little interaction with the fusion center or counterterrorism detectives. Over time, the TLO’s motivation fades, and the number of tips and leads submitted to the fusion center decreases. The TLO model relies heavily on social interaction and the ability of the fusion center or counterterrorism detectives to make the TLO feel part of a team.

**Momentum to continue to the next phase of the intelligence cycle.**

Because the TLO position is a collateral duty, the collection of information depends entirely on the motivation of each specific TLO. The TLO position is a two-year agreement; at the end of this period, the TLO is replaced by another person who must complete the TLO training process. “If the person selected for the TLO position leaves after two years, the knowledge that he gained to do the job and by actually performing the job leaves with him. Knowledge flow, therefore, ceases and the process has to be started again from the beginning” (Burchnell, 2008, p. 36). For many agencies the TLO position, contributes little or nothing to the momentum to press on into the next phase of the intelligence cycle. Each unit, station, or department must decide whether it will be able to sustain a local TLO program, with the requisite initial recruitment and training and the ongoing nurturing of relationships.

The TLO mission is limited to the collection, documentation, and reporting of homeland security information to the local fusion center. The next phase (processing and exploitation) takes place at or through the fusion center and never involves the TLO.

***b. JIT***

**Resources.** Since JIT members operate in a jail, they have many tools to collect information that are not available to detectives outside a jail. All phone conversation, visiting conversation, and letters to and from inmates (with the exception of letters between inmates and their attorneys and clergy) can be recorded or read without a search warrant, without personal acquaintance with the inmate, and without any probable cause. This is a valuable tool that the intelligence community can leverage since it needs a warrant, reasonable suspicion, and/or probable cause to gain access to this sort of surveillance or intelligence gathering outside the jail environment. JIT members can also gather information by conducting inmate searches, cell searches, or bugging a cell.

JIT members gather homeland security information as a collateral duty. Their primary work assignment is to provide security to inmates in the housing area (Los Angeles County, 2010). This allows JIT members to develop a rapport with inmates as

those inmates spend 40 hours with each JIT member every week. Over the course of time, JIT members can assess, develop, and recruit inmates as homeland security informants.

The intelligence community generally pays informants for information. In a jail setting there are a vast number of alternative ways to pay an inmate informant for information. Since their freedoms have been stripped from them, allowing the inmate to have extra phone, visiting, or recreational time has proved to be a more valuable incentive than money. This advantage saves the intelligence community money while it maximizes the collection of information in a controlled environment.

**Training and expertise.** JIT members are TLO-trained and possess a basic understanding of the intelligence community, the local fusion center, and how to submit a tip or a lead. Beyond the TLO training course, each member of a JIT must complete an additional jail-specific training program, which includes participation in five inmate interviews with a seasoned JIT member, followed by responsibility for five inmate interviews with a senior JIT member observing the interview. Much of the JIT member's expertise comes from on-the-job experience and regular debriefing/training meetings together as a team.

**Information sharing.** Tips and leads are documented by a JIT member and submitted to a counterterrorism detective or other designated agent at the fusion center, simultaneously with submission to the JIT leader, as soon as that tip or lead has been collected and at least superficially vetted for accuracy. The time from information collection to initial reporting to the fusion center is no greater than eight hours, and it can often be less than four hours. In addition, the JIT has monthly meetings in which it shares information with one another, conducts training, or shares a request for information (RFI) received from a counterterrorism detective. JIT members discuss interviews conducted over the past month and share new indicators or trends that could be developing. If these discussions lead to salient insights concerning previously submitted intelligence or turn information that once seemed innocuous into a worthwhile tip or lead, the JIT team leader documents and submits those insights or leads to the fusion center as well, for professional analysis (Los Angeles County, 2010).

**Momentum to continue to the next phase of the intelligence cycle.** The JIT mission is limited to the collection, documentation, and initial verification of homeland security information, which is reported to the local fusion center and counterterrorism detectives. The vast majority of the next phase (processing and exploitation) takes place at or through the fusion center and usually does not involve the JIT.

*c. JTTF*

**Resources.** The mission of a JTTF is to leverage the collective resources of its members to prevent, preempt, deter, and investigate domestic terrorist acts that affect the United States. Combining local, state, and federal personnel and resources helps spread the economic cost among all levels of government. Because each JTTF can incorporate a unique mix of government agencies and local organizations, and differing numbers and sizes of those agencies depending on the locale in which that JTTF operates, the resource mix and depth will differ for each JTTF. Urban JTTFs will generally be larger and better resourced than rural JTTFs, and a rural JTTF might have jurisdiction over a much larger geographic area, but a much smaller population. The nature of a JTTF is to bring together whatever law enforcement and first-responder resources do exist in a given area, organizing and empowering them to work together for maximum homeland security effectiveness.

**Training and expertise.** A JTTF is generally made up of local investigators who have experience with informants, search warrants, and criminal operations. Since JTTFs work in a specified area, it is imperative that they include local law enforcement officers with street knowledge and community contacts as an integral part of the JTTF. Not only does a JTTF include experienced local investigators, but it also includes federal agents, who have a wealth of knowledge regarding domestic and international terrorism and who are connected to significant federal resources.

**Information sharing.** The JTTF exists to facilitate information sharing among members of the intelligence community. All JTTF members undergo a

background check to obtain a top secret or secret clearance, allowing the JTTF to openly communicate with local, state, and federal agents.

**Momentum to continue to the next phase of the intelligence cycle.** The JTTF employs investigators whose job it is to investigate homeland security–related crimes, so the collection of information and knowledge of protocol mandates the JTTF into the next phase.

### 3. Processing and Exploitation Phase

Table 3. Processing and Exploitation Phase of the Intelligence Cycle

<b>Processing and Exploitation</b>	Terrorism Liaison Officer	Jail Interview Team	Joint Terrorism Task Force
Resources	3	3	5
Training/Expertise	1	2	5
Information Sharing	1	2	5
Momentum	1	2	5

#### a. TLO

**Resources.** The Los Angeles TLO program, like many around the nation, has a built-in processing and exploitation team in its fusion center, where TLOs report their tips and leads (Joint Regional Intelligence Center, n.d.).

**Training and expertise.** During the process of becoming a TLO, an individual receives guidelines on reporting suspicious activity or homeland security–related information. In Los Angeles the TLOs are directed to email a tip or lead to the LAJRIC Web site; the tip or lead is then automatically sent to the processing and exploitation team (Joint Regional Intelligence Center, n.d.).

**Information sharing.** This is a one-way process, and the exploitation team does not communicate with the TLO. Communication is vital in this step because a translator may be required or information being decrypted may need context (possibly provided in part by the TLO) in order to accurately decrypt data (or to accurately translate a lead in a foreign language).

**Momentum to continue to the next phase of the intelligence cycle.**

During phase three, the processing and exploitation phase, the momentum of the TLO model generally fades away. During meetings with TLOs their biggest complaint is that they do not receive feedback regarding a tip or lead that they have submitted to the fusion center. This is understandably disappointing to them, but it is a necessary part of operational security. After the collection phase, TLOs are seldom part of any additional phase.

***b. JIT***

In this phase, the JIT model nearly mirrors the TLO model since each model's mission is to submit the information collected to the fusion center for processing and analysis.

**Resources.** JIT members are TLO-trained and submit their tips and leads to the fusion center (Los Angeles County, 2010). The fusion center has personnel who process and exploit the tips or leads.

**Training and expertise.** During TLO training, JIT members receive guidelines for reporting suspicious activity or homeland security–related information. In Los Angeles the JIT members are directed to email a tip or lead to the LAJRIC Web site, from which it is automatically sent to the processing and exploitation team (Joint Regional Intelligence Center, n.d.).

**Information sharing.** This is a one-way process, and the processing and exploitation team does not continue to update the JIT on the progress of the investigation. However, communication is vital in this step because translation may be required, or information being decrypted may need context (possibly provided by the JIT) to accurately decrypt and analyze data (or to accurately understand a lead in a foreign language).

**Momentum to continue to the next phase of the intelligence cycle.**

During phase three, the processing and exploitation phase, the momentum of the JIT model begins to fade away. However, due to the unique jail environment, personnel from

processing and exploitation may contact the JIT members for further information, which allows the member of JIT to feel part of the investigative process and to build a relationship with members from the fusion center. This contact encourages the JIT momentum to continue.

**c. JTTF**

**Resources.** The FBI’s processing and exploitation resources are vast. The FBI has language skills and exploitation skills that cover an enormous range of experience. Since the JTTFs are comprised of some FBI agents, the JTTFs are able to utilize the processing and exploitation resources of the FBI and the local fusion centers as well.

**Training and expertise.** The JTTF members generally are connected to a fusion center or an FBI analyst, where they have access to experienced people to process and exploit the information.

**Information sharing.** As mentioned above, the JTTF members interact directly with personnel who process the information; therefore, they can share information face to face, which permits an open and dynamic flow of information sharing.

**Momentum to continue to the next phase of the intelligence cycle.** JTTF members collect intelligence as part of their mission. Once they gather the information, they wait for the processing to be completed so that they can further their investigation and the momentum is continued to the analytical phase.

**4. Analysis and Production**

Table 4. Analysis and Production during the Intelligence Cycle

<b>Analysis and Production</b>	<b>Terrorism Liaison Officer</b>	<b>Jail Interview Team</b>	<b>Joint Terrorism Task Force</b>
Resources	2	2	5
Training/Expertise	1	2	5
Information Sharing	1	1	5
Momentum	1	1	5

*a. TLO*

**Resources.** The TLOs are not involved in this step and have no resources allocated for this.

**Training and expertise.** The TLOs are not trained in analysis and production and develop no expertise in this role. The fusion centers or counterterrorism units, to whom the TLOs report, will have analysts assigned to them who can expertly examine the information.

**Information sharing.** Analysts generally do not communicate with the TLO who submitted the lead. Therefore the analyst could miss important context concerning the lead. Time-sensitive actionable information can be collected by the TLO, but if the TLO does not have a good personal relationship with a counterterrorism detective, the intelligence may become stale due to the time it takes to process the information. Also, most fusion centers operate on the weekends at minimum staffing, if they operate at all. During weekends and holidays, time-sensitive actionable intelligence will take longer to process and disseminate to the end users. There are no weekend breaks for terrorist activities; therefore, it is important to leverage all actionable information in a timely manner because failing to do so could be devastating.

**Momentum to continue to the next phase of the intelligence cycle.** The TLO generally is not contacted, and the momentum for the TLO to continue collecting information diminishes because of the lack of feedback. However, the local fusion center will ensure that the information continues around the intelligence cycle.

*b. JIT*

In phase four, the analytical phase, the JIT model's performance mirrors the TLO model since the process is the same. The JIT model is not involved with the analysis and production phase of the intelligence cycle. On rare occasions, analysts may contact a JIT member to provide jail context to the information being analyzed.

**Resources.** The JIT model does not have an analysis component that is directly integrated within the JIT model. However the JIT model does use the local fusion center for analysis and production.

**Training and Expertise.** The JIT members have a specific expertise that the analysts at the local fusion center do not possess: knowledge of the intricacies of the jail system. This knowledge includes jail databases, jail terminology, and jail culture. During the analysis phase jail expertise could be useful in order to understand the context of the information collected and processed into intelligence.

**Information Sharing.** Since the JIT model does not have members at the local fusion center, the information is not shared. The fusion center collects information from the JIT members, but rarely are JIT members contacted about the information they send to the fusion center. Also, JIT members do not have secret clearances; therefore, if the information is later classified as “secret,” the JIT members are not allowed access to the information.

**Momentum to continue to the next phase of the intelligence cycle.** This phase of the intelligence cycle alienates the JIT members because members are no longer involved in the intelligence cycle. Alienation can reduce the number of tips and leads that the fusion center receives from the JIT members.

*c. JTTF*

**Resources.** The JTTFs have a wide range of resources, including an analyst from the FBI and local law enforcement agencies with an expertise in cartels, immigration fraud, counterfeit currency, international terrorist organizations, domestic terrorist organizations, and cyber terrorism.

**Training and Expertise.** Analysts with wide proficiency are valuable when analyzing a wide range of homeland security information, such as is found in the jail system. In addition, since JTTF members interact with the analyst, a JTTF member can consult an analyst who specializes in the specific crime he is investigating.

**Information Sharing.** Federal analysts have top-secret clearances and can use secret federal databases when analyzing information. Checking information through federal databases allows the intelligence community to connect with all 50 states, a great help when striving to “connect the dots.”

**Momentum to continue to the next phase of the intelligence cycle.** JTTF members are still actively involved in the case at this point and will press forward to phase five for new direction regarding the analyzed information.

**5. Dissemination and Integration Phase**

Table 5. Dissemination and Integration Phase of the Intelligence Cycle

<b>Dissemination and Integration</b>	Terrorism Liaison Officer	Jail Interview Team	Joint Terrorism Task Force
Resources	1	1	5
Training/Expertise	1	1	5
Information Sharing	1	1	5
Momentum	1	1	5

*a. TLO and JIT*

The fusion centers are responsible for disseminating the intelligence products to the end user or consumer for integration. The TLOs and JIT members are not part of this phase.

From an operational standpoint this makes perfect sense, but from a leadership perspective that takes a longer view, it is a problem that needs to be addressed. After a tip or a lead is emailed to the fusion center, the submitter seldom receives any follow-up. He will usually receive an email, thanking him for the information, but rarely does he receive feedback regarding the value of the information. TLO and JIT exclusion is largely based on the lack of security clearance: if the TLO or JIT member submits information relevant to a classified case he cannot receive feedback. This is the phase that

hinders the TLO and JIT program. When a TLO or JIT member spends time to submit information, he would like feedback; without feedback he is less motivated to continue the intelligence cycle.

***b. JTTF***

**Resources.** The information is disseminated to appropriate investigators, policy makers, and managers.

**Training and expertise.** Each phase of the intelligence cycle possesses personnel with a mission and a set of expertise. The dissemination and integration phase allows the JTTF to examine the intelligence and to use its training and experience to act on the intelligence gathered.

**Information sharing.** Since the JTTF is a task force with local, state, and federal agents with secret clearances, the information is shared at all levels of government. The Counter-Terrorism Executive Board (CTEB) was created as a way for executives whose agency is part of a JTTF to exchange information and update the progress of terrorism-related cases. The CTETB is comprised of the top-ranking leadership with members in the JTTF; it allows the exchange of ideas and promotes agency participation in the JTTF. The CTETB is a prime example of how the JTTF model disseminates information to all agencies involved in the JTTF, and it provides a great impetus to continue the intelligence cycle.

**Momentum to continue to the next phase of the intelligence cycle.** The JTTF model integrates the information by planning and thus starts the intelligence cycle all over again.

**C. CONCLUSION**

This research seeks to extrapolate the best practices of each model to form a robust, transferable model for collecting homeland security information from the jail system. An evaluation of the three models generated both expected and unexpected results. Table 6 depicts each model's score in relation to the intelligence cycle. Not

surprisingly, the JTTF model scored highest with a perfect score. This was mainly due to the fact that the JTTF is a full-time position, has local, state, and federal resources, and has an integral information sharing platform.

Table 6. Intelligence Cycle Score Comparison

<b>Intelligence Cycle</b>	<b>Terrorism Liaison Officer</b>	<b>Jail Interview Team</b>	<b>Joint Terrorism Task Force</b>
Planning and Direction	4	4	20
Collection	6	17	20
Processing and Exploitation	6	9	20
Analysis and Production	5	6	20
Dissemination and Integration	4	4	20

An unforeseen result appeared in the collection phase of the intelligence cycle. The JIT model performed nearly as well as the JTTF model, even though the JIT model is a collateral duty and functions in the collection phase without state and federal resources. However, it is important to remember that the JTTF model was evaluated according to its performance in its original environment, which is outside the jail system. The JTTF model does not normally collect any homeland security information from the jail system at all.

A review of the three models shows several characteristics common to the TLO and JIT models and several characteristics demonstrating that the JTTF model surpassed the TLO and JIT models. The following offers a comparison and explanation for these characteristics in each phase of the intelligence cycle.

In the planning and direction phase, the JTTF was a far superior model than the TLO and JIT since the JTTF is a federally funded model. The JTTFs are assigned proactive tasks from the JTTF planning and direction managers, whereas the TLO and

JIT models are merely requested to report suspicious activity that they observe. The JTTF staff contributes to the strategy in the planning and direction phase at the local, regional, and sometimes at the national level.

The collection phase generated an unexpected result. The JIT was a collateral-duty team and a pilot project without formal funding, but the JIT model scored nearly as highly as the JTTF model, which has full-time staff and is funded by local, state, and federal agencies. The JIT model possessed the ability to utilize its position in the jail, as well as existing jail-specific technology and knowledge of jail policy and procedures, to successfully collect homeland security information. Since the JTTF staff roles are full-time positions, the members do not have the advantage of working in an inmate housing area, an advantage that allows JIT members to spot, assess, and recruit informants. JIT members also have access to inmate visitor logs, recorded inmate phone calls, and inmate cell listening devices to gather information. In a jail setting one does not need a search warrant to search inmate cells or to view incoming or outgoing inmate mail. A JTTF member could also utilize the above tools if the need arose, but without working in a jail facility, a JTTF member will not be able to determine which inmates to approach to collect information. A JTTF investigator might make good use of jail technology and protocol to build a case about certain individuals based on outside tips or leads, but no JTTF member can be in the position to pick up fresh tips and leads as they come to light in the jail setting itself.

Each model possessed an avenue to process and exploit the information collected. The JTTF scored higher due to the fact that the JTTF members generally know the members of the processing and exploitation phase and have direct contact with the personnel who process the information collected. In contrast, the TLO and JIT members submit a tip or a lead via the Internet without any contact with a member from the processing and exploitation phase. This is the phase where the TLO and JIT member's momentum begins to decrease around the intelligence cycle.

The analysis and production phase yielded nearly the same results as the processing and exploitation phase for the same reasons. The TLO and JIT members are not informed who will analyze the information they submit, whereas a JTTF member

generally is notified of the analyst working on the information he collects. In addition, if the analysis contains classified information, TLO and JIT members often will not be able to view the analysis because they do not have appropriate security clearances.

The final phase, the dissemination and integration phase, is the phase where the findings are most disturbing. The TLO and JIT models scored the lowest on this phase because members rarely receive feedback about the information they submit. The failure to provide feedback results in a reduction in momentum to continue the intelligence cycle. This is tragic.

During my involvement with the TLO and JIT programs, I witnessed members motivated at the onset of their collateral duty assignments, but when they failed to receive feedback, they in turn failed to note or report additional homeland security information. During my research I discovered that the primary complaint from members of TLO and JIT programs was that they did not receive feedback about the information they submitted. As a result, TLOs and JIT members mistakenly assumed that their tips and leads were either ignored or proved fruitless; they were therefore less and less motivated to take the time to submit a tip or a lead, which in turn diminishes homeland security collection efforts.

During the review of the analysis, it became evident that the JIT model possesses a unique ability to collect information in a jail environment. The JIT scored 17 of 20 in the collection phase, despite the fact that the JIT members do not have the opportunity to devote 40 hours a week to collect homeland security intelligence. The JTTF model scored 20 of 20 in the collection phase, but if the JTTF model were evaluated by its probability to collect information in a jail setting, the JTTF model's collection phase rating would plummet. The JTTF, being a local, state, and federal task force, lacks an intimate knowledge of jail procedures, an opportunity to develop a strong rapport with inmates, and a mastery of the technical capability of a jail setting to collect information—all strong points for a JIT.

The TLO program utilizes homeland security training classes to better educate first responders to recognize homeland security indicators and to teach them the protocol for submitting a tip or lead to the fusion center. Even though the JIT utilizes the TLO training programs and networking capabilities, the JIT scored higher than the TLO model because of the number of persons assigned to each JIT verses the typical TLO deployment model, where generally there is just one TLO assigned to an entire unit or department. The JIT is also a more active model, with monthly meetings to share information, a sense of team identity and camaraderie, and a proactive mission to collect homeland security information. In contrast, the TLO program is both solitary and reactive: TLOs operate as the sole trained sentry watching for possible terrorist activity, and they are taught not to actively investigate or seek out terrorist threats but to report suspicious homeland security information when they stumble across it serendipitously in the line of duty (Joint Regional Intelligence Center, n.d.).

The JTTF model scored the highest due to the JTTF mission mandate, broad resource pool, and full-time highly trained well-connected agents focused exclusively on homeland security efforts. JTTF members have direct contact with specialists in each phase of the intelligence cycle, which in turn helps to create momentum around the intelligence cycle. JTTF members are generally experienced investigators with knowledge of homeland security issues. JTTF members also have security clearances, which helps the information sharing process. Finally, the JTTF has resources from the local, state, and federal levels, which enhances its ability to effectively maneuver around the intelligence cycle.

In summary, although the TLO model could happen to include an occasional jail deputy, the model itself is not well suited to systematically and proactively collect homeland security information from the jail system. The JIT model is the closest extant example of effective intelligence gathering within a jail inmate population: it allows a natural rapport with jail inmates, provides the ability to assess inmates, and utilizes existing human and technology resources efficiently. However, the current JIT model requires several improvements in order to serve as a “best-practice” model for mining the American jail inmate population for its rich resources of homeland security intelligence.

The JIT model is not part of the last three phases of the intelligence cycle, which slows the JIT momentum to continue the cycle. Also, JIT members are not investigators, nor do they have an in-depth knowledge of current homeland security matters. The JTTF model itself, replicated and focused on collecting intelligence from the jail system, is also not well-suited for that task: this would represent bureaucratic and budgetary overkill and unnecessarily duplicate the depth and complexity of any existing JTTF in its jurisdiction. However, a combination of these models (JIT and JTTF) would prove to be a “best-practice” homeland security jail information model.

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## VI. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### A. DISCUSSION

This thesis does not attempt to develop a new intelligence apparatus for the jail system because this would require significant new assets and personnel in a fiscally constrained environment. The FBI has over 28,000 employees, 56 field offices, and 400 satellite offices (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 424). There are 104 Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) across the nation and 4,400 JTTF members from over 600 state and local agencies and 50 federal agencies (FBI, 2004). A thriving framework already exists in the JTTF model—however, that framework must be adjusted and supplemented in order for it to properly serve the jail system.

America is stronger and more resilient as a result of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission to share information and to integrate all sources of information in order to “connect the dots” (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 407). However, the intelligence community must evaluate the last 10 years and determine whether any strategic gaps still remain in intelligence collection. This thesis clearly documents that some of the most notorious terrorists have spent time in a jail and that the intelligence community has yet to take advantage of this insight. The very idea of “homeland security” is a new concept developed on the heels of 9/11 to address the domestic threats that the United States faces. One rapidly increasing threat is the Mexican drug cartels. “Not only are the Mexican cartel wars violent, they are increasingly brutal. New weaponry are joining grenade attacks, beheadings, cartel information operations, ‘corpse-messaging’—or leaving a message on a mutilated corpse—to shape the operational space” (Sullivan, 2012, p. 8). Drug cartel violence is spilling over into the United States, and the United States must address the threat. The U.S. jail system is a prime environment to collect information about the cartels (Borunda, 2011).

Excessive violence by the cartels is a national security problem for Mexico, and—as our close neighbor and political ally—presents high stakes for the United States. In the past year, U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies have worked diligently to reach a consensus view on “spillover” violence and on U.S. vulnerability to the Mexican cartels’

violent tactics. These discussions required the interagency to define “spillover” in practical terms. As agreed to by the interagency community, spillover violence entails deliberate, planned attacks by the cartels on U.S. assets, including civilian, military, or law enforcement officials, innocent U.S. citizens, or physical institutions such as government buildings, consulates, or businesses. (FBI, 2010)

The U.S. jail system is flooded with inmates who have transported drugs for the drug cartels or have actionable information relevant to the drug cartels (Borunda, 2011). Many persons involved in this emerging threat to the United States—and much of the information that can help address it—is confined within the U.S. jail system (Borunda, 2011). Notorious terrorists and drug cartels are just two documented examples that prove that the U.S. jail system possesses actionable homeland security information.

The federal government acknowledges that local law enforcement officers are on the front lines of detection and prevention (USDHS, 2012). Members of the intelligence community are rarely surrounded by such a rich concentration of actionable homeland security information as are the law enforcement officers who work inside a U.S. jail facility. These officers are on the front lines of detection and prevention, but they must obtain the support, resources, and expertise of the intelligence community as a whole. In order to better protect the United States, the intelligence community must embrace a homeland security jail information concept and ensure that jail information collection efforts rotate around the intelligence cycle without losing momentum. A combination of the JTTF and the Jail Interview Team (JIT) models would be the best model for a homeland security jail information team.

## **B. RECOMMENDATIONS**

Contemporary terrorism is a complex phenomenon involving a range of non-state actors linked in networked organizations. These organizations, exemplified by the global jihad movement known as al-Qaeda, are complex non-state actors operating as transnational networks within a galaxy of like-minded networks. These entities pose security threats to nation states and the collective global security. Traditional security and intelligence approaches separated criminal and national security intelligence, as well as domestic and international security concerns. Modern terrorism exploits these seams to operate on a global scale. (Sullivan & Bauer, 2008, p. 26)

Terrorists have successfully exploited the U.S. intelligence weaknesses described above. The intelligence community must now exploit the advantage that the U.S. jail system offers and create a homeland security jail information team. Currently there are two successful frameworks in place to proactively collect homeland security information: the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and the Jail Intelligence Team (JIT). The JTTF concept can be utilized and its efforts expanded to include the jail system, creating a bridge between the JIT members and the intelligence community. This eliminates the major cost for resources and personnel that would be required to create a completely new model. The JTTF/JIT concept also does not place the personnel and financial burden on one agency alone. A homeland security jail intelligence program would benefit local, state, and federal agencies, and security is the responsibility of law enforcement at all levels of government (Mueller, 2011). Therefore, local, state, and federal agencies should share their resources and personnel to establish a homeland security jail intelligence program.

The 9/11 Commission agrees. According to the commission report:

The FBI is just a small fraction of the national law enforcement community in the United States, a community comprised mainly of state and local agencies. The network designed for sharing information, and the work of the FBI through local Joint Terrorism Task Forces, should build a reciprocal relationship, in which state and local agents understand what information they are looking for and, in return, receive some of the information being developed about what is happening, or may happen, in their communities. (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 444)

A JTTF/JIT homeland security jail intelligence model would promote interagency collaboration, create interagency relationships, and advance information sharing efforts among the entire law enforcement community.

In light of the research analysis, a JTTF/JIT homeland security jail intelligence model is strongly recommended. The JIT has resources that the JTTF does not have, particularly the ability to utilize signals intelligence (SIGINT) without the need of a warrant. Newly arrested inmates will communicate with individuals outside a jail facility using telephones, computers, and online inmate-visiting sessions. These forms of communication can be tapped without the need of a warrant. The JIT is also uniquely

positioned to observe suspects, interview, develop relationships, and recruit informants (HUMINT), in a way that is almost unknown outside the jail environment. The JTTF model also has resources that the JIT model does not possess, including classified information, direction received from the planning and direction managers, in-depth homeland security knowledge and training, intelligence databases, and intelligence community networks. The implementation of a JTTF/JIT concept would maximize a homeland security jail intelligence team concept and better fulfill the needs of each phase of the intelligence cycle.

When developing a JTTF/JIT homeland security jail intelligence model, the size and exact composition of the model will depend on location, number of inmates in a specific jail, crimes in that particular jurisdiction, and the profile of the inmates. Thus, the composition of the jail intelligence model will vary. In a city comparable to Los Angeles, the JTTF model should consist of jail personnel who work directly with inmates, like a JIT: local and state homeland security detectives, personnel from the local fusion center, FBI, Drug Enforcement Administration, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and Secret Service. Inmates incarcerated in the U.S. jail system hold information about drug cartels, human trafficking/illegal immigration, firearms and explosives, counterfeit merchandise used to fund terrorist groups, and counterfeit U.S. currency. The federal agencies have much to gain from information collected in a jail system.

### **C. FUTURE RESEARCH**

Exploring uncharted territories is always fraught with challenges and obstacles. However, the creation of a homeland security jail information program is worth the effort and dedication it will take to overcome and excel. The following recommendations should be explored when creating a homeland security jail information program:

- Determine which local, state, and federal agencies will participate in the program;
- From the agencies who desire to participate, create an exploratory committee of managers from each agency;

- The exploratory committee must determine the needs, level of involvement, and expectations of each agency;
- The exploratory committee can draft a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), agreed by and signed by each agency to form a homeland security jail intelligence model;
- Managers at jail facilities should be part of the exploratory committee and should educate the other members about the laws and policies governing a jail facility;
- The exploratory committee should attempt to garner support and input from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU);
- The exploratory committee must develop a protocol to progress around the intelligence cycle; and
- The exploratory committee must establish training and goals and means for all members of the jail interview team, beginning with training and orientation to the new model.

#### **D. CONCLUSIONS**

September 11, 2011, was a day that changed the United States, especially with regard to law enforcement's role in national security (Velez-Villar, 2012). The FBI's assistant director, Directorate of Intelligence, Eric Velez-Villar, stated to the House Homeland Security Committee, "Given the diverse threats we face, it is essential that law enforcement entities work together, making our partnerships with all levels of law enforcement that much more invaluable" (Velez-Villar, 2012). The 9/11 Commission was formed to investigate "facts and circumstances relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001" (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 12). During its investigation, the 9/11 Commission discovered several failures concerning local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies. The following were failures determined by the 9/11 Commission (9/11 Commission, 2004):

The government's ability to collect intelligence inside the United States, and the sharing of such information between the intelligence and law enforcement communities, was not a priority before 9/11. (p. 345)

Before 9/11, with the exception of one portion of the FBI, very little of the sprawling US law enforcement community was engaged in countering

terrorism. Moreover, law enforcement could be effective only after specific individuals were identified, a plot had formed, or an attack had already occurred.” (p. 444)

The following are recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission to address the failures that led up to the terrorist attacks (9/11 Commission, 2004):

Long-term success demands the use of all elements of national power: diplomacy, intelligence, covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy, and homeland defense. If we favor one tool while neglecting others, we leave ourselves vulnerable and weaken our national effort. (p. 381)

[Unify] the many participants in the counterterrorism effort and their knowledge in a network-based information-sharing system that transcends traditional governmental boundaries. (p. 398)

The US government, joined by other governments around the world, is working through intelligence, law enforcement, military, financial, and diplomatic channels to identify, disrupt, capture, or kill individual terrorists. (p. 398)

There is a growing role for state and local law enforcement agencies. They need more training and work with federal agencies so that they can cooperate more effectively with those federal authorities in identifying terrorist suspects. (p. 403)

September 11, 2001, marked a seismic shift in the American paradigm of national security (Lowenthal, 2009, p. 25). In a letter written by Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld on September 17, 2001, Wolfowitz wrote,

[I] wondered why so little thought had been devoted to the danger of suicide pilots, seeing a “failure of imagination” and a mindset that dismissed possibilities. (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 336)

Much has changed since then. The major structural and paradigmatic adjustments in response to the reality check of 9/11 have laid a robust foundation for America’s homeland security in the twenty-first century, but the extent and success of those changes can foster the same comfortable lack of imagination that made us so vulnerable before 9/11 (Johnson & Wirtz, 2011, p. 35). We must not fail to imagine the intelligence collection possibilities in our jail system. We must not become complacent but must press forward, expanding our minds and working together to protect this great nation.

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