

FOURTH GENERATION WARFARE IN CHILE: ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING THREATS

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**FOURTH GENERATION WARFARE IN CHILE: ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING
THREATS**

by

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ABSTRACT

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Since the end of the 20th Century, a range of non-conventional threats challenge the global community. Instability and irregular conflicts are suddenly increasing among nation states, such as insurgency, popular militias, terrorism, and crime. The purpose of this research is to explore the risks of Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) in Chile and how its National Defense Strategy is prepared to face these threats with a specific focus on illicit drug trafficking. First, this paper reviews the theory and characteristics of 4GW. It then identifies current non-conventional threats in Chile according to its national situation and the most important trends regarding to illicit drug trade in Latin America. Next, this paper analyzes Chile's existing National Defense Policy and how it may work to face the 21st Century's scenario. Finally, this research presents conclusions and recommendations for policy makers and advisers - those responsible for making and implementing national security policy in Chile - in order to review and adjust its national strategies, and to enhance better defense relationships in the hemisphere. Further, recommendations made in this paper will be useful for opinion makers and officers in the Chilean Armed Forces who are involved in these strategic challenges in the future.

FOURTH GENERATION WARFARE IN CHILE: ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING THREATS

The security of the nation is the result of a series of actions carried out by the State in order to make progress in achieving its objectives and safeguarding national interests when dealing with significant risks, threats or interference.

—Book of National Defense of Chile

Globalization is a recent observable fact in the world-wide scenario which affects diplomatic, cultural, economic, and military connections among countries. Cooperative and effective tools, such as global marketing and communications beyond the borders, allow states and non-state actors to build a gigantic net of contacts, opportunities, and development. Many Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and numerous international or regional organizations like the United Nations, European Union, African Union, Organization of American States, among others, are taking part demanding participation and integration to fulfill the prime objectives of world-wide peace, growth, and progress.

Since the end of the 20th Century, in addition to the conventional threats, several of those helpful effects also promote a range of non-conventional threats that have rapidly risen and have challenged the global community. The world becomes more uncertain day by day. Potential enemies no longer emerge to fight in conventional way. Most of them have been provided with human, economic and technological resources because they are supported by international organizations and even some states, based on radical inclinations of religion or ideological motivation. Thus, instability and irregular conflicts are suddenly increasing among nation states, such as popular militias, insurgencies, populism, terrorism, crime, and many others.

According to this phenomenon, the purpose of this research is to explore the risk of Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) in Chile and how its National Defense Strategy is prepared to face non-conventional threats with a specific focus on illicit drug trafficking. Initially, this paper reviews the theory and characteristics of 4GW. Then, it identifies current non-conventional threats in Chile, according to its national situation, and the most important trends regarding to illicit drugs trade in Latin America. Next, this paper analyzes the Chile's existing National Defense Policy and how it may work to face the 21st Century's scenario. Finally, this research presents conclusions and recommendations for policy makers and advisers - all those are responsible for making and implementing national security policy in Chile - in order to review and adjust its national strategies, force structures, and to enhance better defense relationships in the hemisphere. Further, recommendations lasted in this paper will be useful for opinion makers and officers in the Chilean Armed Forces who will be involved in strategic challenges in the near future.

Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW): Theory and Characteristics

For a better understanding of this theory, it is helpful to make a brief historical framework. Most of the articles related to this cutting edge concept of 4GW are linked to William S. Lind, who began his work about it in 1989. Through several articles and books, Lind has followed more than two decades of studies regarding the roots, ways, means, goals, and results of 4GW. According to Lind, the first of the Four Generations began with the Peace of Westphalia, when nation-states established a monopoly on war. Since then, "state militaries find it difficult to imagine war in any way other than fighting state armed forces similar to themselves."¹

Lind describes all the generations of warfare emphasizing that First Generation Warfare (1GW) – from 1648 to 1860 - is “the culture of order characterized by a battlefield of order, as a formal war of line and column tactics, and tightly ordered uniformed soldiers with top-down discipline.”² Then, battlefield changed as technology and tactics began to change. In the first decades of the 20th Century, machine guns and artillery delivered indirect fire effects broke down old line and column tactics. Thus, developed by the French Army during and after World War I, Second Generation Warfare (2GW) comes with tactics that are essentially linear, but now based on fire and movement. Massed firepower replaced massed manpower. Surprise, speed, and lethality became essential tools when the goal is attrition, and the doctrine was summed up by the French as, “the artillery conquers, the infantry occupies.”³ However, the tactics used by the German Army in World War I - against the British and French aimed at breaking their trench warfare stalemate - gave rise to the Third Generation Warfare (3GW), commonly known as maneuver warfare or Blitzkrieg. In the offensive, 3GW seeks to bypass and fore the enemy’s. In the defense, it seeks to draw the enemy in and cut him off.⁴ 3GW became non-linear warfare. Its tactics, based not only on firepower and attrition, tend to take advantage of force multipliers⁵ such as intelligence, psychological operations, and technology, to name a few. That meant a revolutionary change traditional culture of order, because 3GW military officers had to make decisions based on a result to be achieved more than on the process and method. As a result, initiative became more important than obedience, and self-discipline overcame imposed discipline as well.⁶

According to Lind, the Fourth Generation marks the most radical change since the peace of Westphalia in 1648. Those changes involve different actors, causes, and techniques to wage warfare and the resulting state militaries fighting and losing wars against non-state opponents due to the rise of cultural, ethnic, and religious conflicts. Thus, current wars are marked by a return to an entire world in conflict, not merely conflict between states.⁷ In this sense, Lind states:

Since 1989, the world has witnessed a progressive weakening of the state and rise of alternative, non-state primary loyalties, for which a growing number of men are willing to fight. That is the heart of my definition of Fourth Generation war.⁸

Consequently, Fourth Generation Wars show an increase in small mobile, maneuverable, and very versatile groups of combatants fighting in a diffuse and decentralized battlefield. Those insurgent groups, or violent non-state actors, often seek to implement their own government or restore an old government over the current ruling power. Thus, targets are not only enemies' forces, but also include the population's support for the war and the enemy's culture.⁹

Fourth Generation Warfare is often seen in conflicts involving large military disparities. Therefore, 4GW can also be understood as a method of warfare that seeks a moral victory by undermining enemy strengths and using asymmetric operations, in terms of weapons and techniques that differ substantially from opponents.¹⁰ This simple idea could include state-to-state wars, but it primarily refers to any conflict in which one of the major participants is not a state. Rather, it involves a violent non-state actor using tactics of education/propaganda, movement-building, secrecy, terror, and/or confusion to overcome its foe's superiority. In that context, 4GW challenges broaden the concept of threat to national security and sovereignty due to the tremendous growth the enemy

has experienced. Nowadays the enemies can be “traditional nation-states; nontraditional, external non-state (small groups and individuals) actors or proxies; and/or violent nontraditional intrastate actors that might threaten the achievement of broader objectives and the vitality of the state.”¹¹ In 4GW conflicts, “non-state actors adopt irregular and asymmetric methods in an attempt to circumvent their military opponents’ strength and strike directly at their opponents’ critical political, cultural, or population targets.”¹² In this way, 4GW has much in common with traditional low-intensity conflict in its classical forms of insurgency, narcoterrorism, and guerrilla warfare.

On the other hand, there are valid criticisms of 4GW theory. Some or many questions whether it really is a “new form of warfare” or whether it is merely the reappearance of approaches and techniques used insurgents and guerrillas in the past.¹³ Although that debate is not the focus of this research, those arguments provide useful insights into the current dialogue that is trying to identify common concepts that define global trends in terms of enemies, causes, means, ways, goals, and will for which these organizations fight.¹⁴

Understanding Threats

Latin American Perspective of Threats. To analyze the current threats from the Latin American perspective, it is helpful to review the “Special Conference of Security” carried out in Mexico in 2003 where the States of the Americas committed to promoting and strengthening peace and security in the Hemisphere. As a result, the Conference composed the “Declaration on Security in the Americas”¹⁵ focused on high-importance matters in terms of hemispheric security and it also points out different nature of threats.

This Declaration on Security in the Americas states:

Our new concept of security in the Hemisphere is multidimensional in scope, includes traditional and new threats, concerns, and other challenges to the security of the states of the Hemisphere... The security threats, concerns, and other challenges in the hemispheric context are of diverse nature and multidimensional scope, and the traditional concept and approach must be expanded to encompass new and nontraditional threats, which include political, economic, social, health, and environmental aspects.¹⁶

In John E. Griffiths' article "Hemispheric Security in Latin America, Scope and Propositions"¹⁷, he deduced that the condition of multidimensional scope is defined by the inclusion of "traditional or military nature threats" and the new "non-military nature threats". He emphasized two important points: first, the Declaration of Security in the Americas clearly recognizes conventional threats understanding them as all those possibilities of traditional military confrontation between two or more states in the Hemisphere. Second, the Declaration of Security in the Americas explicitly recognizes new threats, concerns, and other challenges of a diverse nature; even though it does not establish the differences between some and other, he considers outstanding that the "diverse nature" of the challenges has been indicated.

Chilean Perspective of Threats. Since the publication of the second version of its Book of National Defense (BND) in 2002, before the Special Conference of Security in Mexico 2003, Chile had just outlined its definition of threats. In this sense, threats are understood as "real or perceived actions, provoked consciously or unconsciously, by a potential enemy who presumed to have the intention and capacity to affect our own interests negatively."¹⁸ In fact, threats have always been considered the essential factor to structure a nation's defense. From that point of view, Defense begins by establishing what is to be protected, what are the risks or threats to the object to be defended are,

when should action be taken, and then, defining the means through which a nation will act in its defense.¹⁹

In accordance with the Declaration on Security of the Americas, Chile recognizes that each state within the Hemisphere maintain different perspectives regarding security threats and priorities. To response to this environment, Chilean security architecture must adapt for the particular circumstances of the scenarios it envisions. Due to changing and sometimes unpredictable potential scenarios, Chile has adopted - in its 2010 version of the Book of National Defense - a more flexible conception of the threats with the aim of identifying the events that represent real risks and opportunities in which it is possible to act cooperatively. Accordingly, the phenomena like terrorism, drug trafficking, poverty and other that do not constitute threats, are including as “security problems”, although they possibly can be transformed into “threats”.²⁰

Non-conventional Threats. In accordance with the Declaration of Security in the Americas, new threats, concerns, and other challenges of a diverse nature affecting the security of states of the Hemisphere exist as follows:

- Terrorism, transnational organized crime, the global drug problem, corruption, asset laundering, and illicit trafficking in weapons;
- Extreme poverty and social exclusion of broad sectors of the population, which also affect stability and democracy. Extreme poverty erodes social cohesion and undermines the security of states;
- Natural and man-made disasters, HIV/AIDS and other diseases, other health risks, and environmental degradation;
- Trafficking in persons;
- Attacks to cyber security;
- The potential for damage to arise in the event of an accident or incident during the maritime transport of potentially hazardous

materials, including petroleum and radioactive materials and toxic waste; and

- The possibility of access, possession, and use of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery by terrorists.²¹

In addition to these diverse threats, concerns, and challenges outlined in the Declaration on Security of the Americas, non-conventional threats have become known as emergent threats or asymmetric threats because they have been generated from new scenarios, within a multidimensional scope, and because they are characterized by inequality among the belligerents.

In contrast, Griffiths emphasizes that the Declaration on Security of the Americas does not specify the differences between diverse threats, concerns, and challenges. As a result, he proposes a more detailed classification starting with “non-military range threats”, those into which he principally groups all the phenomena of violent nature and sometimes transnational character triggered for a premeditated intention, with the purpose of producing damage to the human person. Complementarily, this concept also groups the typified crimes as much in the internal legislation of a state as in the international law.²² Within this categorization, among other phenomena, are illicit drug trafficking, organized crimes, trafficking in weapons of massive destruction, violence, terrorism, etc.

According to Griffiths, two other classifications exist: structural risks and catastrophic events. Structural risks are those generated by poverty or the economic instability which degrades well-being; and catastrophic events, like earthquakes, tsunamis, epidemics or spills of dangerous substances. Although these two last classifications could trigger non-military range threats to security, they are more related to the development policies within the nation-states.

Illicit Trade on Drugs: Trends in Latin America

In the last four decades, every continent in the world has faced by non-conventional threats. Latin America has also been a continent that is facing many of them, and all the countries of the region, including Chile, are nowadays trying to find solutions to a variety of phenomena. One of the largest threats, the illicit drug trade, has permanently been on the agenda of the Americas like a multi-faceted threat that jeopardizes the security and the sovereignty of the states.

One of the most significant trends in Latin America is related to the close connection existing between illicit drug trafficking, transnational organized crimes, and illicit trafficking in weapons. Undoubtedly, illicit drugs continue to cause a health menace to humanity and market activities generate the most income to drug mafias, through illegal transactions. It is a recognized fact that drug controls by the authority have generated a criminal market of macroeconomic dimensions that uses violence and corruption to mediate between consumers and suppliers.²³ The Organization of American States is aware of the threat of armed violence to citizens is a rising phenomenon in many parts of the Americas. "The linkage of illicit manufacturing, sale and distribution of firearms, munitions and even explosive material with drug trafficking, terrorism, transnational organized crime, and other criminal enterprises has been well established, and the magnitude of the problem is significant."²⁴ Remnant items of past conflicts and easy money coming from illegal drug transactions make easy the access to illegal firearms, ammunition and even explosives; all those which are going to be used for cartels or traffickers to protect illegal organizations.

Since illicit drug trafficking has a close interaction with organized crime within an international scope, the United Nations has taken part conducting several programs to

monitor and reduce the negative effects from these transnational, non-conventional threats. In those efforts, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime - UNODC²⁵ - presented the World Drug Report in 2009 whose aims are “to enhance Member States’ understanding of global illicit drug trends, and to sensitize all Governments about the need for more systematic collection and reporting of data related to illicit drugs.”²⁶ This report highlights that law enforcement should shift its focus from drug users to drug traffickers, also the necessitates putting an end to the tragedy of cities spinning out of control due drug deals take place predominantly in urban settings under the control of criminal groups.

According to the UNODC, transnational organized crime is considered one of the foremost threats to human security. Therefore, UNODC works closely with Governments, international organizations and civil society to strengthen cooperation to counter the pervasive influence of organized crime and drug trafficking. This UN standpoint involves the following aspects:

- Organized crime is a multi-faceted phenomenon manifested in different activities, drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings; trafficking in firearms; smuggling of migrants; money laundering, among others. It impede the political, social, economic, and cultural development of societies worldwide
- As globalization has expanded international trade, so the range of organized crime activities has broadened and diversified. In particular drug trafficking is one of the main activities of organized crime groups, generating enormous profits.
- The links between drug trafficking and other forms of transnational organized crime calls for a more integrated approach to address this nexus.
- The traditional hierarchical forms of organized crime groups have diminished; replaced with loose networks who work together in order to exploit new market opportunities. For example organized crime groups

involved in drug trafficking are commonly engaged in smuggling of other illegal goods.

- The signing of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime in 2000 was a historic step forward in countering this threat.²⁷

The second major tendency establishes that the fight against the drug trafficking and its associated threats is an effort that demands that governments use their capacities taken as a whole structure. Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia are the world's largest sources of coca leaf and refined cocaine. Thus, their governments have historically been engaging in huge efforts to monitor, control and fight illicit drug trafficking and the illegal trade related to it. One of the most remarkable efforts is the social-political-military Plan Colombia, developed by the Government of Colombia and supported by the United States, as an integrated strategy to prevent the flow of illegal drugs into the United States, as well as to help Colombia promote peace and economic development because it contributes to regional security in the Andes.

The result of increasing U.S. and Colombian law enforcement pressures on the cocaine industry is still affecting within Colombia and the region. Although there seems to be improvement within Colombia, in terms of production of cocaine and control of the narcoterrorism, there also seems to be a negative impact on other countries in the region. Criminal organizations related to the illicit drug trade have dispersed and use other territories for production and the illicit transport of products towards the centers of greater consumption in the United States and Europe, creating problems in neighboring countries within the region.

Illicit drug issues affect many, if not all, state organizations, elements of power, and an entire society. Combatting these negative effects requires a comprehensive

education process to address the youth within a population, agricultural monitoring systems, border protection and customs policies, police law enforcement, employment of police forces, and even more, the Armed Forces, depending on the complexity as the problem appear.




Figure 1: Global Cocaine Seizures, 1987 – 2007

The governments’ efforts in South America as whole, have achieved positive outcomes. Their effects can be observed in the figure 1, which represent global cocaine seizures that have stabilized over the last few years; however, seizures have risen in South and Central America since 2005, in spite of the proliferation of small illicit organizations (cartels) in the region. That could mean that the numerical increase of small cartels would not have implied an increase in the cocaine circulation.

Nevertheless, the main drug-producing countries in Latin America must not only face the challenges derived from the production control, but also all of the problems resulting from a complex process that involves traffic of arms, organized crime, money

laundering, and corruption, among many others. Therefore, in some Latin American countries, especially in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, this problem has surpassed the capacities of the police organisms and the governments have had to use their Armed Forces. This phenomenon also appears currently in Mexico. Although is not a country that produces cocaine, its proximity to the United States - the largest consumer of illicit drugs – has transformed it into the main route of operation trafficking drugs northward. Therefore, it faces the greatest impact of negative effects that the drug trade has to offer disrupting their government and society.

The use of the Armed Forces in countering the threat that drug trade poses represents a high risk for two reasons. First, and the most important, the Armed Forces focus their training, equipment and readiness primarily to confront conventional threats, rather than address non-conventional threats that are better suited for police forces. A shifting focus to this mission possibly degrades the other mission of protecting the nation against conventional threats, which finally affects the national security. Second, the risk of corruption within the Armed Forces, especially in the military ranks, could seriously harm the moral integrity and credibility of these organizations.

The third prominent trend in Latin America in the last decades has been the proliferation of smaller trafficking organizations due to the fall of the Colombian Cocaine Cartels.²⁸ The structure of cocaine trade in Colombia effectively changed in 1995 and ended the dominance of the most powerful cartels of Medellin and Cali. This appeared to be the end of Colombia's role in cocaine trafficking. However, the proliferation of a number of minor trafficking organizations quickly emerged assuming a lower, less violent profile in Latin American society and politics in an effort to avoid detection and

arrest. According to Bagley, this is “the cockroach effect” defined as “the displacement of criminal networks from one city/state/region to another within a given country or from one country to another in search of safer heavens and more pliable state authorities”²⁹

These phenomena caused another effects in the region:

1) The cocaine cultivation began to diminish in Colombia, but it subsequently increased in Peru and Bolivia while traffickers in both countries also increased their own capacity to produce cocaine.³⁰ This is almost exactly like an inverse process that happened in the 1980’s when the United States carried out programs for cocaine eradication in Bolivia - during the government of President Victor Paz administration - and when President Alberto Fujimori leaded his own hard operations against the drug trafficking in Peru.

2) Neighboring countries to the production centers (Colombia, Peru and Bolivia) were added in the transit chain, such as Mexico, Central America, Ecuador, Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, among others. In addition to the increase in levels of internal illicit drug consumption, these countries also became “bridges” for distribution of cocaine destined for the United States and Europe. According to the 2010 World Drug Report, the main concern for the United Nations is the impact of cocaine trafficking on transit countries in Americas where the drug traffickers become powerful enough to take on the state through violent confrontation or high-level corruption. The 2010 World Drug Report affirms that the region worst affected is the Northern Triangle of Central America: Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, where drug-related violence has posed a serious challenge to governance.

3) Mexican organized crime groups have become progressively more involved in the cocaine trade that originates in the Andes. They also have effectively displaced Colombia's cartels with smaller, successor Colombian criminal groups or "cartelitos" (small cartels) as the primary traffickers of South American-refined cocaine through Mexican territory into the United States.³¹ Mexico continues to be the primary transshipment country for United States-bound cocaine from South America, with an estimated 90% of annual cocaine movements toward the US stopping in Mexico.³² The global flows of cocaine in Figure 2 represents that cocaine is mainly transported from Colombia to Mexico or Central America by sea and then by land to the United States and Canada. The shipments from Peru and Bolivia are more common for Europe than for the United States.³³




Figure 2: Main Global Cocaine Flows, 2008³⁴

Even though Chile is not a cocaine producing country, it is considered a transshipment one for cocaine destined for the United States and Europe. Chile is

vulnerable because shared more than one thousand kilometers of its border with Peru and Bolivia - two of the top three cocaine producers of the world. These borders are desert zones in the South American plateau of the Andes. These are very extensive zones with difficult accesses and little population, which makes difficult the control in its entirety. In addition, Chile has a privileged geographic location on the Pacific Ocean, a comparatively more difficult to patrol than the smaller and confined Caribbean. Thus, Pacific Ocean smuggling routes have progressively replaced the more controlled Caribbean as the cocaine traffickers' most profitable smuggling choice.³⁵ Then, it is matter of concern because it can significantly affect Chile's national security, especially in the north.

4) Diversification of means for smuggling illicit products: the remarkable increase of police and military action forced the illicit organizations to diversify their mechanisms to transfer illicit drugs and weapons, using new transportation systems such as self-propelled semi-submersibles, speedboats, and high-technology aircraft flying low altitudes over the sea. "In 2008, 29.5 tm of cocaine were seized by the Colombian Navy on board semi-submersibles in the Pacific Ocean."³⁶ On the other hand, this implied to diversify means and resources for governmental organizations to monitor and control the air and maritime tracks.

Because of Chile's improving economic conditions, domestic cocaine consumption is rising. This now makes Chile a significant consumer of cocaine.³⁷ Statistic from the United Nations' 2010 World Drug Report indicate that the highest prevalence of cocaine use in South America was reported from Argentina (2.7%), followed closely by Chile (2.4%). The annual prevalence of cocaine use in Argentina

and Chile are comparable to the prevalence in United States. According to the school survey conducted by UNODC in the South American countries, the highest annual prevalence of cocaine use among students was in Chile.³⁸ In the same way, the number of gangs connected to illicit drugs increased in the north of the country and, as a result, the index of urban violence has also increased. Both phenomena have forced the state organizations to reinforce their structures and procedures with the intention of avoiding their propagation and the increase of their influences.

The fourth prominent trend is related to those armed groups which at first simply protected the illicit drugs trade, but they normally became paramilitary groups linked to insurgency and narcoterrorism. The Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC) got involved with cocaine production and refining in the early 1980s, primarily as “guards” of the coca cartels’ refining operations and rural landing strips in the Colombian hinterlands.³⁹ The large economic profit they obtain from the illicit businesses allows them to count on resources to try to influence the highest authorities of the State. Terror, murders and kidnappings are the other alternatives to directly influence the state organization. But overall, the large number of their members, their fighting equipment, the high-technology weapon systems, and adequate training could provide them sufficient military capabilities to fight against the regular Armed Forces of the State. This high level of influence, over all powers of the state and their military capabilities to fight against regular forces of the State, constitutes the uppermost risk for any Nation-State.

Analyzing the Colombian conflict in 2002, President Uribe modernized the Colombian military, especially its intelligence community, allowing them to develop

special operations against high-value targets and to reduce the criminal capacity of the terrorist organization, as well as, its command and control structures. It is for this reason that these narcoterrorist groups have sought safety across borders to evade the state effective actions, establishing safe-havens where they plan and execute terrorist acts.⁴⁰

Regarding to the Colombian Insurgency, Dr. Manwaring offers this description:

The narco-insurgent-paramilitary alliance utilizes a mix of aggressive, widespread, and violent political-psychological, economic-commercial, and military-terrorist strategy and tactics primarily to control human (but also physical) terrain in Colombia and other countries in which it operates. The generalized result of the intimidating and destabilizing activities of this alliance of violent non-state actors is a steadily increasing level of manpower, wealth, and power that most nation-states of the world can only envy.⁴¹

Chile's Strategies in the 21st Century

Though most 4GW threats have transnational character, they challenge states in different ways. Their responses will be according to their particular scenario and their own identity. Chile has focused the illicit drug issues like a problem of national and social scope. Therefore, is helpful to describe the core elements involved in the existing Chile's National Defense Strategy and the National Strategy for Prevention and Control of Drugs. Consequently, four key elements are highlighted: 1) Responsibilities on Security and National Defense; 2) Prevention and Control of Drugs; 3) Geographical Features; and 4) Nationalism and Identity.

Responsibilities on Security and National Defense. First, it is important to review the notion of Security and National Defense from the Chilean perspective.⁴² According to the Book of National Defense of Chile, even though security and defense are closely related, they are not the same. "Defense does not inherently produce the security desired, but it is certainly one of the essential factors in achieving it. Defense

contributes to the security of the country, through both deterrence and international cooperation.”⁴³ National Defense is all those resources - human, ethical and material - that the Chilean State may use to ensure its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Its purpose is to reach the level of external security the country requires to achieve its national objectives⁴⁴ free from external interference. To achieve this goal, the Armed Forces constitute a vital part of the instruments of Defense. Chilean State may use them either in deterrent or cooperative events during peacetime, and through military operations in wartime. Additionally, this statement includes what Clausewitz describes as his paradoxical trinity, represented by three key actors: the People, the Army and the Government. In essence, Chile seeks to balance these three elements “like an object suspended between three magnets.”⁴⁵ In this way, the Book of National Defense establishes:

Deterrence is a political-strategic way of using defense means, in which the Armed Forces play a primary but not exclusive role. What deters is the nation’s overall strength, directed by the political authorities of the State and supported by political consensus, as well as by the people’s determination to support the objectives of Defense.⁴⁶

On the other hand, the risk of an international conflict which, for different reasons, cannot be handled in the diplomatic scope and rises toward the generalized use of force could always be present. In that context, this idea follows Clausewitz’s theory that war is a tool for achieving political aims rather than an end in itself; it means “merely the continuation of policy by other means.”⁴⁷ Chilean Policy also comprehends war like the phase subsequent to a crisis⁴⁸, as the most severe of the conflict. It involves not only the use of force but all the country's instruments of power because that conflict threatens its vital interests.

Globalization, as well, has offered nation-states new opportunities to grow. It has also opened new threats. These, well known as non-conventional threats, do not originate from a clearly identifiable source. They may threaten national institutions and infrastructure; they may weaken a nation's economic development. Indeed they may be self-generated, fueled by indigenous grievances, poverty, or insurrection.⁴⁹ This implied the need to define clearly the role that the Armed Forces must play in these issues. According to the Book of the National Defense of Chile, there is consensus in Chile regarding the idea that non-conventional threats generally constitute security-related problems rather than Defense ones. In fact, Chile will use its means of the defense - mainly its Armed Forces - to only face those phenomena that threaten its basic interests that are the sovereignty, the territory and the population.⁵⁰ Consequently, Chile should deal with the non-conventional threats through the Order and Security Forces (police organizations). The role reserved for the Armed Forces, generally speaking, is to offer their support to State authorities and to the police forces in these matters, in compliance with the rule of law currently in force.⁵¹

The Chilean Armed Forces, under the Ministry of the National Defense, are integrated only by the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. These military organizations exist for the defense of the mother country and are essential for national security. Their specific functions and tasks do not specify any role associated with the control or fight against the drug trafficking, because it considers that all support to the civilian authorities and the society will be made without degrading the military function oriented to face external threats.⁵² Exceptionally, the Chilean Navy explicitly considers the task of "facing nonmilitary situations in or from the sea - such as piracy, drug trafficking and

illegal immigration”⁵³ - as highly justifiable in accordance to the wide-ranging maritime scenario where its resources are to be used.

Directly involved in security-related issues such as illicit drug trafficking and all those non-conventional threats associated to this, Chile owns its Order and Security Forces under the Ministry of the Interior. These are composed of the Carabiniers of Chile (Carabineros de Chile) and the Investigations Police of Chile (Policia de Investigaciones de Chile – PDI).

Carabineros de Chile is the uniformed Chilean national police force created in 1927. Their mission is to maintain or re-establish order and security in Chilean society through civic education, service to the community, police work, and in a war situation, to act as a paramilitary force since all their members have military training. The specialized unit for the combat to the illicit drug trafficking is the Department of Drugs OS.7, whose effective work annually allows to seize important amounts of different types of drugs and to stop to a high number of traffickers. In addition, they coordinate the strategies of prevention and application of the national policies and control of the illegal drug use with the state organization National Advice of the Narcotic Control (Consejo Nacional de Control de Estupefacientes - CONACE). In the international scope, the O.S.7 maintains important contacts and interchanges with institutions controlling the traffic and consumption of drugs, among them the D.E.A. (Drug Enforcement Administration) of the United States, and other Police Institutions of America and Europe.⁵⁴

Chile also has an investigative police force, the Investigations Police of Chile (Policia de Investigaciones de Chile, PDI). This is the civil police founded in 1933. Its essential mission is to investigate criminal acts in agreement with the Public Ministry’s

instructions, but also develops the following elemental tasks: to prevent the perpetration of criminal facts and acts that attempt against the stability of the fundamental organizations of the State; to control the entrance and exit of people of the national territory; to control the permanence of foreigners in the country; and to represent Chile like member of the International Police Organization (INTERPOL). Its main specialized organizations are: 1) Antinarcotics Brigade (Brigada Antinarcóticos - BRIANT) whose mission is the prevention and investigation of the production, drug elaboration, traffic and consumption. In addition, it must make educative programs to the community, to avoid that the drug trafficking operates in the country; and 2) Tactical Reaction Antinarcotics Team (Equipo Táctico de Reacción Antinarcóticos - ERTA) as a group highly specialized and equipped to act in situations of risk or possible danger in the antinarcotics' tasks.⁵⁵

Prevention and Control of Drugs. Since 2003, the Chilean Government has carried out a national strategy of prevention and control of drugs, implemented by the National Council for the Control of Narcotic Drugs (Consejo Nacional para el Control de Estupefacientes - CONACE⁵⁶), under the Ministry of the Interior. This interministerial committee - based on the current drug legislation (Act No. 20,000 - 2005) - is the entity of the Government of Chile which provides advice to the President of the Republic and directs the actions of various State agencies⁵⁷ to coordinate, articulate and promote public policies in drugs and implement programs of prevention, control, treatment and rehabilitation. This national strategy has the following main objectives:

To prevent and reduce the abuse and availability of illicit drugs and the adverse consequences associated with such phenomena in the country, in the 2009-2018 timeframe.

To establish a system of social protection to ensure a healthier future, allowing the creation of human and social capital for current and new generations.⁵⁸

The international cooperation to face the problem of drugs has great importance because it is a transnational phenomenon. Thus, the national strategy of Chile - through the international relation department of CONACE - establishes an active participation in specialized international organizations, among them, the United Nations, the Organization of American States, the Common Market of the South (Mercosur), the Group of Financial Action of South America (Gafisud), and also in the Mechanism of Cooperation and Coordination of Drugs between the European Union, Latin America and the Caribbean.⁵⁹ In this way, Chile participates actively in bilateral or multilateral actions to fight international drug trafficking, applying an integrated approach of shared responsibility while respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the countries that adhere.⁶⁰ At the moment, Chile maintains agreements in the matter of drugs with 25 countries, especially with Peru, Bolivia and Argentina.

Geographical Features. When one tries to explain the geography of Chile it can be summarized in a single word: diversity. In the North, Chile presents the driest desert of the world where the country abuts Peru and Bolivia. Extensive and deep ravines divide the desert running from the mountains to reach the sea. The Andes Mountains have a tremendous influence in the North rising above six thousand meters with expanding high plateaus toward the Northeast. The country extends long and narrow to the South drawing more than five thousand kilometers of coastline. Because of its geography, Chile is located in a strategic drug-trafficking corridor between two of the most important cocaine producer countries and the Pacific Ocean, the less controlled route to smuggle illicit narcotics towards the United States and Europe.

“The distinctive features of the national territory and the Chilean people constitute the basic references to be considered in drawing up a National Defense Policy”.⁶¹

However, planning, funding and training forces to protect so vast and diverse territory are also critical issues. Protecting the territory and its population, in the end, is one of the essential objectives for the Armed Forces and Police Forces in Chile, respectively.

Nationalism and Identity. Chilean people are traditionally very respectful of institutions, their officials, their history and national heroes, their Armed Forces, native traditions, symbols, customs, and the rule of law. Regarding religion, the Hispanic heritage has provided a high religious sense in the Chilean society and a high respect for Christian values, with approximately 85% of the Chilean population claiming Catholicism as their preferred religion. The fundamental nucleus of the society is the family; thus, the daily life is characterized by solidarity, friendship, harmonic coexistence and mutual respect.

In Susan Kaufman’s article “Positive Nationalism”⁶², she provides some important clues to understand the highly acclaimed success of Chile in comparison with much of Latin American countries and why Chile’s nationalism is positive. Her analysis - regarding the extraordinary rescue of the 33 miners after 70 days trapped in a mine - states basically that Chile is the leader in Latin America in terms of political and economical success, becoming a stable democracy with a strong democratic political culture and also “developing a vibrant market economy that today has more than 20 trade agreements with more than 50 countries”.⁶³ This is the current strength of Chile to face the 21st Century’s challenges. That is what Jiyul Kim defines as resilience:

Is the *response to globalization, openness to transnational institutions, and coping with environmental pressures*, and refers to the capacity or ability of a culture to resist, adapt, or succumb to external forces. It is a test of the culture's stability and coherence and a measure of the endurance of its identity and political culture.⁶⁴

Conclusion

The tendencies demonstrated in Latin America during the last few or couple decades reveal that the risks of the countries of the region, with regard to cocaine production centers, have increased, especially in the neighboring countries of Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. The use of new routes of transshipment to smuggle illicit drugs towards the rest of the world – mainly to the United States and Europe - and the proliferation of organized criminal groups which look for safe-heavens outside their countries, are increasing the internal violence and threaten the stability of the nation-states in the Americas and the Caribbean.

In some Latin American countries - such as Mexico, Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras, Peru or Bolivia, among others - the drug trafficking and narcoterrorism are threatening the internal security and the integrity of the governments because the extent of the threat has far exceeded police forces' capacities that they have been forced to use their Armed Forces to fight narcoterrorism in a typical atmosphere of Fourth Generation Warfare. On the other hand, there is no doubt that one of the most important non-conventional threats to Chile is related to the illicit drug trafficking. Nevertheless, statistics demonstrate that Chile does not have such high indices of severity in the problem and the combat against the drug trafficking is still handled - very successfully - by the police forces in a context of security-related crimes. Therefore, this problem - although it is present in Chile – does not constitute a threat that can lead to a 4GW

conflict yet. It constitutes a risk which requires permanent observation to avoid that it escalates and increases.

The regional strategic stability in South America, in terms of conventional wars, seems to be a good enough reason to think more about cooperation among nation-states than in conflicts. In fact, accordingly to the Chile's Book of National Defense, its main efforts go in that direction. Nevertheless, Chile's geographic characteristics and the historical geopolitical interests of its neighboring countries force Chile to conceptualize or anticipate war with anyone of them. Traditional threats for Chile remain as they appeared during the Cold War era, in a context of state against state. Therefore, the Book of National Defense of Chile presents all those principles to produce its current National Defense Policies, establishing three common forms of using the defense resources: Cooperation, Deterrence, and Coercive use of military power. Chilean Armed Forces are, undoubtedly, a crucial element to succeed in any of those arenas with a core employment to face conventional threats.

To accomplish these specific missions to fight, prevent, and control the illicit drug trafficking and all of its related issues, Chile counts on two main elements: use of the police forces for enforcement action, combined with a national strategy of prevention and drug control. The most remarkable characteristic of the police forces, in addition to their professionalism, is that they have the scope of "national police", which grants to the Government of Chile the advantage to allot missions, resources and means with a national strategic direction. Further, the prevention and control centralized by CONACE allows facing the problems in an integrated form, involving all the state organizations and participating actively in the international efforts.

Recommendations

The great challenge for the Government of Chile is to reduce the negative effects the illicit drug trade produces within Chilean territory. This will allow Chile to contain this problem handled by the police forces, to continue applying strategies of prevention and control, and finally to create better conditions for the Chilean society.

In the international scope, Chile must continue collaborating in regional and world-wide efforts that are being developed, especially with the northern bordering countries – the top two of the top three cocaine-producing countries in the world. Additionally, the Government of Chile must review the migration policies to incorporate all measures that are necessary to avoid massive migrations from Peru and Bolivia. These migrations may increase the risk of smuggled goods, demand greater police effort in the control of the borders, and increase the suspension index for the Chilean population.

In the internal scope, the authorities and the whole Chilean society must safeguard the political stability of the government. It is an essential condition to establish, develop, and carry out all the strategies necessary to face conventional and nonconventional threats. The civil-military relations must be reinforced, creating instances of mutual knowledge and integration between the strategic leaders involved in missions that the Government of Chile has designed through its national strategies. It is also necessary to increase the long term national policies directed to the education and prevention, with emphasis in the generation of job opportunities for the poorest social groups, especially in the northern cities of the country.

Regarding the police forces, it is vital to reinforce their organizations assigning more and better means in terms of personnel, economic resources, and technology.

This involves improving its working conditions, wages, and benefits with the purpose of obtaining greater interest in the police work and reducing the possibility of corruption. Relative to their organization, police forces must form flexible units that allow them to modify their structures easily as threats of drug trafficking appear. This implies incorporating all the changes necessary in terms of their doctrine and training.

It is impossible to predict the future and very difficult to go ahead to the effects the nonconventional threats can generate. Therefore, the Fourth Generation Warfare's threats is currently present in Chile - because there are not explicit indications of some cause in particular - but due to the ample range of possibilities that the new type of nonconventional adversaries threaten the security of the states and entire societies. As political, environmental, and economic conditions change, national interests and threats also change. Strategic leaders must anticipate their ability to discern between conventional and non-conventional threats, as well as assertive in their responsibility to decide what national means use to face each of them. Policymakers and strategic advisors in Chile must be concerned with all those changes in the national, regional, and international, volatile scenario in order to provide the strategic leaders an accurate understanding to conduct peace and warfare in the 21st Century.

End notes

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¹⁸ Chile's Ministry of National Defense, *Book of the National Defense of Chile*, (Santiago, 2002), 43.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Chile's Ministry of National Defense, *Book of the National Defense of Chile*, (Santiago, 2010), 130.

²¹ Organization of American States (OAS), Special Conference of Security: "Declaration of Security in the Americas", 3.

²² John E. Griffiths, "Hemispheric Security in Latin America, Scope and Propositions", 97.

²³ United Nations, UNODC, 2009 World Drug Report, http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2009/WDR2009_eng_web.pdf (accessed January 10, 2011).

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²⁵ UNODC is a global leader in the fight against illicit drugs and international crime. Established in 1997 through a merger between the United Nations Drug Control Program and the Centre for International Crime Prevention, UNODC operates in all regions of the world through an extensive network of field offices. <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/about-unodc/index.html?ref=menutop> (accessed January 12, 2011).

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²⁷ United Nations, UNODC, United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2008. <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/index.html?ref=menuside> (accessed February 02, 2011).

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⁴¹ Max G. Manwaring, *Insurgency, Terrorism, and Crime: Shadows from the Past and Portents for the Future* (Oklahoma, University of Oklahoma Press: Norman, 2008), 33.

⁴² Osvaldo Vallejos, *Historical insights from Vietnam War and the Chile's National Defense Strategy* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, January 25, 2011), 1-2.

⁴³ Chile's Ministry of National Defense, *Book of the National Defense of Chile*, (Santiago, 2002), 18.

⁴⁴ Chilean National Permanent Objectives are: Preservation of the Chilean nation, Conservation and enrichment of its identity and cultural patrimony, Maintenance of its political independence, Maintenance of its sovereignty, Maintenance of its national territorial integrity, Achievement of high, sustained and sustainable economic development, Achievement of a social development that harmonizes with economic development and is based on individual capabilities and equal opportunity for all, Maintenance of a peaceful and cooperative coexistence among civilians, International projection, and Maintenance of good international relations.

⁴⁵ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1984), 89.

⁴⁶ Chile's Ministry of National Defense, *Book of the National Defense of Chile*, (Santiago, 2002), 57.

⁴⁷ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, 87.

⁴⁸ Crisis is a limited intensity conflict characterized by pressures or negotiations without becoming confrontation or use of force.

⁴⁹ Toledo Claudio, *Chile: Its conventional threats*. Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, April, 2005), 2.

⁵⁰ Chile's Ministry of National Defense, *Book of the National Defense of Chile* (Santiago, 2010), 130.

⁵¹ Chile's Ministry of National Defense, *Book of the National Defense of Chile* (Santiago, 2002), 44.

⁵² Chile's Ministry of National Defense, *Book of the National Defense of Chile* (Santiago, 2010), 251.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 264.

⁵⁴ Carabineros de Chile Homepage, <http://www.carabineros.cl> (accessed February 20, 2011).

⁵⁵ Policía de Investigaciones de Chile Homepage, <http://www.investigaciones.cl/> (accessed February 20, 2011).

⁵⁶ CONACE Homepage http://www.conacedrogas.cl/portal/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=50&Itemid=500 (accessed February 26, 2011).

⁵⁷ This council is composed of the Ministers of Interior, Foreign Affairs, Defense, Finance, Education, Health, Justice, Planning, and Secretary General; Assistant Secretary of Interior, Army, Navy, Carabineros, Investigations Police, CDE, Public Security, Public Safety, Customs, legal adviser, and President of the Republic's representative.

⁵⁸ CONACE Homepage.

⁵⁹ CONACE, National Strategy on Drugs (Estrategia Nacional sobre Drogas 2009-2018) http://www.cicad.oas.org/Fortalecimiento_Institucional/eng/National%20Plans/Chile%202009-2018.pdf (accessed March 07, 2011).

⁶⁰ Ibid.

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⁶² Susan Kaufman, "Positive Nationalism" (Center for Hemispheric Policy, University of Miami, FL, November, 2010): 1.

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⁶⁴ Jiyul Kim, "Cultural Dimensions of Strategy and Policy", Strategic Studies Institute Pubs, no. 919 (2009): 23.