LEVERAGING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (HA) IN SUPPORT OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ELMER R. MASON
United States Army Reserve

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for Public Release.
Distribution is Unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 2011

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle State Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.
LEVERAGING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (HA) IN SUPPORT OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

by

Lieutenant Colonel Elmer R. Mason
United States Army Reserve

Colonel Timothy J. Loney
Project Adviser

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
This strategy research paper (SRP) examines the current U.S. humanitarian assistance (HA) policies and proposes ways to align HA efforts with the National Security Strategy. For clarity, this paper focuses on developmental humanitarian assistance, and excludes disaster assistance. Disaster assistance covers a wide range of short term goals and efforts, agencies and political policies that are substantially different than developmental humanitarian assistance.
LEVERAGING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (HA) IN SUPPORT OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

The end of the Cold War and increased globalization has led to many positive changes throughout the world, such as the reduction of weapons of mass destruction in the United States and Russia. In addition, the threat of communist expansion is gone. However, has the dissolution of the bipolar environment caused the world to become safer? Unfortunately, the answer is “No”. The global environment is still very dangerous. These dangers include ethnic conflict, degradation of the environment, rapid population growth, and aggressive competition for resources among nations. All these factors threaten to undermine political stability in many countries and regions.

One means available for the United States to shape a future environment to its advantage, and assist the stabilization of many countries and regions, is through the use of developmental humanitarian assistance. This kind of humanitarian assistance is vital to U.S. national security and is a strategic, economic, and moral imperative. Through developmental assistance, the United States can advance democracies, improve human rights, strengthen international partnerships, increase global economic growth and maintain the United States as a world leader. Effective support of development is essential to advancing U.S. security objectives to promote security, prosperity, respect for universal values, and a just and sustainable international order.¹

This strategy research paper (SRP) examines the current U.S. humanitarian assistance (HA) policies and, proposes ways to align HA efforts with the National Security Strategy. For clarity, this paper focuses on developmental humanitarian assistance, and excludes disaster assistance. Disaster assistance covers a wide range
of short term goals and efforts, agencies and political policies that are substantially
different than developmental humanitarian assistance.

**Developmental Agencies**

In his second inaugural address, President Bush laid out a hopeful vision of
peace and security for all: “It is the policy of the United States to seek and support the
growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture with the
ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.” Then in 2006 Secretary of State,
Condoleezza Rice established The Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance (ODFA),
directing it to coordinate U.S. Foreign Assistance (FA). To further the former
administration’s initiatives, President Obama has endorsed the “need to invest in
building capable, democratic states that can establish healthy and educated
communities, develop markets, and generate wealth.

ODFA now integrates Department of State (DOS) and U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) FA Planning in order to implement a coordinated
effort. It establishes goals and objectives in the FA framework by aligning resources and
coordinating planning, and programming. It reports developmental program results
based on expenditures at every level. The joint mission of the Department of State and
USAID is to “Advance freedom for the benefit of the American people and the
international community by helping to build and sustain a more democratic, secure, and
prosperous world composed of well-governed states that respond to the needs of their
people, reduce widespread poverty, and act responsibly within the international
system.”

Because of the nation’s recent economic problems, Congressional oversight of
FA has steadily increased since 2001. Even with the establishment of the Director of
Foreign Assistance, and the joint planning efforts of the DOS and USAID, the FA program has not demonstrably improved. USAID’s performance has been especially problematic. USAID’s personnel staff was reduced from approximately 6,000 in 1998 to 2,000 in 2009. This loss of personnel and their expertise has degraded the Agency’s technical competency and its ability to manage projects. So, USAID has become increasingly dependent on issuing more grants and contracts. This has transformed USAID from a creative, proactive, and technically skilled organization focused on implementation to a contracting and grant-making agency focused on contract oversight.⁷

Even FA funding has shifted significantly: The Department of Defense (DOD) accounts for 21% of all nation-building funding. From 1999 to 2005, DOD developmental dollars increased from 3.5% to 21.7% of all developmental assistance dollars. During this same time period, USAID’s share of this budget declined from 65% to less than 40% of the total developmental budget.⁸ More and more developmental funding and resources are allocated to DOD, indicative of the militarization of U.S. developmental policy.

Secretary of State Rice’s effort to synergize FA into a joint DOS and USAID mission has yet to become effective. The nation needs a new FA strategy; USAID’s role should be based on supporting the nation’s FA strategy. In January 2009, Secretary of State Clinton vowed to make development once again one of the pillars of America’s engagement. She declared that FA would be an "equal partner" with diplomacy and defense. The so-called "3-Ds" (diplomacy, defense and development) should be balanced by an “adequately funded” FA program which has been
organizationally neglected, underfunded, and understaffed. Secretary Clinton thus
acknowledged the need to strengthen development which implies building USAID’s
capacity as the agency responsible for development.\(^9\)

In an attempt to address this issue; on 22 September 2010, President Obama
adopted a new U.S. developmental policy for the 21\(^{st}\) century, designed to bring
development back the forefront of U.S. strategic policy:

Our investments in development – and the policies we pursue that support
development – can encourage broad-based economic growth and
democratic governance, facilitate the stabilization of countries emerging
from crisis or conflict, alleviate poverty, and advance global commitments
to the basic welfare and dignity of all humankind. Without sustainable
development, meeting these challenges will prove impossible. To ensure
development expertise is brought to bear in decision making, the
Administrator of USAID will be included in meetings of the National
Security Council, as appropriate. The Administrator will report to the
Secretary of State, who will ensure that development and diplomacy are
effectively coordinated and mutually reinforcing in the operation of foreign
policy. Through existing policy mechanisms (e.g., trade policy through the
United States Trade Representative’s Trade Policy Review Group, etc.),
an assessment of the “development impact” of policy changes affecting
developing countries will be considered.\(^{10}\)

**Foreign Assistance**

The primary pillar of current US engagement with the world is FA.\(^{11}\)
Institutionalized under the Marshall Plan and later the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
that created the US Agency for International Development, U.S. developmental aid
continues to provide a means of denying ideological sanctuary to our adversaries that
prey on poverty and despair. FA also focuses on developing the capacity for self-
governance through economic and other development.\(^{12}\) The intent of FA is a noble
endeavor, but is the current U.S. strategy working?

Current joint USAID/DOS strategy on development is failing because of
insufficient USAID personnel and poor coordination of relevant government agencies.\(^{13}\)
This failure has contributed to the militarization of foreign development. Indicative of the absence of effective USAID leadership, Congress funded the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), which was awarding construction contracts to Chinese Companies in Africa. Rather than strengthening USAID to enable it to work more effectively and efficiently, U.S. executive and congressional leaders have dispersed foreign assistance programs across 12 departments, 25 agencies and nearly 60 government offices.  

This fragmented structure reduces effectiveness and contributes to the duplication of programs, both of which are often cited by Congress when it slashes funding for development. Due to the lack of effective leadership, U.S. FA efforts have become increasingly decentralized and desultory. USAID has become a hollow shell of an organization that merely manages contracting work. It does not focus on identifying strategic needs on the ground or providing results-oriented assistance. USAID has no standard method of measuring development projects. The only common measure of its effectiveness is by the amount of money spent on developmental projects. This certainly is poor indicator of effectiveness and is not part of a coherent strategy.

**Relationships**

As the U.S. economy continues to flounder, President Obama has directed some changes in how USAID operates and endorsed the importance of international development. To show his commitment to U.S. global leadership in international development, the President has directed the Administrator of USAID to sit in the National Security council. He also directed that USAID report to the Secretary of State, but not work for the Secretary. USAID remains firmly in control of its finances and resources and does not have to justify expenditures to the DOS. This leaves some questions to be answered. Does DOS have the required clout with the President and
Congress to prevent "end runs" by USAID initiatives? Is this really the beginning of the integration of DOS/USAID on development? The answer to the first question is “maybe” and the second is “No”.

The changes President Obama made are positive steps, but simply not enough. USAID should work directly for the DOS, not as a separate entity. In this organizational structure, USAID will report directly to the DOS on all developmental projects. USAID must be empowered under DOS as the primary U.S. development agency; it would serve as the principal FA advisor to the DOS. DOS should advise the president and national security principals on FA capabilities and strategy. Also, the total number of full-time developmental specialists employed by USAID should be increased to enhance its ability to carry out development activities around the world.

On 1 November 2010, Foreign Service Officer John Fox claimed that DOS has recognized the need to utilize USAID development as a tool for diplomacy. According to Fox, USAID is sometimes too altruistic and does not regard itself as instrument of foreign policy. In the past, DOS and USAID pursued joint goals and common missions. Due to insufficient USAID personnel, these goals have not been attained.

In 2006, when Secretary of State Rice created the Office of Director of Foreign Assistance position to work on joint USAID/DOS policy and missions, USAID officials were skeptical of this position and change in responsibilities. They feared a loss of autonomy and authority in the planning and execution of strategic development. They also feared the Agency’s experienced foreign aid specialists might be replaced by inexperienced Foreign Service officers. These fears have proven to be unfounded. However, due to the massive loss of USAID personnel from 1998 to 2008, the Agency
devolved into nothing more than a contracting agency that coordinates haphazardly with DOS, DOD and other developmental agencies. USAID does not function as John F. Kennedy intended in 1961. Strategic developmental planning is not occurring in USAID.

There would certainly be some risk if USAID is placed under DOS. Long-term development would certainly be used to enhance diplomacy, but developmental goals can be contaminated by short-term political goals. To achieve short-term gains, DOS personnel may be distracted from long-term developmental activities. Also by placing USAID under DOS may lead to some loss of USAID authority. In effect, DOS would receive a huge increase in developmental funding, but would not be strictly accountable for long-term development.

In an effort to synchronize development, all other relevant agencies with considerable developmental funding, such as the DOD, must coordinate directly with DOS. Developmental information to the President and all other principals should come from the DOS, not USAID. What USAID may consider important in strategic developmental planning may not be as vital to DOS.

Currently, USAID has two kinds of geographic bureaus that are not aligned with DOD or DOS; worldwide bureaus and regional bureaus. USAID’s world bureaus address global health; economic growth, agriculture and trade, promotion of democracy, resolution of conflicts, and humanitarian assistance. The Agency’s geographic bureaus cover several strategic regions: Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Latin America & the Caribbean, Europe and Eurasia, and the Middle East. Similarly, DOS fields 5 major regional agencies that work for the Under Secretary for Political Affairs (who reports to the Secretary of State): Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, Bureau of African
Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Bureau of South and Central Affairs, and Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Both the DOS and USAID Bureaus are responsible for similar geographic areas, which could be easily linked.

USAID’s regional bureaus could be easily integrated into the DOS’s regional bureaus. This integration would ensure that development and political policy are coordinated regionally on a daily basis. It would ensure that USAIDs altruistic concerns contribute to international diplomacy. USAID’s worldwide responsibilities would remain intact, but would report through joint USAID/DOS channels.

During the past decade of wars, USAID diminished in its capacity and lost many personnel. Currently, DOD receives 60% of the funding allocated for development. Accordingly, DOD is now making worldwide developmental policy for the U.S. This paradigm must change. USAID under DOS must be empowered to control the planning, execution and monitoring of all major international development projects. DOD must coordinate with USAID on all long-term developmental projects and programs to ensure there is no duplication of effort and they meet the USAID/DOS standards of development.

To serve as the primary development agency as intended by President Kennedy, USAID must be reorganized. First, a thorough analysis should be done to determine the kinds and numbers of new USAID personnel required to plan and implement U.S. developmental programs that directly support the National Security Strategy. Then, these new personnel should be quickly vetted and hired. Second, all other agencies should be clearly informed that strategic developmental planning must be approved by
USAID, and no other agency, prior to implementation. Finally, as soon as the relationship is functioning properly, it should be apportioned a greater percentage of U.S. FA developmental funding—certainly more than 60% of the budget.

**Other Organizations/Agencies**

In the area of development, the United States need not bear the entire burden alone. To achieve its long-term development goals, the United States must foster cooperation with other nations and international organizations, nongovernmental organization, and privately owned organizations. These organizations include the United Nations (U.N.), World Bank, International Monetary Fund, International Red Cross, and others.

The U.N. is the foremost international organization the U.S. should leverage for assisting with international development. Supported countries must also assist in providing for their own developmental needs. The United States does not have the resources to meet the development needs of all nations. So, DOS/USAID should draft a careful and methodical strategic plan, which includes prioritizing resources and executing political and developmental efforts. Countries the U.S. cannot support or will not support should be consigned to third parties. In priority of support, first and foremost, the United States should leverage the U.N. to provide developmental assistance to those countries that have the greatest strategic interest for the United States. The aid program itself is an instrument of U.S. foreign policy. Then when support is provided from the United States in concert with U.N. members, those countries must be held accountable for the resources and clearly informed of the desired results. These results must be reviewed annually to see if the development
programs are on track. If not, why not? If they continue to fail to meet expectations, support should be withdrawn.

Since globalization is a fact and not fiction, a policy of persuading developed states to assist in the sustained development of poor countries to improve their economies and raise their standard of living is imperative. This persuasion can take place formally or informally at the U.N., through bilateral agreements, or at the G20 meetings.

The G20 was established in 1999, in the wake of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. It brought together advanced and emerging economies to stabilize the global financial market. Since its inception, the G20 has held annual meetings of finance ministers and central bank governors to discuss measures to promote the financial stability of the world and to achieve sustainable economic growth and development.22 Because of the G20’s standing and emphasis on financial development it is a perfect forum to assist in persuading developed countries to assist in long-term developmental planning and resourcing for the development of countries.

Results-Based Development

Effective development programs achieve measurable results that indicate a good return on resources invested. These resources should be invested in long-term sustainable programs, not in quick fixes. There should be no free hands-outs. This does not mean that in times of natural or man-made disasters the United States should not provide humanitarian relief to help the sick, suffering or dying. It does mean that the United States should commit to development programs that support and are tied to the U.S. national strategy. "Give a man a fish; feed him for a day. Teach a man to fish; feed him for a lifetime."23
Consider USAID's successful governmental advisory assistance role in Macedonia from 1991 to 2000. USAID assisted Macedonia in decentralization of governmental authority and pushing responsibilities to its local municipalities. The 1995 adoption of a law of Local Self-Government was considered a major turning point in implementing the new governance policy in Macedonia. The elections of 1998 affirmed the Macedonians' will to reform the government, including the specific confirmation of the Council of Ministers to revise key laws: The ensuing establishment of a Ministry of Local Self-Government affirmed the success of the USAID program.

Developmental programs should provide sustained economic growth; they should promote democracy and human rights; they should reduce conflict and prevent future humanitarian crises; they should ultimately strengthen the United States position in the world.

**Methods**

In his September 2010 Developmental Policy Directive for Global Development, President Obama outlined several methods to ensure global development remains in the forefront of future U.S. policy. These methods include:

- Formulate a U.S. Global Development Strategy for approval by the President every four years;
- Conduct a Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review by the Department of State and USAID, and Establish an Interagency Policy Committee on Global Development, led by the National Security Staff and reporting to the NSC Deputies and Principals, to set priorities, facilitate decision-making where agency positions diverge, and coordinate development policy across the executive branch, including the implementation of this Presidential Policy Directive on Development (PPD). Beyond the issues coordinated by the White House, the Secretary of State will coordinate foreign assistance and the Secretary of the Treasury will coordinate multilateral development bank policy, consistent with existing law. In the field, the Chief of Mission will ensure the coherence and coordination of development cooperation across U.S. agencies.
These methods are perfectly acceptable, but they do not address the underlying problems and changes required. The policy document does not direct any specific policy changes. The distribution of resources has not changed, but the mandatory requirements for coordinated planning and periodic reviews are positive steps. The details on how to implement the new policy are unclear. The responsibility for development appears to remain scattered among several governmental agencies. Two principal agencies are directed to coordinate on development—USAID and DOS. But DOD is not included, but it certainly should be included since it is currently responsible for 60% of the developmental dollars. President Obama’s policy leaves many unanswered questions.

First, how should development planning occur within agencies? In addition to specifying methods of implementation, policy should require USAID regional bureaus to prepare developmental plans in coordination with regional DOS bureaus, with DOD Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs), and with other members of the Interagency. These coordinated plans should be submitted to the Administrator of USAID. Following the Administrator’s approval, this consolidated plan should be distributed to DOS, DOD, USAID and the rest of the interagency. Next, every U.S. Embassy should prepare a country development plan in coordination with DOS/USAID regional bureaus and the DOD GCC. These plans would then be submitted to DOS/USAID for approval. They should be aligned with the DOS/USAID regional developmental strategy, which ultimately aligns with the DOS/USAID strategic plan. Finally, DOS/USAID/embassies and regional bureaus need to take into account and
coordinate with approved non-governmental, International Organizations and supporting nations on the execution of the plan.

Second, how will coordination among agencies achieved? Who will be in charge? The policy did not clearly establish the primary agency responsible for development. The joint venture of Secretary of State Rice and USAID failed in the 1990s. The President should designate USAID as the lead agency; then USAID should answer directly to the DOS. All other agencies and organizations should coordinate with USAID on development matters. Each agency should establish an International Development Committee; each committee should include a USAID representation as the lead advisor. This representative will report findings and recommendations through USAID channels.

Third, does the policy apply to all countries with its focus on recipient country policy reforms and commitment to development? The policy should be applied as equally as possible, but with more weight given to U.S. strategic partners. Countries that are more important strategically can expect preferential treatment. However, careful consideration must be applied to second and third order of effects of this special treatment. Is Egypt’s stability and economic development more important to the U.S. than Madagascar’s? The simple answer is yes.

Fourth, how does the Presidential Policy Directive commit the U.S. government to building the capabilities of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and coordinating its efforts with those of USAID and U.S. development policy? The Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), run by the Millennium Challenge Corporation, is a bilateral development fund announced by the Bush administration in 2002 and created
in January 2004. The Bush administration assumed developmental aid works better in countries with solid economic policies, such as commitment to free markets, and low corruption. Countries that receive MCA assistance are selected on a competitive basis by means of 17 indicators designed to measure a country's effectiveness at ruling justly, investing in people, and fostering enterprise and entrepreneurship. The MCC focuses on promoting economic growth in the recipient countries. The program emphasizes good economic policies in recipient countries.

Because MCC works directly with recipient countries, it does not coordinate its programs with other agencies' developmental programs. A recommendation is the MCC report directly to USAID to ensure that MCC's programs are supporting a coherent strategy of international development. If the MCC coordinated with USAID, they would not have been the target of improper contracting practices by the Media. The MCC should answer directly to the regional USAID bureaus responsible for its recipient countries. The MCC should also provide USAID with an annual report of accomplishments on its initiatives within the national development strategy framework.

Finally, the President did not address the rebuilding USAID leadership and the importance of strategic communication. Nor did he address the shortage of USAID personnel. Implementation of the new policy is only feasible with effective leaders and an effective strategic plan. The actual implementation of PPD has a high likelihood of failure due to insufficient personnel in USAID to manage the program. USAID must increase its qualified personnel from 2,000 back to 6,000 and provide strategic communication training to achieve the President's goal. Otherwise, USAID will continue to serve as a contracting agency with limited oversight capability.
Strategic Leadership

In all services and agencies, senior leadership communication, both internally and externally, is essential for organizational success in today’s diverse environment. So what is leadership communication? And why is it important? Leadership communication consists of those messages from leaders that are rooted in the values and culture of an organization. These messages are received by key stakeholders – employees, customers, strategic partners, shareholders and the media. Senior leader communication establishes the climate and impels organizations to accomplish their core missions. In other words, senior leader communication establishes the foundation for leading others. Agency governmental leaders, like all other senior leaders, need exceptional communication skills.

Over the last decade, major structural and cultural changes have impacted the USAID’s community. USAID’s work force was reduced from 6,000 to 2,000 personnel over the past 10 years. In FY 2007 USAID officers were charged with spending close to $13 billion in 90 countries. By comparison, in 1969, over 10,000 direct-hire USAID staff personnel (16,232 staff in 1969), spent close to $1.7 billion (about $9.6 billion in 2009 dollars) in about 70 countries on development programs. In effect, USAID transformed into a contracting agency with little to no oversight of the development programs.

In 2004, creation of the MCC supplant many USAID economic developments initiatives. Currently, neither agency coordinates its economic developmental initiatives with the other. In 2009, foreign assistance programs were dispersed across 12 departments, 25 agencies and nearly 60 government offices with no coordination, and without an overarching strategy.
To be an effective senior leader, one has to understand the culture of his environment. In USAID this is a challenge. USAID has two cultures, the agency’s traditional humanitarians and the new generation of USAID officers, who regard FA as political instrument are at odds. The new officers are outranked and outnumbered by the traditionalists. A strong effective leader is required to bond these personnel into an effective and comprehensive organization. They should communicate with and establish subordinate leaders with a similar strategic outlook to implement their strategic developmental goals. If this requires purging or reassigning personnel, so be it. Last but not least, the leader will require appropriate resources to affect a proper change.

On 22 September 2010, President Obama’s PPA called for a DOS/USAID joint venture in planning and execution in development. However, the change message was poorly crafted for USAID; further only nominal resources were allocated to effect the change. Even though change is the essence of progress, committing to a change without providing resources is counterproductive. USAID’s organization and operation suffers to this day due to failures in strategic communication and insufficient resourcing and does not match its vision statement.

USAID is envisioned to ensure the strategic and effective use of foreign assistance resources to respond to global needs, make the world safer, and help people better their own lives by supporting programs that: Advance human rights and freedoms; Promote sustainable economic growth and reduce widespread poverty; Promote and support democratic, well-governed states; Increase access to quality education, combat disease, and improve public health; Respond to urgent humanitarian needs; Prevent and respond to conflict; and Address transnational threats.

Consider first the USAID officer: USAID staff generally consists of development professionals with backgrounds in public policy, development, or political science. In the past, technical expertise in agriculture, engineering, planning, public health,
economics and water and sanitation were part of the USAID officer’s profile. However, as USAID’s staff shrank, these skills were outsourced through contractors. Accordingly, the reduced USAID staff lacks much of its former expertise.

Over the past 10 years, USAID has done a superb job of training its’ tactical level units and leaders. But due to its limited numbers, it cannot afford to send senior leaders to strategic training courses. Instead, USAID hires personal service contractors (PSCs) to carry out specific tasks. But it has totally failed to train its strategic leaders to communicate effectively.

Currently in the USAID, there are very few established senior leader programs to train rising leaders on the art of strategic leadership. Most training comes from fellowship programs with universities, or from DOD Senior Service Colleges or private companies. Even though the Senior Service Colleges and fellowships provide adequate training for senior leaders, this professional education is offered only to those specifically selected for the program. There are simply too few slots available to train enough future USAID senior leaders in strategic leadership. The second problem for senior leaders is to attend the training—or not to attend. Even if future leaders are selected for a Senior Service College or fellowship, it is not mandatory to attend. Attendance is only strongly recommended, not required. In reality, no mandatory senior leader program or course is available to perspective USAID senior leaders.

The long-term effect of underdeveloped leaders is ineffective management, a loss of financial resources, and overall poor leadership. And with responsibility for annual funding of 1.7 billion dollars, this could lead to a disaster—with more scrutiny
and pressure by congress or even the reallocation of funding to other agencies to implement development.

Currently, interested candidates can join USAID’s Foreign Service ranks through two processes. The first is through the foreign service limited (FSL) contract conversion. USAID’s FSL process began in 1980. This little-used hiring process was expanded in 2005 when Congress gave USAID the authority to hire up to 175 FSLs per year. The FSL contract requires selectees to agree to two years of service in a hardship post, after which time they will be eligible to convert to a Foreign Service position. When applying for Foreign Service positions, FSLs are often not afforded priority in the bidding process in the same manner a serving Foreign Service officer is after spending only one year in a hardship post. The FSL is a limited five year appointment.38

As the new PPD is implemented and if the Obama administration approves an increase in force size of USAID, strategic leader’s course must be taken into account in the selection of USAID senior leaders. Strategic leadership is vitally important. In order for USAID to accomplish its vision and meet its mission, it must establish a viable strategic leadership program. The program should require all leaders assigned to a strategic position to attend a strategic leaders course. Constructive credit can be applied to officers who attended any of the DOD senior service colleges or private universities. Until a formal senior strategic leaders program is established, officers should attend a semi-annual, two—three-day, strategic leader’s workshop. Many large universities offer strategic leadership programs; they are more than willing to assist for a nominal fee.
Senior USAID officials failed to adequately address changes that have been taking place in USAID. If an effective senior leader educational program was established, it could have eliminated, reduced or limited the impact of these problems. Currently, funding, resources, and personnel are lacking for USAID senior leaders, so they are unable to attend a senior strategic leader course prior to or during a strategic assignment. If USAID is serious about fulfilling its vision and accomplishing its mission, it must establish a strategic leader’s program.

The Way Ahead

The global environment with rapid population growth, competition for resources, and ethnic conflicts all threaten to undermine the political and economic stability in many countries and regions. International development is a means available to the United States to promote stability in the world and vital U.S. strategic security interests. Both Congress and President Obama find international development vitally important to the United States, but do not have a comprehensive strategic plan to accomplish this endeavor. President Obama has issued and implemented his PPD but the following changes are required in order for it to be effective: Designate USAID as the lead agency for development; resource USAID properly to meet the strategic developmental goals; incorporate USAID under DOS; require integrated strategic planning between agencies on development; leverage the U.N. to support U.S. developmental initiatives, require strategic leader training programs for all senior USAID officials. If these measures are not implemented, then the result will be more of the same, ineffective strategic planning, execution and oversight of development programs.
Endnotes


6 Ibid


8 Ibid

9 Ibid


11 Ibid


14 Ibid

15 Ibid

Foreign Service Officer John Fox, Guest Lecturer, US Army War College, comments on USAID, November 1, 2010.


Ibid


Ibid


Ibid


33 Ibid


37 Ibid

38 Ibid