THE NEW STRUCTURE OF BRAZILIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

BY

COLONEL ÉDSON SKORA ROSTY
Brazilian Army

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The New Structure of Brazilian Ministry of Defense: Challenges and Opportunities

COL Édson Skora Rosty

Dr. Max G. Manwaring
Strategic Studies Institute

U.S. Army War College
122 Forbes Avenue
Carlisle, PA 17013

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On August 25, 2010, Brazil’s President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva signed several executive orders with the purpose of modifying and improving the Defense Department in Brazil by restructuring the Ministry of Defense and promoting civilian participation in national defense matters.

The purpose of this Strategic Research Project is to conduct an analysis of the new Ministry of Defense structure and to identify the challenges and opportunities, from the Brazilian point of view, and to see if the new structure will make it possible to improve Brazil’s defense relationships.

To address these issues, I will first perform a quick review of Brazil’s political and military evolution from World War II until now. Second, I will address Brazil’s National Defense Strategy to highlight Brazilian’s national interests in Defense matters. Lastly, I will address the most important part of this research, which is to analyze the new Ministry of Defense structure. The objective is to identify the challenges and opportunities inherent in attaining the objectives of the National Defense Strategy. Finally, I will make recommendations to improve Brazil’s defense relationships.

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Colonel Édson Skora Rosty
Brazilian Army

Dr. Max G. Manwaring
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
ABSTRACT

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THE NEW STRUCTURE OF BRAZILIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

To analyze the new structure of the Brazilian Ministry of Defense, I will consider three main points. First, why does the Brazilian Government need to change its Ministry of Defense structure? Second, taking into account the former structure, what exactly will change? Is there a new structure? Are the roles of the departments improved, reduced, or simply changed? And third, who is responsible for the modifications and what kind of educational or military background is necessary for persons to work at the new Brazilian Ministry of Defense?

Before explaining the main points above, it is necessary to review briefly Brazil’s political and military evolution. It is important to understand the civil-military relationship in Brazil and how it is affected by the National Defense Strategy, published in December 2008.

Due to its geographic size, Brazil has always had influence in the region (South America). Sometimes this has been expressed more strongly, such as during the period of the second Empire (1831–1889), with several military campaigns with or against its neighbors, particularly in the south (Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay), or more diplomatically, as in the first decade of the twentieth century, when the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Barão do Rio Branco (1902–1912), negotiated territorial disputes between Brazil and some of its neighbors and consolidated the borders of modern Brazil.

But Brazil’s entry into the international arena starts in the 1940s, more precisely in January 1942, when Brazil entered into World War II with the Allies against the Axis.
The Brazilian war effort had two main points: (1) Allow the establishment of American military air and sea bases on the Brazilian northeast coast, and (2) send a Brazilian Expeditionary Force to fight the Germans in the Mediterranean theater. Due to their strategic positions in relation to the North of Africa, the military bases in the prominent northeast were called “Trampoline to Victory.”

Because of difficulties with mobilization, preparation and training at American forces’ levels, Brazil did not send its Expeditionary Force until August 1944, and its baptism of fire occurred in September 1944, at Serchio’s River Valley, northeast of Pisa, Italy. The Force was composed of the 1st Infantry Division (army) and the 1st Fighter Group (air force).

This active participation in the war against the Nazis (Germany) and Fascists (Italy) had three main consequences for Brazil. First, it created and strengthened ties with the United States, a relationship characterized as senior versus junior partner. This relationship became important in the future, when Brazil had an important role in preventing communist expansion in South America. Second, it allowed to Brazil to be more active in international forums, such as during the creation of the United Nations. And finally, the war enhanced military influence on Brazil’s internal politics.

In 1945, due to the military effort, President Getulio Vargas resigned, ending eight years of dictatorship. This situation continued in the years that followed, as colonels and lieutenant colonels, veterans of World War II, became generals.

In the 15 years after the end of World War II, Brazil saw several modifications in the internal and external environment. Abroad, the most relevant was the escalation of the “Cold War”, particularly with the rise of Cuba as a communist state and the Russian
and Chinese intention to expand communism around the world. The American–Brazilian military relationship was formalized by the signing of a comprehensive military accord in 1952. Internally, Brazil saw the return of Getulio Vargas to the presidency as a result of democratic elections, saw his suicide after a severe political crisis, and also saw vigorous economic growth but with a huge social stratification. But these events occurred without overt military influence.

However, in 1961, after the resignation of President Janio Quadros, Brazil saw its military become more active. The military ministers considered the vice-president, João Goulart, likely to give power to communists. In fact, at the time of Quadros’s resignation, Goulart was on an official mission to the People’s Republic of China. Despite the military’s concern, João Goulart became President of Brazil. But the relationship between the military and the populist government of João Goulart quickly decayed. The Goulart government showed his intention to avoid conventional methods to solve the economic and social crisis; to be clear, he had turned to the left.

The rise of communism in Brazil was not acceptable to the military generals, former lieutenant colonels of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force. Before the President achieved a leftist revolution, the Brazilian Army made a counter-revolution on March 31, 1964. And a few days later, General Castelo Branco (G3 of the 1st Infantry Division during WWII) was elected by the Congress as President of Brazil. That this counter-revolution was supported by the United States was reflected by the fact that U.S. President Lyndon Johnson recognized the new government a few hours later.

On April 9, 1964, President Castelo Branco decreed an “Institutional Act” that gave the military the power to do anything it wished, but with a self-limiting clause: the
period of military power was to end on January 31, 1996.\textsuperscript{10} This act marked the beginning of military government in Brazil, which ended in March 1985, almost 10 years before the original plan.

In 1966, a failed bomb attack against the presidential cortège, which left two dead and 15 wounded at the Guararapes Airport in Recife, underlined the beginning of a dark phase of Brazilian history,\textsuperscript{11} a period when some citizens used illegal means (e.g., robbing banks, authorities’ kidnapping, bomb attacks, and others) to oppose the military government. Brazil saw urban subversion and rural guerrillas and, on the other hand, State forces strongly fighting against these groups. The repression continued until 1979, when, during the term of the last military president (João Figueiredo), the Congress passed an amnesty law, applied to all political crimes, for both sides.\textsuperscript{12}

But the period of military government was not only characterized by internal friction. Plans adopted by the military presidents increased economic and technologic growth, called the “Brazilian Economic Miracle,”\textsuperscript{13} but the process also produced high inflation and did nothing for social development. During this time, relations with United States government, specifically, with the administration of President Jimmy Carter, were rocky over sensitive issues, such as human rights and nuclear proliferation. Brazil started its nuclear program two years before Carter became president. To show that Brazil no longer needed a patron, the Brazilian government canceled the military accord of 1952.\textsuperscript{14}

After the military counter-revolution in 1964, Brazilian political evolution was quite different from other South American countries. Unlike their neighbors, the Brazilian military government ended by itself. General Ernesto Geisel, who was indirectly elected
President by Congress in 1974, started the process of transferring power to civilians. In his words, the transition was to be “slow, gradual, and certain.” The next military President (João Figueiredo) was to be the last one; to make this feasible, his term was extended one more year, until March 1985.

Democracy was consolidated step-by-step. At the beginning of 1985, Brazil elected, still by Congress, a civilian from the opposition party (Tancredo Neves) as President. Unfortunately, on the day before his inauguration, he was hospitalized with a serious intestinal disease, dying in the next month. Under this unpredictable and unstable scenario, the military strictly followed the constitutional rules from 1967: the vice president became President, proving that the military had decided to give governing power to civilians.

The next presidential election occurred in 1989, one year after the promulgation of the new Constitution. Another step towards consolidating the democracy. The people directly chose the new President, Fernando Collor de Melo. His inauguration occurred on March 15, 1990. Again, the events that followed showed that democracy was strong in Brazil. In May 1992, Collor de Melo’s brother accused him of corruption and provided proof to the press. Again, the military was faced with an unstable and unpredictable scenario. And again, its position was: follow the constitutional rules. In December 1992, the Congress voted to impeach Collor de Melo, proving that the political class had a constitutional responsibility, and that the military in reality had ensured civilian government. The vice-president, Itamar Franco, completed Collor de Melo’s presidential term.
But the full democratic process was not complete. There were two things to accomplish. First, to ensure a peaceful change of power between parties. And second, to ensure that military power would be under civilian control.

The election of the two next presidents, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, of the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (two terms, 1995–2002) and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, of the Worker’s Party (two terms, 2003–2010), demonstrated the accomplishment of the first step. Their elections corroborated the democratic gains, with a peaceful change of parties in the government. Now, with the election of Dilma Roussef from the same party as President Lula, Brazil will have a new democratic experience: the same party governing, but under new leadership.

But, what happened concerning civilian control over the military? This has not been easy, particularly because of distrust on both sides. After the transition from a military to a civilian government in 1985, the most prominent politicians were from groups that opposed the military government, including some who were considered criminals because of illegal use of force against the government. All benefitted from the amnesty law of 1979 and returned to politics. However, their natural bias made these politicians drag their feet on military and defense matters. On the other hand, the military commanders were not comfortable with sharing ideas with their former opponents or, using strong words, their enemies.

The first step to make civilian control a reality was taken by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso at the end of his first term. He decided to create the Ministry of Defense and push back the commanders of the Services to a second level of the government (at that time, they had Minister status). Therefore, on June 10, 1999, the
Ministry of Defense was officially created, and a civilian, Elcio Alvares, became the Minister of Defense. Choosing Alvares was the first problem. He was a politician without a national presence, from a small state without importance for the military. The military expected a retired general to implement the transition, or at least a politician with national renown.

To move forward, the President had to negotiate with the Services about the Ministry’s structure and responsibilities. It was a multilateral negotiation, because each Service had its own self interest in mind and, at that time, there was no consensus in the Armed Forces.

At the same time the Ministry of Defense was created, a law was published. This complementary law (General Rules for Organization, Preparation and Employ of the Armed Forces)\textsuperscript{18} tried to include the Minister of Defense in military procedures, but at the same time maintained the independence and autonomy of each Service, independence in relation to the other Services and autonomy in relation to the authority of the Minister of Defense.

Those assumptions were characterized by the following points: The commanders of the Services would be nominated by the President on the advice of the Minister of Defense.\textsuperscript{19} The Minister did not have the authority to choose commanders. The Minister of Defense was the Superior Director of the Armed Forces, not a commander, and advised by the Defense Military Council (commanders of the Services plus Chief of the General Staff of Defense), General Staff of Defense, and Secretaries of the Ministry of Defense.\textsuperscript{20} Each Service commander had the authority to nominate, for presidential appointment, the promotion and assignment of general officers.\textsuperscript{21} Each Service did its
own budget proposal to meet its needs. The Ministry of Defense simply consolidated the data to send only one document for congressional approval. In case of joint operations, the Joint Commander would be directly subordinate to the President (Supreme Armed Forces Commander); only in peacekeeping operations and in joint exercises would the commander be subordinate to the Minister of Defense. This law was modified in 2004, but only to clarify the procedures to employ the Armed Forces internally to guarantee law and public order, as assigned in Art.142 of the federal Constitution of 1989.

At the time of its creation, the Ministry of Defense was internally structured with five main branches. One, the General Staff of Defense, was exclusively filled by military personnel on active duty; the other four secretariats (Secretary of Politics, Strategy and International Affairs, Secretary of Education, Logistics, Mobilization, Science and Technology, Secretary of Institutional Organization, and Secretary of Civil Aviation) included both military personnel and civilians.

At that time, there was no civilian expertise in defense matters or a specific career of defense, and civilians came to the Ministry of Defense from other ministries without knowledge about the importance of the new ministry. With the intention of creating equality between the Services, it was decided that the Chief of General Staff Defense, the Secretary of Politics, Strategy and International Affairs and the Secretary of Education, Logistics, Mobilization, Science and Technology would be general officers of the last rank, one from each Service determined by rotation.

The main duties of the General Staff of Defense were to: formulate doctrine and plan for the joint employment of the Armed Forces; plan, support and control joint
operations; formulate policy for the system of military command and control; formulate the doctrine of operational intelligence for joint operations; propose guidelines for the performance of the Armed Forces in guaranteeing law and order, and in supporting the fight against border crimes and the environment; propose guidelines for the participation of the Armed Forces in activities related to civil defense; and propose guidelines for the performance of the Armed Forces in peacekeeping operations.

The most important roles of the Politics, Strategy and International Affairs Secretary were to:\(^{26}\) formulate the basis of a national defense policy; formulate the doctrine, policy and military strategy of Defense; supervise the activity of Defense Strategic Intelligence; formulate general guidelines for the integration of the national defense system; guide the conduct of international affairs that involve the military forces in conjunction with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; establish guidelines to regulate the activity of Defense attachés, Brazilian military advisers and the representation of Brazil on the Inter-American Defense Board, and in the relationship of the foreign military attachés in Brazil; assess the strategic situation and the national and international scene in the areas of Brazil's interests; oversee programs and projects in specific sectors or areas of national defense interest; and monitor the National Maritime Policy.

The main duties of the Education, Logistics, Mobilization, Science and Technology Secretary were to:\(^{27}\) formulate and oversee science and technology policy in the Armed Forces; formulate policy and oversee national mobilization; formulate and oversee policy for a defense logistics doctrine and military logistics; oversee the program for national mobilization; formulate and oversee the national policy on export of military equipment; establish guidelines for the assessment of equipment for military
use; encourage research and development, production and export in areas of Defense interest; control the export of war material of a conventional nature; coordinate activities related to military service; coordinate the participation of the Armed Forces in activities related to national development; establish general guidelines for military mobilization; conduct the affairs relating to the compensation trade and, industrial and technology transfer (offset); supervise the activities of the military cataloging system; propose a general orientation for specialized instruction and teaching in aspects common to more than one Service; and coordinate proposals for teaching and study at the Superior War College.

The main roles of the Institutional Organization Secretary were to: develop guidelines related to the modernization of organizational structures, the rationalization and integration of administrative procedures for the Armed Forces; coordinate the proposition of military law common to the Services; formulate policy to pay for military personnel and pensioners; consolidate the annual plans and budget proposals from each Service and from the Ministry of Defense; establish guidelines for activities related to health and social care for Armed Forces personnel and their families and for the central administration of the Ministry of Defense; establish general guidelines and coordinate activities related to military sports common to the Armed Forces.

The most important duties of the Civil Aviation Secretary were to: advise the Minister of Defense in coordinating and supervisory bodies and entities responsible for management, regulation and supervision of civil aviation and civil airport infrastructure; advise the Minister of Defense in the formulation of policy guidelines for national civil aviation; promote interaction with agencies and entities, both national and international,
related to civil aviation; and analyze and propose an appropriate distribution of budget resources relating to airport infrastructure and the infrastructure of civil air navigation.

In analyzing the roles of each Secretary and of the General Staff of Defense, it is possible to identify some vagueness and overlaps. First, there was no direct link between them and the Services. The liaisons were accomplished through tasks or routine procedures (e.g., annual budget proposals). The commanders of Services interacted directly with the Minister of Defense or through the Defense Military Council. Second, important matters were dealt with by more than one secretariat at the same level, creating difficulties in sharing information and attaining objectives. For example: the General Staff of Defense was supposed to propose and supervise the participation of the Services in peacekeeping operations, but the Secretary of Politics, Strategy and International Affairs was to conduct international affairs that involved the military in conjunction with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These double interests only produced delays in the decision-making process about peacekeeping missions. Third, the important task of management of products of defense was given to the Secretary of Education, Logistics, Mobilization, Science and Technology, thus competing with other relevant tasks such as mobilization. This situation was not favorable to the development of a national defense industry.

In the last 11 years, after the creation of the Ministry of Defense, national and international environments have changed incredibly. In economic terms, Brazil has become the eighth largest economy in the world, with potential to grow more in the future due to the existence of arable lands and many natural resources. But this rank does not reflect its society. Brazil has a huge social gap. There are people who do not
have access to the educational system or to health care. This part of society lives with poverty and suffering, often compounded by threats from a criminal element. For this reason, the media and public opinion are excessively critical about spending money on defense matters. In the global environment, the increase of international relationships has pushed many countries to become more active in the diplomatic arena. Several countries, including the United States, see the importance of reforming the United Nations Security Council. Germany, India, Japan and Brazil are natural candidates to become permanent members.

In diplomatic matters, more than a desire to reform the U.N. Security Council, the Brazilian government has promoted two alternative centers of global power: India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA), and Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC). Brazil has also promoted South American integration with institutions like the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the South American Defense Council (CSD). The Brazilian government has pursued a multi-polar international order for asserting Brazilian interests and increasing its global power. This means to be more assertive than subaltern in the international arena; in the words of Minister of Defense Jobim, “to have the capability to say no, when it needs to say no.” However, increasing its global power only in the diplomatic arena is not enough: Brazil needs to become stronger in defense matters to ensure its diplomatic advances. Therefore, in December 2008, Brazil published the National Strategy of Defense, with objectives and guidelines to guide the national defense effort.

This strategy was built on three axes. First, reorganization of the Armed Forces through redefinition of the roles of Ministry of Defense, and establishment of strategic
guidelines for each Service, taking into account three critical areas for national defense: cyber, space and nuclear. Second, restructuring the Brazilian defense industry to allow it to become independent in meeting the needs of the Brazilian Armed Forces. And third, maintaining compulsory military service to enhance the ties between the Armed Forces and civil society.

In the guidelines of the National Strategy of Defense, the need to restructure the Ministry of Defense is clear. One directive is to unify the operations of the three branches of the Armed Forces, to be a Joint Force, far beyond the limits imposed by joint exercise protocols.\(^\text{34}\) Achievement of this goal is imperative to modify the structure and attributions of the General Staff of Defense, to become more proactive. The strategy stresses solving this problem with the creation of a Joint Staff of the Armed Forces.

Another important issue is the subordination of the military structure under civilian control. To attain this objective, the strategy shows the need to improve the civilian career in defense matters and, most important, to modify the complementary law n° 117, September 02, 2004 (General Rules for Organization, Preparation and Employ of the Armed Forces) to give commander's authority over the Commanders of the Services to the Minister of Defense.\(^\text{35}\)

Also, it is important to highlight how the strategy considers the Brazilian defense industry. To pursue the acquisition of military products more effectively, the strategy calls for the creation of a Secretary of Defense Products. Therefore, this important subject will be more prominent in the Ministry's new structure.\(^\text{36}\)
To make the guidelines from the National Defense Strategy a reality, the Brazilian Government passed a new complementary law\textsuperscript{37} that implemented the strategy’s modifications concerning the General Rules for Organization, Preparation and Employ of the Armed Forces. This legislation has four main points. First, it increased the authority of the Minister of Defense and consequently civilian control over the military. Second, it created the Joint Staff of Armed Forces through the transformation of the General Staff of Defense. Third, the law enhanced the role of the Ministry of Defense in the management of products of Defense. And fourth, it gave power to the Services to conduct operations against transnational and environmental (ecological) crimes.

The measures set forth to increase the Minister’s authority are simple. Basically, the law gives commander’s powers to the Minister of Defense. He chooses and indicates the commanders of the Services and the Chief of Joint Staff of Armed Forces for presidential nomination.\textsuperscript{38} Each Service commander lost the authority to indicate general officers for promotion and assignment; now they make a proposal to the Minister of Defense, who indicate them to the President for nomination.\textsuperscript{39}

The budget proposal from each Service will be made jointly with the Ministry of Defense following the priorities of the National Defense Strategy.\textsuperscript{40}

In case of joint operations, the joint commander would be subordinate to the President (Supreme Armed Forces Commander) through the Minister of Defense. In peacekeeping operations and joint exercises, the commander will be directly subordinate to the Minister of Defense.\textsuperscript{41}

This new step toward civilian control brings two big challenges. First is the personal capacity and qualifications of the Minister in the future. These decisions were
made taking into account the personality of current Minister of Defense Nelson Jobim, who has, without a doubt, leadership cachet in military circles and knowledge to work in domestic, regional and international environments. President Lula, who advised the President-elect (Dilma Roussef) to maintain Nelson Jobim as Minister of Defense for the next presidential term, recognized his importance in this process. 42

The second challenge was identified in the National Defense Strategy. It is the need to improve the civilian career in defense matters. How long does it take to make a civilian, without experience, an expert in defense affairs? For example, who in the Ministry will be able to produce the defense budget proposal jointly with the Services? A civilian, a retired officer or an active duty officer, borrowed from the Services? Certainly, this will become a point of tension between the Services, particularly with the continuous budget restrictions very common in Brazil.

The other main point of the new law is the creation of the Joint Staff of Armed Forces. More than transforming the General Staff of Defense, the law tries to enhance the capabilities of the Joint Staff. The Joint Staff will continue to make joint operation plans and advise the Minister of Defense during joint exercises and about the participation of Brazilian forces in peacekeeping operations. In addition, the Minister of Defense has decided to restructure the Ministry to resolve the disconnect between the secretariats and the General Staff. To enhance relationships with the Services, the Chief of Joint Staff will be at the same level as the Services commanders, 43 and will be the coordinator of the committee composed of the Chiefs of General Staff of each Service. 44
On November 24, 2010, a Presidential Decree was published that approved the new structure of the Ministry of Defense; the main modifications are listed below.

The creation of an Institutional Planning Advisory Group whose main duties are to: lead and coordinate the process of drafting and revision of the strategic planning of the Ministry of Defense; develop ongoing and systematic knowledge of the future scenario, with the goal of advising the high-level decision-making process of the Ministry of Defense; articulate with other departments of the Ministry of Defense how to measure results, providing the search of means and technical training according to expectations from strategic planning.

The General Staff of Defense is upgraded to the Joint Staff of Armed Forces, and its main roles are to advise the Minister of Defense in the following matters: national policies and strategies and strategic intelligence and counterintelligence; international acts and issues, and participation in organizations in Brazil and abroad about defense affairs; logistics, mobilization and military technology; and articulation and equipment of the Armed Forces.

The former sections of the General Staff of Defense (Command and Control, Intelligence, Operations and Logistics) are now under the new Department of Preparation and Employment, whose main duties are to: advise the Joint Staff of Armed Forces in matters relating to joint preparation and employment of the Armed Forces; coordinate and propose guidelines for planning, implementation and monitoring of joint preparation and employment; evaluate the joint means of defense from Armed Forces; make and keep current the doctrine and strategic planning for joint operations; plan and coordinate the joint training of the Armed Forces; supervise the employment of
operational commands, joint or from the Services; propose guidelines, plan, coordinate and supervise the performance of the Armed Forces in peacekeeping operations; propose guidelines for participation of the Armed Forces in subsidiary activities.

The former Secretariat of Politics, Strategy and International Affairs is now the Department of Strategic Affairs, and has become subordinate to the Joint Staff of Armed Forces. This transformation occurred without significant internal changes; its sections include: Section of Politics and Strategy, Section of Strategic Intelligence and Section of International Affairs, and its roles are still to: advise the Joint Staff of Armed Forces in matters of policy, strategy and international affairs, and strategic intelligence and counterintelligence; propose guidelines and coordinate the planning, implementation and supervising of issues focused on policy, strategy, international affairs and strategic intelligence; participate in and represent Defense in organizations in Brazil and abroad.

The former Secretariat of Education, Logistics, Mobilization, Science and Technology has been dismantled. Logistics and Mobilization matters are now directed by the new Department of Logistics, also subordinate to the Joint Staff of Armed Forces. The department has two sections: Logistics Integration and Mobilization. Its main jobs are to: advise the Joint Staff of Armed Forces in matters of logistics, mobilization and military service; coordinate the planning, implementation and supervising of programs and projects for logistics, mobilization and military technology.

These three departments of the Joint Staff of Armed Forces will be headed by general officers of the last rank in active duty from each Service. It is easy to see that this new structure is more interconnected than the former one. Now, all groups involved, directly or indirectly, with strategic planning and joint operations are linked under the
supervision of the Joint Staff. Another important advance is the creation of the committee of Chiefs General Staff. This will allow the Chief of Joint Staff to become more effective in coordinating with and between the Services.

However, this upgrade creates a huge new challenge. How can the Ministry of Defense fill positions with capable personnel? Are there enough expert officers in the Armed Forces to fill positions in each Service and in the Ministry of Defense? What percentage of personnel from each Service will be used? Will the number be equal or will the Army (the biggest Service) assign more officers? Will the Minister of Defense be allowed to fill some positions with retired officers or with civilians? For military personnel, will it be mandatory it attend joint courses or strategic courses? And for civilians, what kind of specialization will be required? The official documents do not answer these questions. But the fact is, in the short term, the three main Brazilian military courses on this level (Naval Policy and Strategy Course - Navy; Politics, Strategy and High Administration Course - Army, Air Policy and Strategy Course – Air Force) are not prepared to provide the necessary quantity of specialized officers. The High Studies in Policy and Strategy Course, conducted by the Superior War College under direct supervision of the Ministry of Defense, also is not capable of reducing this gap in human resources. Although it is possible for civilians attend the course, it is difficult to find civilian volunteers willing to spend a year on full-time academic studies.

To conduct the other duties of the former Secretariat of Education, Logistics, Mobilization, Science and Technology, two new secretariats have been created: the Secretariat of Defense Products, which, because of its importance, will be analyzed in the next paragraph, and the Secretariat of Personnel, Education, Health and Sports.
The other former secretariats (Institutional Organization and Civil Aviation) basically retain their same structure and duties, and are not important for this study.

The other important issue of the new law is enhancing the role of the Ministry of Defense in products of defense management. The new structure created, the Secretariat of Defense Products, has three departments: Defense Products Department, Science and Industrial Technology Department, and Cataloging Department.

The main duties of the Secretariat of Defense Products and its departments are to: formulate and update national policy for science, technology and innovation for defense, to develop technology and create new products for defense; formulate and update the national policy for defense industry; formulate and updating of the purchasing policy of defense products; regulate and supervise the actions inherent to the control of imports and exports of defense products; monitor the processes and coordinate programs and projects of articulation and defense equipment; propose guidelines for the establish needs and requirements, in terms of common use, of means of defense; establish, plan and coordinate the standardization of defense products used by the Services; establish and coordinate the integration of acquisitions, regarding the interests of each Service; propose guidelines on the collection and distribution of goods and services; and supervise the activities of acquisition of information on military technology and military cataloging.

After reviewing the main roles of the Secretary of Products of Defense, it is easy to identify how specific and technical this job is. The challenge about civilians experts in defense matters persists here and is probably even worse than in the other secretariats.
From what institution or Services will employees come from to fill the slots in these departments? Are there enough experts in defense products in Brazilian society? If so, will they prefer to work in the government or in the private sector? There will probably be an increase in this area of employment in the industrial sector. But indirectly there is another challenge here. Has Brazil the capability to enhance its defense industry without financial problems? Enhancing the defense industry by looking only to external market is dangerous, because the competition with other countries is stiff. Improving the defense industry with confidence in the internal market is also dangerous, and probably more unpredictable. With its huge social gap, with problems in educational and health care systems, how much and how long will the Brazilian government invest in defense products?

The last main point of the law gives power to the Services to conduct operations against transnational and environmental (ecological) crimes. These operations are characterized by patrolling the land borders, checking on vehicles, boats and planes, and arresting those engaged in flagrant crime. This law is useful particularly for the Navy and Air Force to intercept unauthorized flights and shipping from other countries.

After this analysis, it is possible identify that at the same time there are huge challenges, there are also major opportunities. The complementary law nº 136, August 25, 2010 (General Rules for Organization, Preparation and Employ of the Armed Forces) and the Presidential Decree nº 7.364, November 23, 2010 (Regimental Structure of Ministry of Defense) are aligned with guidelines from National Defense Strategy published in December 2008. Success in implementing and developing of long-term strategy now depends primarily on human resources. The leadership process
is guaranteed with Minister Nelson Jobim as head of the Ministry of Defense in the next presidential term. However, the lack of civilians with expertise in Defense matters still exists, as does the lack of enough military officers from the Services. This challenge also is a huge opportunity. Investing in specialized education and training in defense matters is the key for success. This could happen by increasing the number of courses that already exist in the Armed Forces or by creating such courses of study in civilian institutions. The most important goal here is to create the conditions for both military personnel and their civilians counterparts to be more professional and interactive in defense matters.

Another huge opportunity is a consequence of increasing the management of defense products. Defense industries or companies with the potential to produce military equipment need to get involved in the process. Following this signal, EMBRAER (Empresa Brasileira de Aeronáutica SA) announced the creation of Embraer Defense and Security, which is an important step in consolidating the company’s position in the process of strengthening Brazil’s defense and security industry.\textsuperscript{50}

In concluding this study, it is necessary for me to make some recommendations that could help improve the relationship between the United States and Brazil. These proposals are made on the basis of the opportunities discussed above. The first is at the level of human resources. There are several academic institutions with expertise in defense matters in United States; the US Army War College is one example of them. These institutions could help the Brazilian effort by increasing the participation of Brazilian students at resident and distance courses. This measure should be attempted for both military personnel and civilians, and could be implemented under the new
defense agreement signed by Secretary Robert Gates and Minister Nelson Jobim on April 12, 2010. Its article 2 provides the basis for cooperation with exchanges of students from military institutions and participation in activities (i.e., courses, seminars, conferences, and symposiums) offered by military and civil entities. Deep mutual knowledge of Brazilian and American students in the present will enhance the ties for a strong partnership in the future.

My last recommendation refers to the increase of Brazilian defense products. Probably this is the biggest area of interest from the Brazilian side and also the area of most resistance from the American side. The strong Brazilian position regarding technology transfer when discussing acquisition of defense products should be interpreted not as possible competition or conflict in the future, but as an opportunity to build a strong relationship as equals, and therefore, consolidating the perception of trust and ensuring a true friendship in the future.

Endnotes

1 Thomas Skidmore, Brazil: Five Centuries of Change (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 58.

2 Ibid., 121.


6 Skidmore, Brazil, 143–148.

7 Ibid., 151.
8 Ibid., 155.

9 Ibid., 157.

10 Ibid., 157.


13 Ibid., 177.


15 Skidmore, *Brazil*, 186.

16 Ibid., 189.

17 Ibid., 221.

18 “Normas gerais para a organização, o preparo e o emprego das Forças Armadas,” Lei Complementar nº 97, de 09 de junho de 1999 (Brasília, DF, Brasil, Diário Oficial da União, de 10 Jun 1999).

19 Ibid., Art.4.

20 Ibid., Art.9.

21 Ibid., Art.7.

22 Ibid., Art.12, § 2.

23 Ibid., Art.15.

24 Normas gerais para a organização, o preparo e o emprego das Forças Armadas, Lei Complementar nº 117, de 02 de Setembro de 2004 (Brasília, DF, Brasil, Diário Oficial da União, de 03 Set 2004), Art.15–18.


26 Ibid., 29.

27 Ibid., 41.

28 Ibid., 56.

29 Ibid., 86.

31 Ibid., 12.


34 Ibid., 12.


36 Ibid., 16.

37 Normas gerais para a organização, o preparo e o emprego das Forças Armadas, Lei Complementar nº 136, de 25 de agosto de 2010 (Brasília, DF, Brasil, Diário Oficial da União, de 26 Ago 2010).

38 Ibid., Art. 3A, Art. 4.

39 Ibid., Art. 7.

40 Ibid., Art.12, § 2.

41 Ibid., Art.15.


44 Ibid., Art.3A.


46 Ibid., Art. 4.

47 Ibid., Art. 8.

48 Ibid., Art. 9.

49 Ibid., Art. 25.
