

# AIR LAND SEA BULLETIN



*Issue No. 2011-3*

Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center

*September 2011*

## Open Warfighter Forum



# Report Documentation Page

Form Approved  
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE <b>SEP 2011</b>		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED <b>00-00-2011 to 00-00-2011</b>	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE <b>Air Land Sea Bulletin. Issue No. 2011-3, September 2011</b>				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) <b>Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center,ATTN: ALSB,114 Andrews Street,Langley AFB,VA,23665-2785</b>				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT <b>Approved for public release; distribution unlimited</b>					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT <b>unclassified</b>	b. ABSTRACT <b>unclassified</b>	c. THIS PAGE <b>unclassified</b>			

# CONTENTS

## ALSA Staff

### Director

Col David B. Hume, USAF

### Deputy Director

COL Bruce Sones, USA

### Editor

Ms. Patricia Radcliffe, Civilian, USAF

### Layout

Ms. Laura Caswell, Civilian, USN

### Publications Officer

CDR Cindy Dieterly, USN

**Purpose:** The ALSA Center publishes the *ALSB* three times a year. ALSA is a multi-Service DOD field agency sponsored by the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC), and Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education (LeMay Center). This periodical is governed by Army Regulation 25-30, Chapter 10. The *ALSB* is a vehicle to "spread the word" on recent developments in warfighting concepts, issues, and Service interoperability. The intent is to provide a cross-Service flow of information among readers around the globe. **Disclaimer:** Since the *ALSB* is an open forum, the articles, letters, and opinions expressed or implied herein should not be construed to be the official position of TRADOC, MCCDC, NWDC, Lemay Center, or ALSA Center.

**Submissions:** We solicit articles and reader's comments. Contributions of 1,500 words or less are ideal. Submit contributions, double-spaced in MS Word. Include name, title, complete unit address, telephone number, and email address. Graphics can appear in an article, but you must also provide a separate computer file for each graphic and photograph (photos must be 300 dpi). Send email submissions to [alsadirector@langley.af.mil](mailto:alsadirector@langley.af.mil). The ALSA Center reserves the right to edit content to meet space limitations and conform to the *ALSB* style and format.

**Next issue: January 2012. Submission DEADLINE: COB 1 November 2011.** The theme of this issue is "Tactical Doctrine in Support of Operations".

**Reprints:** ALSA Center grants permission to reprint articles. Please credit the author and the *ALSB*. Local reproduction of the *ALSB* is authorized and encouraged.

**Subscriptions:** We continue to validate our subscriber's information and requirements. If you wish to **discontinue your subscription** of the *ALSB*, please send an email to [alsapubs@langley.af.mil](mailto:alsapubs@langley.af.mil).

**Mailing/Distribution:** This publication is packaged for mailing and distributed by the ALSA Center at Langley AFB, Virginia.

**ALSA Center Web Sites:** The *ALSB* and MTTTP publications are available at our CAC-enabled web site: <https://www.mil.alsa.mil>. For classified ALSA MTTTP publications, visit <http://www.acc.af.smil.mil/alsa>.

Director's Comments .....	3
---------------------------	---

## FEATURE ARTICLES

The Apache Paradox: How the World's Most Lethal Gunship Limits Fratricide and Collateral Damage .....	4
---	---

Strategic Communication: Winning the Battle of the Narrative .....	10
---	----

Extending Distributive Training Worldwide Through the Joint Training Enterprise Network – Expeditionary (JTEN-X) .....	14
--	----

Insights for All Military Advisors: Lessons From Iraq .....	19
---	----

The Assessments Process And Full Spectrum Operations....	24
--	----

## IN HOUSE

Current ALSA MTTTP Publications .....	30
---------------------------------------	----

Tactical Doctrine in Support of Operations.....	33
---	----

ALSA Organization .....	34
-------------------------	----

ALSA Mission and Voting JASC Members .....	35
--	----

Online Access to ALSA Products.....	35
-------------------------------------	----



Cover photo—Master Sgt. Christopher Hecker, Civil Affairs Team Leader assigned to Ghazni Provincial Reconstruction Team, speaks with village elders in Qaryeh Ye-Bakhtiar, Afghanistan on Jan. 6. Members of Ghazni PRT met with villagers immediately following an operation conducted by Afghan National Army soldiers in the village. (Photo by TSgt. Rebecca Corey, USAF)

---

---

## DIRECTOR'S COMMENTS

---

---

On behalf of the Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center, I thank our readers for their continued support.

Currently, the ALSA publication library includes 35 multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTP) publications which are updated on a three-year cycle. Meeting the immediate needs of the Warfighter remains our number one priority and, as ALSA closes out this fiscal year, I reaffirm our commitment to address multi-Service interoperability issues with multi-Service solutions.

In fiscal year 2012, ALSA intends to publish 14 revised and two new publications (Combat Financial Operations, and Female Engagement Teams) for a publication total of 16 MTTP publications in FY12.

This issue of the Air Land Sea Bulletin (ALSB) is an Open Warfighter forum. It contains diverse articles that provide thought-provoking viewpoints and showcase the ingenuity and flexibility of Service men and women of the US Armed Forces. The first article is authored by CW5 Warren Aylworth who articulates the useful employment of the Apache Longbow helicopter during urban operations. The next article, from a team of Army and Air Force officers, emphasizes the need for multi-Service doctrine on strategic communications; doctrine that will be vital to influencing key audiences and winning the battle of the narrative.

The third article, by Lt Col David Merrifield, focuses on the utility of the Joint Training Enterprise Network-Expeditionary (JTEN-X). JTEN-X enables isolated units to interact with their larger command and control centers and virtual simulators to increase training realism.

The fourth article demonstrates the importance of effectively influencing host nation armed forces, police, and government personnel through military advising. Although advising is not a new military mission, LTC Remi Hajjar highlights recent operations in Iraq and

Afghanistan that forecast the continuing need for effective advising operations. The final article, by CW4 Jimmy Gomez and CW2 Jose Serbia, addresses the assessment process a division staff may undergo while defining problems and developing solutions during a theater campaign.

This Open Warfighter forum is intended to create a cross-flow of information among the Services. This is essential to the professional development of Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, Airmen, and Coast Guardsmen who live and work at the tactical level every day. With anticipation, we believe this Open Warfighter forum will enhance your awareness of our nation's Armed Forces, and promote dialogue on ways to better conduct full spectrum operations. We hope this edition of the ALSB will be beneficial to you, and provide insight on the tremendous job our Armed Forces perform.

During the last few months, we have had changes to the JASC and ALSA staff. In August, Lt Gen David Fadok assumed command of Air University and Maj Gen Thomas Andersen from ACC/A8 became Commander of the LeMay Center and, therefore, the newest member of the JASC. Also, I am taking this opportunity to welcome Maj Clayton Laughlin, Lt Col Richard Freeman, Lt Col Steve Lloyd, and LTC Dana Smith to the ALSA staff.

Last, the theme for our January 2012 ALSB is "Tactical Doctrine in Support of Operations." If you have an article you would like us to consider publishing, please email it to [alsac2@langley.af.mil](mailto:alsac2@langley.af.mil) no later than 1 November. For more information on any of our products visit <http://www.alsa.mil>.

As always, we value your feedback on our ALSBs and MTTPs, so do not hesitate to let us know how we are doing.



DAVID B. HUME, Colonel, USAF  
Director

---

---

# THE APACHE PARADOX: HOW THE WORLD'S MOST LETHAL GUNSHIP LIMITS FRATRICIDE AND COLLATERAL DAMAGE

---

---



Combat Aviation Brigade, 4th Infantry Division pilots taxi an AH-64D Apache Longbow helicopter along a flight line on Camp Taji, Iraq. (Photo by Spc. Creighton Holub, USA)

**By CW5 Warren Aylworth, USA**

## THE APACHE PARADOX

The AH-64D Apache Longbow is often thought of as the ugliest, meanest, most feared aircraft flying today. Since the mantra of irregular warfare (IW) is to “make no new enemies” by limiting the chances of civilian casualties (CIVCAS), some might question the wisdom of employing the world’s most lethal attack helicopter in an area where there is a significant risk of fratricide or collateral damage. The paradox is the Apache is not only able to apply decisive, lethal fires on the enemy but it has an incomparable ability to avoid the risks of fratricide and collateral damage. The Apache’s synergistic combination of phenomenal situational awareness (SA), multi-spectral sighting systems, and high accuracy/low-yield weapons not only make it the optimal platform for placing close combat attack (CCA) fires within danger close distances of

friendly forces, but also make it the ideal weapon system for avoiding collateral damage.

## SA—THE LONGBOW ADVANTAGE

No other weapon’s platform can match the Apache Longbow’s ability to thread into the ground commander’s scheme of maneuver. Working in the biosphere, the Apache’s SA is facilitated by five radios (two FM/SINGARS, one UHF, one VHF, and one SATCOM), and the blue force tracker (BFT) system. BFT is the ground Soldier’s equivalent to the fighter pilot’s Link-16.

BFT allows the Army ground forces and Army attack aviation to see each other’s location on a digital map display.

The Apache Longbow’s color multipurpose displays (MPDs) are the heart of the aircraft crew’s SA. The MPDs can display and enlarge images and graphics ranging from

---

---

No other weapon’s platform can match the Apache Longbow’s ability to thread into the ground commander’s scheme of maneuver.

---

---

the ground commander's gridded reference graphics and target photos, to wanted posters of high-value individuals. The MPD's tactical situation display option, with its moving map display and integrated BFT battlefield graphics, provides the AH-64D crew ability to not only know where they are, but also where their friends are located. This is because it can display detailed ground maneuver graphics directly into the cockpit.

### **APACHE SIGHTING SYSTEMS SEE WHERE (AND WHERE NOT) TO SHOOT**

The Apache has a combination of sighting systems that allow the crew to see and understand the world around them. The centerpiece of the Apache sighting systems is the aircraft's integral targeting pod

known as the modernized target acquisition and designation sight (M-TADS). The M-TADS allows the Apache's front seat copilot/gunner to zoom in close to search for and identify targets utilizing the gyro-stabilized 127-power day television, or 40-power forward looking infrared. When in the target area, the Apache's on-board laser spot tracker can lock the M-TADS onto a designated target day or night and has proven to be particularly useful in complex urban terrain. During nighttime operations, the crew's night-vision goggles can see near infrared laser pointers used by ground or air forces to point out targets for attack. In turn, the Apache can use its own powerful infrared zoom laser illumination designators' pointer to show where the Apache's gun is aimed.


---

---

The Apache has a combination of sighting systems that allow the crew to see and understand the world around them.

---

---



US Army Spc. Michael Clark loads .30-mm rounds into an AH-64D Apache Longbow helicopter at Forward Operating Base Salerno in the Khowst province of Afghanistan 19 April 2007. Clark is from Bravo Company, 122nd Aviation Support Battalion, 82nd Aviation Brigade, 82nd Infantry Division (Airborne). (Photo by SSG Isaac A. Graham, USA)

---

---

The Apache has three weapon systems that are uniquely capable in neutralizing the enemy while avoiding collateral damage.

---

---

The Apache crew can also program selected coordinates for display on their “heads down moving map display” or can display this information “heads out” on either their helmet mounted displays or on their M-TADS. The Apache pilot’s helmet mounted display is similar to the fighter pilot’s “heads-up” display and presents a discrete symbol over a position in the outside world. With this “C-scope” feature, whenever crewmembers turn their heads or point M-TADS in a particular direction, they will see a symbol superimposed on that position on the ground. These subsystems allow the supported ground commander an almost unlimited way of handing over targets to the Apache crew to facilitate achieving a positive identification of the target.

#### **THE APACHE’S LOW COLLATERAL DAMAGE WEAPONS**

The Apache has three weapon systems that are uniquely capable in neutralizing the enemy while avoiding

collateral damage. The M-230, 30mm chain gun, the “November model” Hellfire missile, and the 2.75 “Flechette rocket”. Each weapon system offers a particular advantage when it comes to maximizing effectiveness while simultaneously minimizing collateral damage in the urban environment.

The M-230, 30mm chain gun, is the Apache pilot’s weapon of first resort. This multipurpose weapon is mounted under the nose of the AH-64. It can traverse or flex +11 degrees up, 60 degrees down, and +/- 86 degrees to either side. This allows the Apache crew to engage targets from almost any angle.

The 30mm gun was originally designed during the Cold War to engage armored vehicles and deliver long range suppressive fire (as far as three kilometers away) against area targets. Today the gun is used almost exclusively within two kilometers against small-point targets such as personnel or light-skinned vehicles. The gun may be aimed three different ways using the



AH-64A Apache helicopters take flight as daylight fades over Shindand Air Base, Regional Command (West), Afghanistan 22 March 2011. The Apache is responsible for most of the air weapons team coverage in Afghanistan. They are assigned to Task Force Comanche, 4th Combat Aviation Brigade, 4th Infantry Division. (Photo by Sgt. Sean Harriman, USA)

M-TADS, crew's helmets, or locking the gun in a fixed forward position. For rapid engagement of targets at close ranges, the gun can be slaved to the pilot's helmet. This allows the pilot to point the gun with his helmet by simply looking at the target. For high-precision engagements at all ranges, the standard method of aiming the gun is to utilize the gyro-stabilized M-TADS. This takes maximum advantage of the M-TADS built-in laser range finder, and the aircraft's fire control computer to provide for precision engagements of individual insurgents up to a mile away (1,600 meters).

### **HIGH EXPLOSIVES TO AVOID COLLATERAL DAMAGE**

The standard bullet for the 30mm cannon is the M-789 high explosive dual purpose (HEDP) round. In the age of inert/limited-yield, low-collateral-damage bombs, some would ask, wouldn't it be wiser to substitute high explosive (HE) rounds with inert training practice (TP) rounds to avoid CIVCAS? The answer is absolutely not!

Firing inert TP ammunition will not only severely limit the ability to effectively destroy the enemy, but will put the innocent at a disproportionate risk of collateral damage. The steel body of a TP round poses a significant ricochet hazard, particularly in an urban environment. When an inert TP round is fired at a target in the street, the round could strike the pavement around the aim-point and ricochet for another 1,000 meters, possibly impacting in houses, mosques, and other structures which may be important to the local population. In contrast the HEDP is a frangible round that turns into non-lethal dust within a few meters of its impact point; confining the weapon's effects to the immediate vicinity of the positively identified crew selected target.



Maj. Gen. James Hunt, deputy commanding general, Multi-National Corps – Iraq, prepares for his first flight in an AH-64D Apache helicopter to get a better idea of an attack weapons team's capabilities through hands-on operations. Maj Gen Hunt was visiting 1st Battalion, 227th Aviation Regiment, 1st Air Cavalry Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, Multi-National Division – Baghdad, 11 September 2009. (Photo by SGT Seandale Jackson, USA)

### **THE HELLFIRE ADVANTAGE— HIGH ACCURACY/LOW YIELD**

The Hellfire is America's most accurate precision guided munition. It is not only substantially more accurate than the GPS-guided, joint direct attack munition, it has a perfectly scaled amount of explosive. Originally designed to destroy tank-sized targets, the Hellfire's inherent high accuracy combined with its typical 24-pound warhead, makes it the perfect weapon for a collateral-damage-sensitive environment. One version of the Hellfire, the AGM-114N (November model), goes one step beyond its predecessors by offering compartmentalized effects. The November model combines a 27.5 pound, metal-augmented charge, thermobaric warhead with a fixed-time-delay fuze. This combination of enhanced blast effect and inside-the-building-only detonation mitigates unwanted fragmentation and makes the November model the ideal urban counter-sniper weapon.

---

---

The Hellfire is America's most accurate precision guided munition.

---

---

## **HELLFIRE'S MAN-IN-THE-LOOP ADVANTAGE**

In spite of the military's best efforts at prior planning, and even after all rules of engagement (ROE) requirements have been met, there remains the potential for a regrettable situation to arise after the weapon's trigger is pulled. A unique attribute of Hellfire missiles is the ability of the crew to account for the unanticipated arrival of friendly or neutrals within the target area after trigger pull. The crew has two regret avoidance techniques to mitigate a potentially dire situation. One option is to allow the missile to overfly the target. Unlike a bomb that is dropped onto a ballistic aim point near a target, a Hellfire fired from a low-altitude helicopter could simply be allowed to fly over a target. When using the missiles in the lock-on after launch mode, the crew can simply allow the Hellfire to fly over the target by choosing not to put a laser on the target. Though this technique will not work in large urban areas, the Hellfire's nominal 8 to 14 kilometers fly-out distance means the missile can be expected to fly right past small towns and villages and land out in the surrounding countryside.

In large urban environments, or in a case where the over flight is impractical, the crew may select a new impact point for the missile after trigger pull. In the lock-on before launch mode, the alternative regret avoidance technique is to smoothly fly the missile to another less critical impact point. At maximum range, the gunner would have as much as 30 seconds to select a new aim point. In this case, the Apache gunner continues to laser designate for the missile that is in flight and maneuvers the laser spot to another area that will cause less collateral damage. This shift could position may be selected prior to trigger pull; however, the

nominated alternate impact point also should be evaluated for collateral damage or fratricide considerations.

## **FLECHETTE ROCKET ADVANTAGE**

The 2.75 rocket is normally not considered a collateral damage avoidance weapon; however, one variant, the M-255A1 flechette rocket, is in a class of its own. The flechette's biggest limitation is the misconception that it is somehow too harsh a weapon for counter insurgency warfare. The flechette rocket is optimized for the highly restricted ROE environment as it offers a proportionately scaled weapon effect and minimizes the likelihood of collateral damage or leaving a contaminated battlefield. The flechette is particularly well suited for an urban environment where it will defeat enemy combatants on the outside of buildings while not posing a risk to civilians inside buildings or friendly forces inside armored vehicles. The flechette rocket does not contain a high explosive, only a small pyrotechnic charge used to disperse the payload of 1,067 inert dart-like projectiles. These 4.5mm, 60 grain steel projectiles are smaller, lighter, and slower than rifle bullets. The flechette's difference is that a single M-255 represents the equivalent of 34 riflemen emptying a 30 round magazine onto the target all within 0.4 of a second.

Consequently, even in an ROE-restrictive environment if it's clear to fire a rifle at the target, it should be clear to fire flechettes at it. The controlled penetration of the flechettes, combined with the total absence of HE make it the ideal weapon for avoiding collateral damage in an urban environment or when engaging dismounted enemy forces in the vicinity of protected infrastructural facilities.

---

---

The flechette rocket is optimized for the highly restricted ROE environment as it offers a proportionately scaled weapon effect and minimizes the likelihood of collateral damage.

---

---

## CCA-THE ARMY'S ADVANTAGE

When the AH-64D's SA tools are combined with an Army Soldier sitting in the cockpit, the Apache provides a total situational understanding that is unequaled by all other shooters. The Army leverages the aviator's intimate understanding of the ground Soldier's perspective by using highly flexible CCA employment tactics. Though superficially similar to close air support (CAS), the key attribute of the Army's CCA is that it is based upon direct Soldier-to-Soldier contact without the need for routing fire support requests through a limited number of specially trained, certified, qualified joint terminal attack controllers. The Soldier in the Apache cockpit speaks the same language as the

Soldier on the ground and, therefore, does not require a middle man to deliver precision effects close to friendly locations. These are the same attributes that make the AH-64D Apache Longbow the ideal CCA platform. The Apache also provides the joint force commander a unique capability to engage the enemy with precision while reducing the potential of collateral damage.

The Apache Longbow provides unparalleled abilities to intelligently apply just the right amount of force. It combines phenomenal SA, great sighting systems, and high-accuracy, low-yield weapons that give warfighters the lethal weapon systems to attack and destroy enemies while protecting the innocent from collateral damage.

---

---

The Apache Longbow provides unparalleled abilities to intelligently apply just the right amount of force.

---

---



An AH-64D Apache Longbow attack helicopter flies over the desert terrain between Tall' Afar and Mosul, Iraq. (Photo by SGT Ryan Matson, USA)

---

---

## STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION: WINNING THE BATTLE OF THE NARRATIVE

---



Rear Adm. Frank Thorp IV, Navy Chief of Information, opens the Public Affairs Visual Information Training Symposium in Lansdowne, VA 7 June 2009. (Photo by Oscar Sosa)

**By LTC Troy Lorenzo Ewing, USA  
Lt Col Angela Billings, USAF,  
LTC Michael Johnson, USA,  
Lt Col Regina Winchester, USAF,**

---

---

SC concerns ensuring words and deeds are synchronized to convey an overarching message.

---

---

The key component of winning the battle of the narrative is establishing and explaining reasons for potential outcomes of a military operation in terms favorable to friendly forces. Strategic communication (SC) is at the heart of US Government efforts to inform and influence key audiences in support of US national interests, policies, and objectives.<sup>1</sup> SC concerns ensuring words and deeds are synchronized to convey an overarching message. SC priorities are established by national civilian and military leaders to mitigate possible unintended consequences caused by disparities between our words and deeds starting at the strategic level and flowing through the operational and tactical levels.

As globalization continues to reduce barriers between nations, the US military will play an instrumental

supporting role in US governmental efforts to communicate national objectives. In view of this, SC doctrine and training is necessary to help joint force commanders and their staffs, plan and execute a SC strategy. The Service as a whole has to strengthen its ability to articulate consistent SC into strategic, operational, and tactical planning, across the entire range of military operations from recurring military activities in peacetime to major operations.

At the DOD level, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations*, defines SC as “focused [US Government] efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of [US Government] interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.”<sup>2</sup> The key pillars of SC are further broken down into information operations (IO), public affairs (PA), and defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD).

This article is based on the premise that SC is more than just PA/IO. Joint Publication 3-0, states, “SC planning must be integrated into military planning, operations, and documented in operation plans and coordinated and synchronized with other government agencies and multinational partners.”<sup>3</sup>

Overall, thinking within DOD about SC has limited it to the disciplines of PA, IO and DSPD or, even more narrowly, as a function of PA media engagements. There is no consensus on how to carry out SC, or how to train to achieve SC effects. While doctrine points to the three pillars of PA/IO/DSPD, there can be no true SC effect without taking into account operations, planning, intelligence, political advisor and legislative liaison efforts, and funding cycles in coordination with the standard, communication-centric disciplines of IO and PA. The nod to DSPD recognizes there is an interagency tie. Also, it recognizes actions are as

much a part of achieving SC effects as are words. Former Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) ADM Mike Mullen addressed the importance of SC. ADM Mullen stated, “We must be vigilant about holding ourselves accountable to higher standards of conduct and closing any gaps, real or perceived, between what we say about ourselves and what we do to back it up.”<sup>4</sup>

One of the biggest challenges within DOD for SC is the lack of doctrine. “Strategic communications will play an increasingly important role in a unified approach to national security. DOD, in partnership with the Department of State, has begun to make strides in this area, and will continue to do so. However, we should recognize this is a weakness across the US Government, and a coordinated effort must be made to improve the joint planning and implementation of strategic communications.”<sup>5</sup>

---

---

“Strategic communications will play an increasingly important role in a unified approach to national security”

---

---



U.S. Army Sgt. Evan Whitlock, left, hands a tips card to some local nationals during a joint foot patrol in Basra, Iraq, 2 April 2010. Whitlock serves with Tactical Psychological Operations Detachment 1070, 318th TPSYOP Company, attached to the 17th Fires Brigade (Photo by SSG Aselita Mead, USA)

While the need for and value of incorporating SC into the planning process is necessary, the need for doctrine across the Services remains a critical lynchpin in achieving a DOD-wide understanding of SC. As a result, Joint Forces Command recognized this need, and published the pre-doctrinal *Commander's Handbook for Strategic Communication*, "to help joint force commanders and their staffs understand alternative perspectives, techniques, procedures, "best practices," and organizational options."<sup>6</sup>

Since September 11, 2001, SC and public diplomacy have been topics of rigorous debate. Countless reports, white papers and articles discuss a wide range of proposals and recommendations aimed at developing a comprehensive policy and implementation guidance. A 2008 RAND study evaluated and reviewed existing proposals and developed a matrix of commonly identified issues. The most critical issues are best described as: (1) a call for leadership, and (2) interagency cooperation.<sup>7</sup>

Assigning leadership to SC is a tenuous and difficult task. There are differing interpretations of leadership with respect to SC. Military planners operate with specific tasks in mind to achieve a specific end state.

Given the lack of concise and guiding doctrine on SC and any clear organizational concept for these efforts, it is understandable why there is so little DOD guidance on the topic. For many members of the military, SC is not a concept that is implicitly defined or abundantly understood. Part of this is because SC is not an entity in and of itself. It is the result of public and private words and actions; diplomacy, interactions and engagements; planning, and operations, and exercises.

SC is a process of synchronization among DOD and other Government entities to support US national leadership goals and objectives. As ADM Mullen put it, "By organizing to it—creating whole structures around it—we have allowed strategic communi-

cation to become a thing instead of a process, an abstract thought instead of a way of thinking."<sup>8</sup> Mullen described how SC cannot exist in a PA/IO vacuum when he said, "What we are after in the end—or should be after—are actions that speak for themselves, that speak for us. What we need more than anything is credibility. And we can't get that in a talking point."<sup>9</sup>

Adding to these challenges is the fact that DOD not only has to coordinate among its entities, but in today's coalition operating environment, DOD also has to coordinate with other Government agencies and multinational partners. The US benefits from a position of unparalleled military strength and has time and again proven its ability to work collectively with allies to promote global security and international order. However, the US and its coalition allies have struggled to shape the ideas and ideals of key audiences through SC. The ability to take strategic objectives and interests and communicate them effectively, with actions at the operational and tactical level is an art, not a science.

The DOD may address this through application of operational art in its planning efforts. Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, defines operational art as the application of creative imagination to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations by successfully organizing and employing forces across all the levels of war. Operational art also promotes unified action and integration of other agencies and partners toward achieving the national strategic end state.<sup>10</sup> This definition of operational art is a guiding principle of SC. Just as operational art takes strategic guidance and uses operational and tactical forces to achieve the end state; the "art of strategic communication" is the process of translating the executive branch national strategy into an operational SC design, and executing the strategy in words and deeds at the tactical level. This process depends on comprehensive and thorough interagency coordination

---

---

For many members of the military, SC is not a concept that is implicitly defined or abundantly understood.

---

---

as well as defined roles and responsibilities and associated authorities. SC is an important element to win the battle of the narrative and winning the information war; providing resources for it properly remains a challenge. In 2007 over 200 strategic communication practitioners and academics met at the National War College in Washington, D.C. for a Worldwide Strategic Communication Seminar. At the seminar, senior government officials urged attendees to get on with the business of strategic communication, noting that “we will be flying the plane while we’re building it.”<sup>11</sup>

If we accept ADM Mullen’s premise that SC is here to stay as part of DOD’s core lexicon, changes need to be instituted in doctrine and training. ADM Mullen’s vision for SC is that it should be “an enabling function that guides and informs our decisions and not an organization unto itself. Rather than trying to capture all communication activity underneath it, we should use it to describe the process by which we integrate and coordinate.”<sup>12</sup>

Military doctrine is a guide or frame of reference for conducting military operations, and has an extraordinary impact on the implementation of strategy. Doctrine, however, is not strategy. Therefore, educating Service members on the nature of SC should be a high priority. This will allow military personnel to understand the significance of SC and their role in accomplishing coordinated SC effects. To do this, DOD must:

1. Begin with PA, IO, J3 current operations and J5 operational planners. Leverage the skill sets gained through their military training.
2. Incorporate SC into professional military education from basic training through senior levels.
3. Identify SC as a line of operation and develop it throughout the planning process.

4. Drive a change to the military’s cultural mindset. SC must become an inherent consideration within the organization, much as safety is a part of how DOD organizes trains and equips to wage the nation’s wars.

DOD has an important and very visible role in supporting national SC efforts. To better achieve this mission and to ensure actions match words, DOD must drive a culture shift within its ranks through new doctrine, training and education regarding the SC process with clear guidance and expectations set at the highest levels.

---

#### END NOTES

---

<sup>1</sup> Layfield, Major General Stephen R. “Message to the Joint Warfighter,” US Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center, *Commander’s Handbook for Strategic Communication*, 24 June 2010.

<sup>2</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*. Washington, DC: 17 September 2006, incorporating change 2, 22 March 2010, I-2.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, I-3.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid, 4.

<sup>5</sup> US Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center, *Commander’s Handbook for Strategic Communication*, 24 June 2010, II-1.

<sup>6</sup> Layfield, Major General Stephen R. “Message to the Joint Warfighter,” US Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center, *Commander’s Handbook for Strategic Communication*, 24 June 2010.

<sup>7</sup> Paul, Christopher, “Whither Strategic Communication,” 25 February 2009, *RAND Occasional Paper*. Santa Monica, C: The RAND Corporation, 2009, URL:<[http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional\\_paper\\_s/2009/RAND\\_OP250.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_paper_s/2009/RAND_OP250.pdf)>, accessed 4 November 2009.

<sup>8</sup> Mullen, Admiral Michael G. “Strategic Communication: Back to Basics.” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, issue 55, October 2009, 2.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid, 4.

<sup>10</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, Washington, DC: December 2006, IV-1.

<sup>11</sup> Murphy, Dennis. “The Trouble with Strategic Communication(s),” *Center for Strategic Leadership*, U.S. Army War College issue paper, Volume 2-08 January 2008, CSL 1.

<sup>12</sup> Mullen, Admiral Michael G. “Strategic Communication: Back to Basics.” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, issue 55, October 2009, 4.

---



---

... educating Service members on the nature of SC should be a high priority.

---



---

---

# EXTENDING DISTRIBUTIVE TRAINING WORLDWIDE THROUGH THE JOINT TRAINING ENTERPRISE NETWORK-EXPEDITIONARY (JTEN-X)

---



United States Air Force SSgt Isaac Mora, left trains, SrA Colby Scidmore during Joint Training Enterprise Network-Expeditionary Exercise (JTEN-X). The JTEN-X system links a live JTAC team in Grostequinn, France to three virtual simulators located in Germany and the US where targets can be viewed and targeted to create a training battlespace tailored to specific mission objectives. SrA Scidmore is using the ALSA JFIRE MTTP as a reference. (Photo by SSgt Micky M. Bazaldua, USAF)

**By Lt Col Dave Merrifield, USAF**

## OVERVIEW

Isolated military units in austere locations can be integrated wirelessly into the joint live virtual and constructive (JLVC) training environment and simulation architecture using their organic SATCOM equipment. Units training in field environments can now interact with larger command and control (C2) centers and virtual simulators to increase training realism that once stopped with the observer/controller. The warfighter can maintain readiness via the expeditionary capability of the joint training enterprise network (JTEN-X).

Bringing new training opportunities to the joint warfighter is crucial in maintaining the joint oper-

ational edge. A how-to-construct, or step-by-step cookbook, currently under development, will provide directions, parts lists and configuration procedures so any unit, anywhere can link onto the JTEN for training, as required. The proven yet still developing, JTEN-X methodology uses the standard JTEN architectural communication backbone to connect (C2) centers, virtual simulators and live participants to others within the training federation. It provides an extra jump to extend connectivity to remote or austere locations that do not have a traditional connectivity to the JTEN.

In February 2011, US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) demonstrated the JTEN-X methodology to extend modeling and simulation (M&S) to austere locations via

---

The warfighter can maintain readiness via the expeditionary capability of the joint training enterprise network (JTEN-X).

---

satellite capability. In that JTEN-X demonstration, participants from the US and our partners, provided joint terminal attack controllers (JTACs), located at the Polygone Test Range in Grostenquin, France. The JTACs were seamlessly linked with three low-cost virtual flight simulators located in Germany and Florida. These simulators provided a realistic and robust mission rehearsal capability. To add realism into the virtual domains, the Polygone Test Range was temporarily equipped with a mobile range instrumentation system that provided real-time identification, position and tracking data of both friendly and adversary forces. The live instrumented entities were mapped into the virtual domain as avatars and provided a correlation between the live and virtual worlds. In one instance, a live blue pickup truck moving north at 10 mph on the runway in France displayed in the virtual world with the same physical descriptors, position and movement.

Even though the JTEN-X demonstration used a tactical-level JTAC scenario, the design methodology allows for connecting any unit, operational or tactical, to interface with any training scenario. In this demonstration, if we were to use additional military elements, we could have employed an Air Force Air Support Operations Center, US Army Tactical Operations Center, USMC Direct Air Support Center or Joint Operations Center to integrate into the scenario. This would have added to the C2 aspect of training.

JTEN-X extends the JTEN to austere locations, once thought impossible to reach, and brings them into the simulation training community. Not only can DOD fixed and mobile assets be linked but, one could link DOD and US Government simulation centers to run homeland defense/first responder exercise coordination. The possibilities for this JTEN employment methodology are numerous.

## **DEMONSTRATION SPECIFICS**

For the demonstration, USJFCOM partnered with US Air Force's Warrior Preparation Center (WPC) in Einsiedlerhof, Germany to provide a deployable JTAC mission rehearsal training capability anywhere in Europe. The WPC has been a leader in distributing simulated radios and video to JTACs in the field and already have this capability hard-wired to the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) training range in Hohenfels, Germany. But, with the use of satellites and the JTEN-X methodology, training participants are no longer tied to a specific training location.

During the exercise, JTACs planned and executed close air support missions using "low-cost" virtual simulators to act as an F-16, MQ-1 predator and AC-130. The F-16 and MQ-1 simulators were located at the WPC while the AC-130 PC-based virtual calls-for-fire (vCFF) simulator was located at United States Special Operations Command's Joint Training and Simulation Center at Eglin Air Force Base, FL.

The JTACs deployed to the Polygone range with their basic field equipment and planned attacks on fixed and mobile targets. The JTAC's field radio, or man pack (e.g., AN/PRC-117, for the demo), was connected to the simulated radio voice network (used by all virtual aircraft) via the virtual tactical bridge (VTB) developed by Navy Air Systems Command, Orlando FL. The VTB is part of the joint communications framework.

The VTB enabled the JTACs in the field to talk to the virtual simulators using the distributed interactive protocol virtual full-motion video (vFMV), generated from the aircraft simulators, streamed using the core JTEN-X satellite extension to the JTAC's remotely operated video enhancement receiver (ROVER 3) system in the field.

---

---

JTEN-X extends the JTEN to austere locations, once thought impossible to reach, and brings them into the simulation training community.

---

---

The Polygone Test Range was digitalized and mapped so the landscape, major buildings, roadways, taxiways and runway were correlated and displayed realistically and accurately on all virtual systems used during the demonstration. The vFMV picture displayed on the JTAC's ROVER 3 simulated a realistic video downlink from the F-16 targeting pod and MQ-1 camera ball and leveraged USJFCOM's terrain data services (JTDS) which is available to all training partners.

Additionally, the range was temporarily equipped with a portable range instrumentation system which provided blue and red force GPS tracking data. Through this system, live people and vehicles were accurately displayed onto the virtual

domain (e.g., a live blue pickup truck with system #1 cor-related to an appropriate simulation model, so a blue pickup truck avatar would show in the virtual domain). In this demonstration, the man-portable home instrumentation system (MP-HITs), borrowed from the Montana National Guard, and developed by the Program Execution Office for Simulation, Training and Instrumentation, was used as the instrumentation system.

All exercise participants and vehicles were outfitted with an instrumentation vest which included a radio transceiver that relayed its position, movement and identification to the virtual domain to link the live and virtual worlds.

Through this system, live people and vehicles were accurately displayed onto the virtual domain ...




Illustration demonstrates how the JTEN-X system virtually links a JTAC's mental picture to the Joint Operations Center creating a training battlespace tailored to specific mission objectives.

When the JTAC looked out onto the live range, his visual picture matched the virtual view on his ROVER which all three simulated pilots saw simultaneously. Even though there were no aircraft overhead in France, to the JTAC the training was real because his visual and audio feedback from the simulated pilots was timely, accurate and detailed. They depicted the landscape and moving targets with such accuracy, it was easy for the JTAC to build a mental picture, giving him an “immersive feeling” so he believed that there were three aircraft over Grostenquin simultaneously, necessitating airspace deconfliction, and altitude and attack runs.

## **NETWORK ARCHITECTURE**

USJFCOM’s globally distributed JTEN was the backbone of this demonstration. By leveraging two of the 53 persistent JTEN nodes, simulated virtual aircraft from the WPC and US Special Operations Command’s Joint Training and Simulation Center in Florida were connected to the JTAC by extending the JTEN network backbone through SATCOM. The JTEN is a persistent 24/7 network backbone which is capable of sending large amounts of exercise data in real-time.

Currently, there are 53 permanent JTEN sites with the majority of nodes located in the US, with linkages to the United Kingdom., Germany, Korea, and Australia. The JTEN is also connected to Service training networks such as the Air Force’s Distributed Mission Operations Network (DMON) and the Navy Continuous Training Environment (NCTE), thus increasing the world-wide capability of the JTEN network.

The AC-130 vCFF simulator was connected via the Eglin Air Force Base JTEN site and was routed and connected to the WPC through their JTEN node in Germany. From

there all three simulators, the F-16 SIMBOX, MQ-1 air force synthetic environment for reconnaissance and surveillance (AFSERS) and AC-130 vCFF were routed through the Ramstein Air Base, Germany, defense information system network (DISN) teleport site (e.g., the satellite shot) to a military satellite, using Ku band, to the JTEN-X ground station located at the range in Grostenquin, France. Recent additions to military satellite bandwidth capability have opened up a greater use of satellite communication for exercise use and helps avoid the commercial bandwidth bill which could cost up to \$200,000 for a two week, eight-hour-a-day exercise.

At the site, data was routed through a M&S network kit which relayed the information to the JTAC’s AN/PRC-117 and ROVER 3 so the JTAC received voice and FMV in real time.

Network delays were minimal even with digital voice, tracking data, and video being passed simultaneously. The demonstration team and exercise participants saw no noticeable voice or video delay, which added to the training value. There was a slight delay in the tracking data since the instrumentation system rate of update was slower than expected. The key to fixing this problem is to increase the rate of reporting time so tracking data is sent across the network faster to create smoother vehicle movement and avoid jerky data movement. For most of the events, a JTAC instructor from the United States Air Forces in Europe, Air Ground Operations School conducted the missions, but JTAC students were also involved.

The Grostenquin onsite satellite communication equipment was setup and maintained by the 1st Combat Communication Squadron from Ramstein Air Base, Germany. The simplicity of the JTEN-X methodology is based upon using commercial off the shelf and government

---

---

Currently, there are 53 permanent JTEN sites with the majority of nodes located in the US, with linkages to the United Kingdom., Germany, Korea and Australia ...

---

---

off the shelf computers, routers, radios and satellite systems. This JTEN-X demonstration used military satellite terminals and bandwidth, unlike the first demonstration conducted in 2009 which used a commercial satellite dish and bandwidth.

## **FUTURE TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES**

Future training combinations using JTEN-X are being developed on various fronts. These include technological advancements, new training venues and JTAC training refinement. On the technology side, SATCOM usage is being refined while new wireless capabilities are being explored such as the use of cellular networks as the long-haul backbone in place of, or combined with SATCOM.

On the operational side, the use of JTEN-X for JTAC mission rehearsal training provides a great training opportunity for deployed JTACs and could be further refined to include various other JTAC training devices. To deployed units, JTEN-X provides a robust capability to bring in the multiple systems from various platforms to augment live training and provide a repeatable mission rehearsal capability while units are in the field.

USJFCOM has been involved with assisting the Allied Command Transition in Norfolk, VA, in with their requirement to enhance JTAC training through more robust scenarios. These include multiple aircraft, ambiguous situations and rules of engagement issues to improve complex combat decision-making skills. Additionally, the team is looking at other ways to integrate JTEN-X into training to include the integration of NATO simulation centers with tactical units and linking higher headquarters to deployed units

(e.g., mission rehearsal capability for naval forces that receive new tasking while underway). Coordination with the National Guard Bureau is also ongoing to incorporate JTEN-X into homeland defense and first responder exercises to link remote sites to the main exercise hub.

---

## **AUTHOR'S NOTE**

---

USJFCOM J7 Training Directorate is transitioning to the Joint Staff Deputy Director J-7 for Training and will continue to develop and advance the JTEN JTEN-X capabilities and methodologies. A how-to-construct manual is currently under development, and provide directions, parts lists and configuration procedures so any unit can link onto the JTEN for training as required.

For more information on JTEN-X development and future training spirals please contact the following POCs.

**Lt Col David S. Merrifield**  
DD JS/J7 Joint & Coalition  
Warfighting Center  
Suffolk, VA  
DSN 203-501  
David.S.Merrifield@jfcom.mil

**Mr. Mark Williams**  
DD JS/J7 Joint & Coalition  
Warfighting Center  
Senior Communications Engineer  
JTEN-X Lead Systems Engineer  
Suffolk, VA  
DSN 203-7607  
Mark.Williams@jfcom.mil

---

---

To deployed units, JTEN-X provides a robust capability to bring in the multiple systems from various platforms to augment live training.

---

---

---

## INSIGHTS FOR ALL MILITARY ADVISORS: LESSONS FROM IRAQ

---



A sheik explains to Staff Sgt. Richard Thompson, left, of the USA of the 1-77 Armor Regiment that he has not seen or heard any suspicious activities in his village on 26 March 2010 as an unidentified man looks on. US Soldiers of the 1-77 Armor Regiment were on a convoy when they were hit by sniper fire in Dhi Qar province, Iraq.. (Photo by SPC Robert Sheets, USA)

**By Lieutenant Colonel Remi  
Hajjar, USA**

Military Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the two largest military campaigns currently involving the US, could influence the types of operations the Services will conduct in the foreseeable future. These ongoing campaigns demonstrate the importance of effectively influencing host nation armed forces, police, government personnel, and other agencies through military advising. Although advising is not a new mission, recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan underscore its renewed significance, and may forecast the continuing need for effective advising on a larger scale in future campaigns.

Insights collected from a study of 23 military advisors in an organization within the United States Forces–Iraq (USF-I) in 2010 are discussed here. The study includes ideas and recommendations regarding effective advising techniques and pitfalls to avoid. Veteran and new military advisors may gain valuable insight on qualities and relevant points and glean other useful tips regarding how to successfully serve in this capacity.

The study's major advisor lessons and insights and two advising case studies are provided in this article along with recommendations that are prioritized according to the frequency with which they were cited by advisors. The number of those who reported a specific thought is

---

---

Veteran and new military advisors may gain valuable insight on qualities and relevant points and glean other useful tips regarding how to successfully serve as an advisor.

---

---

written in parentheses at the end of each point.

## **INSIGHTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MILITARY ADVISORS**

The main body of this paper shares tips and suggestions for military advisors through four subsections. Within each of these parts, the insights and recommendations are prioritized according to the frequency with which military advisors cited a particular suggestion or idea.

### **SUBSECTION #1: MOST EFFECTIVE ADVISING METHODS, TECHNIQUES, AND ASSOCIATED INSIGHTS**

Three dominant themes emerged with regard to effective advising methods and techniques. One major finding highlights the importance of building a solid relationship with counterparts (CPs) through cross-cultural competence.

Cross-cultural competence means the knowledge, attitudes, and behavioral repertoire and skill sets that military members require to accomplish tasks and missions involving cultural diversity.

Another major outcome illustrates the importance of preparing for advising sessions through rehearsals and establishing clear agendas. Effective use of linguists emerged as another prominent result.

Ideas and recommendations for ensuring the most effective advising methods and techniques are used include the following.

- Build a solid relationship with CPs (rapport, trust). (11)
- Respect CPs; practice the golden rule. (10)
  - Prepare for engagements. (9)
  - Rehearse.
- Have a clear agenda.
- Understand and be sensitive to Iraqi culture. (8)

- Effectively use competent linguists and ensure they are part of a cohesive, tight-knit advisory team. (5)
- Use humor to break the ice during engagements; mix humor with business. (5)
- Use candor in engagements with CPs. (5)
- Speak Arabic; even a few words will help build rapport. (4)
- Spend time with CPs. (4)
- Use a coaching, participative mentoring style with CPs. (3)
- Be open-minded. (3)
- Learn important information about the CPs. (3)
  - Cultural and familial backgrounds, likes/dislikes, interests, etc.
  - When CPs prefer to meet and for how long.
- Accept CPs' hospitality; this is important (beverages, food, etc.). (3)
- Occasionally, discuss non-business topics (family, news, etc.). (3)
- Show CPs how they can accomplish their mission successfully. (3)
- Show compassion for CPs (e.g., keep the US invasion of Iraq in mind when CPs share personal stressors, problems, or issues). (3)
- Be patient. Anticipate delays regarding Iraqi implementation of your ideas; expect partial implementation. (3)

### **SUBSECTION #2: INEFFECTIVE TECHNIQUES AND WHAT TO AVOID WHEN ADVISING**

A few major patterns emerged when considering ineffective advising techniques. The most common mistake is made when military advisors try to dominate and take charge during engagements. Other examples

---

---

Cross-cultural competence means the knowledge, attitudes, and behavioral repertoire and skill sets that military members require to accomplish tasks and missions involving cultural diversity.

---

---

of what not to do when offering advice are as follows.

- Acting too strong, demanding things from CPs. (10)
  - Being a typical, take-charge US military leader.
  - Exhibiting Type-A personality traits (e.g., being too headstrong) (2)
  - Expecting CPs to rigidly mirror US behaviors; applying a US-centric lens. (3)
  - Employing an “ugly American” approach in engagements (e.g., swagger, acting superior or condescending or being a know-it-all). (3)
- Disrespecting CPs. (4)
- Losing one’s patience or temper during an engagement. (4)
- Being closed-minded, not taking an Iraqi viewpoint into account. (4)
- Making false promises. (3)

### **SUBSECTION #3: WHAT ARE THE TRAITS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MOST EFFECTIVE ADVISORS?**

Some of the traits of the most effective advisors are similar to effective advising methods. One pattern entailed the importance of cross-cultural competence for advisors, especially with regard to sufficiently understanding Iraqi culture.

Several other important insights surfaced regarding key advisor characteristics. They are as follows.

- Respect for and knowledge of foreign and CPs’ culture and beliefs (10)
- Expertise in the advisory topic (10)
- Knowledge of Iraqi culture and history (8)
- Good listening skills (7)
- Trustworthiness or honesty (7)

- Patience (6)
- Motivation, a good work ethic (6)
- Flexibility or adaptability (5)
- An outgoing approach, friendliness, a positive attitude, and pleasantness (5)
- Effective communication skills (4)
- Open-mindedness, cultural flexibility, and open to feedback from CPs (4)
- Knowledge of CPs’ background and idiosyncrasies (4)
- Effectiveness as a teacher, trainer, and mentor (3)
- Planning skills (e.g., effective preparation for engagements) (3)
- Accountability and reliability (3)
- Strength and firmness when necessary; self-confidence (3)
- A thirst to learn the new culture and language (e.g., Arabic) (3)

### **SUBSECTION #4: WHAT ARE THE BEST WAYS TO LEARN HOW TO ADVISE?**

The most common suggestions on the best ways to learn advising include the following.

- Taking advisor courses or reading books to learn the culture and history of Iraq (7)
- Learning from senior advisors (5)
- “Learning by fire” (by practicing or advising); it cannot be taught (5)
- Learning communication and presentation skills (3)
- Learning and possessing the relevant subject matter expertise (2)
- Vicariously gaining advisor skills through observation (2)
- Training in foreign internal defense (2)
- Learning to show respect for CPs through knowledge of Iraqi culture

---

---

The most common mistake is made when military advisors try to dominate and take charge during engagements.

---

---

as well as specific CPs' idiosyncrasies and characteristics (2)

- Learning key cultural details from insider (linguists) (2)
- Taking an active listening class (2)
- Playing the role of advisor in a practical exercise (e.g., role playing in a two-hour practice session, and getting feedback from a linguist, CP, and senior advisors who observe the session)
- Gaining field experience (e.g., practical exercises)
- Learning basic language (i.e., Arabic) skills
- Learning to followthrough on agreements with one's CPs to prove reliability.
- Learning how to effectively prepare for engagements
- Learning successful teaching and coaching skills
- Learning the importance of asking relevant questions and seeking key knowledge during engagements
- Participating in practice exercises that illustrate the importance of patience and compassion.

## **TWO ADVISING CASE STUDIES FROM IRAQ: ILLUSTRATIONS OF ADVISING INSIGHTS AND SUGGESTIONS**

During my tour as an advisor in Iraq, the mission required interactions with numerous Iraqi officers: typically colonels, and brigadier and major generals.

This section discusses some of the lessons learned from two particular officers I most frequently advised: BG Abdul and MG Mohamed.

### **CASE ONE: BG ABDUL**

BG Abdul served as a staff officer in the Iraqi unit advised by my organization. My primary interactions with BG Abdul centered on facilities the US built for the Iraqis. One topic

entailed determining when the US would formally hand over the buildings to the Iraqis. In one case, we interacted numerous times to plan a formal ribbon-cutting ceremony for a new facility. Some of the lessons learned from this productive relationship with BG Abdul include the following points.

- Humor helps to break the ice and forge a strong relationship.
- Our engagements involved compromise and balancing US and Iraqi interests and objectives by taking both viewpoints into account.
- When necessary, I brought in relevant subject matter experts to discuss salient points during our engagements. For example, as an intelligence officer, I would periodically bring along logistical or administrative experts to meetings.
- BG Abdul expressed excitement about a planned visit to the US for training and schooling, as well as sight-seeing. He appreciated our suggestions regarding his upcoming trip to the US.

After we successfully completed significant tasks, we praised BG Abdul to his boss; who, in turn, recognized BG Abdul. BG Abdul appreciated this recognition, which also contributed to our strong working relationship. On the whole, we applied cross-cultural competence, a nuanced understanding of BG Abdul, humor, clear agendas for sessions, subject matter expertise, flexibility, compromise, and other factors to build a solid relationship with BG Abdul to accomplish the mission. This positive relationship with an Iraqi counterpart resulted in a "win-win" outcome for both the US and Iraq.

### **CASE TWO: MG MOHAMED**

MG Mohamed served in an important leadership position in the Iraqi organization my unit advised. He was the focal point for many

---

---

Humor helps to break the ice and forge a strong relationship.

---

---

topics and engagements, and his duties kept him extremely busy. Other senior US advisors met with MG Mohamed, which resulted in briefer engagements when I met with him. The major lessons learned from the advising relationship with MG Mohamed follow.

- We always called a scheduler to pre-plan advising sessions with MG Mohamed, and we quickly learned to remain extremely flexible about changes to our meeting times.
- My advising sessions with MG Mohamed lasted far less time than with other Iraqi counterparts. So, the engagements consisted of brief greetings and pleasantries, followed by getting to the main points quickly. This departed from the norm with nearly all other CPs (i.e., the greeting phases and sessions lasted longer).
- At times, MG Mohamed would cite concerns and ask for more from the US, including money, resources, and training. This contrasted the emerging trend for US forces preparing to withdraw from Iraq whereby money, resources, and brand new US-sponsored training opportunities were dwindling. So, frequently, our advising sessions focused on providing MG Mohamed with sound advice for Iraqi-based solutions and initiatives to answer his requests.
- This advising relationship reinforced the lesson that Iraqi military officers are extremely rank conscious. Therefore, all pro-

motable advisors should be frocked as soon as possible.

We built a positive working relationship with MG Mohamed through mutual respect, cross-cultural competence, and a nuanced understanding of the major general. Also, adjusting to his busy and changing schedule, using pointed agendas with only essential discussion topics, relying on subject matter expertise, and other factors led to the successful accomplishment of our advising mission.

---

---

Iraqi military officers are extremely rank conscious. All promotable advisors should be frocked as soon as possible.

---

---

## CONCLUSION

This paper provides recommendations for advisors based on a study recently conducted in Iraq.

Some of this article's major points include the importance of building solid relationships with counterparts, cross-cultural competence, possessing relevant subject matter expertise, having a tight knit, functional advising team; and effectively planning for well-organized advising sessions.

This article also highlights dozens of other points that not only reinforce core recommendations but also provide beneficial insights for advisors operating in Afghanistan, Iraq, and worldwide. The suggestions and insights communicated herein may will benefit veteran and new advisors for the US military, our international military partners, and other agencies conducting military advising missions.


---

---

# THE ASSESSMENTS PROCESS AND FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS

---

---



Soldiers from the 1st Air Cavalry Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, work inside the tactical operations center (TOC) at Camp Beuhring, Kuwait, May 5. The TOC is where the unit keeps track of and coordinates training, among many other tasks. The Soldiers were in Kuwait for more than two weeks completing mandatory training before heading for their 12-month deployment in Iraq. (Photo by SSG Nathan Hoskins, USA)

**By CW4 Jimmy A. Gomez, USA and  
CW2 Jose Serbia, USA**

## BACKGROUND

It sometimes seems as if the internal politics of Kabul are easier to understand than the latest doctrinal changes in [Army] field manuals (FMs). However, [Army] doctrine continues to lag behind the reality and complexity of [Army] operations in the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR). As the security agreements and strategic objectives are changed, the rules of engagement (ROE) evolve with them. This increases the degree of interactive complexity of any situation within a unit's AOR and the staff's vision, understanding, and execution of the operation.

As ROE change, the emerging spectrum of threats is not easily

defined or understood by staff which leads to the [Army's] inability to develop and recommend solutions. Unfortunately, [Army] doctrine does not keep up with these variables of the common operating environment (COE).

As we enter the 10th year of combat operations in Afghanistan, a lot of questions continue to surface from every staff functional area and war fighting function (WFF) regarding the validity, relevance and tactical applicability of the assessments process.

FM 5-0, The Operations Process (March 2010), finally formalizes and outlines the assessments process. Depending on the structure of the problem, the staff may take different approaches to understanding and defining problems and eventually developing solutions tied to campaign

---

---

As ... security agreements and strategic objectives are changed, the rules of engagement (ROE) evolve with them.

---

---

goals and the division commander's endstate. Yet, the biggest question to recurrently surface is, "what is the role of each WFF within the assessments process?"

In this article, we discuss and outline the staff participation in this essential, yet most analytically elusive, process at the division staff level.

## THE PROBLEM

"If commanders had no way to influence the future, if they believed that the natural course of events would lead to a satisfactory outcome, or if they could achieve the desired results purely by reacting, they would have no reason to plan." (FM 5-0, 2010)

To put things in perspective, the assessments process is not a new concept. It has been around for many centuries. The crux of its applicability, effectiveness and mostly its relevance as the core component of every staff's battle rhythm, heavily relies in having a detailed assessments framework in place and a staff able to functionally apply it. The assessments framework must measure the progress along our lines of operations (LOO) outlined in the campaign plan and in support of achieving the campaign endstate(s). This framework must define decisive shaping and sustaining operations and transition these operations to their respective host nation institutions. Further, the assessments framework must be understood and implemented by the entire staff, not just the fires Warfighting function within the division staff.

If the assessments process remains isolated and independent, no amount of staff planning will truly realize the effect of staff synchronization or the impact of synchronizing and massing the Warfighting function on the right target, at the right time, at the right place, and with the right intensity to achieve the desired effect.

Helmut Von Moltke (1800-1891), possibly the most committed disciple of Baron Karl Von Clausewitz,<sup>1</sup> was head of the Prussian and German General Staff from 1858 to 1888. In his book "On Strategy" (published in 1871), Von Moltke wrote: "Only the layman sees in the course of a campaign a consistent execution of a preconceived and highly detailed original concept pursued consistently to the end."

In essence, the assessments process must be viewed by the collective staff as an operation's discipline. Therefore, it must be a major component of every staff battle rhythm and must be a critical task within the operations order and subsequent fragmentary orders to formally capture all permutations of the plan as well as consistently measure all progress or regression along the division commander's lines of effort and the outlined end-state.

Von Moltke also wrote: "No plan of operations extends with certain beyond the first encounter with the enemy's main strength."

Regardless of the staff's echelon herein lies every staff's most difficult task. In the COE, the enemy's main strength is not always tangible, readily identifiable or easily defined in conventional terms. Von Moltke stated, "Certainly the commander [in chief] will keep his great objective continuously in mind, undisturbed by the vicissitudes of events. But the path on which he hopes to reach it can never be firmly established in advance. Throughout the campaign he must make a series of decisions on the basis of situations that cannot be foreseen."

Every commander and every staff must be prepared to use diligence in dealing with temporary setbacks and unanticipated obstacles. Additionally, they must cooperatively remain rigidly focused on the end-state, but creatively flexible in how the division commander's

---

---

The assessments framework must measure the progress along our lines of operations (LOO) outlined in the campaign plan and in support of achieving the campaign endstate(s).

---

---

---

---

“Everything depends on penetrating the uncertainty of veiled situations to evaluate the facts, to clarify the unknown, to make decisions rapidly, and then to carry them out with strength and constancy.”

---

---

endstate is reached. Von Moltke concludes that “The successive acts of war are thus not premeditated designs; but, on the contrary, are spontaneous acts guided by military measures. Everything depends on penetrating the uncertainty of veiled situations to evaluate the facts, to clarify the unknown, to make decisions rapidly, and then to carry them out with strength and constancy.”

As diplomacy and foreign policy evolve, the host nation security agreements evolve. ROE follow suit and consistently become more restrictive. Therefore, [the Army’s] campaign plan’s LOO must logically evolve to account for these variables. The goal of these changes should not be to simply comply with the guidance but to creatively and logically exercise freedom in operational planning and execution. Naturally, [the Army’s] assessments efforts must gradually transition to measuring the effectiveness of lethal and non-lethal initiatives and intended and unintended adaptive-responses along each venue.

In Afghanistan, key leader engagements and reconciliation cell’s initiatives certainly qualify as “veiled situations”. As we decrease [the Army’s] footprint outside the forward operating bases (FOBs), key leader engagements and the reconciliation cells’ initiatives have gradually become the division and brigade combat team (BCT) commanders’ focal point to comply with the International Security Assistance Force commander’s guidance. These COE functions need to support the campaign end-state, objectives and the continuous assessment process, respectively.

The day to day events and content within these special staff sections are abstract but they have become our most important glimpse into tactical, operational and strategic success. The results will be slow but forthcoming, so the commander and staff must collectively exercise tactical patience. Remember, key leader

engagements are designed to influence behaviors (or earn trust and confidence), and therefore they require our persistence to diligently manage and implement these important, non-lethal initiatives.

“Commanders integrate recommendations from the staff, subordinate commanders, and other organizations with their personal assessment. From those recommendations, they decide if and how to modify the operation to better accomplish the mission.” (FM 5-0, 2010)

The Combat Training Centers (CTC’s) continue to collect trends and lessons learned during after action reviews at the end of every BCT’s training rotation. In each instance the CTC trainers/mentors consistently outline the salient fact that most commanders lose their “confidence” in the assessments process because of the staff’s lack of confidence in the application and understanding of the process which leads to imminent frustration and mismanagement. The staff then follows suit and discounts this fundamental process as a core component of their battle rhythm. Typically this occurs upon returning to the staff’s garrison after conducting its final pre-deployment training event at a CTC.

The collective consensus is that “two weeks in the box” is just not enough time for the BCT commander to see the intelligence, operations, and targeting cycles in their entirety. But this two-week cycle is consistently replicating in theatre with a two week targeting cycle. In Afghanistan, this operations cycle is ended every 16 weeks by a commander’s operational assessment brief.

Among the many problems faced by the staff is “what’s reported” during every battle staff update. It is always the unusual or spectacular not whether we are achieving progress or regressing along the lines of effort. Depending on who delivers

these reports (S-2, S-3 or information operation sections), it usually distorts reality and warps the commander's decisions.

Multiple nongovernmental organizations, as well as national and international journals, magazine and newspapers routinely set out to measure [the Army's] campaign's success by measuring how well it is able to "win the hearts and minds" of the population centers within the CENTCOM AOR. Measuring "hearts and minds" is a legacy mindset, inspired by a mantra recited by those in charge of the Vietnam War. The correct approach is to measure how well we influence the "trust and confidence" of population centers through interdependent and replicable actions that eventually are self sustained by host nation institutional efforts and resources. The reasoning is that we can measure the population's trust and confidence in the host nation's governmental and security institutions through the assessments process by identifying quantitative and qualitative metrics.

Furthermore, the entire staff must be keenly aware of the ever-evolving spectrum of threats within the operational environment (OE) by diligently revising the staff running estimates. Last, the staff must be prepared to capture and account for major and significant deviations from the plan. Also, the commander must be prepared to revise his priorities and planning guidance to keep pace with the evolving COE and all changes to the ROE. A careful consideration that should always remain in the back of the staff's collective mind is that the necessity to change the ROE is not always top down, but bottom up, refined, and validated.

## **THE ASSESSMENTS FRAMEWORK**

The current assessment process lies deep within the plans section and is managed by school-trained functional area 49, operations re-

search and systems analyst (ORSA) personnel. These staff officers are responsible for preparing an assessment for the operation in question in support of the commander's objectives. This is achieved by framing the significant hurdle to achieving the commander's goals and the campaign endstate.

The assessments process measures trends. Identifying a problem is critical but has a tendency to spread assessments across all the lines of effort/operation instead of focusing on the significant, or most critical, assessment needs. These considerations should be focused on the significant problem regardless of the lines of effect (LOE). Once the problem is defined, ORSA personnel attempt to identify the best quantitative metric to understand and frame the problem statement.

The success or failure (commander's view) or positive or negative movement (ORSA view) is now based on whether a number of occurrences show movement. At a glance, this oversimplifies the process and, apparently, falls short in depth and scope, which inevitably fails to effectively answer the division commander's questions. In short, the subject matter experts who are collecting and influencing the commander on the related actions, when asked, must span beyond just producing an assessments brief. This may be a function of assessments ignorance or troop-to-task ratio misunderstanding. The significant failure, in our opinion, is how staffs fail to make each LOE/LOO (or warfighting function) responsible to every significant assessment presented to the commander. By making this a requirement, staff functions would attempt to look at their tasks, purpose and endstate in a true holistic effort.

Failure to function in this manner ensures a separate and independent focus along the LOO. If the staff begins with an independent

---

---

Measuring "hearts and minds" is a legacy mindset, inspired by a mantra recited by those in charge of the Vietnam War. The correct approach is to measure how well we influence the "trust and confidence" of population centers ...

---

---

effort, the assessment will only provide an accurate picture by accident. The most likely outcome is an impartial picture as it is viewed by one staff function, and measured only by the actions taken by that staff function. A more successful model is achieved through the staff establishing assessment requirements during the initial planning process as they are: framing the OE (current/desired); identifying key actors (motivations/agenda's); and understanding friction points (tension/competition). Based on this understanding, the staff can begin developing measures of performance and effectiveness along their LOE/LOO that will provide both quantitative and qualitative metrics. These metrics and assessment criteria should be revisited periodically to confirm validity, reestablish relevant facts and assumptions, and receive the commander's guidance, approval, and re-tasking, as necessary.

This type of deliberate effort provides the division commander with a true staff-vetted, ORSA-validated, operational campaign plan assessment brief (quarterly). This type of transparency and synchronization will have the reciprocal effect of focusing the staff not on a series of random and independent actions, but on a metric the commander deems vital to operational success. Assessments outside the commander's approved assessments process should remain within the staff functional area as a separate staff running estimate. It must reinforce and support the approved assessments process tabled during working groups, and be prepared to modify or replace ongoing assessments.

## **THE SOLUTION**

We must not overlook the enormous and incomparable importance of the assessments process. By simply changing FM 5-0's Chapter 6 title from "Assessments" to "Mission

Assessments" removes the guesswork associated with the proverbial question "What are we assessing?" This would prevent individual staff sections from viewing its priorities as the most important to mission accomplishment, thus becoming one sided measurements within the overarching assessments framework. This highlights the need for synchronization and nesting of tasks to create mutually supporting purposes.

When the Army fields a new piece of equipment (i.e., a new HMMWV model), units do not just sign for it and hand the keys over to the operators who immediately begin using it.

"Before equipment is officially signed over to a unit, new equipment training (NET) must be conducted in conjunction with the materiel fielding. NET is the responsibility of the appropriate program executive officer (PEO) or program manager (PM) and allows for the transfer of equipment use and support requirement knowledge from the material developer to the users, trainers, and maintainers of new Army equipment. The PEO/PM NET teams coordinate and arrange NET support to the gaining units for both operation and maintenance training. NET teams are attached to the Army Field Support Brigades (AFSB) for personnel accountability, tactical logistics (including movement), life support, and integration into the local force protection/security plan." (FM 4-93.41, AFSB Operations, Feb. 25, 2009).

Yet, when FMs are revised or new doctrine is developed, approved, and released for implementation, little-to-no support is provided for the staff that must implement the new doctrine. There are only ten divisions in the US Army. The Combined Arms Center should provide a PM and resource NET for each division staff. Additionally, a PM should be attached to the division staff to provide clarity and prevent

---

---

Assessments outside the commander's approved assessments process should remain within the staff functional area as a separate staff running estimate.

---

---

misinterpretation by any staff functional area or warfighting function.

Although, initially the assessments process adds a multiplicity of factors to measure along the decisive points and key tasks within the campaign plan, it also increases the value and depth of the solutions it provides. Clearly, every staff officer must respond to these emerging requirements with renewed intellectual vigor and prevent getting trapped in the proverbial “this is how it worked last time” mindset. Rather, a sense of urgency must drive every staff officer to accurately revise and institutionalize all changes to effectively counter the wide spectrum of threats which interdict the commander’s endstate. Rightly doing so allows the division commander to set in motion a variety and number of conditions to reach a favorable outcome and accomplish our most difficult mission: enabling self-sustaining host nation institutions which severely reduce the increasing possibility for destabilization factors and insurgent growth opportunities.

---

**END NOTE**

1 Baron Karl Von Clausewitz: Nineteenth Century military theorist who stressed the moral and political aspects of war; asserted war is a continuation of political intercourse, with a mixture of other means. His most notable book was titled “*On War*.”

---

**ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

---

FM 2-0, Intelligence in the Operational Environment, May 2004

FM 3-0, Operations, February 2008

FM 4-93.41, AFSB Operations, February 2009

FMI 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, March 2009

FM 5-0, The Operations Process, March 2010

FM 6-0 Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces. August 2003

FM 6-20-10 (FM 3-60), the Army Targeting Process, May 1996

Petraus, David, General, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A). The Australian. 8 November 2010. General David Petraeus draws up timetable for Afghanistan withdrawal. Retrieved 10 November 2010. <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/general-david-petraeus-draws-up-timetable-for-afghanistan-withdrawal/story-e6frg6so-1225949491626>

---

---

... every staff officer to accurately revise and institutionalize all changes to effectively counter the wide spectrum of threats which interdict the commander’s endstate.

---

---

# CURRENT ALSA MTTP PUBLICATIONS

AIR BRANCH – POC [alsaa@langley.af.mil](mailto:alsaa@langley.af.mil)

TITLE	DATE	PUB #	DESCRIPTION / STATUS
<b>AOMSW</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Air Operations in Maritime Surface Warfare</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	17 NOV 08	NTTP 3-20.8 AFFTP 3-2.74	Description: This publication consolidates Service doctrine, TTP, and lessons-learned from current operations and exercises to maximize the effectiveness of "air attacks on enemy surface vessels". Status: <b>Current</b>
<b>AVIATION URBAN OPERATIONS</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Aviation Urban Operations</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	9 JUL 05	FM 3-06.1 MCRP 3-35.3A NTTP 3-01.04 AFFTP 3-2.29	Description: This publication provides MTTP for tactical-level planning and execution of fixed- and rotary-wing aviation urban operations. Status: <b>Revision</b>
<b>IADS</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for an Integrated Air Defense System</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	1 MAY 09	FM 3-01.15 MCRP 3-25E NTTP 3-01.8 AFFTP 3-2.31	Description: This publication provides joint planners with a consolidated reference on Service air defense systems, processes, and structures to include integration procedures. Status: <b>Current</b>
<b>JFIRE</b> <i>Multi-Service Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	20 DEC 07	FM 3-09.32 MCRP 3-16.6A NTTP 3-09.2 AFFTP 3-2.6	Description: A pocket-sized guide of procedures for calls for fire, CAS, and naval gunfire. Provides tactics for joint operations between attack helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft performing integrated battlefield operations. Status: <b>Revision</b>
<b>JSEAD / ARM-J</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses in a Joint Environment</i> <b>Classified SECRET</b>	28 MAY 04	FM 3-01.4 MCRP 3-22.2A NTTP 3-01.42 AFFTP 3-2.28	Description: This publication contributes to Service interoperability by providing the Joint Task Force and subordinate commanders, their staffs, and SEAD operators a single, consolidated reference. Status: <b>Revision</b>
<b>JSTARS (ATCARS)</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	16 NOV 06	FM 3-55.6 MCRP 2-24A NTTP 3-55.13 AFFTP 3-2.2	Description: This publication provides procedures for employing JSTARS in dedicated support to the Joint Force Commander. Describes multi-Service TTP for consideration and use during planning and employment of JSTARS. Status: <b>Revision</b>
<b>KILL BOX</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Kill Box Employment</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	4 AUG 09	FM 3-09.34 MCRP 3-25H NTTP 3-09.2.1 AFFTP 3-2.59	Description: This publication assists the Services and Joint Force Commanders in developing, establishing, and executing Kill Box procedures to allow rapid target engagement. Describes timely, effective multi-Service solutions to FSCMs, ACMs, and maneuver control measures with respect to Kill Box operations. Status: <b>Current</b>
<b>SCAR</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	26 NOV 08	FM 3-60.2 MCRP 3-23C NTTP 3-03.4.3 AFFTP 3-2.72	Description: This publication provides strike coordination and reconnaissance (SCAR) MTTP to the military Services for conducting air interdiction against targets of opportunity. Status: <b>Current</b>
<b>SURVIVAL, EVASION, AND RECOVERY</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	20 MAR 07	FM 3-50.3 NTTP 3-50.3 AFFTP 3-2.26	Description: This publication provides a weather-proof, pocket-sized, quick reference guide of basic survival information to assist Service members in a survival situation regardless of geographic location. Status: <b>Revision</b>
<b>TAGS</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Theater Air-Ground System</i> <b>Distribution Restricted/ REL ABCA</b>	10 APR 07	FM 3-52.2 NTTP 3-56.2 AFFTP 3-2.17	Description: This publication promotes Service awareness regarding the role of airpower in support of the Joint Force Commander's campaign plan, increases understanding of the air-ground system, and provides planning considerations for conducting air-to-ground ops. Status: <b>Current</b>
<b>TST (DYNAMIC TARGETING)</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Targeting Time-Sensitive Targets</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	20 APR 04	FM 3-60.1 MCRP 3-16D NTTP 3-60.1 AFFTP 3-2.3	Description: This publication provides the Joint Force Commander, the operational staff, and components MTTP to coordinate, de-conflict, synchronize, and prosecute TSTs within any area of responsibility. Includes lessons learned, multinational and other government agency considerations. Status: <b>Revision</b>

**AIR BRANCH – POC alsaa@langley.af.mil**

<b>TITLE</b>	<b>DATE</b>	<b>PUB #</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION / STATUS</b>
<b>UAS</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Employment of Unmanned Aircraft Systems</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	3 AUG 06	FM 3-04.15 NTTP 3-55.14 AFTTP 3-2.64	Description: Establishes MTTP for UAS addressing tactical and operational considerations; system capabilities; payloads; mission planning; logistics; and, most importantly, multi-Service execution.  Status: <b>Revision</b>

**LAND AND SEA BRANCH – POC alsab@langley.af.mil**

<b>TITLE</b>	<b>DATE</b>	<b>PUB #</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION / STATUS</b>
<b>ADVISING</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Advising Foreign Forces</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	10 SEP 09	FM 3-07.10 MCRP 3-33.8A NTTP 3-07.5 AFTTP 3-2.76	Description: This publication serves as a reference to ensure coordinated multi-Service operations for planners and operators preparing for, and conducting, advisor team missions. It is intended to provide units and personnel scheduled to advise foreign forces with viable TTP so they can successfully plan, train for, and carry out their mission.  Status: <b>Current</b>
<b>AIRFIELD OPENING</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airfield Opening</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	15 MAY 07	FM 3-17.2 NTTP 3-02.18 AFTTP 3-2.68	Description: This is a quick-reference guide to opening an airfield in accordance with MTTP. It contains planning considerations, airfield layout, and logistical requirements for opening an airfield.  Status: <b>Revision</b>
<b>CFSOF</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Integration and Interoperability</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	17 MAR 10	FM 6-03.05 MCWP 3-36.1 NTTP 3-05.19 AFTTP 3-2.73 USSOCOM Pub 3-33V.3	Description: This publication assists in planning and executing operations where conventional forces and special operations forces (CF/SOF) occupy the same operational environment.  Status: <b>Current</b>
<b>CORDON AND SEARCH</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Cordon and Search Operations</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	25 APR 06	FM 3-06.20 MCRP 3-31.4B NTTP 3-05.8 AFTTP 3-2.62	Description: This publication consolidates the Services' best TTP used in cordon and search operations. This publication provides MTTP for planning and executing cordon and search operations at the tactical level of war.  Status: <b>Revision</b>
<b>EOD</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Explosive Ordnance Disposal in a Joint Environment</i> <b>Approved for Public Release</b>	27 OCT 05	FM 4-30.16 MCRP 3-17.2C NTTP 3-02.5 AFTTP 3-2.32	Description: Provides guidance and procedures for employing a joint EOD force. It assists commanders and planners in understanding the EOD capabilities of each Service.  Status: <b>Revision</b>
<b>Military Diving Operations (MDO)</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Military Diving Operations</i> <b>Approved for Public Release</b>	12 Jan 11	ATTP 3-34.84 MCRP 3-35.9A NTTP 3-07.7 AFTTP 3-2.80 CG COMDTINST 3-07.7	Description: This MTTP publication describes US Military dive mission areas (DMA) as well as the force structure, equipment, and primary missions each Service could provide to a JTF commander.  Status: <b>Current</b>
<b>MILITARY DECEPTION</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Military Deception</i> <b>Classified SECRET</b>	12 APR 07	MCRP 3-40.4A NTTP 3-58.1 AFTTP 3-2.66	Description: This MTTP facilitates integrating, synchronizing, planning, and executing of MILDEC operations. It serves as a "one stop" reference for service MILDEC planners to plan and execute multi-service MILDEC operations.  Status: <b>Revision</b>
<b>NLW</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Tactical Employment of Nonlethal Weapons</i> <b>Approved for Public Release</b>	24 OCT 07	FM 3-22.40 MCWP 3-15.8 NTTP 3-07.3.2 AFTTP 3-2.45	Description: This publication provides a single-source, consolidated reference on the tactical employment of NLWs and offers commanders and their staff guidance for NLW employment and planning. Commanders and staffs can use this publication to aid in the tactical employment of NLW during exercises and contingencies.  Status: <b>Revision</b>
<b>PEACE OPS</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conducting Peace Operations</i> <b>Approved for Public Release</b>	20 OCT 03 Change 1 incorporated 14 APR 09	FM 3-07.31 MCWP 3-33.8 AFTTP 3-2.40	Description: This publication provides tactical-level guidance to the warfighter for conducting peace operations.  Status: <b>Current with Change 1</b>
<b>TACTICAL CONVOY OPERATIONS</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Convoy Operations</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	13 JAN 09	FM 4-01.45 MCRP 4-11.3H NTTP 4-01.3 AFTTP 3-2.58	Description: Consolidates the Services' best TTP used in convoy operations into a single multi-Service TTP. It provides a quick reference guide for convoy commanders and subordinates on how to plan, train, and conduct tactical convoy operations in the contemporary operating environment.  Status: <b>Current</b>

**LAND AND SEA BRANCH – POC alsab@langley.af.mil**

<b>TITLE</b>	<b>DATE</b>	<b>PUB #</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION / STATUS</b>
<b>TECHINT</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Technical Intelligence Operations</i> <b>Approved for Public Release</b>	9 JUN 06	FM 2-22.401 NTTP 2-01.4 AFTTP 3-2.63	Description: This publication provides a common set of MTTP for technical intelligence operations. It serves as a reference for Service technical intelligence planners and operators.  Status: <b>Revision</b>
<b>UXO</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Unexploded Explosive Ordnance Operations</i> <b>Approved for Public Release</b>	16 AUG 05	FM 3-100.38 MCRP 3-17.2B NTTP 3-02.4.1 AFTTP 3-2.12	Description: This MTTP describes hazards of UXO submunitions to land operations, addresses UXO planning considerations, and describes the architecture for reporting and tracking UXO during combat and post conflict.  Status: <b>Revision</b>

**COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2) BRANCH - POC: alsac2@langley.af.mil**

<b>TITLE</b>	<b>DATE</b>	<b>PUB #</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION / STATUS</b>
<b>AIRSPACE CONTROL</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airspace Control</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	22 MAY 09	FM 3-52.1 AFTTP 3-2.78	Description: This MTTP publication is a tactical-level document, which will synchronize and integrate airspace command and control functions and serve as a single-source reference for planners and commanders at all levels.  Status: <b>Current</b>
<b>BREVITY</b> <i>Multi-Service Brevity Codes</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	7 APR 10	FM 1-02.1 MCRP 3-25B NTTP 6-02.1 AFTTP 3-2.5	Description: This publication defines multi-Service brevity which standardizes air-to-air, air-to-surface, surface-to-air, and surface-to-surface brevity code words in multi-Service operations.  Status: <b>Revision</b>
<b>CIVIL SUPPORT (DSCA)</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Civil Support Operations</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	3 DEC 07	FM 3-28.1 NTTP 3-57.2 AFTTP 3-2.67	Description: The DSCA publication fills the Civil Support Operations MTTP void and assists JTF commanders in organizing and employing Multi-Service Task Force support to civil authorities in response to domestic crisis.  Status: <b>Revision</b>
<b>COMCAM</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Combat Camera Operations</i> <b>Approved for Public Release</b>	24 MAY 07	FM 3-55.12 MCRP 3-33.7A NTTP 3-13.12 AFTTP 3-2.41	Description: This publication fills the void that exists regarding combat camera doctrine and assists JTF commanders in structuring and employing combat camera assets as an effective operational planning tool.  Status: <b>Revision</b>
<b>HAVE QUICK</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for HAVE QUICK Radios</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	7 MAY 04	FM 6-02.771 MCRP 3-40.3F NTTP 6-02.7 AFTTP 3-2.49	Description: This publication simplifies planning and coordination of HAVE QUICK radio procedures. It provides operators information on multi-Service HAVE QUICK communication systems while conducting home station training or in preparation for interoperability training.  Status: <b>Revision</b>
<b>HF-ALE</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the High Frequency-Automatic Link Establishment (HF-ALE) Radios</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	20 NOV 07	FM 6-02.74 MCRP 3-40.3E NTTP 6-02.6 AFTTP 3-2.48	Description: This MTTP standardizes high power and low power HF-ALE operations across the Services and enables joint forces to use HF radio as a supplement / alternative to overburdened SATCOM systems for over-the-horizon communications.  Status: <b>Revision</b>
<b>JATC</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Air Traffic Control</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	23 JUL 09	FM 3-52.3 MCRP 3-25A NTTP 3-56.3 AFTTP 3-2.23	Description: This publication provides guidance on ATC responsibilities, procedures, and employment in a joint environment. It discusses JATC employment and Service relationships for initial, transition, and sustained ATC operations across the spectrum of joint operations within the theater or AOR.  Status: <b>Current</b>
<b>EW REPROGRAMMING</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Reprogramming of Electronic Warfare and Target Sensing Systems</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	01 FEB 11	ATTP 3-13.10 MCRP 3-40.5A NTTP 3-51.2 AFTTP 3-2.7	Description: This publication supports the JTF staff in planning, coordinating, and executing reprogramming of electronic warfare and target sensing systems as part of joint force command and control warfare operations.  Status: <b>Current</b>
<b>TACTICAL CHAT</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Internet Tactical Chat in Support of Operations</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	7 JUL 09	FM 6-02.73 MCRP 3-40.2B NTTP 6-02.8 AFTTP 3-2.77	Description: This publication provides MTTP to standardize and describe the use of internet tactical chat (TC) in support of operations. It provides commanders and their units with guidelines to facilitate coordination and integration of TC when conducting multi-Service and joint force operations.  Status: <b>Current</b>

TITLE	DATE	PUB #	DESCRIPTION / STATUS
<b>TACTICAL RADIOS</b> <i>Multi-Service Communications Procedures for Tactical Radios in a Joint Environment</i> <b>Approved for Public Release</b>	14 JUN 02	FM 6-02.72 MCRP 3-40.3A NTTP 6-02.2 AFTTP 3-2.18	Description: This publication standardizes joint operational procedures for SINCGARS and provides an overview of the multi-Service applications of EPLRS.  Status: <b>Revision</b>
<b>UHF TACSAT/DAMA</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Package for Ultra High Frequency Tactical Satellite and Demand Assigned Multiple Access Operations</i> <b>Approved for Public Release</b>	31 AUG 04	FM 6-02.90 MCRP 3-40.3G NTTP 6-02.9 AFTTP 3-2.53	Description: This publication documents TTP that will improve efficiency at the planner and user levels. (Recent operations at the JTF level have demonstrated difficulties in managing a limited number of UHF TACSAT frequencies.)  Status: <b>Revision</b>

---

## January 2012 Air Land Sea Bulletin (ALSB)

---

# *We want your input!*

### **Tactical Doctrine in Support of Operations**

General guideline for submissions:

- Must be 1500 words or less
- Double space
- MS Word format
- Provide name/unit address/telephone numbers/email address;
- Include high-resolution 300 dpi minimum original graphics

**\*Note: Article submissions and photos are due no later than 1 November 2011 for publication in the January 2012 issue.**

**Early submissions are highly encouraged.**

ALSA's C2 Branch  
**alsac2@langley.af.mil**  
 DSN: 575-0854/0903/0967  
 Commercial:  
 (757) 225-0854/0903/0967

The Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center develops multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTPs) with the goal of meeting the needs of the warfighter. In addition to developing MTTPs, ALSA also provides the ALSB forum to facilitate tactical and operationally relevant information exchanges among warfighters of all Services.

We've discovered that often it's the people in the field who work with military equipment and software who can provide innovative and thought provoking feedback to leaders and peers.


Therefore, we invite our readers to share your experiences and possibly have them published in an upcoming ALSB. The topic for the January 2012 ALSB is "Tactical Doctrine in Support of Operations." We are looking for two types of articles for this publication.

The first type would address the use of tactics, techniques and procedures or handbooks that currently exist. ALSA produces JFIRE, Tactical Convoy Operations, Advising, Survival, and Cordon and Search, among other MTTPs. If you have used, or are currently using, any of our publications, please tell us which ones you used and how they supported your operation.

Second, you may have had experiences which are not addressed in doctrine but you think they should be considered. These may be experiences that address an operational gap that highlights emerging needs for supporting multi-Service publications. We want to know about these. So, tell us what you think.

We hope you will take advantage of this opportunity to share your insights, regardless of specialty, and help enhance professional development across the Services.

# ALSA ORGANIZATION



# MISSION



ALSA's mission is to rapidly and responsively develop multi-Service tactics, techniques and procedures (MTTP), studies, and other like solutions across the entire military spectrum to meet the immediate needs of the warfighter.

ALSA is a joint organization chartered by a memorandum of agreement under the authority of the Commanders of the, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC), and Headquarters, Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education. ALSA is governed by a Joint Actions Steering Committee (JASC) consisting of four voting and three nonvoting members.

## Voting JASC Members



RADM Wendi  
B. Carpenter

Commander, Navy  
Warfare Development  
Command



Maj Gen Thomas  
K. Andersen

Commander, Curtis E.  
LeMay Center for Doctrine  
Development and  
Education



Mr. Dale A. Ormond

Deputy to the  
Commanding General US  
Army Combined Arms  
Center



BGen Daniel  
J. O'Donohue

Director, Capabilities  
Development Directorate,  
Marine Corps Combat  
Development Command



## ALSA Public Web Site

<http://www.alsa.mil>

## ALSA CAC Web Site

<http://wwwmil.alsa.mil>

## ALSA SIPR Site

<http://www.acc.af.smil.mil/alsa>

## JDEIS

<https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp?pindex=84>

## Online Access to ALSA Publications

ALSA CENTER  
ATTN: ALSB  
114 ANDREWS STREET  
LANGLEY AFB VA 23665-2785

OFFICIAL BUSINESS



[alsacenter@langley.af.mil](mailto:alsacenter@langley.af.mil)

<http://www.alsa.mil>