

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD: OFFICER CORPS MILITARY
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

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Homeland Security

by

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ABSTRACT

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Senior USCG leaders consistently recognize significant gaps in officer performance. As a result, leader sponsored studies have delved into the root causes of these gaps resulting in recommendations to resolve the concerns. This paper will define the profession of the United States Coast Guard (USCG) officer corps and the officer military professional development programs currently in place in the USCG. Through research and a brief comparison with the U.S. Army officer professional development and education programs, this paper will also draw attention to the previously identified gaps in officer performance. These performance gaps were revealed in internal USCG studies including the Junior Officer Needs Assessment (JONA), the Mid-Grade Officer Leadership Gap Analysis (MOLGA), and the Strategic Capabilities Study. These studies provided senior USCG leaders with viable recommendations to improve officer leader development through a continuum of education. After defining the profession of the USCG officer, revealing the observed performance gaps, studying theorist's methods of developing and refining a profession, recommendations toward improving the USCG officer corps professional military education protocols conclude the report. The USCG should implement a robust officer development program that includes leadership principles and case studies, USCG history, and core courses studying National Security Policy, National Defense Strategy, and National Maritime Strategies. An officer professional development program should augment, not replace, the existing advanced education and military service school participation

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ACRONYMS

AOC	Advanced Operations Course
CO	Commanding Officer
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DoD	Department of Defense
DoS	Department of State
DoT	Department of Transportation
ILE	Intermediate Level Education
LDC	Leadership Development Center
MSO	Marine Safety Office
MT	Mandated Training
OIC	Officer in Charge
OPTEMPO	Operations tempo
RCS	Revenue Cutter Service
TRACEN	Training Center
USA CGSC	United States Army Command and General Staff College
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USCGA	United States Coast Guard Academy
USCGHQ	United States Coast Guard Headquarters
USLSS	United States Life Saving Service

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

What makes the Coast Guard unique is that in executing our diverse missions we harmonize seemingly contradictory mandates. We are charged at once to be police officers, sailors, warriors, humanitarians, regulators, stewards of the environment, diplomats, and guardians of the coast. Thus, we are military, multi-mission, and maritime.

— U.S. Coast Guard, USCG Publication 1

Background

The above statement illustrates that the United States Coast Guard (USCG) is both a military service and law enforcement agency. This mixture of authorities coupled with diverse missions, emerging threats, and large magnitude natural disasters are catalysts when considering the USCG as a profession. The USCG requires an officer corps well versed and knowledgeable in the organizations broad authorities and responsibilities. To understand the USCG, this introduction will briefly discuss the history of the USCG as well as the thesis problem statement, primary and secondary research questions, scope, limitations, definitions and acronyms.

The USCG has undergone tremendous change since its earliest days as the Revenue Cutter Service, or the Revenue-Marine. The Revenue Cutter Service was first established and subsequently transformed as the nation's priorities changed based on threats to national security throughout history. The Revenue Cutter Service was established in 1790 under the purview of the Department of Treasury in order to enforce

tariffs on vessels transporting goods to the colonies.¹ After the United States territories grew, maritime transportation shifted from sail to steam bringing new maritime challenges with it. The USCG was created when the Revenue-Marine and the U.S. Life-Saving Service joined forces in 1915 in order to respond to the new environment.² The federal government continued to reshape the USCG's authorities and responsibilities as the U.S. Lighthouse Service merged with the USCG in 1939, followed by the Bureau of Navigation and Bureau of Marine Inspection in 1946.³ In 1967, the USCG was transferred from the Department of Treasury to the Department of Transportation (DOT) until 1 March 2003, when the USCG transferred to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).⁴ Throughout these numerous reorganizations and transformations including increased responsibilities, the one constant that has remained steadfast is that USCG members serve to protect the Constitution of the United States of America. Laying the foundation for the profession of the USCG officer corps, Alexander Hamilton, the first Secretary of Treasury and considered the father of the USCG, advised that "the officers' demeanor and behavior be marked with prudence, moderation, and good temper. Upon these qualities must depend on the success, usefulness and . . . continuance of the

¹Robert F. Bennett, *The Coast Guardsman's Manual*, 7th ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1983), 5-6.

²United States Coast Guard, "History," slide 3, <http://www.uscg.mil/history/regulations/uscghistory.ppt#337> (accessed 28 April 2011).

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

establishment in which they are included . . . that all personnel should take the oath to support the Constitution of the United States.”⁵

Today, as changes continue to occur organizationally, USCG senior leaders focus on developing professionals at every level of the organization in order to effectively adjust to emerging threats and continue to operate at a high operations tempo (OPTEMPO) with success. However, as the USCG transforms, no formal officer military professional development program exists in order to efficiently maintain the knowledge, expertise and skills required to keep pace with the changes. Research will illustrate that despite the numerous and broad changes within the USCG and how the USCG interacts among the other DHS agencies and DoD services, the officer military professional education has remained optional for USCG officers.

When the terror attacks occurred in September 2001, the USCG was an agency within the Department of Transportation (DOT). While the USCG had tactical law enforcement teams (Taclets), international port security liaison officers (IPSLO) and Port Security Units (PSU) around the globe, establishing the DHS and transferring the USCG to this new agency brought a significant change. It changed the emphasis of the traditional USCG roles from Search and Rescue (SAR) and Maritime Safety to Maritime Security and National Defense. USCG mission sets have not changed. The USCG has always been a multi-mission maritime laws enforcement agency and armed service. The renewed emphasis, however, began to shift budget priorities, personnel assignments and resource allocation priorities.

⁵Donald T. Phillips and James M. Loy, *Character in Action: The U.S. Coast Guard on Leadership* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003), xi.

Along with the shifting management priorities, the culture of the USCG changed as well. A perceived competitive divide developed between those specialty areas that had traditionally received the bulk of the USCG operational budget, and those communities that now receive more substantial allocations. For example, in the past, a large amount of the budget was distributed to cutters and aircraft. However, since 9-11, the small boat community and its associated law enforcement capacity has grown significantly. Law enforcement training and equipment for members has become a focal point. Efforts to ensure that well trained crews operate from capable platforms have resulted in aggressive crews operating from high speed boats with extremely powerful engines behind them requiring significant increase in training requirements. In addition to the adjustment in funding priorities, the shift from Lieutenant Commander led Groups and Marine Safety Offices to Sectors under the command of a Captain was designed to consolidate the broad USCG responsibilities into one command in each major port. Further illustrating the adjustment, Air Stations became responsible for delivery of law enforcement interdiction teams to vessels from aircraft and training centers such as the Special Missions Training Center (SMTC) were established to teach these new law enforcement interdiction skills and methods.

USCG leadership has altered the way business in the service is completed based on shifting national priorities, fiscal priorities, and capacities requirements. USCG responsibilities continue to include partnerships with many local, state and federal agencies, and the DoD services across a wide spectrum of mission. However, the officer professional military education program has remained hinged to education received at the commissioning source and optional courses available to those who apply. Through all of

the changes associated with reorganization within the USCG and transferring from one cabinet level department to another, the USCG officer corps has remained vigilant and dedicated. Reviewing the leadership competencies and studying whether the officers and their supervisors think they meet the standard is a noble effort. Individual initiative is a positive attribute but, it alone will not ensure the officer corps is prepared for the future.

The USCG strongly encourages individual initiative towards education and professional development. Even at the unit level, the USCG leadership requires review of Individual Development Plans (IDP) by the command cadre for all E-1s to O-4s. This is an excellent initiative but with little to no organizational follow-up at the O4 level, there is a limitation on the progress one can make either on his or her own or at the unit level. At the organizational level, the USCG needs to develop a continuum of education similar to that of the USA including the Basic Officer Course, the Captain's Career Course and the CGSC Intermediate-Level Education that are linked to both assignment and promotions. Similar to the USA courses, a USCG program needs to be reinforced in the USCG Officer Evaluations System, the unit leader development programs, promotion systems, assignment systems and potentially advanced education systems.

The USA is similar to the USCG, in that, each organization is continually changing and transforming as the national priorities change. Effectively responding to emerging threats during periods of increasing OPTEMPO, fluctuating budgets and reductions in forces is challenging. Institutionalized officer professional military education is critical at all times, and especially, as the landscape continues to change requiring adaptation to new threats, technological advances and budgetary constraints. Congruent with the various national and organizational changes, the USCG needs to

continually look towards deliberately developing its officers to think, decide, and lead as the organization changes in order to remain focused on strategic end states.

USCG Education and Training

The USCG defines education as focusing on skills and knowledge that are broad based and subject matter driven.⁶ Conversely, the USCG defines training as focusing on skills and knowledge that are job-specific and performance-driven.⁷ Most formal USCG education and training is focused on technical expertise. On-the-job training (OJT) is training that is normally conducted at the duty station by unit personnel. OJT provides unit specific knowledge and skills to improve an individual's job performance. Even the most recent officer career guide, while admittedly assignment based, focuses on the officer's operational field assignments when considering future assignments.⁸

Formal service-wide leadership training opportunities reside in a one-week Leadership and Management School (LAMS) resident training. This one week course is also available several times a year at various locations across the USCG through "road-shows." A "road-show" is essentially the instructors deployed to conduct training regionally for those units whose OPTEMPO precludes its members from attending the resident course. LAMS is also part of the accession point curriculum. It is an excellent introduction to leadership and followership. As officers advance through promotions and

⁶U.S. Coast Guard, COMDTINST M1500.10C, *U.S. Coast Guard Training and Education Manual* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 2009), 1-1.

⁷Ibid.

⁸U.S. Coast Guard, "Developing a career as a Coast Guard Officer," June 2007, http://www.uscg.mil/psc/opm/opmdocs/Developing_a_Career_as_a_CG_Officer.pdf (accessed 28 April 2011).

gain assignment to higher responsibility positions, the LAMS training remains static. Progression in responsibility warrants training on a commensurate level. Static training produces static performance. A one week training course does not adequately meet the needs of the entire organization. Those already selected for cadre positions (Engineer Petty Officer, Executive Officer, Executive Petty Officer, Officer-in-Charge or Commanding Officer) have the option of attending a one-week Command Cadre course. Lieutenant Commanders (O4s) and selected civilian employees may attend the one-week Senior Leaders Program.

Drawing attention to the fact that these courses are optional is not to say that the USCG does not value education for its members. The USCG demonstrates a profound commitment to education and training. This is evidenced in its' relentless pursuit of leveraging technology to accomplish Mandated Training (MT), i.e. Substance Abuse Awareness Training or Civil Rights/Human Relations Awareness Training. Additionally, the USCG supports more than fifty graduate school programs each year for officers who apply and are selected. Typically, this competitive process focuses on the officer's performance evaluations and college entrance exam scores. The training and education endeavors are important and cannot be discounted. However, they do not necessarily expand the military cultural aspect of the USCG profession. A more comprehensive approach includes augmenting these endeavors with an institutionalized professional military educational element within the system. This thesis will address the apparent lack of the USCG officer corps education dedicated to developing officers to be adept in many areas. Starting with conceiving short and long term organizational strategy, critical thinking, and understanding the intricacies of how the USCG works within DHS and

alongside other federal, state and local government agencies and departments in order to achieve national strategies.

The importance of ensuring opportunities for self, unit, and organizational leader growth cannot be understated. One needs to have an understanding of the current USCG officer systems. This understanding, coupled with a discussion of how other organizations have responded to organizational professional development concerns, will provide alternatives to relying on self-initiative and unit level training. Self initiative and unit level training is inadequately instilling the professional ethic and military culture within the USCG.

The USCG administers training and education through the USCG Headquarters Office of Reserve and Leadership (CG-13) which oversees the renowned U.S. Coast Guard Academy (CGA), the Leadership Development Center (LDC), numerous Training Centers (TRACENs) and several training teams that underpin unit level training. The USCG does not have an institutionalized officer professional development program encompassing officer corps leader development. This study will explore the concept of an institutionalized program that transcends the various officer specialties and directly impacts both promotion and assignment opportunities.

While the LDC conducts required entry level leader development training and entry-level command cadre training, there is no continuum of officer professional education or training. Not only does the LAMS training not include a progression through advanced training, but the optional Command Cadre courses are only applicable to those entering a command cadre position. The Command Cadre course is not required nor

offered for all officers. The TRACEN's are dedicated to mainly specialized training such as initial entry level and journeyman equivalent programs.

USCG senior leaders recognize gaps exist in officer professional development. Demonstrating both concern and desire to close the gap, the USCG has conducted several internal studies pertaining to whether junior and mid-grade officers are meeting the standards of their supervisors. Surveys indicate junior and mid-grade officers feel they are obtaining the requisite knowledge to succeed in the USCG. Clearly, the disparity between how officers assess their performance compared to how their superiors assess their performance is concerning. The results of the USCG internal studies will illuminate the gaps and potential methods to minimize the gaps through structured approaches.

Purpose and Problem Statement

The USCG officer professional military education program needs improvement. In addition to the performance gaps identified in the internal studies, this paper will consider the perception of an increase in officer misconduct. Recent experience as a Commanding Officer (CO) of an operational field unit and the opportunity to attend the U.S. Army (USA) Command and General Staff College (CGSC) have provided the insight, education and opportunity needed to pursue research to explore whether a relationship exists between officer misconduct, as well as job performance, and an education system built upon self-initiative. The budget constraints, personnel shortfalls and resource gaps may not directly lead to officer misconduct. However, these factors likely influence focused efforts to establish a more robust professional military education program that would explore leadership challenges before they occur.

The perception that the number of officers removed from command positions across the USCG due to misconduct has increased definitely fosters the need for a critical evaluation. An evaluation of how to improve officer educational opportunities. A focused and systematic officer professional military education program is needed. This program should include assignment and promotion implications would foster an officer corps of critical thinkers and politically adept leaders. Leaders who understand how the USCG interfaces with the larger strategic and operational functions of the National security picture.

U.S. Army Officer Professional Military Education

A review of USA studies conducted will reveal identified gaps in officer performance and the USA's actions to close the gaps. For example, the USA recognized pattern of officers leaving the service after their five year obligation and an increase in outsourced military positions to contractors. USA leadership decided to take a close look at developing their most important resource—their people. For officers, one course established was the USA Command and General Staff College (CGSC). Today the USA requires every Major (O4) to attend and complete the intermediate level education as a condition of promotion and assignment. This program educates field-grade officers in joint (more than one component in DoD), interagency (DoD, DHS, Department of State) and multinational operations. The USA CGSC education is one of several career enhancing leader development courses that the USA administers. USA Basic Officer Leader Course and the Captain's Career Course precede CGSC. After CGSC completion, select officers attend the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). These are highly sought after and rewarding USA programs dedicated to the continuing education of the

organizations professional military officer. These are the type of programs the USCG needs to establish in order to provide a continuum of professional development required to remain experts in USCG organizational strategic and operational policies.

Research Questions

This thesis focuses on the primary research question: how would the USCG benefit from an institutionalized officer professional development program? In order to thoroughly exam and provide evidence to support findings, several secondary research questions will be pursued. Secondary research questions include: what is the profession of the USCG Officer? What is the current USCG officer professional military education regiment? How does the current USCG officer military professional education influence assignments and promotions? What improvements can be made to the USCG military professional education program in order to improve USCG officer performance? Comparatively, how has the USA addressed officer professional military education?

Scope

This paper will only consider the professional military education of the USCG officer corps. Much is expected of officers of the USCG. The expectations increase as the OPTEMPO and level of responsibility of the Service increases. Defining the USCG's military profession is critical in determining the value of professional military education and achieving a professional identity. Unofficially defining career progression points as commissioning, promotion to lieutenant and lieutenant commander, and upon assignment to a command position based solely on subjective performance evaluations is not adequate. Instead, official career progression points should be defined by completion of

tangible and measurable tasks, such as completion of required internal USCG military professional education courses, and assignment to command cadre and other positions of increased responsibility in addition to performance evaluations. Professional military educational opportunities are critical to developing the future officer corps prepared to lead the organization through inevitable change and complex environments.

To demonstrate existing programs, this study will use examples of the USA's progress toward institutionalizing officer professional development. The USA has conducted several studies including the U.S. Army Staff College Level Training Study (Final Report) completed by Colonel Huba Was de Czege in June 1983. While Colonel Was de Czege's report is somewhat dated and other studies have taken place since his report was finalized, it gives validity and context to formal military education including performance gaps that needed to be addressed at the time of the report. The Colonel Was de Czege report was a precursor to the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 as both the report and Goldwater-Nichols Act are products of an identified performance gap within both the USA and DoD.⁹

Not unlike the USA, the USCG as a whole is required to meet multiple and disparate mandates. The USCG members performing these missions must have unity in purpose and profession. There must be a sense of Coast Guardsman first and specialty second. The USCG Core Values of Honor, Respect and Devotion to Duty must be the foundation of all mission sets for all members: military, civilian, and auxiliary. When considering the wider overarching profession of the DHS, it is clear that the stakes are

⁹Huba Wass de Czege, "Final Report: Army Staff College Level Training Study" (Report, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 1983).

higher. The demographics of its members continue to change and disparity in mission-sets grow even vaster. There must be a connection amongst the agencies within DHS that helps to define the profession. The agencies must be able to work alongside or together (augmenting or integrating) to include the DoD. All involved must first understand the organization internally and externally in order to most effective. The educational system must be able to define, instill, and promote the USCG's profession. The USCG is the only military service within the agency. Logically, the DHS and USCG should consider the benefits of establishing an officer education system modeled after the USA. This would include the accession point (Service Academy, Officer Candidate School, other commissioning source), Basic Officer Leader Course, Captain's Career Course, Intermediate Level Education, Advanced Operations Course, War College, and CAPSTONE courses. These USA programs are all officer specific. This paper will explore the potential benefits and address identified and anecdotal gaps in the current USCG systems pertaining only to the USCG officer corps.

Augmenting the USCG service wide core values, guardian ethos, mission sets and the special trust and confidence of the American public will require the USCG would to define and maintain the profession. This can be done by establishing a formal, methodical, institutionalized officer professional education system. The USA has aggressively pursued identifying, defining and codifying the USA's Professional Military Ethic. This has been done with the understanding that the profession hinges on a performing and conducting oneself to a certain standard. Countless articles, books, and papers have been written. Many conferences and symposiums have been held. All in order to determine the definition of and codifying the profession in order to bring

together and recognize its expertise, guiding principles and esprit de corps of the profession. The USCG has the opportunity to establish a similar path having already studied the existing gaps in officer performance.

Limitations

This study will not consider the infrastructure of how to institutionalize a formal leader program in the USCG. Funding, housing classrooms and barracks, developing curriculum, timing of training and education, and many other factors will undoubtedly impact any attempt to formalize a step program to institutionalize leader development. By drawing comparisons to the USA, this study will methodically validate the benefits of integrating an officer professional military education program with leader development. There is not enough time in this accelerated program to conduct in-depth surveys. Completed surveys and studies already and the organizations interpretations of the results will be studied to draw upon as evidence of positive impacts.

Although there is an abundance of USA professional information available through open sources, in comparison, there are a limited number of USCG related books and articles. Further research using official USCG documentation from assignment panels, promotion boards, special boards and advanced education panels may lend more accurate and current facts. Information obtained relating to individuals was gathered through internet searches of open source documents. Further, somewhat dated USCG information regarding officer pitfalls and reliefs could be more detailed and accurate through a Freedom of Information Act request or a USCG sponsored research project where the information would be made more readily available.

Information pertaining to USCG officer reliefs and misconduct was obtained through open source media outlets. Complete details of incidents, investigations and outcomes are not typically forthcoming through the media. As a result, additional research using official USCG documents would be required if more detailed information is desired. This study is not specifically reliant on the details of the incidents so much as recognizing the potential benefits of identifying with a profession and establishing a formal officer professional military education program.

Lastly, this study pertains to the USCG officer corps professional military education programs. Although highly important to the USCG, the enlisted, reserve, civilian, auxiliary and contract workforces are not discussed. This study briefly discusses literature pertaining to the DHS department level education merely to recognize the efforts at the department level to determine skill sets and performance desires.

Summary

The USCG is once again at a crossroads of executing operations on a limited budget with an increased OPTEMPO, and reduced forces. It is imperative that the profession be defined and codified in order to ensure the men and women of the USCG officer corps are prepared to face the challenges of the future.

Chapter 2 will consist of an explanation of sources used to identify patterns or trends, and the general relevance to this study. This review will include limited number of books, journals, USCG and USA studies and doctrine, magazines (*Proceedings*), service newspapers (*Navy Times*, *Army Times*), independent articles, and previous studies including CGSC thesis and monograms. Chapter 3 will describe the methods used to connect the literature with the research questions in order to completely understand how

each source related to the discussion. Chapter 4 will present, interpret, and analyze evidence produced through the research methods. The impact of the research will become evident in this chapter. Finally, chapter 5 will explain the importance of this study as well as present recommendations regarding implications of a USCG officer military professional education program.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

For over two centuries the U.S. Coast Guard has safeguarded our Nation's maritime interests in the heartland, in the ports, at sea, and around the globe. We protect the maritime economy and the environment, we defend our maritime borders and we save those in peril. This history has forged our character and purpose as America's Maritime Guardian—Always Ready for all hazards and all threats.

— U.S. Coast Guard, USCG Publication 1

Purpose

The purpose of this study is to provide evidence that the USCG would benefit from an institutionalized officer military professional development program. The literature review is used to divulge the documents, theorists, studies and the findings and recommendations therein to determine similarities, patterns and trends already published relating to the same or similar topic. Based on assertions and facts found within these sources, conclusions will be formed.

Background

The USCG has a history of transformation and change in order to preempt, to respond to and to overcome emerging threats and exploit advances in technology. While organizationally the USCG continues to operate at very high standards of expertise and stewardship, senior leaders need to consider an adjustment to the way in which the USCG trains and educates its officer corps. This paper will discuss USCG officer performance shortfalls recently observed both anecdotally and through the evaluation and assessment of various studies and surveys conducted internally.

This literature review will include a limited number of books journals, previously completed internal service studies and surveys, USCG doctrine and policies, USA doctrine and policies independent articles, magazines (*Proceedings*), and service newspapers (*Navy Times*).

The primary question, “how would the CG benefit from an institutionalized professional military education program?” may appear to have a simplistic answer. This paper will delve into why the question and its answers are not simplistic. The fact that the USCG leadership has conducted two studies to determine leadership and professional development gaps within the officer corps over the past ten years demonstrates senior leader concern regarding officer corps professional and leader development.

Additionally, the research will answer secondary research questions including: what is the profession of the USCG Officer? What is the current USCG officer professional military education regiment? How does the current USCG officer military professional education influence assignments and promotions? What improvements can be made to the USCG military professional education program in order to improve USCG officer performance? Comparatively, how has the USA addressed officer professional military education?

Identifying and studying the answers to these questions will help to articulate the current methods of officer professional development within the UCSG, impacts on the USCG and how other organizations including military and civilian organizations address leader development.

What Constitutes a Profession?

In order to provide a fundamental context for the discussion, the first task is to validate and to define the profession of the USCG officer corps. This study will consider several theorists who have contemplated and discussed professions and the professional person. The theories espoused by Dr. Andrew Abbott, Samuel Huntington, and Don Snider demonstrate how professionals are developed and maintained, and how they come together to form a profession. The literature pertaining to the military profession is extensive. These three theorists were chosen to illustrate the concept of a profession, how the concept applies to the military officer corps, and the determination of whether the USCG officer corps meets the established criteria found in the literature.

In *The Systems of Professions*, Dr. Andrew Abbott discusses professions in what he refers to as jurisdictions. Abbott discusses the concept of jurisdictions in terms of expertise, education, processes and ethics, and what ties them together.¹⁰ He further explains that within each profession there must be competition within the jurisdiction both locally and nationally.¹¹ General themes of professional development include systems of instruction and training, examinations and prerequisites, a code of ethics, and a client–professional relationship.¹² Much of Abbott’s theory of professions and the system that ties them together internally and externally centers on medical and legal professions, however he does discuss the internal competition of the U.S. Army and U.S.

¹⁰Andrew Abbott, *The System of Professions: An Expert on the Division of Expert Labor* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1988), 1-2.

¹¹Ibid., 2.

¹²Ibid., 4-5.

Navy as their air power capabilities grew. Abbott uses the military example to show the internal struggles that led to the independence of the U.S. Air Force and the external expectations of meeting an emerging threat to the national security while maintaining the character of the profession.¹³

Another prolific military studies theorist, Samuel P. Huntington, discussed the unique civil-military relationship the armed services and their civilian supervisors embody in his book *The Soldier and the State*. After providing a brief historical account of the genesis of a professional officer corps through a detailed discussion of Prussian, French, British, and German systems and the advent of military institutions, Huntington delved into the defining point of the military profession. Maintaining that the military officer's profession is underpinned by his service to a nation, he further connects loyalty to a single institution, or nation in this case, that is generally accepted as embodying the authority of the nation.¹⁴

Defining the military profession is critical to understanding the civil-military relationship between the professional officer corps and the civilian supervisors of that corps. In order to clearly define the military as a profession, Huntington further identifies the first professionalization of an officer corps as that of Prussia.¹⁵ He cites the Prussian initiative to introduce conscription for its enlisted members, abolish class restrictions to entry into the officer corps and require a minimum of general education as the earliest

¹³Abbott, 192.

¹⁴Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 35.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, 37.

attempts of professionalization.¹⁶ Further development during the 1800s and 1900s included rank systems, education systems, and methods to obtain a commission through superior service in the enlisted ranks and entry to military institutions through competitive examinations.¹⁷ Variants of the same systems are used to organize, develop and maintain today's U.S. Armed Services, including the USCG.

In the book *The Future of the Army Profession*, Don Snider draws on some of the ideas of Huntington's ideas as he studied the state of the Army profession. Included in Snider's study is a great deal of analysis pertaining to the military profession of the early 1990s compared to the present profession. Having completed the first edition during the late 1990s, in the second edition, Snider discusses the impacts of resource constraints and declining budgets coupled with the increase in deployments as a catalyst for questioning what the Army profession is today. Snider draws a clear connection within the Army Officer Corps as he explains that without the direct connection to service to the nation and the national populace, the military profession would fail to exist as it does today.¹⁸

Additionally, Snider's comments illustrate a particular relationship between the officer and the profession that enables the profession to remain intact. His discussion centers on whether changes in the environment (e.g. political strategies, technological advances, national will, and societal influences) affect changes within the officer's corps

¹⁶Ibid., 39.

¹⁷Ibid., 41-42.

¹⁸Don M. Snider and Lloyd Matthews, eds., *The Future of the Army Profession*, 2nd ed. (Boston, MA: McGraw Hill Custom Publishing, 2005), 12.

culture. He concludes that, yes, there is a relationship due to the very definition of the USA profession's relationship to serving the American populace.

Interestingly, Snider makes a sharp distinction between the DoD Armed Forces and what he refers to as an emerging national security profession characterized as “a nebulous entity” not yet worthy of recognition as a profession in the same sense of the military profession.¹⁹ Snider's distinction is noteworthy for two reasons. First, the DoD services seem more likely now than ever before to engage in direct Homeland Security missions. And, secondly, because the USCG has always been responsible for the security of the homeland regardless of the DHS establishment in 2003. The nuances of roles, responsibilities, jurisdiction and authority, however, is precisely why the confusion exists and gives credence to the establishing an institutionalized USCG officer professional military education program.

Dr. Abbott, Samuel Huntington, and Don Snider provide a small sampling of literature dedicated to defining and exploring the military profession and those professionals within each field. Each author has identified specific factors that characterize professions. Their commonalities include an education and training system, rank system, and a client-professional relationship. These factors assist in defining the USCG officer corps as a professional organization. The next section will specifically focus on maritime military professional perspectives from the U.S. Navy and USCG. These leaders provide an internal perspective of the profession and the expectations of those officers who belong to it.

¹⁹Ibid., 18.

U.S. Naval and USCG Leadership Perspectives

Similar to those previously discussed, additional theories and discussions of leader development are found in *Naval Leadership, Voices of Experience*, a compilation of advice, guidance and anecdotal examples illustrating how hundreds of influential US and foreign Naval officers define good leadership.²⁰ Throughout the book, Naval officers across a wide spectrum of specialties provide thoughts on leadership and recount experiences that either validated or made them question their thoughts of Naval leadership. Discussions pertaining to leadership philosophies or models directly impact how we think of the military professional. Leadership underpins all professional development regardless of specialty, field, branch or service. In other words, the line that separates leadership and professional development is not clear cut. As a result, this study will focus on the opinions and theories of prolific military officers who have served with distinction and are considered great leaders and professional military officers.

Former American Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Thomas Hayward conveyed his thoughts on the naval officer's profession as one that requires the officer to be responsible for his behavior, his conduct and his work at all times.²¹ He listed five critical elements of the profession as: pride, expertise, loyalty to country, pleasure in work, and self-improvement.²² These traits are further explained as they pertain to how the officer interacts with his seniors, his peers and his subordinates, his commitment to

²⁰Karel Montor, ed., *Naval Leadership, Voiced of Experience* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987), xvi-xvii.

²¹*Ibid.*, 32.

²²*Ibid.*, 32-36.

service to his country and his motivation towards continued education. Directly linking an officer's conduct to his profession, and therefore service to the Nation, Admiral de Cazanove commented on an officer's moral responsibility, in that, "you cannot live in two different worlds, but rather must meet the same standards in both your personal and professional life, for without a high sense of moral responsibility, you will negate everything you have achieved by your personal example in other areas."²³

Further discussion of the professional service to the nation is garnered from past and present USCG leaders such as Admiral James Loy. A glimpse of USCG professionalism is found in *Character in Action*, written by Admiral Loy, USCG retired, who served as USCG Commandant from 1998-2002. Admiral Loy clearly articulates his belief that the USCG is a profession with a cause and that the professionals that make up the USCG are stewards of the American citizen's interests. He further exclaims that the USCG's honor is to serve humanity itself.²⁴ These comments, while broadly including service to all civilization, are echoed daily within the USCG. At all-hands training, commissioning ceremonies, and other traditional military honors and ceremonies, the culture and sentiment Admiral Loy conveys in his book are lauded as the backbone of the USCG. When Admiral Loy, his predecessors and his successors discuss and point directly to the profession of a Coast Guardsman, individuals exposed to the remarks determine their own perspective of what a USCG officer embodies based on their previous training, education and experiences.

²³Ibid., 11.

²⁴James M. Loy and Donald T. Phillips, *Character in Action: The U.S. Coast Guard on Leadership* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003), 11.

Similarly, when Admiral Robert Papp, Jr, succeeded Admiral Thad Allan as the 24th Commandant of the USCG on 25 May 2010, Admiral Papp made brief remarks as is customary of the newly appointed Commandant. He spoke of the sacrifices his family endured over his 35 year career thus far and thanked both his family and the men and women of the USCG for their sacrifices in order to serve the people of the United States. With his inspiring words, he admitted that it is challenging to define the profession of USCG member referred to as “Coastie”;

And . . . To my Shipmates . . . Active duty, Civilian, Reserve and Auxiliary (and the retired versions of all of the foregoing): We are privileged to be members of a very unique Service that, due to our collection of missions, and legacy agencies, sometimes defies logic when someone attempts to classify us, or to place a label on us. As we continue this voyage over the next 4 years, we will be defined by our missions, people and heritage. We will selflessly serve our country, and perform our duties in a manner that secures the trust and confidence of mariners and citizens alike. We will set a course that Steadies the Service, Honors our Profession, Strengthens our Partnerships, and Respects our Shipmates. So when I am pressed for an answer by those who try to define, classify, characterize or label us . . . whenever I’ve been asked to describe what I am, I have always relied definitively, succinctly, accurately, sincerely and with pride: I . . . am a Coast Guardsman. . . . We . . . are the men and women of the United States Coast Guard. So, All ahead standard . . . steady as you go . . . stand a taut watch. Semper Paratus! Thank you!²⁵

Six months later, the Commandant made his annual remarks to the USCGA Corps of Cadets on 6 January 2011. In these remarks, Admiral Papp discussed his interpretation of the Oath of Office, its connection to the Constitution of the United States of America and a commissioned officer’s relationship to the U.S. Constitution through his Oath of Office. Further, Admiral Papp impressed upon the future leaders of the USCG that “these documents [the U.S. Constitution and Oath of Office] constitute the basic and

²⁵Admiral Robert J. Papp, Jr, “Change of Command Remarks” (USCG Change of Command Ceremony, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC, 25 May 2010).

fundamental bond which unites not only the Coast Guard Officer Corps, but the entire Officer Corps of our Armed Forces.”²⁶ To conclude his remarks, Admiral Papp commented “This is our chosen profession. This is our way. This is what we do. We are Coast Guardsmen. We are the men and women of the United States Coast Guard. And, proudly so.”²⁷ The Commandant stressed the commitment officers must demonstrate in order to defend the constitution. No doubt, his inspiring words, echoing back to those of Alexander Hamilton, resonated with the Corps.

Beyond the Naval and USCG senior leadership, some information regarding the labor of the USCG profession is found in *The Coast Guardsman’s Manual*. *The Coast Guardsman’s Manual* is a tool provided to new members of the USCG including the officer corps. It provides in-depth information regarding the history, missions, organization, leadership, discipline and personal standards upheld in the organization. Chapter 1 begins with history and how the USCG history demonstrates the organizations desire to fulfill national purposes.²⁸ Further details include how to wear the uniform, seamanship fundamentals, weapons training, navigation and damage control systems.

Connecting on-duty expectations with the off-duty way of life, Chapter 4 of *The Coast Guardsman’s Manual* is dedicated to personal standards. The overarching message, stated in its introductory paragraph is that the USCG will provide the training and education necessary to complete assigned military and professional duties. But, it

²⁶Admiral Robert J Papp, Jr, “Annual Leadership Address to the Coast Guard Academy Corps of Cadets” (Lecture, Roland Hall Gymnasium, USCG Academy, New London, CT, 7 January 2011).

²⁷Ibid., 7.

²⁸Bennett, *The Coast Guardsman Manual*, 3.

goes on to say that an individual's mental and physical conditions are precursors that enable effective performance.²⁹ While neither the military nor a professional ethic is discussed, Chapter 4 starts to lay a foundation for taking care of oneself and others across a broad range of characteristics that all Coasties embarking on their career in the organization must possess or obtain quickly.

The character of a Coastie at all levels of the organization is critical to the success of the organization as a whole. As the theorists discuss in their ideologies of what defines a military officer, the concept is clear. The military officer must be an expert in his field and must be a person with integrity who is capable of making decisions based on logic and experience. The military officer must study the history of the organization and of past leaders and heroes in order to build upon lessons learned and continue to develop the future leaders of the organization.

Theorists and senior military professionals' remarks pertaining to the military profession assist in understanding how the profession developed over time and the factors required to maintain it. The following section will explore anecdotal information and internal USCG studies in order to determine shortfalls within the profession.

USCG Officer Misconduct

All Service members will openly confirm that being in the Service is a twenty-four hour a day, seven day a week, three hundred sixty-five day a year commitment. While many employed members of society are obligated to a forty - sixty hour work week, shift work, and salary's dependent on the company profits, military Service

²⁹Bennett, *The Coast Guardsman Manual*, 3.

members have a different connection to their employment. Military members serve to protect and defend the rights of the Nations citizens. This fact is not specific to commissioned officers; however, this study will only consider the implications of this notion as it applies to the officer corps. As conveyed by senior leaders in the previous section, a very high personal conduct expectation exists for commissioned officers in all Services. The USCG is no different. Unfortunately, a perceived increase in the number and egregiousness of recent officer misconduct has manifested in the relief or reprimand of several senior USCG officers.

A USCG Personnel Command, Officer Assignment road-show presentation in 2005 included slides discussing officer pitfalls and reliefs. Figures 1 through 3 illustrate an increase in officer pitfall incidents pertaining to both misconduct and professional competence during the specified time period. While these figures are somewhat outdated, recent publicized cases of senior officer reliefs indicated further misconduct.




Figure 1. USCG Officer Pitfalls, FY02-FY05
Source: U.S. Coast Guard, Coast Guard Personnel Command, “Officer Assignment Roadshow” (Arlington, VA: Government Printing Office, 2005).




Figure 2. USCG Officer Pitfall–Categorical FY05
Source: U.S. Coast Guard, Coast Guard Personnel Command, “Officer Assignment Roadshow” (Arlington, VA: Government Printing Office, 2005).




Figure 3. USCG Officer Misconduct Related Separations by grade
Source: U.S. Coast Guard, Coast Guard Personnel Command, “Officer Assignment Roadshow” (Arlington, VA: Government Printing Office, 2005).

The increase in pitfalls from 2002 to 2005 depicted in figures 1 through 3 illustrate that more than thirty percent of the incidents were due to misconduct. Additionally, twenty percent of misconduct related separations during this time period

were O4s, O5s, and O6s. When O3 separations due to misconduct are considered in addition to O4-O6 separations, the percentage jumps to fifty percent of all officer separations due to misconduct.

The raw data behind the numbers projected in figures 1 through 3 is not readily available through open source documentation. This is particularly important due to the subjectivity of the categories contained in the illustrations. For example, Figure 1 does not provide a definition of pitfall. It can be surmised that a pitfall is a misstep either in a professional competence or misconduct realm. Further, Figure 2's method of categorizing the pitfall fails to define each category. It is difficult to know for certain if a failure in performance was defined as merely not meeting the standard expected of the supervisor (e.g. not qualifying in a timely manner), or if the performance was a more egregious performance concern. For these reasons, the information is considered anecdotal. However, the venue at which this information was divulged gives validity to the information. The take-away from this presentation is that officer reliefs due to misconduct increased between 2002 and 2005.

Recent media reports indicate the continued trend of officer misconduct at senior levels of the organization. Gathering data from newspaper and magazine articles provides additional anecdotal evidence as the misconduct continues to increase in number and severity. For example, in May 2009, the O6 Commander of a major USCG Sector was temporarily relieved of command as reported by *The Navy Times*.³⁰ The article reported that the captain was charged with 31 different violations of the Uniform Code of Military

³⁰Susan Gvozdias, "CG captain accused of adultery, indecent acts," 4 November 2009, http://www.navytimes.com/news/2009/11/coastguard_hamilton_110409w/ (accessed 17 April 2011).

Justice (UCMJ).³¹ Charges ranged from failure to follow orders, lying to investigators, attempting to defame other Service members while trying to cover up over 13 years of inappropriate relationships with officer and enlisted women in his charge.³² The captain was found in violation of the UCMJ at administrative non-judicial punishment proceedings in July 2010, and in accordance with the pre-trial agreement, he accepted retirement at the grade of O3 in lieu of courts-martial.³³

A second example is the relief of a major USCG cutter Commanding Officer following his arrest in May 2007 charged with simple assault after arguing with a bar tender during a port call.³⁴ The O5 Commanding Officer of the medium endurance cutter was first temporarily relieved and subsequently retired from active duty as validated in the USCG Register of Officers.³⁵

The very brief examples provided here are just two of several senior officers who recently retired from active duty after having engaged in misconduct. Other examples found in media outlets include myriad offenses by senior officers in command positions, including O5s and O6s, viewing pornographic material on government computer

³¹Ibid.

³²Ibid

³³Ryan Erickson, "Coast Guard's CAPT Hamilton receives his punishment: CAPT to LT and more," 9 April 2010, <http://cgblog.org/2010/04/09/coast-guarde-capt-hamilton-receives-his-punishment-capt-to-lt-and-more> (accessed 28 April 2009).

³⁴Patricia Kime, "Coastie skipper arrested after Key West bar brawl," 17 May 2007, http://www.navytimes.com/news/2007/05/coastguard_skipper_reassigned_070517w/ (accessed 15 April 2011).

³⁵U.S. Coast Guard, Register of Officer, PSCINST M1427.1B, *Register of Officers* (Arlington, VA: CG Personnel Services Command, 2011), 265.

systems,³⁶ wrongful use of cocaine,³⁷ domestic violence,³⁸ and inappropriate relationships.³⁹

The entire story cannot be told through incomplete news articles. Circumstances and facts surrounding the events and the disposition of charges are not readily apparent in all cases. Officer misconduct is not the sole factor with potential negative impacts the status of the profession. A review of internal USCG studies will illuminate the officer performance trends further and provide attainable recommendations that will be further reviewed in Chapter 5. The anecdotal information, the internal studies results and the resulting recommendations will set the conditions and serve as motivation to establish a continuum of formal officer professional military education.

USCG Internal Studies

The anecdotal information in the previous section focused on recent examples of officer misconduct. The trend does beg the question of whether increased high risk operations impact officer's decisions and the overall workforce climate. However, even

³⁶The News Tribune, "Portland Coast Guard captain relieved of command after viewing porn on computer," 10 July 2010, <http://www.thenewstribune.com/2010/07/10/1259108/portland-coast-guard-captain-relieved.html> (accessed 15 April 2011).

³⁷Navy Times, "Coast Guard Captain allegedly used cocaine," 24 August 2008, http://www.navytimes.com/news/2008/08/coastguard_cocaine_082408w/ (accessed 15 April 2011).

³⁸Sam Tyson, "USCG commander arrested on domestic violence charges," 14 July 2010, <http://www.live5news.com/story/12805517/uscg-commander-arrested-on-domestic-violence-charges?redirected=true> (accessed 28 April 2011)

³⁹Patricia Kime, "Dismissal of Haley CO made final," 19 June 2007, http://www.navytimes.com/news/2007/06/coastguard_skipper_fired_070619w/ (accessed 15 April 2011).

before the events of 11 September 2001 and the transfer of the USCG to the newly established DHS in 2003, USCG senior leaders recognized gaps in officer performance and competence when compared to expectations, and turned to chartered studies to validate or refute their concerns, identify the specific performance shortfalls and root causes, and determine a way forward. As a result of the 1996 Workforce Cultural Audit (WCA), USCG senior leaders published the USCG's *Leadership Development Program* in a Commandant Instruction (COMDTINST) to address the need for improved leader skills service wide including active duty, reserve force, auxiliary members and civilian employees.⁴⁰ In 1996, the Junior Officer Needs Assessment working group was chartered in order to research and define the baseline of the junior officer's continuum of improvement. The Leadership Development Program COMDTINST leading to the JONA charter identified and explained the USCG's approach to leadership⁴¹ specifically, the doctrine defined the USCG's Leadership Program Model touting the unique military and humanitarian character of the USCG requiring integrity and professional competence across a wide range of specialties and situations.⁴² As explained in the COMDTINST, the USCG Leadership Model is based on the organizations vision, its core values and societal influences. The organizational vision and expectations led to the development of twenty-eight core competencies which provides a framework for all individuals and units as well

⁴⁰U.S. Coast Guard, "USCG Junior Officer Needs Assessment (JONA)–Final Report," 20 August 1999, <http://www.uscg.mil/leadership/na/jona.pdf> (assessed 28 April 2011).

⁴¹U.S. Coast Guard, Commandant Instruction 5351.1, *Coast Guard Leadership Development Program* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Officer, 12 December 1997), 1.

⁴²*Ibid.*, 2.

as the organization to develop and improve. Individuals are expected to seek education and training. Unit leadership is expected to provide opportunities for improvement through Individual Development Plans (IDP), formal and informal mentoring, training and counseling. Organizationally, senior leaders are expected to put systems in place in order to continually assess and adjust, when needed, the assignments, training, policy and education systems.⁴³

The Coast Guard's Leadership Development Program




Figure 4. USCG Leader Development Model

Source: U.S. Coast Guard, Commandant Instruction 5351.1, *Coast Guard Leadership Development Program* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 12 December 1997), 3.

As is the case with the nature of doctrine, the COMDTINST outlines and defines a macro perspective of the USCG Leadership Development Program. It clearly defines

⁴³Ibid.

the purpose of the instruction, the substance of the program and expectations of all levels of Coasties whether active duty, reserve, auxiliary and civilian government employees. The twenty-one leadership competencies are identified and defined with respect to each level of the organizations (enlisted, officer, civilian).⁴⁴ The document illustrates the crosswalk to leadership tools (e.g. Successful Leader Correspondence Course, Leadership and Management School, Capstone course, Civilian Employee Orientation Program) with the appropriate grade (e.g. E5-E6, O1-O3, O7-O10, NF1-NF6).⁴⁵ While the instructions lists a total of 147 courses or programs to complete the continuum of development, only 37 were designated as applicable to O1-O10 (active and reserve), of which 24 applied to junior officers (O1-O4). Of the 24 programs listed as appropriate for O1-O4 development, nine were yet to be developed as of the December 1997 promulgation date.⁴⁶ The nine programs determined to require development included the following programs depicted in table 1.⁴⁷ Research did not produce evidence that these programs exist today.

⁴⁴Ibid., 1-1 - 1-4.

⁴⁵Ibid., 2-1 - 2-10

⁴⁶Ibid., 3-11.

⁴⁷Ibid., Enclosure 2.

Table 1. Undeveloped USCG Officer Leadership Development Tools

Programs Requiring Development	Grade Targeted
Standardized Accession Point Leadership Training	O1-O4
Ethics in the Military Correspondence Course	O3-O4
First-line Supervisor Correspondence Course (self-study w/case studies)	O2-O3
Leadership Case Study - Individual Program	O1-O3
Leadership Reaction Course (resident, hands-on)	O1-O3
Leadership Seminars	O2
Mid-grade Officer Correspondence Course	O4
Successful Leadership Correspondence Course	O3-O4
Unit leadership Program	O1-O4

Source: Created by author. Compiled from U.S. Coast Guard, Commandant Instruction 5351.1, *Coast Guard Leadership Development Program* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Officer, 12 December 1997), enclosure 2.

Having laid the foundation of expectations, competencies, and performance gaps, the Leadership Development Program Commandant Instruction, a precursor to the Junior Officer Needs Assessment (JONA) study, is discussed. The JONA work group’s task was to further the research and identify the standards and expectations the USCG applies to the development of junior officers. Using the Human Performance Technology methodology, the group identified the desired organizational outcomes, the actual current state of the organization, gaps between the two, and root causes of the gaps and, finally, solutions to close the gaps.⁴⁸

The group collected data using surveys targeting the current junior officer’s population without regard to accession source (USCG Academy, Officer Candidate School, and Direct Commission Officer Program) or current assignment (operations,

⁴⁸U.S. Coast Guard, “USCG Junior Officer Needs Assessment (JONA)–Final Report,” 20 August 1999, <http://www.uscg.mil/leadership/na/jona.pdf> (assessed 28 April 2011), 5.

administrative, afloat, and ashore) and the officers current supervisors.⁴⁹ After collecting data from various sources, including statutory requirements, DoD military services, industry leading civilian companies, official USCG references, interviews with senior USCG leaders, surveys and interviews with personnel at all levels of the organization, the working group identified the factors required in order to make their recommendations.⁵⁰

As a result of their research, the JONA team developed a list of 150 Knowledge, Skills, Attitudes and Abilities (KSAA's) they deemed necessary for junior officer success based on their research.⁵¹

These KSAA's were the benchmark the junior officer's performance would be measured against as the group began to dissect their data.⁵² As discussed, the team needed to define the current state of the KSAA's in order to compare against the desired organizational outcomes. To obtain this information, the group, again, used survey's and interviews of current first-tour junior officers and their supervisors. The group found a categorical difference between those junior officers who attended the USCGA compared to the USCG OCS graduates. As a result, they determined three demographic groups to categorize their results: CGA 0-12 months, OCS/DCO 0-12 months and all accession sources 12-14 months.⁵³ The USCG assignment policy, at the time, directed two-year

⁴⁹Ibid., 6.

⁵⁰Ibid., 5-7.

⁵¹U.S. Coast Guard, "USCG Junior Officer Needs Assessment (JONA)–Final Report," 20 August 1999, <http://www.uscg.mil/leadership/na/jona.pdf> (assessed 28 April 2011), 6 -7.

⁵²Ibid., 7.

⁵³Ibid., 9.

assignments for junior officers assigned to afloat units, two-year assignments for staff or administrative positions and three- or four-year assignments for those assigned to operations ashore positions. Additionally, the assignment policy was that all USCGA graduates be assigned to afloat positions. OCS graduates had a choice of afloat or ashore, however, there were limited OCS assignment opportunities to a shipboard position. DCO accessions were assigned positions within their specialty field (e.g. lawyers to legal positions). The various tour lengths influenced the thought process behind the 0-12 and 12-24 month study timeframes indicated in the report.

The JONA workgroup identified seven attitudinal gaps between the 0-12 month CGA graduates actual performance and the desired outcomes.⁵⁴ The OCS/DCO 0-12 month group was found to have one knowledge gap and three attitudinal gap while the 12-24 month consolidated all commissioning source group was found to have twenty seven attitudinal gaps.⁵⁵ Using a scale of one-to-five with one representing a small gap and five representing a larger gap, the group illustrated the weight of the gap. Attitudinal performance is that which implies a choice made to either do or not do a task.⁵⁶ Knowledge is being able to recall the information needed or recalling where the information needed is located.⁵⁷ Figure 5 lists the gap identified by the JONA working group. The numbers associated with each gap are not relevant to the current study. They

⁵⁴Ibid., 11.

⁵⁵Ibid.

⁵⁶Ibid., 21.

⁵⁷Ibid.

indicate the degree of gap identified and this study is only concerned with the factors identified as gaps.

CGA graduates with 0-12 Months at current unit:

7 Attitudinal Gaps were found.

Display Integrity	0.25	To Be Loyal to Command, Unit, and CG	0.37
Be Ethical	0.16	Hold Others and Self Accountable	0.35
Display a Strong Work Ethic	0.35	Have a Positive Attitude	0.50
Be a Positive Role Model	0.08		

OCS/DCO graduates with 0-12 months at current unit:

1 Knowledge and 3 Attitudinal Gaps were found.

Knowledge of COLREGS	0.03	Display Integrity	0.14
Be Ethical	0.02	Have a Positive Attitude	0.02

All Commissioning sources with 12-24 months at current unit:

27 Attitudinal Gaps were found.

Demonstrate CG Core Values	0.48	Be Adaptable	0.57
Following CG Rules and Regulations	0.36	Have Vigilance	0.80
Value Diversity	0.04	Set Goals	0.48
Use Chain of Command Appropriately	0.78	Be Self-Disciplined	0.42
Serve the Public	0.11	Persevere	0.65
Accepting Responsibility	0.33	Be Open Minded	0.51
Look Out for the Well Being of Others	0.14	Be Humble	0.06
Be Mature	0.05	Be Loyal to Command, Unit, CG	0.35
Chooses to Ask Appropriate Questions	0.67	Display a Strong Work Ethic	0.36
Being Thorough	0.57	Be a Positive Role Model	0.73
Being Approachable	0.15	Have a Positive Attitude	0.67
Accepting Feedback	0.63	Display Integrity	0.29
Value Being a member of the CG	0.43	Be Ethical	0.33
Demonstrate Initiative	0.52		

Figure 5. USCG Junior Officer Attitudinal and Knowledge Gaps Identified
Source: U.S. Coast Guard, “USCG Junior Officer Needs Assessment (JONA)–Final Report,” 20 August 1999, <http://www.uscg.mil/leadership/na/jona.pdf> (assessed 28 April 2011), 11.

After identifying shortfalls, the group used the gap analysis to identify the root causes. This analysis revealed nearly twice as many environmental root causes than attitudinal root causes.⁵⁸ With knowledge of the root causes based on their research and analysis, the JONA work group made 38 recommendations designed to close the gap. Included in the recommended solutions was continued assessment of junior officer development with yearly JONA study updates, variants of supervisor training, FLAG officer (O7-O10) involvement through guidance and direction, more robust mentoring programs, elimination of or removal of the first O1 Officer Evaluation from the member's official record and other in-house recommendations.

Nearly eight years after completion of the JONA study, in July 2007, the USCG Office of Leadership and Development (CG-133) requested a leadership gap analysis of mid-grade (O3-O4) officers with the following primary research question of whether the transition to O4 needs to be facilitated.”⁵⁹ The catalyst for the working group originated in the Commandant's Leadership Advisory Council (LAC).⁶⁰ The LAC was presented with anecdotal situations that brought to question the leadership training, education and performance of mid-grade officer.⁶¹ Although the outcome of the MOLGA study identified a concern with linking the leadership competencies to specific pay grades, like the JONA study in 1999. The MOLGA working group determined the foundation of the

⁵⁸Ibid.

⁵⁹U.S. Coast Guard, “Mid-Grade Officer Leadership Gap Analysis (MOLGA) Report,” 27 December 2007, <http://www.uscg.mil/leadership/lac/MOLGA.Pdf> (accessed 28 March 2011), 1.

⁶⁰Ibid.

⁶¹Ibid., 3.

research would remain vested in the USCG's 28 leadership competencies as defined in the USCG *Leadership Development Program*, promulgated in December 1997.⁶²

As in the previous studies conducted, the MOLGA working group used a Human Performance Technology method to determine the organizations desired outcomes, the actual performance observed as determined through surveys and interviews, a thorough review of the annual Organizational Assessment Survey (2006 in this case), and the study of other services and corporations leadership techniques, training and education programs in order to arrive at recommended solutions to close the gaps identified.

Strategic thinking, political savvy, human resource management and vision development and implementation were the four most widely viewed shortfalls.⁶³ Seventy-percent of all respondents indicated they are not proficient in understanding the civilian personnel system.⁶⁴ Additionally, the working group identified barriers to leader development including topics such as keeping abreast of national and international policies and economic, military and social trends.⁶⁵ Further significant shortfalls identified included the proficiency in recognizing the political impact of various courses of action, assessing staff needs based on organizational goals, and using technology to

⁶²Ibid., 2.

⁶³Ibid., 2.

⁶⁴Ibid., G-1.

⁶⁵Ibid., 13.

enhance decision making.⁶⁶ Another area of concern documented in the MOLGA study is characterized as comprehending the political realities that impact the USCG and DHS.⁶⁷

The MOLGA study offered the respondents an opportunity to make recommendations regarding solutions. Some of the recommendations included providing officers more officer training similar to what the USA offers in the USA Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, and a seminar or performance based qualification with learning objectives focused on understanding big picture political and strategic methodologies.⁶⁸ Some also recommend O2s-O4s professional development include the bigger picture of political, fiscal, and regulatory constraints on the USCG as a whole.⁶⁹

As the USCG leadership continued to study its internal organization, DHS was now over two years old. In 2006, Admiral Thad Allen, USCG Commandant, chartered the USCG and Homeland Security Professional Education and Training (HS-PROFET) working group in order to assess existing homeland security professional education and training, to identify shortcomings and opportunities to make better use of existing programs and to make proposals for both immediate and long term improvements within the CGs education and training programs.⁷⁰ This study focuses on the Homeland Security mission as it pertains to the USCG. As with many USCG programs and studies, this study

⁶⁶Ibid., G-2.

⁶⁷Ibid., 13.

⁶⁸Ibid., E1-E3.

⁶⁹Ibid., E1-E2.

⁷⁰U.S. Coast Guard, “Report on the Coast Guard and Homeland Security Professional Education and Training (HS-PROFET)” (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 12 September 2006).

focuses on technical expertise of one mission (HS) instead of taking a broader view to include a systemic training and education method for all areas of expertise across all mission sets.

The HS PROFET working group's problem statement resulted in the identification of four elements for the USCG to focus improvements: first, existing Homeland Security training and professional education programs were not methodical institutionalized programs; second, officers were uneducated in USCG and DHS organization and functions; third, poor analytical, planning and organizational skills pertaining to homeland security; and, fourth, modifications to existing programs should be broad and include interagency, intra-governmental or joint, private sector and academic homeland security education.⁷¹ Having conducted interviews with senior USCG leaders and researching similar data from other agencies and departments, the working group determined that the USCG should be the lead agency within DHS to develop a Homeland Security Professional Development (HS PD) program in order to further develop a HS career path within the CG and DHS.⁷²

The HS PROFET working group's report also discussed the programs external to the USCG related to the Homeland Security specialty. The U.S. Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) was highlighted as having developed the nation's first Homeland Security/Homeland Defense (HS/HD) post graduate program.⁷³ This program is funded

⁷¹Ibid.

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³Ibid.

by grants and has been operating since 2006 with most graduates coming from non-Coast Guard agencies according to the report.⁷⁴

Following a discussion of the gaps at each level of the USCG training and education, officer and enlisted, as it pertains to Homeland Security, the working group made seven general recommendations and several pay-grade specific recommendations that would benefit the USCG's professional development within the Homeland Security specialty. These recommendations consisted of both short term and long term solutions. In general terms, the working group recommended a robust system of requirements including web-based and residence courses, interagency fellows programs and doctrinal changes requiring certain certifications or qualifications prior to promotion. Of particular interest is the recommendation to establish a USCG Command and Staff College.⁷⁵ At the heart of the training, education and doctrinal changes, the working group recommended several core competencies directly associated with Homeland Security strategic, operational and tactical functions to include risk assessment, risk mitigation and consequence management.⁷⁶

Further confirmation of concerns with leader development gaps within the USCG officer corps is evident in the strategic capabilities assessment conducted by Dr. Judith Youngman, a political science professor at the USCG Academy. Dr. Youngman completed this study in 2006 regarding the USCG and impacts of change on long term strategic planning and effectiveness. Comparing the USCG transformations to those of

⁷⁴Ibid.

⁷⁵Ibid.

⁷⁶Ibid.

the US Army and Canadian Forces, the author determined four impediments that hinder the USCG from achieving optimal strategic capability.⁷⁷

The four areas Dr. Youngman discusses as areas to focus on include: leaders possess competing frameworks for understanding strategic change; stovepipe sub-cultures within the USCG and associated parochialism; lack of understanding to think dynamical especially regarding integrated policy, strategies, operational and tactical planning required within public and military organizations; and, key gaps in officer development related to systems thinking, operational planning including joint, interagency and inter-governmental processes and the social-trustee professionalism-based policy and strategic perspectives and civil-military understanding.⁷⁸

Dr. Youngman concentrated her studies on the USCG Flag Officer (O7 to O10) and Senior Executive Staff although she did interview key senior enlisted members such as the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Coast Guard. Resoundingly, senior leaders discussed the USCG as a culture that is admittedly more prone to action in the moment instead of planning for current and future operations with strategic intent. Several short term recommendations include enhance existing programs such as the Flag Conferences, and one-week long familiarization for O4s and O5s serving in their first USCG Headquarters staff assignment.

At the department level, the DHS Professional Core Competencies Study was chartered. The purpose of the DHS Professional Core competencies Study was to

⁷⁷Judith Youngman, *Preparing for Tomorrow's Missions: An Assessment of Strategic Capability in the United States Coast Guard* (New London, CT: Government Printing Officer, 2006).

⁷⁸Ibid.

determine the professional core competencies required by all DHS leaders and Supervisors.⁷⁹ This research and analysis team consisted of five members of the Homeland Security Institute research staff. Four of these members have accumulated more than 127 combined years of service in various capacities within the federal government and military and all of the team members hold Master's Degrees in their specialty area. Central to the theme of this study is determination of core competencies for those working within the Homeland Security realm in order to codify a common culture with a shared vision, shared values and traditions.⁸⁰

The HSI completed a comprehensive report that clearly announced two significant limitations to the scope of the research and focus. First, the study did not include junior or non-supervisory positions or positions that are referred to as non-career Senior Executive Service (SES) positions.⁸¹ Second, this study does not identify gaps between core competencies and training, education and professional development (TEPD) programs.⁸² The justification for the limitations involved was directly related to the interpretation of the charter. Their mission was to identify the core competencies of professionals within the Department of Homeland Security. Not all employees are finance or intelligence specialists, therefore, it was determined that the competencies required for finance and

⁷⁹Homeland Security Institute, "The Department of Homeland Security Professional Core Competencies White Paper" (Arlington, VA: Homeland Security Institute, 2007).

⁸⁰Ibid., 5.

⁸¹Ibid., 6.

⁸²Ibid., 6.

intelligence, for example, were not broad enough to be specifically oriented to the profession of homeland security.

The team compartmentalized the organizational core competencies into three tiers: core competencies that all federal employees must satisfy in accordance with Office of Personnel Management (OPM) position descriptions, core competencies career employees must have to satisfy DHS job requirements, and all other HLS competencies that aren't tier one or tier two.⁸³ In order to define these tiers in-depth, the researchers used current OPM competency doctrine for SES employees. Tier two competencies were also found in OPM documents already in place across the federal government. Tier two is where specific departmental competencies were required. For example, the Department of Agriculture has a role in protecting our homeland. However, the Department of Agriculture has different core competencies than the Department of Homeland Security.

Finally, tier three core competencies, the most elusive to define, were competencies that did not fit into tier one or tier two. Upon review of all DHS related competencies, “the determination to include or not include a competency was based on research relevant executive and Department strategic guidance and policy documents that have a direct impact on the roles and responsibilities of all DHS directorates and components.”⁸⁴ Additionally, each core competency identified had to meet a “knowledge, skill, ability” test. Because the researchers used interviews and surveys to identify the tier three competencies, much of the data was based on personal experience and current

⁸³Ibid., 6-7.

⁸⁴Ibid., 9.

knowledge and not on doctrine or policy.⁸⁵ In order to ensure the information was appropriately categorized and weighted, each was classified into one of five areas: Official Materials, DHS Organization and Outside Stakeholders, Other Homeland Security Knowledge Requirements, Homeland Security Methodologies and Leadership and Management.⁸⁶

Based on their research, the HSI team concluded their report with six recommendations. These recommendations were developed with the thought that all federal departments and agencies required some homeland security expertise. With that in mind, the recommendations included: a DHS-wide training, education and professional development (TEPD) availability database, create objective personnel performance standards, define a mission and vision for a Homeland Security University, establish quality homeland security learning partnerships with public and private institutions, develop and refine DHS orientation and intern programs in order to develop the next DHS career professionals, and develop a learning and professional development continuum within DHS.⁸⁷ Lastly, the team included recommended Tier 1 through Tier 3 core competencies for the HLS professional, which was defined as a career SES employee of the DHS.

⁸⁵Ibid., 10.

⁸⁶Ibid., 10-13.

⁸⁷Ibid., 14-15.

USCG Strategic Planning Process

In addition to the internal USCG professional development and leader gap studies, the USCG also engaged in formal and comprehensive strategic planning exercises and projects. In 1998, the USCG contracted the Futures Strategy Group as consultants for the first iteration of long term strategic planning named Long View Exercise.⁸⁸ The Futures Strategy Group developed a series of sixteen scenarios to describe potential future status of the world. Of the sixteen scenarios, the USCG senior leaders chose five to further develop. The goal of the exercise was to identify challenges and opportunities as the world factors changed. While the USCG has a long tradition of being prepared to respond in the face of all threats and all hazards, the Long View Exercise was the USCG's method of anticipating potential future threats through a range of potential world environments.⁸⁹

The events of 11 September 2001 validated the USCG's need to develop long term strategies designed to respond to emerging threats. As a result, a review of Long View in 2002, Evergreen 2003 and Evergreen 2007 projects were sanctioned by USCG senior leaders. Of significant importance is the outcome of the Long View Review Project in 2002 that clearly questioned why the USCG had not followed through on the strategies developed in the Long View project. After the Long View review, Evergreen 2003 was sponsored in order to take a second look at the scenarios developed, gain a better understanding of the world structure in 2003 and look strategically at potential

⁸⁸U.S. Coast Guard, *Creating and Sustaining Strategic Intent in the Coast Guard* version 1.0 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 2005), 3.

⁸⁹*Ibid.*, 1.

future challenges. By doing so the USCG would be better positioned to respond with appropriate resources and capabilities. After Evergreen 2003 and the USCG's transfer to the DHS, Project Horizon brought fifteen government agencies to the table with hopes of fostering cooperation amongst the federal agencies.⁹⁰ Finally, Evergreen 2007, aimed at instilling strategic intent throughout the Service, again revisited the scenario based strategies.⁹¹ Since the first scenario based strategic development sessions of Long View in 1998, over 400 USCG officers, enlisted, civilian, auxiliary and contractors have participated in the exercises.⁹² The most recent Evergreen Exercise resulted in thirteen core strategies for consideration by the USCG Senior Leaders.

One of the outcomes of over ten years of scenario-based strategic development is the deliberate focus on strategic intent within the USCG. Five reinforcing principles were identified as critical to ensuring a culture of thinking with strategic intent summed up as the Service knows where it is going as well as where it has been.⁹³ The genesis of strategic thinking in the USCG may not have completely begun with Long View, but certainly it is undeniable that the cycle of the Evergreen Projects to include Long View was a catalyst in a new way of USCG thinking and should be implemented within the USCG training and professional development framework.

⁹⁰U.S. Coast Guard, *Creating and Sustaining Strategic Intent in the U.S. Coast Guard*, version 2.0 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Officer, July 2008), 11.

⁹¹Ibid.

⁹²Ibid., 1.

⁹³Ibid., 27.

The most recent Evergreen Project, the Evergreen II report, contained several recommendations pertaining to implementation and embedding strategic intent within the USCG at all levels of the organization. Among the recommendations, similar to the previously cited studies, the working group validated the need within the USCG to develop strategic thinking, leadership among national assets and a culture of jointness. Differing from the previous studies, the Evergreen Projects did not focus solely on the mid-grade officer's development. While the O3s and O4s are a part of the implementation, the idea with Evergreen recommendations is underpinned by a change in culture throughout the USCG active duty and reserve officers, enlisted, auxiliary and civilian to include contract workers.

The USCG and Joint Professional Military Education—An Issue Paper

In November 2009, U.S. Coast Guard Office of Strategic Analysis (CG-0951) submitted an issue paper entitled, “Joint Professional Military Education (JPME).” This paper discusses the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 requiring JPME and U.S. Code Title 10-Armed Forces; Subtitle A-General Military Law, Part I. Together, the Goldwater-Nichols Act and Title 10 require a JPME for officers in the armed forces with “armed forces” meaning “Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and Coast Guard.”⁹⁴ Despite this definition, the author redirects the definition as it pertains to the JPME requirement due to language in U.S. Code Title 10-Armed Forces; Subtitle A-General Military Law, Part II which discusses the requirements of managing officers specifically trained in joint

⁹⁴U.S. Coast Guard, *Joint Professional Military Education (JPME)* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Officer, 2009).

matters.⁹⁵ The USCG is not included as this article specifically addresses the Secretary of Defense and Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps officers.⁹⁶ This Issue Paper seems to be in response to a direction to determine whether USCG officers attending Senior Service Schools must first complete the Title 10 required JPME, Phase 1. The author clearly analyzed this issue in-depth and concluded that Title 10 specifically left the USCG out of the requirement to attend the JPME courses and designate certain officers with a joint specialty. The USCG leadership then determined that it is not in the USCGs best interest to require the JPME, Phase I training for those selected to attend Senior Service School. There are several reasons listed. Among them are the lack of resources to send numerous officers to the Phase I training (currently the USCG has nine quotas per year).⁹⁷

USCG Officer Education and Training Program

Having discussed the completed studies, applicability of JPME and the strategic planning projects, this paper continues with a discussion of the current USCG officer education and training regiment. The USCG Training and Education Program is codified in the *USCG Training and Education Manual*, COMDTINST M1500.1C.⁹⁸ Tables 2 and 3 denote the available advanced education courses to mid-grade officers. Table 4 lists internal professional development opportunities as well but these programs do not

⁹⁵Ibid.

⁹⁶Ibid.

⁹⁷Ibid.

⁹⁸U.S. Coast Guard, COMDTINST M1500.10C, *U.S. Coast Guard Training and Education Manual* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 2009).

necessarily yield a degree upon completion. In addition to the formal advanced education opportunities, the *Training and Education Manual* consists mainly of information pertaining to enlisted specialty schools, internal leadership development opportunities and the mechanics of oversight of the USCG training and education program.

Table 2. Available USCG Officer Advanced Education Courses

Advanced Education Program (Only Officer listed)	
Academy Instructor	International Affairs
Acquisition Project Management	Law - Juris Doctor
Arenautical Engineering - Avionics	Law - Master of Laws
Arenautical Engineering - Industrial Administration	Marine Engineering
Arenautical Engineering - Structures	Naval Engineering
Aviation Safety Management	Ocean Engineering
Chemical Engineering	Oceanography
Civil Engineering	Operations Research
Civil Engineering/Business Administration (MBA)	Organizational Leadership
Communications, Computer, and Electrical Engineering	Performance Technology
Environmental Health	Personnel Administration
Environmental Management	Public Administration
Financial Management	Public Administration and Management
Fire Protection Engineering	Public Affairs
Health Care Administration	Reserve Program Administrator
Industrial Hygiene	Strategic Intelligence
Industrial Management	System Design and Management
Information Technology	Transportation Management

Source: U.S. Coast Guard, COMDTINST M1500.10C, *U.S. Coast Guard Training and Education Manual* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 2009), 10-7 through 10-9.

Table 3. Available DoD Intermediate Education, War College and Fellows Programs

Intermediate School (IMS)
U.S. Army Command and General Staff
U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff
U.S. Naval War College (Command and Staff)
Senior Service School (SSS)
Air War College
Army War College
Brookings Institute Federal Executive Fellowship
Center for Strategic Intelligence Research fellowship
Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group
Harvard National Security Fellows
Industrial College of the Armed Forces
Industrial College of the Armed Forces - Acquisitions
Joint Military Attache School
Marine Corps War College
National Security Agency/Central Security Service Director's Fellowship
National War College
Rand Military Fellowship
Sloan Fellows Program

Source: U.S. Coast Guard, COMDTINST M1500.10C, *U.S. Coast Guard Training and Education Manual* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 2009), 10-17.

Table 4. Available USCG Officer Professional Development Courses

Grade Eligible (only officer grades listed)	Course
O3 - O4	AILA International Fellow Program
O3 (Sel) - O4	DOD Executive Leadership Development Program
O3 - O4	Executive Leadership Program
O4-O5	Executive Potential Program
O3-O4	Foreign Service Institute
O2-O4	Collaborative Leadership Seminar
O4-O6	Management Development Seminar
O4-O5	Management Development Seminar
O2-O4	Supervisory Development Seminar
O4-O6	Homeland Security Master's Degree (distance learning)
O3 and above	Naval War College - non-resident program
All officers (typically O2-O4)	Officer Advanced Education in Organizational Leadership
All supervisors & managers	DHS Supervisory Leadership Training
All	E-learning courses (Skillsoft)

Source: U.S. Coast Guard, "Leadership and Professional Development Training," <http://www.uscg.mil/leadership/courses/military.asp> (accessed 19 February 2011).

One of the best examples of organizational initiative demonstrating USCG senior leaders commitment to maintaining the public trust using education as a vehicle to maintain competence is the 2008 implementation of required professional certifications in the acquisitions programs.⁹⁹ This requirement to obtain a certain level of education may be unprecedented in the USCG. Even the longest standing field, that of the ship captain does not require a Master's License to demonstrate competence. This newly established engineer requirement could be a catalyst to requiring other civilian recognized certifications or licenses in fields that cross significantly into civilian sector professional organizations. Still, the USCG engineers are bound by their oath of office to uphold the USCG core values and live the Guardian Ethos. This is what sets these engineers apart from their civilian counterparts.

USCG Officer Evaluation, Assignment and Promotion Systems

Given the identified gaps in USCG officer performance and the current education and training program, this section will discuss the USCG Officer Evaluation, Assignment and Promotion Systems to determine potential linkage to measuring and monitoring performance. Analysis of the Officer Evaluation System (OES) in chapter 4 will demonstrate linkages to the desired and actual performance of mid-level officer to the studies conducted that identified gaps in officer professional development. The documents will demonstrate that the evaluation system is based on the officer's performance in support of his or her primary and collateral duties during the reporting

⁹⁹U.S. Coast Guard, ALCOAST 468/08, Professional Education and Certification Requirements for Active Duty Coast Guard Engineers.

period. Several performance dimensions address the evaluatee's political savvy and USCG organizational goals.

When considering the officer evaluation system, as well as the assignment and promotion system, it is crucial to capture the performance standards within the evaluation report. A comparison between the USA and USCG officer evaluation forms will illustrate that the evaluation form by itself is not the concern. Chapter 4 will provide a detailed analysis of officer evaluation forms, officer assignment guides, promotion process documents.

USCG Graduate School

USCG officers recognize that with the large degree of change internally and externally, gaps exist. Since 2003, the establishment of the DHS and the USCG's transfer to the Department, discussions with the Coast Guard officer corps has elicited the idea of a Coast Guard Graduate School. Two striking examples validating the need and desire of a USCG Graduate School are *The Coast Guard Needs Its Own Grad School* written by USCG Captain Francis J. Strom in 2006 and *Why We Need a Homeland Security University* written by Mr. Michael Doyle, a prior Marine Corps officer and USCG Lieutenant Commander Greg Stump in 2003.

In *The Coast Guard Needs Its Own Grad School*, Captain Sturm immediately directs the reader to the fact that the USCG needs to focus on preparing junior officers for the responsibilities they will take on as senior leaders. The author further discusses the growth of the workforce, the increased mission areas and antiquated personnel systems that reinforce assignment and evaluation policies as impediments to breaking down

stovepipes and creating an atmosphere not only open to strategic and critical thinking but demands it.

There is some collaboration among USCG officers but, as Captain Sturm points out, these opportunities are generally found at Commanding Officer conferences at the District level. These conferences encourage vertical and horizontal information sharing but are not events cultivating the next generation of USCG leaders. Community driven conferences are another opportunity to collaborate with peers. The Afloat or Cutter Community, the Aviators or the Sector Conferences all have merit for existence. But, again, these conferences are also designed for information sharing.

Captain Sturm argues that a USCG staff college would assist mid-grade officers to better understand how the USCG works internally but also how the USCG fits into the national systems. Specifically, Captain Sturm advocates for a leader philosophy that understands the military domain, corporate environment and non-governmental organizations that the USCG is required to work within on a daily basis. A USCG staff college should not only be a college but also a strategic research and development center. While the USCG Research and Development Center in Connecticut provides the study of hardware and equipment advances, Captain Sturm is a strong advocate for a strategic development center that would consider the many advances and changes in the maritime environment.

Finally, Captain Sturm discussed the ongoing arguments in favor of Homeland Security University. However, Sturm warns that the USCG officer corps should first understand its own internal range of missions and the intricacies of various programs before embarking on a more complex multi-agency departmental or joint education.

While Captain Sturm's article focused on how the USCG can better prepare the officer corps for senior leader roles, Mr. Doyle and LCDR Stump focus on the unification of twenty-two disparate agencies, missions and policies yet totaling 170,000 employees and a \$37 billion annual budget. The USCG Fiscal Year 2012 (FY12) budget request is \$10.7 billion.

U.S. Army Officer Education System

Reviewing the USAs officer professional military education program provides a strong example of the benefits of an institutionalized officer professional military development program. The USA has studied its officer professional development needs and resolutions many times throughout history. One of the most notable studies is the 1983 evaluation of the mid-career training and education needs of the USA officer corps. Colonel Huba Wass de Czege led the study designed to identify gaps between the performance expectations of mid-grade Army officers and their training and education. While the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College was in operation at the time of Colonel Wass de Czege's study, senior leadership recognized that the Army needed to self-assess current practices and curriculum in order to ensure the training was meeting the desired goals of the Army for the future.

Colonel Wass de Czege's report is a comprehensive study of the army officer corps formal education system. This detailed report relied upon previous U.S Army studies, recent doctrinal changes, foreign army staff college studies, and anecdotal comments from senior Army officers. They were able to use the reports to identify, to define, and to provide recommended solutions to the gaps in the training and education of

mid-level officers.¹⁰⁰ Colonel Wass De Czege identified the following as specific factors causing the identified gaps: increased operations tempo combined with required high state of readiness, operations increasing in range, scope, complexity requiring increased coordination, better and quicker decision making, increasingly complex tools such as weapons systems and hardware required more knowledgeable officers to ensure efficiency of the systems and tools, less resources required officers to do more with less while maintaining quality leadership in planning, training, fighting and sustaining, and rapidly changing technologies both of our own service and the enemy required more education in theory and principles.¹⁰¹ Throughout his report, Colonel Wass de Czege clearly illustrated that if society continued to demand more of our military, with less resources and a more complex landscape, it was critical to provide a commensurate amount of training and education to those leading our soldiers into battle.¹⁰²

Since the Command and General Staff College already existed, the Staff College Training Study concentrated on how to improve the course. The discussion included the three tiered approach to an Army Officer's professional education in terms of what the graduate should be, should know, and should do.

The first tier was the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3). According to Colonel Wass de Czege, the CAS3 graduate should be a motivated team player serving on a battalion brigade, division or installation staff with an understanding

¹⁰⁰Huba Wass de Czege, "Final Report: Army Staff College Level Training Study" (Report, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA 1983), 1-2.

¹⁰¹Ibid., 2-3.

¹⁰²Ibid., 3.

of the Army missions, his primary branch, and familiarity with other branches and can-do approach practical everyday problems logically.¹⁰³

The second tier is the Combined and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) graduate who should be a committed team player on a battalion, brigade, division, and corps staff but would be most effective on a division staff due to his analytical skills and logic.¹⁰⁴ The CGSOC graduate is more capable and experienced than the CAS3 graduate and should be able to handle more difficult problems, understand the way the Army operates and is an expert on combined arms doctrine and how to apply it.¹⁰⁵ Additionally, this officer can easily adapt to and serve on a joint or combined staff having studied in these areas from a division or corps perspective.

The third tier is the Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP). A graduate of the AMSP is first a highly selected member with a great deal of potential.¹⁰⁶ Specifically, this officer is a career minded officer whose attributes of knowledge, adaptability and flexibility make him or her suited for higher level operational staffs where creative flexibility for solving complex new problems and problems with change can be addressed.¹⁰⁷

While the U.S. Army had CAS3 and CGSOC several years prior to this report, the AMSP program was in its pilot year. Colonel Wass de Czege's recommendations clearly

¹⁰³Ibid., 42.

¹⁰⁴Ibid., 43.

¹⁰⁵Ibid.

¹⁰⁶Ibid., 44.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., 44-45.

conveyed concerns with the duration, focus, and substance of the education as well as how instructors were selected and regarded by the Army senior leaders. Stating many contributing factors in addition to the root causes of the gaps provided a full understanding of the importance of the study. Not the least of which was the changing and complex environment. In 1983, during the Cold War, Colonel Wass de Czege was already discussing the need to have an Army run by leaders who can do more with less, under high risk conditions, and in less time, given a very wide ranging set of possible missions.¹⁰⁸ He discussed technological advances, leadership with a common education and understanding of the political environment and cultural perspectives as areas requiring more knowledge on the part of the Army officer corps.¹⁰⁹ To emphasize his points, he compared the U.S. to Israel, Canada, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. Respectively, they held courses of 55 weeks, 65 weeks, 100 weeks and 150 weeks of respectively in order to educate their officers. The U.S., in 1983, held the five-week CAS3 and 40 week CGSOC course totaling 45 weeks of formal professional education.¹¹⁰

In 2005, Major Matthew McKinley produced a monograph examining the USA Officer Education System as part of the overall USA Education System.¹¹¹ Major McKinley's primary focus was the link between the Army's system and adult education.

¹⁰⁸Ibid., 18.

¹⁰⁹Ibid.

¹¹⁰Ibid., 16-17.

¹¹¹Matthew McKinley, "An Assessment of the Army Officer Education System from an Adult Learning Perspective" (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, 2005), iii.

He explains the USA OES system including the Officer Basic Course, Captain Career Course, and Intermediate Level Education. Major McKinley's initiatives serve as an example of the perpetual interest in improving the USAs OES. His study is relevant to the study of the USCG as it links directly to the benefits of a continuum of learning.

Another study was completed in 2010 by Colonel C. Thomas Climer while he was attending the U.S. Army War College. Colonel Climer focused on the professionalism of the U.S. Army Officer Corps. Specifically, Colonel Climer draws from theorists such as Samuel Huntington and Andrew Abbott to present and define officership as a profession.¹¹² After establishing this foundation, Colonel Climer expands his discussion to areas of concern regarding contracting in three critical areas of military education and doctrine that he views as critical to the profession.

Further solidifying the USAs strong desire to evaluate and improve current education programs, in 2009, the USA CGSC conducted a survey of ILE graduates who completed the course of instruction between 2006 and 2009. This study will review the content of the survey and its results. The USA CGSC ILE Graduate Survey Report stated that the purpose of the survey was to determine the usefulness of the ILE curriculum and, also, as a benchmark for future studies. The results of the study will be examined in chapter 4 of this report.¹¹³

¹¹²C. Thomas Climer, "Maintaining the Profession of the U.S. Army Officer Corps" (Strategy Research Paper, U.S. Army War College, 2010), 2-6.

¹¹³U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, "US Army Command and General Staff College Intermediate Level Education Graduate Survey Report, March 2009" (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Government Printing Office, 2009), iii.

Demonstrating a continuous cycle of a desire for improvement, the USA recently embarked on a new and broad campaign to study the profession of arms.¹¹⁴ This study is focused on the USA's ethic as it pertains to the management of war and the profession of arms.¹¹⁵ It is in its early stages having been announced to the USA at large in March 2011.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁴U.S. Army, Profession of Arms Campaign, <http://cape.army.mil/ProfessionOfArms.html> (accessed 23 April 2011).

¹¹⁵Ibid.

¹¹⁶Ibid.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

Purpose

The purpose of this study was to provide evidence that the USCG would benefit from an institutionalized officer professional military education program. The research undertaken was exploratory in nature. Using the primary and secondary research questions as guides, various viewpoints and perspectives were studied to identify factors relevant to the problem statement, to develop recommendations, and to recommend future research. The method used to obtain and analyze the information was categorized into four parts.

First, profession and military profession are defined. Next, having determined the factors that make up a profession, USCG officer corps performance was measured against those factors. After defining the profession and determining the status of the USCG officer corps professional military education system, a comparison was made to the USA officer education program. That program was explored in order to determine if the USA officer education system, in part or in whole, could be used as a benchmark to develop a more robust USCG officer professional military education system. Finally, justified recommendations to improve the existing structure were developed.

Answering the primary research questions, how would the USCG benefit from an institutionalized officer professional development program? lead to a thorough examination of existing literature and provide evidence to support findings. Secondary research questions include: what is the profession of the USCG Officer? What is the current USCG officer professional military education regiment? How does the current

USCG officer military professional education influence assignments and promotions?
What improvements can be made to the USCG military professional education program
in order to improve USCG officer performance? Comparatively, how has the USA
addressed officer professional military education? Chapters 1 and 2 provided required
background information, relevancy and various perspectives pertaining to the study.

Chapter 1 provided an overview of the history of the USCG and the USCG
Education and Training programs. Chapter 2 provided evidence of the USCGs leader
framework and training program. While this study does not review the enlisted programs,
it is clear that the requirements to primarily meet enlisted specialty competencies such as
law enforcement specialist, pollution responder and aviation mechanic are more prevalent
than officer programs.¹¹⁷ Further, the USCG has a robust advanced education program
with more than fifty advanced education opportunities for officers.¹¹⁸ However, the
research shows that the USCG has not established a program designed to develop mid-
level officers as staff officers who study and understand national strategies such as
National Defense Strategy, National Homeland Security Strategy, or the fiscal strategies
that transcend the disparate cabinet level government agencies and departments and their
relationship to the USCG. This study considered the framework of the USA's Officer
Military Professional Development Programs as the status of USCG Officer Military
Professional Development Programs was reviewed. There was no need to review every
USA Officer Education program. The mere fact that USA Officer Professional Military

¹¹⁷U.S. Coast Guard, COMDTINST M1500.10C, *U.S. Coast Guard Training and Education Manual* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 2009).

¹¹⁸*Ibid.*

Education program exists, why it exists and how the USA benefits from the program is relevant to this study.

Research Organization

The USCG has a long tradition of service as both a law enforcement agency and a military service. Defining the profession of the USCG is critical to the success of the organization and its officer corps. As the organization continues to change to address emerging threats including the war on terror and major natural disaster, the officer corps is responsible for ensuring the USCG is organized, equipped and trained to effectively execute missions independently, in a joint, interagency and international environment, with other federal, state and local government, non-government agencies and international partners. This analysis included in-depth research into how a professional military is defined primarily from the perspective of three expert theorists as well as past and present recognized USN and USCG leaders.

Once a viable definition of the USCG concept of the professional military was defined, the research revealed how the USCG achieves results in leader development using its current USCG officer education practices. Relying primarily on recent internal USCG studies, surveys, and organizational doctrine, a strong understanding of USCG officer performance gaps became apparent. In addition to the performance gaps, this study produced sound recommendations applicable to future USCG officer professional development. Finally, a review of USA doctrine contributed to a comparison between how the USA has prioritized and codified their profession through continuous study. The conclusion provides a selection of realistic recommendations for implementation into the USCG's formal officer training and education programs.

Information Collection

In order to provide topic into context, the research started with defining the profession. First, understanding whether the USCG is a military profession. This portion of the research led to the development of rationale supporting why the USCG is a military profession. Although, some officer positions and responsibilities, such as marine inspector, may appear to have a greater linkage to private sector professions, this study will illustrate that all USCG officers are a member of a military profession. While, their secondary specialty connects them to another professional entity, USCG officers are commissioned to serve the nation (regulate, protect, enforce) first, and, as a specialist second. Clear understanding of the foundation of the USCG's military profession is essential. Once understood, all other factors build upon that foundation in order to develop protocols, systems and relationships that will maintain the profession as an expert body.

To assist in identifying the factors that will help maintain the USCG profession, the current USCG officer education system was studied to determine where and why officer performance gaps exist. Documents to support this research were open source available through the USCG internet and intranet web sites. USCG Commandant Instructions were used to demonstrate the foundation of the current training programs. Contrasting and comparing these documents against the internal USCG studies will illustrate that the officer performance gaps are directly connected to doctrinal gaps such as the lack of tangible connections between an officer's level of education and his assignment and promotion potential.

Several internal USCG policy and general guidance documents and presentations were examined in order to provide a window into the current systems and protocols. These documents include the *Officer Career Management Guide*, *Commandant's Direction to Promotion Panels*, *Commandant's Guidance to the Commander Assignment Panel and Captain Assignment Panel*, the *USCG Register of Officers*, the *USCG Training and Education Manual*, the *USCG Officer Career Guide and Sector Assignment Guide*, an issue paper regarding joint military education, the Officer Candidate School *Spindrift*, *USCGA Running Lights*, the USCG and US Army Officer Evaluation forms.

Limitations of Research

This study is not nearly adequate to discuss all of the elements of establishing an institutionalized USCG officer professional military education program. Given the limited duration of this master's course, this study is strictly limited to the benefits of establishing an officer professional development education program similar to the USA's approach. This study does not discuss or recommend the funding or logistics of implementing such a program. The fiscal requirements, staffing, curriculum development, duration, location and timing in an officer's career are all critical elements of a professional development program. Further, the USCG's newly implemented officer competency codes are not discussed within this study. These factors could be subject of follow-on research and strategic planning instead of conducting another study to identify performance gaps and recommendations to take corrective action.

This chapter provided a description of this study's research methodology. Chapter 4 provides an analysis of the information culled from the literature review. Chapter 5 concludes this study with a summary of the study, recommendations pertaining to

improving the USCG's officer professional military development system and recommendations for further research.

CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH ANALYSIS

What makes the Coast Guard unique is that in executing our diverse missions. We harmonize seemingly contradictory mandates. We are charged at once to be police officers, sailors, warriors, humanitarians, regulators, stewards of the environment, diplomats, and guardians of the coast. Thus, we are military, multi-mission, and maritime.

— U.S. Coast Guard, Coast Guard Publication 1

Purpose

The purpose of this study is to provide evidence that the USCG would benefit from an institutionalized officer military professional development program. As discussed in Chapter 1, the USCG has a long history of adapting and responding to emerging threats and crisis as a service to the nation. The USCG officer corps is one of the primary organizations charged with understanding, analyzing and anticipating the change in the maritime environment. More specifically, the office corps responsibility is to organize, equip and train the organizations workforce to achieve mission success. This chapter will draw conclusions from the theorists discussed in chapter 1 to define the profession of the USCG officer corps. After defining the profession of the USCG officer corps, a review of chapter 2's core and supporting documentation including several internal USCG studies such as Long View, Evergreen, JONA, MOLGA and *Preparing for Tomorrow's Missions: an Assessment of Strategic Capability in the United States Coast Guard* will demonstrate a trend in the gaps and strengths of the officer corps. This chapter will consider the similarities and differences in the studies purposes as well as the recommendations in order to validate the recommendations in chapter 5. Chapter 3

explained the research design including how information was collected and organized as well as limitations of information collection.

Again, this chapter will discuss the analysis of the information collected in order to support and provide evidence that ensure recommendations contained in chapter 5 are justifiable based on the research.

Defining the Profession

The *USCG Officer Career Guidebook* asks and answers an important question in the following statement;

What is an officer? All Coast Guard officers take the same oath every other military officer and the President of the United States has taken since George Washington. They swear to affirm: they will uphold the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and to bear true faith and allegiance to the same and to discharge well and faithfully the duties of the office to which appointed without any reservation or purpose of evasion.¹¹⁹

While it is crucial and relevant to recognize the oath of office for all commissioned officers, these statements only touch on the fundamental building block of a USCG officer. The following portion of this study will discuss how theorist's interpretations of the definition of a profession apply to the USCG officer corps.

Dr. Andrew Abbott's *The System of Professions, An Essay on the Division of Labor*, methodically considers the professions of the world, including the historical context and elements that must be met in order to be considered a profession. According to Abbott, a profession's structure and culture is recognized by society.¹²⁰ The profession

¹¹⁹U.S. Coast Guard, *The USCG Officer Career Development Guidebook*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1998), 1-3.

¹²⁰Abbott, *System of Professions*, 315.

is legitimate when it is characterized by having a specific jurisdiction or specialty that it is uniquely suited to carry out.¹²¹ Further understanding the jurisdiction is critical to the professional-client relationship. Dr. Abbott contends that merely claiming a jurisdiction does not in itself determine a profession. Rather, the profession must first be made up of professionals who have expert knowledge in completing the tasks in an ethical way ensuring that trust from the client is maintained.¹²² In order to obtain and maintain that expert knowledge and experience, the profession is typically self-forming, self-regulating and self-initiating.¹²³ The ethics and culture inculcated through the internal education and operations foster the client's trust.¹²⁴

When applying Dr. Abbott's theory to the USCG officer corps, the jurisdiction is the enforcement of federal laws and regulations in the maritime environment as both a law enforcement agency and military service. As such, the officers of the USCG swear allegiance to the United States Constitution and are dedicated to service to the people of the United States with specific focus in the maritime domain. Illustrating both the jurisdiction and the client, Admiral Thad Allen introduced the *Guardian Ethos*, Figure 4, in July 2008 in an attempt to codify the USCG profession and the professional Guardian. Further solidifying the jurisdiction is the fact that the USCG is the only federal agency

¹²¹Ibid., 315.

¹²²Ibid., 59-63.

¹²³Snider, 441.

¹²⁴Abbott, 61-68.

that is both a military service and a law enforcement agency.¹²⁵ The *Guardian Ethos*, he said, was the contract between the members of the USCG and the nation and its citizens. By briefly defining the USCG both to its members and to those it serves, Admiral Allan's quest was to use the *Guardian Ethos*, depicted in figure 6, as the vehicle to define the profession. The officer corps' responsibility is to ensure the workforce is trained, equipped and organized to effectively execute the USCG missions.

"THE GUARDIAN ETHOS"

I AM AMERICA'S MARITIME GUARDIAN.
I SERVE THE CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES.
I WILL PROTECT THEM.
I WILL DEFEND THEM.
I WILL SAVE THEM.
I AM THEIR SHIELD.
FOR THEM I AM SEMPER PARATUS.
I LIVE THE COAST GUARD CORE VALUES.
I AM A GUARDIAN.
WE ARE THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD.

Figure 6. USCG Guardian Ethos

Source: U.S. Coast Guard ALCOAST 366/08, *The Guardian Ethos*, <http://www.uscg.mil/announcements/ALCOAST/ACOAST36608.txt> (accessed 5 March 2011).

The public sector, or the USCG's client, expects a safe and secure maritime environment. Media outlets describe pollution events on navigable waterways, maritime

¹²⁵U.S. Coast Guard ALCOAST 366/08, *The Guardian Ethos*, <http://www.uscg.mil/announcements/ALCOAST/ACOAST36608.txt> (accessed 5 March 2011).

incidents such as bridge collisions, and response to mariners in distress as well as the USCG's response to these situations. Admiral Loy describes the background to several maritime incidents and the USCG response to these emergencies in his book *Character in Action*. Admiral Loy's introduction illustrates the broad responsibilities of the USCG as he lays out a visual of USCG units throughout the US wherever navigable waterways, bridges, ports, commercial maritime entities such as fishing and shipping and the people who legitimately use these conveyances or abuse and exploit them.¹²⁶ Although his written work is touted as a leadership narrative, Admiral Loy recognized the jurisdiction of the organization, the client it serves and the culture internal to the USCG. These factors serve as a basis for understanding the relationship between Abbott's definition of a profession and Loy's validation of the USCG's profession.¹²⁷ It is logical, then, to consider those who are commissioned to organize, train and equip the organization are the experts who possess a unique understanding of the USCG authorities, capabilities, and relationships with other federal, state and local organizations.

Admiral Papp's fiscal year 2012 budget testimony before congress validated the organizations servitude to the Nation as he described how the USCG's operating model served the American people. Simply stated, the USCG maintains a persistent presence in the inland, coastal and off shore maritime environment, adapts and responds to emerging threats using broad legal authorities and assets capable of demanding maritime

¹²⁶Loy, 1.

¹²⁷Ibid., 1-6.

operations.¹²⁸ The Commandant explained that the USCG saves lives, and protects the Nation's borders, maritime transportation nodes, natural resources and the environment providing the Nation a tremendous public service.¹²⁹ All of which demonstrated both the professions expert knowledge of the maritime domain and the organizations servitude.

Admiral Allan's, Admiral Loy's and Admiral Papp's comments illustrate the USCG's organizational relationship with the public sector. The organizations professional-client relationship, coupled with the military status of the Service under the control of civilian supervisors, is the very definition of a professional organization as described by Dr. Abbott.

Applying Dr. Abbott's theory to the entire organization is appropriate. However, this study is focused on the leadership of the USCG and how the professional officer ensures the profession is legitimately maintained. The foundation of all other aspects of the officer corps including accessions, assignments, promotions, discipline, education and training are administered by other officers within the organization. This structure is typical of a profession and helps to delineate the USCG officer corps as a military profession with American society as the client.

Samuel Huntington discussed the profession of the military officer in terms of not only the society that he or she serves but also the mind of the military officer and civilian

¹²⁸ Admiral Robert J. Papp, Jr., "Testimony of Admiral Robert J. Papp, Jr. Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, Coast Guard Fiscal Year 2012, Budget Request Before the House Subcommittee on the Coast Guard and Marine Transportation" (Testimony, Washington, DC, 1 March 2011), <http://www.uscg.mil/seniorleadership/SPEECHES/ADM%20Papp%20written%20testimony.pdf> (accessed 1 March 2011).

¹²⁹ Ibid.

control of the service.¹³⁰ While Huntington theorizes in detail regarding the military history of the professional military, he first defines the profession and then discusses how the military professional effectively works among the civilian politicians.¹³¹

As Huntington traced the origins of the military profession, he found there are five elements required to form the profession which manifests itself through combining expertise, responsibility and unity.¹³² These five elements include entry requirements, advancement opportunities, educational system, military staff system and competence of the officer corps.¹³³ The educational system, staff system and competence are all factors that are directly supported by a professional military education system focused on strategic thinking, political savvy, and understanding the connections between and among local, state and federal agencies. While the USCG has a robust training and education infrastructure, the studies relating to military science are limited. Huntington's concept that military officers learn from experience and, mainly, from the experience of others. Hence, the military officer studies military history in order to understand national strategies and how the organization serves the nation most effectively.¹³⁴ Figure 7 depicts the USCG Commandant's expected core competency outcomes service-wide. In order for the USCG to remain relevant, the USCG officer corps should be able to discuss, critically analyze, and identify relationships among the competencies. As such, the USCG officer

¹³⁰Huntington, 31-40.

¹³¹Ibid., 75-77.

¹³²Ibid., 8-11.

¹³³Ibid., 20.

¹³⁴Ibid., 64.

corps should study USCG history, learn from others within and outside the organization and apply critical thinking to achieve success in these areas.




Figure 7. USCG Core Competencies Impacts
Source: U.S. Coast Guard, *USCG Commandant Direction–2011* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Officer, 2011), 11.

To demonstrate how the USCG officer corps measures against Huntington theory of the professions, these five factors (accessions, advancement, education, military staff, competence) relating to the USCG officer must be examined. The next three sections will discuss the USCG officer accession, promotion, assignment, and staff systems as well as the competence of the corps.

USCG Officer Accessions

There are four USCG officer accession methods. Each accession program has its advantages and shortfalls. The USCG Academy draws cadets from across the nation to

form an elite corps of military students. Officer Candidate School provides opportunities for enlisted members and college graduates to become USCG officers. The Direct Commission program garners interested candidates from the Maritime Academy's as well as other specialty oriented professions such as law. Finally, the Reserve Officer Candidate Program provides opportunities for enlisted and civilian college graduates to join the USCG Reserve Officer Corps. The importance of understanding the genesis of the officer corps leads directly to the definition of the profession.

The USCG officer corps has a deliberate entrance process that candidates must meet or exceed to be considered for entrance into the officer corps. USCGA cadets undergo an extensive four-year educational, social, military and fitness regime before earning a commission.¹³⁵ Officer Candidate School applicants must have demonstrated superior performance as an enlisted member and a predetermined level of education for selection and complete a 16-week course prior to commissioning.¹³⁶ Direct Commission Officers must demonstrate superior academic expertise and undergo an abbreviated in order to earn a commission.¹³⁷ Each process, despite a wide variance in duration and curriculum, is a prerequisite to earning a commission.

Once commissioned, the officer is considered for promotion and assignment by other officers. Although the organization is a military organization that serves civilian supervisors, the members of the officer corps are evaluated, assigned and promoted by

¹³⁵U.S. Coast Guard, COMDTINST M1500.10C, *U.S. Coast Guard Training and Education Manual* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 2009).

¹³⁶*Ibid.*

¹³⁷*Ibid.*

senior officers. Following selection to the next higher grade by a panel of USCG officers, those officers within the controlled grades, O4 and senior, are confirmed for promotion by congress. Officers receiving their commission and promoting to O2 and O3 are approved by the DHS Secretary.

USCG Officer Promotions System

United States Code 14 Section 251 requires the Secretary of DHS to convene promotion selection boards for consideration of USCG officers to the grades of O2 (lieutenant junior grade) through O6 (captain) if there are openings at the higher subsequent grade.¹³⁸ When the Secretary convenes a board, the board consists of a minimum of five USCG officers serving in or above the grade of those subjects of the board.¹³⁹ U.S. Code further stipulates that notification of the board convening will be published and those officers being considered may communicate with the board.¹⁴⁰ The number of officers considered for promotion by the board is determined by the number of actual and projected vacancies expected over the next twelve months.¹⁴¹ Further study of 14 U.S. Code sections 251- 262 provides statutory requirements for USCG officers promotion system regarding promotion zones, defining the promotion year, promotion

¹³⁸Cornell University Law, "14 USC 251," http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/uscode14/usc_sup_01_14_10_I_20_11_30_sql_40_sq2.html (accessed 12 April 2011).

¹³⁹Cornell University Law, "14 USC 252," http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/uscode14/usc_sup_01_14_10_I_20_11_30_sql_40_sq2.html (accessed 12 April 2011).

¹⁴⁰Cornell University Law, "14 USC 253," http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/uscode14/usc_sup_01_14_10_I_20_11_30_sql_40_sq2.html (accessed 12 April 2011).

¹⁴¹Cornell University Law, "14 USC 255," http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/uscode14/usc_sup_01_14_10_I_20_11_30_sql_40_sq2.html (accessed 12 April 2011).

eligibility considerations e.g. best qualified means majority of board while fully qualified means all eligible can be selected, information furnished to the board such as the officers considered official performance record, selection board results and reports, and rules surrounding failure of selection for promotion.¹⁴² These are the statutory requirements for USCG officer promotions established by congress. The USCG internal policies establish the methods in which the USCG executes and administers the promotion board process.

The USCG Personnel Service Center is responsible, among other things, to administer USCG officer promotions.¹⁴³ The Officer Personnel Management Division is made up of Officer Boards, Promotions, and Separations Branch CG PSC (opm-1), Officer Assignments Branch CG PSC (opm-2), Officer Evaluations Branch CG PSC (opm-3), and Officer Career Management Branch (opm-4).¹⁴⁴ These four branches work together to ensure the system as a whole considers the appropriate number of officers, in the proper year group for promotion selection. In general, the (opm-1) staff is responsible for administering the board process.¹⁴⁵ This involves collaboration with all four branches within the Officer Personnel management Division as well as appropriate USCG Headquarters Directorates.

¹⁴²Cornell University Law, “14 USC 256-252,” http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/uscode14/usc_sup_01_14_10_I_20_11_30_sql_40_sq2.html (accessed 12 April 2011).

¹⁴³U.S. Coast Guard Personnel Service Center Commands and Divisions, <http://www.uscg.mil/psc/> (accessed 11 April 2011).

¹⁴⁴Ibid.

¹⁴⁵Ibid.

The statutory and policy requirements surrounding USCG officer promotions are complex and cumbersome. The background staff work required to meet the statutory and policy direction is extensive in order to ensure a fair and equitable process is completed prior to each convened board. However, there is no tangible connection between an officer's professional development and the officer's promotion eligibility. Although an officer with completed advanced education may be competitive for promotion, there is no requirement to obtain additional training or education in order to be selected for promotion to the next higher grade as an officer in the USCG.

Each year, the Commandant publishes guidance to selection boards in order to assist the board members through their review and deliberation process. *Commandant Guidance to Promotion Year 2011 Officer Selection Boards and Panels* focused the board's attention on the USCG as a vocation and not merely a job.¹⁴⁶ Admiral Papp implored the board members to consider officers for promotion who aspired for higher responsibility positions such as command and senior staff positions as well as those who sought and fulfilled positions that broadened their experience.¹⁴⁷ The boards were directed to evaluate the candidates' performance in fostering a positive work environment and how they looked out for their seniors, peers and subordinates to ensure they were well trained and remained healthy.¹⁴⁸ Further demonstrating keen insight into the needs

¹⁴⁶U.S. Coast Guard, "Commandant Guidance to PY11 Officer Selection Boards and Panels," http://www.uscg.mil/psc/opm/opm1/opm1docs/boards/PY11_Docs/PY11%20CCG%20Guidance%20to%20Boards%20and%20panels.pdf (accessed 11 April 2011).

¹⁴⁷*Ibid.*

¹⁴⁸*Ibid.*

of a professional expert officer corps, the Commandant guided the boards to consider internal and external savvy and collaboration experience and potential, those who demonstrate a strong desire to continue to develop their skills in some areas and hone their skills in other areas.¹⁴⁹ Further direction included specific skills required of O3s and O4s distinct from those expected of O5s and O6s. Clearly, the Commandant's expectation of officers selected for O5 and O6 include established expertise in speaking, writing, joint and interagency functions and both internal and external relationship building. Throughout his guidance, the Commandant urged the board members to consider all of the previously mentioned attributes through a leadership lens.

While it is clear that successful officers seek out education and training opportunities, there is no requirement to obtain advanced education. Those graduates of OCS who have not completed their bachelor's degree are encouraged but not required to do so. Those who previously earned a bachelor's degree are encouraged but not required to obtain a master's degree. One remark, in particular, relates directly to officer education and training. In his direction, the Commandant required the board members to consider officers more competitive for promotion if they had sought and obtained education through advanced education, certification programs, authorships or participation in professional organizations.¹⁵⁰ As we have seen through evaluation of Abbott's, Huntington's and Snider's works regarding a professionalism and those professionals that

¹⁴⁹U.S. Coast Guard, "Commandant Guidance to PY11 Officer Selection Boards and Panels," http://www.uscg.mil/psc/opm/opm1/opm1docs/boards/PY11_Docs/PY11%20CCG%20Guidance%20to%20Boards%20and%20panels.pdf (accessed 11 April 2011).

¹⁵⁰Ibid.

belong to it, reaching a certain level of expertise and then maintaining that expertise at a high level of efficiency is critical to professions endurance and resilience. In today's environment of increased operations whether executed in an interagency, joint or single unit mission, the USCG cannot continue to rely solely on an officer's desire for additional education as a method for educating its officers. The officer promotion process needs to link tangibly with an officers military professional development including the very topics discussed in the Commandants direction to the most recent promotion year selection panels. That is, the USCG must develop courses of instruction for officers in topics the Commandant discussed in his guidance such as the National Homeland Security Strategy, the National defense Strategy, the National Infrastructure Security Strategy and the National Intelligence Strategy in order to operate in a joint and interagency environment.

Today, the USCG officer promotion system is regulated by congressional statutes and reinforced in USCG policy. An officers documented past performance of duties in the Officer Evaluation Report is the primary tool used by board members during the selection process. In order to ensure the USCG is fully prepared to execute USCG missions in a wide variety of environments, now is the time to develop a tangible and measurable connection to the officer's education.

USCG Officer Assignment Process

The USCG Personnel Manual, Commandant Instruction Manual 1000.6A explains the distribution of officers.¹⁵¹ Although the orders issuing authority, tour length,

¹⁵¹U.S. Coast Guard, USCG Personnel Manual, COMDTINST M1000.6A (Washington, DC: Government Printing Officer, April 2010).

and considerations for assignment are delineated, the process for officers to request assignments is not discussed. Unofficial assignment guides and official USCG message traffic provide valuable information regarding career paths, qualifications, certifications, and experiences best suited for certain specialty areas and assignments. The Officer Career Development Guidebook, last updated in 1998, contains a great deal of officer career information including the promotion system, advanced education opportunities, assignment considerations, evaluations, officer status explanations and leadership principles.¹⁵² This publication, however, is considered a tool to guide officers. It clearly states it is unofficial and non-directive in nature.¹⁵³ Officers obtain the most current and relevant information regarding the assignment process, positions available and Service priorities through official message traffic released by the USCG Personnel Service Center (CG-PSC), Officer Personnel Management Division, Officer Assignment Branch (opm-2). Generally, the entering arguments for the officer assignment process includes the tour complete officer's requested positions as submitted on the e-resume and the vacancies expected by grade for the assignment year.¹⁵⁴

Additional assignment guides include those developed by the officer assignment staff such as the Sector Assignment Guide, the O5 Assignment Guide and the O6 Assignment Guide. Each of these publications is designed to assist the officer through

¹⁵²U.S. Coast Guard, *The USCG Officer Career Development Guidebook*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1998), Table of contents.

¹⁵³*Ibid.*, Introduction.

¹⁵⁴U.S. Coast Guard, ALCGOFF 147/08, Officer Assignment Year 2009 (AY09) Kickoff, <http://www.uscg.mil/announcements/ALCGOFF/ALCGOFF14708.txt> (accessed 21 April 2011).

process from crafting a realistic e-resume to understanding the various career paths.¹⁵⁵

Figures 9, 10, and 11, are visual representations of a USCG officers career path as he or she develops through a career path that includes the various potential assignments to a USCG Sector. Other sources of career path and assignment information is found in additional program specific guides such as the USCG Commandant's Director of Prevention Policy (CG-54) endorsed *Prevention Officer Career Guide*, the annual *Schedule of Active Duty Promotion List (ADPL) and Inactive Duty Promotion List (IDPL) Officer Personnel Boards and Panels*, and Assignment Officer notes found on the USCG Portal section administered by the (opm-2) staff.

All of these sources provide information pertaining to officer career paths and how assignments build upon subsequently on each other in order to develop an officer through his or her career. Unfortunately, other than competencies and certifications specific to a specialty, there are no USCG mandated education requirements directly affecting promotions. For example, a Deck Watch Officer must meet certain criteria in order to remain assignable to afloat positions. These officers must maintain expertise and knowledge of navigation and ship handling. Officers seeking an afloat command position must meet criteria as announced in the current assignment year *Schedule of Active Duty Promotion List (ADPL) and Inactive Duty Promotion List (IDPL) Officer Personnel Boards and Panels*. Figure 8 is an excerpt from the schedule detailing the requirements established by the Commandant regarding O-3 Afloat Command criteria.

¹⁵⁵U.S. Coast Guard, <http://www.uscg.mil/psc/opm/> (accessed 23 April 2011).

<p><u>O-3 Commands</u>. Panel will consider all lieutenants and lieutenants-select (not including AY 11 CWO-LT) who:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Request screening; (2) Are tour complete in 2011 or 2012 (waivers will be considered based on the needs of the Service and the strength of the candidate pool); (3) Have not previously held an O-3 afloat command; (4) Have completed at least one tour afloat for WPB or WTGB command or two tours afloat for WLM command; (5) Are not currently afloat in an O-2 position with the exception of second-tour Navy Exchange or second-tour positions on WHEC/WMSL/WIX; and (6) Have served afloat since 1 June 2004. A previous ATON (WLB/WLM/WTGB & Barge Combination) afloat tour is necessary to be considered for WLM command. A previous ATON (WLB/WLM/WTGB) or WAGB afloat tour is necessary to be considered for WTGB command.
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Figure 8. USCG Afloat Assignment Criteria for O3 Command Positions

Source: U.S. Coast Guard, Commandant Instruction 1401.5AF, *Schedule of Active Duty Promotion List (ADPL) and Inactive Duty Promotion List (IDPL) Officer Personnel Boards and Panels*, http://www.uscg.mil/psc/opm/Opm1/Opm1docs/Boards/PY11_Docs/PY11%20Schedule%20of%20Officer%20Boards%20and%20Panels.pdf (accessed 21 April 2011).

In accordance with the schedule, the officer must first request to be considered, or screened by the panel, in order to be placed in the candidate pool. Once the officer requests to be screened for afloat command, he or she must then meet the remaining criteria and earn selection for assignment from the reviewing panel. The assignment officer then assigns officers to afloat command positions from the list of officers who successfully screened. After successfully screening for command afloat, the officer submits an e-resume with his or her choice of cutter. From this point forward in the assignment process, the assignment officer works to meet USCG service-wide needs,

program needs and the officer's desires. Aviation and Sector Command Cadre positions are vetted through a similar process.




Figure 9. USCG Prevention Assignment Pyramid

Source: U.S. Coast Guard, "The Sector Officer Assignment Guide," http://www.uscg.mil/opm/opmdocs/2007_Sector_Assignment_guide_1.pdf (accessed 28 March 2011), 10.




Figure 10. USCG Response Assignment Pyramid
 Source: U.S. Coast Guard, "The Sector Officer Assignment Guide," http://www.uscg.mil/opm/opmdocs/2007_Sector_Assignment_guide_1.pdf (accessed 28 March 2011), 15.




Figure 11. USCG Logistics Assignment Pyramid
 Source: U.S. Coast Guard, "The Sector Officer Assignment Guide," http://www.uscg.mil/opm/opmdocs/2007_Sector_Assignment_guide_1.pdf (accessed 28 March 2011), 1.

Senior LTs and LCDRs are at point in their career when they will be assigned to District, Area, FORCECOM or HQ staff. Some more specialized officers will be assigned to specialized support units such as Electronics Support Command. Other will be assigned to instructor positions or management of instructor positions at training centers. Regardless of the position, the senior LT and LCDR level is now the level in the organization where understanding of the USCG integrates, collaborates, supports or partners with other local, state, federal, international, and private organizations.

The senior LT and LCDR level is also the career decision point for many officers. Those officers who desire to remain beyond their initial assignments and promotions are making somewhat of a commitment to a career. The officer career management guide has information discussing the best ways to remain assignable to desirable positions and is positions that should influence promotions. However, there are no guarantees that superior performance in any position will result in a promotion. The nature of the military service is the “up or out” methodology. There are fewer Captain’s than CDR’s, fewer CDR’s than LCDR’s, and so on.¹⁵⁶ There is no tangible correlation between a position held and promotion opportunities. It is reasonable to assume that those officers who seek high levels of responsibility and perform well in the position would be selected for promotion pending adverse entries in the personnel record.

USCG Military Staff System

The USCG staff and organization system is similar in some respects to the DoD numbered system. Albeit, the USCG is not nearly the size of any DoD service, the

¹⁵⁶14 USC—percentage and ppp from opm

general organization is similar as depicted in Figure 10. Huntington discussed the General Staff in Prussia in 1803 as the genesis for future General Staffs.¹⁵⁷ He further explained that this staff required technical expertise in the fundamental principles of military operations and planning.¹⁵⁸ The military staff, Huntington stated, uses the technical knowledge it has in order to manage violence.¹⁵⁹ The USCG missions, like the USA today, do not all pertain to the management of violence. In fact, several missions reflect a humanitarian characteristic such as Search and Rescue and Maritime Pollution Response. Nevertheless, the USCG staff's role is to manage the Service on the strategic and operational levels of executing missions.

Additionally, the staffs support the tactical units through fiscal, operational, training, and resource administration and management. One example of many is the Assistant Commandant for Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Information Technology (C4IT)/CG-6. This staff must possess a high degree of expert knowledge in order to design, develop, deploy, and maintain C4&IT solutions for the entire USCG to enable mission execution and achieve the Coast Guard's goals of maritime safety, security, and stewardship.

¹⁵⁷Huntington, 50.

¹⁵⁸Ibid.

¹⁵⁹Ibid., 25.




Figure 12. USCG Organization Chart - 2009

Source: U.S. Coast Guard, “About,” <http://www.uscg.mil/top/about/organization.asp> (accessed 23 April 2011).

The USCG Commandant’s staff is a critical component ensuring the organization is organized, capable and trained to respond to myriad national and international incidents that fall within the USCG’s jurisdiction, authorities and responsibilities. Admittedly, not all of the USCG’s mission sets are related to the management of violence. The Maritime Law Enforcement functions executed by cutters, air stations and sectors directly employ the use of force and require legitimate legally binding rules of engagement due to the potential violence that could be inflicted. The capabilities and resources these operational assets provide are the most likely allocated to Homeland Defense missions in support of or alongside DoD capabilities and assets. The staff

function is responsible for ensuring standardized doctrine, organization, equipment and training are developed, improved, and implemented Service-wide.

Figure 13, USCG Officer Career Map, depicts both promotion and assignment timeline. Education is conspicuously missing from the timeline with the exception of a reference for Senior Service School and Advanced Education deadlines sometime near selection to Captain and first tour Lieutenant Commander.¹⁶⁰ Additionally, the JONA, MOLGA and Dr. Youngman study focus is depicted using a red star. Although *The USCG Officer Career Development Guidebook* was last updated in 1998, it is reasonably accurate despite variances in the number of officers serving in each grade as stipulated by Congress, and organizational changes including transfer from the DoT to DHS in 2003.¹⁶¹

Having discussed officer accessions, promotions, the military staff and assignments, it is now time to discuss the officer competence aspect of the USCG. Competence is directly related to education, training and experience. In chapters 1 and 2, the competence of the profession was highlighted as an important ingredient in the military profession. The next section will discuss the various USCG programs and how USCG operations are impacted by the success of the current programs.

¹⁶⁰U.S. Coast Guard, *The USCG Officer Career Development Guidebook*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1998), 1-6.

¹⁶¹14 USC 42, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/uscode14/usc_sup_01_14_10_I.html (accessed 21 April 2011)




Figure 13. USCG Officer Career Map

Source: U.S. Coast Guard, *The USCG Officer Career Development Guidebook*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1998), 1-6.

USCG Officer Competence

Having discussed the accession, promotion, assignment and military staff, this section will review the competence of the USCG officer corps as the training and education programs translate into mission execution. As previously mentioned, the competence of the officer directly impacts the success of the organization. The USCG officer promotion and assignment processes are based primarily on the observed performance of the officer. Therefore, the link between the training, education and experience that influences competence, also influences success.

The internal USCG studies examined in this research were completed over a ten year period that spanned a critical time in the history of the USCG marked by change and increased optempo and transformation. These same studies demonstrate that the USCG is dedicated to its member's professional development with respect to understanding the performance gaps and the initiatives to study them. Figure 14 is a comparison of the significant gaps determined in four of the researched studies included in chapter 2. Although the JONA study studied junior officer develop specifically while the other three studied mid- to senior officers performance, there similar factors identified in the studies pertaining to all levels of the USCG officer corps. Further, the comparison illustrates the potential education opportunities at each level when considering the officer career map in figure 13. This section examines the existing USCG officer education and training system. Understanding the current system is critical to understanding potential causes for persistent gaps and recommendations to close the gap. As the education systems are discussed, it's important to consider whether these programs will assist in closing the performance gap as identified through numerous internal studies.

USCG Internal Study - Performance Gap Comparison			
JONA (O1-O2)	MOLGA (O3-O5)	Youngman (O6, Flag, SES)	HS PROFET (Department and Agency)
Coast Guard knowledge	Strategic Thinking	Stove-pipes underpin internal competing frameworks for understanding strategic change	HS professional education programs not institutionalized, methodical
General management knowledge	Vision Development & implementation		
Maritime competency knowledge	Conflict management		
Technical knowledge	Political savvy	Lack of understanding to think dynamically; integrates polices - strategic, operational, tactical planning	Officers uneducated in USCG and DHS organization and functions
Personal knowledge	External awareness		Poor analytical, planning, and organizational skills pertaining to HLS
Management skills	Financial management		Lack of understanding of interagency, inter-governmental, joint, private and academic HLS education
Personal growth skills	Effective communication		
Professional skills	Understanding civilian personnel system		
Communication skills			
Problem solving skills			Gaps in officer development particularly related to: systems thinking; operational planning; joint, interagency, and inter-governmental processes; concept of social trustee professional based on policy and strategic perspective; understanding civil-military relationship
Choose to be a professional			
Choose to build personal qualities			
Leadership abilities			
Ability to operate safely and effectively in a multi-task environment			

Figure 14. USCG Internal Study–Officer Corps Performance Gap Comparison

Source: Created by author; compiled information from chapter 2, literature review.

There are several ways a USCG officer can engage in educational programs. These methods include short term training, advanced education, senior service school and off-duty education.¹⁶² Programs are further divided into those that are resident courses and non-resident courses.¹⁶³ As discussed in chapter 2, the USCG defines education as that which focuses on skills and knowledge that are broad based and subject matter driven whereas training is defined as that which focuses on skills and knowledge that are

¹⁶²U.S. Coast Guard, *The USCG Officer Career Development Guidebook*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1998), 6-1.

¹⁶³Ibid., 6-3.

job specific and performance driven.¹⁶⁴ Short-term training is used to develop and improve specific job related skills and knowledge of the entry level position.¹⁶⁵ Advanced education and senior service school are long term programs provided to establish a high degree of technical and managerial competence at senior level. as well as prepare senior officers for executive level positions.¹⁶⁶ Still other programs available include reliance on personal initiative using the tuition assistance and other veterans benefit programs.¹⁶⁷ Still other methods, as previously discussed, are found in the internal training regiments provided by the LDC, and other TRACENs.

Table 5 illustrates the number of advanced education orders issued each year between 2007 and 2010 assignment years. Despite repeated recommendations to implement officer professional development programs, the number of advanced education opportunities has increased from 153 in AY07 to 194 in AY10. Although the increase of 41 opportunities is a positive, the total number of orders issued increased by 22 percent from 2105 to 2575. Therefore, the percentage of advanced education orders issued in AY07 was 7.2 percent of all the orders issued. In AY10, only 7.6 percent of all orders issued were for Advanced Education. One of the most glaring explanations for the limited percentage increase is that the officer corps itself grew by 5.6 percent from 6206 to 6564. Given a large increase in the number of officers transferring, due in-part to the

¹⁶⁴U.S. Coast Guard, COMDTINST M1500.10C, *U.S. Coast Guard Training and Education Manual* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 2009), 1-1.


¹⁶⁵*Ibid.*, 6-4.

¹⁶⁶U.S. Coast Guard, *The USCG Officer Career Development Guidebook*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1998), 6-4 –through 6-9

¹⁶⁷*Ibid.*, 6-10 through 6-11.

increase in officers service wide, the increase of 41 advanced education orders between AY07 and AY10 is disproportionate to the small increase in the overall strength of the officer corps. Figure 15 visually represents all advanced education orders compared with orders issued to USCG officers to attend service schools between 2007 and 2010.

Table 5. Comparison of USCG officer transfer orders



Source: Created by author using information compiled from U.S. Coast Guard, ALCGOFF 048/07 Officer Personnel Management –Assignment Year 2007 (AY07) Final Report; ALCGOFF 072/09 Officer Assignment Year 2009 (AY09) Final Report; and, ALCGOFF 064/10 Officer Assignment Year 2010 (AY10) Final Report

The total number of advanced education quotas and orders issued is much larger than the number of orders specifically issued for military service schools e.g. USA CGSC. The USCG sends seven to nine officers to the Command and Staff level courses at the Marine Corps War College, Naval War College, Joint Advanced Warfare School

and Army CGSC annually¹⁶⁸. This equates to approximately four to five percent of all advanced education orders annually. Additionally, approximately 13, or 6.5 percent of senior officers in the grades O5 and O6 considered for reassignment are ordered to Senior Service Schools annually.¹⁶⁹




Figure 15. USCG Advanced Education Quota Comparison

Source: Created by author using information compiled from U.S. Coast Guard, ALCGOFF 048/07 Officer Personnel Management–Assignment Year 2007 (AY07) Final Report; ALCGOFF 072/09 Officer Assignment Year 2009 (AY09) Final Report; and, ALCGOFF 064/10 Officer Assignment Year 2010 (AY10) Final Report.

¹⁶⁸U.S. Coast Guard, *Joint Professional Military Education (JPME)* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Officer), 4 November 2009.

¹⁶⁹Ibid.

The officer corps training and education directly impacts the level of expertise that underpins the USCG's ability to execute missions. The current structured programs, however, are not adequate to continue to operate on the strategic and operational levels. Tactically, the USCG embodies the expertise that is expected by the public it serves. Evidence of the USCG's success is demonstrated in figure 13 and 14. The USCG snapshot tells the story of the professionals that make the organization successful. These figures also allude to the complex environment that the USCG works within in order to accomplish its missions. The USCG works domestically, internationally and on the high seas. The organization's partners include the private sector, local, state, tribal, federal and international agencies. Yet, there is no officer education program that ensures the officer corps is knowledgeable in the various facets internal to the organization, or how the organization's external relationships are best maintained.

Further, a formal officer professional development program that includes familiarity with national and organizational strategy, including an understanding of fiscal policies and priorities, capabilities, assets, and personnel accessions, promotions, assignments, and education as each relates to the USCGs internal workings and how the USCG works among its partners. The USCG officer education system meets some of the requirements to ensure specialists are available to complete specific tasks such as legal and marine transportation. However, the performance gaps identified in the literature will not be resolved through the current system.

In an average day, the Coast Guard ...

- ✧ Saves 13 lives
- ✧ Responds to 64 search and rescue cases
- ✧ Rescues 77% of mariners in imminent danger
- ✧ Keeps 959 pounds of cocaine off the streets
- ✧ Saves \$260,000 in property
- ✧ Interdicts 10 undocumented migrants trying to enter the United States
- ✧ Services 49 buoys and fixes 21 discrepancies (such as buoys moved by a hurricane)
- ✧ Provides a presence in all major ports
- ✧ Screens 679 commercial vessels and 170,000 crew and passengers
- ✧ Issues 200 credentials to merchant mariners
- ✧ Inspects 70 containers
- ✧ Inspects 33 vessels for compliance with air emissions standards
- ✧ Performs 30 safety and environmental examinations of foreign vessels entering U.S. ports
- ✧ Boards 15 fishing boats to ensure compliance with fisheries laws
- ✧ Investigates 12 marine accidents
- ✧ Responds to and investigates 10 pollution incidents
- ✧ Does security boardings of 5 high interest vessels
- ✧ Escorts 4 high-value U.S. Navy vessels transiting U.S. waterways
- ✧ Identifies one individual with terrorism associations
- ✧ Has 6 patrol boats and 400 personnel:
 - Protecting Iraq's offshore oil infrastructure
 - Training Iraqi naval forces
 - Keeping sea lanes secure in the Arabian Gulf



Figure 16. USCGs Average Daily Operational Impacts

Source: U.S. Coast Guard, "About," <http://www.uscg.mil/top/about/doc/uscgsnapshot.pdf> (accessed 23 April 2011).

In 2009, the Coast Guard ...

- ✳ Performed domestic icebreaking to keep waterways open for commercial traffic
- ✳ Enabled the transport of \$2 billion worth of cargo
- ✳ Assisted 479 ice transits
- ✳ Tracked 1,200 icebergs that had drifted into transatlantic shipping lanes
- ✳ Detected 112 foreign fishing vessels illegally encroaching the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone
- ✳ Brought scientists to the Arctic to map the Arctic Ocean floor and for studies on polar bears, ocean sediment and methane gas
- ✳ Conducted cooperative patrols with China for fishery enforcement in the North Pacific

Figure 17. Summary of USCG International Impacts - 2009

Source: U.S. Coast Guard, "About," <http://www.uscg.mil/top/about/doc/uscgsnapshot.pdf> (accessed 23 April 2011).

Figures 16 and 17 illustrate the performance success of the organization.

Measuring individual officer performance, however, is executed through the Officer Evaluation System (OES). The Officer Evaluation Report (OER) is touted as the most important document in an officer's career.¹⁷⁰ The rating chain, supervisors of the officer, subjectively evaluates the officer's performance over the duration of the reporting period, and makes promotion and assignment recommendations. Appendix A and D contain the USCG (O3 and O4) and USA (all) officer evaluation templates. They are provided as ancillary documentation but are not, themselves, significant to this study.

The reason the OER is considered the most important document in an officer's career is because the OER is a record of performance used by selection boards (advanced

¹⁷⁰U.S. Coast Guard, *The USCG Officer Career Development Guidebook*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1998), 7-3.

education, promotions, and command cadre) and assignment officers when considering the officer for assignment. A review of Commandant Instruction 1410.2, *Documents Viewed by Coast Guard Officer Promotion and Special Boards* provides insight into the importance of the OER. Specific items that are directed to be viewed and masked from view are listed in Appendix C. A review of these lists reveals that the OER is the only document that contains performance of duties information. The Record of Professional Development, CG-4082, is permitted to be viewed however, it is an optional form the individual officer may submit. A blank CG-4082 is contained in Appendix C. The form indicates how it could be used to influence assignments, promotions and advanced education opportunities but submission is not required. Officers are highly encourage to complete this form once a year prior to the start of the promotion year whether being considered for promotion, assignment opportunities or advanced education.

Samuel Huntington's theory characterizes the military profession as one that predicated on expertise, responsibility and unity and that these traits are measured through five elements of the vocation.¹⁷¹ As discussed, the USCG officer corps demonstrates its expertise, responsibility and unity through its accession, advancement, education, staff and competence. Unfortunately, the organization is missing a connection between each of these elements. In order to develop the highest levels of expertise, the USCG should establish a stronger link between promotions, education, assignments and competence through an officer professional development program.

¹⁷¹Huntington, 20.

USA Officer Corps Professional Military Education

The USA officer professional military education program is a robust system that includes deliberate accession and commissioning requirements, educational requirements for assignment and promotion opportunities.¹⁷² Similar to USCG officer accessions, USA officers are commissioned through the United States Military Academy (USMA) or Officer Candidate School.¹⁷³ Unlike the USCG, upon graduation from a USA accession point, the newly commissioned officers attend the Officer Basic Leader Course.¹⁷⁴ As discussed in Chapter 2, the USA officers are methodically educated based on rank, position and goals. The USA officer education process and curriculum includes a focus on studying broad national strategies as well as USA specific organizational goals and strategies.¹⁷⁵ These programs were established and improved after in-depth study of the USA profession over many years. Figure 18 illustrates the concerns pertaining to USA officer performance as discussed in chapter 2. The USA officer performance concerns do not differ greatly from the gaps identified in the USCG officer corps. The USA studies appear to consider the profession as an entity and how it is performing versus the USCG studies that delve into what attributes are lacking in the individuals that make up the officer corps. Both the USA and USCG officer corps serves effectively, however, over

¹⁷²U.S. Army, Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 2010).

¹⁷³U.S. Army, Army Regulation 350-1, *Army Training and Leader Development* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Officer, December 2009), 66-67.

¹⁷⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁷⁵*Ibid.*

several years and multiple studies, each has identified performance gaps in need of improvement. Additionally, each service has responded differently to the recommendations provided by the working groups or individuals conducting the studies.

USA Internal Study - Performance Gap Comparison	
Wass de Czege	Climer
Analytical thinking skills	Profession hindered by outsourcing USA education instructors
Interoperability with international allies and joint services	Cooperativeness dissipating as senior officers separate from active duty
Critical thinking (how to think, not what to think)	Expertise dwindling as study of profession declines
Lack of training and education in advancing technologies	
Lack of understanding strategic intent	

Figure 18. USA Internal Study–Officer Performance Gap Comparison
Source: Created by author.

As a result of the USA studies, improvements continue to be considered for their already existing officer professional development system. The next few paragraphs will discuss the ILE survey results in order to discern if ILE benefits the USA officer corps ability to effectively execute missions and manage the service.

As discussed, the USA has a long history of studying its profession and methods to improve identified gaps. Recently, much debate has taken place regarding the USA officer corps education process including the Profession of Arms, the Military Ethic and whether the Army officer education programs are meeting the needs of today’s Army. In 2009, the USA CGSC prepared and conducted a survey to include the graduates of CGSC

between 2006 and 2009. The general opinion of more than 3400 officers that completed the survey of the 9910 graduates was that the learning objectives were met.¹⁷⁶

The officers who completed the course and responded to the survey served in positions at every level of the organization including joint, coalition, and combined staffs.¹⁷⁷ They served in the continental United States as well as Afghanistan, Iraq, Kuwait, Asia, Europe and other locations all over the world. This survey, while completed by only a third of the graduates between 2006 and 2009, clearly illustrates the value in studying the past and present in order to develop strategies for the future.¹⁷⁸ There are dissenting opinions regarding ILE effectiveness and relevance. For example, some officers constructively criticized the force management portion of the curriculum as having minor relevance to their branch function.¹⁷⁹ The USA CGSC curriculum will not crosswalk in full to meet the needs of USCG. However, a closer look at the overall system demonstrates how the USA officer corps remains an expert corps. The following paragraphs provide an overview of the USA CGSC curriculum and the survey results.

The ILE program is a basic foundations course focused on professional military education and leader development designed for mid-grade officers.¹⁸⁰ USA officers

¹⁷⁶U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, “US Army Command and General Staff College Intermediate Level Education Graduate Survey Report, March 2009” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Government Printing Office, 2009), iii.

¹⁷⁷Ibid., 2.

¹⁷⁸Ibid., iii.

¹⁷⁹Ibid., iv.

¹⁸⁰U.S. Army Human Resources Command, “Intermediate Level Education,” <https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/protect/branches/officer/LeaderDev/MilSchool/ILE/index.htm> (accessed 6 March 2011).

attend two phases of ILE. The first contains foundational core courses and the second advanced branch specific training.¹⁸¹ Both phases contain five instructional areas including tactics, force management, military history, leadership, and joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational courses.¹⁸² Appendix D contains detailed information pertaining to course flow and topics; however, discussion of these courses is not as relevant to this study as the mere fact that the USA conducts the courses. And, the course matter relevance to performance of duties.

A summary of the most and least favorable categories according to the survey results provides a measure of CGSC relevance. The categories students ranked high in relevance and effectiveness of the CGSC education include: refined critical thinking skills to solve problems and make decisions, improved ability to analyze impacts of international security threats, improved understanding of the military–media relationship, and increased understanding and impact of the joint contemporary environment.¹⁸³

The survey results concluded that USA officers who completed the course assessed some portions of the curriculum as ineffective or not relevant.¹⁸⁴ Force management curriculum was cited as not useful and not relevant, whereas a major trend developed indicating students desired more coursework pertaining to interagency,

¹⁸¹Ibid.

¹⁸²Ibid.

¹⁸³U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, “US Army Command and General Staff College Intermediate Level Education Graduate Survey Report, March 2009” (Fort Leavenworth, KS, March 2009), 5-8.

¹⁸⁴Ibid., iii.

coalition and multinational culture, transformation, emotional intelligence, systems theory, homeland security, targeting and intelligence preparation of the battlefield.¹⁸⁵

The USA CGSC survey results illustrate some of the systems shortfalls and benefits pertaining to the CGSC curriculum as assessed by recent graduates. However, the survey also provides a realistic study of the curriculum successes and, as expected, recommendations of ways to improve the curriculum. Based on the research within this study, the USA's dedication and commitment to understanding the relevance of the USA officer corps is evident. Further, the impact the completion of ILE and AOC makes on the officer corps assignment and promotion opportunities remains critical to the success of the organization.

Summary

The literature available shows distinct trends among the theorists as they discuss the expertise, responsibilities, and relationships that establish and maintain professions. The USCG fulfills those attributes that theorists, and past and present military leaders espouse. Through a detailed examination of the USCG officer programs, it is clear that the USCG senior leaders desire an enduring level of expertise and professionalism. This high standard, however, cannot be maintained without improving the USCG officer education system. Chapter 5 provides recommended actions and further research possibilities.

¹⁸⁵Ibid., iv.

CHAPTER 5

RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION

The Army must enhance leader development in order to maintain the relevance of its; leaders and senior leaders for the contemporary operating environment (COE) of the 21st Century. The complex contemporary political stage and operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism have demanded a different kind of Army strategic leader. These officers must be sound tactical and operational leaders, be multi-disciplined, and possess superior management, cultural, and diplomatic skills not typically required of officers in the past.

— Colonel Jessie Farrington, *Developing Strategic Leaders*

Purpose

The USCG has a long history of timely effective response to a wide variety of crisis and to routine missions. The USCG officer corps is integral to continuing this tradition. In order to maintain expertise in a complex environment, USCG senior leaders must consider improving the USCG officer corps education system. Factors such as advanced technology, more complex and bureaucratic budget processes as well as the USCG's fluctuating budget yield an environment requiring an adept officer corps with an understanding of the global political environment. This study demonstrated the potential benefits of an institutionalized USCG officer corps military professional development program.

Interpretation of Findings

Based on the information contained in the literature review and subsequent analysis in chapter 4, this study confirmed the USCG would benefit from an institutionalized officer professional development program. In fact, it is the responsibility of the organization to ensure its leaders are adequately prepared for the future. The next

few sections discuss previously recommended initiatives as well as recommendations from the author.

The USCG officer corps is a professional body with an obligation to the nation to understand how to best equip, organize and train the organization. In order to fulfill this obligation, organizationally, the USCG needs to develop a robust officer educational system that establishes strategic thinking and political savvy as fundamental and cultural competencies. The concepts of bias towards action and doing more with less are attributes the USCG relies upon year after year. As a response agency, these elements prevail many times as operations are executed. Senior leaders recognize that this translates into completing a large amount of planning, organizing, equipping and training prior to an incident occurring that requires a response. Often, preparation includes actions to prevent incidents as well. Improving the existing officer military professional education programs will serve to enhance the effectiveness of the organization by enabling a better organized, equipped, and trained organization leaning forward to get the job done. The Long View and Evergreen Projects attest to senior leader commitment to preparing the USCG of the future. However, the participation of only of a few select members is not adequate. The following paragraphs briefly discuss recommendations found in the USCG internal studies.

The JONA working group provided thirty-eight recommendations to senior USCG leaders. The first recommendation pertains to development of a continuum of training focused on interpersonal skills, self-awareness and values.¹⁸⁶ Another

¹⁸⁶JONA, 2-1.

recommendation discussed the benefits of establishing a professional development program that focuses on a career instead merely focusing on the first tour only.¹⁸⁷

The MOLGA working group provided several recommendations to address gaps identified in mid-level officer performance. These recommendations pertained mainly to further research as a result of the working groups determination that the USCG twenty-eight leadership competencies did not clearly translate to specific performance at a given paygrade.¹⁸⁸ The working group provided a research proposal focused on the transition between tactical and strategic expertise as it pertains to USCG officer professional development.¹⁸⁹

Dr. Youngman provided numerous recommendations in her study related to change and strategic intent within the USCG. The most notable recommendations include enhancing USCG officer participation in DoD service school educational programs, expand opportunities for assignment to joint positions following completion of joint professional military education, use the Long View and Evergreen Project models to enhance officer professional development, and consider a Homeland Security University or some less resource intensive variation of a university.¹⁹⁰

While the officer advanced education programs in place are vital to continuing effectiveness of the organization, an additional requirement should be established to provide a baseline continuum of military professional education. All officers should be

¹⁸⁷Ibid., 2-4.

¹⁸⁸MOLGA, 17.

¹⁸⁹Ibid., B-1.

¹⁹⁰Youngman, 149-155.

required to read overarching documents such as the USCG Commandant's State of the Coast Guard Address, the USCG Annual Budget Request and Justification and the USCG Annual Posture Statement. Additionally, the DoD Quadrennial Homeland Defense Strategy and the DHS Quadrennial National Security Strategy are a must read for all officers regardless of rank. These documents discuss relevant issues to the nation and strategies to achieve objectives therein. Therefore, they are relevant to how the USCG fits into the system of federal agencies and armed services. The budget process transcends all mission areas of the USCG. It is vital that each and every officer of the USCG understands how the federal budget works, as well as how the DHS facilitates the budget process.

The role of the USCG officer corps is to lead, organize, train and equip the force. In order to effectively manage these efforts, officers must be experts in their specialty area as well as have a clear understanding of USCG roles and missions, and historical CG lessons learned in order to analyze organizational trends in order to effectively integrate the USCG into the larger world model.

Once commissioned, individual officers are relied upon heavily to seek an understanding the past, present and future USCG. Initially, the newly commissioned Ensign is largely involved in entry level training. As illustrated in this study, the entry level training an Ensign completes varies depending on the community or career field he or she is working among. For example, an Ensign who goes directly to aviation training is required to meet very different benchmarks than is the one who is assigned to a High or Medium Endurance Cutter with the idea that the officer will continue to build on that

specialty competence area throughout his or her career.¹⁹¹ As the Ensign progresses and promotes to Lieutenant Junior Grade, he or she normally becomes more involved at the unit level as far as planning future. These are the first opportunities for a junior officer to engage in strategic planning, albeit on the unit level. Given officer assignments, while varied, are generally two to four years in duration, the opportunity to engage in strategy sessions are limited. Again, this is acceptable as the newly commissioned officer is inundated with earning qualifications and certifications. But, there should be some exposure and discussions surrounding organizational vision, and leading the organization through strategic analysis and deliberate action.

As the Lieutenant Junior Grade becomes confident and assumes a mentor and trainer role for newly commissioned Ensigns, he or she must demonstrate the ability to address unit and organizational needs. It is important to keep in mind that in USCG LTJGs can serve as Commanding Officers. These positions are by selection by senior officers and require a high degree of demonstrated judgment. The selection process is based on a subjective review of the officers record of performance. Along with observed and documented performance, the selection process should link directly to professional education. As the officer progresses through his or her career, tangible career progression points should be required in order to move to the next level of the organization.

As the Lieutenant's responsibility continues to increase, officers in the Prevention community are charged with understanding the intricacies of state and local regulatory

¹⁹¹U.S. Coast Guard, Commandant Instruction 1401.5AF, *Schedule of Active Duty Promotion List (ADPL) and Inactive Duty Promotion List (IDPL) Officer Personnel Boards and Panels*, http://www.uscg.mil/psc/opm/Opm1/Opm1docs/Boards/PY11_Docs/PY11%20Schedule%20of%20Officer%20Boards%20and%20Panels.pdf (accessed 21 April 2011).

elements of vessels and facilities while officers in the Response community direct responses to Search and Rescue and Maritime Law enforcement operations such as migrant interdiction or drug interdiction operations. Still those officers residing in the logistics community are vital to the success of operations as they coordinate and facilitate the budget, engineering (civil, facility and naval). There is no foundational training regiment subsequent to the commissioning source providing a fundamental level of education as the officers progress through their careers.

A similar path is taken through the Lieutenant Commander, Commander and Captain ranks. Each officer is encouraged to seek educational opportunities to both broaden their knowledge and skills, and to remain expert specialists. However, there is no course of instruction to ensure emerging doctrine, strategies and tactics reach each and every officer.

The recommendations provided by several internal working groups over the past ten years remain viable today. The Long View and Evergreen Projects need to be expanded to a greater number, if not all, officers. These types of professional development tools implemented in an institutionalized officer military professional development program will serve the organization by ensuring its leaders are adept to critical thinking and decision making.

Recommended Changes

The USCG officer corps is managed and governed with existing accession, assignment, and performance and promotion systems. The underlying commonality of these systems, however, is subjectivity. These systems have proven to work as thousands of officers have been accessed, assigned, evaluated and promoted throughout history.

However, as theorists and military senior leaders have astutely pointed out, in order to maintain expertise, officers must study their organization and nation's history, and must be committed to the client–professional relationship. The USCG's can no longer afford to rely on the initiative of its officer corps to educate itself. The complex operational environment demands more. USCG officer professional development should be pursued through courses of study developed, coordinated and instructed by USCG leaders. These courses should augment the current educational systems by providing a continuum of education starting with initial training followed by a mid-level officer course, and a senior officer course.

Assignments, particularly command and high profile positions, should be predicated on observed, documented performance as well as completed USCG officer professional development courses. Senior USCG leaders should charge the Leadership Development Center with reviewing the studies previously identifying officer performance gaps and developing a viable curriculum focused closing the gaps at the junior officer, and mid-grade officer levels.

The Record of Professional Development, CG-4082, should be required as a supplemental document on the same schedule as the OER. USCG leaders at all levels should be required to report their education and training accomplishments including articles written and published, books read, and certificates obtained. Submitting this form with the OER would serve as a tool for assignment officers, selection boards and unit leader development.

Finally, the changes in the education process and assignment policy discussed throughout this study would naturally enhance the USCG officer promotion system

through the requirements of completing certain USCG officer professional education courses and an annual CG-4082 submission.

Recommendations for Further Study

The USA provides one example of an institutionalized education system. The officer professional development programs represent a continuum and enduring process developed, studied and implemented in order to maintain the culture and expertise of the USA officer corps. There are many other organizations worth studying in order to ascertain how they overcame resource constraints and what benefits were derived from their programs. For example, study of the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marines and U.S. Air Force officer professional development programs may produce alternatives useful to the USCG. The size, mission and cultural impacts of these organizations could produce various solutions and challenges of an institutionalized officer professional development program.

Study of the Customs and Boarder Protection (CBP) education and training program is a viable comparison as both a sister agency within DHS and an agency with similar training and resource requirements. There are many dissimilarities between the USCG and CBP, however, a thorough review of CBP may provide unique approaches to an institutionalized program that links assignment, promotions and performance evaluation with organizational mission success.

Conclusion

The USCG officer corps provides a valuable service to the nation. This study explored the definition of the USCG officer corps profession, the current processes and

systems used to administer and manage the organization, as well as the organizations successes and the areas within the officer corps in need of improvement. Several theorists conclude that a professional organization must continue to grow and learn within its expertise. Remaining experts in their chosen field ensures, USCG officer professional military education would ensure the trust and confidence of their client remains intact.

Dr. Youngman's study provides a fitting conclusion to this study. Drawing upon the USA as an example, she remarked that the USA transformation initiatives focused on the development of officer strategic competencies earlier in an officers career.¹⁹² Further, the USA identified officer competencies encompassing systems governance, and cultural perspectives that helped to reshape the USA officer competencies and reaffirm the basic principles of the profession.¹⁹³ Dr. Youngman's study, as discussed, centered on the most senior USCG leaders. This fact alone validates the need for a continuum of professional education within the USCG officer corps.

¹⁹²Youngman, 122.

¹⁹³Ibid.

GLOSSARY

A School. Entry level training for enlisted members.

C school. Advanced training within a specialty; both officer and enlisted attend.

Group. Outdated term used to identify geographically oriented USCG operational unit responsible for Maritime Law Enforcement (recreational boating, fisheries enforcement, aids to navigation, search and rescue, and marine events).

Marine Safety Office (MSO). Outdated term used to identify geographically oriented USCG operational unit responsible for Captain of the Port Statutory authority including Marine Inspections of commercial vessels, pollution response and Regional Exam Center oversight.

Road show. A training event conducted by a training team held onsite at a field unit vice the training center

Sector. A geographically oriented USCG operational unit responsible for all USCG missions within the geographic boundary

APPENDIX A

USCG OFFICER EVALUATION REPORT (O3 and O4)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY U.S. COAST GUARD CG-5310B (Rev. 02-09)	<h2 style="margin: 0;">OFFICER EVALUATION REPORT (OER)</h2>	Validation:
1. ADMINISTRATIVE DATA		
I understand my signature below does not constitute agreement or disagreement I acknowledge I have reviewed this report.		
a. NAME (Last)	(Initials)	b. Reported-on Officer Signature
		c. DATE OF RANK / /
		d. DATE REPORTED / /
e. UNIT	f. EMPLID	g. GRADE
		h. ATU - OFFAC -
		i. DAYS NOT OBSERVED LV OTHER
j. PERIOD OF REPORT (YYYY/MM/DD) / / TO / /	k. OCCASION FOR REPORT <i>(Mark only one)</i> <input type="radio"/> Annual/ Semiannual <input type="radio"/> Detachment/Change of Reporting Officer <input type="radio"/> Detachment of Officer <input type="radio"/> Promotion	
		l. EXCEPTION REPORT <input type="radio"/> Special <input type="radio"/> Concurrent
m. DATE SUBMITTED / /		
2. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES: List primary duty and summarize all duties and responsibilities (provide Reserve time if applicable).		
PRIMARY DUTY:		
ATTACHMENTS:		
3. PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES: Measures an officer's ability to manage and to get things done.		
a. PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS: Ability to anticipate, determine goals, identify relevant information, set priorities and deadlines, and create a shared vision of the unit's and Coast Guard's future.	1 Got caught by the unexpected; appeared to be controlled by events. Set vague or unrealistic goals. Used unreasonable criteria to set priorities and deadlines. Rarely had plan of action. Failed to focus on relevant information.	3 Consistently prepared. Set high but realistic goals. Used sound criteria to set priorities and deadlines. Used quality tools and processes to develop action plans. Identified key information. Kept supervisors and stakeholders informed.
	<input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
	b. USING RESOURCES: Ability to manage time, materials, information, money, and people (i.e. all CG components as well as external publics).	4 Concentrated on unproductive activities or often overlooked critical demands. Failed to use people productively. Did not follow up. Mismanaged information, money or time. Used ineffective tools or left subordinates without means to accomplish tasks. Employed wasteful methods.
	<input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
	c. RESULTS/EFFECTIVENESS: Quality, quantity, timeliness and impact of work.	5 Got the job done in all routine situations and in many unusual ones. Work was timely and of high quality. Required some of subordinates. Results had a positive impact on department or unit. Continuously improved services and organizational effectiveness.
	<input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
	d. ADAPTABILITY: Ability to modify work methods and priorities in response to new information, changing conditions, political realities, or unexpected obstacles.	6 Receptive to change, new information and technology. Effectively used benchmarks to improve performance and service. Monitored progress and changed course as required. Effectively dealt with pressure and ambiguity. Facilitated smooth transitions. Adjusted direction to accommodate societal trends or political realities.
	<input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
	e. PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE: Ability to acquire, apply and share technical and administrative knowledge and skills associated with description of duties. (Includes operational aspects such as marine safety, seamanship, armanship, SAR, etc., as appropriate.)	7 Competent and credible authority on specialty or operational issues. Acquired and applied excellent operational or specialty expertise for assigned duties. Showed professional growth through education, training and professional reading. Shared knowledge and information with others clearly and simply. Understood own organizational role and customer needs.
	<input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
	8 Exceptional preparation. Always looked beyond immediate events or problems. Skillfully balanced competing demands. Developed strategies with contingency plans. Assessed all aspects of problems, including underlying issues and impact.	9 Unusually skilled at bringing scarce resources to bear on the most critical of competing demands. Optimized productivity through effective delegation, empowerment, and follow-up control. Found ways to systematically reduce cost, eliminate waste, and improve efficiency.
	<input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
	10 Maintained optimal balance among quality, quantity, and timeliness of work. Quality of own and subordinates' work surpassed expectations. Results had a significant positive impact on unit or Coast Guard. Established clearly effective systems of continuous improvement.	11 Rapidly assessed and adjusted to changing conditions, political realities, new information and technology. Very skilled at using and responding to measurement indicators. Championed organizational improvements. Effectively dealt with extremely complex situations. Turned pressure and ambiguity into constructive forces for change.
	<input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
	12 Superior expertise; advice and actions showed great breadth and depth of knowledge. Remarkable grasp of complex issues, concepts, and situations. Rapidly developed professional growth beyond expectations. Vigorously conveyed knowledge, directly resulting in increased workplace productivity. Insightful knowledge of own role, customer needs, and value of work.	N/A
	<input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
COMMENTS:		

Previous Edition Obsolete

4. COMMUNICATION SKILLS: Measures an officer's ability to communicate in a positive, clear, and convincing manner.								
a. SPEAKING AND LISTENING: Ability to speak effectively and listen to understand.	1 <input type="radio"/>	Unable to effectively articulate ideas and facts; lacked preparation, confidence, or logic. Used inappropriate language or rambled. Nervous or distracting mannerisms distracted from message. Failed to listen carefully or was too argumentative.	3 <input type="radio"/>	Effectively expressed ideas and facts in individual and group situations; non-verbal actions consistent with spoken message. Communicated to people at all levels to ensure understanding. Listened carefully for intended message as well as spoken words.	5 <input type="radio"/>	Clearly articulated and promoted ideas before a wide range of audiences; accomplished speaker in both formal and extemporaneous situations. Adept at presenting complex or sensitive issues. Active listener; remarkable ability to listen with open mind and identify key issues.	7 <input type="radio"/>	NO <input type="radio"/>
b. WRITING: Ability to express facts and ideas clearly and convincingly.	<input type="radio"/>	Written material frequently unclear, verbose, or poorly organized. Seldom proofread. Often submitted correspondence which was grammatically incorrect, tailored to wrong audience, or delivered by an inappropriate medium.	<input type="radio"/>	Written material clear, concise, and logically organized. Proofread conscientiously. Correspondence grammatically correct, tailored to audience, and delivered by an appropriate medium. Subordinates' material reflected same high standards.	<input type="radio"/>	Clearly and persuasively expressed complex or controversial material, directly contributing to stated objectives. Written or published material brought credit to the Coast Guard. Actively educated subordinates in effective writing.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
COMMENTS:								

5. LEADERSHIP SKILLS: Measures an officer's ability to support, develop, direct, and influence others in performing work.								
a. LOOKING OUT FOR OTHERS: Ability to consider and respond to others' personal needs, capabilities, and achievements; support for and application of work-life concepts and skills.	1 <input type="radio"/>	Seldom recognized or responded to needs of people; left outside resources untapped despite apparent need. Ignorance of individuals' capabilities increased chance of failure. Seldom recognized or rewarded deserving subordinates.	3 <input type="radio"/>	Cared for people. Recognized and responded to their needs; referred to outside resources as appropriate. Considered individuals' capabilities to maximize opportunities for success. Consistently recognized and rewarded deserving subordinates.	5 <input type="radio"/>	Always accessible. Enhanced overall quality of life. Actively contributed to achieving balance among unit requirements, professional and personal responsibilities. Strong advocate for subordinates; ensured appropriate and timely recognition, both formal and informal.	7 <input type="radio"/>	NO <input type="radio"/>
b. DEVELOPING OTHERS: Ability to use mentoring, counseling, and training to provide opportunities for others' professional development.	<input type="radio"/>	Unreasonably restricted opportunities for professional growth; kept others in narrow roles and discouraged the level of risk-taking necessary for learning. Lack of timely feedback left subordinates guessing.	<input type="radio"/>	Supported and provided opportunities for professional growth. Encouraged others to expand their roles, handle important tasks and learn by doing. Allowed the appropriate level of risk-taking necessary for learning and mission accomplishment. Provided timely praise and constructive feedback.	<input type="radio"/>	Created challenging situations which optimized professional development and maximized opportunity for success. Guided, mentored, and encouraged others to reach new levels of performance. Adeptly counseled others; identified professional potential, strengths and areas for improvement.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
c. DIRECTING OTHERS: Ability to influence or direct others in accomplishing tasks or missions.	<input type="radio"/>	Showed difficulty in directing or influencing others. Low or unclear work standards reduced productivity. Failed to hold subordinates accountable for shoddy work or irresponsible actions. Unwilling to delegate authority to increase efficiency of task accomplishment.	<input type="radio"/>	A leader who earned others' support and commitment. Set high work standards; clearly articulated job requirements, expectations and measurement criteria; held subordinates accountable. When appropriate, delegated authority to those directly responsible for the task.	<input type="radio"/>	An inspirational leader who motivated others to achieve results not normally attainable. Won people over rather than imposing will. Clearly articulated vision, empowered subordinates to set goals and objectives to accomplish tasks. Modified leadership styles to best meet challenging situations.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
d. TEAMWORK: Ability to manage, lead and participate in teams, encourage cooperation, and develop esprit de corps.	<input type="radio"/>	Used teams ineffectively or at wrong times. Conflicts mismanaged or often left unresolved, resulting in decreased team effectiveness. Excluded team members from vital information. Stifled group discussions or did not contribute productively. Inhibited cross functional cooperation to the detriment of unit or service goals.	<input type="radio"/>	Skilfully used teams to increase unit effectiveness, quality, and service. Resolved or managed group conflict, enhanced cooperation, and involved team members in decision process. Valued team participant. Effectively negotiated work across functional boundaries to enhance support of broader mutual goals.	<input type="radio"/>	Insightful use of teams raised unit productivity beyond expectations. Inspired high level of esprit de corps, even in difficult situations. Major contributor to team effort. Established relationships and networks across a broad range of people and groups, raising accomplishments of mutual goals to a remarkable level.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
e. WORKPLACE CLIMATE: Ability to value individual differences and promote an environment of involvement, innovation, open communication and respect.	<input type="radio"/>	Intolerant of individual differences, exhibited discriminatory tendencies toward others. Tolerated or contributed to an uncomfortable or degrading environment. Failed to take responsibility for own words and actions and their impact on others. Failed to support or enforce Coast Guard human resources policies.	<input type="radio"/>	Sensitive to individual differences. Encouraged open communication and respect. Promoted an environment which values fairness, dignity, creativity, and diverse perspectives. Took responsibility for own words and actions and their impact on others. Fully supported and enforced Coast Guard human resources policies.	<input type="radio"/>	Excelled at creating an environment of fairness, candor, and respect among individuals of diverse backgrounds and positions. Optimized use of different perspectives and opinions. Quickly took action against behavior inconsistent with Coast Guard human resources policies, or which detracted from mission accomplishment.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
f. EVALUATIONS: The extent to which an officer, as Reported-on Officer and rater, conducted or required others to conduct accurate, timely evaluations for enlisted, civilian and officer personnel.	<input type="radio"/>	Reports were frequently late. Narratives inaccurate or of poor quality. Failed to uphold service performance standards by assigning accurate marks. Reports required revision or intervention by others. Failed to meet own OES responsibilities as Reported-on Officer.	<input type="radio"/>	Reports consistently submitted on time. Narratives were fair, concise, and contained specific observations of action and impact. Assigned marks against standards. Few reports, if any, returned for revision. Met own OES responsibilities as Reported-on Officer.	<input type="radio"/>	No reports submitted late. Narrative were insightful of the highest quality, and always supported assigned marks. Subordinates' material reflected same high standards. No reports returned for revision. Returned reports to subordinates when appropriate.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
COMMENTS:								

6. SUPERVISOR AUTHENTICATION					(YYYY/MM/DD)
a. NAME AND SIGNATURE	b. GRADE	c. EMPLUD	d. TITLE OF POSITION	e. DATE	/ /

7. REPORTING OFFICER COMMENTS: Supplement or amplify Supervisor's evaluation. Concur Do not concur RO is Supervisor

8. PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL QUALITIES: Measures selected qualities which illustrate the individual's character.

<p>a. INITIATIVE: Ability to originate and act on new ideas, pursue opportunities to learn and develop, and seek responsibility without guidance and supervision.</p>	<p>1 Postponed needed action. Implemented or supported improvements only when directed to do so. Showed little interest in career development. Feasible improvements in methods, services, or products went unexplored.</p>	<p>3 Championed improvement through new ideas, methods, and practices; self-starter. Anticipated problems and took prompt action to avoid or resolve them. Sought opportunities for own career development. Pursued productivity gains and enhanced mission performance by applying new ideas and methods.</p>	<p>5 Aggressively sought out additional responsibility. A self-learner. Made worthwhile ideas and practices work when others might have given up. Extremely innovative. Optimized use of raw ideas and methods to improve work processes, decision-making, and service delivery.</p>	<p>7 NO</p>
<p>b. JUDGMENT: Ability to make sound decisions and provide valid recommendations by using facts, experience, political acumen, common sense, risk assessment, and analytical thought.</p>	<p>Decisions often displayed poor analysis. Failed to make necessary decisions, or jumped to conclusions without considering facts, alternatives, and impact. Did not effectively weigh risk, cost, and time considerations. Unconcerned with political drivers on organization.</p>	<p>4 Demonstrated analytical thought and common sense in making decisions. Used facts, data, and experience and considered the impact of alternatives and political realities. Weighed risk, cost and time considerations. Made sound decisions promptly with the best available information.</p>	<p>6 Combined keen analytical thought, an understanding of political processes, and insight to make appropriate decisions. Focused on the key issues and the most relevant information. Did the right thing at the right time. Actions indicated awareness of impact of decisions on others. Not afraid to take reasonable risks to achieve positive results.</p>	
<p>c. RESPONSIBILITY: Ability to act ethically, courageously, and dependably and inspire the same in others; accountability for own and subordinates' actions.</p>	<p>Actions demonstrated questionable ethics or lack of commitment. Tolerated indifference or failed to hold subordinates accountable. Allowed organization to absorb personnel problems rather than confronting them as required. Tends not to speak up or get involved. Provided minimal support for decisions counter to own ideas.</p>	<p>4 Held self and subordinates, personally and professionally accountable. Spoke up when necessary, even when expressing unpopular positions. Supported organizational policies and decisions which may have been counter to own ideas. Committed to the successful achievement of organizational goals.</p>	<p>6 Integrity and ethics beyond reproach. Always held self and subordinates to highest standards of personal and professional accountability. Did the right thing even when it was difficult. Succeeded in making even unpopular policies or decisions work. Actions demonstrated unwavering commitment to achievement of organizational goals.</p>	
<p>d. PROFESSIONAL PRESENCE: Ability to bring credit to the Coast Guard through one's actions, competence, demeanor, and appearance. Extent to which an officer displayed the Coast Guard's core values of honor, respect, and devotion to duty.</p>	<p>Unaware of general CG objectives; uncooperative or biased in interactions. Lost composure in difficult situations. Conveyed poor image of self and CG. Ignorant of or sloppy with common military courtesies. Uniform appearance and grooming below standard. Failed to display the core values of honor, respect, and devotion to duty.</p>	<p>4 Knowledgeable in how CG objectives serve the public; cooperative and fair in all interactions. Composed in difficult situations. Conveyed positive image of self and CG. Well versed in military etiquette; precise in reading and upholding military courtesies. Great care in uniform appearance and grooming. Abided by the core values of honor, respect, and devotion to duty.</p>	<p>6 Always self-assured, projected ideal CG image. Poised in response to others' provocative actions. Contributed leadership role in civilian/military community. Exemplified and held others accountable for the core values and finest traditions of military customs and protocol. Meticulous uniform appearance and grooming; inspired similar standards in others.</p>	
<p>e. HEALTH AND WELL-BEING: Ability to invest in the Coast Guard's future by caring for the physical health, safety, and emotional well-being of self and others.</p>	<p>Did not adhere to the Coast Guard Fitness Program. Failed to meet minimum standards of weight control or sobriety. Tolerated or condoned others' alcohol abuse. Seldom considered subordinates' health and well-being. Unwilling or unable to recognize and manage stress despite apparent need. Failed to adequately identify and protect personnel from safety hazards.</p>	<p>4 Maintained weight standards and adhered to the Coast Guard Fitness Program. Committed to health and well-being of self and subordinates. Enhanced personal performance through activities supporting physical and emotional well-being. Recognized and managed stress effectively. Ensured that safe operating procedures were followed.</p>	<p>6 Remarkable vitality, enthusiasm, alertness and energy. Consistently contributed at high levels and actively followed a comprehensive fitness program. Optimized personal performance through involvement in activities which supported physical and emotional well-being. Monitored and helped others deal with stress, enhance health and well-being. Demonstrated a significant commitment towards safety of personnel.</p>	

COMMENTS:

9. COMPARISON SCALE (FOR GRADES O3 TO O4): Compare this officer with others of the same grade whom you have known in your career.

Performance unsatisfactory for grade or billet.	Marginal performer; limited potential.	Fair performer; recommended for increased responsibility.	Good performer; give tough, challenging assignments.	Excellent performer; give toughest, most challenging leadership assignments.	Strongly recommended for accelerated promotion.	BEST OFFICER of this grade.
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

10. POTENTIAL: Describe ability to assume greater leadership roles and responsibilities (e.g. command, special assignment, promotion, and special skills).

11. REPORTING OFFICER AUTHENTICATION

a. NAME AND SIGNATURE	b. GRADE	c. EMPLID	d. TITLE OF POSITION	e. DATE
				/ /

12. REVIEWER AUTHENTICATION

a. COMMENTS ATTACHED: (Required when the Reporting Officer is not a CG Officer or CG SES or when Reported-on Officer is unable to review OER)				
b. NAME AND SIGNATURE	c. GRADE	d. EMPLID	e. TITLE OF POSITION	f. DATE
				/ /

INSTRUCTIONS																																		
<p>PURPOSE: The Officer Evaluation Report (OER) primarily provides information for officer corps promotion, selection, and assignment determinations. Secondary purposes include: (1) prescribing common standards of expected performance; (2) reinforcing Coast Guard values; and (3) acting as one means of performance feedback for the Reported-on Officer.</p>	<p>GUIDING INSTRUCTION: Chapter 10-A of the CG Personnel Manual, COMDTINST M1000.6 (series), contains all official guidance on OES requirements.</p> <p>RESPONSIBILITIES: All Coast Guard officers and raters of CG officers should be aware of their OES responsibilities as outlined in the CG Personnel Manual.</p>																																	
<p>SUBMISSION SCHEDULE:</p> <table style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <thead> <tr> <th style="text-align: left;">Grade</th> <th style="text-align: left;">Active Duty</th> <th style="text-align: left;">IDPL</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Captain</td> <td>Apr</td> <td>Apr</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Commander</td> <td>Mar</td> <td>Mar</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Lieutenant Commander</td> <td>Apr</td> <td>Apr</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Lieutenant</td> <td>May</td> <td>May</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Lieutenant (Junior Grade)</td> <td>Jan and Jul</td> <td>Jul</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Lieutenant (Junior Grade) in zone for LT</td> <td>Jun</td> <td>Jun</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Ensign</td> <td>Mar and Sep</td> <td>Mar</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Chief Warrant Officer (W4)</td> <td>Apr</td> <td>Apr</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Chief Warrant Officer (W3)</td> <td>Jul</td> <td>Jul</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Chief Warrant Officer (W2)</td> <td>Jun</td> <td>Jun</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>Notes:</p> <p>(1) An OER period may be extended for up to 92 days (semiannual) or 182 days (annual) under certain conditions. Consult PERSMAN for further guidance.</p> <p>(2) OERs for IDPL grades of CAPT, LTJG, and ENS are annual. All other IDPL OERs are biennial.</p> <p>(3) Officers assigned to DUINS follow an annual/semiannual schedule according to school terms.</p>	Grade	Active Duty	IDPL	Captain	Apr	Apr	Commander	Mar	Mar	Lieutenant Commander	Apr	Apr	Lieutenant	May	May	Lieutenant (Junior Grade)	Jan and Jul	Jul	Lieutenant (Junior Grade) in zone for LT	Jun	Jun	Ensign	Mar and Sep	Mar	Chief Warrant Officer (W4)	Apr	Apr	Chief Warrant Officer (W3)	Jul	Jul	Chief Warrant Officer (W2)	Jun	Jun	<p>PREPARATION CHECKLIST (OPTIONAL):</p> <p>Administrative Data and Description of Duties (Sections 1 and 2):</p> <p>___ All fields completed (enter dates in YYYY/MM/DD format and enter only one occasion for report).</p> <p>___ Primary duty will be capitalized (no other text enhancements, such as underlining, bolding, or all capital letters, are allowed throughout the OER).</p> <p>___ Attachments listed (only personal award citations, punitive letters, or letter reports for senior service school allowed).</p> <p>Performance Evaluation (Sections 3-5 and 7-8)</p> <p>___ Marks assigned according to standards which most closely describe Reported-on Officer's performance during the period.</p> <p>___ Specific examples cited for each mark which deviated from "4". When applicable, comments on seamanship or aimanship ability are distinct.</p> <p>Comparison or Rating Scale and Potential (Sections 9 and 10):</p> <p>___ Section 9 mark assigned according to the instructive clause on the form.</p> <p>___ Comments describe Reported-on Officer's overall potential for greater responsibility (include, as appropriate, recommendations for promotion, special assignment, and command).</p>
Grade	Active Duty	IDPL																																
Captain	Apr	Apr																																
Commander	Mar	Mar																																
Lieutenant Commander	Apr	Apr																																
Lieutenant	May	May																																
Lieutenant (Junior Grade)	Jan and Jul	Jul																																
Lieutenant (Junior Grade) in zone for LT	Jun	Jun																																
Ensign	Mar and Sep	Mar																																
Chief Warrant Officer (W4)	Apr	Apr																																
Chief Warrant Officer (W3)	Jul	Jul																																
Chief Warrant Officer (W2)	Jun	Jun																																
<p>TIMELINE:</p> <p>21 days before end of period: Reported-on Officer submits to Supervisor a list of significant accomplishments during the period, supporting documents (as required), administrative data required for OER Section 1, and a completed OER page 4.</p> <p>10 days after the period: Supervisor sections of OER due to Reporting Officer (RO).</p> <p>30 days after the period: Supervisor and Reporting Officer sections due to the Reviewer. After Reviewer signs the OER, Reported-on Officer reviews the OER and signs in Section 1.b.</p> <p>45 days after the period: OER due to CGPC for review and entry into the official record.</p>	<p>TIPS FOR EFFECTIVE COMMENTS:</p> <p>1. Be specific. Concisely describe the performance by relating the action observed and its impact; quantify the action whenever possible and explain why it was important; avoid empty superlatives. Do not repeat the dimensions.</p> <p>2. Save space. Use information bullets; reduce the use of pronouns; use member's name sparingly, if at all; use action verbs and semicolons; and avoid excess words. Acronyms and abbreviations are effective only if they are common to all Coast Guard communities or are initially defined in the comments.</p> <p>3. Be clear. Don't lose the meaning; watch for cryptic comments.</p>																																	
<p>RESTRICTIONS: Raters shall not mention a Reported-on Officer's: (1) First name; (2) Non-selection for promotion, including allusions thereto; (3) Record appeals; (4) Psychological or medical conditions; (5) marital or family status (including pregnancy); or (6) Performance observed outside the reporting period. Raters also shall not: (1) Expressly evaluate or place emphasis on gender, religion, color, race, or ethnic background (applies to both member and third parties); or (2) Include information which is subject to a security classification. See PERSMAN for additional restrictions that apply to disciplinary proceedings.</p>	<p>13. RETURN ADDRESS. (Name and address to which a copy is sent after filing the original in the officer's record.)</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 60px; width: 100%;"></div>																																	
<p>14. OER ADMINISTRATOR REVIEW:</p> <table style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%; border-bottom: 1px solid black;">a. Initials:</td> <td style="width: 50%; border-bottom: 1px solid black;">b. Date: / /</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2" style="padding: 5px;"> <p>PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT This information is requested under the authority of 14 U.S.C. 833 to determine an officer's suitability for promotion or job assignment. Submitting this information is mandatory. Failure to provide it could adversely affect promotion opportunities and job assignments or lead to disciplinary action.</p> </td> </tr> </table>		a. Initials:	b. Date: / /	<p>PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT This information is requested under the authority of 14 U.S.C. 833 to determine an officer's suitability for promotion or job assignment. Submitting this information is mandatory. Failure to provide it could adversely affect promotion opportunities and job assignments or lead to disciplinary action.</p>																														
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Source: U.S. Coast Guard, Officer Evaluation Report (OER), CG-5310B, February 2009, <http://www.uscg.mil/psc/opm/opm3/digital-signatures.asp> (accessed 23 April 2011).

APPENDIX B

USA OFFICER EVALUATION FORM

+ OFFICER EVALUATION REPORT For use of this form, see AR 623-3; the proponent agency is DCS, G-1.						FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO) SEE PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT IN AR 623-3. +	
PART I - ADMINISTRATIVE DATA							
a. NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)			b. SSN	c. RANK	d. DATE OF RANK (YYYYMMDD)	e. BRANCH	f. DESIGNATED SPECIALTIES / PMOs (WO)
g.1. UNIT, ORG., STATION, ZIP CODE OR APO, MAJOR COMMAND				g.2. STATUS CODE	h. REASON FOR SUBMISSION		
i. PERIOD COVERED FROM (YYYYMMDD) THRU (YYYYMMDD)		j. RATED MONTHS	k. NONRATED CODES	l. NO. OF ENGL 0	m. RATED OFFICER'S APO EMAIL ADDRESS (.gov or .mil)	n. UIC	o. CMD CODE
							p. PSB CODE
PART II - AUTHENTICATION (Rated officer's signature verifies officer has seen completed OER Parts I-VII and the admin data is correct)							
a. NAME OF RATER (Last, First, MI)		SSN	RANK	POSITION	SIGNATURE	DATE (YYYYMMDD)	
b. NAME OF INTERMEDIATE RATER (Last, First, MI)		SSN	RANK	POSITION	SIGNATURE	DATE (YYYYMMDD)	
c. NAME OF SENIOR RATER (Last, First, MI)		SSN	RANK	POSITION	SIGNATURE	DATE (YYYYMMDD)	
SENIOR RATER'S ORGANIZATION			BRANCH	SENIOR RATER TELEPHONE NUMBER	E-MAIL ADDRESS (.gov or .mil)		
d. This is a referred report, do you wish to make comments? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes, comments are attached <input type="checkbox"/> No				e. SIGNATURE OF RATED OFFICER		DATE (YYYYMMDD)	
PART III - DUTY DESCRIPTION							
a. PRINCIPAL DUTY TITLE				b. POSITION AOC/BR			
c. SIGNIFICANT DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES. REFER TO PART IVa, DA FORM 67-9-1.							
PART IV - PERFORMANCE EVALUATION - PROFESSIONALISM (Rater)							
CHARACTER Disposition of the leader: combination of values, attributes, and skills affecting leader actions							
a. ARMY VALUES (Comments mandatory for all "NO" entries. Use PART Vb.)				Yes No Yes No			
1. HONOR: Adherence to the Army's publicly declared code of values				5. RESPECT: Promotes dignity, consideration, fairness, & EO			
2. INTEGRITY: Possesses high personal moral standards; honest in word and deed				6. SELFLESS-SERVICE: Places Army priorities before self			
3. COURAGE: Manifests physical and moral bravery				7. DUTY: Fulfills professional, legal, and moral obligations			
4. LOYALTY: Bears true faith and allegiance to the U.S. Constitution, the Army, the unit, and the soldier							
b. LEADER ATTRIBUTES / SKILLS / ACTIONS: First, mark "YES" or "NO" for each block. Second, choose a total of six that best describe the rated officer. Select one from ATTRIBUTES, two from SKILLS (Competence), and three from ACTIONS (LEADERSHIP). Place an "X" in the appropriate numbered box with optional comments in PART Vb. Comments are mandatory in Part Vb for all "No" entries.							
b.1. ATTRIBUTES (Select 1) Fundamental qualities and characteristics		1. MENTAL YES NO Possesses desire, will, initiative, and discipline		2. PHYSICAL YES NO Maintains appropriate level of physical fitness and military bearing		3. EMOTIONAL YES NO Displays self-control, calm under pressure	
b.2 SKILLS (Competence) (Select 2) Skill development is part of self-development; prerequisite to action		1. CONCEPTUAL YES NO Demonstrates sound judgment, critical/creative thinking, moral reasoning		2. INTERPERSONAL YES NO Shows skill with people: coaching, teaching, counseling, motivating and empowering		3. TECHNICAL YES NO Possesses the necessary expertise to accomplish all tasks and functions	
		4. TACTICAL YES NO Demonstrates proficiency in required professional knowledge, judgment, and warfighting				YES NO	
b.3. ACTIONS (LEADERSHIP) (Select 3) Major activities leaders perform: influencing, operating, and improving							
INFLUENCING Method of reaching goals while operating / improving		1. COMMUNICATING YES NO Displays good oral, written, and listening skills for individuals / groups		2. DECISION-MAKING YES NO Employs sound judgment, logical reasoning and uses resources wisely		3. MOTIVATING YES NO Inspires, motivates, and guides others toward mission accomplishment	
OPERATING Short-term mission accomplishment		4. PLANNING YES NO Develops detailed, executable plans that are feasible, acceptable, and suitable		5. EXECUTING YES NO Shows tactical proficiency, meets mission standards, and takes care of people/resources		6. ASSESSING YES NO Uses after-action and evaluation tools to facilitate consistent improvement	
IMPROVING Long-term improvement in the Army its people and organizations		7. DEVELOPING YES NO Invests adequate time and effort to develop individual subordinates as leaders		8. BUILDING YES NO Spends time and resources improving teams, groups and units; fosters ethical climate		9. LEARNING YES NO Seeks self-improvement and organizational growth; envisioning, adapting and leading change	
c. APFT:		DATE:		HEIGHT:		WEIGHT:	
d. OFFICER DEVELOPMENT - MANDATORY YES OR NO ENTRY FOR RATERS OF CPTs, LTs, CW2s, AND WO1s. WERE DEVELOPMENTAL TASKS RECORDED ON DA FORM 67-9-1a AND QUARTERLY FOLLOW-UP COUNSELINGS CONDUCTED? YES NO NA							

APPENDIX C

DATA SETS PERMITTED TO BE VIEWED BY USCG PROMOTION BOARDS

Data Sets:

Permitted to Be Viewed	Masked From View
Identification Data, General	Security Clearance Data
Pay Grade History Data	Family Data
Award Data	Personal Demographic Information
Assignment History	Pay & Service Length Information
Weight Data*	Sensitive Assignment Data
Separation Data	Medical Data
Performance Data	
Competency/Specialty Data	
Educational Data	

* Only specific instances of noncompliance and recompliance with CG Standards.

Removed from Previous Instruction:

CG-4916 Initial Active Duty Form
 CG-5500 Application for Direct Commission
 CGL-APP Letters of Appointment
 CGL-AV Letters of Designation as CG Aviator
 CGL-27 Letters for 27 Point Screening
 CG-GED Results
 DD-2366 Montgomery GI Bill Act of 1984

Source: U.S. Coast Guard, Documents Viewed by Coast Guard Officer Promotion and Special Boards, Commandant Instruction 1410.2 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, July 2006).


PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT	
<p>In accordance with 5 USC 552a(e) (3), The following information is provided to you when supplying personal information to the U. S. Coast Guard.</p>	
<p>1. AUTHORITY which authorized the solicitation of the information: 14 USC 633.</p>	
<p>2. PRINCIPAL PURPOSE(S) for which information may be used:</p> <div style="border: 1px solid red; padding: 2px;"> <p>(1) Factor in selection for promotion.</p> <p>(2) Factor in duty assignment.</p> <p>(3) Factor in selection for post graduate or specialized training.</p> </div>	
<p>3. The ROUTINE USES which may be made of the information: Same as above.</p>	
<p>4. Whether or not DISCLOSURE of such information is mandatory or voluntary and the effects on the individual, if any, of not providing all or any part of the requested information: Disclosure of the information is <u>voluntary, but is encouraged</u>. Non-disclosure may result in the possibility of diminished chances for selection for promotion or advanced education, or narrowed duty assignment options.</p>	
INSTRUCTIONS	
<p>1. Submit this form to the Commander, U.S. Coast Guard Personnel Command (Records Branch). Only one signed original is needed. Signature approval from the commanding officer is required.</p>	
<p>2. Only official transcripts or certified copies of transcripts will be accepted. No other attachments are authorized.</p>	
<p>3. Complete the form using the following authorized key word(s). Note: Use the provided examples to determine key word(s).</p>	
KEY WORD(S)	DESCRIPTIVE TITLE EXAMPLES (NON-INCLUSIVE)
UNDER GRAD DEGREE	
GRAD DEGREE	
ACADEMIC COURSES	
CG COURSES*	
CERTIFIED COURSES*	
DOD COURSES*	
QUALIFICATIONS*	
LICENSE	
PUBLISHED ARTICLE	
PROFESSIONAL SEMINAR	
LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY	

* Course work NOT documented in Administrative Remarks, DUINS OER, or OER

Source: U.S. Coast Guard, *Record of Professional Development, CG 4082*, February 2010, <http://www.uscg.mil/forms/cg/cg4082.pdf> (accessed 23 April 2011).

APPENDIX D

USA CGSC COURSE OVERVIEW



Source: U.S. Army, *SGA Briefing 11-01v3*, July 2010, slide 26, https://blackboard1.leavenworth.army.mil/webapps/portal/frameset.jsp?tab_tab_group_id=_2_1&url=%2Fwebapps%2Fblackboard%2Fexecute%2Flauncher%3Ftype%3DCourse%26id%3D_283_1%26url%3D (accessed 23 April 2011).

ADVANCED OPERATIONS COURSE (AOC) – ILE 10-01

TOTAL HOURS: 312

O100 - Campaign Planning		O200 - Force Generation		O300 - Major Combat Operations	
Title	Hours	Title	Hours	Title	Hours
O101- Intro (1/16)	2	O201- Global Force Management, Sourcing and synchronization	4	O311 - Tactical Battle Command & Operations	6
O102- JFACC (1/32)	4	O202- Modular Brigade Capabilities	2	O312- MCO- Air Support to FSO	2
O103- SOF support to the CFLCC (1/256)	2	O203- Generating Force Support to Forces	2	O313 - Tactical Sustainment	2
O104- Theater sustainment (1/32)	4	O204- Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Process	4	O320 - Planning Major Combat Operations	34
O105- USAID (1/16)	2	O205- Brigade Training (Training Strategy in ARFORGEN)	16	O399 - Executing Major Combat Operations	42
O199- Exercise (Develop a campaign plan using JOPP) (1/32)	50	O206 - Deploy the Brigade	2	Total	86
Total	64	O210- Airlift, Airspace, ISR	2	O400 - IW-Stability Operations	
		Total	32	O411 - Intro to Irregular Warfare	2
		K100 Contracting		O412 - Counterinsurgency	2
		K221 - Contracting Support to Operational Planning	2	O413 - Stability Operations I	4
		K222- Support & Readiness in ARFORGEN	2	O414 - Stability Operations I	4
		K223- Operational Contracting Support to FSO (Division Focus)	2	O420 - Planning in Irregular Warfare	22
		K224- Operational Contracting Support to FSO (Brigade Focus)	2	O499 - Execute Stability Operations in the BCT/J399 Conducted simultaneously with AFSC Maxwell	30
		Total	8	Total	64

USAF STUDENTS JA300: JOINT / AIR OPERATIONAL PROGRAM J399: JOINT PLANNING EX w/AFSC

S400: SOF STUDIES (FUNDAMENTALS: 24 HRS; ADVANCED: 32 HRS)

PARALLEL INSTRUCTION

H200 - Military Innovation in Peace and War		H300 - Roots of Today's Operational Environment	
Title	HRS	Title	HRS
H201- How Do Militaries Change?	2	H301 - People's Revolutionary War: America	2
H202- Interwar Mechanization	2	H302 - People's Revolutionary War: Mao	2
H203- Interwar Airpower Theory	2	H303- Nuclear and Limited War	2
H204- Carrier Airpower Between the Wars	2	H304- Vietnam I: Insurgency	2
H205- USMC Between the Wars	2	H305- Vietnam II: Vietnamization	2
H206- Blitzkrieg, 1939-40	2	H306- Transition in Post-Vietnam Era	2
H207- The Soviet-German Conflict	2	H307- Non-Western Way of War	2
H208- Midway/Battle of the Atlantic	2	H308- Post as Prologue	2
H209- Bloody Lessons of Island Hopping	2	Total	16
H210- Combined Bomber Offensive	2		
Total	20		

L200 - Leadership Applied	
Title	HRS
L201- Battle Command in Major Combat Operations	2
L202- Battle Command in Irregular Warfare	2
L203- Battle Command and Developing Leaders	3
L204- Battle Command and Decision Making	4
L205- Battle Command and Assessing	2
L206- Battle Command and Ethics in War	2
L207- Battle Command in a Multi-Cultural Environment	2
L208- Battle Command and Moral Courage	2
L209- Battle Command and Communications	2
L210- Battle Command Applied	2
Total	22

HISTORY **HISTORY**

LEADERSHIP

Source: U.S. Army, SGA Briefing 11-01v3, July 2010, slide 28, https://blackboard1.leavenworth.army.mil/webapps/portal/frameset.jsp?tab_tab_group_id=_2_1&url=%2Fwebapps%2Fblackboard%2Fexecute%2Flauncher%3Ftype%3DCourse%26id%3D_283_1%26url%3D (accessed 23 April 2011).

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