An Assessment of the Potential Operational Consequences of Russia Joining NATO.

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While it might currently be challenging to imagine Russia as a NATO member, a change to the future strategic context could make it equally difficult to imagine Russia outside of NATO. The historical analysis of NATO enlargement during the past sixty years yields insights into the operational consequences associated with the possible addition of Russia to the Alliance. The technical details of incorporating new members into the Alliance have remained relatively constant during the past sixty years. In addition, changes in the strategic context have continually redefined the feasibility and acceptability of NATO enlargement. However, factors specific to Russia present unique benefits and challenges that merit consideration prior to NATO extending the invitation to join the Alliance. Russia’s status as a great power could influence how it interacts with NATO and how the Alliance functions. The extension of NATO into Asia and the associated extension of the Article 5 security guarantee brings risk and opportunity for the Alliance. Indeed, extension into Asia may provide the interlocutor that is necessary to deal with adversarial regimes.

NATO, NATO enlargement, Russia, operational consequences, Russian joining NATO

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Abstract


While it might currently be challenging to imagine Russia as a NATO member, a change to the future strategic context could make it equally difficult to imagine Russia outside of NATO. The historical analysis of NATO enlargement during the past sixty years yields insights into the operational consequences associated with the possible addition of Russia to the Alliance. The technical details of incorporating new members into the Alliance have remained relatively constant during the past sixty years. In addition, changes in the strategic context have continually redefined the feasibility and acceptability of NATO enlargement. However, factors specific to Russia present unique benefits and challenges that merit consideration prior to NATO extending the invitation to join the Alliance. Russia’s status as a great power could influence how it interacts with NATO and how the Alliance functions. The extension of NATO into Asia and the associated extension of the Article 5 security guarantee brings risk and opportunity for the Alliance. Indeed, extension into Asia may provide the interlocutor that is necessary to deal with adversarial regimes.
**Table of Contents**

Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1  
1952 Expansion........................................................................................................................................ 5  
1999 Expansion..................................................................................................................................... 18  
2009 Expansion..................................................................................................................................... 35  
The Russia Factor.................................................................................................................................. 41  
Conclusion........................................................................................................................................... 49  
Bibliography....................................................................................................................................... 52
Introduction

While it might currently be challenging to imagine Russia as a NATO member, a change to the future strategic context could make it equally difficult to imagine Russia outside of NATO. The analysis of previous rounds of NATO enlargement informs the understanding of the potential operational consequences associated with the addition of Russia into the Alliance, however Russia also presents unique considerations that must be assessed prior to extending the invitation to Russia to join NATO. The idea of having Russia join NATO first surfaced in the post-Cold War period in a 1991 letter from President Boris Yeltsin to NATO. In this letter, Yeltsin stated that Alliance membership was a long-term Russian political aim.1 More recently, in 2009 the Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski publicly voiced the idea of inviting Russia to join NATO.2 In 2010, several influential German foreign policy experts wrote an open letter arguing in favor of inviting Russia to join NATO in the widely read German weekly newsmagazine, Der Spiegel.3 This monograph explores the potential operational consequences for the planning and conduct of operations associated with Russia becoming a NATO member.4

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4 Operational consequences are associated with the operational level of war. The operational level is not tied to a specific echelon. Rather it is associated with operational art and the function of linking tactical military actions to the achievement of strategic military and political goals. At the operational level, the military commander translates those goals into military missions by designing, organizing and conducting campaigns and major operations.
NATO was created in 1949 as a collective defense alliance between twelve Western European and North American countries to counter Soviet influence. It has endured over sixty years and has survived the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was the threat that prompted its creation. During that time, NATO has grown to twenty-eight member states through six rounds of expansion: 1952, 1955, 1982, 1999, 2004, and 2009.\(^5\) The ‘open door’ concept for expansion is a fundamental component of the Alliance and was included in the original North Atlantic Treaty. Article 10 of the 1949 Washington Treaty promulgates the ‘open door’ concept by stating that the Alliance remains open to new members provided they are in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and contribute to the collective defense of the North Atlantic Area.\(^6\) Expansion has therefore been an inherent component to the evolution of the Alliance. Indeed, NATO has repeatedly adapted to the external strategic environment or the internal constraints and desires of member states. The most significant external security environment changes included the end of the Cold War and the post-2001 focus on counter-terrorism.\(^7\) Internal constraints and desires include, but are not limited to the concept of burdensharing, ideas regarding the Alliance strategic concept, and the international relations of individual member states.\(^8\) However, dealing with the Soviet Union and, since 1991, with Russia has challenged NATO since its inception.

It is useful to consider three periods of NATO’s development during the past sixty years: the Cold War period from 1949 to 1989, the post-Cold War period from 1989 to 2001, and the


\(^7\) Mats Berdal, “NATO at 60,” *Survival*, vol. 51, no. 2 (April-May 2009), 57-61.

\(^8\) Ibid., 58.
The post-9/11 period from 2001 to present. During the first era, NATO was designed primarily to counter the Soviet Union and its satellite states. It was also designed to encourage political, economic and social cooperation among member states. The inclusion of fascist Portugal as an Alliance member in 1949 and the acceptance of the Greek military junta in the 1970s reflect that strategic security imperatives dominated political ideals. After the end of the Cold War, NATO’s focus changed to managing instability within and near the borders of the Alliance. NATO out-of-area peacekeeping operations in the Balkans highlight the change in focus. Post-9/11, NATO remains active in out-of-area operations and has become involved in countering emerging threats, such as counter-terrorism.

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During these three periods of NATO development, the debate regarding the relevancy of NATO has been continuous with many analysts claiming that NATO is in crisis.\textsuperscript{13} However, NATO has provided the essential defense and diplomatic link between European and North American Allies for over sixty years. NATO was formed in recognition of the fact that the existing European powers could not provide an effective counterbalance to the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{14} NATO has continually adapted to changes in the strategic context and remains a relevant organization.\textsuperscript{15} Therefore, the specifics of the relevancy debate are beyond the scope of this monograph. This monograph assumes that NATO will continue to exist and adapt to future strategic contexts.

This monograph uses three cases studies that span the three periods of NATO development to analyze previous rounds of NATO enlargement. Each case surveys external geopolitical factors and internal Alliance constraints and desires as well as identifying the key issues involved in the expansion debate. The operational consequences associated with each round of expansion in terms of environmental, friendly force and threat factors, and the mechanisms developed by NATO to deal with the consequences are addressed. The first case study is the 1952 expansion when Turkey and Greece joined the Alliance. This case study illustrates the Cold War period and emphasizes the study of the evolution of the Alliance based on the threat of communist expansion. The second case study examines the 1999 inclusion of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. This case study represents the post-Cold War period and


highlights the formalized enlargement process that evolved from this round of expansion. The third case is the 2009 accession of Albania and Croatia and represents the post-9/11 timeframe, with particular attention to the internal constraints and desires of member states. Insights from these case studies are used to inform an analysis of the potential operational consequences for the planning and execution of operations should NATO enlarge to include Russia.

1952 Expansion

Consideration of the 1952 addition of Greece and Turkey to NATO must begin with the 1948 Brussels Treaty. Attention is then given to the states included in the talks leading to the North Atlantic Treaty. NATO has its origins in the 1948 Brussels Treaty that included Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. These European states, especially Britain, sought to expand the scope of this alliance and engage the United States to prevent American isolationism and maintain U.S. involvement with the defense of Europe.\(^\text{16}\) During the 1948-1949 North Atlantic Treaty discussions, Alliance members considered Greece and Turkey too remote to be of concern. As the idea of creating a military organization to complement the collective security arrangement evolved, Greece and Turkey were viewed as a potential drain on military strength away from the key area of Western Europe and the Atlantic.\(^\text{17}\)

American involvement in Greece and Turkey, however, predate the formation of NATO. The defining moment for Greek, Turkish and American cooperation was the March 1947 address by the American President Harry Truman to a joint session of the Senate and the House of


Representatives. The official articulation of the “Truman Doctrine” began significant American involvement in Greece and Turkey and foreshadowed the European Recovery Program (ERP), also known as the Marshall Plan. Increased American involvement recognized the decline of British influence in these countries, primarily due to post-World War II (WWII) British financial difficulties. The aim of the Truman Doctrine, as the foundation of the policy to contain communism, was to attract Greece and Turkey to the West and to secure them from the expansionist communist Soviet Union. Since Greece and Turkey were considered vulnerable to communist influence, financial aid from the United States provided via the ERP was augmented by military aid. The rejection of financial aid via the ERP by the Soviets and their influence over satellite countries to do the same cemented the division of Europe into two blocks of power. The demonstrated intention of the Soviet Union to expand its sphere of communist influence by any means was the impetus for the creation of NATO. Indeed, the invasion South Korea confirmed for many the willingness of the Soviet Union to use outright aggression to expand communism. American involvement in Europe to support the recovery of post-WWII

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18 The ERP was the logical successor to the thrust of the Truman Doctrine. The ERP was committed to the reconstruction of Europe and did not initially distinguish between the provision of aid to friendly nations and those nominally in the Soviet sphere of influence. The Soviets sent a delegation to the Paris Conference but subsequently withdrew and forbade their proxies to participate. John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War* (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), 32.


economic and political institutions was necessary to recreate a European balance of power.\textsuperscript{24} By 1952, the strategic imperatives of the containment of communism dominated the U.S.-led decision to expand NATO.\textsuperscript{25} Considerations of democratic government and civil-military relations did not weigh heavily in the decision to invite Greece and Turkey to join NATO.

The origins of NATO reside in the geopolitical aftermath of WWII. The fates of Italy, Norway, Greece, Turkey and Czechoslovakia, among others, were very much undecided in 1948. It was uncertain if they would align with the communist bloc, the democratic world, or adopt some other position.\textsuperscript{26} Diplomatic negotiation between the most powerful countries, the United States, Great Britain, France and, to a lesser extent, Belgium, Canada, Luxemburg and the Netherlands revolved around how to secure the West against the threat of communist expansion.\textsuperscript{27} The United Kingdom, France, Belgium and the Netherlands also had concerns regarding the security of their colonies, primarily in Africa.\textsuperscript{28} The original intent of the primary negotiating group—Belgium, Canada, Luxembour, the Netherlands, the U.K., and the U.S.—had been to agree to the terms of the treaty and then decide which other states to invite to join.


\textsuperscript{25} Kaplan writes “Against the better judgments of the northern allies, the United States led the way to bring Greece and Turkey into NATO.” See Lawrence S. Kaplan, \textit{NATO Divided, NATO United} (Westport: Praeger, 2004), 72.  


\textsuperscript{27} The European delegates favored the Brussels Treaty countries plus the United States and Canada forming an alliance. The Scandinavian countries and Portugal were needed to provide “stepping stones” across the Atlantic and France wanted Italy to gain a Mediterranean partner. See Lawrence S. Kaplan, \textit{NATO Divided, NATO United} (Westport: Praeger, 2004), 3.  

Other countries, however, became aware of the discussions, approached the negotiation group, assessed the situation and some countries made applications to join. Iceland, Norway and Portugal were invited to the discussion based on the geostrategic assets that they could provide, such as forward basing or the denial of access to the Soviets.

Each country had their specific concerns and agenda; for example, the French wanted Italy to join NATO to have a Mediterranean partner, the United States wanted Portugal to join to provide staging bases, and Denmark and Norway opposed Greek and Turkish membership. At the 1948 Pentagon talks, the United States and United Kingdom expressed support for Greek, Turkish, and Iranian defense separately from North Atlantic Treaty discussions, since these countries were still not considered “Western.” Initially, the contribution that Denmark and Norway provided allowed them to influence the debate sufficiently to exclude Greece and Turkey from the Alliance, despite the desire by those two countries to join the Alliance. However, by 1951, the United States initiated a proposal to invite the two Mediterranean countries to join the

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33 Turkey provided a written note to the U.S. and U.K. governments at the Foreign Minister level stating their desire to join the North Atlantic Treaty. This was supported by numerous informal approaches stating the same desire. Greek approaches were less formal but clearly demonstrate an interest in joining the North Atlantic Pact. See Frederick Aandahl and William Z. Slany, eds., *Foreign Relations of the United States 1948*, vol. III: *Western Europe* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1974), 321.
Alliance based on the strategic imperative to secure NATO’s southern flank and contain the spread of communism.\textsuperscript{34} In the end, the United States got its way, Denmark and Norway demurred, and Greece and Turkey were invited into NATO.

NATO evolved as an alliance between 1949 and 1952. The first strategic concept was articulated in 1949 and focused on the “integrated defense of the North Atlantic area.”\textsuperscript{35} After a slow start, some tangible evidence of the commitment of the participants began to develop.\textsuperscript{36} In response to the desire that the Alliance integrate political, military and financial issues in a comprehensive manner, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) was formed in 1951 and included the military committee, the defense production board and the financial and economic board.\textsuperscript{37} All of these efforts reflected anticipated consequences of Alliance operations. NATO established a command architecture under the Military Committee to integrate multinational forces for planning and operations. The establishment of the Military Agency for Standardization promoted interoperability of operational and administrative procedures and the purchase of weapons and equipment, thereby beginning the formation of Alliance institutional mechanisms.\textsuperscript{38} The Korean War, with the associated demonstration of communist expansionism, provided the catalyst for


\textsuperscript{35} Lord Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years 1949-1954 (Utrecht: Bosch-Utrecht, 1954), 27.


\textsuperscript{37} Lord Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years 1949-1954 (Utrecht: Bosch-Utrecht, 1954), 41-42.

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., 79.
Alliance members, in particular the United States, to re-examine the desire of Turkey and Greece to join NATO.³⁹

The modern Turkish Republic emerged out of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I (WWI). The Ottoman Empire ceased to exist and the Turkish Republic was born with the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923.⁴⁰ Turkey remained neutral during WWII and maintained diplomatic and economic ties with both the Axis and the Allied powers. Turkey broke off relations with Nazi Germany in 1944 as a precondition for participation in the formation of the United Nations and later became one of the original fifty-one members of the United Nations.⁴¹ In the development of the post-WWII spheres of influence between East and West, Turkey sought inclusion in Europe. Turkey made this decision based on its history of conflict with Russia, especially strategic concerns regarding the status of the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits that connect the Black Sea to the Mediterranean.⁴² Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin pressed diplomatically for territorial concessions and basing rights in Turkey that would provide the Soviet Union effective control over the Straits.⁴³ Soviet pressure reinforced Turkish desire to align itself with the West and Turkey received significant financial aid and support from the United States. Turkey also sought NATO membership to counterbalance the Soviet threat,


particularly to control of the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits. In fact, Turkey’s desire to join the North Atlantic Treaty and the subsequent denial of membership in 1949 put the Turkish government in a difficult position. At this time, NATO’s main objective in the Mediterranean was to deny the navy bases from which the Soviet navy could threaten lines of communication and economic trade routes. This begs the question of why NATO did not invite Turkey to join when the Alliance was created in 1949.

Objections to including Turkey in the North Atlantic Treaty began when the Alliance was originally formed. Both strategic and ideological objections were raised against inviting Turkey to join NATO. The strategic arguments rested on the remoteness of Turkey, that it was not connected to any other NATO member, its proximity to the Balkans and the extension of the Alliance into the Middle East. The ideological arguments focused on the Islamic faith of much of the Turkish population and the view from Europe that the Turks were an Asiatic people and thus not Western. This debate reflected the consensus decision making that is the foundation of the NATO process. The start of the Korean War in 1950, and the deployment of Turkish soldiers to Korea, provided sufficient impetus to challenge the objections and bring Turkey closer to the West. Indeed, the fear of communist expansion prompted the NAC to “associate” the Greek and Turkish governments with the NATO Southern European-Western Mediterranean Regional

Planning Group in 1950 for planning for the defense of the Mediterranean area. The dialogue for the expansion of NATO had begun and existing NATO members were ready to acknowledge the desire of Turkey to join the Alliance. NATO also considered bringing Greece into the Alliance at the same time.

Greece emerged from WWII with a fragile government in exile in Egypt. British forces evicted the occupying German forces out of the country. The Greek population was politically divided between supporters of the restored monarchy and communism. Greece was at a crossroads between communism and democracy and the outcome would be decided by a civil war that lasted from 1944 to 1949. Direct British military involvement in the civil war and American financial and military aid supported the anti-communist government and military forces. By 1949 the monarchists had won the civil war, aligning Greece with the Western powers. An unstable peace was produced and political turmoil resulted in a series of elections where no single party could gain a majority. Greek security and governance were dependent on British, and later American, financial and military aid. Therefore, the government pursued NATO membership or the formation of another alliance incorporating American military and economic support. By 1952, the U.S. was heavily involved in Greek politics and tried to influence events though negotiation and the provision of aid. The actions of Western countries, primarily the U.S. and


Britain, were in line with the policy of the containment of communism and reflected the principles of the Truman Doctrine.\(^{52}\)

The objections raised to inviting Greece to join NATO in 1949 were similar to the objections towards Turkey; however, with greater religious and cultural affinity between Greeks and the European members of the North Atlantic Treaty, strategic geopolitical considerations and the recent civil war were paramount factors in the exclusion of Greece from the Alliance.\(^{53}\) The objections also reflected the state of contemporary internal North Atlantic Treaty member relations. Britain was interested in developing a separate Middle East Command that would leverage Commonwealth and Arab countries.\(^{54}\) All of the European countries, with the exception of Italy, viewed the expansion of NATO as a drain of resources—primarily U.S. resources—away from Western Europe and their own strategic interests.\(^{55}\)

By 1950 objections to the inclusion of Greece and Turkey into the North Atlantic Treaty were diminished, in part, by the Korean War.\(^{56}\) The demonstrated capacity for communist governments to take great risk to expand their sphere of influence promoted increasing Western collective defense arrangements and diverting aid economic to military resources.\(^{57}\) The Turkish and Greek military contribution to the Korean War drew them even closer to the West and

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53 Ferenc A. Vali, *The Turkish Straits and NATO* (Stanford, California: Hoover, 1972), 83.


56 Ibid., 192.

demonstrated their military capabilities and political will. The unstable peace, the continued threat of communist takeover in Greece and the anticipation that Turkey would not be able to resist being surrounded by communist states if Greece became communist resulted in the two countries being invited to join NATO in the fall of 1951. At this point, both the Allies and the aspirant countries determined that expanding NATO would be mutually beneficial. NATO had determined that Greece and Turkey were necessary to secure the southern flank and supply a significant number of troops. Greece and Turkey viewed NATO as a guarantor of security versus communism. Greece and Turkey rejected alternative regional security cooperation arrangements, such as the establishment of a Middle East organization, and insisted that military cooperation should occur through NATO.

The inclusion of Greece and Turkey into NATO provided several operational consequences for the planning and execution of Alliance operations. In addition to the routine tactical implications associated with the conduct of multinational operations, there were several specific operational implications. The extension of the Article 5 security guarantee to geographically remote countries with the potential threat of Soviet attack was the most significant operational implication. More specifically, NATO extended their security guarantee over a vast geographical distance without adding any capacity to transport NATO forces from Western

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Europe theater to the Mediterranean theater. The most significant operational advantage of Turkey joining NATO was to deny the Soviet Union the ability to transit naval warships from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean undetected or close the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits completely. Control of the Straits secured the Mediterranean shipping routes and military lines of communication. Turkey also provided a substantial land force, between 500,000 and 750,000 soldiers, and was capable of providing marked resistance to Soviet aggression on a second front. Several challenges arose from including Greece and Turkey in NATO. Greece and Turkish Thrace offer little operational or strategic depth and have highly restrictive terrain that does not favor mobile, mechanized operations. By contrast, eastern Anatolia provides sufficient depth to support mechanized formations but lacks the developed infrastructure that is common to Western Europe, which is necessary for mechanized operations. The lack of depth in one area and the lack of the necessary infrastructure in the other provided NATO with the challenge of conducting a shallow defense against a numerically superior enemy. A shallow defense argues for a strong forward defense, which pulls resources away from the strategic concerns of the Western European Allies and speaks to the initial Western European arguments against the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in NATO.

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62 One key difference between NATO’s Southern Region and the Central Front was that Southern Region states were almost completely responsible for their own defense. However, NATO also recognized that the viability of the NATO regional strategy would rely upon assets located in other theaters. The decision to allocate resources to the Southern Region would be a function of resources available and political will. See Center for Strategic & International Studies, *NATO’s Southern Region: Strategy and Resources for Coalition Defense* (Washington: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 1988), 1 and 11.

63 Ferenc A. Vali, *The Turkish Straits and NATO* (Stanford, California: Hoover, 1972), 83.


Western European countries—with the exception of Italy—hinders the deployment of reserve forces in a timely manner. NATO questioned if Greek and Turkish forward defenses could hold long enough to permit reserves from Western Europe to arrive.

Three concepts arose from the difficulty of reinforcing Greece and Turkey and the lack of depth for defensive operations. First, forward basing of air assets and intelligence gathering infrastructure were established to increase the warning time of Soviet attack and improve air support for the forward defense. Bi-lateral status of forces agreements and basing rights were negotiated that permitted the U.S. to address these concerns. Second, naval assets had to secure control of the sea to allow the deployment of land reserves. The ability of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet to disrupt the sea lines of communication had to be eliminated. If the Black Sea fleet could consistently pass into the Mediterranean unmolested, defensive requirements would drain naval assets away from Western Europe and the vital sea lines of communication between North America and Europe. Therefore, Turkey was supported with military aid to exercise control over the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits to prevent Soviet warships and submarines from interfering with NATO vessels in the Mediterranean. Lastly, despite the history of tension between Greece and Turkey and their most recent war 1921-1922, an integrated command and


control structure was established. The Commander Allied Forces Southeastern Europe and Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Mediterranean (CINCAFMED) military commands were established in Turkey to facilitate the integration of multinational forces.

The decision to extend the invitation to Greece and Turkey to join NATO was taken at the seventh session of the NAC between 15-20 September, 1951. However, the formal invitation to join the Alliance required each existing member state to agree to the inclusion of Greece and Turkey and ratify the idea within their own legislative procedures. The official invitation to join NATO was provided in the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Greece and Turkey, dated 22 October, 1951. The ninth session of the North Atlantic Council pronounced that Greece and Turkey had accessed to the Alliance effective 18 February, 1952. The first round of NATO expansion was official. The contrast between this round of expansion and the first post-Cold War expansion could not be more stark.


1999 Expansion

The 1999 enlargement of NATO has its origins in the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. It reflects the military rapprochement between former adversaries and it occurred during the same timeframe as the economic and political expansion of the European Union (EU). The demise of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact forced NATO to redefine itself and adapt to a new security environment. Discussion about the changing role of NATO and expansion began quickly after the fall of the Soviet Union; however, NATO proceeded slowly with expansion due to uncertainty about how German reunification would affect the region, concerns regarding the ability of the identified countries to meet certain admission requirements and to sensitivities towards Russian concerns with NATO expansion.

As early as 1990, NATO and former adversaries were discussing publicly the expansion of the Alliance. At the 1994 NATO Summit, U.S. President Bill Clinton announced that it was no longer a question of whether NATO would enlarge, but only a question of when and how. This prompted NATO’s 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement that sought to define an improved security architecture in terms of political, economic and defense components. The Study concluded why

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77 NATO was concerned about how Russia would react to NATO enlargement and Russia vocally opposed NATO expansion. Jonathan Eyal, “NATO’s Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision,” International Affairs, vol. 73, no. 4 (1997): 699.
NATO should enlarge, defined principles of enlargement, and recommended how NATO should enlarge.\(^{80}\) It confirmed the ‘open-door’ policy of NATO that welcomes all European countries to join the Alliance, provided they met certain criteria.\(^{81}\) The 1999 enlargement has significantly influenced current thinking about expansion. The operational implications of the 1999 expansion focused on reforming military structures and institutions in former communist countries as well as the interoperability of equipment and technology between former adversaries. Enlargement also brought the question of economic and military burdensharing to the forefront as the threat of war in Europe subsided and states sought to reduce military expenditures.\(^{82}\) In addition, the Alliance undertook new missions, such as peacekeeping and building rapid reaction forces.

In response to the end of the Cold War and the profound political changes that happened in Central and Eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s, NATO published a new Strategic Concept in 1991. The 1991 Strategic Concept maintained a European focus and promoted the transition away from the Cold War forward defense posture. The Strategic Concept maintained a weariness of the Soviet Union but identified internal threats, such as economic, social and political instability, as the main sources of insecurity. The overall objective of the Strategic Concept was to preserve the strategic balance in Europe.\(^{83}\) But the strategic context was changing rapidly.


\(^{82}\) The U.S. government sought to drastically reduce their military commitment to Europe, see Frank R. Douglas, *The United States, NATO, and a New Multilateral Relationship* (Westport: Praeger Security International), 78.

NATO had already invited Russia, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Hungarian Republic, the Republic of Poland, the People's Republic of Bulgaria, and Romania to establish diplomatic relations with the Alliance in July 1990. However, NATO continued to be wary of Russian capabilities and intentions. The balance between the expansion of NATO and aggravating Russia was a critical issue. Nonetheless, the U.S. was so powerful in relation to Russia, its European NATO allies and former Soviet bloc countries that once the U.S. decided on a policy of NATO enlargement, there was little that foreign governments could do to stop it. NATO established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NAC-C) in 1990 to bring together the NATO Allies with former Warsaw Pact adversaries and non-aligned European states. The implementation of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in 1994 provided a mechanism to satisfy the desires of NATO to expand its influence, permit Eastern European states to have rapprochement with NATO and minimize the impact of expansion as a hostile act towards Russia. The successor to the NAC-C, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), was


86 The decision by any other country to veto the U.S.-supported NATO enlargement may have resulted in adverse political or economic consequences against the country that opposed U.S. intentions. James M. Goldgeier, Not Whether But When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO (Washington: Brookings Institute Press, 1999), 4.


established in 1997 and provided a venue for multilateral political cooperation while the PfP provided the venue for bilateral military cooperation.\(^{89}\)

Analysis of the 1999 round of NATO enlargement must include consideration of the concurrent expansion ideas of the EU. The EU represents a portion of the European members of NATO, but does not provide a voice for the North American countries. After the end of the Cold War, the traditional roles of NATO and the EU were reevaluated, with NATO becoming more interested in non-security matters and the EU taking on greater responsibility for European security.\(^{90}\) However, the internal EU consternation after the signing of the 1991 Maastricht Treaty that deepened European integration likely caused the EU and member countries to become wary of the inclusion of other states.\(^{91}\) Indeed, NATO enlargement was a mechanism to foster many of the aspects of reform that the EU desired in potential new member states without having to assume all of the risk associated with new countries joining the EU.

The debate surrounding NATO enlargement has been categorized as muted and the actual debate within the Alliance is even more difficult to dissect.\(^{92}\) Two critical questions needed answers: should NATO accept new members and if so, which countries should be invited? There

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were a number of arguments in favor of enlargement. These included that NATO should be responsive to requests to join the Alliance by Central and Eastern European states. Some argued that NATO membership would help improve stability in Central and Eastern European states by preventing a power vacuum from forming and preventing Russia from destabilizing the region. In addition, it was thought that NATO membership would free Central and Eastern European politicians to focus on domestic reforms by ensuring their national sovereignty. Proponents of expansion also argued that enlargement would help keep NATO alive and vibrant, that it was advantageous to expand while Russia was weakened and that NATO could not allow Russia to exercise a de-facto veto over the enlargement decision by their opposition to expansion.

Opponents to enlargement stated that there was no threat that necessitated expansion of the Alliance, eastern expansion created a new division within Europe and, perhaps, among Central and Eastern European states and that offering membership to certain states could have adverse political and military impacts on those states not invited to join. Opponents also argued that expansion could ruin NATO by weakening the Alliance by allowing weaker countries to join and that NATO would not have sufficient forces to devote to defense, especially when existing members began reducing military expenditures and shrinking force size.93

Germany and the U.S. were the leading proponents of NATO enlargement, and they supported the inclusion of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.94 France, Italy, Greece and Turkey supported membership for Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria based on their support of recent NATO operations in the Balkans. The Nordic states supported entry for Estonia, Latvia


and Lithuania, but most of the other Allies (including the U.S., Britain, Germany, France and Italy) opposed them as unready. Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Spain and Portugal did not oppose proposals for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia made by other Allies, but disputed the Baltic states. The U.K. opposed all expansion based on the assessment that none of the countries proposed were ready to join, but decided not to use their veto on expansion.95 Outside of NATO, Russia vocally opposed NATO enlargement. The Russian delegation walked out of their PfP signing ceremony in 1994 in protest of NATO’s ongoing consideration regarding expansion. Russian President Boris Yeltsin warned of Europe being plunged into a ‘cold peace’ should NATO expand.96 Russian opposition fueled concerns within the Alliance of providing Russia with a de-facto veto over NATO policy, therefore NATO developed the PfP and the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council.97

After the Cold War, several key milestones occurred that facilitated enlargement in 1999. The 1990 London NATO Summit Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Treaty Organization initiated the rapprochement with their former adversaries and began the debate

97 The stated objectives of the PfP were to help applicant members facilitate the transparency in national defense planning and budget processes, ensure democratic control of defense forces, maintain the capability and readiness to contribute to operations under the authority of the United Nations, develop cooperative military relations with NATO, and develop forces that are better able to operate with NATO forces. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Partnership for Peace: Framework Document,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization Official Texts, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_text_24469.htm?mode=pressrelease (accessed 20 August, 2011).
regarding enlargement. The 1991 Rome Summit introduced a new Strategic Concept that focused on engaging in political and military dialogue between NATO and Central and Eastern European countries. In 1994, the Brussels Summit introduced the PfP initiative to deepen the structures for cooperation that had already been established. These events laid the groundwork for the 1997 Madrid Summit where the decision to invite Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic to join NATO occurred. The three countries officially became NATO members in December 1999, fifty years after the formation of the Alliance. The years between the collapse of the Soviet Union and inviting the new members to join were full of uncertainty for NATO, for the potential member countries, and in the emerging security environment.

Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland were the former Warsaw Pact countries that displayed the greatest post-communist progress towards political and economic reform. They were also the geographically closest to Western Europe among the former Warsaw Pact countries. With the exception of the Bulgarian border with Greece and Turkey and the 196 km border between Norway and Russia, Czechoslovakia and Poland were the only former Warsaw Pact states to share a border with a NATO country. The inclusion of Czechoslovakia would have


provided Hungary a border with NATO as well. The dissolution of Czechoslovakia and the drift of Slovakia eastwards, however, isolated Hungary geographically. Previous expansion to geographically remote countries such as Greece and Turkey provided precedence for the expansion of NATO to isolated countries. The close geographic proximity and shared history of coerced inclusion in the Soviet communist bloc made the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia natural geopolitical choices for the first round of post-Cold War NATO expansion.  

Each of the four countries actively pursued relations with NATO through the NAC-C and PfP. Poland was strategically located between Germany and Russia, was resource rich, and had a large population in the mid-1990s, factors that could permit it to make significant contributions to NATO. Poland’s transition from the communist government of the Cold War towards democracy progressed through a multistage, evolutionary process. The transition process was negotiated between the communist regime and influential politicians who had popular public support, such as Lech Walesa. The transition was also supported by domestic organizations such as the Catholic Church and the Solidarity trade union. The Polish government was very motivated to join the Alliance after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. Poland was the third country to join the PfP program, in 1994, and the first to establish the Individual Partnership Program. The Individual Partnership Program included Polish participation in peacekeeping missions, joint


104 James W. Peterson, “Conflicting Obligations: The Impact of NATO Membership on Its Ten Newest Members” (conference proceedings, Georgia Political Science Association, Savannah, Georgia, 2005).

exercises with NATO countries, changes to air defense capabilities, convergence of command and control and communications systems with NATO systems and, most significantly, improvements to the democratic control of military forces by the elected government.\textsuperscript{106} Poland also adapted its budget and acquisitions program to focus on interoperability with NATO, including equipment and force structure.\textsuperscript{107}

The integration of Polish forces under the PfP program was not without problems. NATO did not release all of the Standard NATO Agreements (STANAGs) to Polish forces, which prevented integration of certain capabilities. Poland also possessed a large amount of legacy equipment that would take many years to modernize. This equipment was not interoperable with NATO equipment, especially weapons systems and communication equipment. Finally, officer training and career development changes were required to bring Polish battalions to the standard expected of a NATO battalion.\textsuperscript{108} English language training would also have to accelerate for Polish officers since Poland would be required to fill up to three hundred NATO officer billets.\textsuperscript{109} Poland would integrate division-size units with NATO, which emphasized the requirement to replace communications, command and control systems with NATO compatible systems. The 1997 invitation to join NATO eliminated some of the barriers to the integration of military forces that existed during the PfP years, and it provided NATO with greater influence over Polish military decisions.


Hungary entered the post-Cold War period in a similar fashion to Poland; the democratic transformation was evolutionary, not revolutionary. However, there were no well-known leaders for the people to rally around. Instead, the ruling Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party (HSWP) negotiated multiparty elections with eight opposing parties in 1990.\textsuperscript{110} The newly elected government initiated defense reform to establish effective civilian control over the military.\textsuperscript{111} Fundamental reforms were required to transition the military from the centralized communist system to a democratic state system. The structure of civilian government authority over the military also had to be established since uniformed military personnel had provided oversight under the former communist system.\textsuperscript{112} This involved drafting a new constitution to define the responsibilities of the president, government, and National Assembly as well as designate who had the authority to employ military forces within the country and outside of the country.

Hungary began work on their plan to join NATO even before the announcement of the PfP program. In November, 1994, Hungary was the fifth nation to join the PfP program, which was preceded by a multinational exercise with British forces in Hungary that highlighted the technical requirements and linguistic challenges of working with NATO forces.\textsuperscript{113} Hungary faced financial challenges that prevented increased exercise participation with NATO forces. In addition to financial challenges, the Hungarian people became uncertain if they wanted to join

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another alliance. Popular support for military expenditure at the expense of social programs was weak. After being invited to join the Alliance, the government put the question of joining NATO to a referendum in 1997. Even after the invitation to join the Alliance, all of the existing member states needed to ratify the protocol to allow the new members to join. Financial difficulties and the potential for low popular support, either through low acceptance of joining NATO or low voter turnout, threatened the support of the existing members necessary to join NATO. In the end, 85% of Hungarians voted in favor of joining NATO and all of the Alliance member states accepted their accession.  

In contrast to Poland and Hungary, Czechoslovakia threw off the cloak of communism in 1989 in a manner that left former power brokers with little influence in government institutions. The previous authoritarian regime of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic collapsed after it used military forces to suppress a demonstration in Prague and the popular leader Vaclav Havel rallied the opposition parties into a united front. After the election of Havel to President in December 1989, the defense forces were renamed the Czechoslovak Army in an attempt to redefine the apolitical character expected from the military. Havel initiated constitutional reform and appointed a civilian as Defense Minister to bring the military under increased civilian control.


The dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993, known as the Velvet Divorce, caused the Czech Republic and Slovakia to initiate separate constitutional reforms.\textsuperscript{117} The Czech Republic initiated major reforms to the military in pursuit of integration into NATO. The Army began screening professional soldiers to eliminate those involved in suppressing the 1989 revolution and reduce the number of personnel by 10,000. The Czech Army also began the process of reequipping the military and changing the organizational structure from the Soviet-style towards the NATO model. A Rapid Deployment Brigade, designed to be compatible with NATO forces, was created to train for cooperation with NATO forces.\textsuperscript{118} The Czech Republic joined the PfP program in March, 1994 and became the eleventh member. After this point, the Czech military shrank in size in order to become more efficient. The Air Force eliminated four hundred aircraft. The Czech military pursued NATO compatible communications systems, radars, computer systems and technically and linguistically capable officers as their top priority.\textsuperscript{119} The defense minister supported the organizational and equipment modernization with his emphasis on the development of a career structure, professional military education and increased discipline.\textsuperscript{120} In contrast to Hungary, the Czech Republic understood and accepted that integration into NATO would not be cheap and Czech leaders determined that paying the price for NATO integration was worthwhile. The government also established a special interagency Committee of Foreign


\textsuperscript{120} Jeffrey Simon, \textit{NATO and the Czech & Slovak Republics} (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 35.
and Defense Ministry personnel to produce a “National Plan of Compatibility with NATO” in response to the 1995 *Study on NATO Enlargement*. The Czech Republic’s efforts to address the military, political and economic concerns raised by the *Study on NATO Enlargement* contrast with the efforts of Slovakia, just as their fates in joining NATO in 1999 were opposite.

The decision to exclude Slovakia from the 1999 round of expansion provides insight into the matters that NATO considered areas of concern for enlargement, particularly the rise of ideological values and the demise of the prominence of geopolitics. It would have been natural to invite Slovakia to join NATO at the same time as the Czech Republic and the inclusion of Slovakia would have provided Hungary with a border to other NATO countries. However, without a popular leader, such as Vaclav Havel in the Czech Republic or Lech Walesa in Poland, the tension in politics increased after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. After the Velvet Divorce, the Slovak government descended into rival factions vying for power. Between 1992 and 1998, Slovakia had four different governments.

The ongoing political tensions between President Michal Kovac and Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar were highlighted in 1995 when Meciar accused Kovac of making illegal demands from government officials in a failed attempt to remove Kovac from power. Several other examples of disregard for the law and democratic political process were evident between 1995 and 1998. Meciar gradually emerged as the dominant political leader and developed an authoritarian system. Meciar’s political style, however, pushed Slovakia away from democracy,

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121 Ibid., 44.
122 Eva Strelka-Jenkins, *Slovakia’s Journey to NATO Membership* (Slovak Republic: PTK-ECHO, 2003), 77.
123 Peter A. Toma and Dušan Kováč, *Slovakia: From Samo to Dzurinda* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2001), 286.
increased internal tensions and alienated the country from Western integration. In an attempt to gain support for joining NATO, Kovac initiated a referendum on joining NATO in 1997. The result of the referendum was declared invalid because less than 10% of the population voted, which reflected the declining public support to joining NATO. Slovakia also faced a challenge in dealing with the large Hungarian minority that resided within their border. Ethnic Hungarian government officials boycotted votes to protest their treatment by the Slovak majority, causing international condemnation of the Slovak government and further destabilized the fragile political system. More importantly for NATO inclusion, civilian control of the military would be impossible if the political environment was not more stable.

The Slovak military was small when compared to the other leading nations being considered for enlargement, with only 47,000 troops in 1993. Additionally, the Slovak government faced immediate challenges in creating the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic since military planning and leadership had been centralized in Prague while part of Czechoslovakia. Therefore, Slovakia had to create a new defense ministry, a new army command and a new army. To do so, troops had to redeploy from the former Czechoslovakian army and swear allegiance to Slovakia. More significantly, Slovakia had to build the infrastructure to support the army, develop a military education system, prepare new military doctrine and organize in a manner that would be compatible with NATO forces.

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Despite the challenges, Slovakia took steps towards NATO. Slovakia joined the PfP in May, 1994 and participated in the NAC-C. Slovakia also deployed forces to the former Yugoslavia under a United Nations mandate where they worked alongside several NATO countries. Ultimately, in 1997 NATO decided that Slovakia had not made sufficient progress to develop NATO-integrated forces and the authoritarian regime of Mericar was not compatible with the Alliance.\textsuperscript{126} Slovakia was not included in the first round of post-Cold War expansion.

Advocates and opponents to expansion used the operational implications of the 1999 enlargement to argue their respective cases. Proponents of enlargement argued that extending NATO security to the east would provide a stabilizing influence and prevent conflict between and within states. Germany, in particular, sought to expand NATO to the east to enhance their economic investments, engage the U.S. in the region through the Alliance and move potential future zones of conflict away from its borders.\textsuperscript{127} Opponents to enlargement argued that NATO would become embroiled in regional ethnic conflicts, existing Allies would be required to pay for military upgrades in former Warsaw Pact countries, and that enlargement would needlessly antagonize Russia.\textsuperscript{128} The 1995 \textit{Study on NATO Enlargement} sought to prevent existing internal ethnic tensions from becoming Alliance security concerns by requiring prospective members to resolve ethnic disputes in a peaceful manner prior to admission into NATO. The Study also

\textsuperscript{126} Marco Rimanelli, \textit{Historical Dictionary of NATO and Other International Security Organizations} (Lanham, Maryland: Scarecrow Press, 2009), 541.


addressed concerns regarding Russian sensibilities to NATO enlargement and argued that dialogue through the NAC-C would mitigate Russian concerns.129

Operational implications included modifying the force structures to be compatible with NATO capabilities and upgrading antiquated infrastructure to sustain and support the deployment of NATO forces. A significant consideration was that the new members did not provide any additional strategic transportation assets to facilitate the deployment of NATO forces to their territory. Necessary infrastructure upgrades included the road, rail networks, logistics depots and air bases. All of these came with an associated price tag that was beyond the capacity of the new members to pay. U.S. estimates put the price of including the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in range between $27 to $125 billion, with the Clinton Administration accepting a U.S. State Department estimate of between $27-$35 billion over a twelve-year period.130 Proponents of expansion expected the European allies to shoulder much of the cost while opponents expected the U.S. to be asked for most of the money. In addition, NATO had to determine if existing deployment structures were appropriate: should existing members station forces in the new member states or would forces respond to an attack from existing locations?131 Finally, each of the new members added additional military capability to the Alliance, with Poland adding the largest military force. The unanswered question was whether the increase in manpower and depth justified the expense required to modernize these forces.


131 Richard L. Kugler, Enlarging NATO: The Russia Factor (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996), 240.
This round of expansion also highlighted the paradox of requiring aspirant countries to meet certain criteria while not providing them with the necessary information to achieve the specified standards. Indeed, NATO was faced with determining how much information they should provide to PfP members as they worked towards membership. The operational consequences for the planning and conduct of operations associated with compatible command and control processes are more significant than those associated with equipment interoperability. NATO appears to have minimized the former and emphasized the later; moreover, NATO shifted the risk associated with enlargement to the aspirant countries. However, internal to NATO, by 1999 the process for Alliance enlargement was formalized and a template was developed for future expansion. Contrary to previous rounds of expansion, institutional lessons were learned from the 1999 expansion that would be applied to future expansion. The most enduring artifact of the first round of post-Cold War enlargement was the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) published in April 1999. The MAP provided future aspirant members with a process to follow to facilitate membership and a program to assist with their preparations. The MAP addressed five key areas of concern for NATO to assess aspirant members: political and economic issues, defense/military issues, resource issues, security issues and legal issues. The MAP provided the process that future aspirant countries would be required to follow and it tried to make the enlargement process more bureaucratic and less political in nature. However, NATO also stated that the MAP was not to be considered a list of criteria for membership and that interested countries would be considered on a case-by-case basis.\footnote{North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Membership Action Plan (MAP),” North Atlantic Treaty Organization Press Release, \url{http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-066e.htm} (accessed 16 June, 2011).}
2009 Expansion

NATO expanded to twenty-eight countries in 2009 when Albania and Croatia joined the Alliance. Sixty years after the creation of the Alliance, all of the members of the former Warsaw Pact, except Russia and some former Soviet States, were members of NATO.\(^{133}\) The 2009 expansion may be viewed as a continuation of the expansion policy articulated in the 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement and another step towards the integration of all European countries into the Alliance. However, the change in the global security environment due to the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the U.S. in September 2001 and the subsequent invasion of Iraq in 2003 caused NATO to once again reappraise its purpose, including the question of continued expansion.\(^{134}\) In response to the 9/11 terrorist attack, NATO invoked Article 5 of the NATO Charter for the first time in history. The subsequent invasion of Afghanistan was undertaken as a coalition operation rather than as a NATO operation, however, and reflected a split between members of the Alliance regarding the purpose of NATO.\(^{135}\) The split was further magnified during the U.S.-led 2003 invasion of Iraq that was publicly opposed by several Alliance members and not supported by

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\(^{133}\) The Czech Republic (formerly part of Czechoslovakia), Hungary and Poland joined NATO in 1999. Albania, Romania and Slovakia (formerly part of Czechoslovakia) joined in 2004. Albania, an original signatory of the Warsaw Pact who left the organization in 1968, joined in 2009. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were former Soviet States that joined NATO while Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are former Soviet States that have not joined NATO.


\(^{135}\) Jennifer Medcalf, Going Global or Going Nowhere? NATO’s Role in Contemporary International Security (Berlin: Peter Lang, 2008), 115-121.
others. Consequently, NATO was at risk of being considered irrelevant by the largest member: the United States.

Nevertheless, since 2001 NATO has had two rounds of enlargement, in 2004 and 2009, that have added nine countries to the Alliance, and NATO is currently in discussions with several countries for further enlargement.136 The 2004 and 2009 expansions occurred under the 1999 Strategic Concept. This new Strategic Concept captured the experiences of the Alliance between 1991 and 2001, including the conduct of out of area operations, such as peace support operations in the Balkans. The removal of Russia as a named adversary reflected a change in key strategic themes. The focus on partnership, cooperation and dialogue reflect the relative peace that existed for NATO before September, 2001.137

In 2004, NATO invited seven nations to join the Alliance: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.138 In 2008, NATO invited Albania and Croatia to begin accession talks to join the Alliance.139 The two countries officially became NATO members in April, 2009 after ratification of their accession by the other twenty-six Allied countries.140

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Albania and Croatia were participants in the MAP prior to being invited to join the Alliance. Participation in the MAP shifted debate from inviting states to join the Alliance to inviting states to join the MAP. The MAP process has significantly reduced the debate surrounding countries joining NATO, but highlights how the Alliance consensus decision making process can prevent countries from joining NATO. Indeed, the debate surrounding Albania and Croatia joining NATO was overshadowed by disputes within the Alliance over operations in Afghanistan and by Greece blocking the application of the Republic of Macedonia to join NATO. In any event, the 2009 expansion continued the process established in 1999 with the U.S. as the primary promoter of enlargement.

Any discussion of Albanian history or foreign relations must include the nationalist desire to expand the country’s area to include all ethnic Albanians. Large populations of ethnic Albanians live outside of the current borders of the country, in particular in Kosovo and parts of Greece, Macedonia and Montenegro. During WWII, Italy occupied Albania and adjusted


142 The debate regarding the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia joining NATO is being driven by Greece. The Alliance has agreed to invite the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia into the Alliance once a mutually acceptable solution to the country’s name has been found. This debate reflects the consensus-based decision requirement for NATO expansion. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Membership Action Plan,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization A-Z, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_37356.htm (accessed 9 June, 2011).


national boundaries based on ethnicity to resolve the Albania national question. After WWII, the Italian-imposed Greater Albanian slipped away, sowing the seeds for future discontent. Albania’s relations with their Yugoslav partners deteriorated and the Albanian government approached the Soviet Union in search of a benefactor. The Soviets provided aid and guaranteed Albanian security in 1955 when Albania became a founding member of the Warsaw Pact. Warm relations between the two countries did not last long due to Soviet rapprochement with Yugoslavia after Stalin’s death in 1953. China replaced the Soviet Union as the primary aid provider and Albania became the lone European supporter of China during the 1960 Sino-Soviet split. The Soviet Union broke off diplomatic relations with Albania in December 1961 and excluded Albania from Warsaw Pact participation. Albania withdrew from the Warsaw Pact in 1968 in protest of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. China used Albania as a gateway into Europe and as a proxy voice to the United Nations. When China emerged from isolationism in the 1970s, the benefits of supporting Albania were reassessed and aid was reduced. At this point Albania began a difficult path towards self-reliance and isolationism.

After the end of the Cold War, Albania emerged from communist isolationist rule and held multiparty elections in 1992. Albania attempted to align itself economically and politically with Western Europe rather than with Serbia, then the dominant Balkan power. Albania joined

146 Ibid., 65.
the NAC-C in 1992, the PfP in 1994, and the MAP in 1999.\textsuperscript{151} The Albanian government had acute security concerns based on the crisis forming in the former Yugoslavia, especially with the ethnic-Albanian majority in the Serbian province of Kosovo. The Kosovo question would not be resolved for several more years; however, domestic considerations continued to dominate Albania’s interaction with the outside world. In 1997, the collapse of financial pyramid schemes that the government had tolerated, and in some cases encouraged, caused a wave of anti-government protests and the public seizing weapons, raiding army depots and burning government buildings. There was a complete breakdown of the state and United Nations troops were required to help stabilize the situation.\textsuperscript{152} Albania would not have a quick path to NATO membership. The 2009 expansion of NATO completed the integration of former Warsaw Pact countries with the addition of Albania, with the exception of Russia, and with Croatia continued the integration of former Yugoslav republics that had begun with Slovenia in 2004.

The Kingdom of Yugoslavia was formed as a constitutional monarchy after WWI and brought together Croats, Serbs, Slovenes and Bulgars in a political union. Unease over the balance of power between ethnic groups and between the central government and regional governments continued until the end of WWII. During the Cold War, Yugoslavia was held together by wartime communist resistance leader Joseph Tito. After Tito’s death, however, a power vacuum emerged in Yugoslavia. In 1989, Slobodan Milosevic occupied the Yugoslav power vacuum and set the tone of Serbian hegemony over the republics.\textsuperscript{153} It was the breakup of


\textsuperscript{152} U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: Albania,” Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, \url{http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3235.htm} (accessed 4 August, 2011).

the Yugoslav Communist Party in 1990 that pushed the republics towards independence from Yugoslavia. Croatia and Slovenia were the first republics to hold multi-party elections in 1990, which were quickly followed by declarations that they would secede from Yugoslavia. Croatian politicians first expressed the desire to join NATO in 1994. Croatia supported NATO operations in Kosovo by permitting access to its airspace and providing logistical support. Croatia joined the EAPC and PfP programs in 2000 and began the MAP process in 2002. Under the MAP, Croatia has contributed soldiers to operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan.

Croatia and Albania have relatively small populations, military forces, and defense expenditures compared to the top tier NATO countries. Both are positioned to contribute directly and indirectly to ongoing NATO operations and provide operational advantages to NATO at relatively little risk to the Alliance. Both countries are geographically located to support


ongoing NATO operations in Kosovo and in the Adriatic. While NATO operations in Kosovo and monitoring the Mediterranean are secondary to operations in Afghanistan, the provision of troops from minor countries permits other countries to focus their efforts in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{158} Croatian and Albanian support to these operations eases the burden, whether the contribution is logistical, maritime or troops, on other NATO countries. They also contribute small troop contingents to NATO operations in Afghanistan. These countries also extend NATO further into the Balkans, which could provide stepping stones and assistance towards Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbian membership.

The relative lack of debate and study regarding the implications of Croatia and Albania joining NATO reflect, in part, the successful integration of twelve countries into the Alliance since 1999. The small size of these two countries and the absence of critical operational implications may also contribute to the apparent lack of analytical rigor associated with this round of expansion. However, this success may also be a cause for concern when considering inviting Russia to join the Alliance. Indeed, the political weight, large population, vast geographic size and capable military force that include nuclear weapons demand that the operational impactions of Russia joining NATO receive study before the invitation to join is extended.

\section*{The Russia Factor}

Perhaps the most significant, and most constant, question for NATO has been ‘what’s next?’ The end of the Cold War marked a transition point that the Alliance successfully negotiated. The impact of the 2001 terrorist attack against the U.S. resulted in deep divides

between Alliance members, yet NATO remains active and vibrant. One constant factor during each period has been that the influence of Russia has weighed heavily on NATO decision makers. Indeed, Russian has maintained an anti-NATO enlargement stance since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The evaluation of Russia has changed from declared adversary during the Cold War to partner post-Cold War, even if it is a partnership with limitations. The discussion regarding the relationship between NATO and Russia continues, and several voices are asking if Russia should be invited to join the Alliance. There are many reasons to argue against Russia joining NATO: it is not democratic enough, it has not resolved ethnic grievances in a peaceful manner, it is involved in border wars and the existing civil-military relationship does not meet NATO standards. That debate is ongoing and the result of that debate is beyond the scope of this monograph. This work explores the potential operational consequences for the planning and conduct of operations associated with Russia becoming a NATO member, either via the existing MAP framework or through a new framework that caters to Russian status as a great power.

The new NATO Strategic Concept published in 2010 acknowledges the experiences of the Alliance since 9/11, the evolving strategic context and the shift towards conflict prevention, including integrated civil-military planning and operations. The new Strategic Concept also

159 Colin Gray assesses that NATO is a critical component to Western security and remains tolerably vibrant. See Colin S. Gray, Another Bloody Century (London: Phoenix, 2006), 77.


explicitly acknowledges the addition of new members for the first time and proclaims the desire of the Alliance to capitalize on the capabilities that new members bring to NATO. The new Strategic Concept includes specific mention of the Russian nuclear arsenal as the focus for increased transparency and reduction. However, the focus of attention of the 2010 Strategic Concept is towards cooperation and consultation with Russia, rather than conflict.

The incorporation of Russia into NATO is an idea that has been considered since the end of the Cold War. Since relations with Russia were a critical concern of NATO allies, several mechanisms were established to develop a working partnership and mutual respect. Initially, Russia joined the NAC-C (and later EAPC) and PfP programs. Recognition of the importance of Russian-NATO relations prompted the Alliance to offer Russia a separate partnership agreement with the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the creation of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) in 1997. The PJC, and the NATO-Ukraine Commission, share prominence with the EAPC and the Mediterranean Cooperation Group as the principal institutions of partnership cooperation in NATO and reflect the importance that NATO places on the relationship with these countries. The PJC evolved into the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) post-9/11 to reinforce the need for coordinated action against common threats. Therefore, if Russia joins NATO, the


166 NATO suspended formal meetings of the NRC as a result of the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia. NATO and Russia agreed to resume formal NRC meetings in 2008. See North Atlantic Treaty
existing mechanisms for interaction are already in place and will provide the basis for integration into the Alliance. Even though Russia does not currently have a veto over NATO decisions through the NRC, Russia will become one of 29 countries after membership. The difference being that if Russia or NATO walks away from the NRC, then NATO can continue debate on the issue in question and take action, if necessary. The 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia is a good example of how NATO suspended NRC dialogue and continued to function as an organization. As a NATO member, if Russia walks away from the debate, NATO cannot make a decision due to the consensus decision-making process that the Alliance employs.\textsuperscript{167} One key question is how will Russia accept being one of 29 voices within the Alliance?

The Russian seat as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, its substantial energy resources, its geographic position astride Europe and Asia, and the substantial conventional and nuclear military forces combine to make Russian a key player in world affairs.\textsuperscript{168} Russia is significantly larger than the other countries that have joined NATO during previous rounds of enlargement in terms of geographical size, military capability and international political power. From west to east, Russia spans almost half the globe and connects Europe to the Sea of Japan and the Pacific Ocean. From north to south, Russia measures approximately four thousand kilometers and links the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea, the Caspian

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Sea and China. Russia is divided into two uneven parts by the Ural Mountains. To the west lies European Russia, which is home to the majority of the Russian population and industrial base. In the east lies Asiatic Russia, which is sparsely populated but rich in natural resources. Russia has land borders with fourteen countries, including a 3,600 kilometer border with China and a short seventeen kilometer border with North Korea. Russia is currently the ninth most populous country in the world, with a population of almost 139 million. Even though ethnic Russians dominate the country, Russia is ethnically diverse and includes more than one hundred ethnic groups. These groups range in size from many millions to several thousand. However, the Russian population is declining due to a range of demographic, environmental and sociological factors.

Russia maintains significant conventional and nuclear military capabilities. The military is organized into the ground forces, air forces, navy and strategic forces. Strategic forces include rocket forces, airborne troops and military space forces. The recent establishment of four operational-strategic commands (OSK) combines joint forces under regional commanders to produce greater operational effectiveness. The Russian air forces have roughly 160,000 personnel and several thousand aircraft, but many of the aircraft are becoming obsolete and pilot

172 Ibid., 154.
training suffers from a chronic lack of fuel. Equipment modernization efforts are being made and increased funding has been allocated for fuel, however these efforts will require several years to have the institutional benefits realized. Russian ground forces are primarily manned based on the conscript system and number approximately 380,000. Efforts are currently being taken to restructure the ground forces by moving away from conscription, reducing the number of officers and improving the command and control architecture of the army. The Russian navy mirrors the other services with aging equipment and a lack of funding. However, the 142,000 person service does provide a blue water and costal defense capability in the Pacific Ocean, Baltic Sea, Black Sea, Caspian Sea and Barents Sea. The Russian fleet includes less than one hundred surface warships, one aircraft carrier and tens of nuclear powered ballistic-missile carrying submarines. The strategic forces provide the critical difference between Russian military capabilities and the military forces from all previous rounds of NATO enlargement. The Russian strategic forces provide the nuclear deterrent that make up for any conventional force inequality with adversaries. Russian nuclear forces include land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles,

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177 Russia subscribes to an equal security concept that relies on having an advantageous correlation of forces to facilitate success. The correlation of forces, however, is not strictly based on numbers but is influenced by capability. This has prompted significant reform within the Russian military. Nuclear forces provide this equity against major powers that have conventional superiority over Russia. See Timothy L. Thomas, Recasting the Red Star: Russia Forges Tradition and Technologies Through Toughness (Fort Leavenworth: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2011), 346.
submarine-launched ballistic missiles and nuclear bombs. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the possession of nuclear weapons remains Russia’s strongest claim to being a great power.178

Recent Russian history cannot yet be divorced from the Cold War era when the Soviet Union and the United States were avowed enemies. Even before the end of WWII, it was apparent that the communist Soviet Union and capitalist United States were on a collision course in Europe.179 The Soviet Union expanded her territory beyond those of the 1914 Russian Empire, incorporated Latvia and Lithuania and annexed areas of Poland, Belorussia and the Ukraine.180 Satellite states under Soviet influence included all of the members of the Warsaw Pact and, to a certain extent Yugoslavia and China. Many of the sources of ethnic tensions created after WWII were reduced after the collapse of the Soviet Union and annexed lands and incorporated countries secured their liberty. However, Russia continues to have prominent ethnic conflict in the North Caucasus which hampers Russia’s international relations. Indeed, the Dagestan, Chechnya and South Ossetia issues continue to make NATO wary of becoming involved in the Caucasus region, even though Georgia has expressed a strong desire to join the Alliance.181 This is just one of many issues that Russians are grappling with as they search for their own identity after the Cold War.182

179 The Grand Alliance of WWII was a mechanism for cooperation and as well as an instrument to position each country for maximum influence in the post-war period. See John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), 18-27.
182 James H. Billington, Russia in Search of Itself (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), ix.
The key operational consequences of Russia joining NATO are found in the basic arguments against Russia joining the Alliance. These include the argument that the addition of Russia would change the character of NATO and impact operational capability due to political considerations. The consensus-based decision making process that NATO has employed since its inception could be challenged by Russia.\textsuperscript{183} Indeed, Russia’s self-perception as a great power and history of opposition to the United States and NATO could hinder the NATO decision making process. NATO members could be forced to adopt “coalitions of the willing” and conduct operations outside of NATO authority.\textsuperscript{184} This process weakens NATO’s ability to conduct operations and shifts the political decision making process to another venue. In addition, providing the Article 5 security guarantee to Russia would extend NATO’s area of operations into Central Asia, the Middle East and the Far East, including China.\textsuperscript{185} Operational implications associated with extending the geographic area of the Alliance occurred during each round of enlargement; however, in the case of Russia, the vast size and extending into a different continent and several different regions make this consideration unique and perhaps particularly daunting. Nevertheless, the debate surrounding inviting Greece and Turkey to join NATO from 1948-1952 provides some precedence for this issue. As in the case for Greece and Turkey, some change in the strategic context may be necessary to make existing NATO members become interested in extending operations into Asia, the Central Caucasus and the Middle East. Once that occurs, the


quantity of military transportation assets and the quality existing infrastructure become
operational issues, as evidence in the three case studies.

Conclusion

Consistent with Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO has enlarged based on the
requirements of the existing strategic environment during the Cold War, the post-Cold War and
post-9/11 periods. The analysis of case studies from each of these time periods demonstrates
similarities that form patterns and distinctions that remind us that each country must be viewed
individually. These similarities and distinctions provide the basis for the analysis of potential
operational consequences for the planning and conduct of operations associated with Russia
becoming a NATO member.

During each time period, the strategic context was the dominant factor in determining the
feasibility and acceptability of adding new NATO member countries. In most cases, however, the
production of a new NATO Strategic Concept followed enlargement rather than preceding it. The
1952 addition of Greek and Turkey was prompted by the Korean War and reinforced the existing
1949 Strategic Concept. The 1991 Strategic Concept grappled with how to deal with the collapse
of the Warsaw Pact but it does not mention expansion or enlargement. It was the significant
change to the strategic context that promoted enlargement. Indeed, the decision to expand the
Alliance in 1999, taken in 1997, preceded the publication of the 1999 Strategic Concept. The
2004 and 2009 rounds of enlargement corresponded to the 1999 Strategic Concept and both
occurred before the 2010 Strategic Concept document finally addressed the changes in the
strategic context that occurred post-9/11.186 Both the 1999 and 2009 rounds of enlargement were

186 The 2010 Strategic Concept maintains the section devoted to enlargement that was established
in the 1999 Strategic Concept.
prompted by the end of the Cold War and the 2009 round of expansion had little to do with 9/11. This indicates that some change to the current strategic context would be required to permit Russia to join NATO, both for the Alliance to make the invitation and for Russia to decide to join the Alliance. Whatever the change in the strategic context, it would have to be sufficient to convince Russia and NATO members that their union would be beneficial to all parties involved.

It is unlikely for an internal change in the Alliance’s strategic concept to orient NATO towards adding Russia as a member. The dominant role played by the U.S. in Alliance decision making is also evident during each time period. U.S. interest in enlargement after the Korean War and the declaration by President Clinton in 1994 forced the subsequent expansion on the other member countries. Since the U.S. is the largest single country in the Alliance, in terms of economic, military and political strength, this fact is not surprising. In addition, NATO expansion has preceded EU expansion, providing a hedge for European countries against assuming the risks supporting reform in aspirant countries independently and reflecting U.S. interests. The conclusion is that expansion to include Russia must be viewed as a positive change for U.S. interests. This could be through the emergence of a common adversary, or some other change to the strategic context. In all of the cases examined, the addition of new member countries brought additional military assets, but also expanded the territory of the Alliance without adding a corresponding quantity of transportation assets. Alliance members relied on U.S. military or commercial transportation assets for deployment. The addition of Russia to NATO would replicate many of the technical challenges experienced during the 1999 and 2009 round of expansion, but on a much larger scale.

The examination of Russia also presents some unique operational consequences. Foremost among these is Russia’s status as a great power, including their veto in the United Nations Security Council and nuclear strike capability. Estimating how Russia would interact in the North Atlantic Council remains a significant source of risk for NATO. Adding Russia as a member would also push the geographic boundaries of the Alliance into Asia. The addition of
Turkey in 1952 extended NATO into the Middle East, however expansion beyond Europe has been an exception rather than standard practice. Extending NATO into Asia is not without merit, since Russia as a NATO member could serve as a useful interlocutor to adversarial regimes, such as North Korea, Iran or Syria. Finally, the scope of work that would be required to incorporate Russia into NATO is vast. The details of the work resemble those identified during previous rounds of expansion, but the scale associated with Russia make this a matter that necessitates individual examination.

The ‘open door’ concept for expansion remains a fundamental component of the original NATO Charter. The historical analysis of NATO enlargement during the past sixty years yields insights into the operational consequences associated with the possible addition of Russia to the Alliance; however, factors specific to Russia present unique benefits and challenges that merit further consideration prior to NATO extending the invitation to join the Alliance.

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Bibliography


