**African Security Challenges: Now and Over the Horizon**

**Improving African**

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NOW AND OVER THE HORIZON
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THE USE OF NON/LESS-THAN-LETHAL FORCE:
CHALLENGES, ISSUES AND APPROACHES

MAY 2010
WORKING GROUP DISCUSSION REPORT

Jennifer Perry
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
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Science Applications International Corporation

THE DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY
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African Security Challenges: Now and Over the Horizon
Improving African Security Through the Use of Non/Less-Than-Lethal Force: Challenges, Issues, and Approaches

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On February 6, 2007, U.S. President George W. Bush directed the establishment of a new Combatant Command focused on Africa. The announcement of U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) kindled a flurry of discussion amongst Africa watchers in Washington, DC and beyond. Debate largely centered on the implications of this announcement, the mission of the new Command, its location, and above all, how USAFRICOM actions would reconcile with those of other players in the region and whether the decision signified a militarization of U.S. policy in the region.

Regardless of this debate, the establishment of the Command reflects several important changes in U.S. Government, particularly U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) perceptions about the importance of Africa to U.S. strategic interests. Previously, three geographic Combatant Commands (COCOMs) shared responsibility for Africa, a situation that sometimes resulted in fragmented action in the region. USAFRICOM’s almost continent-wide responsibility allows the DoD to assume a comprehensive approach as it addresses security challenges on the continent, suggests an increasing recognition of the commonalities across African states and regions, and serves as an acknowledgement that many security concerns and obstacles, as well as their root causes and effects, transcend these physical boundaries. The Command’s interagency component also suggests a greater recognition of the need for consistent coordination of U.S. activities to address these security challenges. The DoD is but one player in the region and must consistently work with other U.S. Government departments and agencies to support broader activities in the region when appropriate.

With this heightened interest and attention in mind, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Advanced Systems and Concepts Office (DTRA/ASCO) initiated a fundamental research assessment of African security challenges – what they are today and what they might be over the horizon. This assessment could be used to inform future planning and research for ASCO, and inform those U.S. Government players active in the region, including, but not limited to the newest form of DoD engagement, USAFRICOM.

Research Objective and Approach

It is important to note that the vision for this project at the outset was to study USAFRICOM’s mission and structure and determine how these would affect the way that the Command addressed security challenges in the region. When it was determined that many conferences, workshops, and publications had already addressed this topic (coupled with the fact that the USAFRICOM mission and structure were still being refined as it stood up), the research team realized that a broader and more fundamental “challenges-centric” assessment was needed. Indeed, many players were rightly investigating the “nuts and bolts” of USAFRICOM and other U.S. engagement in the region (specifically how that might be affected by the stand-up of the new Command), yet few were conducting a comprehensive assessment of what security challenges those players might need to address today and in the
future. The research team felt an “over the horizon” aspect was especially important and an area in which our research could inform future strategic planning.

The research objective was to define the major categories of security challenges in Africa today and explore possibilities for what they might be over the horizon. Using fundamental insights from academic and research experts to develop a better understanding of those challenges, the research was intended to explore how the challenges intersect and identify their importance for U.S., especially USAFRICOM, activities and engagement on the continent. This research would provide a platform for further study of how the United States can address the identified challenges through various (and ideally coordinated) forms of engagement, including USAFRICOM.

To accomplish this objective, the research team performed academic literature and expert reviews to identify a large list of African security challenges with the recognition that there is some debate among experts on the challenge areas and their importance relative to one another. The team also surveyed U.S. Government strategic documents (including USAFRICOM mission and vision statements) to obtain a list of those challenges the government identifies as important. Eventually, this list was pared down to three broad categories of challenges and served as a foundation for an academic workshop at which the security challenges were discussed in October 2008.¹

1. Transnational security issues
   a. Small arms/light weapons
   b. Maritime security
   c. Disease

2. Internal and regional conflict
   a. Border issues, spread of conflict, and peacekeeping
   b. Humanitarian assistance, refugees, and internally-displaced persons
   c. Rebels
   d. Post-conflict reconstruction issues

3. Potential flashpoints/future security challenges
   a. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and R&D developments
   b. Oil and natural resource competition and exploitation
   c. Terrorism and radical Islam
   d. China and other states

While the approach to the challenges selection was not scientific, the research team viewed this research project as a starting point and not an end point in the study. The workshop in October 2008 provided a foundation for more in-depth and specific discussions and research on major security challenges and their implications; it also pointed the research

¹ The list was pared down for both practical and budgetary reasons. That is, the research team needed to conduct a one day workshop with academic experts and therefore tried to select challenges that could be discussed within that timeframe, but that would also allow for broad participation among many types of experts. It also selected challenges of particular interest to the sponsoring organization (DTRA/ASCO) and incorporated some challenges that might not be viewed as important today, but that could dramatically affect the security landscape tomorrow.
team to several issues involving government and academic debate. Additionally, it highlighted the need to consider various methodologies to discuss security challenges among these two groups to ensure effective discussion. Indeed, it was also widely understood that one study would not be enough to accurately and comprehensively capture the challenges that make up the African security environment.

After the October 2008 workshop, the research team selected four specific challenges, or in some cases combined ones, from the above challenge list to receive more in depth attention by way of working group discussions and analytic papers over the course of the next several months. Participants at these working group discussions would focus on the current and possible future nature of a specific challenge, for example, small arms and light weapons, and how it might intersect with others. They would also preliminarily consider the implications of this challenge for U.S. engagement on the continent. In particular, participants would focus on the dimensions of the challenge that might be manipulated and issues associated with that manipulation.

The topics selected for further study included: weapons of mass destruction, small arms and light weapons, disease, and refugees and militancy. In January 2010, based on inputs from USAFRICOM staff members, the research team also selected two additional topics for further study, including food security and conflict and, departing slightly from previous research topics, challenges, issues, and approaches in improving African security through the use of non/less-than-lethal force. After the topical discussions, the research team would conduct additional activities to synthesize results to date, get additional inputs, and consider the “so what?” question for engagement on the continent in greater depth.

The report that follows outlines the results of the sixth and final working group discussion session that focused on non/less-than-lethal force issues. As such, this report should be viewed as one element of the research endeavor on African security challenges with complete results and findings still pending.

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2 These topics were selected for several reasons. They were the subject of broad debate at the October 2008 workshop or similar events, of interest to the sponsoring organization, and/or lacked extensive study within the U.S. Department of Defense.
SECTION 2:
WORKING GROUP DISCUSSION SESSION OBJECTIVES,
SUCCESSES, AND DIFFICULTIES

Objectives

DTRA/ASCO invited a small group of experts on the challenges, issues, and approaches associated with using non/less-than-lethal force to improve African security to participate in a working group discussion to better define the dimensions of this problem area needing consideration within this context and the possible implications for U.S. engagement. It is important to note that the starting point assumption was that there were both traditional and human security dimensions to security challenges in Africa and that non/less-than-lethal force issues are relevant to consider in both a traditional and human security context.

As the sixth in a series of working sessions on specific security challenges, this working session, like the others, had a secondary objective. Experiences at the October 2008 workshop suggested that there are some difficulties associated with conducting government and academic dialogue on security challenges. This was especially apparent when analyzing the different priorities and approaches taken by the two communities to assess security challenges. One question that revealed the different priorities of the communities, for example, is the issue of whether to consider the root causes of the security challenge area or only their effects. Further, what are the implications of that decision for formulating and implementing policy and related activities in the challenge area? This working session served as one test case to refine ways to facilitate government and academic dialogue in such a way that can most effectively inform strategic planning and understanding while reflecting the analytic complexities of the study topics.3

Working Group Discussion Structure

Participants

The core meeting participants were largely drawn from the academic sector. Three of the experts represented a non-military U.S. university or college and one represented a European university.4 All of the experts had a publishing record on some aspect of force issues in Africa and/or recent experience examining such issues on the ground in Africa through field research. Only one of these five experts had extensive experience interacting with the U.S. national security community on this topic. The other meeting participants contributing to the discussion and/or observing it were drawn from the U.S. Government and contractor sector. This included representatives from USAFRICOM and DTRA with a broad understanding of African security challenges in general and/or African lethal/non-lethal/less-than-lethal force issues specifically.

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3 For a more detailed discussion of this topic, please see the first workshop report from this study, *African Security Challenges: Now and Over the Horizon* (ASCO Report 2009-001).

4 An additional expert from the United Kingdom was slated to participate, but travel issues prevented him from being able to participate in the meeting.
Agenda

The working group session was comprised of plenary discussions and presentations, an admitted departure from previous working group discussions in this series. In advance of the meeting, the research team tasked each of the four academic participants with developing a presentation that addressed a particular aspect of the problem area from a particular perspective and that would serve as a catalyst for a broad group discussion on the current and/or future dimensions of the topic area in Africa. The presentations were offered in an order designed to accommodate a deductive analysis of the issues.

After each presentation, the participants contributed to a discussion of the ideas presented in the talk with the overall goal of more broadly identifying those dimensions of the topic which need to be considered and understood in the African context (particularly in decision making environments) and the analytic dilemmas associated with their examination. Finally, the working group discussion organizers held an additional moderated discussion on issues surrounding United States’ and partnered traditional/and human security-focused engagement on non/less-than-lethal force issues in Africa. A representative from USAFRICOM offered an overview briefing to facilitate an equal understanding among all participants about how the U.S. Department of Defense, through the Command, supports U.S. security engagement in the region prior to this discussion. The discussion was designed to address the following questions:

- How might African and U.S. Government perceptions of the nature of African security problems and the value of non/less-than-lethal force to address them differ? Are there different perceptions across all African states? How do these perceptual differences impact the potential success or failure of efforts to improve African security through non/less-than-lethal force?
- What issues should be discussed when determining the contribution of U.S. Government players to address African security problems through non/less-than-lethal approaches over the long-term? What role might the U.S. Africa Command have over the long-term in supporting U.S. engagement in this area? What are some alternative or additional approaches to U.S. engagement in this area that might be used to address emerging African security problems?
- What are some ways the United States Government can partner with others (other state governments, non-government and/or international organizations) to address this security challenge area? What issues might the U.S. Government need to address when considering these partnership opportunities?

After the working session, the research team drafted this report to summarize the broader findings of the group. The meeting participants were offered an opportunity to review the report prior to publication to ensure it captured the discussion, including dissenting viewpoints, accurately.

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5 Though the participants considered elements of several of these questions during the discussion period, the discussion that actually emerged did not specifically focus on all of these questions.
Meeting the Objectives: Difficulties and Successes

Success: The organizers were successful in convening a highly respected small group of experts who have analyzed various aspects of the use of non/less-than-lethal force dilemma to improve African security. The discussion of the challenges, issues, and approaches of using non/less-than-lethal force to improve African security proceeded at a high level.

Discussion: The academic experts had extensive experience conducting highly-respected research efforts on various aspects of the issue area in Africa. Most had focused this research with a particular lens of analysis (criminal justice or political science, for example) and on a particular manifestation of the issues regionally within Africa (for example, West Africa) or thematically (for example, community policing issues). These varying focuses allowed for a fuller discussion of the points of intersection among many of the dimensions of the issue area. Some of the academic experts had also conducted globally-focused analyses of non/less-than-lethal force issues. This allowed for a full discussion of the analytic complexities associated with studying these issues in any region, including Africa and brought the discussion to a higher level.

With one exception, the academic experts had never offered consulting or research services to the U.S. Government in this area or supported related “on the ground” activities. As a result, they were not particularly experienced with considering the practicalities of U.S. Government engagement on these issues. The advantage of this unfamiliarity was that the discussion that emerged offered some fresh perspectives on engagement concerns, which may not have otherwise been brought forth given a different pool of expert participants.

Difficulty: The discussion focused generally on the nature of the issues, challenges, and approaches in leveraging non/less-than-lethal force to improve African security. Although some insights were offered on engagement issues throughout the discussion (including in a session in the agenda devoted to this topic), it did not receive overwhelming focus.

Discussion: The discussion focused less on engagement issues in part because the participants were much more accustomed to discussing the nature of the challenges, issues, and approaches relevant to non/less-than-lethal force in Africa. However, the participation from the Command (including a briefing from a USAFRICOM representative) assisted in ensuring all participants had a general understanding of U.S. Africa-focused engagement activities in this area. This allowed them to more easily offer ideas on what issues to consider when developing long-term engagement plans as they relate to non/less-than-lethal force issues. Overall, it is generally accepted that both kinds of discussions (those based in theory/academics and those based in “practical realities”) have value but there remains a question about how to integrate the two discussion types and ensure that one type does not overshadow the other. While the approach taken in this discussion session did not solve all of these issues, it did offer insight on the value of ensuring a common understanding of U.S. Government activities in the region among all participants in executing these kinds of discussions.
There was considerable debate among the participants on the role that non/less-than-lethal force options might play in addressing African security problems and the degree to which those kinds of force options are conducive to addressing those problems. However, the participants did agree that these issues should be discussed within the larger context of identifying what the major African security dilemmas are and what tools are available to not only address them, but to prevent them from occurring. A few of these challenges include peacekeeping, small arms and light weapons proliferation, and security sector reform. In every case, the question of whether non/less-than-lethal means can be used to address the challenges is dependent on the context being discussed. No two African contexts are exactly the same. While non/less-than-lethal force options may be useful in improving the security situation in those areas which are not impacted by major violent conflict, such options may not be appropriate responses to other situations. The particulars of each security situation, including the nature of the problem, the nature of security forces engaging in the situation (private security firms, police, military, or paramilitary), and the cultural/political influences on that situation, need to be well-understood when determining the implications of non/less-than-lethal approaches to addressing them.

Further, the participants broadly asserted these discussions of non/less-than-lethal force options to address security problems should take place in the broader context of African military and police reform. However, it should not be assumed that introducing non/less-than-lethal force options into African security forces will change how military and police interact with one another, how they perceive security situations, or their overall patterns of behavior in addressing them. Lessons from places like Sierra Leone on how to effectively engage on security problems and transform security forces might be applied to other African contexts. Although implementing community policing (CP) may be an approach to consider when reforming and developing police forces, it should not be assumed that CP will be beneficial in addressing all African security problems or be appropriate in all contexts. CP could be useful in helping police forces work with communities to identify security problems and focus more holistically on problems vice incidents. If such tactics are successful, force will not need to be employed. If they are not completely successful, non/less-than-lethal force options may be considered with lethal back-up. The effective development of a community policing approach in any African context will require training, resources, and a sustained commitment from all groups involved.

The participants also discussed some principles to follow for external engagement in Africa on military and police reform and non/less-than-lethal weapons issues. They stressed the importance of a long-term, sustained, and consistent engagement strategy on these matters. Training may be an important component of this engagement, but effective engagement will require a good understanding of the African context of interest, the security forces that are engaging in the area, and how non/less-than-lethal force issues are perceived. Expectations need to be managed. Any externally-provided training needs to be tailored to the particular context of interest, the needs of those receiving the training, and the availability of such weapons. The introduction of advanced non/less-than-lethal weapons may not only be inappropriate in certain contexts at a practical level, it may also be an incendiary issue.
A Note on the Organization of the Summaries

As stated previously, the academic experts offered presentations to ground the broader discussion at the meeting. As many of the issues raised in these presentations and discussions of them served as seamless catalysts for broader and interwoven discussion of the issues among all of the meeting participants, the authors of this report have chosen to incorporate these prepared insights into the broader summaries of the discussion, which is organized topically, rather than present a standalone summary of the presentations in and of itself. In a majority of cases, the discussion points are not presented in chronological order as participants jumped from topic to topic. For ease of reading, topical organization is the rule rather than the exception.
The discussion largely focused on those non/less-than-lethal force dilemmas associated three major African security challenge areas – peacekeeping, small arms and light weapons proliferation, and security sector development and reform. Although each of the discussions about the potential roles of these weapons in addressing the security challenge took a slightly different angle, there were several common themes observed within each discussion.

Though the participants recognized that these were not the only security challenges to discuss within the African context, they considered broadly how the state of particular African security environments shapes and is shaped by the nature in which force (lethal and non/less-than-lethal) is employed to address those challenges. African militaries and police, as well as other actors, have a role to play in addressing such challenges; however, the nature of these security organizations needs to be understood within particular contexts to consider the ways in which they might perceive the security challenges and the degree to which non/less-than-lethal force options might be employed to address them.

**Peacekeeping**

One participant discussed the four types of peacekeeping that have been used in Africa by the United Nations (UN), non-African states, and/or African regional or sub-regional organizations. He contended that in three of the four types of peacekeeping in Africa, lethal force is always threatened and/or used to address violence. He broadly demonstrated that only certain kinds of peacekeeping, particularly those that involve the threat or use of lethal force, have been effective in Africa’s intense conflict zones. He noted, however, that there are some successful examples of lethal force being used in conjunction with non-lethal force to achieve peace in small, less violent cases. However, there are no good examples of completely non-lethal peacekeeping approaches being successful in any African context. The effectiveness of a particular peacekeeping approach is largely dependent on the context in which it is being used, not simply whether lethal or non-lethal force is employed.

The first type of peacekeeping is expanded monitoring, which is also known as the “holding the ring” mission. In most cases, the United Nations coordinates these activities, which are conducted through non-lethal means. The participant suggested that this approach only works in limited situations (i.e. those that do not involve high levels of sustained conflict and/or violence, such as on the Syrian-Israeli border). For this reason, he contended that

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6 Within this discussion, the participant advocated for a further study of how African regional and sub-regional organizations can be used to support peacekeeping missions and what issues need to be discussed regarding state leaders’ political will to participate in this engagement and to support coordination among states to respond to conflicts.

7 To maintain the anonymity of the discussion, the personal pronoun “he” has been used to reference all participant statements.

8 Within this context, one participant observed that lethal peacekeeping, in particular, cannot be separated from law enforcement activities. Law enforcement can leverage non/less-than-lethal approaches to promote rule of law.
this approach was not useful in addressing most African conflicts today. In Ethiopia and Eritrea, for example, the peacekeepers were completely ineffective in keeping the peace between the two states. In Sierra Leone, the peacekeeping force comprised of Kenyan and Zambian soldiers without lethal weapons was chased out of the country. Although the UN high-level monitoring mission in Liberia had greater success keeping the peace – a rare occurrence in these types of missions, it is important to note that most of the some 17,000 troops supporting the mercenary operations were not African.

The second type of peacekeeping is regime change assurance. This kind of activity is conducted when there is a realistic ceasefire in place between two or more parties to a conflict which needs to be monitored. Peacekeepers that are charged with conducting this kind of activity usually ensure the ceasefire by orchestrating a transfer of power and/or meaningful elections through non/less-than-lethal means. This approach has been used in Namibia and Mozambique (and, outside of Africa, in Cambodia) with some success.

The third type of peacekeeping is peace enforcement; it is also known as “Chapter 7” peacekeeping and involves a coalition of the willing employing lethal force to achieve peace in a conflict zone. In some cases, however, non-lethal force can be used in conjunction with or as a precursor to, lethal force. The expert contended that Africans, whether states or regional/continent-wide organizations, have been most involved in this kind of peacekeeping. Some examples of these efforts include Tanzanian forces operating in Uganda, Angolan forces operating in Congo-Brazzaville, South Africans operating in Botswana, the African Union operating in Comoros, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) operating in Liberia, Togo, and Niger.9

The expert noted several examples of peace enforcement missions in Africa that involved both lethal and non-lethal force. In Togo and Niger, for example, there were threats of troops moving into the countries; in order to prevent this, the peacekeepers used non-lethal means. It should be noted, though, that the threat of lethal force was still existent in the event that the non-lethal approach did not work. The most efficient peace enforcement mission that involved both non-lethal and lethal force in Africa was not conducted by Africans, but rather by 850 British paratroopers in Sierra Leone acting with only the British Prime Minister’s approval. To this end, the expert suggested that this combination approach (non-lethal force with the threat of lethal force) may be effective in “small cases” though certainly not to address Africa’s hot wars, such as those in the Sudan or the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The fourth type of peacekeeping involves peace building and reconstruction. The discussant contended that although this method has been used globally (including during the current situation in Haiti in the aftermath of the earthquake), it is going out of fashion and does not work particularly well in most current African conflict zones. This kind of peacekeeping can

9 Within this context, the discussant contended that the AU is not always successful in conducting peace enforcement missions. In fact, in most arenas, it has either failed to engage (in Somalia and Zimbabwe, for example), or has failed to effectively conduct a mission (for example, the AU only sends troops to camps in Darfur, which does not result in overarching peace in the region).
involve both non-lethal and lethal means, but there are no current examples of it being used in Africa.

**The Role of Paramilitary Forces in Providing Peacekeeping in Africa**

Within this context, there was also some discussion as to the potentially increasing role of paramilitary forces in providing African security in peacekeeping and other post-conflict zones and the implications of this trend for how lethal and non/less-than-lethal force is used to maintain and/or achieve security. Several experts noted the potential importance of paramilitary forces in providing a rapid-response capability in peacekeeping environments in Africa. They discussed the current trend in which some international police forces that traditionally operate in these types of environments – such as the United Nations Police (UNPOL) – are becoming much more paramilitary in nature, a phenomenon which has implications for the roles these forces play in supporting peacekeeping missions and the degree to which they employ lethal force within those missions. Given the international make-up of such forces, there may be varying views on these forces’ roles and the extent to which and how lethal or non/less-than-lethal force should be used in supporting such missions.

Nonetheless, as one expert noted, there are few if any Africans participating in these international forces due to a lack of available paramilitary training within African police forces.¹⁰ Several experts agreed with this claim and suggested that there is also a lack of available foreign paramilitary forces able to provide such necessary training to the Africans whether for legal or other reasons. This, coupled with the potential difficulties police face in transitioning between paramilitary and traditional police activities when required to perform both roles (perhaps in conjunction with one another), presents a bleak picture for the effective use of paramilitary-related activities in African peacekeeping environments. If these training and capacity challenges could be overcome, however, this transition could have major implications – not only for rapid capability response capacities in African peacekeeping contexts, but also for the employment of lethal and non/less-than-lethal force during this response.

**Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation**

One participant contended that the chief contributor to violence and conflict in Africa is the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW). Killing along the Somalia-Ethiopia border, for example, is fuelled by the proliferation of SALW in the region. Additionally, terrorist organizations like the al-Shabaab in Somalia may have easy access to such weapons. In Somalia, this access fuels the seemingly perpetual conflict which in turn fuels instability, personal security threats, and violence. The vicious cycle of SALW proliferation and violence is difficult to break and it may not be possible to do so through non-lethal means.¹¹

¹⁰ Other experts observed that this training deficiency is not limited to just Africans supporting these missions; instead, they noted that this is a general deficiency within international forces with paramilitary duties. In cases where there is such training, including that which relates to the employment of lethal and non/less-than-lethal force, there are few, if any examples, of the pre- and post-deployment assessments of the impact of such training on how the forces execute their missions.

¹¹ For additional discussion of this issue, please see report the second working group discussion of this study, *Small Arms and Light Weapons in Africa: Current and/or Future Threat?* (ASCO Report 2009-005).
One of the reasons for the difficulty in breaking this cycle relates to the widespread availability and proliferation of AK-47s and machine guns in the region. One participant further emphasized that, with the proper motivation, virtually any individual in Africa today can obtain such weapons and associated ammunition on the black market for cash. Under certain conditions, these individuals might leverage those purchases to ensure their personal security (when they feel it is threatened) and, in some cases, commit acts of violence against other Africans. With so many lethal weapons available for use, there is little chance non-lethal approaches would be useful to deter and defeat those willing to use weapons and fuel conflict.

Within this context, this expert observed that curbing the presence of SALW in the region (including slowing down the illicit arms trade), is the only way that one can begin to use non-lethal approaches to address African conflicts and prevent them from reoccurring. He expressed skepticism, however, that this was even a realistic possibility in the near- or long-term. One of the reasons for this relates to African governments’ capacity and will to address illicit flows of SALW within and across its borders. As one expert observed, only a few African governments (for example, Rwanda and Botswana), have taken major steps to curb the illicit flow of SALW within and across their borders and have achieved some success stemming from these efforts.

Several participants agreed that many African governments may not have a motive to control the illicit flow of weapons into and within their borders even if they have the capacity (which is also unlikely) to address the weapons flow. One expert noted a possible connection between this lack of motivation and many African governments’ reliance on their militaries for regime protection. Without a major SALW problem – often the primary source of violence in many African regions – many African governments would not need (and thus be harder pressed to justify the existence of) militaries.

Another expert, building on the previous point, reminded the group that in many African cases, current government regimes used force (including SALW) to gain power in the first place. To this end, the expert questioned why such governments would want to curb that tool of power. Another expert, however, contended that regime opposition forces (such as rebel groups and insurgents) also rely on SALW to achieve their objectives, and therefore those governments may want to curb the illicit arms trade that fuels that opposition. Although this debate was not settled, regardless of viewpoint on this issue, the participants broadly agreed that government will and capacity was one (but not the only) dimension to consider when examining SALW proliferation problems in Africa and the degree to which it negatively impacts the potential for non-lethal approaches to be used to improve African security.

**Security Sector Development and Reform**

The discussion of those issues associated with African security institutions using non/less-than-lethal force to conduct activities to improve security within their areas of responsibility

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12 The price of ammunition, according to this expert, has decreased within the past ten years, which contributes to this easy access to lethal force irrespective of individual financial status.
centered along four lines: the role of private security firms in Africa; the role, status and development of African militaries; the role, status, and development African civil police forces and their relationships with militaries; and community policing in Africa.

**Private Security Firms**

One participant highlighted the increased role of private security firms in providing security in lieu of governments in Africa (and also globally). One major example of this rise can be found in Rwanda where Intersec and other like organizations are currently operating, but this rise can also be seen in Sierra Leone. Overall, in the United States, there are four times as many private security force members as there are police officers. The participant suggested that the same situation exists in Africa, though private security forces may be more dominant in some regions than others. The participant contended that this phenomenon needs to be examined when considering the potential for non/less-than-lethal force to be effectively employed in the region to improve African security, and, collectively, the participants identified three issues to consider.

First, most of these private companies rely on shotguns as the weapon of choice to use if force becomes necessary in a given situation. Although these shotguns are much less lethal than assault rifles, they are still lethal weapons that remain in the hands of private civilians and, with proper motivation, can be used for illicit purposes. Nonetheless, one participant suggested that these companies usually have adequate control policies, processes, standards, and practices and in some cases, they may be more stringent and effective than some African militaries. For example, a private security officer may be required to turn in his weapon at the end of his shift to an authority. In some cases, African soldiers may not be required to do this and may keep their weapons when they are off-duty, increasing the potential for misuse. Though weapon control levels are high within private companies, the expert participant cautioned against deemphasizing the potential security implications of even more lethal weapons being in the hands of African civilians, especially when that number is already quite high.

Second, private security organizations can play a role in preventing violence. Many types of civilian institutions (such as banks, for example) need legitimate security to prevent theft or other crimes. If private security officers are present within these institutions, criminals may be deterred from conducting such acts, including those which are violent. Because of their sustained localized presence, the need to turn to other security forces, including those which can execute more lethal force options to respond to a situation (whether necessary or not), when a situation gets out of hand may be decreased. This has broad implications for the rate at which lethal force is employed at local levels within Africa. However, the relationship between these two variables should not be overemphasized. There is some debate that private security firms are generally only available to the “rich” and are mostly found in democratic societies. If only the “rich” can afford such preventative security organizations, a question arises about the division of wealth and the fairness of some sectors of society being able to “buy” preventative security while others cannot afford it.

Third, a related question is what the rise of these private security firms in some areas of Africa means for the role and place of the militaries in those areas which can rely on the private firms. If fewer military forces are needed to provide internal security and are
replaced by private security firms, what should be done with the military forces that are no longer needed to provide these services? What other roles might they serve within African society? Any decision on what to do with the affected soldiers would have great implications for the kinds of force which is available and used to ensure security within the African context.

**African Militaries: Role, Status, and Development**

Although private security firms are on the rise in Africa, there are still many states which rely on their militaries to provide for their internal security. In addition to African militaries being political tools of the state and protectors of the regime and its political interests (a situation examined further in the next section of this report), militaries more generally provide internal security within the state as they are, more often than not, the only available tool for this purpose. Given this situation, one needs to understand the central role and relatively high status of African militaries when examining the ways in which and the degree to which such militaries might consider their force options to maintain internal security within their respective territories as well as the possible implications for African governments’ decisions to disband and/or eliminate their militaries and develop less-lethal security forces to serve this purpose.

As previously stated, African militaries are the only means by which most African governments can maintain internal state security. In the African context, the question of whether the military is the most effective tool with which to maintain internal security is not asked because it is the only tool available. Even though training is lacking in Africa in comparison to the West, African militaries are usually the only security forces in Africa that receive any training and therefore are the most capable entities to provide security through lethal and/or non/less-than-lethal means.

One expert observed that, because of this reliance, most African governments prefer their military forces remain at home rather than engage in regional activities such as peacekeeping. This is particularly true during election seasons, where a military’s ability to ensure internal security is most crucial given the instability and violent outbreaks that often arise during these times. However, as another expert observed, there are exceptions. In the cases where the military force is sent beyond its state borders to conduct a peacekeeping mission, for example, an African government might view this as an opportunity to achieve a political goal which might not be reachable if its military were to remain in-country. Alternately, a peacekeeping mission might also be viewed as an opportunity to garner training and professionalization for soldiers. It was noted that this is often an African military’s only access to such professionalization opportunities.

According to another expert, some African governments also view their militaries as a source of employment for their citizenry. Without such military employment opportunities, more instability and violence might arise out of a lack of options for people to provide for their well-being in situations where other reliable employment is unavailable. It is possible that the military might be kept in place, even in situations where other security force options are available.

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13 Within this context, one expert observed that the militaries from Botswana, Burundi, and Uganda are the African forces most involved in peacekeeping on the continent.
available within the state, in part to prevent such a widespread unstable situation within a particular state due to higher levels of unemployment.

The expert expanded on this idea and reminded the group of a situation where the President of Costa Rica, Oscar Arias, visited several African countries, including Namibia, Kenya, and Tanzania, in an effort to persuade them to disband their militaries as he had done in his country. All of these governments, according to this expert, weighed their decisions heavily on economic factors (in addition to political ones) because their militaries were major sources of employment for their people. If an African government had other instruments to maintain internal security and chose to downsize and/or eliminate its military force, then that government would need to find other sources of employment for its demobilized soldiers. Costa Rica provided opportunities for its demobilized soldiers by creating a police force to fill the void, a decision which had major implications for the level of lethal force that was available in the country (as the expert observed, there is a major difference in the lethality of a police officer’s equipment versus the lethality of that of a soldier’s).

However, the question remains about the potential impact of this kind of shift in particular African contexts. As another expert observed, it is difficult, though possible, to turn trained soldiers into police officers. Changing uniforms and weaponry won’t necessarily result in changes in attitudes, perceptions of security problems and the value of force, and behavior, particularly in Africa where professionalization opportunities are lacking from the start.

**The Role, Status, and Development of African Civil Police Forces and Their Relationships with Militaries**

One participant observed that although the relationships between African civil police and African militaries vary from context to context, there are several general themes which underlie these relationships in Africa. Although the particulars associated with each context need to be examined, numerous broad issues relating to the place of the African police and military impact the degree to which and how many of these security forces engage with one another to address security issues. It is important to have an understanding of the low status of African civilian police forces, especially in comparison to African militaries, in order to accurately perceive the challenges that these organizations face which prevent them from collaborating effectively – or, in some cases, at all.

The expert contended that although the nature of this police and military relationship has little to do with how African police and militaries perceive and make decisions about the use of non/less-than-lethal force to address security problems, the place and role of these institutions in Africa needs to be understood when examining the potential to leverage non/less-than-lethal force to address the continent’s security problems.

**Challenges Confronting Africa’s Civilian Police Forces as the Interact with African Militaries**

One question to consider within this context, as a participant observed, is whether a close relationship between African police and militaries is desired and beneficial in all instances. Even if it is desired to achieve broad security objectives, the expert cited several reasons why these relationships rarely materialize. The reasons relate to a lack of an institutional
requirement to engage with one another, political elites’ preferences, differences in the roles, status, and operating approach of each of the forces, and differences in the availability of professionalization opportunities. When examining all of these issues, a nuanced picture of civil police-military relations in Africa emerges.

First, the expert noted that although there are some cases of African police and militaries forming working-level personal relationships (and some of those have been successful), there is no institutional requirement in most African countries for these two forces to engage with one another. In some cases, ethnic relationships, and the degree to which they exist, may be important in determining if a coalition will emerge and the nature of that coalition. When there is engagement, whether institutionalized or not, it may not be beneficial for all parties in every African context due to their respective statuses. In most African contexts, fighting and antagonism between the police and military is the exception rather than the rule. When this situation occurs, police generally come out on the bottom as the engagement occurs on the military’s terms.

Second, African governments, particularly presidents, decide how their military force will engage with their police force. In Zimbabwe, for example, the military is used to intimidate Mugabe’s opponents and senior military personnel run major governmental institutions such as the judiciary. There are no police in comparable positions (including police commissioner Chihuri) so it is unlikely alliances between high level police and military officials will emerge.

Related to this, one potential reason that the political elites in African countries might not want their police to develop good relationships with military organizations or become entrenched in political apparatuses relates to a fear that the military and police will work together to stage a coup. In many cases, governments may choose to purposefully underresource the police and skim off police funds if they need money for some other purpose. These actions serve to perpetuate the police’s low status and to ensure that the police cannot develop good and equal relationships with the military. On their own, African police forces cannot generally stage a coup, in part because they lack the capacity to organize like a military. Police forces in Africa aren’t unified (nor are they required to be so) which makes successfully staging such coordinated actions much more difficult.

Third, there are observable differences in the roles and operating approach of each of the militaries and the police in most African contexts. The integral element shaping the nature of these differences relates to status of each organization, which reinforces both their roles and the kinds of activities they undertake or have the authority to undertake. Generally, African police have a very low status in comparison to the military. They may be – accurately or not – viewed as incompetent, untrained, and corrupt. Because of this, political organizations and ordinary citizens may distrust them. The police generally work in difficult conditions for little pay and may not have the necessary tools to effectively execute necessary security operations.

14 This expert contended that a systematic analysis of this phenomenon has not been conducted in Africa, though it may be necessary to conduct such an analysis to generate more insights and improve knowledge and understanding of the nuanced picture of civil-military relations in African contexts.
The roles of African militaries and police are strikingly different and each of their roles reinforces their respective statuses. African police are perceived as technicians to deal with ordinary crime despite the fact that low level police officers may have the best knowledge of the general security situation on the ground locally. African militaries, on the other hand, engage at a more macro level on issues of interest to the government and view security issues differently than both high and low level police officers. This obvious difference in roles affects the way the two forces operate, which in turn reinforces the disparity in their status within African society. Indeed, as one expert observed, the nature of policing in Africa reinforces the police’s subordinate status by limiting the officers’ focus to crime and intimidation rather than broader national security matters that concern the military. Due to these different focus areas, the police more or less accept the lower status. This may also foster a superior attitude and feelings amongst African military personnel that they are the only ones that can provide security and protection at the highest level.

Fourth, the African police forces’ low status is reinforced and perpetuated by a lack of training opportunities available to them. Although many African militaries suffer from the same issues, this lack of professional development opportunity is most serious and apparent within African police forces. Most officers receive little to no training. There are, however, a few exceptions to this; for example, some African police had previous careers which afforded them valuable relevant training such as being members of rebel forces (particularly in post-conflict societies) or the military (in which case they may have received some education at African military academies).

Implications of African Civilian Police-Military Engagement on Decisions about Force Options

The expert noted that leveraging non/less-than-lethal weapons will likely not change the nature of the civil police and military relationships in Africa because the use of these weapons are generally viewed as an incendiary issue and any decision to use them is 100% political. On the other hand, though this expert asserted that the nature of police and military interaction generally has little impact on African decisions about when to use lethal force and/or non/less-than-lethal force, he noted the importance of understanding why this is the case.

Irrespective of the status, roles, and responsibilities of the African police and the military, it should be noted that in most African contexts, intimidation, corruption, and lethal violence are a part of everyday politics and activities (and in some cases, considered acceptable and normal), and lethal force is valued as a political tool. Because of this situation, internal

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15 Within this context, another expert observed that this difference in how military and police view security issues is actually more nuanced. Military police are likely to perceive security issues differently than infantry soldiers, for example.

16 There was some debate among the participants on whether everyone accepts and tolerates violence in every African state. One participant felt, for example, that Nigerians are not tolerant of violence as being a part of everyday politics. When the Nigerian government used police force against its political opponents, for example, there was a significant uproar and the government did not repeat that tactic. Today, politicians hire their own thugs to oppress opponents during election season. Another expert, within this context, observed that the low-level of complaints within Nigeria about extra-judicial killings was striking. Yet another expert suggested that the participants consider the anthropological literature which suggests
security is what matters to most Africans. Because these concerns are so widespread, it is unlikely any security force, whether military or police, will feel compelled to use only non/less-than-lethal approaches to achieve security (though the misuse of lethal force is in itself a security challenge in Africa). Therefore, non/less-than-lethal weapons issues are not likely to affect internal African police or military decision making related to force employment.

Another issue to consider within this lethal/non/less-than-lethal force employment decision context is the degree to which African police and militaries have the capacity to effectively use lethal and non/less-than-lethal force to conduct security activities. One expert contended that without a balance between police and military forces that are both able to rapidly respond to security situations in whatever manner appropriate, a state will need to rely almost exclusively on its military force to conduct both lethal and non-lethal activities. This is the rule rather than the exception in Africa. Status and role issues of police are a key issue to examine in this context. If police do not have the authority, equipment, and training to rapidly respond to security situations, the military will need to fill this requirement (especially if there is no paramilitary capability) whether it involves lethal force or not.

Within this context, the expert noted that the case of Sierra Leone is a useful example of an atypical situation of the police being somewhat effective in performing both lethal and non-lethal activities to improve security in coordination with the military. However, this experience was certainly not without its challenges and great financial expense. In Sierra Leone in the late 1990s to 2003, the unarmed police couldn’t deal with the rebel situation. The Special Security Division (SSD), a component of the police armed with military-style weapons, fought alongside the military to address these problems in an effective way in this post-conflict environment. However, there was one difficulty in ensuring a sustained, available lethal/non/less-than-lethal force capacity in the police organization. It was often difficult for the Operational Support Division, the successor to the SSD, to provide a mobile armed response capacity to make the transition between lethal and non-lethal activities when they were no longer needed to provide lethal support. They were not provided with skills training to make this transition.

Community Policing

Within this discussion, two experts commented on the ways in which community policing (CP) practices have been instituted in Africa, particularly in post-conflict environments, to address security problems. They considered the degree to which CP practices have been successful, the challenges that arise when the practices are implemented, and the implications of implementing CP practices on decisions about the employment of lethal and/or non/less-than-lethal force to deal with security situations. The experts suggested that there were lessons to be learned, both from the African experience (particularly Sierra Leone, but also perhaps others) and other non-African countries about the ways in which community

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17 This expert observed that generally, irrespective of the state of the relationship between an African military and police force, they need to be fundamentally “good” forces to be effective in achieving a security goal.
policing might be employed within Africa and be used as a way to promote better, more humane policing that does not rely on excessive force in all situations.

The experts also contended that the application of such lessons is context-dependent. When considering how to apply these lessons to a particular context, the particulars of that situation need to be well-understood to ensure maximum benefit and minimize unintended secondary negative consequences. Within this context, the presenters, as well as the other experts, highlighted three major issues: the importance of tailoring CP approaches to particular contexts, general challenges in and benefits of implementing CP in Africa, and implications of CP in changing how force is employed to address security problems in Africa.

**Varying Approaches to Community Policing and the Importance of Understanding Context**

As one expert noted, though CP approaches may vary from context to context, it is generally considered to be a new philosophy in policing which emphasizes the working partnership between police officers and citizens in creative ways in order to solve community problems related to crime, the fear of crime, and general neighborhood disorder. It involves primarily proactive policing; however, the most successful CP programs also include reactive policing used in conjunction with the proactive element.\(^\text{18}\)

CP approaches, as one expert suggested, have been implemented globally. To this end, it might be useful to undertake a cross-border comparative analysis of what those approaches are and how they have been implemented to identify lessons learned which might potentially apply to African contexts. However, there are cultural and other contextual differences which need to be understood when examining how and why CP is implemented in certain situations. These differences have great implications for the ways in which lessons from other contexts, for example from the West, can be applied to African ones (and vice versa).

Within this discussion, the expert identified two types of community policing: that which is state-initiated and that which is community-initiated. State-initiated community policing is more common in the West, while community-initiated community policing is more common in Africa. The expert discussed several reasons for this distinction and further examined how they differ from one another. He emphasized that although this cultural distinction is apparent, there are cases of state-initiated CP in Africa and community-initiated CP in the West.

\(^{18}\) The expert further explained these distinctions. In reactive policing, citizens mobilize the police to intervene in private affairs on an incident by incident basis. Police react to these incidents and identify and implement solutions to that particular incident to restore order and security. Proactive policing, on the other hand, is focused on dealing with problems before they manifest. To do this, police intervene out of their own initiative when they see a threat and/or vulnerability. Proactive policing is more in sync with CP approaches, though CP can and should also involve reactive policing. The expert contended that although both reactive and proactive policing have the same goal (to improve security), police forces should use both approaches in conjunction with one another. That is, though proactive policing (including CP) might be used to identify problems that need to be addressed, reactive policing still has a place in providing solutions to problems as they arise.
Western-style community policing, for example, is a top-down approach to security in which the police (acting on behalf the state) initiate and take a role in mobilizing community self-rule at the lower level. In this regard, the police are in search of a community to mobilize and control those community-level activities with the goal of ensuring public order, territorial control, and moral enforcement. They tend to receive some training in executing these missions, leverage social sciences-based analyses and methodologies in implementing practices, and focus most heavily on policing vulnerable groups and communities and improving governance. The policing agenda is often negotiated with the target community and the priority is generally placed on small public order problems and improving quality of life at the problem rather than incident level. This type of policing can involve militias that are invested with policing powers and recruited, trained, and paid by the state they serve. These militias essentially serve as auxiliary police forces.

In Africa, the situation is generally quite different. CP takes a bottom-up approach because the level of actual and perceived insecurity at the local level is generally much greater, and the ability and/or willingness of the state to reactively address those insecurities is generally much less. The need and desire for such policing arises mostly from the community itself (realizing the level of insecurity it faces) and members of the community are at the forefront in searching for a “state” (or a functioning replacement for a state), as it were, to proactively provide for their security needs. More often than not, the African community initiates the CP approach and implements it informally and unofficially.

One of the reasons for this preference toward community-initiated CP relates to the ubiquity of community self-rule in most African contexts. Generally, informal policing contributes to local safety and is popular with the average citizen while the state is generally viewed as a distant entity and sometimes inhospitable (let alone capable of dealing with security issues at local levels in such a way that is helpful to the affected community). According to one expert, these reasons are cultural, but they may also be rational. In Nigeria, for example, many communities resort to traditional informal policing by rational choice. Groups such as the Bakasi Boys, the Hisbah, and the Odu’a and the People’s Congress (a group that started out fighting for political power and transformed to fight crime) emerged due to the weakness of the central state. In South Africa, vigilantism, a form of bottom-up CP, was a rational response for some communities to their local security situation. Policing was low, the criminal justice system was feeble at best, and the state was generally unable to provide for their local security needs. In Tanzania, some communities were faced with a situation of prevalent gun trading and cattle stealing. They formed security groups at the local level as a rational response to this circumstance.

Within this discussion, one expert suggested that although this Western/African distinction in how CP is approached and implemented is the rule rather than the exception, it is not wise to assume this distinction applies in every African and Western context. The particulars of each context, regardless of physical and/or cultural location, must be understood and emphasized; this includes cultural traditions and security needs. For instance, although state-initiated (top-down) community policing is more common in the West, Sudan and Uganda have adopted this approach to their community policing. In the United States, gated communities and neighborhood watch schemes are examples of community-initiated (bottom-up) community policing.
Overall, the expert suggested that although CP approaches, by necessity, vary throughout the globe and even within particular regions, it may be possible and beneficial to identify principle-level lessons learned from other contexts (i.e., what approaches worked and what did not) and apply them to some African contexts. Some principles that are the foundation of other's CP approaches which might strengthen African CP include the implementation of a police training component to improve and maintain professionalism and helping them be co-producers of justice with the community and prevent crime.

One of the reasons for this is that CP approaches have been used to identify and address security problems that are present in many regions. The expert pointed out that CP approaches have been applied to address human trafficking problems, prostitution, gang violence, political and social riots, counterterrorism, and other crimes. As many of these problems manifest in Africa, there may be a potential to consider what other non-African countries have done to address these issues through CP approaches and tailor them to the African situation.

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19 As part of his presentation, the expert identified specific ways some non-African countries have adopted CP practices which might offer lessons learned, particularly in the form of principles, which can be applied in the African context. He did not highlight what those particular lessons might be, but emphasized how the various approaches were grounded in the particular country's culture and/or security needs and in some cases, might be adapted to fit some African contexts. In China, for example, CP is very much bottom-up in nature and is deeply grounded in the traditional values of Confucianism, Chinese CP emphasizes policing through the inculcation of social norms by clans, families, and other social groups. Japan, on the other hand, has the oldest approach to CP which stemmed from demands for increased accountability, decentralization, and service-orientations within the police force. Japan uses Kabans, or police boxes; the police live with the people and because they are not viewed as the enemy, they can more easily gather intelligence. Japanese CP also focuses on public relations and developing community support groups. This approach, the expert contended, is rooted both in Japanese culture, traditions, and customs, but also egalitarianism in general (a common value in the United States context). CP techniques used in the United States can be traced back to those used in Great Britain, where the police have integrated communities into their efforts to control crime so that they are co-producers of justice. It involves promoting neighborhood watch groups. As part of its CP strategy, metropolitan police project teams define and diagnose problems at a local level such as vehicle theft and prostitution, and tactical teams tackle rioting problems. Some other countries developed CP strategies in direct response to their security needs and do not involve as much of an overt cultural foundation as in places like China or Japan. Israel, for example, due to regional and terrorism security threats, spends a great deal of money on ensuring security, including policing. Its CP approach has been transformed from a reactive one to a proactive one and focuses on determining what the security realities are and planning efforts to address emerging problems. CP in Australia also emerged due to its security problems – albeit at more local levels, including drug smuggling and trading and burglaries. It involves a proactive approach to policing. Police are trained in security audit techniques and how to focus on hot crime spots to decrease repeat residential thefts. The police also inform residents in local areas about methods to prevent crime and ensure personal security. A focus within the police forces on intelligence-gathering, developing communication channels with the community, and maintaining the free flow of information between the police and the public has helped reduce drug trading in particular, according to this expert.

20 One participant cautioned against assuming all African police forces have the same levels of professionalism and would therefore require the same kinds of training in this area. In some cases, professionalism might be a “luxury” focus of such training, when there are other fundamental problems that need addressing within the force.
Challenges in and Benefits of Implementing Community Policing

The discussion of the general challenges and benefits of implementing community policing proceeded along three lines. First, the experts discussed those challenges which have manifested globally when various countries have tried to adopt and implement CP approaches and identified, to some extent, how those challenges might be relevant in the African context. The second discussion focused on the benefits of such approaches. The third discussion focused on a consideration of the successes, benefits, and challenges of one African country, Sierra Leone, in adopting a community policing-based approach to improving its own security situation. Within this context, an expert discussed why these successes, benefits, and challenges associated with CP emerged in Sierra Leone in particular and identified the extent to which lessons might be learned and applied from that case to other African contexts. These discussions paved the way for a more specific consideration of the implications of CP in Africa for the employment of lethal and non/less-than-lethal force.

Challenges of CP

Several experts broadly discussed some of the challenges associating with implementing and using CP approaches in virtually any geographic location. They noted that many of the challenges, though global, were particularly relevant to the African context. Above all, one challenge stems from recognizing and integrating a country’s customs, traditions, and rules into CP training and approaches, which requires an indigenous understanding of those elements. There was widespread agreement that context-specific attention to these details and tailoring of CP approaches in addition to training is an essential ingredient for ensuring the potential success of any CP initiative.

Changing the Police Force

Other challenges relate to fostering acceptance of changes and implementing them within the existing police force to accommodate new CP approaches within the force. As one expert observed, this includes convincing top police management to embrace CP principles in general and changing the traditional police culture from being primarily reactive and incident-driven to incorporating proactive and problem solving-based approaches to policing. As another expert contended, this shift can be easier said than done in many cases. Police need to learn proper reactive policing before learning proactive techniques for CP to be successful because reactive policing may be necessary to deal with the problems that proactive policing approaches help identify. In cases where this shift is near impossible, the expert offered that problem-oriented, rather than incident-oriented, policing may be an alternate and more reasonable goal to attain. A shift to problem-oriented policing would require attention on ways to improve communication between the police force and the community it is serving.

As another expert observed, implementing CP also might involve more practical changes within the force. Decentralizing police commands and changing their organization (particularly at the administrative level) may be met with both internal and external opposition. This was a problem in Nigeria where actions to decentralize its police force were largely opposed.
Identifying “Who” to Involve

As several of the experts observed, other challenges relate to involving the appropriate people in activities to implement CP, including the training of would-be community police officers. Experts and those with a native/indigenous understanding of the area in which the CP approach is going to be employed are needed to implement the planned activities with any degree of success. Trainers must also be aware of the unique factors – including cultural ones – which are intrinsic to the area, and use that information to tailor the training. An approach which involves a “one-size-fits-all” contractor conducting training in Africa and other regions may not be successful if that contractor is not well-versed in each particular context. A comprehensive, consistent, and long-term strategy is needed to ensure effective police training in a given situation.

Likewise, as one expert observed, an effective trainer requires an understanding of the security realities that those receiving the training need to address. If a trainer is from the West, he/she might not be accustomed to dealing with the kinds of security problems to which an African police officer might have to react on a day to day basis. It is possible that these problems might require maximum force responses in some situations (including, but not limited to, resolving land disputes after mass migrations and resettlements, performing refugee camp and border control policing duties, dealing with rebels from other countries who commit crimes, and dealing with dynamic arms smuggling networks). Therefore, the trainer’s knowledge and experience on how to deal with those situations which are uncommon in the West may be limited, which would have great implications for his ability to conduct effective skills-based training in those areas. However, such a situation would provide the Western trainer an opportunity to learn from the African experience. In these instances, the focus of such training might be on ways to prevent such security situations from happening in the first place, or at least to prevent them from escalating.

Human Rights, Civil Liberties, Constitutional Freedom, and Anti-Corruption Training

One expert observed that human rights, civil liberties, and constitutional freedom training needs to be incorporated into any CP-related training due to the fact that the success of any CP initiative relies heavily on community and police interaction. Though no participant discounted this idea, one of them cautioned against assuming every offer for such training would be met with a great deal of enthusiasm. Additional, it should not be assumed that every police officer receiving the training would apply the practices he learned in training on the job. However, such programming is needed as a precursor to integrating police at the community level to ensure their involvement in the community does not result in more personal security problems. Communication skills training should also be a major foundational element to any training program.

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21 This participant contended that while the international community is fond of the human rights training element, it might not be a stretch to say that many Africans are cynical of it. When the international community is involved in such programming, police receive such training (perhaps several times), however there is no guarantee that such training will result in changes in attitude and behavior about human rights issues in practice.
One expert also contended that corruption issues within the existing police force need to be identified and addressed within CP-related training. A challenge, he stated, was to ensure this training focused on both high (administrative) and low level corruption. Citing the example of Sierra Leone, he noted that there were 15 ranks between the highest and the lowest ranks within its police force during the conflict in the 1990s. Corruption did not only occur at the highest ranks of the force and did not simply involve high-level administrative issues. He suggested that low level corruption pervaded all of the ranks within the force, particularly when it came to rice rations. Due to scarcity issues, these rations were a fungible commodity to trade during wartime. The higher the rank of the police officer within the force, the more rations that officer received. This translated in a greater capability to engage in this kind of trading. Therefore, this low-level corruption was a concern within both the upper and lower ranks of the force. The expert further noted that trainers often focused only on high level/administrative corruption and turned a blind eye to the low level activities and did not provide training in this area. The case of Sierra Leone suggests that this is not a useful way to conduct training to promote overall reform.

Resource Issues

Other challenges associated with the implementation of a CP approach relate to resources. Financial resources are required both to implement and sustain a CP program in any context. As one expert observed, in cases where the international community is involved in developing the CP program, it may be a challenge for the receiving country to maintain and sustain the program once implemented if donor funding is no longer available. For instance, Brazil and Colombia were unable to sustain their CP programs when funding from donors to establish the program was depleted. When donor funds are available and used for this purpose, it may be difficult to ensure accountability within the police force in expending those funds. As another expert noted, if a CP program is not being met with any marked improvement in security, a change in how resources are expended may be necessary. For example, more resources might need to be placed against one area vice another.

Fostering Relationships and Developing Trust

Yet other challenges relate to training police officers to conduct community policing activities. In order for CP to be used successfully to improve security situations, the public/community needs to have a close relationship with the community police force. As one expert noted, in cases where the police are only accustomed to reactive policing, it can be difficult to foster new attitudes and practices needed to deal closely with communities as co-producers of justice. Community and police interaction not only requires good, effective communication, but it also demands trust between the two groups and a mutual understanding that all activities will be impartial.  

The participants further highlighted the importance of trust/feelings of impartiality between the community and police as a necessary ingredient for successful CP by considering why CP

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22 One expert noted that pluralistic police forces have a history in some areas of Africa, particularly within tribal contexts. This history, this expert noted, might be leveraged in implementing CP approaches in some contexts where mistrust and potential situations of partiality might occur.
failed in many “ordinary” non-gated communities in South Africa post-apartheid. One expert asserted, and others agreed, that this failure was very much related to distrust between some segments of the populace and the police. During apartheid, informal policing was used to intimidate the populace so distrust of community-level police in some segments of the population is a legacy from that time period. This trust issue, according to another expert, was found both within the general populace and the police force. He asserted that in the 1990s, post-apartheid, many police officers found it to be too dangerous to patrol for crime in ordinary neighborhoods and remained on stand-by at the station ready to react if a criminal incident occurred. As yet another expert observed, the long-term success of CP in South Africa is largely dependent on the distance from the apartheid era; it takes time to rebuild trust between the police and communities. Timing, as well as trust, is an important criterion for successful CP implementation in any context.

However, as another expert opined, the case of South Africa illustrates that building trust requires more than time. In addition to time, the police force’s ability to improve the security situation within those communities that distrust it depends on the support of the population. The police need to show that the force is improving the security situation, adding value, and committed to sustained activities within that community to garner this support. Without the initial support of the community to let the police force conduct any kind of activity, however, this goal can be difficult to achieve. Overall, one needs to demonstrate success in one area of activity in order to build trust in another area. A history of corruption within the police force, at both the high and low levels within the organization, can make developing this trust even more difficult.

As another expert observed, it is almost always “risky” to implement and integrate CP approaches to policing when trust levels are low and dangerous conditions exist at the community level. However, he advocated for trying to make a positive difference through trying CP despite those conditions. There will inevitably be more crime if one does nothing about the crime that already exists and waits for more crime to emerge. One way to potentially demonstrate the positive impact of CP is to try to implement it in areas where it is more likely to succeed to demonstrate the value to those communities which are skeptical and distrustful of it.

Benefits of CP

Though challenges exist to its implementation, there was general agreement that CP, if tailored to the context and sustained, can be used to improve African security at all levels in most, if not all, African contexts. Globally, there are many examples of CP being successful both in terms of being implemented and achieving an improved security situation, though, as one expert observed, this success was not always realized after the first attempt. For instance, CP implementation attempts in Belgium initially did not meet with much success, but some success was achieved with repeat attempts. As another expert observed, repeating these attempts may not always result in more success if the same approach is used to implement and sustain CP. He advocated for any attempt at implementing and sustaining a CP program to include impact assessments, including how CP has transformed the problem-solving process within the police force and the impact it has had on its organization, its leadership, and the way it expends resources. These aspects, he contended, need to be well-
understood to make necessary modifications as the CP program continues to ensure its long-term success.

The participants also identified specific ways in which a CP approach might be used to improve security, not only in Africa, but globally. Within this context, one expert suggested that although CP cannot solve all African security problems, it can help in identifying what they are at the ground level. He offered one approach which has been used successfully in many global contexts to assist police with this problem identification. This approach, known as the S.A.R.A model involves scanning (identifying the problem and finding the salient patterns), analysis (determining the cause and extent of the problem), response (developing and implementing strategies aimed at solving the problem), and assessment (evaluating the overall effectiveness of the response in addressing the problem and the impact). Because community police tend to be generalists rather than specialists (like other police forces) it is easier for them to engage in a broader, more holistic way on all aspects of a potential and/or actual security situation and conduct the steps within the S.A.R.A model. Power is, therefore, shared among all of the community police.23

He suggested that this approach is not only helpful to identify problems that have already manifested, but to identify and evaluate risks for other areas in which the problem might arise and construct counter-measures to deal with them. This latter area, in particular, requires that community police be well-trained in scanning for vulnerabilities, analyzing methods of attack, responding to potential vulnerabilities and threats by allocating necessary police forces to thwart an attack, and assessing the impact of that response to determine the extent to which it was effective. This assessment can involve sporadic readiness tests.

Successes, Benefits, and Challenges in Implementing Community Policing in Sierra Leone

After discussing community policing in a comparative global (and regional) perspective, the participants then considered the case of Sierra Leone – an African country in which community policing approaches have been implemented with some success. One expert suggested that the reason this case is largely considered a successful instance of post-conflict security sector reform is in part due to the country’s unique situation. However, he explored whether lessons could be gleaned from the Sierra Leone experience and applied to other African contexts seeking security sector reform, including implementing community policing practices.

Dimensions of the Sierra Leone Case

The expert contended that while it is not possible to isolate all of the variables that affected the outcome of Sierra Leone’s security sector reform activities – including its implementation of community policing – without experimental research, there is enough evidence to discern what situation emerged (and is emerging) in the country and understand some of the benefits, successes, and challenges associated with balancing proactive and reactive policing in the country. The relative “success” of community policing (grounded mainly in a proactive approach), he suggested, should be associated with some early actions

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23 Related to this point, another expert remarked that while many police readily grasp the intelligence benefits of employing CP approaches, they often do not like the power-sharing aspect of it.
that Sierra Leone’s government and partners took in the aftermath of the conflict. These actions had a huge impact on the degree to which CP has been successful in the country today.

Today, for instance, the peace gained in 2002 is still holding in Sierra Leone. Despite continuing problems of unemployment and corruption in the country, Sierra Leone has not slipped back into the violence that it experienced in the 1990s. Even during national elections, a time which can be filled with instability and chaos in many African countries due to governance issues, a mostly unarmed police force is able to provide security and maintain order and stability in the country.

The expert then described two factors unique to the Sierra Leone experience which contributed to this sustained peace and effective policing and an environment in which the police can effectively perform their duties. First, in 1999, a United Nations peacekeeping force arrived in Sierra Leone and assisted with disarming 70,000 former combatants as part of a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) effort. Half of these former combatants were able to find employment, which lessened the possibility that they would seek and/or facilitate a return to conflict and reduced the potential strain on the police force and competition in terms of lethal force use.

Second, it should be noted that the country has a history of having an unarmed police force. This is a product and legacy of the British influence on the country during its colonial period with its notions of peace primacy and minimal force. In 1961, post-independence, there was some reform of the police force in the country which contributed to its long-term stability, including opening up the force to include women and allowing Africans to assume command positions within the force. However, there was also politicization of the force, including the establishment of criminal procedures to allow for prosecution of lower level crime (which was thought to breed corruption), including traffic violations. These early reform actions had a potential impact on the way security sector reform emerged and was sustained post-conflict; the implementation of reforms in the 1990s and 2000s did not require those seeking the reform to start from scratch. A history of reformation was already established when the conflict-related police reform began in 1996, even before peace had been achieved. The expert suggested that this early start to reform had a major impact on the degree to which the reform was maintained post-conflict.

Within this context, he also suggested that the task force, The Commonwealth Police Development Task Force (CPDTF) charged with police reform was a major contributor to the actual success of the reform activities. It leveraged a pragmatic approach to addressing problems, including issues of past corruption within the force. Primarily, it focused on developing a new track record of appropriate behavior within the force and conducting actions to make the policing more problem-oriented. This included many activities to improve communication both within the force and with the public community at large. One

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24 Related to this point, another expert suggested that European colonial legacies and pasts are likely to have an impact on the nature of policing in Africa. Nigeria’s police are heavily influenced to this day by British notions of minimal force and peace primacy.

25 Related to this point, this expert suggested later on in the discussion that police can easily adapt to their environments. In Sierra Leone, policing did not cease to exist during its civil war.
way that the task force sought to improve communication with the community and use that foundation to improve problem-solving techniques was to create a “tasking and coordination group” within the task force. This group identified the community stakeholders (a necessary step to develop good community relations) and used the S.A.R.A model to obtain knowledge of the community that the police force would serve.

This task force was also able to garner support from the international community to implement reforms. One way it did this was to use the term “community policing” (a term, according to this expert, that is a widely-used label that can mean any thing one wants it to mean in practice) when discussing its reform efforts and plans. This attracted the attention of and funds from international donors – who are generally enamored with this concept – to implement reform efforts. These international donors included the United Kingdom (UK) (through the Department for International Development (DFID)) with its former colonial ties to Sierra Leone.

According to this expert, this security sector reform, which included a heavy emphasis on police reform, was conducted in three phases. The first phase was focused on “reactive policing,” which involved obtaining necessary equipment, rebuilding structures, providing basic training to the police force, and developing a basic level of domestic security during election season. The second phase focused on building a cadre of senior police officers, all of whom received ten weeks or more of training in the UK through the International Commanders Program. In this regard, Sierra Leone leveraged its existing ties with its former colonial power. The third phase focused on reforming the security sector more generally, including the corrections system. Steps in this phase included ameliorating the conditions of those who were incarcerated in Sierra Leone’s prisons and improving its court system. This expert stressed the importance of court reform and suggested that the degree to which this reform takes place (and is successful) has great implications for the success of long-term police reform. For example, if a court does not have necessary resources to execute judicial activities, there is no need for police to follow the requirements it sets forth.

The Applicability of Lessons Learned in Sierra Leone to Other African Contexts

The expert identified four major areas in which other African countries might apply the lessons learned in Sierra Leone to conduct their own police reform and institute a community policing element to it. These areas include adopting a whole of government approach to reform, developing an external support base for the reform, focusing on fundamental reforms, and implementing a police training component.

First, the people and government of Sierra Leone were “fatigued” by the violence and this “fatigue” contributed to the internal desire to not only achieve peace and stability, but also to collectively sustain it and conduct widespread reform. To this end, Sierra Leone adopted a “whole of government” approach to implementing reform. Its reform actions involved integrating police reform and development with the reform and development of other elements of its public sector, including the judicial sector. This included not only developing a court system (tailored to Sierra Leone’s specific needs) and training personnel to effectively work in the court system, but also convening human rights trials within Sierra Leone to assist the country in starting anew while not dismissing past judicial wrongs. This expert suggested that this broader focus on tailored judicial reform had broad implications for the overall
reform within the country and opined that this internally-driven holistic model could be leveraged in other post-conflict African situations.

Second, although Sierra Leone’s reform was kindled from within the country, it relied heavily on the UK, the country’s former colonial power, to conduct its security sector reform, including police reform as appropriate. The UK government played a lead assistance role in the reform project and provided major investment into the efforts. The close and established relationship between the two countries at both an official and personal level, along with language commonalities and mutual interests, allowed for this kind of partnership. Unlike in situations in which a country needs to rely on multiple donors to support its reform projects, this kind of bilateral activity required much less coordination to make and implement decisions, which in turn reduced the potential for problems that could block progress.26 The expert suggested that this neo-colonial strategy, though controversial, may be able to be translated into some other African contexts, particularly in situations where the governments retain productive, close ties with former colonial powers.

Sierra Leone’s reliance on external support to implement reforms was not limited to funding. It relied on an expat to serve as director of police. According to the expert, because the senior officer corps within the country was so politicized, selecting one of those individuals to fill the director position would have almost guaranteed reform failure. The expert indicated that most of the country was supportive of this decision and suggested that this model might be adopted elsewhere in Africa where politicization and corruption is a potential issue not only in the police forces, but other judicial organizations.27

Third, Sierra Leone adopted a “back to basics” approach to its police reform. Rather than completely focusing on developing a community police element (which would be a hard goal to attain given the state of its police), it focused on putting its armed police under civilian control and developing policing approaches which were problem-oriented rather than incident-oriented in a sustained and persistent manner.28 This, although borrowing from CP techniques, was not a complete shift to CP. It also focused on developing its reactive policing capacity, which is necessary for proactive policing to be put into place in any

26 On the other hand, another expert noted that there are many countries which share an interest in a particular African country that can provide support (a situation which may not exist on other continents). If leveraged effectively, such multi-country engagement strategies could also prove to be beneficial and positively impact the country in question.
27 Another expert agreed with this point and suggested that in general, police reform in Africa is top-down. Because of corruption, bottom-up reform is unlikely to work. There is a need for “clean hands” at the top of police organizations in order to lower corruption and build trust with the citizenry (as was the case in Botswana as well as in Sierra Leone). Further, expats may be able to be more controlled than locals to ensure policing and security goals are met.
28 This expert further explained why the armed police were put under civilian control and the impact of that decision for Sierra Leone. Recognizing that a mostly unarmed police force, while effective in ensuring internal security, did not offer Sierra Leone with an armed presence for self-defense (which was also needed for credibility reasons), the government of Sierra Leone also transformed its paramilitary force, the Internal Security Unit (ISU), into the Operational Support Division (OSD) as part of its security sector reform activities. DFID funds allowed the OSD force members to be outfitted with civilian-style weapons and receive training on specific techniques to control crowds and negotiate in hostage situations, but also ways to use minimal force. Unlike the ISU, the OSD is under the control of the civil police rather than the President. In this way, the Sierra Leone Police have both lethal and non-lethal force options at its disposal.
context. This plan to focus less on complete and sudden change and more on long-term sustainment and gradual reformative adjustments resulted in long-term success. Through patience and a sustained commitment to reform (even with fits and starts along the way), Sierra Leone was able to make a successful transition with long-term potential. By focusing on developing institutional memory with a cadre of “middle managers,” it increased its potential for long-term reform. These “middle managers” would, while remembering what occurred in the past, adapt, promote, and implement changes and advances as the eventual leaders of the force.29 The expert suggested this approach could potentially work in other African contexts where sudden changes in the police force would be destabilizing and/or short-lived.

Fourth, one integral element of this “back to basics” approach was to include a police training component that focused heavily on developing communication skills. According to this expert, the presence of sophisticated and experienced trainers to assist Sierra Leone’s police in developing good policing practices and standards was a major contributor to its success. In some cases, involving trainers in police reform that do not have the necessary skill sets can do more harm than good even if there is a large cadre of such trainers present. In this way, a larger training presence is not always the best way to ensure the best kind of training and the best response to it. Likewise, a training program that does not emphasize communication skills is likely not to be as effective as one that does include this element. This expert suggested that this fundamental focus on communication and “good training” is a translatable lesson learned from the Sierra Leone experience.30

Implications of Community Policing in Changing How Force is Used to Address Security Problems

The participants also considered the implications of African countries adopting community policing approaches in shaping the use of non/less-than-lethal force to maintain security. There was general agreement that the aim of CP is not to give up force (lethal or not) entirely, but to minimize its use, to use it in such a way that is appropriate to address the problem at hand. In this regard, force is used when necessary and a CP approach may allow some changes in how force is used and the degree to which it is used in a particular situation. Training on the most reasonable and appropriate ways to use force to protect the populace and bring a security situation under control should be a major component of any CP implementation program.

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29 Within this context, one expert recommended a greater attention to how “the institution” affects policing and the role of institutional memory in promoting and implementing change. Without a stable institution in place, for example, police force members may not feel they are required to do anything.

30 As part of this discussion, several participants noted the importance of addressing police morale and health issues prior to or while implementing any training regiment because those factors can have a major impact on a police officer’s capacity to do his/her job, just as it does in the military. One expert discussed how funding was provided to provide basic medicine, anti-malaria drugs, and hospital bedding to the Sierra Leone police during its reform activities. The reason for this is widespread sickness has a major impact on not only police capacity, but also morale. Efforts to improve the health of the police force, in addition to developing a healthy force, might also improve morale. Better health and morale are necessary ingredients for police training to be effective. However, this expert cautioned that no systematic research initiative has been conducted which considers the implications of morale and health (as well as pay) on police force development and reform in post-conflict African societies.
Fundamentally, as one expert observed, CP is based on the recognition that citizens are co-producers of crime prevention and that good police-citizens are required to do this. The information they provide to the police is the foundation of solving crimes, arresting offenders, preventing disorder, and, in some cases, countering terrorism. Given the primacy of good relations and effective information exchange in ensuring successful CP, the CP approach minimizes the use of force in police work. It may also limit the use of non/less-than-lethal weapons since good CP is based solidly on police partnering with communities. However, since proactive CP is not always effective, there may be some instances in which using such force becomes necessary to address a security situation. Non-lethal weapons might be used to gain control over individuals who are actively resisting police intervention in a security situation and are exhibiting active aggression. If such methods do not work to ameliorate the situation, reactive, lethal force might be available as a back-up if a violent situation becomes more likely.

Within this context, the participants discussed several types of non/less-than-lethal weapons. Batons are the most common of these weapons in Africa. In some cases, shields are also available to police forces. Other more advanced forms of non/less-than-lethal weapons which are common in the West, such as Tasers, are far less common on the continent. Several experts observed that African training on such weapons should therefore focus on those weapons to which Africans have access (particularly to control crowds) and should also highlight the importance of communication skills above all weaponry in dealing with security situations.

There was some unresolved debate as to whether CP training should include more advanced forms of non/less-than-lethal weapons which are not common or less common in Africa and which require even more training if they are to be used properly, appropriately, and effectively. One participant felt that this knowledge and skills-based training on new technologies, though challenging, would strengthen police training programs as and provide police with the skills necessary to integrate those advances into their policing practices. Others agreed that the potential for using such advanced technology exists in some African contexts, but not others. Others still felt that introducing these advanced weapons into any training program would be a mistake as most of these weapons are out of reach of most African police forces due to resource and trust issues; even if they were not out of reach, their introduction into many African contexts would be an incendiary political issue. Even if such weapons were to be provided to the police forces, as one expert suggested, there are resource considerations relating to maintaining those weapons provisions once they are

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31 As part of this discussion, several experts discussed Tasers, in particular, though one expert also mentioned chemical agents and beanbag shotguns. In the African context, Tasers are only scarcely used in Senegal (and perhaps other places), according to one expert, though they are a popular law-enforcement tool in the West as they are viewed as a safer alternative to the use of deadly force in dangerous and life-threatening situations. Tasers decrease the number of police and suspect injuries (though there have been debates on whether they also can cause death and whether their use should be limited). They are usually used, according to one participant, in the 50 meter range with lethal back-up that will be employed if the suspect/perpetrator does not back down and shows a willingness to use violence. However, police need to be trained to use such tools properly, appropriately, and effectively in these particular situations. In the UK, for example, Tasers can only be used by trained firearms officers in situations where the use of force firearms is also authorized (as a back-up).

32 This debate is further described in the next section of this report, particularly as it relates to U.S. involvement in such training.
received. There was general agreement, however, that police training should include some focus on the appropriate and reasonable ways to use force in a given situation, and perhaps focus on ways to prevent those security situations from occurring in the first place.
The discussion of African perceptions on non/less-than-lethal force as a means to improve security and the related dilemmas and implications for U.S. engagement on non/less-than-lethal force issues proceeded along four lines. First, participants considered the importance of any external engager (whether the United States or otherwise) to understand the forces which provide security (the military and the police) within the particular African context of interest in forming a basis for decisions about how engage with them. This understanding should include knowledge of training as it relates to force usage. Second, the experts highlighted the importance of context in forming an understanding of how African security organizations perceive non/less-than-lethal force approaches to security and their effectiveness to address security problems. Third, participants identified some potential ways that the United States (through AFRICOM and others) can engage on non/less-than-lethal force approaches in Africa over the long-term and considered the ways it is already engaging in this area.

**Importance of Understanding African Forces that Provide Security When Making Engagement Decisions**

Several participants stressed the importance of understanding those actors charged with responding to the security problems in Africa at a fundamental level when considering externally-driven engagement plans involving attempts to reform these security organizations and assist them in evaluating appropriate uses of force to address their security problems. These security organizations include both African militaries and police who, while potential “solvers” of security problems, can, in some contexts, be contributors to those problems. While the participants stressed that no two such security organizations are the same within Africa, they contended that a lack of knowledge and understanding of these security organizations is one reason why externally-driven engagement on lethal/non/less-than-lethal force issues may be fraught with challenges and may indirectly contribute to further instability rather than positive change.

As part of this discussion, one participant highlighted three key analytical dilemmas that have broad implications for the effectiveness of external attempts to assist African police in evaluating and/or developing a better understanding of how (and what kinds of) force might be employed to address security problems of concern. The expert suggested that these dilemmas fall into two categories. The first and second relate to knowledge and understanding of the fundamental nature of African police forces. The third dilemma (which is related to this knowledge and understanding issue) is the notion that external engagers can never truly obtain all of the requisite knowledge and understanding of African police forces and use that knowledge to formulate engagement strategies to support their development.

First, Western engagers may not understand the basis for African policing and how Africans learn policing approaches. At best, these engagers might have an incomplete understanding
of how Africans think about policing, but they do not usually have a complete picture.
Second, this lack of understanding is made worse by the fact that there is a knowledge gap in
identifying how cultural transmission takes place across police forces and the impact of
relationships in shaping this transmission. Without an in-depth understanding of
relationships (including indigenous ties) and the ways they impact how policing structures,
approaches, and practices develop, it can be difficult for engagers to provide advice,
assistance, or other support to allow those institutions continued positive development.
This situation is further complicated by the fact that most police-related literature that could
be of assistance to those external actors providing this support is based on the Anglo-
American policing experience, research, and terminology. When Western engagers attempt
to universalize those experiences (as they are apt to do when they lack understanding of the
African situations of interest), it is likely that their engagement will not be productive and
applicable to the unique African situations they wish to help to transform.

A related third point is that these engagers, even if they try to gain the requisite knowledge
of the African police force of interest, can never truly understand every aspect of those
forces as an outsider. One of the reasons for this is that such outsiders often only engage
with those police officers in Africa at the highest ranks, particularly those who have been
educated in the West. Although lower ranking officers have a more complete and possibly
more realistic understanding of the on-the-ground security situations within their areas of
responsibility, it is very difficult for outsiders to engage with these officers for both practical
and political reasons.

Given these challenges related to outsiders’ understanding of African police forces, the
expert commented that any engager needs to manage both their own expectations and the
expectations of those receiving their assistance about what can be achieved via an
engagement strategy involving police development and reform. The expert cited three
principles to consider within this context.

First, given the potential for the misunderstanding of African police forces, engagers should
focus on skills transfers, which are more straightforward and can be easily transferred across
cultural boundaries without much potential for misapplication. Such training also appeals
to young officers, who are more easily adaptable to improvements and changes in police
practices. The decisions on where to focus such tactic and skills-based training should be
made according to the needs within that particular African context. This will require
communication with the intended recipients of such training.

Second, all external engagers should not expect to influence African police culture or habits
through their engagement, including training, as such change needs to come from within the
force. Training, though unlikely to broadly influence how police officers in Africa think or

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33 As an example of what skills training might entail, the expert noted that France just provided anti-
hacking training to the Nigerian police force.
34 Within this context, another expert observed that there may be a direct relationship between good
policing and good governance within particular African contexts. That is, those African countries that do
not have major governance issues (such as Botswana) may be more prone to having a “good” police force
than those who do not. In this regard, police reform may rely on more fundamental political change,
which may be even more difficult to achieve. However, Singapore is one example of a country that
operate or persuade them to change fundamental patterns in their behavior, may have some impact at the individual level particularly if the engagement (through training) is both positive and sustained. For example, if a police officer that has received such training enters into a security situation, that person may think about how to apply the tactics skills they learned and, in a best case scenario, this training may stop them from using excessive violence. However, if the engagement is not sustained (i.e. it involves a one-off training exercise), it is likely not to have any impact and, in some cases, may even be problematic.

As a third point, the expert suggested that even if engagement decisions are based on an understanding of the needs of a particular African police force and consultations with that force, there always exists a great potential for the engagement to be based on the agenda the engager has set forth rather than the agenda of the recipient of that engagement. Even if the engagement decisions include attention to the African actor’s agenda, it is likely that the agenda will be that of the high ranking African police (given that such consultations usually happen within the higher ranks). In these situations, it may not be appropriate to take every input that entity provides as the ground truth of what the security situation is like on the ground and what is needed to address that situation. Both of these factors have great implications for the degree to which externally-driven police training will be effective in promoting major necessary reform within the forces.

**Importance of Context in Understanding African Perceptions of Non/Less-than-Lethal Force**

As previously observed, several participants emphasized that context matters when determining how African security organizations might perceive the challenges, benefits, and potential success of employing non/less-than lethal force approaches to deal with their security problems. The realities on the ground matter when considering the attitudes regarding the use of non/less-than-lethal force options to deal with a situation, and how those attitudes impact decisions on force usage. For example, few if any actors in the region dealing with major violent conflict (such as in the case of the DRC and Sudan), would consider using non/less-than-lethal force to deal with their security situations or aspects of them. It might not even be appropriate to consider them. As one expert observed, in this regard, non-lethal force might be considered an oxymoron in many African contexts. In some cases, non-lethal force options may be looked upon favorably when dealing with small security situations when they are combined with lethal force as a back-up. However, the nature of violence can be unpredictable and even small security situations can eventually become major situations of widespread violence. Overall, these perceptions are shaped by current and potential future security realities and can vary from context to context.

Although it is counter-productive to generalize across all African contexts, it could also be said, as one expert stated, that violence is both a normal and accepted (if not tolerated) part (and tool of) everyday politics in many, if not all, African contexts. This situation has great implications for how various actors will perceive not only the value and effectiveness of non/less-than-lethal force, but also its potential to be successful in achieving security considering violence, and even lethality, is so common and in some cases, tolerated. Many

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focused on improving governance with some success which included (and resulted in) positive changes within its police force. It may be a model that could be followed in some African contexts.
African security forces, including the police and military, often use violence to achieve security objectives (whether warranted/reasonable/appropriate or not), but this is not the only factor that needs to be considered. In many cases, those forces are dealing with perpetrators willing to use brutal force at any cost regardless of its effectiveness in solving those security issues.

The expert contended, in this regard, that while it is arrogant to assume that Africans do not deserve humane policing, it is inappropriate to assume that introducing non-lethal weapons, particularly advanced ones, into the African police tool kit will be an effective way to transform African policing for the better and ensure force is always used responsibly to address any security situation. In some cases, this move could be an incendiary one, especially if the definition of what does and does not constitute a non/less-than-lethal weapon is unclear. A fundamental challenge is determining what effective policing is in the first place and what security problems exist. Without an understanding of this issue, it is difficult to draw conclusions about how non/less-than-lethal weapons would contribute to overall police effectiveness to address such problems.

The expert extended this point and suggested that even if such non-lethal weapons are found to be an effective way to deal with particular African security situations, one needs to consider the particular status of most African police forces when exploring the degree to which they will become part of a police officer’s toolkit and therefore be able to be used. In particular, non/less than-lethal weapons may be viewed as exciting new technology by African leaders (that is, they might equate such weapons to things like Tasers, rather than simple batons and shields). Due to the low status of police in many African contexts and the separation that exists between the police force and the political apparatus (which includes, in most cases, the military) it is often unlikely such weapons (and training on how to use them) would be directed to the police force. They would instead be directed to special military units with higher status who are “trusted” by political leaders.

Overall, there was some debate among the participants about the value of introducing non/less-than-lethal weapons debates into the African context particularly with regard to police reform. As one expert observed, encouraging African security forces to use non/less-than-lethal weapons will not result in changed behavior. Likewise, the use of such weapons should not be equated with changed attitudes within the African security forces about the value and limitations of force to improve security. However, if other activities are conducted to help police and military in Africa consider best practices to policing, the use of such tools can serve as a demonstration to the African community that those practices have changed. Therein, he suggested, lays the potential value of such weapons within the African police and military reform context. The value only can come once more fundamental reform activities have been successfully conducted. Others questioned their value entirely (given that many Africans would associate such weapons with the advanced kind such as Tasers and not necessarily things like batons and shields) and stressed the political baggage which comes with the introduction of such weapons, which may, in some cases, still be able to “kill” depending on how they are used in practice.

However, there was widespread agreement among the experts that externally-driven engagement on appropriate ways to use force to address security problems, if done correctly and in conjunction with other training activities, can potentially impact police reform and
development in African contexts. The limits of technical solutions to enable such reform and improve police effectiveness, whatever that entails, must be understood. The participants advocated for these principles to be applied to the United States’ or any other international actors’ engagement on these issues.

**Implications for U.S. Engagement on Lethal and Non/Less-than-Lethal Force Issues in Africa**

The discussion of how the United States, through USAFRICOM and other entities, might engage in Africa on non/less-than-lethal force issues focused on two lines of thought. First, participants considered what the United States is doing in this area through USAFRICOM and the limitations and challenges associated with this engagement. Second, the experts discussed further ways the United States could support African police and military reform and development activities in this area. There was general agreement that while the United States’ engagement in this area can be beneficial in promoting reasonable uses of force within African militaries and police organizations, particularly if the engagement is sustained, there are several limitations and challenges to this engagement and several principles to bear in mind when planning future initiatives.

**USAFRICOM Activities, Limitations, and Challenges**

Several participants discussed how USAFRICOM has been engaging with African militaries on non/less-than-lethal force matters, particularly as they relate to peacekeeping environments. Generally, as one USAFRICOM representative asserted, most of the Command’s efforts in this area focus on training African militaries (and police supporting peacekeeping operations) on crowd control techniques as part of team-building exercises. These exercises, conducted in response to a government’s request, focus primarily on developing communication skills to effectively deal with the dynamics of such situations. In some cases, it may include some training on baton and shield usage if the African security force has access to such non-lethal tools. However, the training is tailored to the tools which are available in the country requesting the training. For example, since the Cameroonian force does not have access to shields, USAFRICOM’s training exercise in that country focused on effective ways to use batons. In those unique/rare cases where a country has interest and access to more advanced non/less-than-lethal weapons (such as Tasers), the African government may request USAFRICOM to conduct a training exercise that includes a component focused on those tools as well. One participant noted that USAFRICOM and its predecessors have been engaged in fulfilling these types of requests over the long term; he further noted that this type of training provides even more value added when the same students receive training each year. For example, Morocco is a case in which USAFRICOM’s training exercises, which began in 2007, build from year to year with much yearly overlap in the student body.\(^35\)

However, the expert cautioned that there are legal limitations to the kinds of training and support USAFRICOM can provide to police forces on non/less-than-lethal force approaches. Because of its Congressional mandate, the U.S. military can only provide

\(^{35}\) This representative noted that the commanders usually remain the same as well as generally about 50% of the other participants in the exercise.
training to police forces as it relates to peacekeeping operations, and most engagement is focused military to military. There are other civilian government agencies that may be more appropriate to provide training specifically geared towards local African police. In this vein, several advocated a whole of government approach to the engagement as training in this area is required of both military and police forces within Africa.

**U.S. Long-Term Engagement in Africa**

Though views on the best ways and the extent to which the United States might engage with Africa on non/less-than-lethal force issues were split among the discussants, there was general agreement that these issues certainly required more study, attention, and analysis. As one expert observed, while the United States should proceed with caution in engaging with African governments and militaries on these issues (and understand the particular contexts, tailor its engagement, and manage expectations), there is no reason why the United States should avoid engagement on security sector reform activities entirely; force usage training might be considered as part of this engagement. However, such engagement needs to be sustained. Providing training and funding to one country at a singular moment in time and then disengaging may do more harm than good. Even if there is no negative impact of this disengagement, the potential for those activities to promote long-term change is minimal.

There was agreement that while the United States military could certainly have a role to play in this area, there is a certain amount of baggage that accompanies international military engagement in these topical areas on the African continent. This type of engagement may be met with skepticism and suspicion. While funding and/or training to conduct reforms may be welcome, there may be trade-offs for the African governments to consider when accepting such assistance (such as increased attention to and scrutiny of certain practices).

Cultural and historical-based issues might also inform an African government’s decision to accept such assistance from certain countries. As one expert observed, some African governments may be wary of accepting assistance from the United States because it does not have a colonial history on the continent and in many cases, may lack a long-standing relationship with African governments. Therefore, offers of assistance, particularly those involving the military, may be met with suspicion and perceptions that the United States does not “belong.”

Despite this potential situation, several participants noted some other areas in which the U.S. military and other civilian partners might engage in Africa to support police and military reformation, including ensuring appropriate and responsible use of force to address African security problems. These recommendations included:

- Conducting more outreach within Africa governments, militaries, and academic institutions to demonstrate the kinds of activities USAFRICOM has conducted in partnership with Africans to improve security to limit skepticism about its interests and activities.
- Increasing the training of militaries on responsible uses of force (a similar program might be implemented within civilian agencies of the U.S. Government to further train police). All training should be skills-based.
Establishing relationships with African-based academic institutions and think tanks that are supporting efforts to improve civil-military relationships within Africa and assisting them in best practices in conducting research.

Focusing on infrastructure development which can have a long-term impact on Africans’ ability to address their own security (as well as economic) concerns.