AIR COMMANDO INTEL: OPTIMIZING
SPECIALIZATION TRAINING FOR AIR FORCE SPECIAL
OPERATIONS COMMAND INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS

by

Christopher L. Workinger

December 2011

Thesis Advisor: Kalev I. Sepp
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AIR COMMANDO INTEL:
OPTIMIZING SPECIALIZATION TRAINING FOR AIR FORCE SPECIAL
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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
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ABSTRACT

Since 1999, Air Force Intelligence officers have been trained, force managed, and assigned in accordance with a “generalist” approach to intelligence disciplines. Specialization is the exception, and intelligence officers are assigned to a variety of missions, disciplines, and commands in an attempt to “broaden” their experience and maximize exposure to various disciplines. Because of this approach, specialization training after completion of the Air Force Intelligence Officer Course has become crucial to intelligence officer success at the unit level. This research examines specialization training provided to intelligence officers assigned to Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) flying squadrons. Information gathered through surveys and interviews of AFSOC squadron leadership, weapons officers, and intelligence officers, coupled with a detailed analysis of AFSOC Intelligence Officer responsibilities and training, was utilized to develop a web-based survey designed to measure intelligence officer performance at unit level AFSOC flying squadrons. The survey results were analyzed to determine areas of strength and weakness, and recommendations for optimizing specialization training were created from the survey results. Recommendations include actions to enhance intelligence at the individual and team level in AFSOC flying squadrons, minor modifications to specialization training, and an alternative intelligence career path which allows increased specialization is discussed.
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<td>Anti-Aircraft Artillery</td>
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<td>AETC</td>
<td>Air Education and Training Command</td>
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<td>ACO</td>
<td>Airspace Control Order</td>
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<td>AF</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
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<td>AFI</td>
<td>Air Force Instruction</td>
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<td>Air Force Special Operations School</td>
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<td>Air Force Special Operations Command</td>
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<td>AOC</td>
<td>Air and Space Operations Center</td>
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<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
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<td>Air Support Request</td>
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<td>Air Tasking Order</td>
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<td>AvFID</td>
<td>Aviation Foreign Internal Defense</td>
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<td>BMC</td>
<td>Basic Mission Capable</td>
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<td>BQ</td>
<td>Basic Qualification</td>
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<td>C &amp; R</td>
<td>Collection &amp; Reporting</td>
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<td>CMR</td>
<td>Combat Mission Ready</td>
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<td>CoCT</td>
<td>Code of Conduct Training</td>
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<td>CSAR</td>
<td>Combat Search and Rescue</td>
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<td>CT</td>
<td>Continuation Training</td>
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<td>DCGS</td>
<td>Distributed Common Ground System</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>EIT</td>
<td>External Intelligence Training</td>
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<td>EPA</td>
<td>Evasion Plan of Action</td>
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<td>GEOINT</td>
<td>Geo-spatial Intelligence</td>
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<td>IIT</td>
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<td>Intelligence Formal Training Unit</td>
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<td>Imagery Intelligence</td>
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<td>IMOM</td>
<td>Integrated Many on Many</td>
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<td>IPB</td>
<td>Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace</td>
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<td>IPOE</td>
<td>Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment</td>
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<td>IR</td>
<td>Infrared</td>
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<td>ISOPREP</td>
<td>Isolated Personnel Report</td>
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<td>ISR</td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance</td>
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<td>IWO</td>
<td>Intelligence Weapons Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>IQT</td>
<td>Initial Qualification Training</td>
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<td>MAJCOM</td>
<td>Major Command</td>
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<td>METT-T</td>
<td>Mission, Enemy, Terrain and Weather, Troops, Time</td>
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<td>MDS</td>
<td>Mission Design Series</td>
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<tr>
<td>MISREP</td>
<td>Mission Report</td>
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<td>MQT</td>
<td>Mission Qualification Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSAV</td>
<td>Non-Standard Aviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OB</td>
<td>Order of Battle</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCOKA</td>
<td>Observation and field of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain, avenues of approach</td>
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<td>PBA</td>
<td>Predictive Battlespace Awareness</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Definition</td>
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<td>PR</td>
<td>Personnel Recovery and Production Request</td>
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<td>RAP</td>
<td>Ready Airman Program</td>
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<td>RIP</td>
<td>Ready Intelligence Program</td>
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<td>RFI</td>
<td>Request for Information</td>
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<td>RPA</td>
<td>Remotely Piloted Aircraft</td>
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<td>SAM</td>
<td>Surface to Air Missile</td>
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<td>SOPE</td>
<td>Special Operations Planning Exercise</td>
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<td>SOG</td>
<td>Special Operations Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEI</td>
<td>Special Experience Identifier</td>
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<td>SERE</td>
<td>Survival Evasion Resistance Escape</td>
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<td>Special Tactics Support Request</td>
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<td>TTP</td>
<td>Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures</td>
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<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States Air Force</td>
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<td>USSOCOM</td>
<td>United States Special Operations Command</td>
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<td>VR</td>
<td>Visual Recognition</td>
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And finally, to the Air Force Intelligence professionals working tirelessly at flying squadrons around the globe—may your logic be sound, your briefings to the point, and may your efforts contribute to a successful mission.
I. INTRODUCTION

Believe an expert.

—Virgil

In the years prior to 1993, United States Air Force intelligence officers specialized in one of eight disciplines, providing officers with a great deal of specialization and expertise, but at the cost of breadth. The officer corps’ excessive specialization led to very narrow views of intelligence and service capabilities, and eventually prompted changes in intelligence officer force management to resolve the perceived weakness. Starting in 1994, AF senior leadership created the Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) 14N, and broke the career field into three sub-disciplines—Alpha, Bravo and Charlie. Due to a continued perception of “stove-piped” intelligence officer experience, the career field was further unified into a single AFSC—14N—just five years after the first moves away from specialization.

Since 1999, Air Force (AF) intelligence officers have been trained as intelligence generalists and, through the current approach to career field management, do not specialize in any one mission area for more than one or two assignments in a given career. While this generalization provides officers with a wide view of AF operations and intelligence, it sacrifices the depth of knowledge and experience required for expertise. Between the extremes of total specialization and total generalization, representative of the pre-1993 and post-1999 approaches, a balance must be struck which enables intelligence officers to gain and maintain some level of expertise, while not stagnating in a single mission, job, or assignment.

Air Force intelligence officers are situated in a highly diverse operating environment and are expected to perform across three domains—air, space, and cyberspace.\(^5\) Within these domains, 14Ns operate amongst the USAF’s twelve core functions—nuclear deterrence, air superiority, space superiority, cyberspace superiority, global precision attack, rapid global mobility, special operations, global integrated intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), command and control (C2), personnel recovery (PR), building partnerships, and agile combat support.\(^6\) The level of complexity required for effective intelligence operations should be answered with extensive specialization training to ensure the knowledge and analytical skill to thrive. Over the past decade, Air Force Intelligence has made some great strides regarding specialization training. The implementation of the Weaponizing Intelligence Combat Capabilities-Training (WICC-T) concept, designed as “an initiative to establish minimum proficiency standards for all USAF intelligence positions and to provide policy and guidance on how to train and certify intelligence personnel to meet these standards,”\(^7\) has brought great changes to AF intelligence specialization training. First implemented for F-16 fighter and KC-135 refueling squadron intelligence personnel, the WICC-T construct was established via AFI for AFSOC squadrons in 2009. But is this training sufficient to prepare AFSOC 14Ns for their assignments?

A. SCOPE

1. AFSOC Intelligence Officers

This research is focused on AF intelligence officers—14Ns—assigned to Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC). This choice for emphasis does not presume that intelligence officers assigned to this command need more specialization

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training than an officer assigned to a fighter or bomber squadron, for example. Specialization training is equally important for all intelligence officers to adequately prepare them for assignments to various missions. This study focused on AFSOC in an attempt to gauge the current state of specialization training and to measure 14N effectiveness at the unit level for the AF’s special operations force. Similar studies are encouraged for other domains and missions in an attempt to better understand and assess specialization training for various AF intelligence assignments.

While intelligence is provided to AFSOC squadrons from both officer (AFSC 14N) and enlisted personnel (AFSC 1N0), often while working as a team within the squadron, this study focused on 14Ns in order to provide the contextual detail required for the research. Intelligence officer career paths are managed separately and differently as compared to the enlisted counterparts, and separation of the two AFSCs, for the purposes of this research, was necessary to adequately explain the 14N’s environment—especially regarding the effects of career field management on 14N experience.

2. Flying Squadron Selection

Within AFSOC, 14Ns are assigned to a vast array of squadrons and missions at the flying wing, group and squadron level. Assignments at the flying wing level and below, often referred to AF-wide as “unit-level intelligence,” run the gamut in terms of SOF missions for AFSOC. Squadrons within the command cover missions in special tactics (combat control, pararescue, combat weather), ISR (remotely piloted aircraft and distributed ground station missions), strike (AC-130, MC-130W, MQ-1/9), aerial refueling (MC-130P), fixed-wing (MC-130H/P/W) and tilt-rotor (CV-22) airlift, and non-standard aviation (PC-12, M-28, et. al.).\(^8\) This study focused on 14Ns assigned to manned (i.e., not remotely piloted) flying squadrons—AC-130H/U, MC-130E/P/W, CV-22, and Non-Standard Aviation (NSAV). While intelligence for special tactics and dedicated ISR missions (e.g., remotely piloted aircraft squadrons) are equally important

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and complex, the specialization training and Air Force Instruction (AFI)-directed responsibilities at the squadron level were sufficiently different to exclude them from the scope of this research.

AFSOC intelligence officers operate within the special operations core function at the flying unit level, however, this does not mean that 14Ns operate exclusively within this particular core function. AFSOC unit-level intelligence may also operate in direct support of other core functions such as rapid global mobility, global integrated ISR, and personnel recovery, for example, while accomplishing squadron level duties.

B. THESIS

AFSOC 14Ns operate in a complex environment that requires tailored specialization training to prepare them for assignments to operational flying squadrons. Does the specialization training currently executed adequately prepare 14Ns for these assignments? Can specialization training be optimized to better prepare 14Ns for these assignments?

C. CONTEXT

The environment in which AFSOC unit-level 14Ns are situated consists of three major elements: the career field; training; and roles and responsibilities at the squadron level. Today’s approach to career field management establishes the basic professional environment and includes the current approach for 14Ns as generalists, areas of current 14N core expertise, professional competencies, tradecraft, and knowledge. Training for 14Ns assigned to AFSOC squadrons is broken into five phases: the intelligence officer course; initial qualification training (IQT); mission qualification training (MQT); specialized training, and continuation training (CT). Roles and responsibilities at the squadron level are directed by Air Force Instructions (AFI) and mandate specific tasks for unit-level 14Ns operating with AFSOC flying squadrons. Each of these three major elements will be introduced briefly below, and then explored more fully in the second, third, and fourth chapters, respectively, that follow.
1. Career Field Management

Since the move from specialization in 1999, AF intelligence officers are generally not assigned within the same core function for more than an assignment or two. For AFSOC 14Ns, this means that assignments as a Lieutenant or Captain to the flying unit level will be followed by a different assignment, for example to a signals intelligence (SIGINT) unit in another command (i.e., outside of AFSOC), in order to “broaden” officers. While this approach does create generalists who have working knowledge of multiple core functions after several assignments, it sacrifices a tremendous amount of expertise each time an officer starts in an entirely new mission area. “Corporate knowledge” regarding organizations, missions, professional contacts, and “lingo” is often no longer relevant upon reassignment and this knowledge must be regained at the new job. In cases where the new assignment is significantly different (e.g., a move from AFSOC to Space Command), a limited of knowledge from the previous assignment will be useful at the new assignment. Specialization training aims to ease this transition, but four week courses cannot replace knowledge gained over multiple years of experience. Is there a balance that can be struck which allows some level of specialization without sacrificing a total reset of organizational, and mission knowledge with each new assignment?

2. Intelligence Officer Training

After selection to the intelligence career field, AF officers commence a training process which starts with the 315th Training Squadron “Intelligence Officer Course” at Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas. This six-and-a-half month course provides students with a training baseline covering all aspects of Air Force Intelligence and all officers attend the same course. Officers are awarded the Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) 14N upon successful completion of the curriculum. Once 14Ns receive assignments to various positions within the Air Force, specialization training is provided, if available, as officers start work in their new assignments. Officers selected for assignment to AFSOC squadrons, with the exception of those assigned to remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) and
distributed common ground station (DCGS) assignments that receive separate specialization training, will proceed to the next training phase—Initial Qualification Training (IQT).

AFSOC 14N IQT requirements are directed by AFI 14-202 Intelligence Training and are fulfilled by the AFSOC Intelligence Formal Training Unit (IFTU) curriculum at Hurlburt Field, Florida. Similar to the Intelligence Officer Course’s approach of training officers across all AF intelligence disciplines, the AFSOC IFTU trains 14Ns across all AFSOC missions and applicable intelligence disciplines,\(^9\) with the exception of officers bound for RPA and DCGS squadrons as described above. AFI 14-202 mandates completion of the AFSOC IFTU prior to assignments in the Major Command’s (MAJCOM) squadrons and officers must attend and complete the 20 day course before moving to the third phase of training—Mission Qualification Training (MQT)—at their respective squadrons.\(^10\)

MQT is conducted at the AFSOC flying wing where the 14N will be assigned, and this training must be completed before 14Ns can proceed to their assigned flying squadrons. This training is “needed to qualify intelligence personnel to perform their specific unit mission in an assigned position,”\(^11\) and the duration ranges from four to eight weeks, depending on the curriculum. MQT is generally the responsibility of the Intelligence Weapons Officer (IWO) or similarly designated officer, and establishes a tailored training baseline for specified tasks, knowledge, and roles the 14N is expected to execute at the squadron. 14Ns will also establish initial currencies in all AFI 14-2 AF Special Operations Forces (AFSOC)/Personnel Recovery (PR) directed tasks during MQT.

Before AFSOC 14Ns can brief and provide intelligence to aircrews, specialized training must be completed. This training is completed at the flying wing in the weeks after MQT and includes various steps to certify 14Ns for operations at their assigned


\(^10\) Ibid.

\(^11\) Ibid.
squadrons. Specialized training is the final training phase before starting work at their assigned squadrons and is followed by continuation training (CT) for maintaining currency.

Continuation Training is designed to help intelligence officers maintain currencies and proficiency on the myriad of threat, mission design series (MDS), SOF, ISR, and evasion and recovery knowledge, plus job-related tasks required for effective operations. These knowledge and task proficiencies must be maintained for 14Ns to operate effectively at the unit level. Conducted weekly while in garrison (i.e., not deployed), CT can be either knowledge or task related and ensures 14Ns maintain AFI-mandated currencies.

3. Roles and Responsibilities

Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) intelligence officers assigned to manned flying units such as AC-130, MC-130, CV-22, and “Non-Standard Aviation” (Light Airlift) squadrons serve as critical members of the squadron operations team and are essential to squadron-level operations effectiveness. While specific, nuanced tasks within each squadron are slightly different based on the supported aircraft mission design series (MDS), intelligence officer roles and responsibilities at the unit-level include, in general, providing updates on current theater events, threat disposition and capabilities, mission planning operations, and evasion and recovery support.\textsuperscript{12} Accurate, mission-tailored intelligence contributes to mission accomplishment, whereas inaccurate and non-mission-tailored intelligence could lead either to degraded mission accomplishment, or, in a worst-case scenario, damage or destruction of the platform, crew, and failure of the special operations mission in its entirety. After briefly discussing intelligence training and the basic differences between in-garrison and deployed operations, this chapter will explain AFI intelligence requirements for flying units and explore, in detail, each of the

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{12}Air Force Instruction (AFI) 14-2AFSO/PR Volume 3, AFSOF/PR Unit Intelligence Procedures, June 1, 2009, 14-17.
intelligence roles and responsibilities that enable AFSOC missions during employment and sustainment.

D. CURRENT INITIATIVES

Formal feedback on AF intelligence officers is requested and collected by the 315th Training Squadron (Intelligence Officer Course) approximately six months after 14Ns complete the AFSC-awarding course. Surveys are sent to the officer’s supervisor and this feedback on 14N performance, knowledge level and skills is utilized to evaluate the adequacy of the training syllabus. Feedback trends are collected and used during the annual 14N Utilization and Training Conference to modify 14N training.

The feedback process in the months after 14Ns complete the AFSOC IFTU is accomplished in three ways. First, students fill out critique forms on each lesson, the lesson material and the instructor after each course. Next, a formal feedback form is sent to the unit training manager in the months after students complete the AFSOC IFTU. Lastly, AFSOC IFTU trainers conduct field interviews on an annual basis. While this feedback process produces useful information regarding the initial phase of AFSOC specialization training (IQT), there is no large-scale, comprehensive process to collect feedback on AFSOC 14N performance after all phases of specialization training are completed.

E. METHODOLOGY

This research was designed to shed light on an important issue—AFSOC 14N performance at AC-130, MC-130, CV-22, and NSAV flying squadrons—and aimed to answer a important question: Does the specialization training provided to AFSOC 14Ns sufficiently prepare officers for their duties at the unit level? To answer this question, a two-pronged approach was utilized. First, extensive research and interviews were conducted on training provided to AFSOC 14Ns to baseline current syllabi, curriculums, and methods, with an emphasis on specialization training. Second, an anonymous web-

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13 Donald Severns, e-mail message, November 10, 2011.
based survey was developed and executed to gauge 14N performance at the unit level. The survey was e-mailed to squadron leadership (commanders, operations officers, and weapons officers) as well as 14Ns serving at operational AFSOC flying squadrons. This methodology will be fully explained in Chapter V.

F. SUMMARY

In the years prior to 1993, AF intelligence officers specialized in one of eight disciplines, providing officers with a great deal of specialization and expertise, but at the cost of breadth. Since 1999, AF intelligence officers have been trained as intelligence generalists and, through the current approach to career field management, do not specialize in any one mission. While this generalization provides officers with a wide view of Air Force (AF) operations and intelligence, it sacrifices the depth of knowledge and experience required for expertise. Air Force intelligence officers are situated in highly diverse operating environments and are expected to perform across three domains and twelve core functions. The level of complexity required for effective intelligence operations should be answered with extensive specialization training to ensure the knowledge and analytical skill to thrive.

Great advances regarding specialization training have been made over the past decade, yet little feedback targeted at AFSOC 14Ns unit-level performance has been accomplished. This research is focused on AF intelligence officers assigned to AFSOC and sought to shed light on 14N performance at AC-130, MC-130, CV-22, and NSAV flying squadrons. The primary research question—does the specialization training provided to AFSOC 14Ns sufficiently prepare officers for their duties at the unit level—was tackled via a web-based survey of squadron leadership and 14Ns to gauge intelligence officer performance at the unit level.
II. THE 14N CAREER FIELD

Intelligence officers could spend more time in each job, thus acquiring greater depth in fewer areas.

—RAND Corp, 2009

The management of Air Force intelligence is fraught with many challenges, not the least of which is the fact the service operates in three domains—air, space, and cyberspace. With its seventeen operational functions, the Air Force demands an incredible breadth of knowledge and skill to enable this expanse of functions effectively at the operational and tactical levels. The Air Force’s current approach of one Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC)—14N—for all intelligence officers is a drastic departure from its roots where eight sub-AFSCs existed. This single-AFSC policy reflects the service’s approach to develop “broadened specialists” in intelligence, but at what point does generalization become a liability due to a lack of expertise? At the other end of the spectrum, specialization enables the building of expertise, but when does specialization (i.e., “stovepiping”) become counterproductive? Certainly, a balance between generalization and specialization must be determined and implemented.

A. THE ROAD TO THE “MODERN 14N”

This chapter seeks to explain historical as well as current Air Force approaches to the management of the intelligence career field, and analyzes the implications and progression of these approaches. Because of the AF’s current approach to intelligence—


18 Ibid.
one AFSC and a “generalized” officer corps—AFSOC 14Ns (or any 14N for that matter) will rarely be allowed to specialize in any given mission area or within any intelligence discipline for more than one or two assignments. As a result, a tremendous amount of job knowledge, especially as it pertains to organizations, “lingo,” and the supported weapons system capabilities, must be re-learned at each new assignment. This chapter is intended to shed light on this “generalization-specialization paradox.”

After providing a brief history of the progression of the intelligence AFSC from highly specialized through broadly generalized, the Air Force Intelligence core competencies—created to help guide the generalist career field—will be explored. Next, the AF intelligence force management plan, which was utilized from 2002–2008, will be covered and analysis of the effects of the generalization approach will be highlighted. Finally, the current approach to career field management, first introduced in Deputy Chief of Staff of ISR (AF/A2) Lieutenant General David Deptula’s 2009 policy letter and later expanded upon by the current AF/A2, will be detailed. Ultimately, this chapter will conclude that while the AF moved from a highly specialized force to a broadly generalized force over the course of fifteen years, this move did not come without costs to expertise. The newest approach introduced in 2009, which takes a small step back towards specialization, is a move in the right direction towards building expertise back into the force, however, the pendulum must continue to swing toward specialization in order to strike the right balance on the spectrum. Until this happens, extensive specialization training will be essential to building effective 14Ns.

B. FORCE MANAGEMENT APPROACHES

1. Specialization

Prior to 1993, AF intelligence officers were divided into eight sub-AFSCs, essentially one field aligned with each intelligence discipline or “INT.” Officers were trained and thus specialized in either human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), mapping, charting and geodesy (MC&G),
applications (e.g., unit level intelligence), targeting, staff, or command. While this specialized approach to the management of officers in the intelligence career field yielded plenty of expertise, it was seen as unsustainable and excessively “stovepiped” officers purportedly knew too little about other INTs—a widely recognized and commonly discussed observation highlighted during Operation Desert Storm. While this scenario is highly likely due to the specialization of intelligence officers at the time, was it necessarily an indicator of overall AF intelligence ineffectiveness?

2. First Moves toward Greater Breadth

With the post-Cold War downsizing of the force and with promotions lagging, AF leadership decided to create one AFSC—14N—with three sub-areas A, B, and C aligned with operations, applications, and mapping, charting and geodesy, respectively. The first year of the new 14N AFSC implementation was 1994. The three-shred 14N approach (i.e., 14NA, 14NB, 14NC) lasted from 1994–1998 and enabled officers to specialize within either the operations, applications, or mapping, charting and geodesy fields. Example assignments in the operations, or “alpha” track, included jobs within multiple intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) fields such as SIGINT, IMINT, and airborne ISR operations (e.g., RC-135). While the alpha track was “specialized” in terms of narrowing the field to include “only” ISR operations, this career track still required a vast amount of knowledge and skill to conquer jobs and tasks effectively. One can easily argue that either the SIGINT or IMINT specialties can take the better part of a career to truly master.

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20 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
Assignments in the applications, or “bravo” track included unit level intelligence assignments (e.g., flying squadrons, operations support squadrons) as well as targeting positions. The mapping, charting and geodesy, or “charlie” track generally included assignments within the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA), later renamed the National Imagery and Mapping Agency and, finally, taking on its current name, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). While these changes to the career field did bring a broadened approach to AF intelligence as compared to the eight sub-AFSC policy, AF leadership was still not happy with the career field and more changes were implemented. Due to a perception that the 3-shred approach was still “too specialized” for AF intelligence officers and a belief that “officers are not specialists—(the) enlisted force are our experts,” the 14N career field was modified again, this time to a single AFSC.23

3. 14N Career Field as Generalists

The new policy to “develop broadened specialists”24 by merging the 14N force in to a single AFSC began in 1999.25 One of the primary casualties of the new generalization approach was the extreme cutback in the amount of specialization training new 14Ns received on any given subject. Using SIGINT training as a representative example provides a telling data point. An intelligence officer attending initial training under the pre-1993 construct within the 8031 AFSC (SIGINT) received between four and five months of SIGINT training before going to his/her first assignment.26 In the 1994-1998 three-shred approach, a 14N “Alpha” student received five weeks of SIGINT training.27 By 2002, a 14N in the single-AFSC approach received only five days of

26 Ibid., 6.
27 Ibid., 6.
SIGINT training. While specialization training in the form of “top off intelligence courses,” later called intelligence formal training units (IFTUs) would eventually fill this training gap, some of these courses would not be developed for many years leaving the pressure on intelligence officers to “adapt and learn quickly” regarding skills and knowledge required on the job.

C. METHODS OF MANAGING GENERALIZATION

1. Core Competencies

In a move to deal with the challenges of career field generalization, AF intelligence leadership developed core competencies, which were described as “vital areas of expertise.” The five original 14N core competencies were intelligence preparation of the battlespace/predictive battlespace awareness (IPB/PBA), targeting, ISR campaign planning and execution, Air Operations Center (AOC)/unit operations, and force protection. These core competencies were later modified slightly and trimmed by one competency—force protection—to become four core competencies. They were predictive analysis, ISR operations, targeting, and AOC/unit-level intelligence. Experience in each of these competencies was eventually tracked through “special experience identifiers” (SEIs). Updates were called for on an annual basis to ensure personnel information was current. These core competencies became the basis for the career field’s “4-3-2-1” force management plan from 2002–2008.

2. Managing Careers by Core Competencies

The “4-3-2-1” plan was developed as a career guide for AF intelligence officers regarding the four core competencies and lasted for approximately seven years. The plan

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29 Ibid.
31 Ibid., 6.
called for 14Ns to acquire education in all four areas (via the AFSC-awarding course), exposure in three areas, special experience identifiers in two areas, and expertise/depth in one area. While easy to understand, this plan was ultimately abandoned starting in 2009 because it “lacked key components of a force management strategy.” Additionally, the plan was critiqued for having “started with what 14Ns need to do, not what we need to know,” as well as the fact that there was little to no deliberate 14N education throughout careers. Other glaring faults included the elimination of AF Intelligence’s HUMINT capability starting in 1995—a capability which was re-started in May 2007.

Based on the documentation available, it is apparent that the motivations for the change to a single AFSC were at least twofold. First, a single-AFSC approach provided officers with a more complete understanding of all of Air Force intelligence’s capabilities and contributed to the breaking down of the “stovepipes,” which existed under the pre-1993 policy. Second, and somewhat interconnected, the new approach was seen to increase the chances for 14N promotion to the general officer ranks. This was a recurring theme regarding promotions and the perception that they were either “lagging” or “a concern.” Lagging promotions were highlighted during both the pre-1993 as well as the 1994–1998 approaches to management of the career field, and this perception was not unfounded. A third motivation worth mentioning is the fact that personnel management of the 14N career field (e.g., the “faces in spaces” aspect) was much more efficient with an aligned 14N career field.

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34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
D. GLASS CEILINGS

Getting AF Intelligence officers promoted to the rank of general officer has been a challenge for the intelligence career field since the early 1990s high of 14 general officers from intelligence backgrounds.39 By 2003, the “three top intelligence posts in the Air Force—each a general officer’s billet—(were) held by rated officers, not career intelligence officers.”40 From 2001 to 2005, only one career intelligence officer was selected for promotion to brigadier general.41 Fortunately, this situation has changed, and as of 2011 promotion rates for 14Ns to the general officer ranks are far better than in previous years.42 Additionally, there are currently several AF intelligence general officers serving in top intelligence jobs including the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (AF/AA2) as well as two commanders of Joint Intelligence functions (J2) at combatant commands.43 As for the cause of this improved situation, it remains difficult to attribute definitively. While 14N promotion to the general officer ranks is not the point of this research, a related question certainly pertains—does the entire 14N force have to generalize in a bid to become the next AF/A2? Or is it more important to allow a portion of the force to specialize—in this case AFSOC 14Ns—for a part of their careers to allow the building of expertise and credibility? This would help to ensure the expertise required of AF intelligence officers was acquired, utilized effectively, and not squandered as soon as the career field called for them to move to a new field each assignment under the guise of “broadening.”

40 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
The limited numbers of 14Ns in the general officer ranks reported in 2005 spurred further study into this area and resulted in a 2009 RAND Project Air Force report on the intelligence career field. Upon the USAF’s request, RAND “undertook an analysis of the competencies required for intelligence jobs and compared the qualifications in the officer supply with the qualifications jobs demand.” According to the report, the study was at least in part inspired by:

A mismatch in the late 1990s between the qualifications needed for key general officer positions and the available candidates’ background and experience stimulated an extensive force development initiative at the U.S. Air Force intended to improve the development of senior and mid-career officers. The Air Force needed to shape cohorts of officers with sufficient breadth for their current jobs and for positions they may need to fill in the future. In the past, most officers had been managed almost solely within their career fields and were too narrowly specialized.

AF leadership’s interpretation of this mismatch for the intelligence career field had initially resulted in generalization (i.e., less specialization) of the intelligence officer corps in the mid-1990s, eventually resulting in the “one intelligence AFSC” approach. As for the effects of this approach on the 14N officer corps, the move to generalization may have gone too far.

The effects of the single AFSC approach on the intelligence career field were studied by RAND and captured a 2009 report entitled “Improving Development and Utilization of U.S. Air Force Intelligence Officers.” Methodologically, the study first defined required background and experience for 14N jobs (i.e., the demand) through subject matter experts in the form of AF intelligence colonels. Next, AF intelligence officer qualifications (i.e., the supply) were determined based on historical personnel

records at the Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC).\textsuperscript{47} Finally, the gaps between the supply and demand were assessed and the results indicated that it was possible to be “too broadened.”\textsuperscript{48} In fact, the study found that it had already occurred for 14Ns by 2009:

Our study found that the types of experience needed for 14N jobs are far fewer than the types of experience accumulated. For example, there are on average only 10.8 job requirements for 14N colonels, but over their careers 14N colonels acquire an average of 35 types of experience. This number suggests that much greater depth is possible: Intelligence officers could spend more time in each job, thus acquiring greater depth in fewer areas.\textsuperscript{49}

F. NEW APPROACHES

In March 2009, the 14N career field began the abandonment of the four core competencies as directed by the Deputy Chief of Staff for ISR (AF/A2) in a policy letter. In place of the old competencies, Lieutenant General Deptula detailed the new guidance to the career field in two levels. First was “core expertise … that body of knowledge we expect of all 14Ns to learn and to know better than any other career field in the AF.”\textsuperscript{50} Intended to form the basis of education and training, core expertise was defined in three broad categories: analytic expertise; global ISR operations; and effects-based ISR planning and assessment.\textsuperscript{51}

1. Professional Competencies

Next, seven professional competencies were detailed and they were described as “those intelligence mission areas in which we leverage our core expertise as full mission partners in air, space and cyber operations.”\textsuperscript{52} The professional competencies were:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{47} Ibid., xii.
  \item \textsuperscript{48} Ibid., xiii.
  \item \textsuperscript{49} Ibid., xii.
  \item \textsuperscript{50} Lt Gen David A. Deptula, “Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 14N Policy Letter,” March 20, 2009.
  \item \textsuperscript{51} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{52} David A. Deptula, \textit{Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 14N Policy Letter}, March 20, 2009.
\end{itemize}
Analysis and forecasting; foreign area expertise; ISR campaign planning; execution and assessment; kinetic and non-kinetic targeting; AOC capabilities and operations and; programming and acquisition. The AF’s top intelligence general (a rated officer) recognized that the list was not exhaustive and that the career field was too broad to “bin it neatly,” however, in just seven years’ time, the competencies jumped from four to seven and were far more inclusive and representative of AF intelligence tasks and knowledge requirements. Probably most importantly, Lt Gen Deptula recognized the challenges of intelligence across three domains and stated that “unlike the comprehensive nature of our core expertise, our professional competencies do not comprise a checklist for a single officer to experience. Rather, intelligence force managers must ensure that as a career field [emphasis in original], we maintain sufficient expertise in each of these competencies.”

2. **New Approaches to Force Management**

The 2009 policy letter continues to be developed, and the *14N Force Management 2011 Plan* details far more than what was covered in the Deputy Chief of Staff for ISR’s policy letter. As compared to the 2002–2008 approach, the new policy being proposed is more comprehensive and includes experience tracking via AFPC, the establishment of 14N skill levels, the introduction of 14N functional competencies, continuing technical training, and the addition of “open” and “expert” career paths as well as the development of a portion of the 14N force as regional specialists.

3. **ISR Functional Areas**

In further defining the roles of 14Ns, the 2011 plan sets forth ISR functional areas in three categories. The first category is the intelligence cycle and enterprise

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53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
57 Ibid., 6-9.
The second category are the new 14N functional competencies in two sub-categories—tradecraft and knowledge. And the third category are the levels of leadership—progressing from the company grade officer ranks through the field grade officer ranks at increasing spheres of influence and levels of responsibility. Putting it all together, 14N competencies and experience can be defined as “performing (the intelligence cycle), using tradecraft and knowledge, at the (designated) level of leadership, supporting the (assigned) mission area.” (See Figure 1)

![Defining 14N Competencies & Experience](image)

**Figure 1.** Defining 14N Competencies and Experience

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58 Ibid., 6.
59 Ibid., 7.
60 Ibid., 8.
61 Ibid., 9.
4. Functional Competencies

The new 14N Force Management Plan’s functional competencies are eightfold and include analysis, collection management, operations-intelligence integration, near-real-time ISR operations, cyber ISR operations, targeting; HUMINT, and airborne ISR operations. The knowledge competencies are six-fold and include geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), technical intelligence (TECHINT), SIGINT, open-source intelligence (OSINT), measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT), and Staff. The strengths in the new plan lie in its robustness—issues as complicated as warfare and intelligence cannot be easily encapsulated in just four core competencies. This is a double-edged sword, however, and the plan’s primary weaknesses lie in its complicated nature. Management of expectations will be the crux of the new plan’s success or failure and a glimpse of the new 14N Career Field Education and Training Plan (CFETP)—a regulation that will mandate aspects of career field management—indicate that a shift back toward specialization is recommended for AF 14Ns. In the draft document set to release in November 2011, the guidance states that 14Ns are expected to “truly master, at most, one competency in their career.” This new CFETP could significantly change the way 14Ns conduct business in the future, especially in allowing a greater degree of specialization as compared to the last decade.

G. SUMMARY

The breadth of operational and tactical level missions in which Air Force intelligence must operate is challenged by three domains and seventeen operational functions. As a result, the AF demands an incredible breadth of knowledge and skill to enable this expanse of functions effectively. The Air Force’s current approach of one Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC)—14N—for all intelligence officers is a drastic departure.

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63 Ibid., 7.
64 Ibid., 7.
65 Department of the Air Force, AFSC 14NX Intelligence Officer Career Field Education and Training Program (DRAFT), November 2011.
from its roots where eight former AFSCs allowed a considerable degree of specialization. The trend toward generalization started in 1994 and culminated in a single AF intelligence AFSC, but at what cost?

This chapter explained the historical and current Air Force approach to the management of the intelligence career field, while analyzing the implications and progression of these approaches. A history of the original five core competencies and their eventual transition into the four core competencies which dominated the 2002–2008 timeframe were explored, in addition to the 4-3-2-1 policy which guided the generalization of the force. The effects of this plan—namely the overgeneralization of 14Ns as documented in the RAND Project Air Force report—demonstrates the cost of not allowing intelligence officers to specialize, at least to a certain extent. Finally, the current approach to career field management, first introduced in 2009 explained that a more complex and robust career field management plan was necessary to effectively manage the 14N force. Ultimately, while the new AF plan is a step in the right direction towards the much-needed specialization the 14N force lacked over the past decade, AF leadership must continue to evaluate and modify this approach to ensure the correct balance is found on the spectrum.
III. 14N TRAINING

In times of crisis, people don’t rise to the occasion; they sink to their level of training.

—Training Axiom

Upon selection to the intelligence career field, AF officers begin a training process that can consist of up to five phases and lasts approximately nine months, depending on the assignment. The phases—the AFSC-awarding Intelligence Officer Course, initial qualification training (IQT), mission qualification training (MQT), specialized training, and continuation training (CT)—progress from generalized through highly specialized training. While some 14Ns will go straight to operational assignments after just the first phase of training, 14Ns with assignments to operational flying wings will complete the first four phases prior to an assignment to an operational squadron. AFSOC intelligence officers fall into this latter category, and must complete all training through “external intelligence trainer”—a certification required to instruct aircrews—and achieve “combat mission ready” status before serving at an AFSOC flying squadron. This chapter will detail the training AFSOC 14Ns receive, and will explore the five training phases to build the baseline required for later analysis.

A. INTELLIGENCE OFFICER COURSE

The initial training phase for AF intelligence officers is the “Intelligence Officer Course” at the 315th Training Squadron (315 TRS), Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas. This 141 training day, six-and-a-half month curriculum provides students with a training baseline covering all aspects of Air Force Intelligence and all officers, regardless of follow-on assignment, attend the same course. Officers are awarded the Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) 14N upon successful completion of the curriculum.

1. Course Description

The Intelligence Officer Course trains officers across all AF intelligence requirements and is designed to “provide a core curriculum of basic intelligence
fundamentals.” The course includes an introduction to intelligence and training on the intelligence cycle, signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), national intelligence support, intelligence support to warfighting, collection management, communication skills, targeting, intelligence support to operational units, attack assessment, adversary threats and tactics, friendly force capabilities and limitations, application, analysis, production, and dissemination of intelligence, and a capstone exercise. Class size is generally between 18 and 20 students, and the curriculum includes instruction, progress checks in the form of briefings and other practicals, and written examinations to measure progress. Students struggling with concepts can be “washed back” to the beginning of a block to ensure required knowledge and skills are achieved and this process is exercised on a regular basis, occurring at a rate of approximately 28-29 percent. Students can be eliminated from the course, however, this only occurs at a rate of about one percent.

2. Syllabus

The 14N course is broken into 21 blocks of instruction and serves to introduce and familiarize students with a vast amount of knowledge and skills on the intelligence community, missions, tasks, and responsibilities. A summary of the instructional blocks is included in Table 1.

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66 Air Education and Training Command (AETC), Course Syllabus, Intelligence Officer Course, June 15, 2007.
67 Ibid.
68 David Morandi, interview by author, Goodfellow Air Force Base, TX, September 20, 2011.
69 David Morandi, e-mail message, September 23, 2011.
70 Ibid.
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<td>Geospatial Information &amp; Services</td>
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Table 1. Intelligence Officer Course Syllabus

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71 Air Education and Training Command (AETC), Course Syllabus, Intelligence Officer Course, June 15, 2007.
The depth of material covered within the course is dictated by the course training standard (CTS) and the school follows the standardized AF proficiency levels to manage syllabi and training. These training proficiency levels are broken into three categories—task performance, task knowledge, and subject knowledge—and each of these are subdivided into four values of increasing knowledge or task ability. See Table 2—Proficiency Key Code. The 14N course is covered almost entirely at the first two levels of proficiency, mostly due to the sheer amount of material covered in a relatively short time period.

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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>to do most parts of the task</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Partially Proficient</td>
<td>Can do most parts of the task. Needs help only on the hardest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>parts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Competent</td>
<td>Can do all parts of the task. Needs only a spot check of work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Highly Proficient</td>
<td>Can do the complete task quickly and accurately. Can tell or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>show others how to do the task.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Knowledge</td>
<td>a</td>
<td>Nomenclature</td>
<td>Can name parts, tools and simple facts about the task.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>Procedures</td>
<td>Can determine step by step procedures for doing the task.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c</td>
<td>Operating Principles</td>
<td>Can identify why and when the task must be done and why each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>step is needed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d</td>
<td>Advanced Theory</td>
<td>Can predict, isolate, and resolve the problems about the task.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject Knowledge</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Facts</td>
<td>Can identify basic facts about the subject.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Principles</td>
<td>Can identify relationship of basic facts and state general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>principles about the subject.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Analysis</td>
<td>Can analyze facts and principles and draw conclusions about the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>subject.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>Can evaluate conditions and make proper decisions about the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>subject.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Proficiency Key Code

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3. Analysis

To its credit, the Intelligence Officer Course effectively accomplishes what it was designed to do—provide officers a core curriculum of basic intelligence fundamentals. As explained in Chapter II, the current 14N career field approach of intelligence generalists results in officers being trained on all aspects of Air Force intelligence. The repercussions of this approach in can be viewed as both a strength and a weakness. The obvious strength of this approach is the near elimination of the “stove-piped” intelligence officer because officers are trained, at least at an introductory level, across nearly every foreseeable AF intelligence application. This allows 14Ns to “see the bigger picture” based on their broad training base. The obvious weaknesses are the depth of the course material presented and resultant lack of knowledge and task proficiency. Almost the entire curriculum is covered at the two lowest proficiency levels—task performance “1” and “2,” task knowledge “a” and “b,” and subject knowledge “A” and “B” (see Table 2)—meaning that 14Ns leave the course with familiarity of a broad task and knowledge set, but with very little proficiency or expertise. For 14Ns on their way to AFSOC flying wings, this places the burden of specialization training (by design) on the next phases of intelligence training—IQT and MQT.

B. INITIAL QUALIFICATION TRAINING (IQT)

Initial Qualification Training (IQT) serves as the second phase of overall 14N training and provides AFSOC intelligence officers their first specialization training opportunities. AFSOC IQT requirements are directed by AFI 14-202 Intelligence Training and AFI 14-2 AFSOF/PR Volume 1 and are fulfilled by the AFSOC Intelligence Formal Training Unit (IFTU) at Hurlburt Field, Florida. Similar to the Intelligence Officer Course’s approach of training officers across all AF intelligence disciplines, the

73 While not an emphasis area for this research, recently expanded AF missions sets (e.g. cyber) are covered very little in the current 14N course and future significant syllabus additions could detract from the current curriculum by watering down an already generalized course. This could mean even less time dedicated to the current topics. Senior AF intelligence leadership will ultimately have to make a decision regarding 14N training—allow some level of specialization at the AFSC-awarding course, increase the time allocated for 14N training to allow sufficient time to train across all AF intelligence applications, or increase the course content and accept the consequences of additional courseware added to the syllabus.
AFSOC IFTU trains 14Ns across all AFSOC missions and applicable intelligence disciplines\(^\text{74}\) with the exception of officers bound for RPA and DCGS squadrons as described previously. AFI 14-202 mandates completion of the AFSOC IFTU prior to operational unit-level assignments in the Major Command’s (MAJCOM) squadrons and officers must attend and complete the 20-day course either enroute to, or shortly after reporting to their assigned flying wings. After graduating the course, officers are certified as basic qualified (BQ).\(^\text{75}\)

1. Course Description

The AFSOC IFTU is designed to familiarize intelligence personnel with AFSOC mission tasks and the course prepares students for assignment to AFSOC operational units.\(^\text{76}\) Graduates are trained to the familiar level in SOF and personnel recovery (PR) aircraft capabilities and limitations, SOF command and control structures, Pararescue Team and Combat Control capabilities and limitations, weapons employment and characteristics, avionics and countermeasures use, and SOF/PR specific-terminology.\(^\text{77}\) Graduates also have a “limited proficiency in intelligence automated data-processing equipment and operations,” and are trained for proficiency in tailored analysis, and mission planning.\(^\text{78}\)

2. Syllabus

The AFSOC IFTU course is broken into eight blocks of instruction interwoven into a comprehensive syllabus flow (i.e., they are not taught sequentially like the 14N course) and serves to familiarize students with AFSOF mission tasks. The course builds

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\(^{75}\) Air Force Instruction (AFI) 14-2AFSOF/PR Volume 1, *AFSOF/PR Unit Intelligence Training*, June 1, 2009, 7.


\(^{77}\) Ibid.

\(^{78}\) Ibid., 1.
on concepts from the 14N course and provides focus on AFSOC-specific intelligence requirements. A summary of the instructional blocks is included in Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Block</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Block Contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BRF</td>
<td>Briefing, Debriefing, &amp; Reporting</td>
<td>Mission Reports (MISREP), MISREP Practical, Contingency Briefings, Debriefing &amp; Reporting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPN</td>
<td>Weapons System</td>
<td>Intro to USSOCOM, MC-130E/H/P/W, EC-130 Commando Solo, AC-130H/U, STS Employment, CV-22, HH-60G, U-28, Aircraft Static Display, AFSOC Remotely Piloted Aircraft, 11th Intelligence Squadron, Aviation Foreign Internal Defense (AvFID)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THT</td>
<td>Threats</td>
<td>Threat aircraft, radar surface-to-air missiles (SAM), IR SAMs, man-portable air defense systems, anti-aircraft artillery (AAA), threat lasers &amp; anti-helo mines, asymmetric threats to SOF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>Personnel Recovery Concepts</td>
<td>Personnel recovery (PR), combat search and rescue (CSAR), PR case study, Nat’l Agency Support to PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSN</td>
<td>Mission Planning</td>
<td>SOF Mission Planning Exercise/Organization, Case Studies (Somalia/Lebanon), HUMINT case study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYS</td>
<td>Systems</td>
<td>Mission Planning Tools - FalconView, Integrated Many on Many (IMOM), IRC Chat Basics, Geospatial Products Listing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. AFSOC IFTU Syllabus Blocks

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The course is taught eight times per year, with a capacity of 12 students per class.\(^8^0\) While completing the curriculum is mandated by AFI 14-202, there is a shortage of training slots for current demand, resulting in a backlog of student attendees.\(^8^1\) The AFI does make provisions for this situation, and students not able to attend the course in-residence can take a course equivalent utilizing approved training materials after submitting a waiver request.\(^8^2\)

After three weeks of instruction, students participate in a week-long special operations planning exercise (SOPE). Students are placed into teams and research, prepare and ultimately present a final briefing. This capstone event is utilized to demonstrate skills and knowledge learned in the course.\(^8^3\)

### 3. Analysis

With a 20-training-day syllabus dedicated entirely to familiarizing 14Ns with AFSOC roles, missions, platforms familiarization, and intelligence for AFSOF, the AFSOC IFTU fulfills a critical first-line specialization training requirement. In addition to providing specialized training on platforms, missions, capabilities and employment, the course also contains a block on critical thinking, analytical methods, and SOF-related case studies to help students apply the concepts taught in the course. Ultimately, the course effectively accomplishes what it is designed to do—familiarize intelligence personnel with AFSOC mission tasks and prepare students for assignment to AFSOC operational units. The course’s strengths lie in its experienced instructor cadre, its focused and proven AFSOC curriculum, and the capstone exercise which serves to reinforce the course content for students. Unfortunately, the course is unable to reach beyond the first two levels of proficiency (See Table 2—Proficiency Key Code), again, due to the amount the material covered in the relatively short period of time. This is also

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\(^8^0\) Donald Severns, interview by author, Hurlburt Field, FL, September 23, 2011.

\(^8^1\) Ibid.

\(^8^2\) Air Force Instruction (AFI) 14-2AFSOF/PR Volume 1, *AFSOF/PR Unit Intelligence Training*, June 1, 2009, 7.

\(^8^3\) Donald Severns, interview by author, Hurlburt Field, FL, September 23, 2011.
by design, and after completing IQT, AFSOC 14Ns move to the next phase of specialization training—Mission Qualification Training (MQT)—at their respective squadrons.

C. MISSION QUALIFICATION TRAINING (MQT)

Mission Qualification Training (MQT) is conducted at the AFSOC 14N’s assigned flying wing and is designed to “qualify intelligence personnel in an assigned duty position to perform the unit mission.” MQT establishes a specialization-training baseline for specified tasks, knowledge, and roles the 14N will be expected to execute at his or her squadron. 14Ns establish initial currencies in all AFI 14-2 AFSOF/PR-directed tasks and graduate MQT in either basic mission capable (BMC) or combat mission ready (CMR) status.

1. Course Description

MQT requirements and courseware are based on requirements established in AFI 14-2 AFSOF/PR Volume 1 AFSOF/PR Unit Intelligence Training. This training starts within 45 days of the 14N’s first duty day and intelligence officers must complete MQT before they can proceed to their assigned flying squadrons. Training duration ranges from four to eight weeks, depending on the flying wing, and is generally the responsibility of the Intelligence Weapons Officer (IWO) or similarly designated officer.

2. Syllabus

Utilizing AFI guidance, IWOs at AFSOC flying wings establish their own MQT syllabi. This approach allows instructors to maximize specialization training for specific platforms, squadrons, and local procedures. Local specialization also provides a small classroom setting (i.e., just a few students per instructor) and a great degree of flexibility allowing instructors the ability to tailor specialization training for specific operational and

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84 Air Force Instruction (AFI) 14-2 AFSOF/PR Volume 1, AFSOF/PR Unit Intelligence Training, June 1, 2009, 8.
85 Ibid.
tactical needs. AFI 14-2 directed requirements are broken into two categories—knowledge MQT and task MQT—and are listed in Table 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knowledge MQT</th>
<th>Task MQT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unit Weapons System Academics</td>
<td>Manual Order of Battle (OB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Integration in Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection</td>
<td>Automated OB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area of Responsibility (AOR) Threat</td>
<td>Changeover Briefing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR Visual Recognition</td>
<td>Deployment Briefing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Recovery/Recovery Operations (PR/RO)</td>
<td>Initial Situation Briefing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Integration</td>
<td>Situation Briefing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Relief/Civil Search and Rescue (SAR)</td>
<td>Air Tasking Order (ATO) / Airspace Control Order (ACO) / Special Instructions (SPINS) / Air Support Request (ASR) / Special Tactics Support Request (STSR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research, Analysis, and Dissemination</td>
<td>Mission Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mission Folders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mission Briefing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Step Briefing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mission Tracking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Debriefing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intelligence Reports</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. AFI 14-2 MQT Requirements

MQT syllabi at the 1st Special Operations Wing (1 SOW), Hurlburt Field, FL, 353rd Special Operations Group (353 SOG), Kadena AB, Japan, and 27th Special Operations Wing (27 SOW), Cannon AFB, NM all meet and exceed the AFI-directed requirements. Each syllabus contained a unique strength and the intelligence weapons officers interviewed were passionate about their training programs. Strengths in the 1 SOW MQT syllabus included three intelligence analysis classes aimed at teaching
students “how” versus “what” to think. The courses cover counter-terrorism analysis, analysis and assessments, and principles of surface-to-air fire analysis. A notable strength in the 353 SOG MQT syllabus was MC-130H and MC-130P platform academics taught by flying squadron aircrews in the 14N’s future squadron. A noteworthy strength in the 27 SOW MQT curriculum included four training blocks dedicated to analysis and critical thinking. All three MQT programs included multiple training “practicals”—individual and team application exercises—on topics such as threats, insurgent groups, and ISR capabilities and employment.

3. Analysis

In terms of specialization training, MQT provides the best learning opportunities for 14Ns for multiple reasons. First, almost all concepts taught in MQT have been introduced at the intelligence officer course and the AFSOC IFTU, meaning that 14N students are not hearing the information for the first time. Revisits on this important academics should mean more retention for 14Ns in MQT. Second, the “how does this apply to me” question is not a factor—14Ns attend this training at their assigned operational AFSOC flying wing, during a time when they are about to be assigned to an operational AFSOC flying squadron. Third, 14Ns are in a small classroom environment with a recognized subject matter expert—the intelligence weapons officer—resulting in a situation where tailored training and time for question and answer sessions rule. For these reasons, MQT is arguably one of the most important phases of specialization training for AFSOC 14Ns. Effectively executing this level of specialization results in maximum preparedness for 14Ns going to operational flying squadrons.

86 Jessica Graves, interview by author, Hurlburt Field, FL, September 22, 2011.
87 Ibid.
88 Jonathan Baker, interview by author, Kadena AB, Japan, November 2, 2011.
89 Adam Young, e-mail interview, November 8, 2011.
D. CONTINUATION TRAINING (CT)

Continuation training (CT) provides the vehicle for AFSOC 14Ns to maintain AFI-directed currencies, and proficiency and knowledge on a myriad of threats, SOF aircraft and tactics, ISR, evasion and recovery knowledge, current intelligence updates, and job-related tasks. Training is divided into two categories—internal intelligence training (intelligence personnel training intelligence personnel) and mission related training via the ready intelligence program (RIP).90 Both knowledge proficiencies and task proficiencies must be maintained for 14Ns to operate effectively at the unit level.

1. Course Description

Internal intelligence training “is intended to facilitate maintaining designated qualification and currency status of all intelligence personnel.”91 The intent of the ready intelligence program (RIP) is “to ensure intelligence personnel perform mission essential tasks with sufficient frequency to maintain proficiency in their duty positions.”92 CT is designed as an ongoing training event for intelligence personnel to maintain currencies on required knowledge and tasks. In general, unit-level intelligence personnel meet weekly and train, as required, in accordance with AFI 14-2 AFSOF/PR. Intelligence officers assigned to flying squadrons maintain combat mission ready status (CMR) while intelligence leadership (e.g., the Special Operation Support Squadron—SOSS) generally maintaining basic mission capable status (BMC). All RIP currency requirements are detailed in Table 4—Ready Intelligence Program Requirements.

2. Syllabus

CT requirements are scheduled and executed in accordance with AFI 14-2 AFSOF/PR Volume 1. Training is also documented in accordance with the AFI to ensure currencies are maintained.

90 AFI 14-2 AFSOF/PR Volume 1, AFSOF/PR Unit Intelligence Training, June 1, 2009, 14.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Currency Requirement</th>
<th>Frequency to Maintain Combat Mission Ready</th>
<th>Frequency to Maintain Basic Mission Capable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manual Order of Battle</td>
<td>Semi-Annually</td>
<td>Annually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automated Order of Battle</td>
<td>Semi-Annually</td>
<td>Annually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changeover Briefing</td>
<td>Semi-Annually</td>
<td>Annually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployment Briefing</td>
<td>Semi-Annually</td>
<td>Annually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial Situation Briefing</td>
<td>Semi-Annually</td>
<td>Annually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situation Briefing</td>
<td>Semi-Annually</td>
<td>Annually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATO/ACO/SPINS/STSR Breakout</td>
<td>Semi-Annually</td>
<td>Annually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Planning</td>
<td>Semi-Annually</td>
<td>Annually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Folder Construction</td>
<td>Semi-Annually</td>
<td>Annually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Briefing/Alert Briefing</td>
<td>Quarterly</td>
<td>Annually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step Briefing</td>
<td>Quarterly</td>
<td>Annually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Tracking</td>
<td>Semi-Annually</td>
<td>Annually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debriefing</td>
<td>Quarterly</td>
<td>Annually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Reports</td>
<td>Quarterly</td>
<td>Annually</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. Ready Intelligence Program Requirements93

3. Analysis

The greatest strength in CT is that intelligence personnel must meet currency requirements in the RIP much like pilots and aircrews meet readiness requirements in the ready airman program (RAP). While CT consumes time and resources, it is a good investment to guarantee 14N readiness. This approach to training is a new development for Air Force Intelligence and began in mid-2005 with F-16 and KC-135 flying wings. AFSOC began this transformation in 2008 and 2009. Success in this approach to training lies in the ability, or inability, to maintain currencies. In the event of excessive additional

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93 AFI 14-2 AFSOF/PR Volume 1, AFSOF/PR Unit Intelligence Training, June 1, 2009, 15.
duties added to a 14Ns responsibilities, a historical problem area for unit-level intelligence officers, RIP currency requirement scheduling should take priority and trump other tasks. Unfortunately, another possible result is little reduction in the 14N’s workload, leaving officers no option but to work long days to keep up with their responsibilities.

E. ADDITIONAL SPECIALIZATION TRAINING

External intelligence training (EIT)—the formal name for intelligence personnel training aircrews—requires a final phase of specialization training for 14Ns. EIT requirements are completed after MQT and must be accomplished before 14Ns train AFSOC aircrews unsupervised. As per AFI 14-2 AFSOF/PR Volume 1, “all intelligence personnel assigned or attached to a special operations squadron must be qualified as EITs.”94 In addition to completing MQT, and qualification in either BMC or CMR status, 14Ns must complete Code of Conduct Training (CoCT) Level B before teaching personnel recovery (PR) topics.95 The complete list of EIT specialization training is included in Table 6 and training event currencies are included in Table 7.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Topic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EIT 1</td>
<td>External Intelligence Training Concepts and Methods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIT 2</td>
<td>AOR Threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIT 3</td>
<td>Collection and Reporting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIT 4</td>
<td>Visual Recognition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIT 5</td>
<td>Personnel Recovery (PR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIT 6</td>
<td>Intelligence Integration in Force Protection</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6. External Intelligence Trainer (EIT) Event Matrix

94 AFI 14-2 AFSOF/PR Volume 1, AFSOF/PR Unit Intelligence Training, June 1, 2009, 17.
95 Ibid., 15.
### Table 7. External Intelligence Trainer Event Training Currencies.96

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Specialized Training</th>
<th>Currency Requirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| AOR Threat                    | Complete EIT 1 and EIT 2 and specific tasks               | Quarterly
|                               | Initial EIT Evaluation                                    | Instruct 1 threat training event per 3 month period       |
| Collection and Reporting (C & R) | Complete EIT 1 and EIT 3 and specific tasks               | Annually
|                               | Initial EIT Evaluation                                    | Instruct 1 C&R training event per 12 month period         |
| Visual Recognition (VR)       | Complete EIT 1 and EIT 4 and specific tasks               | Semi-annually
|                               | Initial EIT Evaluation                                    | Instruct 1 VR training event per 6 month period           |
| Personnel Recovery (PR)       | Complete EIT 1 and EIT 4 and specific tasks               | Annually
|                               | Initial EIT Evaluation                                    | Instruct 1 PR training event per 12 month period          |
| Intelligence Integration in Force Protection | Complete EIT 1 and EIT 6 and specific tasks               | Annually
|                               | Initial EIT Evaluation                                    | Instruct one FP training event per 12-month period        |

F. SUMMARY

After being selected to the intelligence career field, AF officers bound for AFSOC squadrons begin a five-phase training process which can last up to one year. After completing the AFSC-awarding Intelligence Officer Course, AFSOC 14Ns proceed to the AFSOC IFTU, which serves as IQT, at Hurlburt Field, FL. Next, MQT provides a tailored training baseline for their individual assignment. Specialized Training ensures they are prepared to instruct intelligence to SOF aircrews, and lastly, continuation training (CT) ensures they maintain all AFI-directed currencies. These five phases of rigorous training are required to ensure 14Ns can perform their duties and responsibilities.

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96 AFI 14-2 AFSOF/PR Volume 1, AFSOF/PR Unit Intelligence Training, June 1, 2009, 19.
at operational AFSOC squadrons and serve to prepare for their roles and responsibilities in operational AFSOC flying squadrons.
IV. SQUADRON LEVEL ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

A. INTRODUCTION

Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) intelligence officers assigned to manned flying units such as AC-130, MC-130, CV-22, and “Non-Standard Aviation” (Light Airlift) squadrons serve as critical members of the squadron operations team and are essential to squadron-level operations effectiveness. While specific, nuanced tasks within each squadron are slightly different based on the supported aircraft mission design series (MDS), intelligence officer roles and responsibilities at the unit-level include, in general, providing updates on current theater events, threat disposition and capabilities, mission planning operations, and evasion and recovery support. Accurate, mission-tailored intelligence contributes to mission accomplishment, whereas inaccurate and non-mission-tailored intelligence could lead either to degraded mission accomplishment, or, in a worst-case scenario, damage or destruction of the platform, crew, and failure of the special operations mission in its entirety.

After briefly discussing intelligence training and the basic differences between in-garrison and deployed operations, this chapter will explain Air Force Instruction (AFI) intelligence requirements for flying units and explore, in detail, each of the intelligence roles and responsibilities that enable AFSOC missions during employment and sustainment. These intelligence operations roles and responsibilities include information flow, order of battle displays, mission planning, briefing, debriefing, reporting, and personnel recovery support. The chapter will conclude with a brief summary, an explanation of the knowledge requirements essential to effective unit level intelligence operations, and a question—is the level of knowledge required for effective unit-level intelligence provided to AFSOC intelligence officers by the time they are assigned as “mission-ready” to their respective squadrons?

97 Air Force Instruction (AFI) 14-2AFSOF/PR Volume 3, AFSOF/PR Unit Intelligence Procedures, June 1, 2009, 14-17.
B. OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS

Broadly speaking, AFSOC unit-level intelligence roles and responsibilities can be broken into two main situations or environments—(A) in garrison or “peacetime” operations and (B) deployed or contingency operations. While intelligence roles and responsibilities are somewhat similar in both environments, the obvious aim of unit-level intelligence during peacetime/in-garrison operations is to train and prepare squadron leadership, planners, and aircrews for their combat roles during deployed / contingency operations. Once deployed or directly in support of an operation or contingency, intelligence primary roles and responsibilities revolve around employment and sustainment of the mission.

C. UNIT LEVEL INTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBILITIES

1. Overview

Air Force flying unit responsibilities (service-wide and not specific to AFSOC) are delineated within AFI 14-202 Volume 3 General Intelligence Rules. Within this instruction, eight key functions for unit level intelligence are mandated: 98

1. Research, analysis, and dissemination of all incoming information and intelligence to all applicable mission personnel (e.g. battle staffs, aircrews, mission planners, subordinate units, etc.)

2. Maintaining current order of battle displays

3. Providing updated automated threat files for use in automated mission planning systems

4. Establishing quality control procedures for reports (mission reports and intelligence reports) and monitoring the flying schedule and unit taskings to anticipate reporting requirements

5. Ensuring units access to the most current intelligence available and immediate dissemination of theater threat update codes

6. Providing intelligence support to commanders and their staffs through current and relevant intelligence products and briefings

7. Providing intelligence to base organizations, base agencies, tenant organizations and transient units as needed

8. Managing all production requests (PR) and requests for information (RFI)

2. Guidance

The AFSOC Director of Intelligence (A2) provides a supplement to AFI 14-202 Volume 3 General Intelligence Rules which mandates additional tasks for intelligence units in the command. This document is the Air Force Special Operations Command Supplement to General Intelligence Rules, dated 10 March 2008. While there are numerous additional tasks added to the instruction, no additional tasks are specifically added to the flying unit responsibilities already delineated above.99

Unit-level intelligence roles and responsibilities specific to AFSOC squadrons are delineated within AFI 14-2 (AFSOC/PR) Air Force Special Operations Forces/Personnel Recovery) Volume 3 AFSOF/PR Unit Intelligence Procedures.100 Within this instruction, roles and responsibilities for the “employment and sustainment of AFSOF units” are mandated through seven key tasks—information flow, order of battle displays, mission planning, briefing, debriefing, reporting, and personnel recovery support.101 The challenge for unit-level intelligence officers is to manage and execute these key tasks effectively with the intelligence personnel—rarely more than two personnel at any given time—and resources available.

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100 Air Force Instruction (AFI) 14-2AFSOC/PR Volume 3, AFSOF/PR Unit Intelligence Procedures, June 1, 2009.

101 Ibid., 14.

102 Ibid.
3. Research, Analysis and Dissemination

The overarching task for AFSOC unit-level intelligence is to facilitate information flow. Communication of “significant and critical intelligence” must be timely, accurate, and consistent. Communication including questions, events, issues, incoming intelligence, systems status, as well as any other key information/intelligence as the situation dictates must be coordinated amongst all squadron personnel. Formal communications with higher headquarters such as mission reports, intelligence reports, and requests for information (RFIs) must also be managed in accordance with local and command procedures. Ultimately, intelligence officers will succeed or fail based on their ability to disseminate information and intelligence efficiently and effectively, throughout the entire squadron and mission. One of the primary means which unit level intelligence officers communicate the intelligence situation is through order of battle displays.

4. Order of Battle Displays

Order of battle displays provide battlespace situational awareness to flying squadron leadership, aircrews, mission planners, and intelligence personnel and are crucial to effective special operations missions. Displays generally take one of two forms—either digitally using geographic information system (GIS) software (e.g., Falcon View or Google Earth), or hard-copy charts and maps displayed on a table or wall and updated manually. Regardless of the medium, the display is a representation of the battle space area of operations (AO) on a geospatially-appropriate base map and includes operations information as well as intelligence. Friendly force and operations information includes mission and operational objectives, friendly force orders of battle (air, land, sea, conventional and SOF), personnel recovery information, and local

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103 Air Force Instruction (AFI) 14-2AFSOF/PR Volume 3, AFSOF/PR Unit Intelligence Procedures, June 1, 2009, 16.
104 Ibid., 16.
105 Ibid., 14-15.
106 Ibid., 14-15.
conditions information. Intelligence displayed on the map includes enemy activities, conventional enemy orders of battle (air, land, and sea forces, known positions, etc.), irregular enemy orders of battle (terrorist and insurgent safe houses, attack locations, etc.) and any other applicable intelligence, including signals intelligence (SIGINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), and geospatial intelligence (GEOINT). The order of battle display serves as the squadron’s primary situational-awareness (SA) enhancing product and enables squadron operations. In addition to enabling general battle space SA, one of the primary uses for the display is mission planning.

5. Mission Planning

Detailed and meticulous mission planning is essential for effective flying missions, and intelligence personnel play a key role in mission success at the squadron level. After receiving the mission from the air tasking order (ATO) or other tasking document, information from the airspace control order (ACO) and special instructions (SPINS) are applied, and squadron operations and intelligence personnel work to plan mission routes, profiles, and select the appropriate tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). Squadron intelligence personnel conduct intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE) analysis and also consider mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time available (METT-T) analysis as well as observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain, avenues of approach (OCOKA) analytical approaches during mission planning. Analysis from IPOE, METT-T, and OCOKA methodologies enable intelligence personnel to make estimates on enemy detection of the mission, enemy response times, and aids in the selection of minimum risk mission routing. Intelligence on the target or objective area is obtained and along with intelligence on enemy orders of battle and enemy activities, intelligence personnel make recommendations on ingress routing, objective area threat mitigation, and egress

107 Air Force Instruction (AFI) 14-2AFSOF/PR Volume 3, AFSOF/PR Unit Intelligence Procedures, June 1, 2009, 14.
108 Ibid., 15.
Ultimately, mission products are created for use during the briefing and execution of the mission. Products include geospatial representations with overlaid information and intelligence for the route, target/objective area, and any other locations where the mission might fly. Often times, less detailed products (i.e., smaller-scale maps) on the entire AO are included to aid aircrews in the event of a mission divert or dynamic re-tasking. Mission plans are modified, as required, up to the point of execution based on new threats, new environmental conditions, modified taskings, and diverted missions.

6. Briefing, Debriefing, and Reporting

Briefings are among one of the primary methods for the dissemination of information and intelligence at the squadron level. Briefings are provided to all levels within the squadron including leadership, planners, flyers, and intelligence personnel. Intelligence briefings provide situational awareness throughout almost all squadron wartime functions including situation updates to decision makers, situation updates for mission planning, mission briefings, and shift changeover briefings.

Debriefings are also essential to squadron intelligence effectiveness, and theater as well as Air Force instructions mandate an intelligence debriefing of operators upon completion of every tasked mission. Unit level intelligence debriefers utilize mission products, maps, and imagery, if applicable, for the event and the event’s focus is on information which could have potential intelligence value. The fulfillment of essential elements of information, first covered in the mission briefing, are covered again in the debriefing to determine if the operators have any significant information of value post-mission. Time sensitive or critical information is disseminated rapidly and information

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109 Air Force Instruction (AFI) 14-2AFSOF/PR Volume 3, AFSOF/PR Unit Intelligence Procedures, June 1, 2009, 15.
110 Ibid., 16.
111 Ibid., 16.
112 Ibid., 16.
113 Air Force Instruction (AFI) 14-2AFSOF/PR Volume 3, AFSOF/PR Unit Intelligence Procedures, June 1, 2009, 16.
and intelligence from the debriefing are drafted into the appropriate format and reported
up the chain of command.\textsuperscript{114}

The two primary reports created by AFSOC unit level intelligence personnel are
the mission report (MISREP) and the intelligence report (INTREP).\textsuperscript{115} MISREPs are the
primary vehicle for capturing and communicating the details and narratives of all
squadron flying missions. Specific details of the mission such as takeoff and landing
times, actual time on target/objective, responses and reactions to threats, sightings, and
overall mission results are documented in the MISREP for local record and the final
document is forwarded to higher headquarters.\textsuperscript{116} The INTREP is utilized for follow-on
reports to MISREPs and for all other squadron level reporting of information of potential
intelligence value.

7. Access to Intelligence and Requests for Information (RFI)

Throughout all unit-level intelligence responsibilities, 14Ns must ensure there is a
process in place for aircrews, leadership, and fellow intelligence personnel to access
intelligence. Examples include access to threat files for mission planning purposes,
posting intelligence update briefings for personnel to reference, and the availability of
geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) products. Additionally, if unit level intelligence
requires information or intelligence for an operation (e.g., current imagery for a landing
zone) which is not readily available, a process to request, track, receive, and disseminate
RFIs must be in place.

8. Personnel Recovery Support

In addition to their obvious intelligence roles covered to this point, 14Ns also play
an integral part in squadron-level personnel recovery support. Intelligence officers
provide threat, terrain, and cultural-level analysis to assist aircrews in developing evasion

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., 17.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., 17.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., 17.
plans of action (EPA). Additionally, intelligence personnel manage the isolated personnel report (ISOPREP) program. In the event of a downed aircraft resulting in evading survivors, these crucial documents provide combat search and rescue forces the ability to authenticate downed and evading aircrews. Unit level intelligence officers must also understand evasion, resistance, and recovery principles to include pre-mission sanitization procedures, bailout and evasion procedures, the code of conduct, prisoner of war rules of engagement, and personnel recovery procedures in order to integrate these details effectively into the mission and briefings.

D. SUMMARY

Air Force Instructions detail each of the intelligence roles and responsibilities that enable AFSOC missions during employment and sustainment—information flow, order of battle displays, mission planning, briefing, debriefing, reporting, and personnel recovery support. But if the training is not adequate and the knowledge and skills of intelligence officers are lacking even slightly, the effectiveness of AFSOC 14Ns can be quickly degraded. At this point, an important question must be asked: Do the 14Ns assigned to AFSOC flying squadrons have the knowledge and skills required to effectively fulfill the “employment and sustainment” tasks outlined in the AFI? Is their knowledge of threat systems, the area of operations (AO), AFSOC platforms, SOF teams and missions, personnel recovery principles and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) sufficient to provide the required content?

117 Air Force Instruction (AFI) 14-2AFSOC/PR Volume 3, AFSOF/PR Unit Intelligence Procedures, June 1, 2009, 17.

118 Air Force Instruction (AFI) 14-2AFSOC/PR Volume 3, AFSOF/PR Unit Intelligence Procedures, June 1, 2009, 17.
V. SURVEYS AND INTERVIEWS

This research was designed to shed light on an important issue—AFSOC 14N performance at AC-130, MC-130, CV-22, and NSAV flying squadrons—and aimed to answer an important question: Does the specialization training provided to AFSOC 14Ns sufficiently prepare officers for their duties at the unit level? To answer this question, a two-pronged approach was utilized. First, extensive research and interviews were conducted on training provided to AFSOC 14Ns to baseline current syllabi, curriculums, and methods, with an emphasis on specialization training. Second, an anonymous web-based survey was developed and executed to gauge 14N performance at the unit level. The survey was e-mailed to squadron leadership (commanders, operations officers, and weapons officers) as well as 14Ns serving at operational AFSOC flying squadrons.

A. TRAINING RESEARCH

Research on the five phases of 14N training—Intelligence Officer Course, IQT, MQT, specialized training, and CT—was conducted to gauge the current state of 14N training and to collect detailed information on current training initiatives and syllabi. Site visits, interviews, and discussions were conducted with officers at the 315th Training Squadron (Intelligence Officer Course), the AFSOC IFTU (IQT), and the 1st Special Operations Support Squadron (1 SOSS). The 1 SOSS is responsible for MQT, specialized training, and CT for all 14Ns assigned to the 1st Special Operations Wing (1 SOW). Interviews were conducted with select instructors at the Air Force Special Operations School (AFSOS) to explore potential specialization training resources already in existence. Telephone and/or e-mail interviews were conducted with intelligence officer leadership at the 27th Special Operations Wing (27 SOW) Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico and 353 Special Operations Group (353 SOG), Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, Japan, to research the state of specialization training at these organizations.
B. SURVEYS

In order to gauge AFSOC 14N performance at the unit-level, anonymous web-based surveys were developed and distributed to squadron leadership and key personnel at AC-130, MC-130, CV-22, and NSAV squadrons. Recipients of the survey included key consumers of unit-level intelligence, namely squadron commanders, operations officers, and weapons officers. The surveys asked a series of questions regarding intelligence officer knowledge, skills, performance, and the need for additional specialization training based on performance. Survey categories and questions were based on 14N requirements as mandated by AFI (reference Chapter IV—14N Roles and Responsibilities) and are detailed below. Intelligence officers at these squadrons received similar surveys and were asked to rate their own performance.

1. Knowledge and Skills

Squadron leadership and key personnel were asked to assess the knowledge and skills of 14Ns assigned to their squadrons, based on performance, for a series of statements on a scale from one to five—strongly disagree through strongly agree. Intelligence officers were also asked to rate their own knowledge and skills. This portion of the survey explored knowledge and skills based on performance for the following statements:

a. 14Ns understand adversary threat equipment (anti-aircraft artillery, surface to air missiles, heavy machine guns, etc) capabilities and limitations
b. 14Ns understand adversary threat tactics
c. 14Ns understand adversary personnel disposition (networks/leadership)
d. 14Ns understand primary mission aircraft capabilities and limitations
e. 14Ns understand primary mission aircraft tactics
f. 14Ns understand Special Operations Command (SOCOM) organizations
g. 14Ns understand SOCOM teams
h. 14Ns understand SOCOM missions
i. 14Ns understand available ISR resources
j. 14Ns understand how to obtain available human intelligence (HUMINT) resources
k. 14Ns understand how to obtain available geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) resources
l. 14Ns understand how to obtain available signals intelligence (SIGINT) resources
m. 14Ns understand survival, evasion, resistance, escape (SERE) principles
n. 14Ns possess the necessary critical thinking skills
o. 14Ns possess the necessary analytical skills
p. 14Ns are responsible for additional duties which significantly detracts from their intelligence duties
q. 14Ns serve as a critical member of this squadron/team
r. 14Ns provide relevant, mission-tailored products

With statistical analysis, trends and patterns in survey responses were analyzed to determine areas of strength, areas of weakness and potential areas for improvement. Other factors were analyzed as well including the links between how highly 14Ns were viewed as a part of the team and their overall effectiveness ratings, the link between excessive additional duties and overall effectiveness, and the links between analytical skills/critical thinking and overall effectiveness, among others. Similarities and differences from the two perspectives (squadron leadership and 14Ns) were also analyzed to determine similarities and discontinuities from the surveys. 14N training was compared to weakness areas to determine whether officers had received training on these topics. In these cases, emphasis was placed on the extent and type of training 14Ns received for causation analysis. Full results of the survey analysis are provided in Chapter VI—Survey Results.

2. Tailored Intelligence

Undertrained, or even untrained individuals, can technically “provide intelligence” to leadership, mission planners, and aircrews, however, the lack of adequate training should be obvious based on the quality of the intelligence provided. Specifically, the extent to which the intelligence is tailored for the audience is a primary factor for
determining effectiveness. Well-trained intelligence professionals tailor intelligence and products based on the airframe, the mission, and environment, among other factors. The next survey question sought to explore the extent to which 14Ns were tailoring their intelligence products for AFSOC squadron leadership, mission-planners and aircrews. Squadron leadership and intelligence officers were asked to rate how effectively 14Ns tailored intelligence products on a scale from one to five, with one representing very generic (worst) products and five representing highly mission tailored (best) products. The survey included the following categories:

a. Current intelligence products
b. Threat briefings/products
c. Targeting/target package/terminal area products
d. Mission planning products
e. Providing available HUMINT
f. Providing available GEOINT
g. Providing available SIGINT
h. SERE/Evasion and recovery products

Results from this portion of the survey were utilized to determine how effectively 14Ns were tailoring intelligence for their squadrons. Areas of strength and weakness were analyzed to determine links between knowledge and the ability to effectively tailor intelligence. Where applicable, areas of weakness were compared to training syllabi to determine possible factors of causation. Lastly, 14N responses were compared to leadership responses to determine trends and incongruence.

3. Specialization Training Recommendations

The next survey question sought to explore the opinions of AFSOC squadron leadership and 14Ns on the need for additional specialization training. Squadron leadership and key personnel were asked to assess the knowledge and skills of 14Ns assigned to their squadrons on a scale from one to five—strongly disagree through
strongly agree. Intelligence officers were also asked to rate their own knowledge and skills. This survey question explored the following categories:

a. 14Ns require no additional training to contribute to this mission understand adversary threat equipment (anti-aircraft artillery, surface to air missiles, heavy machine guns, etc) capabilities and limitations

b. 14Ns require additional training on adversary threat capabilities, limitations and tactics

c. 14Ns require additional training on mission aircraft capabilities, limitations, and tactics

d. 14Ns require additional training on SOCOM organizations, teams and missions

e. 14NS require additional training on ISR platform capabilities

f. 14Ns require additional training on GEOINT

g. 14Ns require additional training on HUMINT

h. 14Ns require additional training on SIGINT

i. 14Ns require additional SERE training

j. 14Ns require additional analysis training

k. 14Ns require additional critical thinking skills training

Results from this portion of the survey were utilized to determine most and least common recommended areas for additional training to determine potential emphasis areas for specialization training. Analysis was also accomplished to determine links between weak performance and recommended additional training. 14N responses were again compared to leadership responses to determine trends and incongruence.

4. Open-Ended Survey Questions

Opportunities to provide comments were available after each section of questions and several specific open-ended questions were included in the leadership surveys to provide the opportunity for squadron leadership to state opinions, thoughts, and provide feedback outside the construct of a regimented survey. Squadron leadership were asked the following two questions:

a. Are there any products, in your opinion, that 14Ns are not providing?
b. In your opinion, are there any knowledge gaps or missing skill sets which AFSOC Intelligence officers do not currently possess?

Results from the open ended questions were analyzed to determine trends in AFSOC leadership views on 14N performance. Responses were also utilized to provide alternative perspectives on expectations and observations of AFSOC intelligence officers. Statistical analysis, results and observations are included in Chapter VI—Survey Results.
VI. SURVEY RESULTS

A. INTRODUCTION

The survey utilized in this research was purpose-built in order to assess AFSOC unit-level 14N effectiveness at the unit level for AC-130, MC-130, CV-22, and NSAV squadrons. The survey targeted two main groups of individuals in AFSOC flying units—leadership and flying squadron intelligence officers. Leadership, for the purposes of this survey, was defined as squadron commanders (CC), operations officers (DO or Ops-O), weapons officers (W-prefix), and intelligence flight commanders (SOSS/IN). In total, 28 leadership surveys were returned as a part of this study. The second category for the surveys were 14Ns serving at the squadrons listed above. Unfortunately, not all AFSOC squadrons have assigned 14Ns—non-commissioned officers fulfill the unit level intelligence roles—thus limiting the potential number of surveys. In total, eight surveys were evaluated as a part of this study. Analysis was accomplished across the three main categories in the survey—14N knowledge and skill, 14N product tailoring, and recommendations for additional specialization training—from both the leadership and intelligence officer perspectives. Analysis included comparison of responses between the two groups in the survey, correlation analysis, and regression analysis.

B. ANALYSIS

1. Statistical Analysis

   a. 14N Knowledge and Skills

   In the first section of the survey, respondents were asked to rank statements regarding 14N knowledge and skills. There were main eight categories of questions (See Table 8) leading up to the final statement: “14Ns provide relevant, mission-tailored intelligence products.” Respondents were asked to rate each statement on a five-point scale—one through five—with one representing strong disagreement with
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>14N Knowledge &amp; Performance</strong></th>
<th><strong>Leadership Response</strong></th>
<th><strong>14N Response</strong></th>
<th><strong>Mean Difference</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Category</strong></td>
<td><strong>Variable</strong></td>
<td><strong>Mean (Standard Deviation)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Mean (Standard Deviation)</strong></td>
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<td>4.500 (0.534)</td>
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<td>4.750 (0.463)</td>
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<td>4.625 (0.744)</td>
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<td>Mission Aircraft Tactics</td>
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<td>Organizations</td>
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<td>4.000 (1.195)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Teams</td>
<td>3.000 (1.183)</td>
<td>4.625 (0.517)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Missions</td>
<td>3.182 (1.220)</td>
<td>4.625 (0.517)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Resources</td>
<td>3.864 (0.941)</td>
<td>4.375 (0.744)</td>
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<td>3.500 (1.309)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>GEOINT</td>
<td>3.864 (1.246)</td>
<td>4.625 (0.517)</td>
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<td>SIGINT</td>
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<td>SERE</td>
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<td>Analytical Skills</td>
<td>3.900 (0.852)</td>
<td>5.000 (0)</td>
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<td>Excessive Additional Duties</td>
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<td>3.750 (1.035)</td>
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<td>Team</td>
<td>14N Critical Team Member</td>
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<td>3.375 (1.408)</td>
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<td>Overall</td>
<td>Effective Intelligence</td>
<td>3.909 (1.019)</td>
<td>4.625 (0.517)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8. Survey Results—14N Knowledge and Performance

statement and five representing strong agreement with the statement. A statistical analysis of the 14N knowledge and performance variables (See Table 8) reveals that, overall, according to AFSOC leadership, 14Ns generally have adequate knowledge and skills to perform effectively in unit level intelligence positions. Similarly, with slightly
higher average overall responses, 14Ns agreed they have the knowledge and skills required for effectiveness at unit-level intelligence positions. From the leadership’s perspective, 14Ns possess the knowledge and skills required for success in unit level operations as evidenced by the 3.909 mean (SD 1.019) for the overall dependent variable—effective intelligence. In comparison the 14N survey yielded a 4.625 mean (SD 0.517) for the dependent variable. However, more nuanced variations and insightful difference can be drawn from the data.

For instance, AFSOC leadership rated 14Ns the highest in the threat category, portions of the blue forces category, portions of the ISR category, the analysis and critical thinking category, and the team category. The two strongest categories were threat equipment knowledge and 14Ns as a critical team member. The weakest 14N areas identified by leadership in the survey were SOCOM knowledge and portions of ISR knowledge. Intelligence officers rated themselves high—above 4.0—in all categories except HUMINT, and being a critical member of the team.

In terms of threat equipment, leadership agreed that 14Ns possessed the necessary knowledge with the second highest mean in this section of the survey—4.091—and the lowest standard deviation (0.610) measured in this portion of the survey. One leadership survey participant summed up this general observation with the statement “In the legacy platforms (AC-130) TOD (threat of the day) briefs are effective because they are tailored to known mission profiles.”119 This survey participant then went on to explain some of the low marks as well—“Newer AFSOC aircraft (NSAV) are less tailored which could be a hit on ops because we are not doing a good enough job of getting the intel folks in the airplane for fam rides.”120 Knowledge of enemy tactics and personnel disposition were slightly lower with a 3.773 mean (SD 0.752) and 3.857 mean (0.853), respectively. 14Ns were also confident in their threat knowledge, with 4.500, 4.750, and 4.375 means, respectively, in the threat equipment, tactics, and personnel categories. One survey participant summed up 14N threat knowledge with the following

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119 Anonymous Survey Respondent, October 2011.
120 Ibid.
statement: “Overall—AFSOC intelligence officers understand threats and have obviously been well trained in their primary duty.”121

Interestingly, 14Ns were as confident in their threat knowledge as their blue forces knowledge. 14N survey means for mission aircraft and tactics knowledge were 4.625 and 4.750, respectively. Leadership agreed with 14N mission aircraft knowledge as adequate, and rated this category as high as 14N threat knowledge. However, this was not always the case. One leadership survey participant requested intelligence officers possessed “more familiarity with their supported aircraft.”122

One of the leadership survey’s weakest areas for observed 14N knowledge and skills was the SOCOM category. The three SOCOM variables included in the survey—organizations, teams and missions—yielded means of 3.227 (SD 0.972), 3.000 (SD 1.183), and 3.182 (SD 1.220), respectively, from the leadership’s perspective. 14Ns rated their SOCOM knowledge significantly higher, and placed their knowledge nearly equal to their threat knowledge. From the 14N perspective, SOCOM organizations, teams and missions yielded means of 4.000, 4.625, and 4.625 respectively. While 14Ns need not be experts on the SOCOM organizations, teams and missions, it is essential that they are familiar enough to allow accurate analysis and the appropriate context while providing intelligence for aircrews, mission planners and leadership. The data reveals that 14Ns are confident they possess this knowledge, while leadership observed weaker SOCOM knowledge. One leadership survey participant summarized the need for more training on the subject—“our whole force could use more education on SOCOM structure, missions, and goals.”123 The implication is that 14Ns may be overconfident in their knowledge of SOCOM organizations, teams and missions, and increased knowledge could result in improved intelligence analysis and products due to an enhanced understanding of these forces, their capabilities, and methods.

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121 Anonymous Survey Respondent, October 2011.
122 Ibid.
123 Ibid.
AFSOC leadership identified 14Ns having adequate knowledge in ISR resources (mean 3.864, SD 0.941) and GEOINT (mean 3.864, SD 1.246), but comparatively weaker knowledge in HUMINT and SIGINT with means of 3.091 (SD 1.306) and 3.182 (SD 1.140), respectively. 14Ns agreed that they possessed the required knowledge for effectiveness in ISR resources (mean 4.375, SD 0.744), GEOINT (mean 4.625, SD 0.517) and, in contrast to the leadership’s observations, 14Ns were confident in their SIGINT knowledge (mean 4.000, SD 1.309). 14Ns were in agreement with the leadership’s perspective on HUMINT, with this rated as the weakest knowledge in the ISR category (mean 3.500, SD of 1.309).

In the critical thinking and analytical skills category, AFSOC leadership identified 14Ns as having adequate knowledge and skills with a mean of 3.809 (SD 1.030) and 3.900 (SD 0.852), respectively. Leadership ratings in this category were among the highest ratings in this portion of the survey and were equivalent with leadership’s view on 14N threat knowledge. Intelligence officers were highly confident in their critical thinking and analytic skill abilities. The mean was 5.000 for both categories (SD 0).

The intent of the “excessive additional duties” question was to determine if 14Ns were excessively over-tasked with non-intelligence related tasks. The piling-on of additional duties is an unfortunate, but common problem among unit level intelligence officers—14Ns are often the only non-rated officers in the squadron. Ideally, the mean response to this question would be close to “1”; however, the mean response from 14Ns was 3.750, which indicates a substantial agreement to the statement. The standard deviation on this question was 1.035. Put simply, this means additional duties could potentially impose a heavy burden on the 14N’s primary intelligence duties. While a few additional duties might not detract from 14N performance, excessive additional duties can significantly detract from their job performance. The mean leadership response to this question was 3.136 with a standard deviation of 1.356. In summary, some leadership seem to underestimate the impact of distracters on the 14N’s performance.

The “14N is a critical member of the team” question was designed to determine what to extent AFSOC 14Ns were integrated into the squadrons, from two
perspectives. Interestingly, this category was the lowest mean (3.375) from the 14N perspective, but the highest mean from the leadership perspective (4.227). Translated, this means that leadership are confident their 14Ns are critical member of the team—with comparatively little variance (SD 0.887)—while some 14Ns did not feel they were a part of the team—with double the variance (SD 1.408). 14N responses ran the entire spectrum from strongly disagree (1) through strongly agree (5), meaning that some 14Ns felt strongly about being a critical team member while others felt the opposite. Connectedness to the team is obviously not a given, and like any professional relationship, it takes effort from both sides. One leadership survey participant stated “it all comes down to willingness to truly be a part of the squadron. Intel members are caught between their functional community and the squadrons they support.”124 While this is true, sometimes AFSOC aircrews must identify opportunities, reciprocate, and help to develop their 14Ns as integral members of the team. In almost every case, the 14N will be one of the only “non-fliers” in the squadron. With tasks that often take the 14N out of the immediate reach of the aircrews, it is crucial that both sides work to make the operations-intelligence relationship a strong one.

b. **14N Product Tailoring**

The next data set analyzed were the responses from both leadership and 14Ns on the extent to which 14Ns tailored their products for aircrews, mission planers and leadership. There were eight questions included in this section of the survey (reference Table 9) and respondents were asked to rate to what extent 14Ns tailored their products to the audience and mission. Respondents were asked to rate each statement on a five-point scale—one through five—with one representing “very generic products” (worst) and five representing ‘highly mission-tailored products’ (best).

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124 Anonymous Survey Respondent, October 2011.
In terms of product tailoring, leadership observed, overall, that seven of eight categories met the neutral (3) value and fell between “neutral” and “somewhat mission tailored” (4). Leadership observed that 14Ns tailored current intelligence better than any other category in this section of the survey (mean 4.045, SD 0.722). This was the only category from the leadership’s perspective which met the “somewhat mission-tailored” threshold. All other categories fell in between the values of three and four.’

14Ns observed, overall, that seven of eight categories met the “somewhat mission tailored” and fell between “somewhat mission tailored” (4) and “highly mission-tailored” (5). The survey revealed that 14Ns felt their best-tailored products were SIGINT (mean 4.667, SD 0.516), and target package/terminal area products (mean 4.571, SD 0.534). Leadership observations did not agree with these 14N-identified strength areas. According to the leadership survey, SIGINT and target package/terminal area products were two of the lowest categories with means of 3.278 and 3.631, respectively.

Table 9. Survey Results–14N Product Tailoring

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Leadership Response</th>
<th>14N Response</th>
<th>Mean Difference</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Mean (Standard Deviation)</td>
<td>Mean (Standard Deviation)</td>
<td>Delta</td>
</tr>
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<td>Current Intelligence</td>
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<td>4.250 (0.707)</td>
<td>0.205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat</td>
<td>3.682 (0.893)</td>
<td>4.125 (1.126)</td>
<td>0.443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Package/Terminal Area</td>
<td>3.631 (1.116)</td>
<td>4.571 (0.534)</td>
<td>0.940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Planning Products</td>
<td>3.818 (1.097)</td>
<td>4.286 (1.113)</td>
<td>0.468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>3.187 (1.109)</td>
<td>4.000 (1.095)</td>
<td>0.813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEOINT</td>
<td>3.611 (1.145)</td>
<td>4.333 (1.211)</td>
<td>0.722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGINT</td>
<td>3.278 (1.127)</td>
<td>4.667 (0.516)</td>
<td>1.389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERE</td>
<td>3.714 (1.007)</td>
<td>3.750 (1.488)</td>
<td>0.036</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
c. 14N Specialization Training Recommendations

In the third section of the survey, respondents were asked to rank statements regarding additional 14N specialization training. There were 11 main categories of questions (See Table 10) that generally correlated with the questions regarding 14N knowledge and skills. Similar to the 14N knowledge and skills questions, respondents were asked to rate each statement on a five-point scale—one through five—with one representing strong disagreement with statement and five representing strong agreement with the statement regarding 14Ns requiring additional specialization training. See Table 10—Specialization Training Recommendations.

A statistical analysis of the 14N Additional Training Recommendations data reveals, overall, that both 14Ns and AFSOC leadership felt that 14Ns require some form of additional specialization training. On the statement “14Ns require zero additional specialization training,” leadership disagreed more than 14Ns. The mean leadership response was 1.864 (SD 0.774) while the mean 14N response was 2.625 (SD 1.408). The most recommended training from the leadership perspective was on the topics of SOCOM, mission aircraft, HUMINT and SIGINT. From the 14N perspective, the most recommended training topics were SOCOM, SERE, mission aircraft, threat, and HUMINT.

The commonalities in this recommendation—SOCOM, mission aircraft, and HUMINT—make sense as these were highlighted as areas for improvement in the 14N knowledge and skills survey. Additionally, as described in Chapter III—14N Training, courses on SOCOM and HUMINT were included, but were not lengthy nor a major focus area. Leadership’s recommendation for SIGINT training agrees with their observation of this particular “INT” as somewhat weak and makes sense due to the limited amount of SIGINT training now provided in the intelligence officer course. The 14N request for additional training on SERE topics also makes sense as none of the 14Ns surveyed had attended SV-80 USAF Survival Training, while all aircrews must attend this training prior to assignments to operational flying wings. The 14N request for additional threat training, despite strong marks from leadership and self-assessment in the
14N knowledge and skills survey, probably indicates that 14Ns are humble regarding their constant need for more knowledge on a recognized primary intelligence responsibility. Some 14Ns are thriving in this arena, however, despite the lack of formal survival training. One leadership survey noted “the intel corps does a very good job producing SERE products and making sure the ISOPREPS have been accomplished.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Recommendations</th>
<th>Leadership Response</th>
<th>14N Response</th>
<th>Mean Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Mean (Standard Deviation)</td>
<td>Mean (Standard Deviation)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Additional Training Req’d</td>
<td>1.864 (0.774)</td>
<td>2.625 (1.408)</td>
<td>0.761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat</td>
<td>3.454 (1.101)</td>
<td>3.750 (0.707)</td>
<td>0.296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Aircraft</td>
<td>3.773 (0.922)</td>
<td>3.875 (0.640)</td>
<td>0.102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCOM</td>
<td>4.091 (0.921)</td>
<td>4.000 (0.756)</td>
<td>-0.091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISR Platforms</td>
<td>3.524 (1.209)</td>
<td>3.375 (1.188)</td>
<td>-0.149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEOINT</td>
<td>3.571 (1.248)</td>
<td>3.50 (1.309)</td>
<td>-0.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>3.714 (1.055)</td>
<td>3.750 (1.281)</td>
<td>0.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGINT</td>
<td>3.667 (1.016)</td>
<td>3.125 (1.458)</td>
<td>-0.542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGINT</td>
<td>3.364 (1.093)</td>
<td>3.875 (0.641)</td>
<td>0.511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis Skills</td>
<td>3.364 (1.293)</td>
<td>3.250 (1.035)</td>
<td>-0.114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical Thinking Skills</td>
<td>3.428 (1.325)</td>
<td>3.250 (1.035)</td>
<td>-0.178</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10. Survey Results—14N Training Recommendations

2. Correlation Analysis

To determine areas of importance based on individual intelligence variables and the overall dependent variable—14Ns provide relevant, mission tailored intelligence—a correlation analysis was accomplished and analyzed. See Table 11.
From the leadership’s perspective, correlation analysis on the individual intelligence variables against the dependent variable reveals that leadership values the following areas of 14N knowledge and skill the most: Threat, blue forces, GEOINT, SERE, analysis and critical thinking, and 14Ns as a critical team member. The least valued knowledge and skill areas were SOCOM knowledge and detractors (excessive
Interestingly, in the ISR category, knowledge in overall ISR resources, HUMINT, and SIGINT did not correlate as strongly as GEOINT and threat. This probably results from the generally held view that 14Ns primarily provide threat products and GEOINT products (Imagery, IMINT, maps and charts) for AFSOC flying squadrons.

From the 14N perspective, the correlation analysis reveals strong ties to the dependent variable in the following categories: Threat tactics, blue forces, SOCOM and GEOINT. The weakest ties to the overall dependent variable—effective intelligence—were ISR resources, HUMINT, SIGINT, and SERE. It is very interesting that 14Ns placed a higher value on blue forces and SOCOM knowledge as compared to key ISR variables such as HUMINT and SIGINT. This probably reveals that the AFSOC 14Ns surveyed are more comfortable with blue forces and SOCOM knowledge than with HUMINT and SIGINT—most likely due to the fact that they work with the former categories daily, and do not necessarily work with HUMINT or SIGINT on a regular basis.

The results from the detractor question—designed to determine how leadership and 14Ns viewed excessive additional duties—were also very interesting. Based on the correlation analysis, leadership were overall neutral on this variable’s impact on 14N effectiveness. That is, the correlation value was not a significant positive number or a significant negative number. From the 14N perspective, the value was a significant value, approximately on par with the importance of GEOINT, but a negative value. This means that 14Ns recognize that excessive detractors impact their performance effectiveness, while leadership did not recognize this as an issue.

3. Regression Analysis

Regression analysis on the knowledge and skill variables was conducted to determine areas of importance as seen by the leadership. For the purposes of this analysis, the categories of variables were analyzed (threat knowledge, blue forces knowledge, etc) versus the individual variables as seen in previous tables. Unfortunately,
due to the low number of 14N surveys returned, regression analysis from the 14N perspective was not possible. See Table 12—Regression Analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Threat</td>
<td>1.142</td>
<td>1.450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue Forces</td>
<td>0.278</td>
<td>0.760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCOM</td>
<td>-0.960</td>
<td>-2.680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis &amp; Thinking</td>
<td>1.123</td>
<td>2.230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detractors</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>0.530</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12. Regression Analysis

The results from the regression analysis reveal that leadership value threat knowledge and analysis and critical thinking skills more than any other AFSOC 14N knowledge or skill analyzed. This correlates with previous analyses, although more detailed results on individual variables is available in previous sections of this chapter. Interestingly, SOCOM knowledge and ISR were not weighted nearly as heavily as threat and the ability to think and analyze.

C. SUMMARY

Statistical and correlation analysis of the survey results revealed many useful and interesting conclusions regarding AFSOC 14N unit level performance. Survey results from both the 14N’s perspective and the leadership’s perspective allowed some basic “compare and contrast” analysis and shed light on AFSOC 14N performance. Overall, 14Ns are getting the job done at the unit level, as evidenced by the leadership’s marks on 14N performance in terms of knowledge, skills, and intelligence product tailoring. This
does not mean, however, that all is completely well. Valuable lessons can be learned and improvements can be made to existing processes in the constant struggle to make unit-level intelligence better.

Statistical analysis of the 14N knowledge and performance variables revealed that AFSOC leadership felt 14Ns generally have adequate knowledge and skills to perform effectively in unit level intelligence positions. Similarly, and with slightly higher average overall responses, 14Ns also agreed. In terms of product tailoring, leadership observed, overall, that seven of eight survey categories met or exceeded the neutral value (3) for product tailoring, while 14Ns observed that seven of eight categories of their own products met the “somewhat mission tailored” category (4) and fell between “somewhat mission tailored (4) and “highly mission-tailored” (5). This reveals that 14Ns view their products as more highly mission-tailored as compared to the leadership’s observations on the same products.

The leadership’s most recommended training for 14Ns was on SOCOM, mission aircraft, HUMINT and SIGINT and from the 14N perspective, the most recommended additional training topics were SOCOM, SERE, mission aircraft, threat, and HUMINT. The commonalities in this recommendation—SOCOM, mission aircraft, and HUMINT—make sense as these were highlighted as areas for improvement in the 14N knowledge and skills survey.

The “14N is a critical member of the team” question was the lowest mean value from the 14N perspective, but the highest mean from the leadership perspective. Translated, this means that leadership are confident their 14Ns are critical member of the team, while some 14Ns did not feel they were a part of the team. As discussed above, operations-intelligence integration is critical to effective flying operations. This starts with a sound professional relationship between 14Ns and their squadron’s aircrews.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

This project is designed to shed light on an important issue—AFSOC 14N performance at AC-130, MC-130, CV-22, and NAVAIR flying squadrons. In order to answer the research question—does the specialization training provided to AFSOC 14Ns sufficiently prepare officers for their duties at the unit level—a two-pronged research approach was utilized. Research and interviews conducted on AFSOC 14N specialization training revealed that extensive specialization training is provided to intelligence officers bound for AFSOC flying squadrons. This training takes place in three major phases—initial qualification training, mission qualification training, and specialized training—and must be completed before assignment to an operational squadron. The majority of specialization training takes place at the operational flying wing, providing a tremendous opportunity to tailor training to a specific 14N’s needs. Unfortunately, because of the operational tempo at AFSOC flying wings, this training is not always uninterrupted or without distractions.

The anonymous, purpose-built, web-based survey was developed and executed to gauge 14N performance at the unit level. The survey was e-mailed to squadron leadership (commanders, operations officers, and weapons officers) as well as 14Ns serving at operational AFSOC flying squadrons and revealed that, overall, AFSOC 14Ns are getting the job done at the unit level. While 14Ns assessed their own performance slightly higher than their leaders’ observations, the mean responses from leadership revealed no major grievances or shortcomings approaching failure. There were, however, some weaknesses revealed which can be fixed to improve 14N performance.

The following pages build on the findings and analysis of the previous six chapters and propose recommendations to improve AFSOC 14N performance at the unit level. The recommendations fall into four major categories—wing level emphasis on specialization training, coordination to maximize current training efforts, specialization training recommendations, and a specialization career path.
A. PRIORITIZING SPECIALIZATION TRAINING

1. Recommendation

AFSOC wing senior intelligence officers (SIOs) place the highest possible priority on specialization training and provide maximum manning, resources and uninterrupted time blocks for MQT, specialized training, and continuation training.

2. Discussion

Unlike the intelligence officer course and the AFSOC intelligence IFTU that occur in a dedicated training environment, specialization training at the wing takes place in an operational setting where competing priorities are the norm. As a result, reduced manning in training shops, interruptions, and shortened training cycles are sometimes chosen to meet operational requirements. Conducting specialization training at an operational wing has its benefits, too, which certainly outweigh the drawbacks. Access to the operational squadrons, the weapons platforms, and the actual working spaces, among others, are critical to specialization training success. As discussed in Chapter III—MQT, specialized training, and continuation training are the most critical phases of specialization training and placing a priority on these critical phases of training will pay dividends in the long run, primarily with more highly trained 14Ns. One reaps what one sews.

3. Conclusion: Prioritizing Specialization Training

The power to place maximum prioritization on specialization training lies with the AFSOC Wing SIO / Special Operations Support Squadron Intelligence Flight Commanders (SOSS/IN). Wherever and whenever possible, SIOs need to ensure their training shops are manned to the maximum feasible levels, scheduling allows uninterrupted training time, and decisions to interrupt training are made only when absolutely necessary. Maximizing this critical phase of training will pay great dividends
in the future with more highly trained 14Ns. If resources and manning are unavailable, requests to higher headquarters would be more than justified based on the AFI mandates for conducting specialization training.

B. MAXIMIZING CURRENT EFFORTS THROUGH COORDINATION

While travelling and conducting interviews during this thesis research, it became obvious that almost every institution visited could benefit from training or products from another organization. With little effort besides taking the time to schedule and coordinate these efforts, there were three standout instances where already existing products and processes could benefit another individual or organization tremendously.

1. Recommendation

   a. Intelligence Weapons Officers Coordinate and Share Specialization Training Products

   b. AF Special Operations School (AFSOS) Instructors Coordinate with AFSOC IFTU Instructors to Schedule AFSOC IFTU Training

   c. 14Ns Leverage AFSOS Expertise for Specialized Products

2. Discussion

Due to the fact that wing-level specialization training is developed based on each individual wing’s requirements, separate training programs were created for each of the three AFSOC wings included in this research. In analyzing these training programs, it quickly became obvious that other AFSOC wings could benefit from some of the training programs included in MQT, specialized training, and continuation training programs. Similarly, while interviewing Major Christopher Mullins, the Course Director for the US Central Command Theater for SOF (CTSOF) at the USAF Special Operations School (USAFSOS), it was mentioned that 14Ns and other instructors within the USAFSOS could greatly benefit from some the academics taught at the AFSOC IFTU—especially
training on AFSOC platforms and missions. These academics were identified as courses that could enhance analysis and background on AFSOC capabilities for AFSOS instructors. Lastly, during this same interview, Major Mullins mentioned an underutilized intelligence resource at the USAFSOS—requests for tailored training products from operational flying squadrons. In a representative example of this capability, a special operations squadron (SOS) requested a specific country briefing, tailored to future deployment location, be researched and briefed at the squadron. 14Ns at unit level assignments (SOS and SOSS) must be aware that they need not operate in a vacuum. Learning to leverage existing expertise and capitalizing on the capabilities of outside organizations maximizes time for other critical squadron tasks.

3. Conclusion

Coordination, delegation, and leveraging the capabilities and expertise of other AFSOC organizations is crucial for any successful intelligence application. With minimal time required, the three examples listed above are representative of maximizing resources and working as efficiently as possible. AFSOC 14Ns at all levels should look to leverage existing resources and expertise whenever possible and especially in a time of heavy budget restraints.

C. SPECIALIZATION TRAINING RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Recommendation

AFSOC 36-2201 requires the Introduction to Special Operations Course for all personnel assigned to AFSOC within six months of assignment to the command.

a. Discussion

Based on the leadership survey results, AFSOC 14N knowledge of SOCOM organizations, teams, and missions was comparatively weak. While leadership did not necessarily correlate SOCOM knowledge to the overall dependent variable, unit-
level 14Ns must have a working SOCOM to facilitate analysis and products and context. The Introduction to Special Operations Course (ISOC) is a three-day, operational level introduction to SOCOM components, history and heritage, and SOF core areas.\footnote{Ned Calvert, interview by author, Hurlburt Field, FL, September 23, 2011.} The course is designed for AFSOC personnel E-1 through O-6 and accommodates approximately 1200 students per year.\footnote{Ned Calvert, interview by author, Hurlburt Field, FL, September 23, 2011.} Discussion on making this course a mandatory requirement for all personnel assigned to the command through AFSOC 36-2201 was ongoing at the time of this research.

\textit{b. Conclusion}

While ISOC most likely wouldn’t remedy every potential weakness for AFSOC 14Ns, the training would be highly beneficial to further familiarize unit-level intelligence officers with AFSOC and SOCOM. The case studies would also benefit 14Ns and could add additional historical context to their analytical tool kits. It is recommended that AFSOC 36-2201 be passed with the ISOC provision.

\textbf{2. Recommendation}

Academics on Non-Standard Aviation (NSAV) platforms be added to the AFSOC IFTU curriculum.

\textit{a. Discussion}

During the research for this project, the syllabi and requirements for all required AFSOC specialization training were obtained and reviewed in detail. While analyzing the AFSOC IFTU syllabus, it was noted that academics on all AFSOC platforms (AC-130, MC-130, CV-22, MQ-1/9, etc.) were included with one exception—non-standard aviation academics. NSAV platforms are a relatively new addition to AFSOC, and this helps to explain the deficiency. 14Ns with assignments to NSAV squadrons do receive platform academics during MQT, however, adding dedicated platform academics during IQT to serve to further enhance this training.

\footnote{Ned Calvert, interview by author, Hurlburt Field, FL, September 23, 2011.}  
\footnote{Ned Calvert, interview by author, Hurlburt Field, FL, September 23, 2011.}
b. **Conclusion**

Adding NSAV platform academics to the AFSOC IFTU curriculum would benefit all AFSOC 14Ns, especially those bound for NSAV squadrons.

3. **Recommendation**

Intelligence Weapons Officers add HUMINT training and practical exercises to mission qualification training and continuation training curriculums.

a. **Discussion**

Survey analysis revealed a weakness in 14Ns knowledge on leveraging human resources intelligence. HUMINT, when available, can provide critical insights and intelligence which are not available via other means. Unfortunately, HUMINT is a complicated source for intelligence, and 14Ns must learn techniques on how to utilize this resource effectively. During research interviews at 1 SOSS/IN, Hurlburt Field, FL, Captain Jessica Graves revealed a highly effective HUMINT academic course and practical that is included in the 1 SOW MQT program. It is recommended that Capt Graves share this courseware with intelligence weapons officers at other AFSOC bases to help train AFSOC 14Ns to retrieve, analyze and utilize this critical resource.

b. **Conclusion**

14N weaknesses in HUMINT resources are completely understandable. Unit-level intelligence officers rarely work with this resource and, as a result, are likely not comfortable utilizing this sometimes complicated source of intelligence. Academics on how to retrieve and analyze HUMINT, in addition to practical exercises, will go far to help increase unit level 14N effectiveness with this resource.

4. **Recommendation**

AFSOC 14Ns solidify their mission aircraft knowledge through familiarization flights, simulator missions, aircraft tours, and “tactical talk” discussions
a. Discussion

Survey results from both the leadership and 14N perspectives revealed that 14Ns had adequate knowledge on mission aircraft and tactics. Despite this observation, and despite the academics provided on AFSOC platforms at the intelligence officer course, the AFSOC IFTU, and mission qualification training, both leadership and AFSOC 14Ns recommended additional specialization training on mission aircraft and tactics. This is understandable, since tailoring intelligence to the AFSOC mission is impossible without understanding the platform and its tactics. Academics can only do so much for knowledge, as evidence by this situation. Application and experience will get the most mileage in this situation, and unit level 14Ns are encouraged to maximize their opportunities on familiarization flights, simulators, and aircraft tours/walk-arounds with an emphasis on engaging with a knowledgeable aircrew member. 14Ns should engage in detailed, tactical discussion regarding the platform, tactics, techniques and procedures, and intelligence applications for the mission and crew.

b. Conclusion

Academic knowledge alone can only take an student so far, and applying this knowledge coupled with familiarization flights, simulator missions, aircraft walk-arounds, and detailed tactical discussions with a knowledgeable crew member will help to solidify 14N knowledge of the platform and tactics. These activities will also help to build stronger bonds with aircrew members and build trust, camaraderie, and teamwork.

D. SPECIALIZATION CAREER PATH

1. Recommendation

Senior USAF intelligence leadership allows a portion of the 14N force to specialize within AFSOC/SOCOM
2. Discussion

The AF approach to managing 14N careers since 1999 has brought unnecessary challenges to the force. Not allowing some degree of specialization has resulted in 14Ns who are over generalized and undertrained due to the vast skills sets and knowledge required for effectiveness. Initially, this left the burden on 14Ns themselves, however, in recent years modifications to specialization training regulations and programs has helped tremendously. Specialization training does not replace experience, however, and the continued practice of bouncing 14Ns between commands, missions, and even domains (air, space, cyberspace) throughout their careers is unnecessary and detracts from intelligence expertise. Allowing specialization within a set of capabilities and missions—such as AFSOC and SOCOM—would allow a level of depth, experience, and expertise without necessarily sacrificing a career or excessively “stove-piping” officers.

In the case of an AFSOC/SOCOM specialization, a 14N could have sufficient experience and leadership opportunities, while still showing career progress in terms of ever-increasing levels of responsibility and spheres of influence. With assignments available in unit level operations (AC-130, MC-130, Special Tactics), SOF ISR (MQ-1, MQ-9, DCGS), the AFSOC Staff (A2), overseas opportunities (EUCOM, PACOM), and Field Grade Officer and above assignments at combatant commands (CENTCOM, SOCOM), the Pentagon (Air Staff, Joint Staff) and joint assignments with SOCOM, 14Ns could proceed through an entire career and maintain a level of credibility and expertise on AFSOC/SOCOM organizations, teams, and missions. This approach could still prepare 14Ns for eventual assignments in to Joint Intelligence Positions (J2), if the individual’s career progressed to that point. This approach would not necessarily be exclusive to AFSOC/SOCOM, and could also be applied to the Space and Cyber domains, as well as other appropriate tracks. Broadening would still be utilized with professional military education (PME) as well as the ISR 300 and ISR 400 curriculums proposed with the new approach 14N career management. 14Ns could also still be centrally managed, so that in the event of a shortfall, intelligence officers could be moved into positions where needed.
3. Conclusion

Air Force senior leadership should look into redefining what level of specialization is allowable for 14Ns. While the approach introduced here is not necessarily advocating that 14Ns be permanently assigned to AFSOC/SOCOM track, an increased degree of specialization would build expertise, and not necessarily sacrifice the experience needed for 14N effectiveness. As evidenced in the RAND study on 14N utilization, the current approach broadens officers to an excessive extent, and is counterproductive to intelligence expertise.
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APPENDIX A: 14N SURVEY (LEADERSHIP VERSION)

Figure 2. 14N Survey (Leadership Version) Page 1
2. Please indicate your current rank.
   - [ ] Col
   - [ ] Lt Col
   - [ ] Maj
   - [ ] Capt
   Other (please specify)

3. Please indicate your current position.
   - [ ] Group Commander
   - [ ] Deputy Group Commander
   - [ ] Squadron Commander
   - [ ] Squadron Director of Operations (DO or OPS O)
   - [ ] Squadron Weapons Officer
   - [ ] Intelligence Flight Commander (SOSS/IN)
   Other (please specify)

4. How long have you served in your current position?
   - [ ] Less than 6 months
   - [ ] 6 months to 1 year
   - [ ] 1-2 years
   - [ ] 2-3 years
   - [ ] 3+ years
   Other (please specify)
On AFSOC Intel

5. Question 5/10
AFSOC Intelligence officers possess a variety of knowledge and skill sets which contribute to the mission.

Please indicate your observations and experiences on the ACTUAL PERFORMANCE of AFSOC Intelligence officers assigned to your squadron.

For each category indicate your choices on the scale of 1 - Strongly Disagree through 5 - Strongly Agree. If you feel a particular topic is not required for AFSOC Intel, please indicate this in the appropriate field.

On the ACTUAL PERFORMANCE of AFSOC Intelligence Officers Assigned to this Squadron:

- I strongly DISAGREE with this statement
- I DISAGREE with this statement
- I neither agree nor disagree with this statement
- I AGREE with this statement
- I strongly AGREE with this statement
- N/A

Understand adversary threat equipment (AAMS/HMG)
- Understand adversary threat tactics
- Understand adversary personnel disposition (Networks/Leadership)
- Understand primary mission aircraft capabilities and limitations
- Understand SOCOM organizations (JSOC/SOTF)
- Understand SOCOM teams (ODA/SEALS)
- Understand SOCOM missions (CT/DA/SRA/SE)
- Understand Available ISR Resources
- Understand how to obtain available HUMINT resources
- Understand how to obtain available GEINT (Imagery/HUMINT/Maps) resources
- Understand how to obtain available SIGINT resources
- Understand SERE principles
- Possess the necessary critical thinking skills
- Possess the necessary analytical skills
- Are responsible for additional duties which significantly detract from their intelligence duties
- Serve as a critical member of this squadron/team
- Provide relevant, mission-tailored intelligence products

Comments

Figure 4.  14N Survey (Leadership Version) Page 3
6. Question 6/10
AFSOC Intelligence officers provide a variety of products in the course of their duties.

Please RATE THE INTEL and MISSION PLANNING PRODUCTS provided by AFSOC intelligence officers assigned to this squadron on a scale from 1 - Very Generic through 5 - Highly Mission-Tailored.

If a product is not provided, please indicate this in the appropriate field.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current Intelligence Products (Briefings, Updates)</th>
<th>Somewhat Generic</th>
<th>Neutral (Sometimes Generic/Sometimes Tailored)</th>
<th>Somewhat Mission-Tailored</th>
<th>Highly Mission-Tailored, Extremely Useful</th>
<th>This Product is Not Provided</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Threat Briefings/Products (AAA/HMG, SAMS)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeting/Target Package/Mission Terminal Area Products</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Planning Products (Maps, Imagery, Route Intel)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing available ISR/Enablers - HUMINT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing available ISR/Enablers - GEOINT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing available ISR/Enablers - SIGINT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERE/Evasion and Recovery Products (E&amp;E Plans, Area Studies)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Are there any products, in your opinion, that intelligence officers are NOT providing?

Figure 5. 14N Survey (Leadership Version) Page 4
7. Question 7/10
What are your thoughts on the potential for additional specialization training for AFSOC Intelligence Officers?

Please indicate your answers on the scale from 1 - Strongly Agree through 5 - Strongly Disagree.

AFSOC Intelligence officers assigned to this squadron:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>Strongly DISAGREE</th>
<th>I DISAGREE with this statement</th>
<th>neither agree nor disagree with this statement</th>
<th>AGREE with this statement</th>
<th>strongly AGREE with this statement</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Require ZERO additional training to contribute to this mission</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Require additional training on adversary threat capabilities, limitations and tactics</td>
<td>☐</td>
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<td>Require additional training on mission aircraft capabilities, limitations and tactics</td>
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<tr>
<td>Require additional training on SOCOM organizations, teams and missions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Require additional training on ISR platform capabilities/processes</td>
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<td>Require additional training on acquiring GEOINT</td>
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<td>Require additional training on acquiring HUMINT</td>
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<td>Require additional training on acquiring SIGINT</td>
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<td>Require additional SERE training</td>
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<td>Require additional analysis training</td>
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<td>Require additional critical thinking skills training</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Comments

...
8. Question 8/10
In your opinion, are there any knowledge gaps or missing skills sets which AFSOC Intelligence officers do not currently possess?

9. Question 9/10
Please provide any other comments or suggestions regarding AFSOC Intelligence Officer products, performance, or training which were not addressed in the survey.

10. Question 10/10
Thank you for your participation in this survey. Your time, inputs, and comments are greatly appreciated.

If you have questions about this study, please contact either the Principal Investigator, Dr. Kalev Sepp, kisepp@nps.edu, or the lead researcher, Major Christopher Workinger, clworkin@nps.edu.

The overall results of the study will be provided to U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command. You may obtain a copy of the research after it is completed by contacting Major Christopher Workinger at clworkin@nps.edu

Please select the "Done" button below to finalize your inputs. Thank you.
1. Informed Consent Form (Legal Rights and Background of this Survey)

You are invited to take a survey for a research study on specialization training for Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) Intelligence Officers. The survey is designed to provide information for evaluating the effectiveness of intelligence officers assigned to AFSOC squadrons. The results may benefit future training for AFSOC intelligence officers as well as intelligence professionals in other communities.

This research is being conducted by Major Christopher Workinger, an active duty Air Force Intelligence Officer currently studying at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. The overall results of the study will be provided to U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command. You may obtain a copy of the research after it is completed by contacting Major Christopher Workinger at cworkin@nps.edu.

This survey should take about 15-20 minutes to complete. Please note that all survey records and data collected are anonymous: individuals who participate can not and will not be identified. Individual names will not be recorded for survey participants and therefore cannot be associated with collected data. The information collected in this survey will be only be utilized for the official purposes of this research. There are no foreseeable physical, social, economic, or legal risks associated with participation in this survey. Your input is important to us, and we hope you choose to participate. Participation is voluntary and you are free to stop the survey or skip survey questions at any time without penalty.

If you have questions about this study, please contact either the Principal Investigator, Dr. Kalev Sepp, kisepp@nps.edu, or the lead researcher, Major Christopher Workinger, cworkin@nps.edu. Questions regarding your rights as a participant can be directed to the Naval Postgraduate School’s Institutional Review Board Chair, USN CAPT John Schmidt 831-656-3876, jkschmid@nps.edu.

Once you start this survey, your inputs will not be recorded until you complete the survey and push the “Done” button after question 10. Unfortunately, there is no capability to save your inputs and return at a later time.

We hope you are willing to participate in our study on AFSOC Intelligence Officer performance and training. We value your experience and views. If you are willing to participate, please indicate below to begin the survey:

- I agree to participate in this survey
- I decline to participate in this survey

Next
Figure 9. 14N Survey (14N Version) Page 2
AFSOC intelligence officers possess a variety of knowledge and skill sets which contribute to the mission.

Please indicate your observations and experiences regarding YOUR PERFORMANCE while assigned to this AFSOC squadron.

For each category indicate your choices on the scale of 1 - Strongly Disagree through 5 - Strongly Agree. If you feel a particular topic is not applicable, please indicate this in the appropriate field.

As an intelligence officer assigned to this squadron:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I strongly DISAGREE with this statement</th>
<th>I DISAGREE with this statement</th>
<th>I neither agree nor disagree with this statement</th>
<th>I AGREE with this statement</th>
<th>I strongly AGREE with this statement</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I understand adversary threat equipment (AAA/SAMS/ENDING) capabilities and limitations</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>I understand adversary threat tactics</td>
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<tr>
<td>I understand adversary personnel disposition (Networks/Leadership)</td>
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<tr>
<td>I understand primary mission aircraft capabilities and limitations (AC-130, MC-130, CV-22, NSF/NSW)</td>
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<tr>
<td>I understand primary mission aircraft tactics</td>
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<tr>
<td>I understand SOCOM operations (JSOC/JSOTF)</td>
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<tr>
<td>I understand SOCOM team (ODA/SEALS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>I understand SOCOM missions (JSOC/JSOTF)</td>
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<tr>
<td>I understand available ISR Resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>I understand how to obtain available HUMINT resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>I understand how to obtain available GOINT (Imagery/INTMaps) resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>I understand how to obtain available SIGINT Resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>I understand SINE principles</td>
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<tr>
<td>I possess the necessary, critical thinking skills</td>
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<td>I possess the necessary analytical skills</td>
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<tr>
<td>I am responsible for additional duties which significantly distract from my intelligence duties</td>
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<tr>
<td>I serve as a critical member of this squadron/team</td>
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<tr>
<td>I provide relevant, mission-tailored intelligence products</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Comments:

Figure 10. 14N Survey (14N Version) Page 3
AFSOC Intelligence officers provide a variety of products in the course of their duties.

Please rate the intelligence and mission planning products that you provide to this AFSOC squadron on a scale from 1 - Very Generic through 5 - Highly Mission-Tailored.

If a product is not provided, please indicate this in the appropriate field.

How would you rate the products you create and provide to this squadron?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current Intelligence Products (Briefings, Updates)</th>
<th>Very Generic</th>
<th>Generic</th>
<th>Neutral (Sometimes Generic/Sometimes Mission-Tailored)</th>
<th>Highly Mission-Tailored</th>
<th>N/A</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Threat Briefings/Products (AAA/HMG, SAMIS)</td>
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<td>Targeting/Target Package/Mission Terminal Area Products</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mission Planning Products (Maps, Imagery, Route Intel)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Providing available ISR/Enablers - HUMINT</td>
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<tr>
<td>Providing available ISR/Enablers - GEOINT</td>
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<tr>
<td>Providing available ISR/Enablers - SIGINT</td>
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<tr>
<td>SERE/Evasion and Recovery Products (E&amp;E Plans, Area Studies)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Comments:

Figure 11. 14N Survey (14N Version) Page 4
8. Question 8/10

What are your thoughts on the potential for additional specialization training for AFSOC Intelligence Officers?

Please indicate your answers on the scale from 1 - Strongly Agree through 5 - Strongly Disagree.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>I completely DISAGREE with this comment</th>
<th>I DISAGREE with this comment</th>
<th>I am neutral I have no opinion on this comment</th>
<th>I AGREE with this comment</th>
<th>I completely AGREE with this comment</th>
<th>N/A</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I require ZERO additional training to contribute to this mission</td>
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<td>I would benefit from additional training on adversary threat</td>
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<td>capabilities, limitations and tactics</td>
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<tr>
<td>I would benefit from additional training on mission aircraft</td>
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<td>capabilities, limitations and tactics</td>
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<td>I would benefit from additional training on SOCOM organizations, teams</td>
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<td>and missions</td>
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<td>I would benefit from additional training ISR platform capabilities/</td>
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<td>I would benefit from additional training on acquiring GEOINT</td>
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<td>I would benefit from additional training on acquiring HUMINT</td>
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<td>I would benefit from additional training on acquiring SIGINT</td>
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<td>I would benefit from additional SERE training</td>
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<td>I would benefit from additional analysis training</td>
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<td>I would benefit from additional critical thinking skills training</td>
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</table>

Comments

...
9. Question 9/10
Please provide any other comments on AFSOC intelligence officer training, performance, or missing/lacking skill sets which were not addressed thus far in the survey.

10. Question 10/10
Thank you for your participation in this survey. Your time, inputs, and comments are greatly appreciated.

If you have questions about this study, please contact either the Principal Investigator, Dr. Kalev Sepp, kisepp@nps.edu, or the lead researcher, Major Christopher Workinger, cworkin@nps.edu.

The overall results of the study will be provided to U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command. You may obtain a copy of the research after it is completed by contacting Major Christopher Workinger at cworkin@nps.edu.

Please select the “Done” button below to finalize your inputs. Thank you.
MEMORANDUM FOR NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL (NPS) HUMAN RESOURCE PROTECTION OFFICE

FROM: HQ AFSOC/A3

SUBJECT: NPS Thesis Research Project for Major Christopher Workinger

1. Approval to conduct survey and interview research using personnel assigned to Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) is granted.

2. This approval is granted with the understanding that the survey and interview research will focus on performance and training for AFSOC intelligence officers assigned to Operations Groups for AC-130, MC-130, CV-22, and non-standard aviation squadrons. The survey will be directed at approximately one hundred AFSOC leadership and intelligence personnel at the squadron level by web-based questionnaire. Interviews regarding the current state of AFSOC intelligence training will be conducted with the personnel responsible for training. Participation will be voluntary and designed to minimize impact on the units concerned.

3. The point of contact for this memorandum is Ms. Tittle, AFSCC/A2F, DSN: 579-2841.

DANIEL T. SETTERGREEN, Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

Figure 14. Command Sponsor Letter
Interview Questions and Themes

Interview Questions and Themes
Workiner/Seepp
IRB
Defense Analysis Department
Expected Completion: DEC 2011

General Themes:
- Course objectives
- Training curriculum
- Course length
- Timing of training for students
- Potential for growth
- Assignments

Example Interview Questions for Military Intelligence Training:

1. What is the name of the intelligence course/curriculum?
2. Describe the course’s objectives, course length, and curriculum.
3. Can you provide an UNCLASSIFIED copy of the syllabus or curriculum?
4. What is the governing instruction for this training? (Air Force Instruction, etc)
5. If a copy of the syllabus is unavailable, can you describe the general flow of academics, exercises and blocks of instruction?
6. At what point in students careers do they attend this training? (Initial, refresher, before assignment to particular squadrons, etc)
7. What is the average instructor-to-student ratio for classes?
8. What is the failure/wash out rate for the curriculum?
9. Do students go directly to operational squadrons after departing this course?
10. What, if any, additional training do students receive after they depart this course?
11. What are the courses strengths and weaknesses?
12. Is there any potential for additional throughput (more students) or additional courses/training to be added?
13. Follow-on questions to be determined based on answers to the questions above:

Example Interview Questions for Military Intelligence Assignment personnel:

1. What factors are considered when assigning intelligence officers?
2. How important is “broadening” when assigning intel officers?
3. What factors are considered on generalization vs specialization for intel officers?
4. How many assignments will intel officers have in a particular “INT” (IMINT, SIGINT, etc)
5. What is the current guidance from senior leaders on career progression and assignments?
LIST OF REFERENCES


Department of the Air Force. *AFSC 14NX Intelligence Officer Career Field Education and Training Program (DRAFT)*, November 2011.


INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center  
   Ft. Belvoir, Virginia

2. Dudley Knox Library  
   Naval Postgraduate School  
   Monterey, California

3. Air Force Special Operations Command/Intelligence Directorate (AFSOC/A2)  
   Hurlburt Field, Florida

4. Air Force Special Operations Command Intelligence Formal Training Unit  
   AFSOC IFTU  
   Hurlburt Field, Florida

5. 1st Special Operations Support Squadron/Intelligence Flight (1 SOSS/IN)  
   Hurlburt Field, Florida

6. 27th Special Operations Support Squadron/Intelligence Flight (27 SOSS/IN)  
   Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico

7. 352nd Special Operations Support Squadron/Intelligence Flight (352 SOSS/IN)  
   RAF Mildenhall, United Kingdom

8. 353rd Special Operations Support Squadron/Intelligence Flight (353 SOSS/IN)  
   Kadena Airbase, Japan