WHY NOT EXTENDED DETERRENCE FROM ROMANIA?
U.S. EUROPEAN PHASED ADAPTIVE APPROACH (EPAA) AND NATO’S BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE (BMD) SITE AT DEVESELU AIR BASE IN ROMANIA

by

Jesus Jimenez

December 2011

Thesis Co-Advisors: Mikhail Tsypkin Carolyn Halladay

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Jesus Jimenez

Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943–5000

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In September 2011, the United States and Romania signed the cooperative anti-missile agreement for the United States to build, operate, and maintain ballistic missile defense (BMD) system elements at Deveselu Air Base, the previously confirmed selection for the Romanian site of Phase II of the so-called European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). The plans envision Deveselu Air Base hosting land-based Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors by 2015, as part of the Aegis Ashore (AA) System. This vision is important because the United States, Romania, and other NATO allies face ballistic missile threats, particularly amid the increasingly unsettled situation in the Middle East. The EPAA also marks a major development in the broader context of policy and strategy, both within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and between NATO and other states in the regions, as NATO and the United States thereby both significantly extend deterrence in expanding their BMD reach. This thesis tests how the plans for the deployment of U.S. BMD system elements in Romania reflect and support the U.S. and trans-Atlantic Alliance strategic purposes and what the political significance of this deployment is in U.S.-Romanian relations, in U.S. relations with other NATO allies and in the Alliance as a whole, and in U.S.-Russian and NATO-Russian relations.

Romania, NATO, U.S. European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), ballistic missile defense, Deveselu, extended deterrence, defense policy, defense strategy, standard missile-3, Aegis Ashore System, Russia, Alliance, relations

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IN ROMANIA

Jesus Jimenez
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
B.S., Carnegie Mellon University, 1998
MBA, Walden University, 2008

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December 2011

Author: Jesus Jimenez

Approved by: Mikhail Tsypkin, PhD
Thesis Co-Advisor

Carolyn Halladay, PhD
Thesis Co-Advisor

Daniel J. Moran, PhD
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs
ABSTRACT

In September 2011, the United States and Romania signed the cooperative anti-missile agreement for the United States to build, operate, and maintain ballistic missile defense (BMD) system elements at Deveselu Air Base, the previously confirmed selection for the Romanian site of Phase II of the so-called European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). The plans envision Deveselu Air Base hosting land-based Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors by 2015, as part of the Aegis Ashore (AA) System. This vision is important because the United States, Romania, and other NATO allies face ballistic missile threats, particularly amid the increasingly unsettled situation in the Middle East. The EPAA also marks a major development in the broader context of policy and strategy, both within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and between NATO and other states in the regions, as NATO and the United States thereby both significantly extend deterrence in expanding their BMD reach. This thesis tests how the plans for the deployment of U.S. BMD system elements in Romania reflect and support the U.S. and trans-Atlantic Alliance strategic purposes and what the political significance of this deployment is in U.S.-Romanian relations, in U.S. relations with other NATO allies and in the Alliance as a whole, and in U.S.-Russian and NATO-Russian relations.
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2001 (FEB): Russian government proposes cooperative NATO-Russia effort to develop a mobile land-based BMD system to incorporate Russian and Western technologies.

2002 (JUN): The United States formally rescinds the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty after thirty years.


2005 (MAR): NATO announces decision to develop Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense system (ALTBMD) by 2010.

2006 (MAY): NATO Missile Defense Feasibility Study announces Alliance is able to construct a system to defend its national territories from Iran, Syria and North Korea.

2007 (FEB): G.W. Bush administration announces “third site” plans independent of NATO with Poland and Czech Republic.

2007 (JUN): NATO backs BMD for Southeastern Europe in conjunction with U.S. Shield.

2007 (JUL): At the Kennebunkport Summit Russia proposes the United States utilize a BMD radar in southern Russia.

2008 (AUG): Armed conflict breaks out between Russia and Georgia over South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

2008 (AUG): United States, Poland sign Declaration on Strategic Cooperation to enhance bilateral ballistic missile cooperation (not ratified).

2009 (FEB): Congressional Budget Office presents four options for BMD in Europe. Option 3 provisions for launch sites in Poland and Romania.

2009 (MAR): USS The Sullivans (DDG 68) deploys to the Mediterranean as first ballistic missile-capable platform.
2009 (JUN): U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Russian Chief of Defense at the Presidential Summit in Moscow sign framework document to build on a bilateral defense relationship


2009 (SEP): Obama administration announces it would cancel the Bush-proposed European BMD program; Defense Secretary Gates announces U.S. plans for regional BMD capability in Europe alternative

2009 (SEP): BMD USS Stout (DDG 55) returns to Norfolk after Mediterranean deployment training with Turkish, Romanian and Georgian sailors.

2009 (DEC): Russian Prime Minister Putin links BMD talks to START renegotiations

2010 (JAN): Poland and United States announce June 2010 deployment of U.S. Patriot missiles and 100 U.S. personnel from Germany to Poland, based on 2008 agreement

2010 (FEB): Romania and the United States announce Romania’s agreement to host U.S. short- to medium-range interceptor missiles

2010 (FEB): Bulgarian Prime Minister Boiko Borisov announces support of participation in U.S. EPAA missile defense system

2010 (FEB): Moldova government issues a statement in support of U.S. missile defense elements in Romania


2011 (MAR): USS Monterey (CG 61) deploys to the Mediterranean as the first ballistic-capable ship supporting the new defense plan known as the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA)
2011  BMD EPAA Phase I deployment of forward-based sensors and BMD-capable Aegis ships carrying SM-3 Block IA interceptors

2011 (MAY): United States and Romania announce the selection of the Deveselu Air Base as the Romanian site of Phase II of the EPAA

2011 (APR): USS O’Kane (DDG 77) successfully launches SM-3 Block IA missile and intercept a Polaris type target missile in 11 minutes, validating the start of BMD PAA Phase I

2011 (SEP): Secretary of State Clinton and Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Baconschi sign U.S.-Romanian Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement on the Deployment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System in Romania

2011 (SEP): NATO Secretary General welcomes entry into force of missile defence basing agreement between Poland and the United States.


2012  Achievement of NATO standards by NATO partners and preparations for STRIKFORNATO for the NATO Response Force

2015  BMD EPAA Phase II expansion of land-based architecture to include Aegis Ashore (AA) site in Romania

2018  BMD PAA Phase III deployment of SM-3 Block IIA interceptors on land and at sea to cover all NATO Europe countries

2021  BMD PAA Phase IV deployment of next generation SM-3 interceptors, the Block IIB to engage longer-range ballistic missiles in their ascent phase.
**LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Aegis Ashore</td>
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<td>ALTBMD</td>
<td>Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense</td>
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<td>BMD</td>
<td>Ballistic Missile Defense</td>
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<td>BMDS</td>
<td>Ballistic Missile Defense System</td>
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<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
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<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>CFE</td>
<td>Conventional Armed Forces Treaty</td>
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<td>CRS</td>
<td>Congressional Research Service</td>
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<td>DIA</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>EPAA</td>
<td>European-based Phased Adaptive Approach</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>U.S. European Command</td>
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<td>GBI</td>
<td>Ground-Based Interceptors</td>
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<td>HTK</td>
<td>Hit-To-Kill</td>
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<td>ICBM</td>
<td>Intercontinental Ballistic Missile</td>
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<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<td>JDEF</td>
<td>Joint Defender</td>
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<td>MDA</td>
<td>Missile Defense Agency</td>
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<td>MRBM</td>
<td>Medium-Range Ballistic Missile</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NCRI</td>
<td>National Council of Resistance on Iran</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPT</td>
<td>Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
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<td>NPS</td>
<td>Naval Postgraduate School</td>
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<td>NRC</td>
<td>NATO-Russia Council</td>
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<td>NWC</td>
<td>U.S. Naval War College</td>
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<td>SM-3</td>
<td>Standard Missile-3</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRBM</td>
<td>Short-Range Ballistic Missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>THAAD</td>
<td>Terminal High Altitude Area Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>UEWR</td>
<td>Upgraded Early Warning Radar</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

In September 2011, the United States and Romania signed a legally binding cooperative agreement for the United States to build, operate, and maintain ballistic missile defense system (BMDS) elements at Deveselu Air Base. (The base was the Romanian site of Phase II of the so-called European Phased Adaptive Approach [EPAA].) The plans envision Deveselu Air Base hosting land-based Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors, as part of the Aegis Ashore (AA) System, by 2015. The deployment of U.S. missile defense interceptors in Romania will serve U.S. and NATO security interests. This decision is important because the United States, Romania, and other NATO allies face ballistic missile threats, particularly amid the increasingly unsettled situation in the Middle East. The EPAA also marks a major development in the broader context of policy and strategy both within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and between NATO and other states in the regions, as NATO and the United States thereby both significantly extend deterrence in expanding their BMD reach. The present study focuses on this larger aspect, asking specifically: How do the plans for the deployment of U.S. BMD system elements in Romania reflect and support strategic purposes of the United States and the Alliance? What is the political significance of this deployment in U.S.-Romanian relations,

1. At the time of this writing, the formal ratification by the Romanian Parliament of this agreement is expected within weeks or months. This paper proceeds on the assumption that the agreement is, in fact, as much of a “done deal” as current accounts indicate. See “Agreement Between the United States of America and Romania on the Deployment of the United States Ballistic Missile Defense System in Romania,” U.S. Embassy Romania, accessed September 23, 2011, http://romania.usembassy.gov/policy/missile-defense-agreement.html.

in U.S. relations with other NATO allies and in the Alliance as a whole, and in U.S.-Russian and NATO-Russian relations?

B. IMPORTANCE

While new NATO members and partners are embracing political and military change at their own national risk, competition among new members appears to push their political elites toward democratic behavior and statecraft (in the conventional Western sense), civilian control of the military, public accountability, and so on. This same competition also moves the new NATO states clearly to embrace NATO’s desired political-military objectives. For example, once the Romanians agreed to host U.S. BMD system elements, other NATO members agreed to host such U.S. capabilities, too. Romanians are in negotiations to buy new or used F-16s from Lockheed Martin, and other NATO states are sure to follow suit. Thus, NATO appears rightly to impute qualitative democratic changes for new NATO members. Still, while embarking on advanced capabilities, new NATO members appear to take on more risks and challenges that prove comforting and reassuring to their publics.

In order to understand the strategic and political purposes of advances in the military capabilities of NATO members (with the acquisition of advanced radars or aircraft), especially among such newer members as Romania, it is necessary to define the extent of these advances. Ultimately, the basis on which the United States, Romania, and other member states made their decisions on BMD promises to influence the future of NATO decision-making—not least

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3. Defense budgets of peripheral NATO member states are budgets like any other constrained by the lack of resources or credit. Defense resources are contracting in these difficult times. Defense spending is declining in the peripheral member states, at least temporarily. Peripheral NATO members converging with European fiscal policy struggle to sustain 3-percent GDP deficit constraints while collecting fiscal and tax revenues. This crisis then is challenging for NATO members fulfilling NATO commitments in terms of burden sharing relative to each member’s economic crisis condition.

because the decision represents an unprecedented increase in partnership and interoperability, with a political and BMD system that defends NATO countries, Israel, even Russia, and at least as far as the boundaries of this newly extended deterrence. This Romanian decision also reflects Romania’s own interests in harmony with the United Nations (UN) Charter and international law, and affirms NATO security indivisibility. It also recognizes the shared strategic mutual security envisioned in Article III of the Washington Treaty, and recognizes NATO provisions in such documents as the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (NATO SOFA) of 1951 in London, the U.S.-Romania Defense Cooperation Agreement of 2005, the U.S.-Romania Classified Military Information Agreement in 1995, and the NATO Security Agreement of 1997. Additionally, this decision recognizes the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery by ballistic missile, reconfirms EPAA and BMDS’s defensive operation, recognizes a legitimate collective approach in response to terrorist threats against international stability, and reassures Romania’s national defense and common goals in defense of NATO allies and partners, while honoring the standing Defense Cooperation Agreement.5

C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS

Despite the Russian Federation military doctrine’s silence on the topic of a specific Iranian ballistic missile threat, and Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s dismissal of the existence of an Iranian ballistic missile threat altogether, BMD findings by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Congressional Research Service (CRS), testimony by Commander, United States European Command (EUCOM) and contemporary sanctions on Iran demonstrate that Iran is more competent in missile technology than North Korea today.6 Longer-range

missiles and solid-fuel technology mean these weapons can be hidden in less vulnerable locations, while requiring shorter launch times. Ranging 2,000 kilometers, Iran’s tested solid-fuel Sajil 2 and liquid-fuel Shahab 3 missiles readily can reach as far as Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, and Romania. Efforts toward a Shahab 3 variant, also known as Shahab 3A, and the Ashura may realize a three-stage missile that ranges 3,700 kilometers, meaning Iran will threaten most other Western European countries directly as well.

Current BMD system elements also include SM-3 (Block IA) interceptor missiles on U.S. Aegis air defense warships deployed off the Israeli coast. The EPAA plans focus on defense against ballistic and cruise missiles fired mainly from sites ashore with over flight paths over Turkey, Romania, and Poland. Nevertheless, plans also exist to defend against missile threats fired from ships, tasking the use of Aegis BMD-capable ships as relevant, while U.S. and NATO allies, as well as partners, examine deterrence and reassurance issues regarding the use of SM-3 BMD capabilities, near-term at Deveselu Air Base in Romania (2011) and longer (2015, 2018, 2020). All told, the future of BMD warships deployed in the Adriatic, Black, and Baltic Seas may serve the reassurance purposes NATO is seeking and augment the future of NATO’s extended land-based deterrence.

Romanian, U.S., and NATO security concerns addressed by the U.S. Defense Shield, originally proposed in the Czech Republic and Poland, benefitted Romania geographically only partially. Allegedly, Romania’s southern region simply did not fall under the umbrella of ballistic defense. The new proposal covers all of Romania, exceeding comprehensive NATO and Romanian


security objectives. Yet the new system also raises several questions about how NATO member-states work with and in the Alliance. Plans for improved SM-3 missiles (Block IB) based in Eastern Europe, including Romania, are on track to being realized. Will political and financial support sustain the phased approach for SM-3 missiles (Block IIA), ground-based interceptor (GBI), or the development of the more advanced SM-3 derivatives to intercept longer-range missiles?9

In what ways should NATO’s political and material capability for BMD develop? Initially, missile defense mitigation of ballistic missile threats may inspire allies, partners, and even competitors to join NATO at the table of diplomacy and cooperation.10 With the perceived threat from global terrorism, as well as from non-governmental and non-state actors, and keeping in mind the emergence of conventional threats, NATO commanders may want to weigh in on integrated European and American sensors and interceptors as a core Alliance missile defense system on a continuous basis. Acknowledging the real fiscal constraints facing European defense budgets, the United States and European NATO member countries will prioritize that the EPAA proposal serve NATO, the European Union, both or none of the above.11 Lastly, NATO should continue monitoring contemporary developments in missile defense technology and threats.

The dialogue on BMD was again at a breakthrough in November 2010 among the United States, NATO, and Russia. Renewed commitments assure the movement forward of EPAA politically and financially. Forecasts to address BMD collectively fit in with the NATO vision for how the EPAA and BMD will remain viable in the future. Funding for the national ballistic programs does not

translate into increases in funding to support EPAA and BMD interceptor system elements under the national control of Romania. NATO and Secretary General Rasmussen in recent developments appear hopeful of a large breakthrough in pooled funding in positioning BMD’s political and financial support for the time being and the future. Already, Romania, Poland, Turkey and Spain announced their agreement, anticipating that others will join. Physical deployment of sea-based and land-based elements will then follow as planned for 2011, 2015, 2018, and 2020.

The significance of U.S. BMD system elements in Romania matters not only to the region protected by NATO, but also to such national actors as Russia that care about a perceived weakening of their security as a result of BMD deployments by NATO. Dialogue between NATO and Russia on BMD has taken place since the conclusion in 1997 of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations. NATO and Russia desired consultation, cooperation, joint decision-making and joint action to constitute the core of their relations. The Act established a NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council (replaced by the NATO-Russia Council or NRC in 2002). The Act contained NATO’s insistence that the Alliance had “no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture or nuclear policy—and do not foresee any future need to do so.” NATO also pledged not to station troops in the new member states, while refining the basic scope and parameters for an adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.

Now that the Russians are (again) looking forward to a role in European missile defense as voiced at the 2010 Lisbon Summit, though not on American terms, the moment appears opportune for new diplomatic security efforts and a common missile defense vision between the Alliance-Russia and the U.S.-


Russia. However, the bilateral political processes are not as straightforward as the multinational political processes of NATO discussed in a later chapter. As legitimate authority over sovereign states and its role in keeping a pacifying order in the region, NATO has this understandable responsibility to develop cooperative security relations.15

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

The Washington Treaty and NATO Treaty (1949) describe NATO’s vision for extended deterrence in conjunction with expanding its membership.16 General background on Romania in NATO is reasonably well developed; hence, the observations that follow widely cite and confirm NATO extended deterrence from the 1950s to the present.17 They also agree that NATO strategy, after its momentary 1989 identity crisis, stimulated change in policy for NATO and the Soviet Union from nuclear deterrence postures to the Eastern European missile defense developments today.

Conditions for success for Eastern European NATO member expansion are endorsed by diplomatic and strategic visions framed by the November 1991 North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and October 1993 Partnership for Peace (PfP).18 Today, NATO policy and strategy continues to define conditions for decision-making success in the form of principles supporting burden-sharing based on community values. In this case, NATO strategy lays out opportunities in extended deterrence and burden-sharing to develop its current vision of ballistic missile defense, described by NATO 2020, as an “essential mission.”19


18. Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door.

The deployment of BMD elements brings to Romania a substantial amount of U.S. investment that boosts the local economy around Deveselu Air Base. In addition to the BMD elements, suppliers, vendors, basing and personnel add to the investment that Romania would receive in providing U.S. logistical support. Failure to communicate legitimacy for the EPAA and BMD could define conditions for failure in NATO extended deterrence in Romania. Profit motives that are not transparent would undermine the legitimacy for deployment of BMD elements in Romania. Criticism outside of NATO for its decision to deploy BMD in Romania compounds only by a Romanian decision for BMD that serves as profitable for Romania’s relationship with the United States.

However, NATO extended deterrence does not appear to encourage countries operating in their own interest, and frames failure when attempting to go at it alone as typified by the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict. Commander, United States European Command, Admiral Stavridis, said:

The complexities of managing a military-to-military relationship with Russia are high. On one hand, there are many areas of potential cooperation and partnership, including Afghanistan, arms control, counter-terrorism, counter-piracy, counter-narcotics, and eventually missile defense. On the other hand, many of our allies and friends in the region remain concerned about Russian actions, including the conflict with Georgia in the summer of 2008, exercises on their borders like the Zapad series in 2009, and Russia’s continuing suspension of implementation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.

NATO acted as fast as legitimately possible in the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict. Moreover, debate persists as to which of the Russian, Georgian or NATO actions in this conflict were legitimate. In light of similar criticisms,

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NATO’s EPAA and BMD response to threats ought to be fast enough, so that threat response immediately addresses incoming attacking missiles, while verifying “go” or “no-go” formalities.

Tensions among NATO members over Afghanistan and Iraq, where in both cases, a challenge for NATO was maintaining cohesiveness where NATO appeared weak in the test of strength. These tensions continue to discourage NATO cooperative decision-making again.22

Even though U.S., Romanian or NATO self interests surface, NATO members on NATO’s frontier, such as Romania, are particularly interested in a strong trans-Atlantic partnership, securing in NATO’s interests and bolstering security over the Black Sea for the region.23 Romania proactively has been accepting burdens, and deepening Maritime Partnership Program Interoperability Relationships with the United States and NATO members in the Black Sea.24 Indeed, former Romanian Chief of the General Staff (CHOD), Admiral Gheorghe Marin claims missile defense in Romania follows an extension of larger trends protecting NATO and American armed forces stationed in Europe.25 In addition, Admiral Marin confirms that strategic cooperative bilateral training and exercises continue appearing to some NATO members as a change in NATO policy in Eastern Europe. This change incorporates the strengths of NATO members on the periphery of NATO’s overarching security.

At the same time, the Romanian decision reflects NATO’s extended deterrence goals; Commander U.S. Air Forces Europe (USAFE) claims that

Romania appears willing to play an important expansionary role as a NATO member. USAFE leadership and the Romanian National Security Strategy agreed that hosting missile interceptors protects U.S. families in Europe and enhances NATO Article V commitments.

The USAFE Commander and Octavian, a political scientist from the University of Bucharest, both agree that missile defense in Romania provides the Alliance’s Defenses with defense enhancements against a verifiable threat from Iran, and argue that Romania also meets, and exceeds its share of NATO’s Article V regional burden. In short, Romania’s support of NATO’s collective defense enhancements assure NATO of Romania’s willingness to influence and support NATO’s regional burden for missile defense and extended deterrence as agreed to by the Reunion of the Mixed Committee between Romania and the United States.26

Most importantly, Romanian modernization of equipment to meet NATO extended deterrence security force goals according to Admiral Marin should weigh heavily against any criticism regarding NATO, the U.S. and Romania’s decision to deploy EPAA and BMD elements at Deveselu Air Base.27 Romania raises the standard for modernizing its military in the midst of domestic political complications and defense spending during financial crisis.

For one, in 2008, Bucharest, Romania’s capital, hosted the NATO Summit which was regarded as a crucial event.28 Romania has published acquisitions from Lockheed Martin in 2008 and 2010, where Romania formed a partnership with Lockheed Martin in co-production of 17 TPS-79(R) Multi-Mission...


Surveillance Radar systems and executed purchase requests of $4.5 billion in F-16s. In the midst of financial difficulties, Romania clearly prioritizes its budget to bolster its and NATO’s security with the modernization of its air forces and its support for EPAA and BMD obligations.

Finally, Romania’s influence of NATO extended deterrence appears to be taking shape in strong bilateral ties with the U.S. Armed Forces. Former CHOD Admiral Marin and the former Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) of the Romanian Navy, RADM Dorin Danila, both expressed to the CNE-C6F Maritime Partnership Program Team representatives that “it is good to see the strength of America is behind the Romanian people.” U.S. Navy presence solidified interoperability planning for the inaugural USS Mount Whitney (LCC/JCC 20) Black Sea Partnership Cruise (BSPC) in 2008. As reported by Nick Iliev, reporter for the Sofia Echo and Scott Miller, the C6F Public Affairs Officer, this first-time event included six Black Sea region country delegations, NATO and non-NATO members, adding to the list of significant milestones in NATO interoperability engagement.

E. METHODS AND SOURCES

This thesis draws from widely cited historical accounts of NATO, as well as the latest vision documents, interviews, and journals describing key developing events, concerns and precedents from the U.S. EPAA and NATO missile defense, and the U.S. BMD site at Deveselu Air Base in Romania. First, the evidence focuses on debates from both sides of the fence of analysts and

31. RADM Dorin Danila, interview witnessed by the author, August 17, 2007.
researchers on whether NATO-led deployment of missile defense in Eastern Europe, specifically Romania, is consistent or in tension with broader NATO extended deterrence objectives. In addition, NATO documentation will guide assertions about the Alliance’s decision-making process, and this thesis also examines how these methods and sources are relevant to Romania’s decision. Last, as the deployment of missile defense in Romania is very much a matter of current events as this thesis is in process, data available will also be drawn from Joint Defender (JDEF) modeling, from Naval Postgraduate School lectures, the European Security Institute, and foreign sources translated from Romanian into English by the author of events as late as November 15, 2011.

Next, JDEF modeling will provide best insight on missile over-flights to deeper target sets in Europe, or even beyond, when threats from intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) enter the picture in 2015, when the U.S. homeland then becomes a potential target, depending on the latest unclassified intelligence assessments. JDEF modeling will explore some of these issues, classified database issues aside, to bolster this thesis argument.

For modeling purposes, the JDEF model will assist in exploring coverage of Southeastern European target sets from AA SM-3 AEGIS assets by the year 2015, and the potential effectiveness of afloat SM-3 AEGIS ships between 2011 and 2015, and beyond. As Iranian missile ranges develop toward an ICBM capability, JDEF modeling will explore how this will affect SM-3 AA and afloat asset capabilities to intercept Iranian threats to the U.S. homeland. The evidence will show what analysts synthesize the U.S., NATO and Russia and Romania can achieve in cooperation, successfully or not.

In summary, this paper will not attempt to distill many years of conditions for NATO expansion relative to specific decisions over deployment of BMD, nor all of the evidence for the threat from Iran by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI). Moreover, it will only address the extended deterrence from the view of the Congressional
Research Service (CRS) and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) that concludes that Iran’s nuclear program is not for peaceful purposes, and that Iran’s most likely delivery of a nuclear warhead against the United States or Europe would be by the use of ballistic missiles.

Russian objections and concern over NATO capability enhancements, and the U.S. bilateral approach to BMD deployment in Romania will be addressed in the scope of this paper as appropriate. However, it is necessary to understand the larger conceptual purposes for NATO and U.S. extended deterrence. On the one hand, NATO’s aims in specific areas, for example, how the political processes realize EPAA and BMD system element deployment at Deveselu, Romania, show how NATO follows consistent NATO decision-making. On the other hand, a complete understanding of this issue requires consideration of NATO and U.S. long-term goals on a wide scale; what they are attempting to do, and what their goals are, and how that will enhance NATO and U.S. security.34

F. THESIS OVERVIEW

In order to understand NATO and U.S. extended deterrence by way of BMD deployment, diplomats and military officials must understand the extent of this deployment. Following this thesis introduction, Chapter II discusses conditions for success or failure of the BMD site at Deveselu Air Base. Chapter III discusses the role of U.S., NATO, European, Russian and Romanian security perspectives, missile defense policies and capabilities. Chapter IV considers cooperative U.S. EPAA, NATO and Romanian cooperative deployment of land based BMD element scenarios from Deveselu Air Base, Romania. Chapter V asserts conclusions and recommendations based on cooperative U.S., NATO and Romanian decisions.

Finally, this research will explore the value added by the EPAA and BMD coverage of Southeastern European ashore by 2015, and the potential

effectiveness of afloat deterrence deployed between 2011 and 2015, and beyond. Iranian missile range development toward an ICBM capability synergizes NATO’s decision to support U.S., Romanian EPAA and BMD extended deterrence. This deterrence will affect SM-3 AA and afloat asset capabilities to intercept Iranian threats to the U.S. homeland. Politics and financial support will fall in line when the evidence synthesized reveals how preparedness by the United States, NATO, and Romania posit cost effective continuation in defense.
II. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF BMD SITE AT DEVESELU AIR BASE, ROMANIA

The twenty-first century features the importance of global political negotiation in the face of BMD proliferation by North Korea, Iran, Pakistan and India. Fortunately, for the United States, trans-Atlantic Alliance relationships have never been stronger militarily. U.S. armed forces and European partner militaries have seen unprecedented activity together through the Iraq and Afghanistan wars over one of the longest periods of conflict for the United States. Interoperability in BMD deployment with U.S. Allies, on the one hand, while ballistic missile threats proliferate on the other hand, are the two opposed trajectories that merge into a real need for cooperation with BMD from Romania. BMD extended deterrence objectives fit the threat circumstances for emerging theory on how to address ballistic missile proliferation and its development over the last few wars. Inherent to the features of the circumstances are the requirements for legitimacy, purpose and resolve. To gain public approval, Europe and the United States must continually set a high negotiation standard and precedent. U.S. actions to bolster Europe’s BMD defenses cooperatively by way of NATO echo what the United States appears to be successfully negotiating with its defensive military capabilities. Despite varying measures of effectiveness before and after the Gulf War, numerous successful tests of BMD elements impel the United States to implement BMD and the EPAA in Europe from Romania to protect its allies and U.S. troops deployed abroad.

The deployment of U.S. missile defense interceptors in Romania is consistent with declared North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) assurance goals through interoperability; it is also how the United States assures allies and deters aggression in support of U.S. extended deterrence, while watching
carefully the peace between Europe-Russia and states within Europe. The diplomatic relations in this case follow a new pattern by which NATO, in conjunction with U.S. leadership, shapes interests and restraints in security reform on its eastern flank. At the same time, international relations (IR) perspectives matter, and are at the core of negotiations by political and military officers working on this EPAA and BMD project for NATO, Europe and United States that advances policies and capabilities based on real technology accepted by diplomatic intentions and desired conclusions behind EPAA and BMD.

The purpose of this analysis is to align current events in BMD with the current long-term strategic policy for the United States in Europe and to explore the broader U.S.-Europe relationship within which the issue of BMD exists. Romania, the United States and NATO must necessarily define objectives for the strategy and politics supporting the NATO BMD mission and prioritize these objectives. Survival or defeat of U.S.-Europe policy strategy hinges on diplomatic, informational and economic resources and features of contemporary aims of modern defenses that would postpone the next modern war on NATO and Alliance terms.

A. BMD CONSTRAINTS AND OPPORTUNITIES

The strategic policy advancing defensive BMD capabilities must follow a discernible baseline for dialogue that transcends diplomatic and military negotiations transparent to Romanian, U.S. and European diplomats, politicians and military officers, as well as their Russian colleagues. The following discussion develops the objectives for this framework for the BMD project in this light. European popular opinion holds the key to approval of U.S. BMD and


EPAA protection over European soil. Does European popular opinion hold the United States in high enough regard today because of who the United States is diplomatically? The United States-Romanian relationship has a long and consistent history. The Romanian-NATO relationship has a similar history and both relationships continue to grow closer. For European attitudes to associate a favorable response to the United States and its deployment of BMD system elements in Romania, the United States must weigh its behavior and choices carefully in carrying out its legally binding agreement over BMD with Romania. Yes, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan show shifting European and global opinion, but these wars only demonstrated U.S.’s resolve that assures and deters aggression from Europe’s Black Sea gateway to the east.39 For all the diplomats, politicians and military officers concerned, the United States, Romania and NATO basic trajectory for the BMD project in Romania assures a modern defensive capability for Europe.

Improving security-institution interrelations between the European Union and NATO also defines another objective for the United States. The European Union and NATO understand that the United States has the military capabilities to do what the United States wants to, strategically and otherwise, globally. The European Union and NATO members factor this into their military relationship with the United States. What is NATO Transformation is also driving these dynamic political and military goals of its members.40 Since 1989, NATO has almost doubled in size from sixteen members to a current roster of twenty-eight independent member countries.41 With the nuclear issue supposedly “long since

faded, both in U.S. policy and in that of the Alliance," NATO, the United States and Europe are embarking in policies beyond the old geographical limits.42

Today, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, as well as pro-U.S., pro-NATO French President Nicolas Sarkozy and the French Air Force General, General Stéphane Abrial, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, champion the EPAA and BMD.43 EPAA and BMD defensive capabilities align themselves with European security institution goals to maintain the relative peace in Europe. A thwarted missile attack on Europe allows European security institutions time to conference a response. What then will the United States successfully negotiate with European security institutions regarding BMD system element deployment over objections by Russia, and for how long?44

Developing the right objectives, the realist approach for BMD, is one of caution to warnings of instability in international relations between U.S.-Russia, Europe-Russia and NATO-Russia. While mindful that a debate on emerging power structure and policy reactions can ensue, Europe and the United States are bound to defending their own power structure and interests.45 Based on the premise that Russian chances of committing to a BMD solution are increasingly

42. Robert J. Norstad, Cold War NATO Supreme Commander, (St. Martin’s, 2000), 228. Even before 1989, NATO Transformation required a committed leadership from the United States when considering new policies during the Cold War. NATO political and defensive capability transformations when negotiating with Russia required the talent of personalities such as Eisenhower, Churchill and Stalin, Kennedy and Khrushchev, Reagan and Gorbachev, Clinton and Yeltsin and Bush and Putin. So strong were the interactions of these personalities that their leadership for or against each other added to shaping the collective purposes and missions of NATO during and after the Cold War. Eisenhower and Truman would agree today as to the United States being the most committed European NATO Member, in leadership, words and in deeds. NATO Transformation includes engagement by the United States in fostering partnerships and security cooperation with past and new members alike despite an extended period of French historic antagonism of the U.S. commitment in military leadership. Nevertheless, cooperative NATO policy and strategy has prevailed amidst controversy, debate, and crisis.


more probable, Europe-U.S. relations must respond carefully at this point to support BMD in the interest of prolonging another sixty years of collective deterrence in Europe.\textsuperscript{46} At the same time, little information about the targeting of Russia by rogue states exists as common knowledge, while confirmed BMD proliferation is rampant and affirms the desires for U.S. initiatives necessary to defend against these threats and prolong the peace of Europe.\textsuperscript{47} Additionally, this initiative extends security for economic prosperity and NATO expansion to new Eastern European democracies.

In contrast, the liberal framework, as promulgated after World War I or World War II, argued for the international impetus for cooperation and provision of non-traditional security and economic controls to protect humans from the futility of war and its economic devastation.\textsuperscript{48} Supervising shattered economic welfare and trade brought about the setting up of larger organizations. In addition, larger institutions regulated this trade. This represented a shift of responsibility to cooperative institutions for managing security in crises amidst other global issues and expanding mercantilism.\textsuperscript{49} In U.S.-Europe relations, the United Nations (U.N.) approaches such responsibility in a real way, or NATO which approaches it as the only organization that, oddly enough, brings Turkey, Russia, Norway, Canada and the United States to the negotiations table, unlike the European Union (EU) and the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to date. The liberal framework surfaces here as the EPAA and BMD project adjoins the United States, NATO and Romania into a cooperative organization to implement extended deterrence for Europe.

One leader may or may not shape the social dimension of the nation on the issue of BMD. Nevertheless, the way that others react to the United States and Europe in regards to BMD is the critical constructivist feature that cannot be

\textsuperscript{46} Nye, \textit{Understanding}, 90. Collective security approach.  
\textsuperscript{47} Betts, \textit{Conflict After the Cold War}, 19. Multipolarity of the New Europe.  
\textsuperscript{48} Nye, \textit{Understanding}, 50. Emphasis of liberalism on economic welfare and trade.  
\textsuperscript{49} Betts, \textit{Conflict After the Cold War}, 325.
generated from the realist or liberal point of view.\textsuperscript{50} Attending to identity politics, the constructivist point of view focuses the United States on continuing its role as the American pacifier in Eastern and Southeastern Europe in a social way. Current dynamics in Europe show how the United States continues realigning itself, while maintaining partnerships with traditional Allies to support freedom, democracy and political change.

The real, liberal, and constructivist frameworks inevitably surface in the negotiations of all the parties involved and must meld together for a best approach that sidesteps power plays and exactly confronts the intentions of the missile proliferation threat. Europe and the U.S. officials ought to purposefully choose their target U.S. and global audience when drafting their long-term strategy of the EPAA and BMD.\textsuperscript{51} The real approach addresses the real threat identified here thus far in a major way. Priority should be made to address the real threat with what are real capabilities that fall in line with the priorities for Europe, NATO and the United States in forming partnerships and applying bold systemic strategy, including the confluence of an armed defense.\textsuperscript{52} The challenge is that all NATO members must care enough about the real threat to alienate and establish the threat is inimical to all. As the threat proves itself to be a real enemy requiring strategic BMD, all parties will have to agree to impose that entity as a legitimate enemy worth defending against with NATO backing and no longer leave room in the framework for an approachable settlement range for negotiation with the threat or this entity.\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{50} Nye, \textit{Understanding}, 7. Realism and liberalism fail to explain long-term global political change.

\textsuperscript{51} Traditional Europe-U.S. relations mandate actions for the best outlook regarding each other’s interests while keeping their own interests, at the forefront. The subject negotiations should play the role of bolstering trust, while considering the balance of power at the regional level. The negotiations purposely ought to leave room for reinvigorating alliances and the revisiting of relations in enduring friendships.

\textsuperscript{52} Lauren et al., \textit{Force and Statecraft}, 274.

\textsuperscript{53} Lauren et al., \textit{Force and Statecraft}, 168. North Korean settlement range.
The liberal outlook with its guarantees, gains only a percentage of the response in this arena. Already, U.S. relations in Europe are at an advanced state and in need of real IR theory to address the real, non-traditional, missile proliferation, security threat. The time is here again to remain ahead of the missile proliferation threat to its conclusion. Liberal IR theory responds to limiting missile proliferation in some ways, but dismisses threats or priority issues in Europe covered by the EPAA vision. Alternatively, a constructivist approach appears relevant to incorporating the current dynamics in negotiations between friends and partners for the deployment of BMD elements in Eastern Europe. BMD element deployment in Romania is a realist solution to a real threat. The idea that the United States ought to deploy BMD system elements receives criticism, due to a threat some will continue to deny, but that more understand as real. The realist approach assures us that NATO, the U.S. and Romania’s approach to collective security is going to deter the use of ballistic missiles by rogue threats and buy the trans-Atlantic Alliance time in case of a missile attack.

B. PRIORITIZING POLICY OBJECTIVES

Is the most important objective that Europe values the United States favorably so that BMD and EPAA are no longer European issues of concern, but rather of assurance to this trans-Atlantic Alliance? Europe today values interstate and intrastate stability and peace, as already pointed out. The United States is powerful militarily, a sovereign nation that holds its security as a priority issue, and regards global institutions as exogenous. The United States agrees to defend the security of members of NATO but prioritizes the security of the homeland.\(^{54}\) Deploying BMD elements in Romania is justified because the United States already has BMD defending the United States. BMD in Europe then serves as an extension of deterrence for the United States. In addition to BMD, the United States weighs in globally on all dimensions of security, non-security

\(^{54}\) The United States is also broad in its application of diplomatic, informational, military and economic power, pluralist as a state and carrying a mixed bag of issues while connecting domestic institutions to global ones.
and identity. U.S. BMD deployments complement the weight of the United States in each of these dimensions. U.S. BMD complements intervention and influence of “failed state” suppression, protects from pre-emptive use of force by ballistic missile threats, and can expand to provide an umbrella for humanitarian intervention where the United States is present. While the United States applies a broad range of ideas in its application of military power, the United States retains today a modern and dependent nature in its identity as a pacifying military force in the world that in Europe adds support for its BMD cause.55

The United States can also try to prioritize its integrity by matching what it is doing with what it appears to be doing. Will the United States be able to anticipate whether Europe hates, loves or accepts the United States in response to how the United States is reconciling diplomatic initiatives with Russia and Central and Eastern Europe?56 It is a task where the number and diversity of the state-issues add to the complexity of resolving them. Turkey, for example, exposes NATO to a range of civil and sub-state conflicts, notably on its border with Russia, where interstate frictions are attended by cries for independence and irredentism. One such upheaval takes the form of extremism from members of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) and Turkey. Al Qaeda also remains a violent non-governmental organization and non-state actor nearby. In all of these, however, Europe and the United States set the tone for democracy in all of these areas that require a defense.

Thus, the resolve by the United States to do what the United States wants to in terms of capabilities, militarily and otherwise are prioritized above others because it is committed to defend itself and its European allies: allies like Romania.57 On the one hand, the United States augments Europe’s military capabilities and matches financial support for EPAA and BMD with its economic

55. Lauren et al., Force and Statecraft, 274. U.S. armed force as coercive diplomacy and defensive deterrence.
56. Lauren et al., Force and Statecraft, 276–277. Evolving international system.
57. Lauren et al., Force and Statecraft, 93.
resources. The United States competes with other states while pursuing its own interests and ensuring its security.\textsuperscript{58} For this reason, not only will the United States continue to provide security globally for the foreseeable future but also sustain the sovereignty of European nations and reassure Europe with EPAA and BMD elements.

C. POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS

BMD in Romania is an extended deterrence opportunity for all of Europe from Iran. Here the United States adds to its security, while cementing relations with Eastern and Southeastern Europe and deploys a defensive capability that in the eyes of some critics upsets the balance of power. The remarks made after the NATO Summit in Lisbon by Russian President Medvedev argue to this effect, particularly when he invoked the risk that ongoing negotiations would instigate a new arms race.

Despite the rhetoric, the United States’ plans are moving in a way that harmonizes and bolsters security in Europe’s eastern and southeastern peripheries, within the scope of NATO and with the efficacy of U.S. planning.\textsuperscript{59} The alternative to such cooperative defense efforts as EPAA and BMD would be a long-term strategic policy that ultimately removes the United States from Europe. NATO is already announcing dramatic downsizing and de-funding billets, but not to the point of extinction. Spain is experiencing the downsizing of NATO land component (LCC) in Madrid, while preparing to welcome the expansion of the U.S. Naval Base in Rota that will add 3200 U.S. Navy personnel, all of which must fall under the umbrella of BMD protection. Today the focus of U.S. partnership is augmenting its past partnerships while in search

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{58} Lauren et al., \textit{Force and Statecraft}, 121. NSS of the United States made this very clear while supporting preemption and unilateralism.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{59} Lauren et al., \textit{Force and Statecraft}, 240. Scope and efficacy of crisis management will dictate outcome.}
of new partnerships that reach out to Southeastern and Eastern Europe with BMD and the EPAA shifting U.S. objectives that gradually gain broad adherence.60

Growing momentum for EPAA and BMD can be hampered by any loss in credibility in what the United States is currently doing, or how it means to go about doing it. At the end of the Cold War, Europe cheerfully formulated who the United States was by what it did in Europe. Similarly, opinion regarding momentum for EPAA and BMD agreements may remain on the upswing but only for so long, if the following European generations do not feel the same about EPAA’s strategic effectiveness. Nothing was certain here regarding the wide acceptance of BMD, which is why the agreement confirming deployment of EPAA and BMD system elements in Romania is surprising and telling of fresh possibilities. A fresh perspective on an open-ended framework for BMD and EPAA negotiations may allow the shaping of the long-term strategy, based on a prior state of relations between the United States and Europe that are strong and clear.61

Differing sources of support are required for this strategy. There is the need for systemic, state and individual level approbation. Public support in Europe may need to focus on how U.S. interests change and how the United States wants to exercise power.62 Europe is aware of the consequences of the deployment of BMD system elements and the stigma that it creates. That said, the policy followed by the building, operation and maintenance of EPAA and BMD system elements will be successful by how the United States advances its negotiations of the policy and how Europe receives it.

In the meantime, all European states will have time to make of the threat from Iran what the strategy of the U.S., Allies and partners make of it, and act

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60. Mike Mullen, Naval Postgraduate School SGL, comments by U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff (CJCS) Monterey, California, October 5, 2010.
61. Betts, Conflict After the Cold War, 14.
62. Betts, Conflict After the Cold War, 237.
with one accord. Addressing deployment of BMD system elements summarizes well the power policy of the United States. The realist approach here makes sense, supporting an emerging power structure and policy committed to extended deterrence. Peppered with liberal and constructivist theory, realist-centric power theory, focused on strategically defensive state security, is what the EPAA and BMDS elements will work to provide to all of Europe.
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III. SECURITY PERSPECTIVES FROM U.S., ROMANIAN, RUSSIAN, AND EUROPEAN POINTS OF VIEW

Since 2001, the United States introduced overarching U.S. BMD security perspectives to Europe and Russia on how it planned to counter ballistic missile proliferation. The Bush plan and today’s adaptive missile defense plan have been introduced since then, similar in their end but different in their implementation. The Bush plan would deploy BMDS elements in Poland and the Czech Republic. The Bush plan also discomfits the Russians because shouldering the entire cost of their BMD system would become prohibitive for their budget. Russia’s rhetoric after this plan announced dramatic challenges to the progress of BMDS deployment diplomatically. Under the Obama plan EPAA and BMDS appear to have been de-politicized, but at what cost to us? The current adaptive missile defense plan for BMDS element deployment to Romania draws a different response from Russia that appeases Russian leadership, for now, but not by much. The United States, Europe, and NATO prefer that Russia control its own BMD system elements and, in turn, let NATO also control theirs.

The momentum for EPAA and BMD from the United States, Europe, and NATO for BMD deployment in Romania despite Russia’s discouraging and tentative position has to be on a very sound foundation that continues to build. If Romania is supporting BMD on the sound foundation of increased interoperability with NATO and the United States, then its relationship with the United States and BMDS deployment should be of little cause for concern to Europe or Russia. The approach of building a sound foundation diplomatically in conjunction with a transparent deployment of BMDS elements in Romania is a bold move on the part of the United States and a brave offer for Europe to accept. Similarly, Romania is bold to accept to support BMDS elements as a NATO periphery member in favor a strong trans-Atlantic partnership securing freedom of the
A sound foundation of cooperation on U.S., Romanian, Russian and European security perspectives that offer Russia buy-in on Alliance terms, then, is the desired end that is in line with NATO goals.

A. U.S. SECURITY PERSPECTIVES

The U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS) and National Military Strategy (NMS) state their position clearly regarding the overarching position of the United States to do all it can to strengthen in partnership the security relationships that benefit coalition capabilities. EPAA deployment of BMDS elements in Romania is the adaptive ballistic missile defense system the United States and their coalition partners plan to effectively deploy by 2015. The goal, from the U.S. perspective, is to deter regional adversaries from gaining ascendancy through their own imported ballistic defense elements, summarized as follows: “we will strengthen our regional deterrence postures—for example, through phased, adaptive missile defense architectures—in order to make certain that regional adversaries gain no advantages from their acquisition of new, offensive military capabilities.”

The U.S resolutely pursues missile defense in this recent National Security Strategy. Whether through collective action with Russia in partnership based on common interests, or by accommodating Russia’s strong international voice, or none of the above, the EPAA and BMDS continues to be the resolution of the United States to counter missile proliferation. The Obama adaptive missile defense plan is resolute to deter adversarial plans in the European periphery while transparent to Russia in its aims. From Moscow, President Obama’s international order found in the NSS claims:

As President of the United States, I will work tirelessly to protect America’s security and to advance our interests. But no one nation can meet the challenges of the 21st century on its own, nor dictate

its terms to the world. That is why America seeks an international system that lets nations pursue their interests peacefully, especially when those interests diverge; a system where the universal rights of human beings are respected, and violations of those rights are opposed; a system where we hold ourselves to the same standards that we apply to other nations, with clear rights and responsibilities for all.65

The views of both the Bush and Obama administrations continue to advance the United States security interests. With the EPAA and BMDS, the United States will advance those security interests in coordination with Europe, while negotiations with Russia continue. For now, the NDS and NMS reach out in earnest to Russia for strategic arms reduction, counter-terrorism, and the like, but the most important issue for the NDS is cooperation with Russia on BMD. The NDS and NMS voiced shared concern about and for Russia66 and U.S.’ interests and values that seem central to relational success. Cooperation with Russia appears critical because of Russia’s major role in dialogue, militarily and diplomatically, about security with its neighbors and Asia.67 The NDS and NMS desire that Russia owns security concerns and threats, while cooperating with the United States in Europe. Unfortunately, Russia is making its voice known in a way that discourages progress of EPAA and BMDS deployments, at least politically, albeit answering its own influential ends.

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) emphasizes increase in missile defense and cooperation in a parallel effort to WMD reduction efforts worldwide. On this issue, treaties bind the United States and Russia. And although the QDR currently leaves open possibilities for BMD negotiations with Russia, the QDR also reflects concerns that the United States has about Russia. The QDR further affirms that the United States will continue to regard Russia’s neighbors, such as

Romania and Poland, as independent and sovereign states. Here again, it is at these junctures that Russia encounters difficulty in explaining its desires for international influence in ways that the United States no longer can, nor should accept. In sum, the United States will continue to engage and cooperate with Russia as issues emerge; however, it takes the same stance on other countries of U.S. concern.

In summary, the U.S. NDS tasks the U.S. military with playing a responsible role and engage the design of defensive security through EPAA and BMDS elements from Romania. The NMS calls for an active role from the Joint Force and the United States European Command in the defensive security design for NATO while cooperating with Russia. Integrating this with a tentative Russian defense policy is still where we are today. However, Admiral Mullen’s approach to this defensive design includes the leadership of the United States as “facilitator, enabler, convener, and guarantor to address problems that are truly international in nature.” The threat is only part of the problem, but consensus on addressing the threat with BMDS reflects a large part of why the United States’ leadership provides the above guidance in the NDS and NMS. The future of joint capabilities to assure favorable outcomes in international deterrence and allied assurance are one way the United States will lead and advance America’s interests strategically with BMD. In brief missions or in sustained military capability, United States’ defensive designs are maximizing deterrence and minimizing aggressor capability from as far as geographical limits allow. EPAA vision and BMD deployment is the collective defensive design that marks the future of trans-Atlantic Alliance deterrence and continues to be a high priority for NATO and U.S. military strategy.


B. ROMANIAN SECURITY PERSPECTIVES

Romanian security perspectives continue to increase engagement with the United States through NATO and bilaterally. Now that there is a clear Joint Declaration between the United States and Romania, and the signatures are concluded over an agreement for the building, operation and maintenance of land based BMD system elements from Deveselu, for Romania it is important to revisit the debates prior to this juncture from Romanian points of view.

Talks with Romanian Armed Forces Officers confirm that a tension of resentment, instead of pressures of conflict, with Russia exist that are different from the reasons for the 2008 Russian-Georgia Conflict. Romania’s February 2010 decision to support BMD is consistent with its initiatives to modernize and equip to the latest standards its missile defense capability with NATO Transformation security force goals, according to former Romanian CHOD Admiral Marin. Additionally, Romanian Armed Forces Leadership makes the case for continued diplomatic solutions via multilateral partnerships and intensified political dialogue, positioning Romanians as builders of stability and security as far east as the Black Sea Region.

Tensions regarding the Romanian case began with bold policy changes taking shape with the announcement, in February 2010, by Romanian President Traian Basescu expressing full-fledged support for hosting missile interceptors in a developing U.S. Anti-missile Defense Shield Proposal. Admiral Marin claims missile defense in Romania follows an extension of larger trends protecting NATO and American Armed Forces stationed in Europe. The claims also agree with Romania’s current bid for new or used F-16s from Lockheed Martin that will equip them over the next few years and complements the Aegis Radar product for deploying in the BMD solution.70

Admiral Marin summarizes that strategic cooperative bilateral training and exercises confirm what continues as a change in NATO policy in Eastern Europe.

security interoperability and engagement. Romanian, U.S. and NATO strategic security cooperation clearly appears to be taking new form with the U.S. Defense Shield Proposal, originally proposed to the Czech Republic and Poland, that is now receiving wide acceptance. The new proposal covers all of Romania’s security concerns, exceeding comprehensive NATO and Romanian security objectives.

This Romanian decision reflects NATO’s familiar concept of NATO Transformation that continues to conform NATO defense to European and U.S. defensive security needs. In the wake of being a Partnership for Peace member ( PfP ), Micu, a doctoral student in International Relations at the University of Cambridge, suggests that Romanian membership to NATO in 2004 is a strong indication of popular Romanian opinion and support for Romania’s Western European identity. Romanian European identity organically conforms as the average Romanian develops their evolving sense of community to other founding and peripheral NATO members. Romanian Strategy is playing an important expansionary role as a NATO member, accepting burdens, and actively deepening maritime partnership program interoperability relationships with the United States and NATO members in the Black Sea.

Although there appears to be widespread consensus on supporting NATO initiatives, Romania’s decision begs debate as to why it is doing so, and for what reasons. By going through with its decision, Romania reflects NATO initiatives in provisioning the Alliance’s Defenses with defense enhancements against a verifiable threat from Iran, in turn crediting Romania with meeting and exceeding a portion of its NATO Article V regional burden. Romania demonstrates its willingness to exhibit all the characteristics of Europeanism, accepting and maintaining probationary status as a European Union member since September 2007. It appears also that hosting missile interceptors supports protecting U.S. families in Europe and satisfies NATO Article V commitments. This and other similar reasons justify how Romania reflects NATO initiatives, ranging from Eastern European security concerns regarding Russia to strategic reassurance
by the Euro-Atlantic community, and as declared by the Joint Declaration between the United States and Romania.

This Romanian decision influences NATO Transformation. Romania’s support of NATO collective defense enhancements appears arguably consistent with its plans to support NATO regional burden for missile defense. Romania’s influence of NATO Transformation appears to be taking shape in parallel with strong bilateral ties with the U.S. Armed Forces, a NATO founding member. U.S. Navy presence in Romania solidified interoperability planning for the inaugural USS Mount Whitney (LCC/JCC 20) Black Sea Partnership Cruise (BSPC) in 2008. As reported by military and public media observers, this first time event embarked six Black Sea region country delegations, NATO and non-NATO members, adding a significant milestone in NATO interoperability engagement. Romania raises the standard for acting interdependently, a formidable NATO characteristic, with its political communication to NATO and defense spending with the United States amidst economic crisis conditions.

The project of missile defense then provides for Romania’s territorial sovereignty and supports energy initiatives while influencing regionally viable NATO goals. The evidence shows BMD supports NATO’s 2020 strategy for deterrence and reassurance in the face of threats and the challenge of destabilizing costs. BMD presents the option of deterrence as a projection of power outward, while reassurance remains internal to NATO’s security and transformation needs. Deterrence by naval power, air power, nuclear power and now ballistic missile power follows the trend of preparedness acceptable to NATO Transformation.

Reassurance and deterrence are pivotal to NATO Transformation needs today. BMD in Romania assures NATO with greater influence in security policy, foreign policy and military strategy to preserve the peace. This assurance also reinforces the original intentions of Article V, even though the original threats to
NATO have also transformed. Only the threat by Iran is mentioned in the NATO 2020 document, where BMD in Europe as a significant capability reassures NATO’s eastern flank.

As a result of BMD’s deterrence and reassurance capability, consensus for deployment of BMD in Romania appears widespread, with the exception of some who believe NATO Transformation on NATO’s eastern flank should move faster. Consensus for missile defense in Romania conforms to NATO Transformation and reflects expansionary goals. Romania, meeting the challenge of BMD mission, reflects how NATO wants to influence how Romania and NATO members should be thinking about security in the long run.

Romanian security perspectives benefit largely from NATO Transformation goals and vice versa. Since 2002, all levels of the Romanian Ministry of Defense contributed to NATO force goals in interoperability and partnership for a more coherent and efficient integration. Romania expects to influence peace and security in the Black Sea Region that in turn will lead to unprecedented economic investment and prosperity. Bilateral affairs in missile defense in Romania, too, represent an advanced step for Romania in supporting regional NATO force burdens, responding to the latest NATO Transformation needs that remain transparent to NATO.

C. RUSSIAN SECURITY PERSPECTIVES

Russian opinion holds that on strategic deterrence, command, and control, BMDS architecture by the United States and NATO would be redundant and unnecessary. However, BMDS from Romania is refocusing seventy years of defensive security planning that apparently was spread thin across several foci. The Czech Republic and Poland support BMD defensive security because both assert that Russia is comparable to Iran as an Article V NATO threat. However, Europeans disagree with each other on this matter. Defensive security from Romania was foremost on European minds when the Warsaw Pact absorbed Bulgaria and Romania under Soviet rule to influence states like Romania that
had very little power to resist. Desires for Georgia to become part of NATO and part of European defensive security appears almost impossible with the tensions present between Georgia and Russia, as is the case with Ukraine. In the aftermath of Iraq, the lack of consensus among twenty-eight NATO members regarding the war in Afghanistan is a step backward for NATO today, challenging consensus of defensive security U.S. BMDS deployments in Europe.

Supposedly, gone are the days when Russian opinion could instill fear in Europeans. Or, is such fear still on their agenda? Respect, fear, and resetting NATO policy is evidently critical to Russian civil-military relations, as well as to foreign and defense policies. Russian priorities have gained the sympathy of some European and NATO allies, thus dividing NATO opinion. To some NATO allies, exacerbating the Russian relationship is not an option, facilitating a Russian win. Some NATO arguments portray Russia as a toothless challenge but respect what Russia puts on the bargaining table. Russia is an international actor; and whether their information accurately reflects their capabilities or not, it still keeps pressure on the situation. Without a second thought, in fact, Russian opinion moves and shakes decisions in Europe. Russia has shown that it can divide the Allies, negotiate its ends, and provoke European fear that Russia will raise gas and oil threats and effectually intimidate Western, Southern and Eastern Europe.

So is progress impossible? The United States can move in any direction to formulate a continued plan for cooperative EPAA and BMD deployment with the support of Europe. Although some of NATO and Russia’s desires diverge significantly today, some prospects for planning together look bright.

Russia cannot divide NATO’s plans on deploying BMDS elements indefinitely. Apparently, establishing the EPAA as a one-sector BMD shield is viable, although a two-sector shield system remains the only forthcoming reality,

with the way current negotiations between Russia, the United States and NATO stand. At this point, pending Russia’s complete buy-in and support of the two-sector shield, Russia would be privy to a collaborative picture of the threat and contribute to the collective defense of Europe. Sharing appropriate sensor requirements, radar transitions, and an operational area picture are not farfetched notions to the United States, with which the Russian civilian-military leaders likewise concur. Sharing the picture is the easy part.72

Ultimately, however, no conclusion can yet be drawn, as the Russian attitude militarily based on Russian Military Federation Doctrine and civilian opinion remains tentative. A Russian alternative response would imply that Europe is a global power, so Russia pursues sanctions with Iran while pursuing engagement that disassociates itself from any hostility with Tehran. Nevertheless, Russia desires a combined solution integrating the European NATO system elements that would include sharing control with Russia. Russia continues to warn the United States that more negotiations are needed before BMD can even further marginalize European power. Russian leverage is subtle today, but may not remain so tomorrow with Russian aims at restructuring and modernization. Russians are again on the balancing end, fearful that the U.S. BMD system deployment is aimed at them and could be made able to neutralize their nuclear deterrence.

D. EUROPEAN SECURITY PERSPECTIVES

European attitudes, opinions that consist of both their governments’ and their peoples’, regarding their stance on the EPAA and BMD in Romania also need weighing in negotiations. Informed Europeans, particularly at the elite level, overall maintain that the United States has an active leadership role to play in forging the road ahead for EPAA and BMD. Europeans and Allies yield to the

72. Eric Edelman, comment on BMD by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, April 3, 2007, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3923. “Sensor and early-warning technology might be used so that we can have a common operational picture and that the data that we get from these radars and from other sensors can be shared with Russia”
United States the direction of high-level defense policy arrangements in nuclear treaties and in contracts involving the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), or the UN. Today, NATO members, including Turkey, Poland and Spain, are cooperating with United States leadership and the momentum from the United States to deploy BMDS in Romania and on their territories.

Complications threaten when European governments perceive wide gaps in the amount of coordination apparent in joint exercises or in the transparency behind the bilateral deployment of BMD system elements in Central and Eastern Europe. This circumstance exacerbates European worry that communication at some points is becoming more one-sided and thus, unfair, which in turn raises suspicions and lowers trust.73 “Working closely with Moscow on developing joint ballistic missile defence and early-warning systems would eliminate a source of great tension between the two countries over the past two years.”74 The issues of transparency and trust make this a difficult-to-resolve challenge, with Russian opinion stressing that BMD cooperation needs to be a collaborative effort. Time will tell whether these issues will be brief or long lasting. At some point, Russians want to experience an exchange with the United States in which there is ongoing transparency and cooperation without loss of security to them. How that can be achieved on both sides without European loss of confidence may well take some time.

Apparently, there is a growing momentum of Europeans in NATO that desire to see a BMD plan succeed, as legal agreements are now in progress. European opinion, after the signing of the agreement between Romania and the United States, suddenly needs less time and money before they will implement their own compatible BMD capabilities as claimed by the Dutch and Finnish.75

However, Poland and the Czech Republic prioritize their view of the Russian threat before Iran and Russia sees defense against Iran as pointless.

However, BMD between the United States, Europe, and Russia thus will not disappear, or at least not easily. The investment for the United States and NATO for these negotiations is extensive. The pieces are in place, the ball has started rolling, and now the strategy is to work out a feasible plan to benefit the entire region. At best, the United States, Europe, and even Russia, would then appear to be on a convergent path described by Admiral Stavridis as follows:

Working with Russia is about balance and seeking to find the potential for cooperation, while maintaining an honest and open dialogue about all aspects of our relationship, including where we disagree. While a great deal of engagement with Russia is handled either by State Department in the diplomatic realm or directly by the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense, we at European Command are ready to pursue military-to-military communication, engagement, and even training and operations with Russia where and when appropriate.\(^\text{76}\)

Europe, Russia and the United States have decided to go cooperatively forward with BMD and their consequent deployment as of the Lisbon Summit November 2010. As the Russians are aware, BMDS elements have already been planned and are already on BMD-capable ships and allotted land. Quality Russian participation in BMDS deployment discussions has been reported from the Lisbon Summit. Newspapers, websites, and other media have captured NATO’s claim to the following:

In accordance with the detailed provisions of this Declaration, we have also . . . decided to develop a missile defence capability to protect all NATO European populations, territory and forces, and invited Russia to cooperate with us…. We are actively pursuing cooperation with Russia on missile defence, including through the resumption of theatre missile defence exercises.\(^\text{77}\)

\(^{76}\) Stavridis, Testimony Before the 111th Congress 2010, 34.

In some circles, before the revolutions in the Middle East, deployment of BMDS elements in Romania and Bulgaria seemed laughable. The Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, General Stéphane Abrial, however, stoically emphasized that BMD was the number one issue for NATO. With the unsettling events in the Middle East and the constant threats against Israel, cooperation between U.S. leadership and NATO leadership seems settled.

How will European leadership continue to respond? Will European leadership accept a two-sector shield in which Russia will be responsible for its BMD capability over its own territory, while NATO shares in and will be responsible for BMD capability for the remaining European populations, territories, and forces? As regards the NATO-Russian cooperation 2010 Strategic Concept, will NATO and Russia come to a consensus on what the BMD project will need for its realization now that the United States has signed a legal agreement with Romania? NATO BMD and the U.S. EPAA appear to agree yet again.

IV. COOPERATIVE U.S. EPAA, NATO, AND ROMANIAN BMD SCENARIO FROM DEVESELU AIR BASE, ROMANIA

Romania, Poland, Turkey, and Spain recently expressed, by signed agreements, their embrace of EPAA and NATO BMD by way of supporting U.S. afloat or ashore system elements. The types of radars available to the U.S. military and the comprehensive capabilities and elements in Europe together form the infrastructure for command and control (C2), target detection and tracking sensors, and interceptor missiles that exist and are being successfully tested and integrated. On track is the Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) confirmation of the successful integration testing in an operational environment between BMDS PAA Phase 1 capabilities and the NATO ALTBMD system. NATO, the United States and Romania plan to deploy AA detection and 24 interceptor missiles from Deveselu, Romania.

The following Joint Defender Unclassified Modeling program (JDEF) explores the envelope of SM-3 Intercept capabilities from the geographic area surrounding Deveselu, Romania, and within the operating campaign conditions. JDEF modeling at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) engages students, faculty and staff to brainstorm operational scenarios with political ramifications. Although the MDA has announced its own plans and evidences of how BMD and the EPAA will be effective, JDEF allows the analyst a means to understand the technical nature of the BMD and EPAA problem. This JDEF chapter is useful as a reference for the technical terms associated with BMD and the EPAA, as well as the relationships between all of the BMD elements that NATO policies


intend to implement. The JDEF download included unclassified database information from capital city coordinates to defender platform capabilities to attacker threat missile ranges. This JDEF model generated in September 2011 provides a basic overview for how the Romanian Air Force Base in Deveselu would be effectual as the U.S. BMD site, now that the bilateral agreements between the United States and Romania are signed. The author then added the location of Deveselu with the technical information about the capabilities announced by the agreements that the site would employ. The author then compiled the simulation again with the addition of this Deveselu data point and interpreted the results as discussed below using information from the program’s manual.

The model below describes the role the Deveselu interceptors will have in disrupting alleged Iranian attacking launch site threat models at an unclassified level. This U.S. Aegis Ashore ballistic missile defense site and the solutions from Deveselu demonstrate the burden sharing that Romania has accepted in cooperating with NATO and the United States in disrupting Iranian SRBM and MRBM threats as follows. Piece by piece the model describes the attacker launch sites, afloat and ashore defender positions, and the defense response.

A. EPAA AND NATO BMD SCENARIO OVERVIEW

The geographic area presented in the following model is limited to the European area of responsibility. Current threat capabilities from Iran are within the scope of this model, where threats reach as far into Europe as 1,000 kilometers and 1,500 kilometers. Figure 1 presents an overview of the defended positions, EPAA and NATO BMD solutions, BMD ashore and afloat platform positions and attacker launch sites:
Figure 1. European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) and NATO Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) JDEF Model Overview

Figure 2. Defended European Asset Positions

Figure 2 highlights the high-density populated capital city areas of London, Paris, Amsterdam, Berlin, Warsaw, Bucharest, and Sofia. For simulation
purposes, these cities represent an unclassified premise for where Iranian terrorism could preemptively strike to achieve its ends, and may but does not necessarily constitute the real-world threat.

B. IRANIAN MRBM THREAT ATTACKER POSITIONS

Threat positions at the assigned locations in this model are input as depicted in Figure 3 and are used in this simulation solely to generate output from the program. They are not the exact positions based on real intelligence assessments about Iranian launch positions. The program allows the attacker positions a maximum number of missiles the attacker can launch from fixed or mobile launch sites at its defended asset during a planning scenario. For simplicity, each attacker launch site is allowed one missile for all defended assets sets. Larger numbers of attacker missiles, of course, will give the attacker maximum flexibility, but complicate JDEF model calculations and the time required to generate a solution. All of the launch sites shown here are within the territory of Iran. Adding Syrian or Belarusian threat inputs are outside the scope of this scenario, but are part of EPAA and NATO BMD efforts that include forecasting elements that will deploy in Poland to combat these threats.
The integration of EPAA and NATO BMD today is complete. Testing continues that refines the current architecture and plans against future threats. The platforms used here represent afloat platforms from the Black Sea and Persian Gulf, as well as ashore elements in Deveselu and in the vicinity that can detect and track ScudB, ScudC or Iranian MRBMs. The ten attacker launch sites in this scenario launch Iranian MRBM attacker missiles that are targeting the defended cities in Figure 1 and Figure 2. The attacking missiles appear to have made some distance from launch on their way to the defended positions, but this is a modeling constraint. The red dotted lines merely show the path of the attacking missiles and its countervailing interceptor missile with the interceptor’s assignment path. Successfully tested interceptors intend to detect and arrive at attacking launch sites during the attacking missile’s thirty-second boost phase. Early detection is critical to the success of an interceptor kill, which critics thought
impossible. Shown in Figure 4, in both ashore and afloat solutions, are intercept attacker missiles from defense sites in Deveselu, the Black Sea and the Persian Gulf.

Figure 4. Aegis Ashore / Afloat Ballistic Missile Defense Solutions

C. AFLOAT AND ASHORE RADAR ASSIGNMENTS

EPAA and NATO BMD deployment are only possible with the cooperation of all NATO allies. As seen at best in Figure 4, radar coverage, radar assignment and immediate over-flight trajectory of the interceptor missile that needs to arrive at the attacker launch missile in a timely manner are over Turkey, parts of Greece, and Southeastern Europe. The attacker missiles, if allowed to launch unimpeded would have over-flights over Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova, Ukraine, and Poland, where Ukraine and Moldova are NATO countries. All NATO countries in the know would facilitate the necessary immediate execution and response time to destroy the attacking missiles.
Launch sites in Figure 5, for modeling purposes, target Amsterdam, Warsaw, London, Bucharest and Berlin. Each of those launch sites would be under the sharp eye of the SPY radar aboard the DDX platform deployed in the Persian Gulf, capable of making radar assignments for attacking MRBMs from as many as five launch site origins. Multiple systems verify the radar assignments from the DDX platform, including those aboard other afloat platforms or AA in the area. Here “DDX” is a JDEF modeling term that reflects DDG variants.

The AA assignments complement Romania’s anticipated purchase of latest generation F-16 jets. Eyewitness accounts discriminating attacking missiles traveling at thousands of miles per hour, from a commercial airliner traveling at hundreds of miles per hour, is exactly what the NATO and the concerned international community would want to reassure their publics about.
In Figure 6, the intercept assignments prepare against attacking MRBMs targeting Amsterdam and London using Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) by Hit-To-Kill (HTK) exo-atmospheric missile defense. Simultaneously, a Patriot Battery assigns Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) missiles to engage MRBMs launched from attacker launch sites three and four, directed at Bucharest and Sofia. In moments, the systems from Deveselu are working cooperatively with afloat and other ashore platforms, as well as interactively with NATO command, to ensure against leakers that remain unassigned and prevent them from successfully penetrating BMD defenses. Here the initial defenses also create an alarm shared by NATO countries, allowing them the benefit of triggering national early warning systems and preparing to follow their own order of battle in defense.

Figure 6. Ashore Defender Position Intercept Assignments from Deveselu, Romania

Afloat BMD capability already regularly makes port calls in the Black Sea to the cities of Constanta, Romania and Varna, Bulgaria. The USS Monterey
deployed for the Mediterranean, arriving in the Black Sea in the port of Constanta on June 14, 2011. Figure 7 shows DDX and CG BMD capable ships assigning SM-3 intercepts from the Black Sea to defend Warsaw, Paris and Berlin against MRBM attacks from launch sites two, five and six. The positions of the afloat platforms are random, and the platforms would successfully arrive at similar intercepts from anywhere in the Black Sea.

In summary, the above scenarios show the successful confluence of EPAA and BMD capability made possible only by the conferencing of national European priorities with a common outlook on BMD. NATO stands in the gap that bridges trans-Atlantic security during a time when such threats already exist. Simultaneity of BMD allows NATO and national militaries to be reassured merely
by being radar-present, and approaches missile threat deterrence in a new way. Romania, Poland, Turkey and Spain recently committed to being a part of that new way of implementing security. The solution summary concludes with a 100-percent intercept of seven launched missiles, with only seven percent expected damage due to unknowns.
V. CONCLUSIONS

EPAA and BMD in Romania joins the practice of diplomatic international relations theory, security perspectives from military doctrine and models of a real threat to the United States, NATO, allies and partners, together. Evidence from NATO’s recent policy statements and press releases confirm refinement in addressing characteristics, concerns and precedents in negotiating EPAA and BMD from the United States, all the way to Europe and abroad. Analysts and researchers exist on both sides of the spectrum who agree or disagree as to whether U.S. deployment of BMDS in Romania or anywhere is consistent, or in tension with broader NATO-led strategic and political objectives. As discussed earlier, President Obama advocates BMDS, and Republican Presidential candidates, Herman Cain, Rick Perry, and Mitt Romney promise it is part of the future of U.S. defense postures.

The momentum for U.S. BMD deployment in Romania and in Europe is today at a record high. Transparent signing of agreements, publicized visits by recently appointed U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta to NATO countries supporting BMDS, in addition to research at the Naval Postgraduate School, the European Union Institute for Security Studies, and foreign sources translated from Romanian into English, confirm the publicity of this momentum. NATO diplomats and military officials are ensuring that documentation guides transformation and the transparent conferencing of defense and capabilities decisions.

Teamwork on EPAA and BMDS, with today’s number of participating democracies covering NATO deliberations over deployment of BMD, is making history. Collective national defense, including the capabilities of a conference system of defense with advanced missile technology, is at the forefront of modern strategic defense against threats of modern war. If the threat occurs, the defensive system will need the alert U.S. and NATO staffs, and a steady
Supreme Allied Commanding coach. Modern strategic defense regarding EPAA and U.S. BMD system elements, after all, will do what it is programmed to do, and whatever else that is directed by U.S. and NATO experts.

EPAA and BMDS architecture planning and infrastructure deployment continue on schedule, despite Russian objections and concerns about NATO capability enhancements. President Obama’s planned U.S. BMD changes to begin in Romania appeased Russian demands temporarily, but are resurfacing as NATO reaffirms long-term goals in southern, eastern, and western Europe. Russia does not accept the Iranian threat by itself and will need justification for the scope of the strategy supporting the NATO BMD mission going forward. Russia will not submit to U.S., NATO’s or European aims, unless those aims factor a level of respect their political, military leaders and intelligentsia believe. One such U.S., NATO and European aim does not exist, and the strategic purposes of the United States, NATO and Europe continue to grow in the midst of missile proliferation. So these U.S., NATO and European aims diverge from Russian aims and instead advance a conference of EPAA and BMD missile defense effort with a number and pass-code that Russia, for now, does not get.

The collective response against missile proliferation by the United States, NATO and new NATO members such as Romania, is consistent with declared NATO goals and the way forward towards a conferenced defense architecture. The high level of consensus in Romania for U.S. deployment of missile defense interceptors in the country bolsters political support for countering an already maturing missile proliferation threat. Political and military collectiveness to vet cohesive defensive action against indiscriminately launched threats is a modern approach to how NATO is rightly shaping security reform on its eastern flank. The allies that build trust together will stay together. U.S., NATO and Romanian security goals that work together will stay together. Reciprocally, U.S. and NATO reassurance bolsters Romanian national strategic goals.

Twenty-four U.S. SM-3 missile defense interceptors in Romania are the effective start to serving U.S., NATO and Romanian security needs agreed to in
September 2011. Current reports address this discussion from singularly focused views, while this paper addressed Romania’s decision to support the U.S. BMDS elements from multiple political, military and strategic areas of concern. Plans for the EPAA and AA U.S. BMDS elements in Romania reflect and support the U.S. national and Alliance strategic purposes. The political significance of agreement to deploy BMDS elements in Romania marks the beginning of a political momentum conferencing the agreements on EPAA and NATO BMD defense of the nations of Poland, Turkey and Spain, as well as Romania.

The United States, NATO, Romania, and other NATO allies prepare their nations defensively against ballistic missile threats and missile proliferation. BMD capabilities reassure legitimacy in modern war on U.S. and NATO terms for the Alliance, while advertising deterrence, defense and assurance of European and U.S. populations and military service members serving in Europe. The national strategy is building threat deterrence with the deployment of these U.S. BMD system elements in Romania, from where SRBM, MRBM, IRBM missile capability can be identified and ideally neutralized at launch. U.S., NATO and Romanian national strategies confer on bolstering the advocacy for this deployment in U.S.-Romanian relations, in U.S. relations with other NATO allies and in the Alliance as a whole. U.S.-Russian and NATO-Russian BMD and EPAA milestones are hopeful and possible but unlikely in the immediate future.

The conferencing and networking effect that the EPAA and U.S. BMDS connecting NATO members and partners achieves, some view as fostering risky political and military promoting competition between new members towards characteristically persuasive democratic behavior and clearly in support of desired NATO political-military objectives. Romanians agreed to host U.S. BMD system elements and Bulgaria agreed to host such U.S. capabilities, too. Now Romania, Poland, Turkey and Spain have agreements to allow the United States to build, maintain and operate infrastructure in support of EPAA and BMDS system architecture. U.S. and NATO initiatives to negotiate this vision rightly
impute qualitative democratic changes to new NATO members while melding with tenured ones. Embarking on advanced capabilities for all NATO members in this economically austere period hedges their national risks and challenges and reinforces the stability that a viable defense offers for long-standing democracies.

In summary, in order to deter strategic and political governmental, non-governmental and non-state threats, U.S., NATO and transatlantic Alliance diplomats and military officials must understand how best to employ the strategic and political advances in military capabilities of NATO members, and the extent to which these military capabilities cost effectively. Why U.S. BMD deployment in Romania matters and why the decision promises the future in the advance conferencing of transparent and multi-present NATO capabilities moves NATO members to be prepared to think beyond this problem and future ones in a collective way into the foreseeable future.
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