THE STICKY SUBJECT OF RELIGION:
CAN IT EVER BE THE GLUE FOR A STABLE SOCIETY?

by

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December 2011

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An assumption underpinning Western liberal democracy is that separation of religion and state always improves stability, and U.S. policy often encourages nations to move toward secular government structures. Yet, ethnically plural societies may need a common identity for the nation to gel and religion might be the "glue" that can hold a society together. Recent nation-building efforts signal a need for greater understanding of how best to employ religion as a cross-cutting tie for social cohesion. This thesis examines Israel, Iran, and Turkey; each has varying ethnic and religious compositions and has attempted to use religion for domestic stability. While Israel and Iran validate religion's cohesive power, all cases highlight the possible adverse effects of this approach. The findings of this thesis identify which political systems, religious contexts, population demographics, and/or political circumstances are most conducive for leveraging religion to aid domestic stability. We conclude that, while in many cases religion may increase volatility, in some circumstances religious glue may, actually, effectively bridge ethnic divisions to promote cohesion and stability. The most conducive conditions for this approach are when political systems protect minority rights and allow religion in the public sphere, but restrict the government from mandating religious practices.
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An assumption underpinning Western liberal democracy is that separation of religion and state always improves stability, and U.S. policy often encourages nations to move toward secular government structures. Yet, ethnically plural societies may need a common identity for the nation to gel and religion might be the “glue” that can hold a society together. Recent nation-building efforts signal a need for greater understanding of how best to employ religion as a cross-cutting tie for social cohesion. This thesis examines Israel, Iran, and Turkey; each has varying ethnic and religious compositions and has attempted to use religion for domestic stability. While Israel and Iran validate religion’s cohesive power, all cases highlight the possible adverse effects of this approach. The findings of this thesis identify which political systems, religious contexts, population demographics, and/or political circumstances are most conducive for leveraging religion to aid domestic stability. We conclude that, while in many cases religion may increase volatility, in some circumstances religious glue may, actually, effectively bridge ethnic divisions to promote cohesion and stability. The most conducive conditions for this approach are when political systems protect minority rights and allow religion in the public sphere, but restrict the government from mandating religious practices.
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<tr>
<td>AKP</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party (in Turkish: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)</td>
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<td>Central Bureau of Statistics – Israel</td>
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<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>IFHR</td>
<td>International Federation of Human Rights</td>
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I. INTRODUCTION

Government endorsement...of religion...sends a message to non-adherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community.

Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, March 5, 1984

A. PURPOSE

An assumption underpinning Western liberal democracy is that separation of religion and state improves political and social stability. Yet, despite insisting on promoting this interpretation as the best way to establish a free and equitable society, this solution is not straightforward in nations with a longstanding tradition of religion being a significant aspect of the society. Consequently, where there are significant ethnic and religious minorities, the marriage of religion and state is more complicated. To that end, the purpose of this thesis is to explore if and how religious identity can promote stability in ethnically plural societies and to investigate the political structures and conditions most compatible with employing religion as a cross-cutting tie for social cohesion.

B. BACKGROUND

The conventional wisdom commonly utilized to form U.S. foreign policy holds that separation of religion and state improves political and social stability (Cavanaugh, 2009, p. 3; Philpott, 2007, p. 522; Benard, 2003, pp. xi–xii). Additionally, though increasingly under dispute, this conventional wisdom also asserts that the effects of religion on politics and the affairs of the state are in decline (Rubin, 1994, p. 33). As a result of these views, U.S. policy often encourages nations to move toward secular government structures to increase this stability (Juergensmeyer, 2001, pp. 179–180). Although it may be necessary to promote the separation of religion and state in environments with high religious plurality, in cases of low religious plurality, this may not be prudent. In fact, sometimes religious identity may even be the “glue” that holds a society together. If this is true, then promoting separation of religion and state in all cases may not be the best method for improving national stability; a structure allowing
for a closer relationship between religion and state may better promote these countries’ national stability. Yet, this also has potential for negative consequences. For example, allowing religion to influence governance may generate intra-religious disputes and have negative effects on religious minorities. These consequences will need to be considered to determine if the net effect on stability is constructive.

Even though the West prides itself on a tradition that promotes separation of church and state, it is important to understand that religion and government are still intertwined today and may even be growing closer considering current world events. For example, in the wake of the ongoing Arab Spring occurring in several Arab countries from Morocco to Bahrain, uprisings mean that simple religious rituals such as afternoon prayers become “catalysts for the biggest anti-government demonstrations of the revolution” (Gilgoff & Merica, 2011, para. 27). Before the Arab Spring, the dictatorial leaders of countries such as Egypt and Tunisia suppressed religious-based political parties (Haddadi, 2011, para. 5). Recent removal of these leaders from power allowed religious political parties new opportunities, lending new traction to the integration of Islam and politics (paras. 1, 3). While heralding the popular movements for their democratic spirit, many U.S. policy officials have reservations about the potential influence of religion in these new states since this could threaten their development as liberal democratic states (“U.S. to work,” 2011, paras. 2, 10, 19). Furthermore, recent U.S. activities in Afghanistan and Iraq aimed at rebuilding these national governments also make the examination of religious involvement in state matters relevant for current national security policy.

C. THESIS ORGANIZATION

Five chapters follow this introduction. Chapter II introduces the research questions and underlying hypothesis. This is followed by a literature review that outlines the two main underlying philosophies of civil religion/religious toleration and separation of church and state. Next, the research methodology is outlined to explain how the comparison across case studies is structured, followed by a discussion of case selection. Chapters III through V each contain individual country case studies that discuss information necessary for case comparison and analysis. For each of these chapters, the
sections include a brief background and basic information about ethnic composition, religious composition, religion and governance, common sources of instability, and the use of religion as glue. Finally, Chapter VI contains the case study comparison and analysis with conclusions and recommendations based on the research. Of course, applicability of conclusions to other situations will be limited by the similarity of other cases to case studies presented in this analysis.
II. METHODOLOGY AND LITERATURE REVIEW

A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS/HYPOTHESIS

Under what circumstances should governments intentionally try to reduce religion-state differentiation in order to use “religious glue” to form cross-cutting ties between different ethnic groups? Additionally, is religion, through a reduction in the gap between religion and state, effective glue for bonding a nation together where religious plurality is low but ethnic plurality is high? Lastly, how involved should religion be in government in order to best promote societal stability? We hypothesize that under certain circumstances religion can provide social cohesion without inducing additional instability.

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

We begin with the Great Separation, the foundation for the separation of religion and state in the West. We then take into account some of the reactions that challenged this movement in seeking a greater role for religion in societies, to include a recent trend of contemporary religious insurgencies, which demonstrates the continued desire for religion as the central element in society. We would note that while some have investigated the fractious effect of religion, what remains underexplored in recent literature are the positive effects of religion for increased stability and the political structures most compatible when religion still plays an active role.

The foundation of the Great Separation was laid by two English philosophers in response to the intense destruction generated by the European Wars of Religion (circa 1524–1648). During this period, religion and politics were intensely intertwined, escalating into rebellions and decades long wars fought along doctrinal divides of faith. As numerous Protestant sects splintered away from the Roman Catholic Church, rulers attempted to enforce their chosen faith, at times against the choice of their subjects (Kreis, 2009, para. 12). The desire to follow their religious convictions prompted numerous wars in Bohemia (modern day Germany), France, Holland, and Britain. For example, the Thirty Years’ War in Germany included massive alliances formed along
Protestant and Catholic lines (para. 12). While these wars, like previous wars, certainly had repercussions for control of territory and power, the religious context of these struggles ostensibly pegged mortal salvation to the outcome, which fueled bitter fighting that would not be seen again in Europe until the World Wars of the 20th century (para. 17).

Against this backdrop of unprecedented fighting, which included an English civil war from 1642 to 1651, Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) wrote his landmark work, *Leviathan* (1651). In this work, he introduced the idea of political legitimacy based on something other than divine revelation (Lilla, 2007, ―The Great Separation‖ section). Additionally, in an attempt to diminish the religious fervor perpetuating the wars, Hobbes (1950) suggested that man cannot experience a divine revelation through another man and, therefore, should question the legitimacy of modern prophets preaching divine revelations (p. 323). Lilla (2007) interprets Hobbes’ intent as enabling man to see war as the result of man’s politics, not God’s command, in order to break the cycle of conflict and destruction (―Miracle‖ section). While this may have reduced wars between nations, Hobbes’ (1950) subordination of the church to the state, which was logically necessary to prevent challenges to the social contract, did not resolve domestic religious debates (pp. 337–338).

Building on Hobbes’ basic social contract theory, John Locke (1632–1704) argued about the need to reduce the state’s power, particularly in the realm of religion. Hobbes had argued that the sovereign needed absolute authority to execute the social contract of maintaining order, but Locke asserted that men join society to preserve their life, liberty, and well-being. Due to the founding purpose of the contract, citizens may revoke their contract with the government if rulers tyrannically violate the interests of the people (Friend, 2004, ―Hobbes‖ section, para. 1, ―Locke‖ section, para. 7). Therefore, the government may only violate individual rights when necessary for the public good (Tuckness, 2010, para. 4.8). While this constrained the government’s authority, Locke further argued for separating the spheres of politics and religion in his work, *Letters Concerning Toleration* (1689) (para. 7.1). Locke disagreed with Hobbes about subordinating the church to the state, but leveraged Hobbes’ discussion of man’s
experience of divine revelation. Locke went a step further than Hobbes to emphasize that true belief can only be generated within the individual, not from an external source, God, or men. Consequently, Locke argues that neither the state nor any individual has authority to define what is true in religion for another, and so neither has justification to enforce a specific interpretation since faith cannot be compelled by force (McGrath, 1998, p. 214–5). While Hobbes and Locke differed in some aspects of their philosophies, both sought escape from the discord and devastation that plagued Europe at the time, and together provided the conceptual foundation for the separation of church and state.

While the motive to separate religion and state is understandable, two notable scholars from very different perspectives, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) and later Emile Durkheim (1858–1917), questioned whether society could function without a religious center. Rousseau followed Locke by arguing for a social contract guided by “general will” (similar to Locke’s “public good”) (Friend, 2004, “Rousseau” section, para. 8), but differed from Locke in articulating man’s innate need for religion as evidenced by natural feelings of conscience, charity, and virtue. However, still acutely aware of the battles waged over interpretations of Christianity in the previous century, Rousseau believed that faith is generated internally and advocated that all religions were equally worthy, a position that earned him criticism from church authorities (Lilla, 2007, “The Inner Light” section). Furthermore, given his view of humans as fundamentally moral and “theotropic” creatures, Rousseau questioned whether rigidly separated religion and politics was sustainable (“Miracles” section).

Rousseau’s views proved influential several decades later. Although Hobbes predicted an era of peace once the religious fuel was removed from the fire, Europe soon witnessed another wave of violence with the French Revolution (1789–1799) and the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815). Since neither war was fought in the name of religion, people sought another explanation and posited that the lack of a moral core in society contributed to the violence (Lilla, 2007, “Rousseau’s Children” section). Thanks in part to Rousseau, the brand of “liberal theology” developed in the 19th century may have removed so much specificity that the vacant core could no longer inspire followers (“The Inner Light” section).
At the same time, religion also received an endorsement from the emerging field of sociology. Although Emile Durkheim denied religion had a supernatural origin, he nonetheless argued for its crucial role in society. As an organically created institution, religion promoted communal solidarity and social norms (Strenski, 2006, p. 296). Like Rousseau, Durkheim was intrigued by the commonalities among religions and attempted to identify essential core elements across religious traditions (p. 296). Thus, while philosophers had laid a logical foundation to disentangle religion from politics in order to prevent violent fighting, the question became whether society could function with religion so marginalized. This also generated the inevitable follow-up question: if religion is necessary, how can it best be handled politically?

Nevertheless, many social scientists, particularly during the 1950s and 1960s, predicted that modernization would lead to the spread of secularization, pluralism, and political differentiation as the Western experience became a universal phenomenon (Sahliyeh, 1990, p. 3). This modernization theory, criticized by Jonathan Fox (2002) precisely because it was created and advocated by predominantly Western academics studying the West (p. 35), also predicted that ethnicity would disappear as an important political factor (p. 33). While Rodney Stark (1999) argues that this theory of modernization causing secularization was never valid, and while Fox and Sandler (2005) argue that this previously dominant theory in sociology and political science is now increasingly called into question” (p. 328), Rubin (1994) maintains that these ideas still form the basis for U.S. foreign policy towards religion in politics (p. 33). Fox (2001) also argues that education in the U.S. that teaches about liberal democracy and the importance of the separation of church and state fundamentally affect views on this subject (pp. 57–58).

Although, as previously stated, the majority of separation theorists wrote from a Western perspective, these principles are not inherently limited to that faith tradition. In contrast to what was predicted by the secularization and modernization theories, religion has unexpectedly risen to the forefront of violent political struggle in almost every major religious tradition. In Global Rebellion, Mark Juergensmeyer (2008) captures the diverse landscape of religious movements, from the Sinhala Buddhist movement in Sri Lanka,
through Jewish militants in Israel, to the many Islamic movements across Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, to militant Christian movements in the United States. Interestingly, even in the U.S., which may be considered the archetype for the separation of religion and state, the boundaries of religion’s role in society and tolerance for other sects is less certain than social scientists may proclaim. For example, Stephen Prothero (2006), a modern religion professor, discusses how U.S. society often marginalizes rather than embraces religious minorities, and how emerging religious groups face intense ostracism by established groups (p. 259). At the very least, it seems clear that the concept and practice of separating religion and state as sought by social scientists of the 20th century is complex and difficult to implement.

While recent trends in religious-based violence may strengthen the desire to effect a separation of religion and state, they also highlight the forceful role that religion continues to play. Nikos Kokosalakis (1985) argues that even with other drivers such as nationalism or democracy, the effects of religion can add legitimacy or act as a source of opposition (p. 371). Barry Rubin (1994) asserts that in many places religion is a “central political pillar maintaining the power of any ruler” (p. 20) and criticizes Western intellectuals for relegating religion to solely a “theological set of issues” (p. 20). Furthermore, as James Wellman and Kyoko Tokuno (2004) note, religion provides a “powerful engine for individual and group identity formation” (p. 292). However, they also argue that since a religion often builds its identity based on a contrast with an out-group (a secular or competing religious community), there is a natural propensity towards conflict (pp. 292, 295). This leads to the question: if religion inherently contains seeds of cohesion and conflict, is it possible to harness religion on behalf of cross-cutting cultural ties without sparking conflict or instability?

Although the West may have led the way for secularization, the process of balancing religion and politics is dynamic and ongoing. Not surprisingly, nation-states connected to other religious faiths approach secularization with concern and skepticism. Consequently, states facing reform opportunities must balance the Hobbesian desire to extract religion from politics with religion’s potential to create cohesion and nationalism. Ethnic composition can often be an important component of establishing nationalism;
however, religion can be an integral element as well (Hastings, 1997, pp. 3–4). Yet, as Hastings points out, not all religions have the same political effect on nationalism; Christianity carves out nations while Islam initially sought, and still theoretically seeks, a united *umma* (p. 187). This thesis will explore whether this subtle difference complicates or eases politics when states closely align religion with their political structures.

As discussed above, there is considerable debate about what separation (if any) is most appropriate between religion and state. However, there is a hole in the literature with regard to how that separation affects stability given varying religious and ethnic societal make-ups. For instance, Fox (2002) argues that no general theory for ethno-religious conflict exists, but then defines ethno-religious conflict between two groups that are of different religions, rather than between ethnic groups that share a religion (pp. 143–144). In addition, Daniel Philpott (2007) discusses the sociological term “differentiation” (a term by which he roughly means separation between religion and state) but mainly attempts to correlate this with democratization and political violence (pp. 505–506). Ethnicity’s role is briefly discussed, but is not a major aspect of his argument. Robert Dowd (2004) questions the conventional wisdom that there is less violence between religiously homogenous groups (“A Test of the Conventional Wisdom” section). He argues that at least in Sub-Saharan Africa, more religiously plural countries have somewhat less violent conflict than religiously homogeneous countries (“A Test of the Conventional Wisdom” section). He goes on to argue that when the conflict is primarily between ethnicities, the difference is even starker; religiously plural countries have much less violent conflict than religiously homogeneous countries (“A Test of the Conventional Wisdom” section). However, his focus is on religious institutions in civil society and their effects; he does not explore the degree of religion-state separation as a factor.

C. METHODOLOGY

This thesis explores the interaction of ethnicity and religion in the formation of a state, particularly across religious faiths, to assess whether religion-state separation is appropriate and necessary in all cases. In order to accomplish this, it investigates the conditions under which the interplay among religious plurality, ethnic plurality, and
degree of separation between religion and the state affect that country's stability. Employing the structured, focused comparison method, including both cross-case comparisons and within case process tracing, case study analysis provides empirical observations for each variable and determines the overall range evaluated by the analysis. Therefore, in addition to background data, the structured comparison poses the same questions to each case study; these are shown below:

- **Codify features and identify trends**
  - What is the ethnic composition of the country (and has this demographic significantly shifted in the last twenty or forty years)?
  - What is the religious composition of the country (and has this demographic significantly shifted in the last twenty or forty years)?
  - What is the degree of diffusion between religion and the state, and how/why has this changed over time? (i.e., how do religious organizations participate in governance?)
  - What are the most common and/or critical sources of instability in the country? Do religious or ethnic groups tend to mitigate or introduce instability?

- **Causation**
  - Under what conditions has utilizing religion as glue been attempted and how effective was that attempt (both formally by the government and informally through social movements)?

- **Counterfactual analysis**
  - Could changes to political structure (with an increase or decrease of differentiation) mitigate/diffuse any specific sources of instability identified?

- **Cross-case comparison**
  - Could alternative political structures with an increase or decrease of differentiation mitigate/diffuse any specific sources of instability identified? Are there possible adverse effects?
  - What type of political system would support using religion as glue?

Case selection was determined based on a variety of factors including ethnic and religious composition, government style, and elapsed time since implementing major
government structural changes. The intent was to select cases representing a wide spectrum of governments from secular to religious. Since the purpose of this study is to explore the use of religion to promote stability in ethnically plural societies, the countries chosen have two or more major ethnic groups. Candidate cases were further defined as countries with the majority ethnic group comprising no more than 80% of the population and/or a single ethnic minority having more than 15% of the population. Thus, Egypt was discarded because it is not ethnically diverse with a 99.6 percent Egyptian population (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], 2011a, “People and Society” section).

Next, in order to assess religion’s role in promoting stability, cases were chosen that demonstrate varying roles of religion in governance. Sri Lanka has ethnic tensions, but was rejected for having no unifying religion bridging ethnic groups; in fact, religion reinforces ethnic divisions between the mostly Hindu Tamils who sought autonomy from the predominantly Buddhist Sinhalese majority (CIA, 2011f, “People and Society” section; Bhattacharji, 2009, “Who are the Tamils” section). Countries that were determined to have less representative governments were likewise discarded, including Saudi Arabia. While Saudi Arabia has a constitution based in Islamic law and suffers from some ethnic tension (even though the largest ethnic minority is only 10% of the populace), the government is a monarchy ruled by the king (CIA, 2011e, “People and Society” section, “Government” section). Finally, the countries chosen have had representative governments with a relatively constant religious-state differentiation for at least twenty years. This enables us to adequately assess how religion plays a role in social cohesion and state stability, thereby eliminating countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan that are still in the infancy stages of becoming a democracy.

In the end, the three cases selected for in-depth analysis are Israel, Iran, and Turkey. First, Israel was chosen as a unique example of having been created as a religious homeland, accepting immigrants from numerous regions to form a brand new polity. Next, Iran’s tremendous ethnic diversity and unique Islamic configuration provides an opportunity to explore the low religious-state differentiation end of the

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1Religious compositions referenced here do not take into account sectarian differences, but case analysis will explore the impact of sectarian divisions when appropriate.
spectrum. Finally, Turkey’s determination to remain secular even with indigenous Islamist movements and political initiatives that appeal to religious identity provides an example of higher religious-state differentiation. Overall, these cases fulfill all selection criteria and provide a spectrum of configurations where religion plays a role in government.
III. ISRAEL CASE STUDY

Israel was expressly created as a Jewish nation-state in 1947—that is, it was established in a fashion that made Judaism or “Jewishness” a fundamental part of national identity. Yet, the prominence of religion in Israel over the past 60+ years has actually created a less stable society, generating intra-religious disputes and negative effects on minorities, specifically the Arabs, who are both Muslim and Christian. Essentially, Israel was created as a Jewish national home, but those pushing for its establishment underestimated the “problem” posed by the Arab population or simply “hoped that a solution would emerge in due course” (Shlaim, 2001, p. 4). Ultimately, the Israeli Supreme court determined that “Israel as a Jewish state… [means] maintenance of a Jewish majority, the right of Jews to immigrate and ties with Jewish communities outside Israel” (Dowty, 1999, p. 31). However, defining what it means to be a Jew has itself been a challenge in and to Israel. While the Orthodox believe being Jewish is defined by birth, secularists believe self-identification matters (Edelman, 2000, p. 209).

A. BACKGROUND

Before Israel even became a Jewish homeland, there were two waves of Jewish settlers to the region, in 1882 and 1904, respectively. At the time, the Turkish Ottoman Empire ruled the region, but its acceptance of these two waves initiated an ongoing trend of tension between Arabs and Jews over land (Kimmerling, 2008, p. 307). Starting in the late 19th century in Europe, the “Jewish Question” became a term used to denote how Jews were being singled out for growing anti-Semitism and many people believed that the only way to overcome this was through establishment of a Jewish State, a task that gave rise to the Zionist movement (Kimmerling, 2008, p. 228; Wheatcroft, 1996, pp. 158–159). After considering areas in South America and East Africa, the Zionists chose Palestine because of its religious significance to Jews and the perception that it was a largely uninhabited area under the rule of a decaying empire (Said, 1979, pp. 23–24).

Shortly after taking control of the region post-World War I, the British government committed to creating a “national home,” a purposely ambiguous term, for
the Jews as stated in the Balfour Declaration (Sprinzak, 1991, p. xiii). The British mandate was established in 1920; however, Palestine became difficult for Great Britain to actively control, and the Arabs began a series of attacks and terrorist acts against Jews (p. xiv). In an attempt to create peace, the Peel Commission (Palestine Royal Commission) in 1937 recommended dividing Palestine to accommodate both Arabs and Jews, but this was ultimately rejected (p. xiv). Two years later, the British White Paper rejected partition and established a policy of limited immigration and land purchases (p. xiv). In the wake of World War II, Nazi Germany’s massive repression and extermination of Jews strengthened the case for a Jewish state (Shlaim, 2009, p. xi). To facilitate this, the United Nations (UN) passed a resolution on November 29, 1947 to partition Palestine, resulting in a civil war between the Arabs and Jews (Sprinzak, 1991, p. xv).

When the British mandate expired on May 15, 1948, Zionist leader David Ben-Gurion (later Israel’s first Prime Minister) declared the new State of Israel independent (Sprinzak, 1991, pp. xv–xvii). Subsequently, UN General Assembly Resolution 194 was passed in December 1948, granting Palestinian refugees the right of return (Kimmerling, 2008, p. 314). Soon after, Israel’s Law of Return was passed, opening the door for Holocaust survivors and other emigrants from Muslim countries (p. 314). The combination of these immigration policies doubled the Jewish population in Israel between 1948 and 1952 (p. 314).

Unhappy with these changes and foreseeing the inevitable loss of lands that were symbolically significant to Islam, surrounding Arab states began to invade soon after Ben-Gurion’s declaration of independence (Shlaim, 2009, p. xvii). The first Arab-Israeli War ensued in 1948 (p. xvii). This was only the first in a series of Arab-Israeli conflicts, with the most significant wars being the Six Day War in June 1967 between Israel and its neighbors, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria; the 1973 Arab-Israeli War between Israel and a coalition of Arab states led by Egypt and Syria; Israel’s attacks on Lebanon in June 1982 and July 1986; and intifadas in December 1987 and September 2000 in which Palestinians rose up against Israeli occupation (pp. xx–xxi).

Throughout Israel’s history as an independent state, there have also been multiple attempts by the Arabs and Jews to reach a peace agreement; for example, the Camp

Most recently, in 2009 Prime Minister Salem Fayyad of the Palestinian Authority (representing Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and West Bank under Fatah’s control) called for a two state solution, one to be Arab and one Jewish (an idea that has reemerged multiple times since 1947), to which Hamas objected (Iseroff, 2007, “History Since Oslo” section). The “Palestinian Authority [then] issued a plan for establishing a state unilaterally by 2011, endorsed by the European Union and claiming all of the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem” (“History Since Oslo” section). In Israel, the 2009 elections resulted in Benjamin Netanyahu as the new Israeli Prime Minister (“History Since Oslo” section). He pledged Israeli support for partition between Israel and Palestine, as well as promised not to confiscate additional Palestinian lands for Jewish settlements (“History Since Oslo” section). As of yet, however, no substantive changes have occurred.

B. ETHNIC COMPOSITION

In order to understand the full extent of Israel’s challenges, it is important to note that Israel is “a deeply divided society… [with] ethnic and religious cleavages” (Dowty, 1999, p. 4). According to the CIA (2011d), Israel has a population of approximately 7.5 million people (“People and Society” section). Ethnically, Israel is 75.6% Jewish, 20.3% Arab, and 4.2% Other (non-Jewish citizens) (according to 2009 data, CBS-I, 2010, “Population” section, Table 2.1). Another 3.8 million Arabs live in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (CIA, 2011h, “People and Society” section; CIA, 2011b, “People and Society” section). From 1970 to 1990, the percentage of the Jewish population declined from 85.4% to 81.9% (CBS-I, 2010, “Population” section, Table 2.1). At the end of 1948, the year Israel became a state, the Jews comprised 82.1% of the population and the remaining 17.9% were Arabs. Looking even further back, the Jewish population was once much smaller. According to the 1922 census, the population of Palestine was 11.1% Jewish, 87.8% Arab, and 1.01% other (Iseroff, 2007, Table A-1). Today, the Jews comprise slightly more than half of the population in the former Mandate Palestine, and the
declining percentage of Jewish population means that they may not retain the majority for long. Furthermore, although the Jews are currently in a majority in Israel, they are a miniscule minority (about 2%) in an otherwise Arab region of nearly 300 million people (Milgram, Geisis, Katz & Haskaya, 2008, p. 3), a point Israeli political leaders often make.

C. RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION

The religious composition of Israel has also changed over time (as depicted in Table 1), with a strong correlation between ethnicity and religion. Aside from the Jewish population, most other religious groups consist predominantly of ethnic Arabs. Of note, a snapshot of the religious composition of Palestine in 1922 and again in 1947 just before Israel became a state shows an even greater increase in the Jewish population.

Table 1. Religious Group Population Summary: Israel and Palestine

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>Jewish</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Christian</th>
<th>Druze</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>75.6%</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>81.9%</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>85.4%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>85.1%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>(data combined)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>Jewish</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Christian</th>
<th>Druze</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>33.24%</td>
<td>58.06%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>11.14%</td>
<td>78.3%</td>
<td>7.86%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.84%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D. RELIGION AND GOVERNANCE

From a historical perspective, the way in which Israel was formed makes it difficult to clearly delineate between religion and nation (Kimmerling, 2008, p. 231). The state of Israel was not established politically or militarily, but rather by a group of Europeans who sought a safe haven after the Holocaust and after the devastation of

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2 Data presented is from Central Bureau of Statistics-Israel (does not include West Bank or Gaza Strip) (2010, "Population, by Religion” section) and MidEast web (Iseroff, 2007, Table A-2).

3 The 1947 entries reflect estimated data from MidEast web (Iseroff, 2007, Table 3).
Jewish culture and everyday life in Eastern Europe, tragedies that fueled the desire to actively build a Jewish state (Sprinzak, 1991, p. 11; Dudinski, 1996, p. 66). Initially, during the British mandate period from 1920–1948, an elected body of Jews officially oversaw “Jewish communal affairs” setting the stage for politics to come (Long & Reich, 1980, p. 323). Essentially, Israel inherited a millet system which granted religious communities autonomy and jurisdiction in personal matters (Kimmerling, 2008, p. 232). Under this system, citizens are subjected to two separate legal and judicial systems that operate according to…opposing principles. One is secular, Western, and universalistic; the other is religious and primordial, and is mainly run…according to the orthodox interpretation of halakha” (p. 232). Even religious minorities in Israel have been affected by this dual system of governance (pp. 232–233). Further, Israel’s Jewish religious law impinges on practically all aspects of daily life (Englard, 1987, p. 191). Ironically, with this dual system, religion affects governance, further dividing Jews and Arabs in Israel.

With respect to governance, Israel is a parliamentary republic consisting of the legislative branch (called the Knesset), the executive branch (the cabinet, led by the Prime Minister), and a symbolic president elected by the Knesset who serves as head of state (Long & Reich, 1980, pp. 11, 331–332, Table 1.4). The 120-member Knesset seats representatives from all major political parties (including minority Arab parties) usually formed “to reflect ethnic or religious groupings” (Iseroff, 2007, “Israeli Political System and Parties” section). The government rules by Basic Laws that comprise an unwritten constitution (Kimmerling, 2008, p. 330). Although the government is officially considered to be secular, religion and state are not formally separated because of the significance religion had in initially forming the government (Long & Reich, 1980, pp. 328, 335). At the time of independence, Israel recognized Orthodox Judaism as the official religion for its Jewish citizens (Edelman, 2000, p. 204). Moreover, the state provides finances to build and maintain synagogues and even some mosques and to pay religious leaders’ salaries, all of which is sustained by a governmental department created specifically for such affairs (Hazan & Maor, 2000, p. 78; Englard, 1987, p. 192). The intermingling of religion and state is also seen in Israel’s commitment to a constitutional system that promotes both a Jewish and democratic state, which has fueled ongoing
disagreement about how best to synthesize the two ideas into one constitutional output, causing further divisions and conflict since nearly 20 percent of Israel’s citizens are not Jewish (Hirschl, 2004, p. 1833).

Throughout Israel’s history, the relationship between religion and politics has varied based on which party or leader is in power. The political parties are often divided by country and region of origin, left or right wing beliefs, and policy disagreements, thereby demonstrating that a common religious identity is not enough to unite them (p. 191). When the right-wing Likud party came to power in 1977 by unseating the Labor party, which had previously dominated Israeli politics the Likud rejected possible partition of Palestine from Israel because they believed the land belonged to Greater Israel (Shlaim, 2009, p. 154, 170). Conversely, when the Labor party returned to power in 1992, the concept of land for peace once again came to the fore (p. 171). Surprisingly, the idea of partition was revived when the Likud party was returned to power by a large majority in 2001 with the election of Ariel Sharon as prime minister, although overall voter turnout was low due to boycotts by Palestinian Arabs (Kimmerling, 2008, p. 329). Ironically, soon after, Hamas—a terrorist group according to the U.S. government that is an offspring of the Muslim Brotherhood with an Islamist agenda for Palestine—was democratically elected to power in Gaza in 2006 (p. 333).

E. COMMON SOURCES OF INSTABILITY

One basis for instability in Israel is having two nationalist entities in a political structure that fails to recognize the rights of one, the Arabs (Pappe & Meir, 2000, p. 2). As soon as Palestine was chosen as the new homeland for the Jews there was a contradiction. While Jews could finally create their own state and history, to an extent these decisions were made by the British, who were weakened by war and were losing their ability to exert their influence in Palestine (Wheatcroft, 1996, p. 237). The British extended to the Jewish minority the “right to national self-determination…while implicitly denying that right to the majority [Arabs who] constituted roughly 91 percent of the population” (Shlaim, 2009, p. 11). It can even be argued that Great Britain
overstepped its moral bounds in its promise [of] a national home for a tiny Jewish minority in a predominantly Arab country,” a formula that foreshadowed failure from the outset (p. 23).

In reality, the Jewish homeland was established thanks to conquest rather than by consent, so that Zionist ideas ended up being adopted at a time in history when the popularity of both imperialism and colonialism were on the wane (Wheatcroft, 1996, p. 118). Israel’s success depended on bridging the gap between two competing nationalisms—Palestinian and Jewish—appealing to two distinct ethnic communities, and [involving] one land,” both sides bearing the heavy baggage of history, ideology and distorted images of the other” (Shlaim, 2009, pp. 25–26). The Arabs considered the Jewish takeover unjust because they were not responsible for the way the Jews in Europe had been treated, yet were ultimately forced to pay the price (p. xii). Because of this, Arabs not only rejected Jews’ right to an independent existence in Palestine, but they really could not accept Jews as a sovereign entity in the Land of Israel” (p. 26). Basically, while Jewish immigrants saw the return to their biblical homeland as their religious right, Arabs saw them as strangers, Europeans, whites, and a corrupting influence on their moral, traditional society and agents of the Western colonial world order” (Kimmerling, 2008, p. 276).

In order to stabilize the region, the only choices available to Zionists were either to base Jewish life in Palestine on militarism and imperialism” or to disregard the idea of a Jewish National Home (Wheatcroft, 1996, p. 181). To preserve the vision of Israel as a Jewish state after the 1949 armistice agreements, the Jews therefore placed Arabs under military control and restricted their ability to travel (Long & Reich, 1980, p. 325). It became increasingly difficult to socially integrate the Arabs due to their separate schooling, their not serving in the army, and their living in separate villages, further establishing Israeli Arabs as a non-assimilating minority with their own culture, language, and identity” (Long & Reich, 1980, p. 326; Dowty, 1999, p. 6). These separations only intensified over time.

Ultimately, the major source of conflict in Israel stems from the fact that Palestinian Arabs have never been extended fully equal rights (Dowty, 1999, p. 2).
Formal structures, such as the Law of Return,” excludes non-Jews (p. 4). This exclusionary Jewish Law of Return gives full citizenship and benefits to Jews who immigrate to Israel, a right that is not extended to non-Jewish immigrants (Hirschel, 2004, p. 1845; Long & Reich, 1980, p. 325). The Israeli government likewise extends citizenship to its Jewish settlers beyond the Green Line without guaranteeing that opportunity to Palestinians, while also failing to enforce clear property rights (Dowty, 1999, p. 2). Constant conflict between the Palestinians and Jews has occurred as Israeli settlements continue to encroach on Arab land. The government has often ignored and even encouraged this act, even supporting settlers’ requests for land. As some analysts have written, by doing so they have diverted national-religious ambitions to the periphery, away from traditional power bases of the ruling mainstream elites” (International Crisis Group, 2009, p. 3).

Indeed, some researchers believe there is a significant domestic political dimension to the issue of settlements. For example, Natasha Dudinski (1996) writes that in Israel, the unhappy synthesis of democracy and theocracy is a result of the religious parties’ ability to impose religious law on the largely secular society” (p. 5). Dudinski further explains that tensions between Arabs and Jews are ethnic or national-political tensions, not, except on rare occasions, religious tensions. On the other hand, since Jewish national identity is conditioned upon Jewish religious membership, members of other religions cannot enjoy the same status as Jews even if they are prepared to integrate themselves into the Jewish nation” (p. 16).

In the end, when it comes to compromise, Arabs have more of an incentive to establish contact with Jews than the reverse, given that privilege, status and power reside with the Jewish majority” (Milgram, Geisis, Katz, & Haskaya, 2008, p. 110). Studies have shown that Jews who want to improve relations with their Israeli Arab counterparts also prefer a two-state solution, not wanting to expel Arabs from any part of Israel even if conditions were such that this were feasible (p. 112). However, conflicts over religion, language, ethnicity, ethno-national sovereignty, land, and historical and cultural traditions” make negotiations in Israel extremely difficult; especially since the majority Jews are a minority elsewhere regionally and globally, leaving little incentive to fully
compromise (p. 114). Over time, the willingness to compromise has ebbed and flowed depending on which party is in power. For example, when the Likud party took power in 1977, it refused to compromise over land and would not address partition (Shlaim, 2009, p. 154). Likud supporters were for a “Greater Israel… [where] Judea and Samaria, the biblical terms for the West Bank, are an integral part of…the Land of Israel” (p. 170). Conversely, when the Labor party returned to power in 1992 it promised autonomy to the Palestinians since Labor voters supported partition and land for peace agreements (Kimmerling, 2008, p. 321; Shlaim, 2009, p. 171).

F. RELIGION AS GLUE

Religious symbolism was used to bolster Zionism, highlighted by the movement’s adoption of the Old Testament Hebrew language (p. 123). However, not all immigrants moved to Israel to support Zionism or pursue religious fulfillment. Ironically, the creation of Israel prompted increased persecution of Jews in Arab countries, whether or not they supported Zionism, prompting new waves of non-European Jewish immigration (p. 47). Religion provided these immigrants a tie to those already there (Kimmerling, 2008, pp. 8, 123). In fact, religion provided the people from varying backgrounds with a common set of beliefs and practices and something for the state to build a sense of nationalism around. Once various groups of Jews immigrated to Israel, “the social boundaries of the collectivity were formed by the Jewish religion” (pp. 87, 123). Furthermore, with increasing Arab-Israeli conflict, religion played a role in legitimizing the “existence of the [Jewish] collectivity as a political entity in the Middle East” (p. 87). Although not all Jews were Zionists, Jewish identity provided immediate inclusion in the collectivity (p. 87).

Ultimately, since religion was the one thing all Jews had in common, “religion was the principal solution to the problem of linking nation to land” (Kimmerling, 2008, p. 87). Many Western scholars might argue that combining religion and nationalism in the modern nation-state system does not work well, and especially not in democracies (Juergensmeyer, 1995, p. 386). The Israeli case seems to bear this out when one moves beyond the integration of Jews to the inclusion of Arabs. Although efforts to integrate
Arabs into Israeli society have consisted of…link[ing] them economically and politically,” no such attempts have been made to assimilate them –culturally or socially, to the larger society” (Dudinski, 1996, p. 48).

The ties between Judaism as a religion and the Jewish national identity have never been clearly articulated (Edelman, 2000, p. 209). Although Israel’s Orthodox communities seek to preserve the status quo of Israel being a Jewish state, its non-Orthodox citizens increasingly seek to promote religious pluralism which they consider crucial to stability (Edelman, 2000, pp. 204). According to Mark Juergensmeyer (1993), nationalist and religious ties are similar because “both are expressions of faith, both involve an identity with and a loyalty to a large community, and both insist on the ultimate moral legitimacy of the authority invested in the leadership of that community” (p. 16), making the “relationship between religion and nationalism mutually destructive,” and enabling religion to inappropriately intertwine with politics (p. 210). To some degree, secularists in Israel have attempted to overcome this volatile combination by shifting from what started as an “ethno-religious or cultural identity,” to more of a “national and territorial identity” (Kimmerling, 2008, p. 279).

As it is, “Israelis’ sense of ‘Jewishness’ is increasingly defined by the Zionist experience of living in Israel and not by an affinity with the Jewish religious tradition” (Cohen & Rynhold, 2005, p 8). Zionism’s aim has been to unite secular and non-secular Jews in order to create a new Jewish nationalism with a focus on national liberation; however, those secular Zionists who subscribe to this nationalism have had difficulty with the fact that others believe that Judaism defines every part of their “individual, collective, and national” existence without a distinction between secular and religious law” (Rubinstein, 1984, pp. 37–38). It was and still is difficult to fully describe the State of Israel as secular since it was formed as a Jewish homeland and the question of who was a Jew was decided on religious grounds,” and the connection between religion and being a Jew is too intense to remain religiously neutral (Wheatcroft, 1996, p. 266; Yakobson, 2008, p. 2).

In other words, while it was important to Jews to use religion and nationalism to help overcome a legacy of persecution, this was done at the expense of the Arabs.
Amongst Jews themselves, religion has created bonds across people who emigrated from very different regions. But across religions in Israel this has only led to trouble.

**G. CASE CONCLUSIONS**

Today, the majority of the Jewish population in Israel identifies itself as secular, and Arabs continue to echo the sentiment that the only formula for peace is separation of religion from state matters (Dudinski, 1996, p. 3). Although groups like Hamas and Hizbullah formed to fight the Israeli occupation, they have not been able to prevail (Robinson, 2007, p. 94). Neither they nor Israel have proved capable of ending the ongoing conflict, so presumably Israel must find some common ground between democratically serving all its residents while simultaneously pursuing more “particularistic goals” that appeal to the Jewish people’s sense of ethnic and religious nationalism (Dowty, 1999, p. 5).

Because the Jews were essentially ceded control of an already occupied region, they were destined for difficulties from the start. Outside of Israel, when a Jew “needed to keep his…ethnic or religious identity, [he] became a French Jew or Jewish French”; however, the problem with Israel being established as a Jewish state is that it is impossible to “fuse Jewish and Christian, Jewish and Muslim, or Jewish and Buddhist” because this “implies that Jews are a nation, and Judaism is a Jewish national identity” (Kimmerling, 2008, p. 230). Ironically, prior to the establishment of the state of Israel, Jews were arguably better off in the Muslim world because they never had to take on an identity other than being Jewish.

Not only did the Jewish identity of the new Israeli state help reverse the population balance between Arabs and Jews in Palestine, it also secured the Jews’ status as a predominant influence there (Pappe & Meir, 2000, p. 1). Moreover, the distinctiveness of the Jewish tradition produced a strong sense of nationalism which stoked the desire for establishing a Jewish homeland in a place that tied people to their history (Rubinstein, 1984, pp. 17, 27). The government then used in-gathering of the Jews to expand beyond the 1947 boundaries, further fueling many Jews’ sense of national destiny (Liebman & Don-Yehiya, 1983, p. 132; Yakobson, 2008, p. 2). Consequently,
tensions persist. Ethnic and religious differences continue to divide the country, and the history of how grievances have accumulated leaves few satisfying solutions. In the final analysis, if Arabs and Jews would be willing to compromise on land rights the best solution could be partition. Otherwise, both groups are likely to remain unable to find a common identity to supersede religion.
IV. IRAN CASE STUDY

In 1979, the Islamic Revolution catapulted Iran into the international spotlight and stunned the Western world by overthrowing the secularist Pahlavi regime to build an Islamic state (Feldman, 2003, p. 87). Even today, Iran remains a uniquely enduring example of religious rule in a modern political system (Juergensmeyer, 2008, p. 47). Overall, the Islamic identity of the new republic provided the desired cohesion to unify the multi-ethnic nation, although some ethnic disputes and religious discrimination linger; at the same time, the tight structural connection between religious power and the government has created an acute crisis threatening Iran’s future.

A. BACKGROUND

Iran first emerged during the Achaemenid Dynasty in 6th century BCE and has been ruled by successive Greek, Arab, Turkic, and Mongol dynasties, leading to a mélange of many cultures (U.S. Library of Congress, 2008, p. 1). In 1501 AD, the Safavid dynasty created the first strong centralized state and used Shi’ism to unify the population and distinguish Iran from hostile Sunni neighbors” (Keddie, 1986, p. 158). This identity may have served as proto-nationalism, but its boundaries were indistinct given pan-Islamic sentiments. Also, the clergy was only informally invested in politics whenever it cared for societal needs (Vaziri, 1993, pp. 172, 173). The Qajar dynasty finally eliminated autonomous provinces in the late 1800s and held power through the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 (Mojab & Hassampour, 1995, p. 231). The Qajar state suppressed the revolutionary movement in 1911, but fell to a coup d’etat led by Reza Khan Pahlavi in 1921 (Mojab & Hassampour, 1995, p. 231; Mojtahed-Zadeh, 2007, p. 26). Starting in 1925, the Pahlavi monarchy launched a campaign to unify the nation under a centralized, secular state (Mojab & Hassampour, 1995, p. 231). Borrowing from European success in solidifying nations by mandating a common language, Pahlavi hoped to bridge ethnic populations by mandating Farsi and even arresting minorities who spoke in Kurdish (Vaziri, 1993, p. 176; Mojab & Hassampour, 1995, p. 231). However, in part thanks to his support of Germany in World War II, Allied forces pressured Reza Shah to abdicate to his son Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in 1941 (Keddie, 2003, p. 105).
Iran’s post–World War II history is similarly volatile. Following the war, the Pahlavi regime faced domestic social and economic crises that built popular support for Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq while also engendering increased foreign interference to resist Mossadeq’s oil reforms (Keddie, 2003, pp. 110, 128). With covert Western assistance, Pahlavi removed Mossadeq’s nationalist regime, paving the way for dictatorial rule and a rejuvenated modernization program (pp. 132–133). The Shah’s secular reforms and continued marginalization of the clergy provoked opposition (pp. 222–223). The clergy ultimately formed an alliance with secular leftist groups and found mass support among members of the merchant –bazaari‖ class frustrated by economic policies, as well as urban immigrants disgruntled about unemployment (pp. 233, 227-228). Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini’s popularity quickly grew and, following a short revolution, Khomeini’s coalition seized power in February 1979 (pp. 225, 238). At that time, the leftists and moderates lacked the unity to resist Khomeini’s theocratic vision (p. 243). He dominated the drafting of the constitution and consolidated his power by late 1980 (pp. 247, 252).

Iran’s complex history prompts some to label it –a very old country but a new modern state,‖ belonging neither with early modernizers like England, France, Japan and Turkey nor with those countries gaining independence following World War II (Keddie, 1986, p. 158). Some even claim that Iran remains a multi-national Persian-dominated empire, and resembles the Russian-dominated Soviet Union more than a nation-state (Bradley, 2006, p. 3).

B. ETHNIC COMPOSITION

Based on its long and dynamic history, Iran unsurprisingly contains many diverse ethnic groups. According to the CIA (2011c), the current population of Iran totals over 77 million, comprised of Persians (61%), Azerbaijani Turks (Azerbaijani for short) (16%), Kurds (10%), Lurs (6%), Arabs (2%), Baluchis (2%), Turkmen (1%), Qashqai (1%), and other non-Persian, non-Turkic peoples (–People and Society‖ section). Each of these ethnic groups constitutes either a majority or a significant minority in some region in Iran and speaks a distinct language (Hooglund, 2008, pp. 91–92, 295). Table 2 summarizes ethnic population data between 1977 and 2006. Earlier ethnic assessments
are not available because censuses during the Pahlavi dynasty did not record ethnicity (Higgins, 1986, Table 6.2). In 1977, estimates from academic sources place the population at 34 million with minority ethnicities comprising a greater portion of society: Persians (50%), Azerbaijanis (26%), Kurds (10%), Lurs (3%), Arabs (1.7%), and Baluchis (1.7%) (Table 6.2). More official sources validate these estimates; for instance, the 1986 population distribution roughly mirrored the pre-revolution ethnic composition, although the Persian community expanded to 59% of the total population of 45 million while the proportion of other ethnic groups declined slightly (U.S. Library of Congress, 1986, Table 3).

Overall, the ethnic composition of Iran has remained quite diverse over the last 35 years, with Persians comprising a healthy and growing majority while other ethnic groups maintain distinct languages and influence in separate areas.

C. RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION

In Iran, Shia Muslims comprise the overwhelming majority of the population, with Sunni Muslims and other non-Muslim faith groups constituting minority communities, which have declined since the revolution. Notably, sectarian divisions often align with ethnic divisions. Today, Shia Muslims constitute approximately 89% of the population and include most Persians, Azerbaijanis, Lurs, Arabs, and Qashqai (Crane, Lal & Martini, 2008, pp. 40–41). Sunni Muslims comprise approximately 9% of the population, most of whom are Kurds (although a significant minority of Kurds are Shi‘ite) (p. 40). The remainder is nearly all Baluchis and Turkmens, with a small number of Arabs (p. 40). Non-Muslim groups include Armenian Christians, Assyrian Christians, Zoroastrians, Baha‘is, Jews, and Protestant Christians of Persian or Azeri descent (Hooglund, 2008, p. 295). These total less than 1% of the country’s population (p. 295). In contrast, prior to the revolution, non-Muslim communities comprised over 2% of the Iranian population in 1977, more than double the current ratio (Higgins, 1986, Table 6.2). In terms of population totals, most non-Muslims groups have declined slightly while the remaining population has approximately doubled in size. More significantly, Jews have
decreased from 85,000 in 1978 to about 25,000 today (Hooglund, 2008, p. 131). In sum, Iran contains substantial ethnic diversity, but dwindling non-Muslim populations as summarized in Table 2.

### Table 2. Ethnic and Religious Group Population Summary: Iran

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Religious affiliation</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>2006 70 million total</th>
<th>1986 46 million total</th>
<th>19775 34 million total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Persians</td>
<td>Shia</td>
<td>Central plateau</td>
<td>45.5 million—65%</td>
<td>26.6 million—59%</td>
<td>17 million—50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijani</td>
<td>Shia</td>
<td>Northwest</td>
<td>11.2 million—16%</td>
<td>11.5 million—25%</td>
<td>9 million—26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurds</td>
<td>75% Sunni</td>
<td>Northwest mtns.</td>
<td>4.8 million—7%</td>
<td>4 million—9%</td>
<td>3.5 million—10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lurs</td>
<td>Shia</td>
<td>West mountains</td>
<td>4 million—6%</td>
<td>800,000—2%</td>
<td>1 million—3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabs</td>
<td>Mostly Shia</td>
<td>South, Southwest</td>
<td>1.3 million—1.9%</td>
<td>530,000—1.2%</td>
<td>600,000—1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baluchis</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Southeast</td>
<td>800,000—1.2%</td>
<td>600,000—1.3%</td>
<td>600,000—1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenes</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>600,000—0.8%</td>
<td>250,000—0.6%</td>
<td>500,000—1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qashqai and other tribes</td>
<td>Shia</td>
<td>Southeast, various</td>
<td>600,000—0.8%</td>
<td>500,000—1.1%</td>
<td>400,000—1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenians</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Tehran, NW cities</td>
<td>300,000—0.4%</td>
<td>250,000—0.5%</td>
<td>270,000—0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assyrians</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Tehran, Orumiyeh</td>
<td>32,000—0.05%</td>
<td>32,000—0.07%</td>
<td>32,000—0.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>Judaism</td>
<td>Tehran, cities</td>
<td>25,000—0.04%</td>
<td>50,000—0.1%</td>
<td>85,000—0.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zoroastrians</td>
<td>Zoroastrian</td>
<td>Tehran, Yazd</td>
<td>32,000—0.05%</td>
<td>32,000—0.07%</td>
<td>36,000—0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baha’i</td>
<td>Baha’i</td>
<td>Major cities</td>
<td>250,000—0.4%</td>
<td>350,000—0.8%</td>
<td>300,000—0.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### D. RELIGION AND GOVERNANCE

Following the revolution, Iran instituted a new Islamic Republic government with a theoretical separation of powers, though the clergy continues to dominate politics. Based on Khomeini’s creation and interpretation of *Velayat-e Faqih* (guardianship of the

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5 Since official censuses under the Pahlavi regime did not record ethnicity, the estimated population data for 1977 attempts to reconcile values from several academic sources, but may contain inaccuracies (Higgins, 1986, Table 6.2).

6 Early estimates of the nomadic Luri tribes such as the Bakhtiari may have been flawed while their continued migration to towns and villages may make recent census data more accurate (Hooglund, 2008, p. 95).

7 During the war with Iraq, the concentrated fighting in the southwestern Arab region of Khuzestan may account for the decline in the Arab population during this period through death or displacement (Bradley, 2006, para. 9).
jurisprudent) to justify clerical rule, the constitution grants substantial power to the faqih (Leader of the Revolution—an expert in religious law selected by an 86-member body of senior clergymen) (Jahanbegloo, 2010, p. 23; Gasiorowski, 2008, p. 220). The faqih establishes state policy, declares war and peace, commands the armed forces, and appoints and dismisses members of the Guardians Council, judiciary heads, and military commanders (pp. 218–219). The president, elected by popular vote every four years, is functionally the second-highest government official and is limited to two consecutive terms (p. 221). The legislative branch consists of a 290-seat Majlis (parliament) with five seats reserved for religious Christian, Jewish, and Zoroastrian minorities (pp. 221). The 12-member Guardians Council, all directly or indirectly selected by the Leader, has veto authority over Majlis-passed legislation deemed un-Islamic or unconstitutional, and approves presidential candidates based on their Shia Islamic credentials and demonstrated dedication to the principles of the revolution (pp. 221–222). When planning for his succession, Khomeini pushed through constitutional amendments that “increased the political and decreased the religious nature” of the Leader and formalized his control of policy, military and security forces, the judiciary, and the media before handing over the Islamic Republic to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in 1989 (Keddie, 2003, p. 261). Khamenei remains a dominant figure in Iranian politics today (Takeyh, 2006, p. 33).

Worth noting is that there is ambiguity and the friction of “dual sovereignty” in deriving authority from and promising accountability to both the people through elections and the clergy (Gasiorowski, 2008, pp. 224–225). Immediately following the revolution, Khomeini’s popularity blocked dissension, but by the late 1990s President Muhammad Khatami began promoting the concept of popular sovereignty and declared that the Islamic Republic belongs to the people (Masroori, 2007, pp. 184, 186). Perhaps not surprisingly, over the past 15 years, popular will has become more assertive and has manifested itself in several political movements. As the moral capital associated with institutions in the post-Khomeini era continues to fade, the political legitimacy crisis intensifies (Jahanbegloo, 2010, p. 27).

According to the constitution, political parties consistent with the principles of independence, freedom, national unity, the criteria of Islam, or the basis of the Islamic
republic” are permitted, but were not legalized until legislation passed in 1998 (Gasiorowski, 2008, p. 229). The constitutional and statute protections still do not extend to proponents of “Islamic democracy” (p. 232). However, since Khomeini’s death, at least three broad movements or coalitions of groups have emerged (p. 229). First, President Rafsanjani led the “pragmatist” movement aimed at economic reform, though hard-line conservatives blocked many of his policies (Takeyh, 2006, pp. 42–43). Following Rafsanjani, President Khatami burst onto the scene in 1997, garnering 70% of the votes cast by more than 80% of eligible voters (Feldman, 2003, p. 90). Khatami campaigned on a “reformist” platform of democratization, personal freedoms, and rule of law (Masroori, 2007, p. 174). However, the Guardians Council and judiciary routinely blocked his civil liberty and ethnic reforms, causing a stalemate and voter apathy for the 2005 elections (Crane et al., 2008, pp. 29–30). With reform momentum dwindling, a “conservative” candidate proved able to mobilize the lower classes by focusing on economic inequality (Takeyh, 2006, p. 37). President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected in a surprise victory (p. 37). Then, Ahmadinejad’s 2009 re-election led to popular demonstrations and accusations of fraud (U.S. Library of Congress, 2009, pp. 6–7). In short, though tension has been building, the complex system and virtually unchecked power of the Leader make change difficult. Even so, the fact remains that three distinct policy periods over the course of thirty-two years demonstrate that the Islamic Republic is not a static system. Currently, the regime is in the grip of a legitimacy crisis.

E. COMMON SOURCES OF INSTABILITY

Since the Islamic Revolution, Iran has faced domestic instability from ethnic groups and international pressure for religious minority rights. The first wave of ethnic instability came during regime consolidation. The second took place over the last decade. Immediately after the revolution, Kurds, Turkmen, Baluchis, Arabs, and Azerbaijanis demanded their cultural, linguistic, and economic autonomy in a federated system (Mojab & Hassampour, 1995, p. 235; Shaffer, 2002, p. 85). The regime, in contrast, appealed to Islamic brotherhood to bind the nation (Vaziri, 1993, p. 199). Where violence broke out, the regime suppressed movements quickly, except in Kurdistan where insurgents held territory until July 1984 (Mojab & Hassampour, 1995, p. 235; Keddie, 2003, p. 254).
Given that both the Azerbaijanis and Kurds had established autonomous republics to reject "Persianization" policies in 1945, Tehran was anxious to contain any new revolt, and the population (at least the Persian population) supported strengthening the central government (pp. 111, 245). Interestingly, after the revolution, the Azerbaijani resistance lasted less than a month, mostly because the Azerbaijanis participated in and identified with the revolution (Shaffer, 2002, pp. 78, 84). Overall, ethnic groups sought a more federated system and ethnic rights, not secession.

Many attribute the resurgence of ethnic identities and conflict to Khatami’s reformist policies, although geopolitical considerations played a significant role as well (Bayat, 2005, p. 43). Even today, the central government worries that greater freedoms for co-ethnics in newly federated Iraq and Afghanistan may spark secessionist movements (Zambelis, 2007, para. 1). In 2005–2006, the government’s attempts to repress movements in ethnic areas sparked violence in at least three regions. In Khuzestan during 2005, three waves of bombings and riots erupted in response to a leaked letter by Vice President Abtahi (which he denies and calls a forgery); according to the letter, the government planned to expel ethnic Arabs from the oil-rich region and replace them with Persians (Bradley, 2007, p. 185). At least 20 people were reportedly killed during these riots, and allegedly many of those arrested were summarily executed by security forces (p. 184). Elsewhere, Iranian soldiers have been battling the militant Jundallah group in Baluchistan, and reports claim 40 deaths and 700 arrests occurred during clashes with the security forces in Kurdish zones during 2006 (Bradley, 2007, p. 186; Bradley, 2006, para. 30).

One common feature appears to be Tehran’s uneven economic and development policies (Hooglund, 2008, p. 128). In Baluchistan, the Sunni population is afflicted with 35–50% unemployment, while Tehran complains about the general lawlessness and booming drug trade (Bradley, 2007, p. 186; Rubin, 2005, para. 14). Similarly, the Arabs complain that though the state’s financial lifeblood flows through their lands, the government still has not installed a functioning sewer (Bradley, 2006, paras. 9, 11). Despite dissatisfaction with Tehran, recent surveys indicate that political activists in the major ethnic groups (e.g., Kurds, Azerbaijanis, Baluchis, and Arabs) almost unanimously
want equality or autonomy but not secession (Khorshidi, Fee, & Soltani, 2010, p. 273). They seek only to "change Tehran's policies, not Iran's borders" (Shaffer, 2006, para. 12). Overall, Iran's socioeconomic and media control policies exacerbate ethnic tensions, but these conflicts are not insoluble.

Although the religious identity of the new Iranian state offers a platform for stability, the religious minorities experience institutionalized and social discrimination. While none of these groups possesses domestic influence over the government, the plight of religious minorities does generate international criticism. Even Sunni Muslims complain about bureaucratic attempts to bar construction of their mosques (International Federation of Human Rights [IFHR], 2003, p. 6). More institutionalized discrimination occurs against non-Muslims, including the "recognized religious minorities" identified in Article 13 of the Constitution: Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian Iranians (p. 6). Although granted the opportunity to practice their religious rites, they are forced to observe Islamic codes of behavior in public and are governed by penal and civil regulations, limited in employment and education, and restricted to five designated seats in the 290-seat Majlis (U.S. Library of Congress, 2008, p. 6; IFHR, pp. 6–10). Iranian Jews in particular experience greater insecurity whenever there are spikes in hostility between Iran and Israel, thereby leading many to emigrate (Hooglund, 2008, p. 132).

While these restrictions chafe, the Baha'is—considered heretical by mainstream Muslims—are not only denied constitutional protection, but are actively persecuted by the state (IFHR, 2003, p. 11). The small, geographically dispersed population poses no real threat to the state, and their aggressive persecution appears to be symbolic. It is certainly a major reason Iran is considered a human rights violator in the international arena. Dozens of Baha'is are arrested annually and over 200 have been executed since 1980, to include as recently as 1998 (IFHR, 2003, pp. 12–13; Crane et al., 2008, p. 43). Additionally, when discovered, Baha'is are denied education, employment, and property.

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8 Zoroastrianism, which originated in the region in the 7th century BC, is recognized as a possible monotheistic precursor to Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (see http://www.religionfacts.com/zoroastrianism/index.htm). As such, Zoroastrians are protected while Baha'is are deemed heretical and persecuted (Hooglund, 2008, pp. 129–131).

Compared to the instability generated from ethnic conflicts and religious discrimination, by far the greatest source of instability recently has been the youth movement, which erupted in Iran after the disputed 2009 presidential election. Following a contentious campaign, the Iranian population was stunned when incumbent President Ahmadinejad was declared the winner of the 2009 election with 62% of the votes cast (U.S. Library of Congress, 2009, pp. 3–5). Accusations of fraud quickly mounted (pp. 5–7). Despite the ban on unauthorized public gatherings, an estimated several hundred thousand protesters, frustrated by the government’s blatant disregard for the rules, flooded the streets of Tehran, resulting in at least 27 deaths over a two week period (U.S. Library of Congress, pp. 7–8; Afshari, 2009, p. 844). Many analysts considered Iran to be at a crossroads, between liberal democratic reform and a military coup (U.S. Library of Congress, 2009, p. 10; Abootalebi, 2009, p. 14). The roots of the turmoil can be traced back to the two conflicting principles of sovereignty in the Islamic Republic’s constitution — "authority based on divine will" and "the will of the people" (Jahanbegloo, 2010, p. 24).

Facing the choice between greater democracy and authoritarianism, Ahmadinejad chose to tighten control. Ramin Jahanbegloo (2010), a political science professor and native Iranian, describes Ahmadinejad’s attempts to "elos[e] the chapter of popular sovereignty by giving new life to the authoritarian structure of the Islamic republic and removing any space for dissent" (p. 28). In the year following the 2009 election, protests were driven underground, two dissidents were executed while six others remained on death row, and the regime continued to disrupt mass media (Human Rights Watch, 2010, paras. 2, 4, 8). In February 2011, a fresh wave of protests erupted when Majlis members called for the prosecution of Mir Hossein Moussavi and Mehdi Karroubi, the presidential candidates defeated by Ahmadinejad and symbolic leaders of the protest movement (MacFarquhar & Cowell, 2011, para. 10). This is noteworthy since previous regimes resisted directly harassing popular leaders (Feldman, 2003, p. 90). Protesters escalated in
turn by chanting against Khamenei and the entire regime instead of just targeting Ahmadinejad (MacFarquhar & Cowell, 2011, para. 22). As of this writing, the legitimacy crisis in Iran generated by contradictory dual sources of sovereignty appears to be intensifying.

The highly-politicized younger generation knows the potential for revolutionary change to devastate a society and is inspired by the non-violent protests of Moussavi’s Green Movement, but lacks organization (Amuzegar, 2003, p. 50; Jahanbegloo, 2010, p. 29). A youth bulge generated by reproductive policies and health system improvements early in Khomeini’s regime has distorted the population; the 16–50 year old demographic accounts for 59% of the voting population while revolutionary participants (now over 50) account for only 15% (Keddie, 2003, p. 315; U.S. Census Bureau, 2011, Iran data). Although politicized, the youth gravitate to practical policy issues more than to ideological discourse (Afshari, 2009, pp. 848, 850). Additionally, whereas religious symbols were routinely used during the Islamic Revolution, today Ahmadinejad’s clumsy appeals to Shi’ite symbols alienate some devout followers as debasing the religion, perhaps indicating their greater desire to redirect religion away from the political arena (p. 846). Frustrated by the reform stalemate, hollow rhetoric, and economic hardship, members of the younger generation appear poised and have the numbers to challenge the regime (Alamdari, 2005, p. 1299). But, standing in their way are just ten to twelve million supporters of Khamenei and Ahmadinejad, and these conservative forces have all of the guns (Majd, 2009, p. xvi).

F. RELIGION AS GLUE

Given Iran’s multi-ethnic composition, religion provides an overarching path to nationalism and a potentially helpful method of binding the population, though some lingering issues remain. Importantly, the fact that many ethnic minorities have co-ethnics in neighboring countries (e.g., Azerbaijani in Azerbaijan; Kurds and Arabs in Iraq; Turkmen in Turkmenistan; and Baluchis in both Afghanistan and Pakistan) places stresses on national cohesion (Bradley, 2007, p. 182). This is particularly the case whenever nationalism is thought of in ethnic terms. In contrast to Shah Pahlavi’s ill-defined ‘Iranian’ identity that failed to deliver a much coveted unified nation given his
clumsy dismissal of ethnic traditions as local manifestations of “Persian” culture, Khomeini’s effort largely succeeded (Vaziri, 1993, p. 198; Mojab & Hassampour, 1995, pp. 232, 234; Juergensmeyer, 2008, p. 36). The effectiveness of Khomeini’s religious nationalism may have surprised Saddam Hussein when he invaded Iran in 1980, expecting to be welcomed as a liberator by the Arabs in Khuzestan and to win an easy victory against the nascent Islamic regime (Bradley, 2006, p. 184). Instead, the Iranian Arabs rallied around the Iranian flag, perhaps because they knew about Saddam Hussein’s persecution of Shi’ites in Iraq (Rubin, 2005, para. 8; Bradley, 2007, p. 184).

Further evidence for the greater cohesiveness religious nationalism can offer may be drawn from the differing responses of the Kurds and the Azerbaijanis after the Islamic Revolution. Although both ethnic groups had previously declared their autonomy from the Shah’s regime, after 1979 the Kurds sustained a multi-year rebellion while the Azerbaijanis worked to integrate themselves into the state (Higgins, 1986, p. 189). The new regime’s Shi’ite-based nationalism drew the Azerbaijanis into the mainstream while the Kurds remained marginalized as an out-group, now based on sectarian beliefs instead of ethnicity (pp. 186, 190). Perhaps this explains why Azerbaijanis did not seek independence and the Kurds did. In addition, as a result of being better integrated ideologically via the new Iranian nationalism, Azerbaijanis have been increasingly better integrated economically and professionally (Shaffer, 2002, pp. 213–214). However, the fact that they still encounter residual social status bias and crass jokes about their ethnic inferiority indicates that the more inclusive religious nationalism has not eradicated ethnic friction altogether (Shaffer, 2002, p. 213; Majd, 2009, p. 166).

While an alternative nationalism narrative could make the regime more tolerant of ethnic differences, to include language, the state has not consistently honored language rights, perhaps indicating the regime’s unease with embracing the ethnic diversity that exists beneath its Islamic umbrella (Higgins, 1986, p. 179; Mojab & Hassampour, 1995, p. 243). Despite early constitutional promises of minority rights in education, Khomeini’s regime alienated groups by refusing to functionally reform the Shah’s language policies (Mojab & Hassampour, 1995, p. 243; Shaffer, 2002, p. 114). Many minorities resented Persian as a “national” language and considered it a “Pahlavi ploy”
carried over by the new regime (Bayat, 2005, p. 44). Eventually, the state liberalized language policies for education and the media as it tried to forestall a potential irredentist movement following the independence of the Azerbaijani Republic in 1993 (Mojab & Hassanpour, 1995, p. 244). Khatami’s further reforms enabled the public expression of other ethnic identities (Bayat, 2005, p. 43)—though subsequent closures of ethnic language media in 2006 after ethnic conflicts erupted suggest Tehran continues to be uneasy with embracing the secondary ethnic attributes of citizens (Bayat, 2005, p. 43; Bradley, 2006, para. 30). Although the Islamic regime professes greater equality for ethnicities, the state’s policies reveal that the situation is more complicated.

G. CASE CONCLUSIONS

Consequently, we could say religious identity has proved somewhat effective as glue, but has not eliminated all instability issues. First, latent racism or regionalism continues to create tensions. Also, whereas the Pahlavi regime crudely tried to soften the boundaries of ethnic divides, the religious character of the Islamic Republic sharply divides communities, with even Muslims not in the Twelver Imam Shi’ism being separated from the mainstream (Mojab & Hassanpour, 1995, pp. 232, 238). This system creates a permanent, intractable out-group with no safeguards for religious minority rights. Additionally, the desire for Islamic precepts to guide society has given rise to a new religious bureaucracy to oversee civil service institutions, granting decision-making authority on practical affairs to religiously-trained mullahs (Crane et al. 2008, p. 9). Some observe that these mullahs have run “the country into the ground,” seeding doubts about the efficacy of clerical rule and Islamic governance (Feldman, 2003, p. 93; Keddie, 2003, p. 316). Currently, the crisis of “dual legitimacy” creates a large source of instability as popular will confronts divine authority.

Given the dissatisfaction with the Shah and demographic realities prior to the revolution, religion was a powerful unifying force for the nation bridging some ethnic divisions. The catch is that the implementation following the revolution has created new problems for the state that threatens its stability because the population objects to the current hardline Shi’ite, autocratic regime as evidenced by the Green Movement in 2009. Reforming the regime to an alternate political structure that does not place unchecked
political power in the hands of the clergy may enable the population to preserve the Islamic character of the country in order to harness the social cohesiveness of religion. This structural change will make rectifying lingering ethnic and religious minority issues more achievable through policy adjustments. To be a model for building a nation-state, Iran should build a political system with a single source of sovereignty and accountability, equalize economic development, and tolerate religious minorities to increase stability.
V. TURKEY CASE STUDY

Located at a strategic crossroad between Europe and Asia, the Republic of Turkey was formed from the central lands of the fallen Ottoman Empire on October 29, 1923 (Glazer, 1996, p. 36). Mustafa Kemal, the leader of the nationalist movement in the War of Independence, became its first president and instituted a landmark reform program to modernize the country (pp. 33, 36). Since then, his ideological principles continue to fuel ethnic and religious conflicts, generating substantial sources of instability within Turkey. More recently, the successful rise of a political party with significantly different approaches to these problems provides both the possibility of resolution, but also raises the concern that it is merely biding its time before implementing a vastly different and more radical agenda.

A. BACKGROUND

In his role as president, it is nearly impossible to overstate Mustafa Kemal’s effect on Turkey; he “took fewer years to wipe away the defining traditions of Turkish life than centuries had been spent building them” (Kinser, 2001, p. 45). His reform program, known as Kemalism, included six “arrows:” republicanism, nationalism, populism, reformism, etatism (statism) [state direction of the economy], and secularism” (Glazer, 1996, p. 37). Notably, Kemal ascribed unconventional meanings to two of these ideals. With populism he attempted to identify and assimilate everyone as “Turks,” thereby abolishing the autonomy enjoyed by other ethnic groups during the Ottoman Empire. With secularism he removed religious control of the state only to later enable state control of religion (Glazer, 1996, pp. 37–38; Rabasa & Larrabee, 2008, p. 11).

In implementing Kemalism, Mustafa Kemal (who later took the surname Atatürk, or “father of the Turks”) made sweeping changes that would have been impossible under democratic rule (Kinser, 2001, p. 10). The most significant of these included abolishing the Muslim Caliphate, dissolving Islamic courts, mandating Western dress, changing the Turkish language from Arabic script to Latin letters, mandating Sunday as the day of rest, and shifting the official calendar from the Muslim to the Christian one (pp. 44–45).
population vehemently resisted many of these changes, but Atatürk’s “raw power” prevented all but a few reversals, such as his attempt to change the Muslim call to worship from Arabic to Turkish (p. 46). In making such broad and radical changes and preaching his vision, Atatürk took on the persona of something akin to a secular god for many Turks, and Kemalism became something akin to a secular religion (p. 35).

Although Atatürk’s agenda appears modern and liberal, Kemalism’s staunchest adherents, to include members of the military and other Turkish elites, used this secular religion to block true democracy, arguing that the population was not ready to govern itself and not mature enough to handle true democratic debate (Kinser, 2001, p. 10). They feared that increased freedom would inevitably result in societal “catastrophe” or possibly allow the rise of Islamist parties to the point they would attempt to establish a totalitarian state (Kinser, 2001, p. 10; Karakas, 2007, p. 1). Furthermore, as evidenced by military coups in 1960, 1971, 1980 and the “soft coup” in 1997, along with its ability to control the government through the National Security Council (NSC) (at least until its reform in 2003), the military wielded significant influence on Turkish politics (Kinser, 2001, pp. 14–15; Rabasa & Larrabee, 2008, pp. 44, 69). While each coup was somewhat different, all grew out of the Turkish military’s fear that the country was straying from its Kemalist roots, necessitating a “rescue,” so that the country could be returned to its proper course (Glazer, 1996, pp. 42, 60; Rabasa & Larrabee, 2008, p. 40; Mango, 2004, p. 97).

Since the most recent of these coups in 1997, several events have altered the political landscape within Turkey. To gain admission to the European Union, the Turkish government reformed the National Security Council into a mostly civilian, strictly advisory body to curtail the military’s previous power (Rabasa & Larrabee, 2008, p. 69). In addition, the Justice and Development party (in Turkish: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, or AKP), a party with Islamist roots that now professes itself to be “conservative democratic,” uses Western ideas to challenge Kemalist positions and the influence of the military in politics (pp. 31, 47). However, despite AKP leaders’ public disavowal of their previously held Islamist views, many secularists and others inside and outside Turkey
remain skeptical, suspicious that the AKP is waiting for the right time to implement its "true" Islamist agenda (U.S. Library of Congress, 2010, pp. 25–26).

B. ETHNIC COMPOSITION

Since independence, the Turkish government has attempted to minimize the appearance of or discussion about ethnic, religious, or linguistic differences within the population, a position in keeping with the Kemalist "arrow" of populism (Hooglund, 1996b, p. 95; Glazer, 1996, pp. 37–38). As a result, Turkish censuses do not record ethnicity, religion, or even primary language (State Institute of Statistics, 2000, Appendix; Mutlu, 1996, p. 519). The Turkish government has also tried to disguise the existence of its Kurdish ethnic minority using euphemisms such as "Mountin Turks" and "Eastern Turks" (Hooglund, 1996b, p. 95). Furthermore, in accordance with its interpretation of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, the Turkish government only recognizes Jews, Greek Orthodox Christians, and Armenian Orthodox Christians as legitimate minorities (U.S. Department of State [U.S. DoS], 2008, "Religious Demography" section, para. 1). Consequently, ethnic and religious population figures are at best estimates, with significant variation between sources, often attributable to the source's policy objectives and biases.

The CIA (2011g) for instance identifies the ethnic composition of Turkey's 78.7 million citizens, based on 2008 estimates, as 70–75% Turkish, 18% Kurd and 7–12% other minorities ("People and Society" section). This aligns with estimates in a 2000 report completed for the Turkish National Security Council (NSC) that was suppressed until 2008, which calculates the population to be about 71% ethnically Turkish and just over 16% Kurd (to include Zazas, a group generally considered to be Kurdish) ("Trial Sheds Light," 2008). The "other" minorities include Circassians (3.2%), Bosnians (2.6%), Georgians (1.3%), Albanians (1.7%), Arabs (1.1%), and smaller numbers of Pomaks, Laz, Hemsins, Roma, Greeks, Armenians, and three communities of ethnically distinct Jews ("Trial Sheds Light," 2008; Hooglund, 1996b, pp. 104–105). The report also makes the point that many of the members of these ethnic groups can no longer speak their group's native language, and have in fact become "Turkified" ("Trial Sheds Light," 2008). For the largest ethnic minority in Turkey—the Kurds—assessments over the
last 45 years consistently include low-end estimates of near 10% and high end values of over 23%, depending on the nature of the source (Hooglund, 1996b, p. 86; Mutlu, 1996, p. 534). Notably, Servet Mutlu’s more academic effort estimates that the Kurdish population had sustained a nearly 50% greater growth rate than the Turkish population since 1965, to reach 12.6% of the population in 1990 (p. 532). The 2000 population report substantiates the faster growth rate of the Kurdish community, indicating it has already surpassed 16%.

C. RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION

Through a series of definitive actions to shape its demographics, Turkey has an overwhelmingly Muslim majority, which constitutes approximately 98.2% of the population (CIA, 2011g, “People and Society” section). Myriad small religious communities exist within the 0.8% of non-Muslims, including Jews, Armenian Orthodox Christians (Armenians), Greek Orthodox Christians (Greeks), Syriac Christians, Baha’is, Yezidis, Jehovah’s Witnesses, other Protestants, and others (U.S. DoS, 2010, “Religious Demography” section, para. 3). However, prior to independence, both the Armenians and Greeks comprised much larger populations. Before World War I, approximately 1.5–2.0 million Armenians lived in the territory of modern-day Turkey, although only 60,000–65,000 remain today in the wake of large-scale deportations or killings (Hooglund, 1996b, pp.103–104; “Foreign Ministry,” 2008, para. 2, U.S. DoS, 2010, “Religious Demography” section, para. 3; Glazer, 1996, p. 30). Similarly, in 1924, two million Greeks still lived in Turkey. This was just prior to implementation of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which directed the forced exchange of about 1.5 million “Greeks” (so labeled according to their religion) to immigrate to Greece, while approximately 500,000 Muslim “Turks” (again, labeled by religious affiliation) emigrated from Greece (Hooglund, 1996b, p. 103; Kinser, 2001, pp. 203–204). For the 200,000 Greeks who the treaty allowed to remain in Turkey, their numbers dwindled consistently over the years thanks to a series of official government actions and other acts of discrimination and

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9 Detailing the events of 1915 and assessing the Armenian claims of Turkish-led genocide are beyond the scope of this thesis. In the end, the ethno-religious minority has drastically decreased to no longer to be a source of instability, though the methods are still under debate and may not be suitable as a solution to contemporary issues.
violence (Hooglund, 1996b, p. 103; Kinser, 2001, pp. 204–206). As a result, by 2008, the Greek community in Turkey had fallen to approximately 3,000–4,000 (Foreign Ministry,” 2008, para. 2). As a rough demonstration of what the demographics of Turkey might have been, taking Turkey’s 13.6 million people from the 1927 census, adding back in the 1.5 million Greeks deported and the 2 million Armenians deported or killed and subtracting the 500,000 Greek Muslim immigrants, Turkey would have been approximately one-fifth Orthodox Christian had these forced demographic changes not been made (Hooglund, 1996b, pp. 86, 103–104). The Jewish community is the only other recognized minority and was never very big in Turkey; it similarly steadily declined, though not in the same drastic fashion as that of the Armenians and Greeks (Hooglund, 1996b, p. 104; U.S. DoS, 2010, “Religious Demography” section, para. 3).

While Turkey continues to officially acknowledge the existence of Orthodox Christian and Jewish minorities, it actively tries to minimize the differences to be found among its Muslim majority. For instance, the primary religious minority within Turkey is the Alevis, a heterodox Muslim sect constituting between 19 and 26 percent of all Turkish Muslims (U.S. DoS, 2010, “Religious Demography” section, paras. 1–2). In addition there are approximately a half-million non-Alevi Shiites (“Religious Demography” section, para. 3). Although generally categorized as Shiite Muslims, some outside and inside the Alevi community consider Alevis to be something other than Muslim due to their incorporation of pre-Islamic beliefs and non-adherence to the five pillars of Islam (U.S. DoS, 2010, “Religious Demography” section, para. 2; Rabasa & Larrabee, 2008, p. 20). However, according to available data, it does not appear that the Alevis’ percentage in the total population has changed significantly in recent decades: in 1995 one estimate put their numbers at 25% of the Muslim population, while the NSC report in 2000 claimed only 15% (Zeidan, 1995, “Introduction” section, para. 1; “Trial Sheds Light,” 2008, “About 9 million Alevis” section, para. 3). What is also worth noting here is the overlap between the largest religious minority and largest ethnic minority, with estimates that about one-third of Kurds are Alevis (Hooglund, 1996b, p. 100).
D. RELIGION AND GOVERNANCE

One defining characteristic of Kemalism and a top priority for Atatürk was to make Turkey a secular republic, which entailed fundamentally changing the relationship between Islam and politics that had existed during the Ottoman period (Glazer, 1996, p. 38). To replace religious authority with state authority, Atatürk eliminated the Caliphate and Islamic courts, introduced a new secular civil code copied from the Swiss, and banned all religious symbols from public places (Hurd, 2008, p. 66; Karakas, 2007, p. 9). However, as Jenny White (2002) points out, “secularism” is really a mistranslation of the Turkish laiklik; instead of secularism’s “separation of religion and state,” it really means laicism, the “subordination of religion to the state” (p. 35).

While other models of laicism, such as that found in France, insist on strict neutrality on religious issues, Turkish laicism aims to establish state control of Sunni Islam, to the point that Sunni Islam has become a de facto state religion (Karakas, 2007, pp. 8, 12; Hurd, 2008, p. 66). Some describe this unique form of laicism as a “mixture of Turkish nationalist, Sunni Islamic and European laicist traditions” (p. 66) or as a “Kemalist Tripod” of religion, nation, and laicism (Karakas, 2007, p. 8). While it appears that Atatürk’s reforms eliminated Islam from its previous role in the governance of the state, over time the state became increasingly and intimately involved in the regulation and governance of Islam through the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Shankland, 1999, p. 6). This organization, established shortly after the founding of the republic, has grown into a massive institution. It represents the fourth largest item in the budget, and has an overall goal of preventing the introduction of alternate versions of Islam which might threaten the Turkish state. It also has wide ranging responsibilities and authorities, to include supervising mosques, paying the clergy, supplying sermons, and ruling on religious questions (Karakas, 2007, p. 11). Significantly, while this directorate is funded by tax dollars (paid by all Turks, regardless of religious affiliation), it subsidizes Sunni Islam exclusively, and does not redistribute any tax dollars for the practice of other religions (Rabasa & Larrabee, 2008, p. 12). Despite the fact that other religious
communities do not wish to fall under the directorate’s control, the use of tax dollars to fund only Sunni Islam is a source of resentment, especially among the country’s Alevi community (Mango, 2004, p. 132).

Although to some degree inherent contradictions exist between the strict Kemalist adherence to secularism and the propagation of what is essentially a state religion, attempts to overtly bring religion back into the political sphere have been repeatedly attempted and consistently rejected. Kemalist elites have used military coups as well as the ability of Turkey’s constitutional court to declare a political party illegal to successfully resist efforts to inject religion back into politics (Rabasa & Larrabee, 2008, p. 73). While not the sole reason for all four coups, the military saw the rise of Islamic influence as a sufficiently significant threat that it has used this as one of the “justifications” for retaking control in the past (Yavuz, 2003, p. 63; Rabasa & Larrabee, 2008, p. 40; Glazer, 1996, p. 60; Hurd, 2008, p. 68).

Whether this unique form of secularism will continue in Turkey largely depends on the AKP’s future agenda; it has already been the political party in power for most of the last decade. Considerable disagreement exists as to whether it will continue to be a “conservative democratic” party or return to its Islamist roots, especially now that its potential opponents have been weakened (U.S. Library of Congress, 2010, pp. 25–26). The AKP’s mounting strength, buoyed by parliamentary wins in 2002, 2007, and 2011, have thwarted opponents’ attempts to carry off yet another military coup and have blocked a judicial initiative to declare the AKP illegal, two tactics that Kemalist elites previously used successfully (Rabasa & Larrabee, 2008, pp. 47, 49, 71–72; Letsch, 2011, para. 1; U.S. Library of Congress, 2010, pp. 4–5). In fact, some argue that the military lost nearly all of its political power when its 2007 coup threat was successfully resisted (Tait, 2011, “Power Plays” section, para. 3). Although it did not win enough seats to unilaterally rewrite the constitution, the AKP’s resounding success in the parliamentary elections of 2011 has made many nervous about Turkey’s future; some anticipate the AKP will move toward authoritarianism, while others tout the recent election and the

E. COMMON SOURCES OF INSTABILITY

Since the creation of the Turkish Republic, several key internal conflicts have resulted in instability the country, mostly related to the ongoing debate over Kemalism and its repercussions for ethnic and religious minorities. Although most ethnic and religious conflicts predate Kemalism, Atatürk’s principles for the role of religion and ethnicity in Turkish society particularly inflame Kurds and Alevis (Hooglund, 1996b, p. 95). As already noted, Turkey did not inherit a homogeneous Muslim society. Instead, it created one through brutal policies that produced drastic demographic changes and reduced the Greek and Armenian communities to populations too small to pose a significant threat to the country’s overall stability. Consequently, the ethnic conflict between ethnic Turks and the Kurds and the religious conflict between Sunni Muslims and Alevis remain the greatest threats to stability, while the government, inspired by the Kemalist “arrow” of populism, actively attempts to suppress their existence, and eliminate them via assimilation (Glazer, 1996, pp. 37–38; Hooglund, 1996b, p. 95). However, rather than eliminating these divisions, M. Hacken Yavuz (2003) argues that Kemalism has actually exacerbated them (p. 52).

The Kurd drive for independence began with Kurdish rebellions as early as 1788 (Mutlu, 1996, p. 534). Kurds secured a promise for an independent Kurdish state in the Treaty of Sèvres between the Ottoman Empire and the Allied powers following World War I (McDowall, 1992, p. 33). Unfortunately for the Kurds, the Ottoman Empire collapsed before this could be implemented, and the renegotiation between the Allies and the new Turkish Republic, encapsulated in the Treaty of Lausanne, made no mention of a Kurdish state (pp. 35–36). Although many Kurds supported Atatürk in the War of Independence in order to avoid ending up in a Christian country, the campaign to eliminate an independent Kurdish identity began the day the Caliphate was abolished in 1924 (pp. 35–36). Viewed as the only group large enough to challenge the Kemalist idea of a homogeneous “Turkish” society (Hooglund, 1996b, p. 98), the Turkish government
immediately targeted the Kurds by banning “Kurdish schools, associations, publications, religious fraternities and teaching foundations” (McDowall, 1992, p. 36). As a strategy to assimilate the Kurds, the government also suppressed the use of the Kurdish language (Hooglund, 1996b, p. 98). To further implement its Kemalist ideals, the Turkish government issued prison sentences for a Kurd declaring himself/herself a Kurd, created educational programs to “Turkify” Kurdish children and declared it illegal for a political party to say that minorities exist (McDowall, 1992, p. 40; Karkakas, 2007, p. 18; Kinser, 2001, p. 147).


The AKP has made several attempts to resolve the Kurdish issue and degrade support for the PKK, including the “Kurdish opening,” which Prime Minister Erdroğan characterized as a democratization project (Doğan & Yavuz, 2009, para. 2). However, even before specific proposals could be entertained, Kemalists derailed the initiative as
negotiating with terrorists,” and the AKP suffered a public relations disaster when returning PKK members, regarded by most Turks as terrorists, were greeted by fellow Kurds with a hero’s welcome (U.S. Library of Congress, 2010, pp. 16–17).

Calls for reconciliation and the PKK’s terrorist attacks continue (pp. 17–19). For example, in July 2011, a tentative agreement on a “peace council” was followed by a PKK attack that killed 13 soldiers, allegedly orchestrated by Kurds who opposed negotiations (Cengiz, 2011, paras. 1–3). Thus, though some of the more overt attempts to suppress Kurdish identity have waned in recent years, memories of persecution on the part of the Kurds and of insurgent violence on the part of the Turks have led to profound mistrust and suggest that this ethnic conflict will remain a key source of instability for the foreseeable future.

The Alevi also represent a challenge to the Kemalist ideal of a homogeneous populace. The one glaring difference is they have adopted less violent means of confrontation. Given their association with the Shia, the Ottoman Empire long perceived the Alevi to be a threat and therefore persecuted and often massacred them (Yavuz, 2003, p. 66). Consequently, they became ardent supporters of Atatürk’s plans for secularization, believing that this would end their oppression (p. 66). They were bitterly disappointed when the state aligned itself with Sunni Islam (Shankland, 2003, p. 1). In response, during the 1960s, many Alevi joined Marxist groups to the point that socialism became a surrogate community identity (Yavuz, 2003, pp. 67, 77). Originating in both sectarian (Sunni vs. Alevi) and political or ideological (right vs. left) divides, specific sparks (e.g., a speech at a music festival in 1967 that asserted Alevi rights and a 1993 gathering of left-wing Alevi intellectuals that inflamed sectarian tensions) resulted in massacres of Alevi (pp. 67, 77–78). Furthermore, these same divisions motivated a series of five mass killings of Alevi by Sunni nationalists in 1977–1978, an underlying contributor to the military coup of 1980 (pp. 68–69). Although M. Hacken Yavuz (2003) contends that these massacres were key to the mobilization of an Alevi political identity (pp. 67–68, 78), David Shankland (2003) points out that Alevi overwhelmingly want to be identified in secular terms, not as a religious minority (p. 172–173).
Despite the fact that systematic grievances persist, such as religious education that attempt to “Sunnify” Alevi children in schools, official harassment related to registering Alevi places of worship and the practice of tax dollars going exclusively to fund Sunni institutions, Alevis have adopted non-violent tactics and attempt to work through the political system (Karakas, 2007, p. 18; U.S. DoS, 2010, “Restrictions on Religious Freedom” section, paras, 3, 17). In addition, even the AKP has begun to discuss official recognition of the Alevi faith (Head, 2011, “Edward’s ‘opening’” section, para. 2). While tensions will likely remain for the foreseeable future, the Alevis’ decision to pursue equity through political rather than violent means bodes well for their eventual resolution.

Finally, in addition to these Kurdish and Alevi issues, a broad tension exists between Kemalists and Islamists over the proper degree of separation between mosque and state, and how to apply the secular religion of Kemalism. Again, a major contributing factor to all four of Turkey’s military coups was Islam’s growing role in politics, while suspicion about the AKP’s future political agenda portends an uncertain and potentially volatile environment. As previously mentioned, whether the AKP will turn to a more overtly Islamist agenda and whether the Kemalist elites have the power to stop it if it does, remains an open question in Turkish politics (U.S. Library of Congress, 2010, pp. 25–26; Falk & Elver, 2011).

F. RELIGION AS GLUE

Beginning with the coup of 1980 and ending with the “soft coup” of 1997, the Turkish government attempted to counter a series of perceived threats by experimenting with using Islam as societal glue, through implementation of what was called the “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” (Rabasa & Larrabee, 2008, pp. 37–38, 44). This attempt to use Islam represented a significant departure for the military, which was running the government at the time, because historically the military had strictly adhered to the Kemalist ideology that advocated promoting language and history instead of religion as a source of social cohesion (Cetinsaya, 1999, p. 362). While the immediate spark for the 1980 coup was a political meeting in which Islamists openly challenged the government, a major underlying factor was forestalling civil war between Marxist Kurdish and Alevi
groups on the one hand, and rightist Sunni Turkish groups on the other (Yavuz, 2003, pp. 68–69). In order to counter the leftist threat following the coup, to defuse ethnic and sectarian strife, and to suppress increasingly radical thought from Iran, Pakistan, and the Arab world, the military chose to employ Islam as a counterbalancing force (Karakas, 2007, p. 18; Yavuz, 2003, pp. 69–70).

With conceptual roots in the 1860s, the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis blended Turkish nationalism, Ottoman history, and elements of Sunni Islam (Cetinsaya, 1999, pp. 351, 373–374; Yavuz, 2003, p. 71). The military hoped the ideology would be a vehicle to create a “depoliticized Turkish-Islamic culture” (Rabasa & Larrabee, 2008, p. 38) by emphasizing family, the mosque, and the military as the “institutional pillars that were to produce a disciplined and unified society” (Yavuz, 2003, p. 73). To gain support, implementation “stress[ed] the danger of anarchy and social divisions” (p. 72) and advocated Islam coupled with Turkish nationalism as the solution (p. 72). This was promulgated through the re-introduction of compulsory Islamic education in schools, and a new mission for the Religious Affairs Directorate which was to incorporate the synthesis in religious materials and lectures, especially in Kurdish areas, to emphasize the danger from “godless” leftist ideologies (Karakas, 2007, pp. 18–19).

However, as Yavuz (2003) points out, this ideology was significantly flawed since it attempted to “override other interests and identities” and, by being a “hegemonic ideology…neglected the multicultural nature of Turkish society” (p. 72). Cemal Karakas (2007) additionally characterizes it unfavorably as “state-led Islamization ‘from above’” (p. 17). Rather than embrace and leverage the commonalities found between the various ethnic and religious groups within Islam, the synthesis promoted an exclusively Turkish (in the ethnic sense) and Sunni society, as evidenced by religious education intended to “‘Turkify’ Kurdish and ‘Sunniify’ Alevi children” (p. 18). Furthermore, this newfound emphasis on Islam in public life and religious education actually resulted in a rise of political Islam and Islamist views, culminating in the success of the Welfare Party and the election of the country’s first Islamist Prime Minister, Necmettin Erbakan, in 1996 (Mango, 2004, p. 96). Following what were considered to be anti-secular actions, the military instituted the “soft coup” of 1997 and forced Erbakan to resign (Rabasa &
Larrabee, 2008, p. 44). Subsequently, the military embarked on a process to eradicate political Islam from education, business and other activities” (Mango, 2004, p. 97), thereby signaling the difficulties using Islam as a source of social glue (Rabasa & Larrabee, 2008, p. 44).

G. CASE CONCLUSIONS

With Turkey’s absolutely overwhelming Muslim majority (admittedly achieved through tactics that do not lend themselves to suggested courses of action in the modern era), the use of an overarching Muslim identity as a stabilizing mechanism seems as though it should be effective. Kemalism, however, especially in its current form, with a de facto state religion that excludes upwards of a quarter of the population and suppresses ethnic diversity, is incompatible with creating this Muslim identity. If the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis had emphasized commonalities of belief across all Muslims, instead of emphasizing Sunni Islam, and had it focused on duties and responsibilities common to all citizens of Turkey instead of emphasizing Turkishness in the ethnic sense, it might have worked. However, since Kemalist principles would have had to be violated to accomplish this, a fundamental restructuring of the secular religion of Turkey would have also been necessary.

Or, to consider the diametrical opposite as a solution, say Turkey got out of the business of administering a state religion and made no attempt to use religion as glue, instead returning to the true principles of laicism. This idea, coupled with abandoning forced assimilation and accepting ethnic differences instead, could potentially foster a form of nationalism similar to that found in the United States, which is not based on belonging to a particular ethnicity.

However, regardless of whether Turkey chooses to use Islam as a source of social cohesion or not, continuing with the Kemalist fantasy of a society free of ethnic or sectarian distinctions while at the same time promulgating a state religion is bound to lead to further instability and eliminate any chance for Turkey to peacefully resolve its internal problems. Therefore, while increasing or decreasing the separation of mosque
and state are both directions in which Turkey could go to increase stability, saying one thing while doing another is not a viable option going forward.
VI. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

In order to evaluate the cohesive value of religion, in this chapter we will first review the three cases. Next, the successes and problems with this approach are assessed, followed by a discussion of alternative measures that could be used to harness religion while reducing its adverse effects. Finally we identify key features of political systems, religions, and conditions that establish circumstances most suitable for using religious identity and suggest potential other mechanisms that might be more suitable in other situations.

A. CROSS CASE COMPARISON

To begin, it is important to point out that the three cases represent a range in terms of ethnic plurality, religious homogeneity, and varying configurations of religion and state separation. For instance, the Israeli population includes two primary ethnic groups—Jews and Arabs—that are each predominantly religiously homogeneous, such that religion reinforces ethnic groups rather than bridges their differences. As a state, Israel professes to be secular, which is demonstrated by it allowing minorities to participate in its representative government and by funding synagogues and mosques alike. However, the Jewish religious tradition permeates the government and influences current political issues. The unequal citizenship rights for non-Jewish immigrants further detract from Israel’s claim of being secular.

In the second case study, Turkey’s population also includes two primary ethnic groups—Turks and Kurds—and two primary faith groups—Sunni and Alevi—but in this case the religious and ethnic communities overlap. The Turkish government, like the Israeli government, is officially secular and, in fact, has the judicial authority to disband political parties for “anti-secular” behavior inconsistent with Kemalism. Yet, through the Directorate of Religious Affairs, the state exercises substantial involvement in Sunni mosques by providing religious content and funding even as it denies state funds to other religious groups, such as the Alevis. Additionally, at times, the state has promoted an Islamic identity and appealed to Islamic symbols.
Finally, Iran presents greater ethnic plurality, greater religious homogeneity, and much tighter alignment of religion and state. The Persians hold a slim majority against the Azerbaijanis, Kurds, Lurs, Arabs, and Baluchis, with over 90 percent identifying as Shia Muslims, although the sectarian divisions that do exist generally align along ethnic lines. The *velayat-e faqih* doctrine and constitutional provisions formally establish Iran as an Islamic state that tolerates only recognized religious minorities.

Looking across these three cases, we find a highly bipolar population, a slightly more blended population, and a third population that has greater ethnic variation. Also, the degree of religion and state separation decreases across all three cases. Additionally, the cases include nations associated with two major religions (Judaism and Islam); populations with inter-faith and sectarian divisions; and efforts to leverage religion to consolidate new states, as well as to forestall civil conflict later in those states' existence.

In two of the cases, religion provided some effective cohesion, at least for a time among a segment of the population. But in the third case the experiment largely failed. First, in Israel, Jewish heritage united numerous immigrants into a single social collectivity and bonded them to the state, regardless of their place of origin. Similarly, religion provided the vehicle and the identity to unite the many ethnic groups in Iran in order to overthrow Shah Pahlavi’s regime. Following the revolution and continuing today, many ethnic groups in Iran seek greater autonomy, but largely identify as “Iranian” in an Islamic state. In contrast, the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis failed to unify constituent populations in Turkey, largely because the state chose a narrow definition that promoted only ethnic Turkishness and Sunni Islam instead of finding commonalities with the Kurds and Alevis. By demanding conformity instead of creating an inclusive identity, the Turkish state exacerbated ethnic and religious tensions, while opening the door for conservative Islamists to enter the political arena. Ultimately, Turkey’s efforts to leverage religion for cohesion effectively failed. Actually, aside from religion’s positive initial effects in both Israel and Iran, the political use of religion also generated unfavorable second order effects in these two countries.

Recurrent adverse effects from religious nationalism include the creation of an intractable out-group that is often the object of conflict or tension (Wellman & Tokuno,
Consequently, in both Iran and Turkey, the Jewish and Christian populations continue to shrink while sectarian minorities complain about biased state policies. Non-Jewish individuals in Israel have long felt officially rejected; Israeli Arabs who lived there in 1948 waited almost 20 years for recognition as citizens (Kimmerling, 2008, p. 285). Moreover, Israeli Jews were required to serve in the Israeli Defense Force while most Israeli Arabs were banned from serving, yet were then denied rights on the basis of not fulfilling citizenship duties. Overall, the case studies suggest that when national identity builds on religious identity, this emphasizes the non-conformity of some, thereby isolating them outside the core unless they sacrifice their original faith and convert, an illiberal solution that may still prove insufficient for stability.

In addition to creating these out-groups, the state often adopts policies that treat minorities differently. For example, when Israeli Arabs did gain citizenship, they received only limited access to state resources and were still denied the same welfare, employment, and housing benefits Jewish Israelis received (Kimmerling, 2008, pp. 285, 281). Turkey’s response to out-groups was even more extreme, with more than a million individuals deported to Greece due to their religion; the government applied similar (or worse) measures to the Armenians. Minorities that remained in Turkey were, and to some extent still are, subject to varying levels of official and unofficial discrimination. For example, a 1934 law outlawed Greeks from holding jobs in professions such as law, dentistry, and pharmacy (Kinser, 2001, p. 204). Furthermore, although it was later repealed, an immediate and very high wealth tax was levied only on Jewish, Greek, and Armenian merchants in the early 1940s, resulting in property seizures, arrests and deportations when they could not pay the tax (which amounted to one half to three quarters of an individual’s annual salary, to be paid within 15 days) (p. 205). In Iran, institutionalized discrimination means stricter punishments for penal code violations and sets diyeh (the blood money payment to a deceased’s family) for non-Muslims at half of the amount for Muslims (IFHR, 2003, pp. 8–9). Although activists celebrated a law passed in 2003 that authorized equal payment to families of non-Muslims (by granting

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10 Although some Arab Druze, Circassians, and Bedouins were allowed to serve the military, Arab Muslims were not (see Kimmerling, p. 281).
additional payment beyond *diyeh* requirements), Islamic jurisprudence still upholds the inferior status of non-Muslims (Sanasarian & Davidi, 2007, pp. 64–65). In short, equal treatment of minorities proves a recurring challenge for each of the three states.

Another adverse effect can be found in the provision of government services, as seen in Iran when religious officials began directing state institutions (Crane et al., 2008, p. 9). The clergy’s desire to ensure that the state operated under Islamic precepts, coupled with vacancies created by government officials and professionals fleeing Iran after the revolution, placed the religiously-trained mullahs in charge of practical affairs (Crane et al., 2008, p. 9; Feldman, 2003, p. 93). As the economy faltered, many criticized “the administrative competence of the religious establishment” (Crane et al., 2008, p. 9). While nothing quite this blatant has occurred in Israel or Turkey, there is the potential for this should bureaucratic and administrative responsibilities ever be tied to religious affiliation. In general, it appears that religious-based nationalism cannot only lead to a permanent out-group, but the propensity to violate minority rights. Both require mitigation if religion is to be used as a component of national identity.

### B. COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSIS

To avoid these hazards, alternative configurations involving religion should be considered. In *After Jihad*, Noah Feldman (2003) describes possible methods to marry Islam and democracy in a modern government. For instance, a state could declare Islam an official state religion and use its symbolism in flags, oaths of office and state support of mosques (akin to Britain’s relationship to Anglican Christianity). Or it could allow the legislature to pass laws inspired by the Islamic code (pp. 54–56). This could help keep religion an identifying feature of the nation without threatening minority rights so severely.

All three case studies present opportunities to apply Feldman’s approach in order to keep religion in the public sphere. For example, Turkey might not need to remove all state involvement in religion or abolish the Directorate of Religious Affairs. It could instead reform the program to be less directive in content and provide funding to Alevi and other minority groups as it now does to the Sunni population. Such a model has been
used, for instance, in the Netherlands (Karakas, 2007, p. 7). Iran could decrease the elite clergy’s veto authority, equalize penal and civil codes, and broaden minority status to include those beyond its current “recognized” groups. In Israel, meanwhile, rights could be extended equally to all minorities, and the government could celebrate not only Jewish but also Islamic holidays. In all three cases, religion could remain in the public sphere as a means to help promote national cohesion, but only if religious doctrine were to be rendered less influential in the functioning of the state.

Examining these cases from a slightly different perspective also suggests those conditions most suitable for leveraging religion to aid domestic stability in ethnically plural situations. An ideal circumstance for a religious national identity would be to have a completely homogeneous population, which would eliminate the problematic issues of out-groups and minority rights. However, this is unlikely to occur naturally, and the process of demographic reshaping through killing, deportation, or even incentivizing relocation is untenable to even consider in today’s world. Israel’s creation thanks to colonialism and Turkey’s methods of removing Greek and Armenian Orthodox Christians would generate massive international disapproval and possibly intervention today. Therefore, minorities and minority issues remain facts of life for most countries.

Certain features of state political systems as well as religious teachings can likewise impact the treatment of minorities. First, in order to protect minorities, the state needs codified liberalism to guarantee rights and separates powers, and thereby prevent democratic activities from devolving into the tyranny of the masses (Zakaria, 2003, p. 17). In all three cases studied, the primary religious group possesses sufficient numbers to impose its will on minority groups through democratic processes unless individual rights are recognized and protected by government institutions. Regarding the separation of powers, the unbalanced power distribution in Iran demonstrates how structures without this check can revert to autocratic methods. Despite majority support in the legislature to reform diyeh benefits, these initiatives were blocked by the clerical elite. In fact, since the clergy is often not democratically elected or trained for state administration, it makes no sense to have them govern. Indeed, Abdol Karim Soroush, an Islamic intellectual in Iran, differentiates between a state ruled by the clerical class and a “religious state” that
focuses on “creating an atmosphere that defends believers’ free and conscious faith and religious experience” (as cited in Takeyh, 2006, p. 47). As Paul Weithman points out, in liberal democracies citizens are not limited to secular or rational justifications, but they may offer religious arguments in debates and use religious reasons for voting choices (Hackett, 2005, p. 672). By facilitating the practice of religion and respect for the role of religious values, the state can promote its people’s religious identities without placing the entire society under clerical rule. In other words, a well-balanced political structure that seeks to make something of religious identity would use liberal democracy and prevent clerical rule, but would not banish religion from the public sphere.

Religious principles and teachings invariably influence the society’s relationship with minorities and out-groups. As Feldman (2003) notes, when blending religion into governance, whether “the religion itself embraces the equality for everyone” is critical to establishing equal treatment of all citizens (p. 62). Judaism’s inherited membership promotes exclusivity, while Islam’s tiered tolerance of Abrahamic versus other faiths fosters inequality. Consequently, as Feldman predicts, these features lead to biased state policies as seen in the case studies. Additionally, if the religion emphasizes the rights of the communal whole over individuals, such collectivist attitudes can hamper liberalism (Juergensmeyer, 2008, p. 238). In instances when minority groups are very small and unable to demand rights or changes through government representation or civil disobedience, such as the Baha’is in Iran, the state has particularly little incentive to change its policies of persecution.

Finally, how the religion addresses differences may indicate how compatible it will be with a pluralistic society. In Iran, religious intellectuals, such as Abdol Karim Soroush, are increasingly vocal in arguing that Islam mandates discourse and consensus, while political leaders, such as ex-President Khatami, argue that the practice of Islam requires freedom of opinion and expression (Takeyh, 2006, p. 46; Masroori, 2007, p. 180). These views reflect a vision of Islam that would support a stable, pluralistic society better than belief systems that demand eradication of dissension. As our three cases show, where the dominant religion does not promote equality of all individuals, recognize
individual rights relative to the communal whole, or tolerate conceptual pluralism, the result is likely to be instability and religion is more apt to inflame conflict rather than strengthen cohesion.

Other conclusions can be drawn by comparing demographics across the three cases. First, greater relative size and regional concentration of minority groups leads to a greater likelihood of instability. In Iran, small, dispersed populations of Jews, Christians and Baha'is do not generate as much domestic instability as Sunni Kurds produce. In Turkey, the Alevi and Kurdish minority populations are similar in size; however, the Kurds are somewhat more concentrated, constituting a majority in southeast Turkey. This may help explain the greater violence associated with the Kurdish conflict. However, it is impossible to isolate this effect from other factors, such as the nature of their grievances and the fact that a Kurdish political identity has existed much longer than has that of the Alevis. Also, the degree to which the religious minority is cemented in an ethnic group seems to increase potential for instability in the face of religious nationalism. For the Sunni Kurds and Baluchis in Iran, marginalization as sectarian minorities reinforces their ethnic distinctiveness. Even more striking is the situation in Israel where the religious and ethnic divisions are reinforcing and offer no cross cutting social bonds across the populations. In contrast, Shia Islam in Iran does provide a broad umbrella to unite many ethnic groups. In fact, this proved quite useful in preventing an Azerbaijani irredentist movement due to differences in identity and values after the Soviet Union dissolved (Shaffer, 2002, p. 203). Overall, it appears that smaller, dispersed minority groups or greater interlacing between religious and ethnic groups offer greater opportunities to use religion as a social glue successfully.

Lastly, when the political context offers the potential to attach religious significance to political issues, conflict can escalate and religion can back people into uncompromising positions. For example, in Israel religious groups primarily gathered strength via Zionist political parties and were successful in affecting the country's orientation, thereby infusing religious meaning into political activity, whether in relation to independence or territorial expansion (Kimmerling, 2008, p. 94). These gains, however, came at a price. For instance, Jews and Muslims continually disagree about the
country’s boundaries, in part because they are being defined according to religious history. During Iran’s Islamic Revolution, Khomeini wanted to reject both Western liberalism and Soviet Marxism and used religious character to create an independent course that invigorated the population (Masroori, 2007, p. 184). Since 1979, religion has remained important, but ideological zeal is said to be waning (Jahanbegloo, 2010, p. 26). Currently, Ahmadinejad and the conservatives proclaim their ongoing defiance of the West over policy issues such as nuclear weapons, while the U.S. fuels this antagonism by designating Iran part of the “axis of evil” in 2002 (Takeyh, 2006, pp. 133, 155).

Interestingly, the confrontations are focusing more on national sovereignty and security needs than religious imperatives (pp. 150–151). Nonetheless, the takeaway is that how tightly religion and politics are fused does not just have domestic, but can have international implications as well. Overall, although some conditions may be alterable – e.g., the political system and policies- the underlying religious principles about equality, community, and dissension along with the specific composition of the population and the political context are relatively fixed, and are critical to take into account when fostering a religious identity to improve stability.

C. ALTERNATIVES TO RELIGION AS GLUE

If conditions are not suitable for religion to be used as a glue to overcome ethnic divisions, other mechanisms may exist to promote national cohesion. One common option is the promotion of a single country-wide language in order to create a communal identity. Unfortunately, these attempts have often been oppressively implemented. For instance, Atatürk and Shah Pahlavi promoted the use of Turkish and Farsi respectively, but also brutally suppressed other languages, such as Kurdish. In Israel, Hebrew was used as a unifying force for the Jewish population under Zionism (Kimmerling, 2008, p. 123), but this obviously excluded Arabs who were not going to abandon Arabic for a language closely tied to the Jewish faith. Currently, the Israeli state officially uses Arabic to interact with its minority citizens, but state business is conducted in Hebrew (CIA, 2011d, “People and Society” section).

Another source of cohesion and a common feature in many countries is mandatory military service. This can be used for cohesion if an effort is made to ensure
that individual units are not segregated according to members‘ ethnicity, religion, or place of origin, etc. For example, Turkey conscripts its soldiers from the population at large, and intentionally assigns young men to areas outside of those from which they come in a conscious effort to nation-build (The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001, pp. 9, 19). In contrast, the Israeli Defense Force originally banned most Arabs from serving and even today does not draft Israeli Arabs (and very few Arabs volunteer to serve).

Alternatively, as Alexis De Tocqueville pointed out in *Democracy in America*, a third potential form of cohesion resides in the idea of civil society organizations building social capital and a sense of community. By organizing groups to do what no single individual in society can, civil society organizations naturally bring people together, ideally across ethnic and religious boundaries, thereby breaking them down. However, as with military service, civil society organizations that are not formed across these boundaries, but are instead stovepiped within ethnic or religious communities are useless for fostering nationalism; in fact, they will actually increase divisions within a country.

Of course, cohesion can also be fostered by promoting nationalism based on geographic borders, trying to create a “nation” that corresponds with the borders of the state. Civic nationalism, which is what exists in the United States, attempts to define identity based on where people live and not by religious or ethnic distinctions. Notably, Atatürk’s original conception of “Turkishness” was also based on people living within the geographic borders of Turkey rather than on identifying those who were ethnically “Türk” (Glazer, 1996, p. 37–38). In the case of a country like Israel, however, this idea of civic nationalism is problematic, with fundamental disagreement between different groups as to where the borders of the state should actually be drawn. This helps underscore that, no matter how compelling a concept may be in theory, in practice creating cohesion on the ground is not a simple task.
D. SUMMARY

Overall, religion is an indisputably powerful force, but its galvanizing effect comes with significant drawbacks. To answer the question of whether religion as glue is a viable method for creating social cohesion, the benefits must outweigh the costs. Fortunately, some of the difficulties can be proactively addressed. While the solution is not to banish religion from the public sphere entirely, successfully using it as a stabilizing force depends on the society's ability to address its harmful side effects. For highly religiously plural societies, or societies that have no conception of extending rights to minorities, religion as a glue will be profoundly counterproductive. However, if minority groups are small and society has the capacity to extend them basic rights, religious glue may effectively bridge ethnic divisions.
LIST OF REFERENCES


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