THE SHOTGUN OR THE SCHOOLHOUSE? OPTIMAL STRATEGY TO ACHIEVE CANADIAN POLICY OBJECTIVES IN CANADA

by

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December 2011

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This thesis investigates how the use of Canadian Forces personnel employed in a security sector reform context within fragile states may best achieve stated Government of Canada (GoC) policy objectives on the continent of Africa. Two established constructs will be considered. The first is “the schoolhouse” based on the United Kingdom-led International Military Assistance Training Team (Sierra Leone) involving a centralized team of advisors and trainers. The other is “the shotgun” based on CF member employment within United Nations African missions (UNAMID, MONUSCO, and UNMISS) involving individual member augmentation spread throughout these UN organizations. The thesis will consider if the differences in organizational processes and outcomes more or less effectively achieve GoC policy objectives. Finally, the thesis will suggest recommendations for policy and further study.
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ABSTRACT

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AU   African Union
CF   Canadian Forces
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency
DDR  Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration
DfID Department for International Development
DND  Department of National Defense
DOJ  Department of Justice
DSS  Defense Sector Reform
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
FCO  Foreign and Commonwealth Office
GFN-SSR Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform
GoC  Government of Canada
HMG  Her Majesty’s Government
IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMATT International Military Assistance Training Team
MoD  Ministry of Defense
MONUSCO United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO  Non-Commissioned Officer
NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECD-DAC The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – Development Assistance Committee
<table>
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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PSO/PKO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations/ Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>SL</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>South African Development Community</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur</td>
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<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan</td>
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<td>UNMO</td>
<td>United Nations Military Observer</td>
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<td>WDR</td>
<td>World Development Report</td>
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<td>WGA</td>
<td>Whole of Government Approach</td>
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I. INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN

“In fragile situations, the priority for institutional transformation and good governance is specifically to deliver citizen security, justice, and jobs. Without a basic level of citizen security there can be no enduring social and economic development.”

World Bank Development Report 2011

“The Government of Canada should develop a coherent and comprehensive international policy on Africa and, in so doing, reorient existing policy on Africa to devote significantly greater attention to generating economic and employment opportunities for African people.”

The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

“The world needs more Canada.”

Bono

A. INTRODUCTION

Africa is too great to grasp all at once and one should not try. That, however unintentionally, is exactly what much of the world does. It results in the stereotyping of Africa’s people, its nations, its governance, its geography, and its history because they are simply more comprehensible that way. Unfortunately, these packaged perceptions are generally informed by selective media reports that do not reflect the broader realities of Africa. Once perceptions and expectations have been created they are very difficult to change.

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Given years of developmental assistance involvement, and the difficulties experienced, the international donor community has begun to change its perceptions of and actions on the continent. One area of common agreement is that Africa has not achieved its global political and internal socio-economic potential. Though not the purview of this thesis, this paradox of unrealized potential while many billions of dollars have been provided does raise many interesting questions.

Donor countries have not seen a return in human rights and security equivalent to the amount of assistance they have provided to Africa. African civil wars continue, disease and famine endure, poverty and short life expectancy are constant, and poor governance and weak institutions persist. Nevertheless, the African spirit of survival and adaptation endures, and numerous nations are making headway, if slowly. The listing of free, partly free, and not free countries in the annual Freedom House reports indicates a significant advancement of freedom in Africa since the 1970s, and the Human Development Report 2011 shows that Africa’s average Human Development Index (HDI) increased 18 percent between 1990 and 2010 (41 percent since 1970), reflecting large improvements in life expectancy, school enrollment, literacy, and income.

Canada has long been at the forefront of this assistance effort. For some 60 years Canada has provided various forms and levels of aid, trade, knowledge, and labor, and its funding commitments have continued to grow. The current world economic situation, however, is such that the relatively large Canadian outlays of aid will begin to contract and the Government of Canada (GoC) will have to be even more focused and limited in

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its allocation of assistance. Thus, there is a higher expectation by the GoC of program effectiveness and results. Agencies and programs will be required to conduct extensive internal reviews to determine better practices.6

This thesis aims to identify program effectiveness. In order to proffer policy recommendations, it will seek to determine whether GoC African Security Sector Reform (SSR) policy objectives and, indeed, whether African nations would be better served by the employment of Canadian Forces (CF) personnel in one of two constructs. The first would be in a configuration similar to that of the International Military Training Assistance Team in Sierra Leone [IMATT (SL)], with a centrally located training and advisory organization referred to in this thesis hereafter as “the schoolhouse.” The second construct is the individual augmentation of military personnel throughout various United Nations (UN) missions in Africa, which I will refer to in this thesis as “the shotgun.” Thus, the central question that this thesis proposes to answer is, “Does the shotgun or the schoolhouse best achieve GoC SSR policy objectives in Africa?”

This study is important for several reasons. It will add to the minimal amount of readily available scholarly literature on the topic of future GoC and CF involvement in Africa. In addition, it will consider how CF personnel may be utilized most effectively in order to achieve GoC policy objectives. Finally, the study is important because it seeks to add to the debate about how best to further assist African capability development.

This study is conducted as a number of geo-political, Canadian domestic, and African economic and social situations converge. The global focus on combating terrorism provides the overarching environment. Since 2001, Western nations have concentrated an inordinate amount of money and effort, and lost thousands of lives in the

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6 Government of Canada, Strategic and Operating Reviews (Budget 2011) - Canada’s Economic Action Plan http://parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/391/fore/rep/repafrifeb07-e.pdf. “Budget 2011 launches a comprehensive one-year Strategic and Operating Review across all of government in 2011-12. This review will focus on improving the efficiency and effectiveness of government operations and programs to ensure value for taxpayer money and will replace the next cycle of strategic reviews. The Strategic and Operating Review will examine direct program spending, as appropriated by Parliament. About $80 billion of direct program spending will be reviewed with the objective of achieving at least $4 billion in ongoing annual savings by 2014-15 or 5 percent of the review base. The review will place particular emphasis on generating savings from operating expenses and improving productivity, while also examining the relevance and effectiveness of programs.”
battle against the spread of terrorism. The U.S. DoD alone has spent over $800 billion and has lost almost 5,000 soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan, while Canadian costs are expected to be over $11 billion and the CF has seen some 136 soldiers killed in action in Afghanistan. Both of these totals continue to climb, yet the battle is far from over and the terror arena has spread into much of the African continent. Western interest in increased terrorist activity as a potential security threat continues to grow.8

As Canada’s combat role in Afghanistan transitions from combat to providing training and professional development services to the national security forces, and therefore requires fewer troops, the thoughts of many stakeholders turn to “What might be next?” The GoC, the Department of National Defense (DND), the media, Canada’s international allies and aid partners, donor recipient nations, and others have begun to offer thoughts about how to best utilize Canadian Forces soldiers abroad to make the world a better place, because this is what Canadian soldiers are expected to do.9 In this vein, time is being taken to “re-set” the operational capability of the CF post-Afghanistan combat operations and to identify future operational trends such as the need to address “regional human security issues with international security implications” and for which CF personnel may be deployed.10


The Conservative Party of Canada has been in power since 2006 forming a minority government until it won a majority in May 2011.\textsuperscript{11} It is now in a position to direct policy as it sees fit with minimal input from other political parties if it so chooses. Under Conservative Party leadership, the GoC has considerably restructured its international aid processes. While funding has been increased, due to the commitments of previous governments and their subsequent fulfillment by the Conservatives, the number of beneficiary nations has been substantially reduced. The GoC has put forward a clear policy on its objectives in Afghanistan, Haiti, and the Americas, but has been relatively silent on its plans for Africa.\textsuperscript{12} Indeed, there is no clearly stated coherent Africa policy.\textsuperscript{13}

Economically, there is universal acknowledgment of the wealth of untapped natural resources in and surrounding the African continent. Yet, it has been primarily the western nations, their transnational corporations, and a small African elite that have benefitted from whatever extraction of these resources that has taken place. This very unequal distribution of the continent’s wealth is a primary source of civil conflict. Internally, poor governance, weak institutions, and insufficient infrastructure are primarily to blame for the lack of development, while externally the international community has stifled trade and limited the functioning of viable African economies.

The social situation in Africa ranges from the peace and stability of Botswana to the lawlessness and statelessness of Somalia, with every level of inequity, poverty, corruption, civil conflict, institutional weakness, health care deficiency, and environmental degradation in between. While world development is improving, according to the UN HDI, the index also identifies that of the 41 countries in its Low Human Development ranking, 36 are African. Of the 166 countries measured, the bottom


\textsuperscript{13} The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Overcoming 40 Years of Failure: A New Roadmap for Sub-Saharan Africa: 90, http://parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/391/fore/rep/repaprifeb07-e.pdf.
fourteen are African. So, while the 30-year trend for the continent is upwards, there is still very much that needs to be done.\textsuperscript{14}

Together, all of these issues cry out for increased GoC and CF participation in Africa; however, there are many regions of the world that also need “some Canada.” While the will of Canadians to assist is great, the nation’s resources are extremely limited and must be carefully allocated in order to achieve maximum effect. This thesis will concentrate on maximizing the effect of military support in achieving GoC Africa SSR policy objectives.

\section*{B. EXISTING LITERATURE}

The literature read for the overall development of this thesis is generally broad and deep, yet there is little, if anything, focused on the specifics to be addressed here. Certainly, the literature on Africa is as wide-ranging as that on any subject with shelves full of books written about Africa’s history and development, or the lack thereof, as well as of individual countries. Historians such as Basil Davidson and Thomas Pakenham have written in a manner that establishes in a reader’s mind that Africa is not a single entity, and that its history does not begin with first contact with the Europeans.\textsuperscript{15} Rather, Africa is a very complex mix of dozens of countries, hundreds of peoples, thousands of languages, and infinite potential. With great care and detail historians discuss cultures far older and more developed than those that came to plunder them. They bring light to the myth of the “dark continent” and shatter the lens through which multiple peoples are classed into a single racial group–black.

As for journalists’ accounts, reporters like Richard Dowden and Blaine Harden shed light through their interviews, encounters, and experiences on the clear divide between the people of Africa and their leaders, and the impact of Western policies and business interests. With clarity, empathy, and frequent frustration, these authors reflect on


the disparities, tragedies, horrors, and even the occasional joys felt by many African people. Their collective descriptions of the corruption, ineffectiveness, and callousness of African leaders coupled with the greed, destruction, and unfair practices engaged in by numerous Western governments and transnational corporations, awakens within a reader a sense of frustration and a desire to improve the quality of life for the many Africans who remain under the thumb of an indifferent global community and its interests.16

The literature outlining security sector reform (SSR) continues to grow day by day. SSR is a relatively new concept, which came about as the international community began to seek efficiencies and to accomplish more strategically. For instance, the products of the Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development–Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC), and the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) all have contributed to establishing the SSR framework.

Another literature that I reviewed is that related to government policy on Africa and SSR. The United Kingdom’s (UK) policy is, for instance, easy to find and is clear and detailed. It is readily available on HMG websites, and the Department for International Development (DfID) is a parent organization of the GFN-SSR. The IMATT itself has provided primary source documentation on SSR and its role within that framework.

GoC policies on SSR, which draw on and are aligned with the OECD-DAC Handbook, can be found in the Canadian Guidelines for Security Sector Reform. Surprisingly, GoC policy regarding aid to Africa in general is not found in any single government statement. There is as much literature decrying the paucity of an official stance or objectives as there is laying out bits and pieces of GoC policies on Africa. At this point in time, any GoC policies can only be identified through the process of combing through multiple government websites and documents.

UN documentation primarily comes in the form of facts and figures provided by UN secondary sources and, admittedly, is less detailed than that provided by IMATT, as it is primarily focused at an operational level, rather than a tactical level. Literature outlining future CF involvement in Africa is not available.

The end result is a distinct scarcity of literature on the use and outcomes of Canadian Forces operating within an SSR framework in general, and specifically in a construct such as IMATT. This thesis then should contribute new material and analysis.

C. RESEARCH DESIGN

The evidence offered in this thesis will be in the form of qualitative case studies employing the method of focused comparison. The cases involved are limited to those that are located on the African continent and that are at least partially focused on the military component of institutional capacity building. In order to tailor this at least in part for a Canadian audience, the cases were selected based on current or historical Canadian involvement, the similarity and differences in capacity-building objectives, conflict history, and the likelihood of their continued or future use in fragile state scenarios. Neither the GoC nor the DND have indicated they might create a completely new entity; therefore, this thesis will analyze those that are already known and understood.

These criteria should also allow for theory development for a broader application in any GoC-pursued SSR capacity-building endeavor, such as developing police forces, judiciary, and intelligence services and so on, and will help establish a baseline for studying similar organizations in areas other than Africa.

These criteria do, however, rule out entities on the continent such as the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program run by the U.S. State Department, the focus of which is to prepare African nations to “participate in multinational peace support operations.” Because ACOTA merely trains individuals,

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and up to company-size elements for basic light infantry tasks, it is not considered an institution builder. Other entities, such as the Reinforcement of African Peace-Keeping Capacities (ReCAMP), which is supported by the Government of France and whose purpose is to “allow Africans to carry out peace support operations on their own continent,” and the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) with its mandate of governance reforms and reducing threats of conflict, also fail to meet the selected criteria.\(^{19}\)

As previously mentioned, the International Military Assistance Training Team in Sierra Leone [IMATT (SL)] does meet the criteria. IMATT was established by Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) in 2000 as an element of the UK response to Sierra Leone’s civil war. Similarly, elements from the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), and the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) also meet my criteria.

Again, the goal of this thesis is to determine which of two constructs using CF personnel—the shotgun or the schoolhouse—best achieves the GoC’s identified Africa policy objectives within a fragile state security sector capacity-building context. The problem being addressed is to find increased effectiveness in the application of scarce GoC and CF resources in order to achieve the desired security sector end state. Thus, the level of success of each of the GoC’s and HMG’s current Africa security sector capacity-building policies needs to be determined. To the extent that each construct has been able to achieve selected objectives, it reflects success.\(^{20}\) Simplified, through an SSR lens, two different means, each employing three distinctive ways, will be analyzed to determine


\(^{20}\) This thesis uses primary and secondary source material to identify GoC and HMG policy objectives in Africa, primary and secondary source material to investigate IMATT, and secondary source material to analyze the policies, objectives, structures, and outcomes of UNAMID, MONUSCO, and UNMISS within the security sector context. Thus, the unit of analysis is the GoC Africa policy, while the unit of observation is the construct itself, the shotgun or the schoolhouse, the UN missions and IMATT respectively. The theoretical population considered is the current and future IMATT-like and UN capacity-building missions in Africa.
how well they meet the desired ends. Further analysis will lead to recommendations on a
way forward for the GoC to achieve its identified Africa policy objectives.21

Chapter II begins with a brief description of the historical and contemporary
environment of Africa. This is followed by an investigation into the concepts, context,
and challenges of SSR. The chapter ends with a list of 10 components for SSR success,
thereby establishing the framework within which the GoC and HMG policies might be
expected to work and detailing what they might be expected to achieve.

Chapter III outlines the respective national policy objectives—the ends—of HMG
and the GoC, and a manageable and prioritized list of four key objectives is developed.
These are identified based on the emphasis placed upon them by HMG according to
available source material. GoC policy objectives are reviewed and prioritized in a similar
manner. The four key HMG objectives drawn from the Sierra Leone case are conflict
prevention, access to security and justice, transparent and accountable governance, and
support for elections. In comparison, Canada’s four priority objectives in Africa are
conflict prevention, political stabilization, Canadian leadership (in terms of shaping
international development assistance and policy to achieve increased effectiveness), and
human development.

Chapter IV describes in detail what IMATT and UN missions—means—do and
assesses their outcomes through an SSR lens. IMATT’s three priority ways are to advise,
to train, and to teach. In contrast, the three priority ways of the UN are to gather system-
wide intelligence for future SSR structural reform (data mapping), to conduct training
across the breadth of SSR sectors (broad training), and to use a mix of military, police,
and civilian staff to conduct its SSR training (mixed trainers).

After examining the outcomes of the IMATT missions and comparing these to the
outcomes of the UN Missions it should become clear which offers the best way forward
for the GoC to employ CF personnel and achieve its Africa policies. Ultimately, I will

21 To be clear, the ends are the list of 4 national objectives, the means are IMATT and the UN, and the
ways are the methods or processes used e.g. advise, train, teach.
argue that GoC policy objectives will be better met using the schoolhouse rather than the shotgun construct.

The final chapter will offer conclusions and policy recommendations, as well as suggestions about areas for future study.
II. AFRICA AND SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

“Reestablishing trust between the people and the state must therefore start with the core function of a state, the capacity to assert its monopoly on the legitimate use of force.”

*Jean-Marie Guéhenno,*

United Nations (UN) Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations22

A. THE AFRICAN CONTEXT SINCE THE 1960S INDEPENDENCE ERA

During the Cold War period, African nations courted and were courted by both the West and Marxist states. “Aid” provided by external governments tended to be heavily weighted toward African military and intelligence organizations and activities that emphasized internal security in exchange for support of political ideologies. These more often than not simply worked to keep illegitimate and kleptocratic regimes in power at the continued expense of the people.

Since the shaking off of the chains of colonial control, the leaders of African nations have had to contend with tensions resulting from varied factors such as African tribalism, the fact of not having created their own countries, the forced coexistence of multiple ethnicities under the same banner, imposed Western political and economic systems, bureaucracies which were gutted by the widespread departure of trained European staff, and the loss of much of their own identity under European rule.

Many early leaders seized upon the opportunity to lay claim to power, taking advantage of Western democratic processes to do so. While multi-party democracy was initially established in numerous countries, it was soon abandoned and replaced by the single-party system, which transformed into the single leader, or “Big Man,” system. The state began to assume control over African economies and rewarded national elites who

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supported the Big Man. These economies were eventually destroyed from within. This led to military coups that were begun under the pretense of improving stability and rooting out corruption. The end of the Cold War saw the withdrawal of the Western powers and the Russians, and Africa was left to fend for itself. Africa was directed to follow the free market and was tied in to the IMF and World Bank. Increasing corruption and the impoverishment led to a great deal of violence throughout the 1980s–1990s.\textsuperscript{23}

Since independence, the growth of democracy, the primacy of the rule of law, respect for human rights, and pursuit of economic development have been uneven, haphazard, slow, difficult, and even denied throughout much of Africa.

\textbf{B. THE CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN CONTEXT}

While there has been relative improvement in political systems, bouts of violence have continued into the Twenty-First Century, as the recent conflicts in Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Darfur, Libya, and the ongoing conflicts in the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, North and South Sudan, and Somalia all attest.

Additionally, West Africa is suffering destabilization resulting from significant drug trafficking, Central Africa is plagued by militant and insurgent groups, the Trans-Sahel and East Africa have been caught up in the war on terror, and Southern Africa must cope with widespread political and ethnic violence. The results of this continued instability and conflict include human trauma, increased poverty, reduced international investment, diminishing economic growth, and deteriorating national capacity to deliver on human security, political legitimacy, territorial integrity, and institutional viability. All of these factors contribute to a synchronous cycle of further decline.

These situations have compelled the international community to launch numerous, but largely uncoordinated, aid efforts to try to reform the institutions that deliver citizen security, justice, and development, in addition to the ongoing UN peacekeeping missions. There have been widespread appeals for better cooperation and coordination between international donors and recipients.

\textsuperscript{23} Richard Dowden, \textit{Africa: Altered States, Ordinary Miracles} (New York: PublicAffairs, 2009), 51–89.
C. THE PROBLEM

Among the innumerable tactical-level direct aid requirements, many countries in Africa are in dire need of advice, funding, and material assistance for strategic political, economic, and security purposes. Entire systems and structures require additional and new inputs, methods of transformation, outputs, outcomes, and impacts. The World Bank has highlighted the importance of prioritizing the reform and reinforcement of institutions that provide citizen security, justice, and jobs to prevent a recurrence of violence and to serve as the basis for future reform.24

The World Bank makes four recommendations for how to use international aid to move beyond conflict and fragility and to secure development. First, institutional legitimacy is the key to stability. Second, investing in citizen security, justice, and jobs is essential to reducing violence. Third, confronting this challenge effectively means that institutions need to change. Fourth, and finally, there is a need to adopt a layered (national, regional, global) approach. The early focus is on security and state legitimacy. If a state cannot provide adequate protection of its citizens then, with little access to justice, no job opportunities, and weak institutions, the likelihood of violence increases. Consolidation and coordination of security services is a fundamental first step. Fragile states need to quickly restore public confidence before moving ahead on any longer-term systemic transformation. “Early wins—actions that can generate quick, tangible results—are critical.”25

While there is certainly an international desire to help, donors have diminishing amounts of available aid. They are experiencing donor burnout, are achieving too little development to show in return for their investments, and are subject to their own inefficiencies and the politicization of aid decisions.26 An example of what this situation

25 Ibid.
can lead to is Canada’s plan to freeze its foreign aid budget for the next several years, reduce direct aid grants, and put greater reliance on multilateral development banks.\(^{27}\) Similarly, the UK’s Bilateral Aid Review led to a reduction in the number of supported countries and the re-allocation of funds to “more effective” agencies.\(^{28}\) Essentially, aid needs to be concentrated, efficient, transparent, and accountable. It must meet with recipient needs, be developed in conjunction with recipient nations, and be harmonized with and conducted jointly with our international partners, at a minimum.


If we turn to SSR more specifically, the key challenge is that African leaders more often than not do not want or believe in SSR. Reform is considered a threat to their power and is viewed as a way for those who are on the outside to obtain power. Perhaps only a dozen African countries out of 54 have actually conducted SSR, and for the most part they have had it forced upon them. When it is accepted, leaders often use it as a means to stay in power and SSR rhetoric is often used to manipulate donor countries.

A second challenge is that local populations initially see SSR as a means to further strengthen the corrupt, brutally repressive military they have come to fear and distrust. Civil society actors need to be convinced that SSR involves a partnership and is not being imposed. They need to play a role in planning and implementation, especially of military SSR. After all, there are usually significant differences between what the people and what the elites want. The challenge is to know to whom to listen and what to consider.

A third challenge is to encourage France, a former colonial power with considerable influence in a number of African countries, to fully embrace the SSR


concept and to play the role of facilitator.\textsuperscript{29} SSR plans likewise need to be coordinated with other affected colonial powers, such as the UK and Portugal.

A different challenge to SSR is the somewhat ethereal concentration on policies and training, which are long-term in nature and difficult to see and touch. This is especially true when compared to the practices of such countries as China, whose idea of development focuses on immediate delivery of infrastructure in return for access to natural resources. Local citizens can readily see the Chinese building roads, but it is much more difficult for them to appreciate in the cost and efforts incurred by a donor nation when it trains the police forces, say.

The UN has recently indicated that SSR aspects will become integral to planning UN operations. It appears to have accepted the majority of the guidelines outlined in the OECD-DAC handbook. The UN and the AU are working together to develop a continental security sector reform policy framework for eventual implementation.\textsuperscript{30}

The \textit{OECD DAC Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance} is, in effect, the international donor SSR playbook. Many of these guidelines resulted from the UK’s experiences in Sierra Leone with IMATT.\textsuperscript{31} Figure 1 depicts the key components in a nationally-owned SSR process.\textsuperscript{32}

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\item \textsuperscript{29}Boubacar N'Diaye, \textit{The British Experience: Building Sierra Leone's Security Sector}, from notes taken by author during Cooperative Engagement for Partnership Capacity: Africa as a Model for Whole of Government conference in Monterey, California, 06/15/2011.
\item \textsuperscript{31}Aldo Gaeta, \textit{The British Experience: Building Sierra Leone's Security Sector}, from notes taken by author during the Cooperative Engagement for Partnership Capacity: Africa as a Model for Whole of Government conference in Monterey, California, 06/15/2011.
\item \textsuperscript{32}Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, \textit{The OECD-DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (SSR) Supporting Security and Justice}, OECD Publishing, 5 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/25/38406485.pdf. The security system is defined as including core security actors (e.g., armed forces, police, gendarmerie, border guards, customs and immigration, and intelligence and security services); security management and oversight bodies (e.g., ministries of defense and internal affairs, financial management bodies and public complaints commissions); justice and law enforcement institutions (e.g., the judiciary, prisons, prosecution services, traditional justice systems); and non-statutory security forces (e.g., private security companies, guerrilla armies and private militia).
\end{itemize}
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The OECD-DAC views the entire activity as a security-development nexus and defines SSR as: “seeking to increase partner countries’ ability to meet the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance, and the rule of law.”

Of course, there are a number of other descriptions, definitions, and conceptualizations of SSR. The UK Secretary of State for International Development from 1997-2003, who was instrumental in the development of the UK model of SSR and its implementation, believes SSR is part of a process that leads to greater cooperation between the global community and the host nation in “ending conflict and building

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competent state institutions that would encourage economic growth and human development in the poorest countries.”

Canadian Mark Sedra, a senior fellow at The Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) and political science professor at the University of Waterloo who has been instrumental in the development of the Canadian SSR process, offers a very clear definition of SSR. According to Sedra, SSR involves more than simply restoring to a government the monopoly over the use of coercive force.

[…]The main innovation of the SSR model as compared to previous forms of security assistance in the Cold War and before is its focus on governance. The professionalism and effectiveness of the security sector is not just measured by the capacity of the security forces, but how well they are managed, monitored and held accountable. Moreover, the SSR model conceives of the security sector as more than its blunt, hard security instruments, recognizing that the security forces cannot perform their duties effectively in the absence of competent legal frameworks and judicial bodies as well as correctional institutions and government oversight bodies.

_A Beginner’s Guide to SSR_ points out that,

> [s]ecurity is also intrinsic to personal and state safety, access to government services, and participation in political processes. SSR contributes to the development of appropriate structures to help prevent instability and violent conflict. It can contribute to creating the conditions necessary for economic and social development and the protection of human rights and is therefore a prerequisite to achieving the Millennium Development Goals.

_A Beginner’s Guide to SSR_ also makes clear that as states have failed to provide or have been complicit in denying security to their own people, the security agenda has necessarily broadened to include the well-being of populations and human rights, thereby resulting in security and development becoming increasingly linked. As a consequence,

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international security actors and development practitioners have realized that it is impractical to consider development without taking security issues into account and vice versa. This necessitates coordinating short-term security operations with longer-term development work.\(^{36}\) It also invalidates the concept of defense sector reform (DSR), as it is too narrow an approach and will only strengthen one sector to the detriment of all others as well as the entire reform process itself.

The definitions and concepts continue, but the end is the same: the focus of SSR is on capacity governance as much as it is on rebuilding capacity. This is the root of the requirement to link security with development over the long-term in order to prevent violence and instability and to alleviate poverty.

In order to implement an SSR program, the OECD-DAC outlines four overarching objectives for international actors to focus on in support of partner countries.

- Establishment of effective governance, oversight and accountability in the security system.
- Improved delivery of security and justice services.
- Development of local leadership and ownership of the reform process.
- Sustainability of justice and security service delivery.

Referencing the OECD-DAC Handbook, \textit{A Beginner’s Guide to SSR} cites additional objectives in the implementation of SSR to include: dialogue between security and non-security actors is essential; SSR is a long-term commitment for both the donor and the recipient; and integrated government teams may be more productive than if they work independently as unique government departments.\(^ {37}\)

Implementation should not, however, be held hostage to the perfect plan. Even with limited capacity, a donor that takes early actions and a best-fit approach directed at key sectors can make a notable difference. Early action is a signal that can lead to confidence in a recipient government on the part of its people.


\(^{37}\) Ibid.
Despite broad agreement about ideal implementation practices, a significant gap remains between theory of SSR implementation and actual practice. Those who would attempt to do have much less ideal conditions in which to operate than those who theorize. SSR decisions will be made “in the field and within dysfunctional, at times, non-existent, state institutions.” While each situation will be unique and will require different resources and assistance, it is not hard to imagine what one might face.

For instance, the conflict may be declared over, but the threat is only diminished, not extinguished. The newly minted, post-conflict security sector forces themselves are often a mix of former combatants who have been reintegrated into a national force. They are usually untrained, many having been recently conscripted and coerced into being foot soldiers in rival warring camps. They are now required to work together for a political and organizational leadership they may have been trying to kill only a short time before. That leadership has historically been corrupt, oblivious to the deprivations of the people, and will likely be highly ineffective and indifferent for many years. Yet, it is on behalf of these “democratically” elected civilian governments, which often regard security forces as profit-making ventures, which they must carry out their functions. The situation may even be worse in that the combatants may not even be accountable to the government.

The security forces, likely a bloated and ineffectually structured organization, will be required to operate within a fractured society and protect a citizenry who dislike and distrust them for good reason, as these same forces were the most predatory and violent of groups during the latest conflict. There will be “old guard” elements that regard any change as undesirable and will become obstacles to future initiatives. With no Senior Non-Commissioned Officer corps there is no link between officers and soldiers. Decision-making is highly centralized to the point where the Chief of Defense Staff signs the officers’ leave passes.

38 Mark Sedra, ed., "Introduction," The Future of Security Sector Reform," The Centre for International Governance Innovation, 17, http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/The Future of Security Sector Reform.pdf. Mr. Sedra remarks, “Most SSR practitioners and analysts would readily admit that while the international community of practice has achieved high marks in developing and institutionalizing the SSR concept, it has received a failing grade on implementation.”

These security forces will be poorly and irregularly paid, they will probably be poorly educated, they will not be immunized, and they and their families will likely be subjected to unhealthy living conditions in extremely unsanitary and crowded barracks with little access to medical facilities. This greatly increases the likelihood of further corruption at the lower ranks as members will seek out and accept bribes, be complicit in criminal activities, and steal from their parent organizations simply as a means of enhancing their own quality of life. Anecdotally, in Sierra Leone an average of eight people live off of the salary of a single Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) member. It is also likely such military personnel will be paid and resourced better than their police counterparts. Friction, distrust, and animosity quickly result and working together is almost impossible.

Not only will the forces will be poorly resourced, but they are unlikely to be able to secure the people or the territory’s own borders without considerable international assistance. They will lack accommodations, personal equipment, mobility and lift vehicles, logistic/resupply capability, personnel policies and, often, strategic direction, doctrine, and objectives. While there will likely be cellphone communication, there will just as likely be few or no computers. Their communications “up country” will be via Morse code and telegraph. At the other end of the spectrum, they will be incredibly happy that a Western military is prepared to assist in their training and they will enthusiastically approach their daily training regime.

There will likely be multiple donor nations willing to assist in the initial development of these forces. However, development workers seldom want to work with either donor or host security forces. Donor nations seem to default to building up host nation military forces rather than other security system elements. The tendency is for lead donor nations to create force structures based on their own system rather than what the African country requires. Partner donor nations will often have strategic policies, practices, objectives, and durations of commitment that conflict with one another. Undoubtedly, friction will develop, unity of effort will be strained, and inefficiencies and overlap of programs will occur.
There will be little, if any, long-term planning capability by the host nation forces. Having likely fought for years to survive day-to-day, planning for infrastructure development or equipment acquisition five years hence will seem an exercise in futility to them. Due to insufficient and irregular funding, the military will suffer considerable erosion of skills after the initial donor training sessions. Nor will host nation forces have the ability to continue the training itself.

The donor nations themselves will be hard pressed to provide a fully manned organization of trained personnel for the entire duration of the commitment. Donors may need to contract out to the private sector. A loss of visibility and loss of control of processes and objectives will likely result, usually to the detriment of both donor and recipient nation goals.40

Donor nations will provide equipment and training of varying quality, but because the need is so great African nations will accept almost everything given to them, even if it makes no tactical sense or will be unsustainable. After the donor departs, significant sustainment and maintenance challenges will begin. Recipient nation forces will, in short order, also be expected to “right-size” and reduce their numbers, potentially leading to violence perpetrated by their disenfranchised members.

There will also be tension between donors and recipients over ownership of the process. The donor will hope to impart best practices and receive best value for its taxpayers’ money, while the recipient may not be fully willing or able to adopt the processes being offered/directed. Expectation management is key. Additional strain on the relationship will result as the recipient seeks more and more resources from a donor with limited funds and other commitments.

While hypothetical, the example just offered provides some tactical detail regarding the difficulty in coordinating the practices and objectives of donor states, and the ability and desire of aid recipients to accept and effectively apply the aid. Support can be found in Hrach Gregorian’s report in which he concludes that numerous donor

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40 Sedra, The Future of Security Sector Reform, 112.
challenges and limited recipient absorptive capacities will make SSR difficult to implement.41

E. SSR—WHAT CONSTITUTES SUCCESS?

Success is very difficult to define. Each donor nation should identify in its initial plan—developed with the recipient nation—regarding what the objectives are, what the measures of performance and effectiveness will be, and what constitutes success. This appears to rarely happen and donor nations get caught in an aid situation longer then they want, often creating a “culture of dependency.” That in turn often ends up creating bad blood and can lead to a premature pull-out. Planners must be realistic. It is not the donor nation that will bring a recipient to a Western standard, nor perhaps is a Western standard required or desired for African nations. Donors need to work with their host nation partners and identify what is “sufficient” and then withdraw, leaving the host to carry on. Additionally, working with regional organizations such as the AU, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) provides legitimacy, adds context, eases cultural acceptance, and makes any SSR effort that much more efficacious.42

Achieving the following 10 components, culled from various SSR and government aid references, would certainly be helpful:

• Local civil society has input and buy-in for the plan.
• The recipient government accepts and effectively actions ownership of the process.
• The sector of that recipient government becomes democratically accountable and self-sustaining.

41 Hrach Gregorian, "G8 Security Sector Capacity Building in Fragile States: Examining Effectiveness and Coherence" Canadian Defense and Foreign Affairs Institute, May 2010, 3-5, http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/G8 Security Sector Capacity Building.pdf. Gregorian lists disunity of vision and practice among government agencies; lack of manpower, resources, and mission clarity; redundant and symbolic initiatives; and mindset differences between multinational partners as inhibitors to effective donor efforts. On the flip side of the coin, recipients may be too poorly governed to effectively utilize assistance, or they may be corrupt, lack transparency and accountability, and seek to play donors off of each other.

42 Mark Sedra, The View from Within, from notes taken by author during the Cooperative Engagement for Partnership Capacity: Africa as a Model for Whole of Government conference in Monterey, California, 06/14/2011.
• Any one sector advancement is integrated with those of other sectors.
• The sectors assisted can contribute to prevent further national conflict and, in their own way, enable economic development and poverty reduction.
• Sectors are “right-sized” for the actual needs and sustainment capability of the government.
• The security sector(s) being developed can absorb the shock of donor withdrawal and continue to effectively function in a manner required by its government once funding has been withdrawn.
• Civil society has the perception it is secure.
• An exit strategy is identified before entry.
• A post-donor strategy for sustainment is in hand before withdrawal.

Success may be difficult to define, but it is more difficult to achieve. In his 2008 monograph on the state of SSR being conducted in Liberia, Mark Malan argues that there was too much that was conceptual and not enough practicality in the grand European approaches to SSR. He states that there was excessive “emphasis on perfecting the governmental process rather than producing a tangible outcome. Ridding citizens of their sense of insecurity and providing them decent law enforcement seem to get lost in the shuffle, when what are truly needed are resources.” 43 Malan believes that donors needed to commit resources and effort over the long term and that wasn’t the case.

Malan follows this with a critique of the UN, whose doctrine of multidimensional peacekeeping operations recognizes its role in SSR is to create the necessary conditions and implement SSR yet after seeks to minimize how long and what end this will take so as to allow for the handover of responsibilities to another “lead actor.” 44 The issue, more often than not, is that there are no lead actors.

Contrasting two approaches regional approaches to SSR, Malan is strongly critical of the U.S. style in Liberia and praises the UK in Sierra Leone. The U.S. did not adhere to SSR principles and its singular emphasis was on creating the structures, but not the capacity, of the Armed Forces of Liberia without linkage to any other security sector.

Further, he contends that that little consultation with Liberian society was carried out in the development of their military and there was no sense on the part of Liberians that their government had been involved in the design of its military. There was doubt the forces would be sustainable when the U.S. and its civilian contractors who were providing the training pulled out, as well as a belief that the halting and unreliable funding hampered all efforts. He ends by declaring the U.S. “insensitive” to the Liberian context.\textsuperscript{45} Indeed, after four years the Liberian military is still not operational, while the population continues to view the Liberian police very negatively.\textsuperscript{46}

In contrast to the U.S., the UK assumed a clear lead in Sierra Leone and supported the enhancement of short and longer-term security through a program aimed at training, equipping, and advising government security forces. It also developed a comprehensive national security strategy and defense policy, integrated UK forces directly into the RSLAF, appointed a senior British police officer as the inspector general, and forged a partnership in designing the forces’ structure and responsibilities. Finally, the UK has remained in place for some dozen years. According to Malan, SSR does not have to be grand. Rather, more can be done to actually mitigate insecurity with a modest but practical program that focuses primarily on military and criminal justice reform.\textsuperscript{47}

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{45} Malan, \textit{Security Sector Reform in Liberia: Mixed Results from Humble Beginnings}, March 2008, 69.
\item \textsuperscript{46} Dr. Ivor Richard Fung, \textit{The View from Within}, from notes taken by author during the Cooperative Engagement for Partnership Capacity: Africa as a Model for Whole of Government conference in Monterey, California, 06/14/2011.
\item \textsuperscript{47} Malan, \textit{Security Sector Reform in Liberia: Mixed Results from Humble Beginnings}, 67–69.
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\end{footnotesize}
III. SECURITY SECTOR REFORM POLICY OBJECTIVES

The UK and Canada are both signatories to a number of strategic documents outlining aid and development practices and objectives. These include The Millennium Declaration (2000) representing a compact between poorer and wealthier countries to increase peace and end poverty\(^{48}\); the Paris Declaration (2005), which focused on the five fundamental principles for making aid more effective: ownership, alignment, harmonization, results, and mutual accountability; the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) aimed at accelerating the achievement of the Paris targets\(^{49}\) and the annual G8 Summit Declaration focused on addressing global challenges in partnership with the global community\(^{50}\).

Both countries were also signatories to the G8 Africa Action Plan, which was produced for the 2002 Kananaskis Summit. This set out “the G8’s initial response” to the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), according to which African partners would be selected on the basis of “measured results” (in meeting NEPAD commitments). Thus, efforts would focus on countries that demonstrated a political and financial commitment to good governance and the rule of law, to investing in their people, and to pursuing sound economic policies. There was a promised commitment by the G8 to promote peace and security in Africa, to boost expertise and capacity, to encourage trade and direct growth-oriented investment, and to provide more effective official development assistance\(^{51}\).

\(^{48}\) United Nations General Assembly, *United Nations Millenium Declaration*, 2000. http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm. The UN Millennium Declaration was signed by 189 UN member countries in 2000. It lists eight key goals that are broken down into twenty-one quantifiable targets and measured by some sixty indicators. The target date for their achievement is 2015 and while progress is being made, it is doubtful the goals will be achieved.

\(^{49}\) OECD — Development Co-operative Directorate, *Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action*, http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1_1_1,00.html.


A list of Action Plan “engagements” were identified, which included making conflict prevention and resolution a top priority; generating economic growth for poverty reduction and development; fostering trade, investment, and sustainable development; implementing debt relief; investing in education; improving health; increasing agricultural productivity; and, of paramount importance, strengthening institutions and governance.\footnote{Ibid.}

A. THE UNITED KINGDOM—“WHAT ARE WE TRYING TO ACHIEVE?”

The UK was an early leader in the now-maturing field of SSR. HMG utilizes the combined efforts of DfID, FCO, MoD, and other agencies to develop, fund, and implement its SSR activities. In dealing with large government bureaucracies with independent objectives and internal sources of friction, there will undoubtedly be disagreements. Yet, HMG has clearly outlined the objectives, expenditures, and results of many of its SSR projects.

Nonetheless, while one might think that the direction given in the highest level document to subordinate organizations would flow smoothly and uninterrupted, like leaves in a stream down a series of gentle waterfalls, to the actual implementing unit, that simply has not been the case. Each has applied its own “spin” and identifies its own objectives according to its own organizational mandate, thus leading to disjuncture between overarching strategic aims and tactical implementation. Table 1 summarizes the expressed goals of the various programs.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UKaid Document</th>
<th>Expressed Goals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>UK aid: Changing lives, delivering results (2011)</strong></td>
<td>Basic building blocks for a better life (food, water, health, education), tackle poverty and insecurity (governance, elections, access to justice); support to women and girls; help drive economic growth. Recipient no longer reliant on aid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DFID Eliminating World Poverty (2009)</strong></td>
<td>Help build peaceful states and societies as a foundation for sustainable development; treat access to security and justice as a basic service; support economic opportunities; work more effectively across government departments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UK MoD Objectives</strong></td>
<td>Support development of effective, democratically accountable and self-sustaining armed forces capable of meeting directed tasks; conflict prevention activities; support RSLAF preparations for 2012 elections; maintain and develop RSLAF PSO/PK capability in support of UNAMID and possible other missions; provide training and education support to RSLAF, develop the Maritime Wing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Commander IMATT Directive</strong></td>
<td>Assist SL MoD and RSLAF to meet the defence missions and tasks assigned them, thereby contributing to internal and regional stability, thus encouraging national economic and social development.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. UK Security Sector Reform Objectives in Africa

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Out of this we can glean four key UK lines of operation in Sierra Leone: prevention of conflict; improve access to security and justice; ensure transparent and accountable governance; and provide support for elections.

B. CANADA—“WHAT ARE WE TRYING TO ACHIEVE?”

Over the last 40 years, Canada’s humanitarian aid to Africa has been qualified as having provided “little in the way of demonstrable results.” Canadian aid has been spread so thin as to make up less than ten percent of total aid received by any of its African partner nations. Priorities have often changed, as has ministerial leadership. Much of Canada’s early assistance to Africa was in the form of project-based aid, consisting of traditional stand-alone projects such as the provision of wells. This has changed significantly and much more of Canada’s Africa aid is now program-based.

While humanitarian aid to Africa may not have met the desired goals, Canada has had success and a long history of (with behind-the-scenes U.S. and UK encouragement) in providing military training support in Africa. During the 1960s, and into the early 1970s, the Canadian military was in high demand to supply training assistance teams throughout the continent. These external requests for support were strongly championed by the External Affairs department in the face of reticence by the military. Interestingly, two of the only seven “countries of focus” for current Canadian aid to Africa happen to be past beneficiaries of that Cold War-era military assistance: Ghana and Tanzania.

Canada’s role in unilateral action is in the past, but it has remained a firm believer and participant in multilateral UN and NATO operations. Canada supports UN peace operations, and seeks to support peace building activities that bridge the gap between immediate post-conflict aid and long-term development assistance. Given its large


commitment to Afghanistan, Canada’s participation in these operations has waned over the years to the point where other nations have stepped in; Canada now provides only .2 percent of a combined police/military expert/troop deployment of some 99,000 UN personnel.62

Nevertheless, Canada still plays in the SSR sphere. While it has had personnel in IMATT, augmenting the UK since its 2000 inception, indications are that Canada has only recently put intellectual effort behind developing an SSR doctrine, and is only now in the throes of taking the initiative to act as a lead implementer. Some might argue that Canada has always contributed to SSR with the provision of military, justice, police, and gender advisors, trainers, and resources, but that was historically ad hoc and not a part of the growing and increasingly recognized SSR domain.

Canada’s course of action now is to develop a regional engagement policy and use the SSR guidelines as a tool to guide implementation.63 Similar to HMG, there are a number of agencies and ministries that work together to plan and deliver Canadian aid. These include DFAIT, CIDA, DND, DOJ, and Public Safety Canada, among others.

According to the GoC SSR Guidelines, the aim of Canadian engagement in international SSR efforts “is to contribute to the establishment of effective, affordable, accountable, responsive, representative, and sustainable security institutions in participatory contexts, so that those institutions can carry out their legitimate functions in accordance with national laws and international norms and standards.” Further, “Canada’s participation in SSR in a given country must be informed by wider Canadian foreign policy priorities.”64 Apparently, pure altruism does not have a place in Canada’s SSR efforts.

Again, several key documents can be drawn on to yield different agents’ roles. These are as listed in Table 2.

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63 Natalie Caron, email message to author, 11/14/11.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Canada: Document</th>
<th>Expressed Goals</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DFAIT Report on Plans and Priorities (2011-2012)</td>
<td>An engagement strategy with Africa will be developed and implemented to reinforce relations with key states, as well as continental partners, such as the African Union (AU). Will contribute to efforts to address emerging security challenges, including management of new security vulnerabilities in Africa (Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo-Great Lakes, Somalia, Sahel), including terrorism, drug trafficking, international crime and piracy. Canadian aid policy remains effective, accountable and aligned with Canadian priorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFAIT: SSR (2011)</td>
<td>The Government of Canada’s engagement in international SSR efforts is intended to provide an environment conducive to economic and social development, the establishment of the rule of law, and political stabilization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA’s Aid Effectiveness Action Plan (2009-2012)</td>
<td>Implement integrated strategies that address the combined objectives of peace-building, state-building, and poverty reduction, while ensuring the protection and participation of women; Participate in country level exercises to monitor implementation of the DAC Principles; and Promote use of joint funding mechanisms and modalities in situations of conflict and fragility, in order to more effectively bridge humanitarian, recovery, and longer-term development phases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA Sub-Saharan Africa: Overview</td>
<td>Canada will strengthen aid effectiveness by focusing on five key areas of intervention that are highly relevant to the African environment and to reaching the Millennium Development Goals for Africa: governance; health (including HIV/AIDS prevention and control); basic education; private sector development, and environmental sustainability. Gender equality remains an essential crosscutting theme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Guidelines for SSR (2010)</td>
<td>Enable conditions conducive to stability, security, development, poverty reduction and democracy by the establishment of security institutions that are: effective, affordable, accountable, responsive, representative, and sustainable. The timing of SSR engagements should favor prevention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Support Operations, B-GJ-005-307/FP-030</td>
<td>Security sector reform can be key in constructing institutions in the assisted state that will allow it to stabilize. Training. The aim of training for forces of the assisted state is to enhance democratic accountability and transparency. Advisory Role. Military advice to the assisted state can be critical in two key areas: (1) Military Roles. Advice is required on the appropriate roles and missions for the security forces. (2) Resource Rationalization of fleets of vehicles, small arms and weapons platforms into the new national inventory will greatly reduce maintenance and sustainment cost.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table 2. Canadian Security Sector Reform Objectives in Africa

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From these we can glean four key Canadian objectives: conflict prevention, political stabilization, Canadian leadership, and human development.
IV. MISSION PROCESSES AND OUTCOMES: COMPARING THE SCHOOLHOUSE TO THE SHOTGUN

The objective of this chapter is to describe what the IMATT and the UN missions do and the outcomes they have achieved within the SSR framework. The goal is to identify a short list of key achievements or impacts. These will then be considered with the national objectives identified in Chapter III and analyzed in order to measure their efficacy in achieving SSR policies.71

UK and Canadian military personnel are among the best trained, highly motivated, and most capable in the world. They seek to achieve maximum results in the worst of conditions and in the minimum amount of time. They are recognized, sought after, and welcomed by citizens throughout much of the world for the capabilities they bring. They offer a military example par excellence of professionalism, one that any African country would do well to emulate.

A. THE UK AND THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE TRAINING TEAM (SIERRA LEONE)—THE SCHOOLHOUSE

“The professionalism and capability of the RSLAF has developed considerably over the past decade under IMATT mentorship. The invaluable moral and material support provided by IMATT … is a clear manifestation of the strong bond they have with the RSLAF.”

Ernest Bai Koroma, President of Sierra Leone72

“Just ten years back we were an almost failed state and now we are stable enough to help others—that is a real achievement.”

Alfred Palo Conteh, Sierra Leone’s Defense Minister73

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71 Some may claim I have “cherry-picked” the outcomes. I have based my choices on the expressed beliefs of those involved from the Sierra Leonean/IMATT staff point of view, study of the SSR processes, the author’s more than 20 years military experience (including participation in UN operations), and my own belief in what the average Canadian hopes his/her government would be seeking to achieve in Africa with aid coming from our tax dollars.


The UK currently uses the IMATT construct as the main instrument to implement its SSR objectives in Sierra Leone. This is premised on the initial context of the conflict, UK willingness to deploy its military, the appropriateness of IMATT structure for the task, and the UK’s colonial past in Sierra Leone.

The UK and Sierra Leone have a relationship that extends back to Britain’s slave-trading days, which lasted from the mid-1500s until the abolition of the practice in the late 1700s. In 1808 Sierra Leone became a British colony and since that period the two have developed some of the closest ties yet between a former colony and its colonizer. Independence was gained from Britain in 1961.

In response to the Sierra Leonean civil war (1991–2002), the resulting collapse of the state, and the inability of the military to control territory or itself, there began a number of uncoordinated externally initiated efforts to stabilize the country, assist the democratically elected government, and maintain any achieved peace. A number of programs were designed to rebuild Sierra Leone’s parliament, judiciary, police, and public sector, and to retrain and reform the military in 1996–1998. These were, however, stunted in their implementation and effectiveness due to several coups in quick succession.

After then-President Kabbah was returned to power in 1998, he requested support from HMG in the area of civilian control of the armed forces (he had, pre-coup, also asked for assistance in re-establishing a functional Sierra Leone Police force). A combined DfID, Foreign Commonwealth Office (FCO), and UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) security package was developed to principally focus on military deficiencies, since these had historically been instrumental in causing political and social instability. Thus began the security sector reform program (SILSEP) in Sierra Leone.

The initial step taken by DfID, FCO, and UK MoD staff came in the form of fact-finding missions aimed at gaining a detailed appreciation of the ground situation, especially the functioning of the government and the military. This resulted in a funded SSR program with multi-departmental input. An initial planning team came to realize in 1999 that a broader effort was required and a complete Defense Review would be
necessary. This generated a strategic defense review followed by an “...outline Defense Policy with Defense Missions and Military Tasks, new defense structures, and a detailed organization for the MoD and armed forces.” A military assistance training team was identified as the entity that could best support the planning and restructuring of the SLA, as well as fill some of the key command and staff positions.

The IMATT concept was initially outlined by the UK MoD advisory team in its publication *Future UK Military Commitment in Support of DfID’s Security Sector Reform Program* (SILSEP) produced in November 1999. The model was briefed to the Commonwealth and Overseas Defense Attachés and Advisors and attendees were offered the opportunity to participate by providing personnel. A number of countries, including Canada, provided staff, and IMATT began its deployment to Sierra Leone in June 2000 with the objective of quickly delivering training and staff support to the Sierra Leonean Army, which would allow it to face a re-emerging rebel Revolutionary United Front.74

IMATT originally included a blend of command, staff executive, and advisory functions. That is, it actually commanded RSLAF units, filled general staff positions with all of the accompanying authority, and provided advisors at all levels throughout the RSLAF organization. There has, since 2004, been a transition to advisory and limited training roles only. The advisory positions are primarily at senior staff levels, i.e., Advisors to SL MoD and Commander Joint Force Command, and technical advisors such as Deck Chief and Joint Operations Cell advisors. The training positions are all primarily as course instructors and staff at the Horton Academy which provides junior, intermediate, and senior officer level military operational and staff training for officers of the RSLAF.

IMATT’s planning, guiding, staffing, enabling, and executing responsibilities have been numerous. It has integrated itself with the MoD and RSLAF and advised on key strategic military operational planning, resource management, and personnel policy, and has produced policy documentation to include Defense white papers and vision documents. This has assisted the RSLAF to effectively and strategically deploy

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throughout the country, secure Sierra Leone’s borders, and contribute to domestic peace and security. IMATT involvement has been instrumental in the advancement of the Sierra Leonean security situation over the past eleven years.

IMATT has also advised on the very delicate matter of right-sizing the RSLAF from its post-war high of some 14,500 to a more balanced and affordable force of 8,500 that is still capable of meeting its tasks. IMATT’s input and oversight has resulted in greatly improved terms and conditions of service, regulated pay and benefits, and created a fair, transparent, and timely Military Justice System. IMATT efforts in the development of selection boards have assisted in assuring transparency and fairness in the identification and selection of officers for promotion, postings, and advanced training, which has directly improved morale across the RSLAF. Notably, the MoD is the sole government ministry to have achieved “Self-accounting Status.” From a small organization with no authority, MoD is now one of the flagship Ministries of Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL).  

Through its training role, IMATT has provided, maintained, and enhanced tactical level training, primarily for officers, and has provided some Senior NCO training. It has also been instrumental in ensuring that the RSLAF is fully prepared to meet the security needs of the state and its citizens. In establishing what is, in effect, a military education system—to include a range of courses such as the Junior and Intermediate Staff Courses, Command and Staff Training Course for senior officers, and Peace Support Operations (PSO) training for deploying officers—IMATT has helped create a solid cadre of well-trained leaders capable of taking the RSLAF into the future. In fact, the military academy, Horton Academy, is gaining recognition as a regional center of excellence.

It should be clear that from the description above that the three priority ways of IMATT are to advise, to train, and to teach. The RSLAF is now a well-trained, reorganized, disciplined, and credible military force that can maintain the territorial integrity of the state. With IMATT’s assistance, the RSLAF has developed to the point where it assumes responsibilities for any internal threat duties that the Sierra Leonean

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Police have neither the capacity nor capability to handle. These RSLAF capabilities have allowed the GoSL to look for opportunities beyond its borders to employ the Force in operations that contribute to its wider national interests. This includes support to UN missions and ECOWAS.

Those serving in IMATT have set the example and enforced the standard in all of their military and social interactions with the GoSL, MoD, RSLAF, and Sierra Leonean public. IMATT members have helped instill a sense of professionalism and progress within the RSLAF and have encouraged them to want to live up to their motto “Serving the Nation.” It is no surprise, then, that Sierra Leoneans now see their military in an extremely positive light. Civil-military relations have greatly improved, due in no small part to the role of IMATT.

After some 11 years in situ IMATT has achieved a certain modicum of success viewed through an SSR lens. While that may not sound like a ringing endorsement, it rates far higher than the cumulative effects of an untold number of other international aid efforts. IMATT’s focus has been primarily on the RSLAF with minimal sector integration but there is little in the way of a UK WGA effort in other sectors for IMATT to integrate with. Several years of HMG budget cuts and downsizing have not helped IMATT in its mission, but progress continues. A post-2012 election exit strategy has been identified but that has only been a fairly recent occurrence. It is uncertain how capably Sierra Leone will be able to handle a withdrawal shock. On the positive side, it has earned an esteemed place within the MoD and RSLAF, it is well respected by the civilian population, and is seen to be the honest intermediary for most organizations wishing to deal with the GoSL. With the direct assistance of IMATT, the RSLAF has achieved a level of popular support that it never had before.

The present situation within Sierra Leone indicates that the four objectives of HMG, prevent conflict, access to justice and security, transparent and accountable governance, and support to elections is certainly being met by IMATT within the SSR defense sector.
B. CANADA AND UN OPERATIONS—THE SHOTGUN

“Too often, we have debated the finer points of language while innocent people continue to die. Darfur is only the latest example.”

Paul Martin Jr., Prime Minister of Canada

"Our foreign policy has changed a lot, unfortunately, we have disappeared from Africa.”

Jean Chrétien, Prime Minister of Canada

As a founding member, Canada has long been a proponent of the UN and an active participant in its peacekeeping operations. Canadians of all stripes have long believed that Canada invented peacekeeping, tracing this back to Canada's then-Minister for External Affairs, Lester B. Pearson’s receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize for working within the UN to field the first impartial multinational force, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), to serve as a buffer between Egypt and Israel in 1956.

Canada maintains the view that “the UN helps to preserve our sovereignty, protect our key interests and defend our values and helps us cope with ‘problems without passports’—threats such as the proliferation of WMD, the degradation of our common environment, contagious disease and chronic starvation, human rights and human wrongs, mass illiteracy and massive displacement.”

Canada operates in a multilateral fashion, in that it is a “joiner” of multilateral institutions and processes. There has been some criticism that Canada is a member of many organizations, but that it does not contribute sufficiently to them to be a credible

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77 Michel Dolbec, Chrétien Says Harper Trip to China is Three Years Late, http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/article/712593--chr-acute-tien-says-harper-trip-to-china-is-three-years-late. Former Canadian Prime Minister Chrétien commenting on the current Conservative Government's Africa policies (or lack thereof).

member. While it chairs many councils, committees, and conferences; offers visionary policy; promotes international development and action plans; provides significant amounts of aid; sponsors research; and negotiates resolutions and international treaties, it does not often seek to assume singular responsibility or leadership for an operation outside of its borders. It appears Canada prefers to reduce risk exposure should a project or mission deviate from the planned “correct” track.

Canada, like all other donor countries, has felt the effects of the Global Financial Crisis. This has reinforced Canadian demands for increased accountability, transparency, and efficiency, but the crisis has also impacted the numbers, types, scope, and risk acceptance of projects, programs, and missions. Given a lack of a clear, coherent Africa policy and a GoC view that SSR must be a “whole of government” approach (WGA), coupled with the resource demands that WGA requires, it is understandable why allocating a few dozen soldiers, police officers, diplomats, and civilian staff to UN Africa missions is a simple response to a demand. This offers an inexpensive, multilateral way to, on paper, meet WGA parameters and it can then be so claimed by the GoC.

Canada is participating, militarily, in four Sub-Saharan operations: three are described below and the fourth involves Canadian forces that are currently supporting IMATT (SL).

1. **United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMISS)**

UNMISS was established in the Republic of South Sudan by the UN Security Council through the adoption of Resolution 1996 (2011) on 8 July 2011 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The country was experiencing persistent conflict and violence and required international assistance to stabilize the situation, ensure the protection of its civilians, and help develop national capacity.

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“The mandate of UNMISS shall be to consolidate peace and security, and to help establish the conditions for development in the Republic of South Sudan, with a view to strengthening the capacity of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan to govern effectively and democratically and establish good relations with its neighbors.”

It is planned for an initial period of one year, and consists of up to 7,000 military personnel and 900 civilian police personnel, among others.

The key UN objectives include:

Providing long-term state-building support to the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS) on political transition, constitutional process, and holding elections; assist in the prevention of further conflict through support to national/state/county level organizations to resolve conflict, monitor and investigate human rights violations, advise and assist local military and police forces, and deter violence through proactive patrolling; and to develop GRSS SSR capability through strategy development, DDR implementation, advice to and training of police services and to develop a military justice system.

Operation SOPRANO is the Canadian contribution to the UNMISS peace support mission. It consists of up to eight personnel—primarily staff officers—within the UN headquarters element, two presently vacant military liaison officer positions, and three staff members in the national support element who also provide support to the nearby Canadian UNAMID members.

It is quite early in the mandate, but there is little to indicate that anything is being accomplished other than UNMISS’s attempts to keep apart the still-warring factions from Sudan and South Sudan. The disarmament phase of DDR has begun in three states. The border remains insecure, inter-communal fighting continues, and return of refugees has

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81 Ibid.

82 Major David White, in discussion with author regarding Operation SOPRANO Manning, 16 November 2011.
been partially blocked. Further, the Sudanese air force has encroached into South Sudan airspace and refugee camps have been bombed, Oxfam has withdrawn from the border area, and both sides have been seen building up their military presence along the border. This gives every indication that the mandate of this mission will need to be extended, and that SSR, if being attempted at all, cannot be carried out with any effectiveness.

2. African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID)

UNAMID was established in Darfur, Sudan by the UN Security Council through the adoption of Resolution 1769 (2007) on 31 July 2007 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and authorized for a period of 12 months. This was extended until July 2012. Government forces, government-supported paramilitaries, and rebel forces have been fighting since 2003. Many thousands have been killed and millions displaced. International assistance was required to protect civilian populations and assist with the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement.

Broad objectives of the UNAMID mandate set out in paragraphs 54 and 55 of the Report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission of 5 June 2007 include securing necessary conditions for the safe provision of humanitarian assistance, protection of civilian populations, and assistance in the promotion of the rule of law, by helping to strengthen an independent judiciary and the

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prison system. UNAMID is authorized to consist of up to 19,555 military personnel, and 6,432 civilian police personnel, among others.88

Its key SSR-related tasks include assisting in the establishment of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program called for in the Darfur Peace Agreement and to support the parties to the Darfur Peace Agreement in restructuring and building the capacity of the police service in Darfur, including through monitoring, training, mentoring, co-location, and joint patrols.

Operation SAFARI is the Canadian contribution to the UNAMID peace support mission. It consists of up to six personnel—primarily logistics staff officers—working out of the UN Headquarters in El Fasher. Its focus is logistic operational planning with additional work done in Intelligence and Personnel functions.89 While there is GoC rhetoric regarding a whole of government approach, in this case the military members of UNAMID are “the only Government of Canada presence in Darfur itself.”90

The Report of the Secretary-General assesses achievement of UN/AU benchmarks as a “modest improvement.” SSR-type training has been provided to approximately 1,000 people in the area of community policing. Additionally, some training has been provided in the areas of human rights protections for legal/judicial personnel, prison records management, women’s rights, and rule of law and fair trial standards. This modest success has been achieved even though over 70 percent of the military contingents have arrived under-strength, under-equipped, and have inadequate pre-deployment health screening and vaccinations.91

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90 Ibid.


MONUSCO was established in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (transitioning from the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo—MONUC) by the UN Security Council through the adoption of Resolution 1925 (2010) on 1 July 2010 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It came about as a result of trying to end ten years of conflict centered in the DRC and involving some nine African nations, with millions killed and millions more displaced. The MONUC/MONUSCO mandate has been extended several times, and has most recently until June 2011.

MONUSCO is authorized to provide a military strength up to 20,575 and a police presence of up to 1,441 personnel. Its mandate, an excellent example of an SSR mandate, authorizes:

- The protection of civilians by all means; the strengthening of DRC’s military capacity, including military justice and military police; the supporting of police reform; developing and implementing a multi-year joint United Nations justice support program in order to develop the criminal justice chain, the police, the judiciary and prisons in conflict-affected areas, and a strategic programmatic support at the central level in Kinshasa; the supporting of the Congolese Government in consolidating State authority in the territory freed from armed groups; the supporting of the Congolese government in the Security Sector Reform process in order to build a credible, cohesive and disciplined army; the developing of the National Police capacity and related law enforcement agencies; and the monitoring of the implementation of the arms embargo imposed under resolution 1896 (2009).

Operation CROCODILE is the Canadian contribution to the MONUSCO peace support mission. It consists of up to nine personnel—primarily staff officers—split between working out of the UN Headquarters in Kinshasa and the Forward Headquarters.

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in Goma. Several of the staff officers solely focus on internal-to-UN mission operations. There also several legal officers who advise the mission and who conduct SSR training within the legal/judicial/human rights fields. Finally, there are also two officers who have a direct SSR training tasking primarily for new recruits.

SSR accomplishments in the DRC are limited. Demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) efforts have slowed and the integration of armed groups into the armed forces remains problematic and the entire process shows signs of unraveling. MONUSCO and the Government are still “mapping data” about the nation’s judicial, penal, and police systems in order to develop a plan for the future. The army has a reform plan that was presented to international partners in January 2009, but it remains unimplemented. The army is greatly under-resourced and under-trained. There have been numerous and various training sessions held, but not enough to meet the need, and there is little indication that any of the training is of the “train the trainer” type.\footnote{United Nations Security Council, \textit{Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2011/656}, 24 October 2011.}

Taken together, all three UN missions yield three priority ways: gather system wide information for future SSR structural reform (data mapping), to conduct training across the breadth of the SSR sectors, even though this is insufficient to meet the need (broad training), and to use a mix of military, police, and civilian staff to conduct its SSR training (mixed trainers). Unfortunately, the sum total of these efforts has not been what anyone might have hoped.

The UN has been operating in some form in Sudan since 2007 and in the DRC since 1999, yet neither has achieved any level of SSR success and there is little in the way of any indication of future success. The UN continues to fight fires both within the DRC (related to local governance and the UN’s own military operations) and with identifying donor nations to (1) augment the UN force and (2) assume the lead nation role in various sectors of the missions. Essentially, UN SSR efforts are “a mile wide and an inch deep.”
Canadian participation in these missions is miniscule and the few positions are not even fully manned. Half of those that are filled have internal UN mission daily operations as their focus, not on operations which are directly assisting the local population.

In terms of success through the lens of the 10 components, there has been no local buy-in of any UN mission SSR effort. Granted, the UN has fought to establish a buffer zone to enable SSR to begin, but the follow-on SSR steps taken thus far have been insufficient by any measure (mainly because lead actors need to step forward). There is no indication that the governments involved have assumed ownership of any area of the SSR process. There is too little SSR work going on to consider any sector integration and no effort has been made to right-size any of the nations’ militaries. There is little indication the local populace believes they are secure. There is neither exit strategy nor post-donor strategy at this point, and a UN withdrawal now would likely plunge the affected areas back into violent conflict.

The present situation within the three UN missions indicates that the four objectives of the GoC conflict prevention, political stabilization, Canadian leadership, and human development are not being sufficiently met by the UN within the SSR defense sector.

C. CANADA AND THE SCHOOLHOUSE: INFERENCES

While there are more similarities than differences between HMG and GoC practices and military force procedures (there are still definite differences), it appears quite reasonable to suggest that GoC objectives would much more easily be met via an IMATT-like construct. As Canada is highly regarded in much of Africa for fairness, for not having overt economic designs on African resources, and for coming with no colonial baggage, its SSR efforts would initially be well received. Add to this its bilateral and multilateral nature, can-do mentality, emphasis on WGA, previous humanitarian aid experience in Africa, and its combat capable, highly prepared CF personnel who would be part of the ‘advise and train’ team, and the GoC would be better able to set the UN or other partners up for success.
In terms of potential success through the lens of the previously mentioned 10 components, a rapid, well-resourced commitment to a recipient country of Canadian military personnel and equipment would engender local buy-in. It would be expected that drawing upon previous experience and recently developed SSR doctrine that the GoC would ensure conditions such as recipient government plan ownership, an exit strategy, a post-donor strategy, and ensuring the host would be capable of absorbing donor withdrawal shock would be detailed within any plan.

With Canada as a lead nation in the defense sector, integration with other security sectors such as justice and prison reform would likely be automatic since Canada has considerable expertise and interest in those fields at present. Further, the current GoC policies of accountability, transparency, and efficiency—especially regarding taxpayer money spent on foreign aid—would directly influence any aid plan to assure sector right-sizing, sector accountability, and ensuring that sectors would seek to contribute to broader national development. The duration of commitment and the level of resource allocation would be crucial.

The use of the means of an IMATT-like structure and its ways, to advise, train, and teach, offers greater opportunity than the current UN Africa mission to achieve, within the SSR defense sector, the four objectives of the GoC: conflict prevention, political stabilization, Canadian leadership, and human development.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. CONCLUSIONS

1. About Africa

Africa is much more complex than the average person appreciates, as is the sheer scope of its conflicts and depth of its needs. While there has been general, but limited improvement in the quality of life in Africa, far too much unnecessary suffering and wanton destruction continues. It is clear that the world has not received the expected peace and development return on its investment that it has expected given the levels of commitment and resources that it has provided to the region.

While the ideological conflict waged during the Cold War has passed, the new battle shaping up is an economic one between the West and Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC) countries; this will likely once again politicize aid to Africa. Along with the politicization of aid comes the potential for loss of sovereignty as organizations like the World Bank seek to further control how funds are allocated to and spent by African nations.

African nations have not achieved the level of prosperity that, with their natural resource wealth, is thanks to their own doing and to the imposed constraints of the West. It appears likely that any road to peace, security, and development will be difficult. It may be a generation before tangible advancements are made in most African countries where the UN is presently engaged. This is predicated on no further donor nations’ cuts to their aid budgets, a possibility that looms as nations conduct core reviews.

Leaders who are devoted to the well-being of their nations and their people, visionaries who can see beyond the setting of the sun and who inspire confidence in the global donor community are needed in Africa. Leaders who will stand above tribal allegiances, eschew the Big Man syndrome, and work for and on behalf of the citizens of the nation are vital to the development of any country. They must be found and their ideas promoted, their education sponsored, and their aspirations supported.
2. About SSR

SSR is a growing field that has achieved complete legitimacy with the UN and the international donor community. It links security with development over the long term. As lessons learned begin accumulating, international donors realize that a more harmonized, integrated, aligned, and flexible SSR process is required. The process needs to be better coordinated with partner donor nations and more effectively controlled and executed by the recipient nation.

SSR’s focus must first be on governance and institutions. This then can be followed by a complete reform effort for each sector, from broad government policy to the color of a police officer’s uniform. Concurrently, efforts must be integrated between sectors. Reforming all sectors is impossible for a single donor nation to do alone. The current practice makes little sense, with various donor nations attempting to reform portions of multiple sectors while others try to do the same (leading to overlap or duplication of efforts): the results are inefficient use of scarce resources, development of friction between donors, and inconsistencies of policy and practices among too many actors.

At the other end of the spectrum, the U.S. method in Liberia of focusing on building structures but not capacity, of leading rather than consulting Liberians, and of providing focused training without linking it to any other part of the security sector is a situation that must also be studied for what to avoid in the future.

It must be remembered that the focus of the capacity-building effort is to provide a capacity that adds to the security of a nation’s people, not the security its leadership. It is simply not enough to produce X number of Officers and Y number of light infantry qualified soldiers. The outcomes from those outputs need to be controlled. The knowledge, skills, and resources imparted must be suitable. They must be used to enhance the protection of human rights and security and not be developed as a tool for people’s future suppression or destruction.

It is important to appreciate that fragile governments need assistance to govern. At the strategic level there is maneuver room for donor nations to plan multilateral SSR
actions and development schemes, but at the tactical level there can only be one lead nation imparting advice, coordinating projects, and developing training. This will help to avoid discord, ambiguity, and confusion between the recipient and donor nations. There is an argument, then, for Canadian support to be provided in this lead nation manner, as Canadian military personnel are ideally suited to assist in any advisory, executive, training, and exemplary roles.

3. **About the Africa UN Missions**

It seems that UN operations need reform as well. All UN missions are understaffed and under-resourced. They all also lack “lead nations” willing to assume responsibility for an entire area of the operation. The UN is inherently bureaucratic, unwieldy, and inefficient. Yet, it is also recognized as an eminently legitimate organization throughout the world. This necessitates that donor countries work with the UN to achieve humanitarian, security, and development objectives. That does not necessarily mean donor countries must subordinate themselves to the UN. However, once the lead is assumed there needs to be a clear command and control structure.

The UN creates a buffer zone to allow for peace and negotiation. It normally sets the conditions for capacity building rather than actually conducting it. When it does engage in SSR activities on the ground there is significant bureaucratic effort required and consensus must be gained. Loss of focus, loss of immediate effect, and loss of time often result. One advantage the UN possesses over IMATT is it has greater international buy-in and has a very visible presence. The combination of the UN establishing the buffer zone and an IMATT-like structure operating under its umbrella would appear to be an ideal match.\(^\text{95}\) Although operations conducted under the aegis of the UN would automatically provide legitimacy, the UN is not without problems. Its deployments are often so large—tens of thousands of peacekeepers—that its focus principally becomes looking after itself and ensuring their own functioning and protection rather than on reforming or rebuilding the supported national security elements. In comparison to an IMATT-like operation, UN operations are relatively easy and cost-free for governments

\(^{95}\) Wing Commander Dick Woodward, in discussion with author, 3 November 2011.
to support: all they need to do is provide annual contributions to “the center” and allocate military personnel to fill out troop, staff, or observer positions and garner disbursements for their contributions in exchange.

As a member of UN missions in Africa, Canada is one small player among many. Despite its occasional self-congratulation, more often than not credit, if given by the local populace, goes not to Canada but to the UN.

Canada is in the top ten of Assessed Contributors to the peacekeeping and regular UN budgets (and is one of a handful of countries that owes nothing as of 30 September 2007). Yet, it is not in the top twenty of troop and police personnel contributors. It is, however, in the top five for civilian staff at UN DKPO HQ, and Professional and General Service staff at the UN Missions.

The UN desperately needs lead nations and general assistance in operations all over the world. There is ample opportunity for Canada to assume a leadership role and step up in a concentrated manner in an SSR environment. Canada has proven to be a key NATO player in Afghanistan. It does not seem a stretch to suggest it could play a critical role in Africa.

Today, much emphasis is placed on preventing further conflict. Further conflict is prevented when a significant element with every resource appears quickly, decisively, and acts in accordance with the harmonized objectives of the host nation, donor partners, and the broader international community. Everyone knows that if you need to put out a campfire, you don’t use a squirt gun. You hit it with five buckets of water, kick apart the remaining logs, shovel dirt over the cinders, and throw another bucket of water on for good measure. Do that and that fire is out. Canada, as the initial driver of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) concept and one of its most ardent supporters, has an added responsibility to “go in hard” with lots of buckets of water when the context meets the parameters of R2P.
4. About Canada’s Aid Policy to Africa

Even if donor nation contributions do not shrink, they will surely grow more focused, and as always be subject to politicization. Recipient nations will have to demonstrate tighter controls, increased transparency, clear accountability, and measurable efficiency. The contemporary context of aid provision requires the alleviation of suffering, poverty reduction, and security. It also requires that donor nations withhold aid when development or security goals are not being met. While Canada’s aid contributions are currently significant, they are likely to shrink given the world economic climate. Even so, effective planning, proper resource allocation, alignment with recipient nation needs, successful execution, and useful validation can only be carried out when a national strategy has been developed.

UK policy regarding aid to Africa is clear, consistent, and complete. Canada’s policy is not as comprehensive, coherent, or well-communicated. The GoC has declared its priorities to be expanding economic links with the BRIC nations and the U.S. and focusing assistance on achieving security, governance, and stability within the Americas and in Afghanistan. The GoC is well aware of the moral requirements of providing aid and resources to Africa. The current government, to a lesser extent than previous governments, has allocated significant funds to African projects and programs in the last decade. However, the GoC appears to have chosen to focus any future activities on the continent with an eye toward the way that events in Africa will affect Canada’s own economy and national security. In my view, this is the wrong initial position to take.

The overall UK government objective is to reduce the potential for future conflict in Africa, primarily through reducing poverty, increasing prosperity, and promoting democracy. The UK’s methodology emphasizes preventive measures over reactive and post-conflict measures. With Sierra Leone functioning as a beacon of stability, it assists in keeping the wider region stable.

With a clear, comprehensive policy, Canada would enter Africa with no history of colonization, with a long history of service in Africa, with enormous credibility from ten years of fighting the Taliban and training Afghans, and with an opportunity to apply the
preventative humanitarian and security reforms that GoC ministries have theorized about. This is an opportunity to lead in the area of reform and to do it the Canadian way instead of having to work at the lowest common denominator level of needing to achieve consensus. This is what a Whole of Government approach is designed for. While using terminology borrowed from the principles of war may seem inappropriate, utilizing the schoolhouse construct allows for the application of the majority of those principles: selection and maintenance of the aim, maintenance of morale, security, concentration of force, economy of effort, flexibility, co-operation, and administration.

While the current situation in the three UN missions, UNMISS, UNAMID, and MONUSCO, is grim and daunting, the Canadian involvement is, at least in terms of participation of personnel and SSR-effects achieved, inconsequential and ornamental. Of some 55,000 military and police positions in the three missions, Canada will fill fewer than 70 of them.

At the same time, Canada is in the midst of repatriating some 1,200 Operation ATHENA personnel back from Afghanistan, while up to 950 remain and continue to train and deliver professional development services to the Afghan National Army. Many stakeholders are seeking a follow-on role for the CF. For fragile African countries actively seeking military training assistance, 950 Canadian Forces personnel would make an incredible difference in improving security and likely saving the lives of thousands of Africans in the process.

The decision comes down to addressing an SSR project via a Whole of Government approach across the breadth of the SSR sectors, or focusing Canadian efforts as part of a multilateral approach within only one or two sectors. At its most basic, CF personnel can be spread a mile wide and an inch deep, or they can be concentrated, focused, and effective.

5. About the Schoolhouse Construct

The schoolhouse construct requires a WGA commitment of the highest order, one that is generational in length. This approach offers the opportunity to create historic links with the recipient country. There is an opportunity to gain invaluable experience for CF
personnel by assisting nations in capacity-building activities in locations where most CF personnel would never have the occasion to deploy. Personal conversations with members of the OP SCULPTURE (the Canadian members of IMATT) have made it clear that all are operating at a level of responsibility and completing a breadth of duties they would never have had an opportunity to conduct on any other mission, let alone in the course of their routine duties. Job satisfaction for them goes far beyond what can be gained on a UN operation. This scenario can only have a positive result for military personnel retention.

6. About the Comparison

IMATT has achieved a degree of success after 11 years. It is well respected within Sierra Leone, has cemented UK credibility within West Africa, and provided the UK with a strong claim of being the originator of SSR doctrine.

The GoC/Combined UN missions’ SSR lack of success, unfortunately, suggests serious deficiencies with SSR efforts and achievements in both Sudan and the DRC. Gaining legitimacy and establishing a buffer zone is the role for the UN; lead nations are required to action SSR. Further the amount of Canadian personnel support has been minimal and the overall effect practically negligible.

Finally, the inferences drawn from a GoC/IMATT-like construct strongly suggest a level of success at least commensurate with that of the UK in IMATT (subject to a long-term commitment of will and resources). With the wealth of lessons learned from IMATT (SL)’s example, it should be possible to strengthen SSR guidelines, and plan a long-term, well-resourced, WGA GoC effort. It is likely that a higher level of success within and across sectors is possible.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

The overarching recommendation that arises from this study is that Canada should focus the majority of its Africa aid efforts on particular sectors within its currently identified countries of focus. The key paper-specific recommendation is that GoC African security sector reform (SSR) policy objectives and Africans themselves would be better
served by the employment of Canadian Forces (CF) personnel in a schoolhouse (IMATT-like) construct.

The schoolhouse does demand a long-term commitment, a desire to assist the recipient nation in achieving what it needs and wants to achieve, and for Canada to assume the lead and be prepared to act alone and absorb any international “heat” that may arise. The determination to succeed is paramount. The manning of positions should be international, however, and African military forces should participate. Individual postings need to last for a minimum of two to three years.

With the schoolhouse approach, the only required liaison is the recipient government. In this construct, donor nation influence is direct, unfettered, and ultimately effective. Clear expectations of results should be tied to all aid, yet at the same time there must be a commitment of at least three to five years to allow for regularity in recipient nation operations, budgeting, and planning. Both parties would need to decide what standards to aim for at the local, provincial, and national levels given the African context. It is crucial to embed processes and procedures into governmental and military institutions that will endure beyond eventual donor disengagement.

Focus should be placed on a specific sector (e.g., military reform) with maximum assets applied in conjunction with the “focused” efforts of other lead nations in their sectors (e.g., justice, prison system). Canada should carry out activities in “sectors of focus” in the same manner the GoC has developed its “countries of focus” policy. Canada should work with donor nations to identify a “lead nation” in each sector in UN missions.

Steered by the recipient nation, donor nations would work out an accepted end state that the lead nation would help to achieve. Other donor nations would then place supporting resources and personnel under the control of the lead nation, which would naturally be expected to attain identified objectives in an allotted timeframe. This would better coordinate all donor efforts, greatly increase resource effectiveness, reduce bureaucratic inefficiencies, focus donor nation efforts into areas where they may have particular expertise or strengths, and achieve the desired reforms more quickly. Drawing
from U.S. Special Forces operational practices, SSR needs to be done by, with, and through regional and local organizations, recipient governments, and local interests.

Assuming this type of responsibility does not have to be exorbitantly expensive. Much can be accomplished with little. However, should assuming a lead nation SSR role prove beyond the resource availability or will of the GoC, a very strong secondary recommendation is to support African sub-regional organizations such as the South African Development Community (SADC), ECOWAS, IGAD, and others with personnel and resources. These are the sub-regional organizations best suited to work between donor nations and recipient nations in order to facilitate reform and development. Filling civilian and military staff officer positions in UN missions is a worthy objective, but Canadian influence on SSR and on UN and national policies will likely be far greater by filling advisory and staff positions within African regional organizations.

Without a doubt, the single most important step any country can take is to put their people on the ground to interact with local leaders and citizens and to gather intelligence—for lack of a more subtle term—on the political, social, and economic situation, and to gauge how the locals think and what their desires are. Canada needs to shift its emphasis away from filling HQ desk jobs and should put many more personnel, whether military, police, or civilians, into the field.

Second to getting people on the ground is the need to quickly provide an infusion of resources to address immediate and short-term needs. Donor nations and recipient governments need to be seen to be acting quickly and doing so effectively with the goal of alleviating suffering.

In fragile states there will be a need to heal the wounds of oppression and violence, usually inflicted by the government, the military, and paramilitaries. It is also necessary that new governments provide the leadership required to make a concerted effort to win back popular support. Advisory assistance at this level would be a best practice. The international community should identify promising new leaders and bureaucrats and to provide them with the opportunity to assume leadership roles in their government and communities. With the cooperation of the host government, these young,
potential leaders should be supported and sponsored to study in Canada, work in the Canadian bureaucratic system, and transition back into positions in their own government.

In addition to advising and training military institutions e.g. the MoD, training of a nation’s armed forces should be split between infantry skills and technical skills such as engineering, carpentry, masonry, or plant operations, which would lead to skilled military personnel working for their fellow citizens. They should also be trained and prepared to assist the national police forces in the performance of law enforcement duties in the event they need to be called upon. “The military must be leveraged as a tool for development not just a tool for defense.” ⁹⁶ Seeing soldiers not as predators, but as co-builders of their communities, would go a long way to creating the positive civilian-military relationship necessary for successful reform.

GoC efforts should focus on the principle of “help them, help themselves.” That is, there needs to be national level “train the trainer” courses. Canada can assist through the provision of tactical training and military education, stabilization and reconstruction skills, and latest generation equipment. The CF has everything the UN and Africa are looking for to assist the local military: fighters, advisors, teachers, and trainers.

There are ongoing situations where the GoC could implement the schoolhouse approach. A potential opportunity would appear to be South Sudan, as it is both a GoC Africa country of focus and currently has a UN mission in place, staffed with several Canadians. While the South Sudan has a very large army of over 150,000 personnel, the newly installed government has publicly declared that, in accordance with the constitution, “South Sudan Armed Forces personnel are to be ‘non-partisan, national in character, patriotic, regular, professional, disciplined, productive and subordinate to the

⁹⁶ LTC Shannon Beebe, Security Sector Reform as Development, from notes taken by author during the Cooperative Engagement for Partnership Capacity: Africa as a Model for Whole of Government conference in Monterey, California, 06/16/2011.
civilian authority.” 97 If requested to do so by the South Sudan government, Canada could assume a lead nation SSR role within the military sector. This would likely be very much welcomed by the UN and would be seen with much less suspicion by Sudan than if a similar effort were made by other Western countries. This would be a very demanding task and the GoC would need to be “all in.”

No doubt, adopting the schoolhouse construct would mean inputs would initially be high, plateau, and then begin to fall as the program matured. International assistance in providing personnel and resources would be sought, but project leadership would not be shared or relinquished. The work involved would normally consist of advice, training, oversight, and, perhaps initially, an executive role. Performance measurement and measures of effectiveness would naturally have to be clearly identified, sequenced objectives laid out, and an exit plan established. No recommendations are being made as to size or funding amounts because every situation will be different.

Finally, while this thesis study has concentrated on how the GoC can better support SSR in Africa, the methodology and results could be applied to other regions, such as the Americas, or to other non-SSR sectors, or to broader humanitarian aid efforts. Ideally, the recommendations just offered will play a small part in further assisting the GoC with capability development. Be it from the perspective of future Canadian security or from the more appropriate moral perspective, the need is too great to not take more effective action.

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