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### Band of Brothers or Dysfunctional Family? A Military Perspective on Coalition Challenges During Stability Operations

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Band of Brothers or Dysfunctional Family?
A Military Perspective on Coalition Challenges During Stability Operations

Russell W. Glenn
The research described in this report was sponsored by the U.S. Joint Forces Command and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community under Contract W74V8H-06-C-0002.

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Preface

Counterinsurgency (COIN) and other stability operations seldom present a nation with trials that threaten its very survival (unless the country in question is the one directly under assault).\(^1\) Bonds between coalition members are therefore weaker in such situations than they are when threat of annihilation reinforces mutual dependence. These situations are further complicated by the use of force likely not being the primary implement for attaining ultimate success. Devoid of a preeminent threat and denied primary dependence on armed forces, primary coalition objectives tend to be political rather than military in character. They include the myriad tasks embodied in such wide-ranging language as *counterinsurgency*, *nation building*, *developing government capacity*, and *providing humanitarian assistance* and that are collectively referred to in doctrine as *stability operations*. Armed forces are not staffed or trained to meet the long-term demands of many of these tasks. An alliance or coalition must therefore incorporate participation by other government agencies and—ultimately—that of the indigenous government and its population to an extent not expected during conventional combat operations. (Indeed, the indigenous country is sometimes excluded from membership in a coalition longer than appropriately serving the coalition’s objectives would seem to dictate.) Recent contingencies have also seen commercial enterprises, militias, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) become key participants in these undertakings. The result is coalitions of a size seldom seen and with a number of affiliations rarely, if ever approached, before the closing years of the 20th century. This monograph investigates the dramatic expansion of challenges confronting alliances and coalitions today and thereafter considers potential solutions that include questioning our very conception of what constitutes a coalition in today’s world.

While military readers may comprise the primary audience for this document, the scope of this study should make it of interest to representatives of any governmental agency likely to participate in a coalition with domestic or multinational partners and those from IGOs,

\(^1\) For the purposes of this document, I consider COIN operations to be a subset of stability operations. The latter are defined in U.S. joint military doctrine as an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 1-02, 2001 [2008b], p. 515)

To emphasize the application of the analysis herein to COIN in particular as well as stability operations in general and to avoid overuse of stability operations as a term, at times I refer to COIN alone when the point seems particularly appropriate to COIN operations. That use should not be taken as meaning that the discussion is exclusive of other types of stability operations.
NGOs, and commercial or research organizations that choose to operate where alliances and coalitions deploy their capabilities.

The RAND National Defense Research Institute

This research was sponsored by the U.S. Joint Forces Command and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.

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A coalition, “an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action,” is the 21st-century norm when the United States commits military forces to an international venture. Frequently, such entities involve members in numbers greater than was the norm even a decade or two before the close of the 20th century. In this and other ways, coalition operations today are often different from those of the past. It is the challenges for coalition leadership associated with this greater quantity, related variety of member and collective needs, and different operational demands that are the focus of the pages that follow. Though the discussion will frequently draw its examples from and thereby have more pointed application to some situations—in particular, those involving stability operations—the resultant observations and recommendations will often also have application to coalition undertakings more generally. The extent to which this is the case will, unsurprisingly, be very much situation dependent.

It is valuable both to distinguish coalitions from their more settled brethren—alliances—and to appreciate the many similarities. The kinship is a close one, and a student of either is fortunate in that both offer many lessons of value regarding the other. Yet, as difficult as alliances have proven throughout history, coalitions can be more challenging still. It behooves us to consider both, but, herein, it is the greater demands of coalitions that merit our primary attention even as we occasionally draw on the lessons that alliances sometimes offer this investigation.

An alliance, “the relationship that results from a formal agreement (e.g., treaty) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members,” can be envisioned as a tuxedo-clad affair, one whose members slouch in deep leather chairs while engaging in comfortable conversation with long-standing intimates. Each knows what is expected of the other when they meet. Surprises tend to be few, though old irritations may occasionally ruffle relationships. Coalitions are, in contrast, come-as-you-are events, with some participants properly attired while others arrive in a state completely unsuitable for the event at hand. Late arrivals are commonplace; some will decide to attend only after ensuring that participation does not threaten other opportunities. Mutual suspicions can arise after entry as members find themselves in strange, sometimes even exotic, company. All carefully monitor the host, who wines and dines newfound friends and old acquaintances alike. Some sit at the head table; others are treated kindly, if less favorably. The difference is ever a potential source of jealousy, despite the cuisine being a direct consequence of what each member offers the collective enterprise. Most will tolerate the disparity; some will depart in a huff, the host first seeking to convince the disgruntled to stay, then expressing condolences.

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3 JP 1-02 (2001 [2008a], p. 31).
at any misunderstanding and assuring the departing that the door remains open for a later return. Coalitions are, therefore, frequently tumultuous affairs in comparison to the more-refined alliance associations.

This raises the question of why anyone would choose to participate in a coalition. Two notable reasons are in immediate evidence. First, despite the variation in backgrounds, differences in motivations, and fickleness of some, most members arrive with one or more capabilities that, when combined with those of others, enhance the collective capabilities of the whole. The many thereby hope to accomplish aims that would be attainable only at greater expense were they undertaken unilaterally, if indeed they could be achieved at all. Second, while the international community often views with suspicion actions taken by a single nation alone, a cooperative enterprise can bolster legitimacy and soothe fears of what might otherwise mistakenly be interpreted as a renewal of colonial ambitions, pursuit of a less developed nation’s natural resources, or other unsavory objective.

As challenging as coalition warfare is during conventional conflicts, the difficulties are compounded in number and character when the contingency is instead a stability operation. The absence of a threat that puts survival interests at risk translates into weaker commitment and more-restrictive caveats on how a participant’s capabilities are employed. Yet, though the ties binding nations in a coalition are weaker during a stability operation, once conventional combat has ended, the potential benefits of membership can combine with reduced risk to swell the numbers wishing to participate. At that point, external parties may conclude that the victor is evident. Countries that previously feared alienating one or the other adversary flock to join the winner. The expansion of membership often includes representatives of developing nations less well equipped, trained, and disciplined than is desirable, conditions that present a challenge to coalition leaders having to incorporate these sometimes marginal and, at other times, outright unhelpful assets into operations.4 Liaison requirements will likewise expand, tasking human and equipment resources beyond the limits for which they were designed. Difficult decisions regarding the sharing of sensitive technologies and intelligence will test collective resolve. Day-to-day coordination and maintenance of a consistent message will become increasingly complex as the number of members and coalition affiliates expands. Already-complicated operations, such as completing the handover of responsibility in an area of operation, will become yet more difficult as differences in language, operational sophistication, commitment, economic resources, and other factors vary to an extent not previously seen.

The transition from conventional conflict to postwar recovery or other stability operation brings other challenges as well. Development of overarching guidance in the form of a campaign plan has proven elusive during such undertakings, any collective plans generally appearing months or years after initial deployment (if at all). Even when created, these plans are often products developed by one participant (generally the lead nation’s military component) rather than efforts that encompass substantive input from all participants. The result is overfocus on but a few components of the whole, a shortfall that virtually ensures suboptimal performance, given the broad palette of capabilities demanded during a stability operation. Member nations’ home governments can further complicate coalition effectiveness by treating stability operations as peacetime business as usual, meaning that those deployed can find

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4 Coalition leader, when used in this document, generally refers to an individual. Lead nation or lead organization instead designates the country, alliance, or other organization that assumes primary oversight responsibility.
themselves confronted by lethargy and a culture of nine-to-five activity in the national capitals or organizations on which they depend.

Coalitions inherently also suffer from the dissimilarity and unfamiliarity of their separate parts. Their ad hoc character means that members are less likely to be familiar with each other’s capabilities than would be were they part of an alliance. The barriers to cooperation can therefore initially be considerable. A coalition leader expecting to command (or lead, in another context, should he or she be a civilian) with the authority he or she would the forces of a single nation’s military will be disappointed. The traditional C2 of command and control will more often than not have to be seen in terms of cooperation and compromise. Complete unity of command is rarely achievable; it must instead be measured in degree rather than as an absolute. Fortunately, the less demanding standards of unity of effort and unity of message may serve as channels of progress when unity of command proves unattainable.

Anything done to improve the cooperation between coalition members is a step forward. A solution employed very effectively during operations in the Balkans at the end of the 20th century involved using an alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as the foundation for the larger coalition that sought to bring peace to that tumultuous region. Equipment commonalities, preestablished procedures, and established relationships served as a basis for any changes necessitated by unique operational demands, including the incorporation of non-NATO members into the coalition. The use of an established alliance streamlined coalition formation and helped during later operations. Employing an alliance as the basis for a coalition helped in reducing the impact of individual members’ agendas as well; many of those potential stumbling blocks had been dealt with during earlier exercises and over years of internal negotiation and compromise.

Mitigating Divisive Forces and Overcoming Obstacles to Coalition Effectiveness

Just as previous operations and exercises lubricated the workings of the NATO-based coalition in the Balkans, training, seminars, field and command-post exercise events, and the exchange of liaison officers can help coalition members to meld more rapidly. Exchange programs that send prospective coalition-member representatives to each other’s training programs have long been an effective way of improving mutual familiarity (though the benefits of these activities could be better capitalized upon were more countries to actively encourage students to maintain ties with former international or other-agency colleagues). Likewise, training, equipping, and assigning top-quality individuals to liaison positions during exercises and active operations improve coalition functioning.

It is evident, even in this brief, introductory summary, that individual relationships will make or break a coalition. The military leader noted for his or her adroitness at war fighting or bureaucratic know-how may lack the requisite diplomatic skills to succeed in a less overtly combative environment. Individual characteristics essential to sustaining a coalition include having a mind flexible enough to walk around the table—view issues from other members’ perspectives—and adapt accordingly. Having the right men and women in positions at every echelon will be crucial to collective success in achieving coalition objectives.
Expanding the Concept of “Coalition”

Security (e.g., military and police) forces cannot defeat an insurgency or build a nation alone. The broad spectrum of requirements requires the cooperation of participating nations’ governments across their capabilities. Experts in justice, diplomacy, economics, education, and many other areas are no less crucial than the soldier training a broken nation’s army or police officer molding an indigenous counterpart to walk the beat in a host nation’s cities. But Iraq, Afghanistan, and other stability operations’ challenges around the world tell us that even these coalitions of governmental organizations are insufficient to the immensity of the tasks at hand. National governments are not designed to build governing capacity; they are organized to perpetuate it. The post–World War II Marshall Plan benefited greatly from the strengths and support provided by the U.S. government, but it was, in many cases, the commercial world’s managers and civilian economic geniuses who deserve much of the credit for success. Unfortunately, we do not witness the same degree of government–private sector cooperation today. We do, however, see essential capabilities brought to stability operations by NGOs, IGOs, and—to a lesser extent—commercial ventures. And we (sometimes belatedly) recognize that an indigenous citizenry and its governing bodies (to the extent they exist) will be key to achieving coalition objectives. The current conceptualization of a coalition exclusively as “an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations” is proving inadequate. Coalitions need to incorporate these other entities into planning and operational processes to a greater or lesser extent, depending on the capabilities a particular entity has to offer, its willingness to cooperate in the collective venture, and the nature of the challenge. Some will be members in a very robust sense; others may merit or choose to be little more than distant affiliates. Just as not all members of a coalition currently receive the same access to intelligence, so too will the extent of benefits vary with the addition of these other parties. A coalition today is more appropriately defined as “an ad hoc arrangement between two or more organizations in the interest of common action.” Prospective coalition leaders—whether military or civilian—need to understand that collective and individual members’ ends are better served by inclusiveness than by exclusivity.

Building Better Future Coalitions

Enhancing U.S. readiness to more effectively project its influence via the medium of coalitions is an ongoing challenge. Fortunately, it is one that has recently gained the attention of leaders in the federal government. Such initiatives as the 1997 presidential decision directive (PDD) 56, created to improve U.S. interagency cooperation; the more recent U.S. Department of State’s creation of its Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization; and that department’s accompanying efforts to form a group of resources to support future deployments (the Civilian Response Corps, or CRC, with its active [CRC-A], standby [CRC-S], and reserve [CRC-R] components) provide but three examples. Yet there remains much to be done in bettering U.S. leadership of and participation in coalitions. Expanding the understanding of what is meant by coalition is one step forward, as would be acting to capitalize on the grander spectrum of capabilities that expansion implies. Movement along that path will require a cooperative effort, the support of all participants, and more-than-occasional compromise.

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5 See PDD 56 and FAS (1997).
Unfortunately, that path forward is, at present, poorly defined. Recommendations receiving attention herein that address shortcomings include the development of doctrine, training, and lessons-learned capabilities to guide future coalition leaders—civilian and military—and those who work with them. In the immediate term, it seems prudent to assign responsibility for the development of this doctrine, the design of much of the training, and collection and analysis of lessons learned to U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), given its current duties regarding joint-service doctrine and training. Placing these responsibilities in a suprardepartmental government agency or, better yet, an independent enterprise outside of government would be preferable from the standpoint of avoiding bureaucratic tensions, but the urgency of the need makes it advisable to capitalize on the human resources and past experience existent in USJFCOM for at least the first iteration of development in this regard.

The ad hoc nature of coalitions does not imply that organizations do not prepare individuals for the eventuality of leading these ventures. Expansion of current educational exchange programs to provide for attendance at government schools and NGO or IGO training courses has been mentioned. Contact information for individuals completing these courses should be noted in appropriate databases to allow for ready identification during future operations. Similarly, prospective liaison officers and those likely to serve in coalition leadership positions ought to attend graduate courses appropriate to pending duties. These longer-range preparatory programs should have collective exercise counterparts that bring representatives of future coalition members and affiliates together, much as national training centers offer combined-arms and joint training at present. Training conducted immediately prior to deployment should additionally bring national teams or smaller coalition components together as a precursor to deploying as teams. In-theater training should likewise be available after deployment for those joining a coalition belatedly or unable to partake of home-station preparation. Serious consideration should be given to creation of an interagency staff college to educate midlevel executives (i.e., equivalent to majors or lieutenant colonels in the armed forces) from all branches of government and representatives of NGOs or other organizations as appropriate. Assignment to interagency positions akin to military joint assignments would logically follow attendance. Policies regarding promotions and other personnel matters—whether dictated by the executive branch or by Congress—would likely be necessary to enhance the desirability of such assignments and preclude the professional marginalization of those serving in them.

Recent operations reflect that more needs to be done to enhance unity of effort and the achievement of unity of message in addition to approximating unity of command to the extent feasible for both a coalition’s senior leadership and that at subordinate echelons. Care in selecting leaders with the right mix of talents will aid in this regard, as it will in addressing the many individual participants’ and collective objectives inherent in the cooperative endeavor. Greater inclusion of relevant parties during coalition planning, during subsequent rehearsals and exercises, and in the formation and deployment of advance parties is strongly recommended in the interest of better orchestrating assets that currently too often compete with and undermine the effectiveness of coalition operations.

Coalition administration during stability operations too often suffers at the hand of lead-nation bureaucratic procedures that ignore other participants’ unfamiliarity or inability to meet stringent procedural guidelines designed for peacetime operational tempos. Excellent coalition leadership, superb training, excellence in common procedures, and a willingness to cooperate and compromise can all be frustrated by acquisition and other regulations inad-
equate to the demands of overcoming threats to peace, aiding the needy, and building governments capable of serving their populations.

Finally, coalition leaders conducting stability operations should question their initiatives, asking, “Will this move the coalition toward accomplishment of its objectives?” Often, those objectives will include establishment of capable self-government. In such cases, a coalition is fundamentally failing if it is not preparing the indigenous population and those who will serve it for that eventuality. The right choices in that regard may not be what they initially seem. Surrender of governing authority to indigenous leaders not yet ready, or permitting their selection by a population ill prepared for its responsibilities as an electorate, may condemn a coalition venture to ultimate failure and the local population to unnecessary suffering. Though policy dictates to those leading coalition stability operations no less than it does to generals in war, ill-advised political expediency can be the dagger that kills prospects for success.
I thank those in the Joint Irregular Warfare Center, U.S. Joint Forces Command, for their continued support. I also thank the many individuals who dedicated time to grant interviews without which this work would have lacked vital insights impossible to obtain otherwise. I give particular thanks to the British Army’s Lt Col David Russell-Parsons for his help in coordinating meetings with those serving at Shrivenham and, as ever, my friend St. John “Singe” Coughlan’s aid in identifying colleagues with the combination of experience, intelligence, professionalism, and forthrightness to make the resulting interview sessions the superb resource they always are. I offer additional special note of appreciation to colleague Maj Gen Jonathan Bailey (British Army, retired), whose suggestions for enhancing this work were most valuable, and a notable thanks as well to COL Kevin Nykanen (U.S. Army), without whom the many valuable interviews in Tampa, Florida, would never have happened.

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# Abbreviations

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<tr>
<td>ABCA</td>
<td>American, British, Canadian, and Australian Armies’ Standardization (an organization facilitating interoperability between the member nations’ land forces)</td>
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<td>ADZ</td>
<td>Afghan development zone</td>
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<td>AFP</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Philippines</td>
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<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>armored personnel carrier</td>
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<td>ARRC</td>
<td>Allied Rapid Reaction Corps</td>
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<td>AWACS</td>
<td>airborne warning and control system</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCTC</td>
<td>Battle Command Training Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>command and control</td>
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<tr>
<td>C3IC</td>
<td>coalition coordination, communication, and integration center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>comprehensive approach</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARE</td>
<td>Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>close air support</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEFCOM</td>
<td>Canadian Expeditionary Force Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>Command and General Staff College</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>civil-military cooperation</td>
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<td>CO</td>
<td>commanding officer</td>
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<td>COIN</td>
<td>counterinsurgency</td>
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<td>COMINTERFET</td>
<td>Commander, International Force in East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>CORDS</td>
<td>Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Coalition Provisional Authority</td>
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<td>CRC</td>
<td>Civilian Response Corps</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>CRC-S</td>
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<td>DFAT</td>
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<td>Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe</td>
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<td>FRY</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FWC</td>
<td>Federal War Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCP</td>
<td>gross cell product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEF</td>
<td>guidance for the employment of the force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPA</td>
<td>governance and public administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HACC</td>
<td>humanitarian-assistance coordination center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAER</td>
<td>humanitarian aid and emergency rehabilitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HC</td>
<td>high commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMAS</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Australian Ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMCS</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Canadian Ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMG</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMNZS</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s New Zealand Ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMS</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOC</td>
<td>humanitarian operations center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HVT</td>
<td>high-value target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAWG</td>
<td>Interagency Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>improvised explosive device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFOR</td>
<td>implementation force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>intergovernmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III MEF</td>
<td>III Marine Expeditionary Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>InterAction</td>
<td>American Council for Voluntary International Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>INTERFET</td>
<td>International Force in East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSOTF-P</td>
<td>Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>KLA</td>
<td>Kosovo Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAV</td>
<td>light amphibious vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCT</td>
<td>landing craft, tank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LO</td>
<td>liaison officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOO</td>
<td>line of operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIS</td>
<td>Military Intelligence Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MND (SE)</td>
<td>Multi-National Division South East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNF-I</td>
<td>Multi-National Force–Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>UK Ministry of Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NBI</td>
<td>National Bureau of Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFZ</td>
<td>no-fly zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>nongovernmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIAC</td>
<td>National Iraqi Assistance Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOFORN</td>
<td>not releasable to foreign nationals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAF</td>
<td>Operation Allied Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
OCPA  office of the Coalition Provisional Authority
ODA  operational detachment alpha
OEF  Operation Enduring Freedom
OHR  Office of the High Representative
OIF  Operation Iraqi Freedom
OPSEC  operations security
ORHA  Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
OSCE  Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe
P-5  permanent five
PDD  presidential decision directive
PKF  peacekeeping force
PRC  Popular Resistance Committee
PRT  provincial reconstruction team
PSC  private security company
PSYOP  psychological operations
PWRR  Princess of Wales’s Royal Regiment
RAMSI  Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands
RoCK  Representative of Canada in Kandahar
ROE  rule of engagement
RPG  rocket-propelled grenade
RTF  Reconstruction Task Force
RUC  Royal Ulster Constabulary
S3  operations officer
SACEUR  Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SAMS  School of Advanced Military Studies
SASO  stability and support operation
SEATO  Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SF  special force
SFOR  stabilisation force
SOF  special operations force
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>special representative of the secretary-general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSI</td>
<td>Strategic Studies Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STANAG</td>
<td>standardization agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWEC</td>
<td>state war-executive committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCG</td>
<td>tactical coordination group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOW</td>
<td>tube launched, optically tracked, wire guided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMET</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMI</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHOC</td>
<td>United Nations Humanitarian Operations Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>U.S. Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCENTCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USEUCOM</td>
<td>U.S. European Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USFORINTERFET</td>
<td>U.S. Forces, International Force in East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>U.S. government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USJFCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Joint Forces Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>U.S. Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNS</td>
<td>U.S. Naval Ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS</td>
<td>U.S. ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSOCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XO</td>
<td>executive officer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The highest realization of warfare is to attack the enemy’s plans; next is to attack their alliances.

—Sun-tzu, The Art of War¹

In war it is not always possible to have everything go exactly as one likes. In working with allies it sometimes happens that they develop opinions of their own.

—Sir Winston Churchill, The Hinge of Fate²

The United States is the land of Eisenhower, the man who led the most successful alliance of the 20th century—indeed, one of the most notable in the history of warfare. The United States is the nation privileged by its partners to lead the coalition that swept the Iraqi Army from the field in a matter of hours in 1991 and again in a matter of days a dozen years later. What value could there be in contemplating how such a proven exemplar might improve its performance as leader of coalitions at the dawning of the 21st century?

The United States’ is also the military that saw GEN George S. Patton clash with FM Bernard Montgomery in Sicily and northwest Europe. It is the U.S. government that struggled to find an effective relationship with Vietnam during more than a decade of fighting in Southeast Asia. And it is the world’s premier military power that has made missteps while leading the coalitions that work to rebuild the nations of Afghanistan and Iraq. There are still many lessons to learn—and relearn—when it comes to finding the keys to successful coalition leadership, regardless of whether that leadership is civilian or military. That is the focus here—in particular, identifying elements crucial to the oversight of coalition ventures during stability operations.

Alliances and coalitions are close kin; many of the observations made with respect to one are no less relevant to the other. The former are defined as “the relationship that results from a formal agreement (e.g., treaty) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members”; the latter are “an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action.”³ Each provides lessons drawn from the other. But it is a coalition that poses difficulties beyond those found in its more formal and aged relation. The lesser formality inherent in a coalition means that members are less familiar

¹ Sun-tzu (1994, p. 177).
³ JP 1-02 (2001 [2008a], pp. 31, 92).
with each other; likely share less in the way of common equipment, doctrine, and procedures; and have a more fluid membership. It is also coalitions that more frequently characterize recent and ongoing deployments to stability operations. Thus, in the pages that follow, we focus primarily on the greater challenges posed by coalitions and solutions to those challenges, even while we occasionally draw on relevant lessons from the history of alliances.

Multinational and interagency undertakings continue to challenge both U.S. leaders and those from other nations and organizations. The problem is not a trivial one. Misunderstandings between members of these cooperative ventures have cost men and women their lives, lost battles, and underpinned the demise of nations. There are many reasons that the tasks at hand can be even more difficult when alliance or coalition members find themselves threatened with an adversary that does not threaten survival interests, as is typically the case during stability operations (with some exceptions—e.g., the nation that is at once threatened by an insurgency and a member of the coalition battling that insurgency). The pages that follow first contemplate what comprise a coalition and what forces tend to bind or separate its members. Analysis addresses three particular challenges: (1) structural considerations that a military leader can influence to improve coalition effectiveness, (2) difficulties associated with unity of command, and (3) characteristics that should be considered in selecting individuals for coalition leadership positions. The overarching objective is to provide insights of value to leaders—primarily those military, but others as well—as they prepare for and participate in coalitions during stability operations in years to come. A quick look over our collective shoulder demonstrates the value in such consideration. The coalition supporting operations in September 2006 Iraq numbered 31 nations; that in October 2008 Afghanistan included 39 such participants.4 Far from diminishing in importance, the demand for effective leadership has become all but ubiquitous during international deployments as coalitions grow in size and complexity.

The ties that bind nations during coalition operations often extend beyond military activities to include economic, diplomatic, and other functions. Military concerns need not dominate alliances and coalitions; they should not during many of the activities undertaken during stability operations. Recognition of this fact carries with it a number of nontrivial implications, including the possibility of civilian leadership during some or all phases of a coalition operation and expansion of our definition to include non–nation-state members in such collective enterprises.

**Coalitions (and Alliances) 101: The Basics**

The multinational dimension acts, to a great extent, as Clausewitzian friction, multiplying the “countless minor incidents . . . that combine to lower the general level of performance, so that one always falls short of the intended goal.”

—Lt Gen Sir John Kiszely, Coalition Command in Contemporary Operations5

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4 D. Wright and Reese (2008, p. 21); Burns (2008).
The Nature of Coalitions

Many of the command challenges inherent in a coalition force are similar to those inherent in an alliance—for example, the problems of integration, interoperability, decision-making, and achieving unity of purpose. But an alliance, particularly one as closely integrated and of such long-standing as NATO [the North Atlantic Treaty Organization], can achieve—and, in NATO’s case, has achieved—considerably more progress in overcoming these challenges than a coalition.

—Lt Gen Sir John Kiszely, Coalition Command in Contemporary Operations

It behooves us to begin our trek toward better understanding coalitions—and alliances—by asking what motivates their formation. What forces act as adhesives, and which, instead, tend to weaken the bonds holding participating countries together? Appreciation of these basics is a forerunner to achieving the more-extensive objectives sought.

Their definitions tell us that alliances and coalitions share the characteristic of bringing together several participants in a cooperative venture. The two differ primarily in the formality of the ties that bind members and duration of the affiliation. For most Americans, the most familiar alliance is NATO, due to its lengthy history, recent high profile during operations in the Balkans, and post–Cold War pursuit of membership by several eastern European nations. The formal agreement binding its members is the North Atlantic Treaty signed in Washington, D.C., on April 4, 1949, the opening lines of which make its objectives clear:

The Parties to this Treaty . . . are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security.

Contrast this broad commitment to mutual defense, one now more than half a century old, with the less-formal ties that brought countries’ armed forces to Iraq or Afghanistan during the past decade. No single agreement obliges participants to maintain support. The number of nations committing forces to either contingency has varied considerably over time as objectives changed or other influences affected membership. Each of these cooperative ventures constitutes a coalition (though that in Afghanistan also includes the NATO alliance among its members).

Commitments made to a coalition can take forms other than those requiring the physical presence or participation of its representatives. Turkey supported the 1991 coalition seeking to oust Saddam Hussein from Kuwait by allowing U.S. aircraft to launch wartime missions from Incirlik Air Base and sending 100,000 personnel to the Iraqi border, the latter causing the Iraqi dictator to divert forces that could otherwise have been committed to defend against the attack that ultimately came from the south. Germany and Japan supported operations with financial outlays of $6.5 billion and $9 billion, respectively, amounts exceeded only by those

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6 Kiszely (2008b, p. 2).
7 NATO (1949)
from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Such participation recalls U.S. provision of intelligence to the United Kingdom during the 1983 Falklands War or the various types of support the United States provided to Britain in the months prior to formal U.S. entry into World War II.

**Reasons for Joining a Coalition**

Although there is great political strength to be gained from a large number of participating nations, and potentially an increase in combat power, it is also true that the amount of friction in an operation rises in direct proportion to the number and diversity of participating nations.

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*Lt Gen Sir John Kiszely, Coalition Command in Contemporary Operations*

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I use the analogy of a rope to describe peace support operations in a post-conflict situation. The provision of security is only one strand; the other stands are political progress, humanitarian aid, demobilization of the factions’ armies, reconstruction and economic progress. Once the strands are woven together, the rope is stronger than the sum of its parts.

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*Gen Mike Jackson, Soldier: The Autobiography of General Sir Mike Jackson*

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There are two fundamental motivations for creating an alliance or coalition. The first is straightforward: to bring together the combination of capabilities necessary to achieve the ends shared by its members. Those joining the partnership might provide armed forces, allow basing of an international force, agree to overflight rights, back the collective whole with intelligence, support the undertaking financially, or provide aid otherwise unlikely to reach a needy population in timely fashion. Such assemblages might, in theory, consist only of those nations that substantively add to the capabilities of the whole, since adding other participants would seem an unnecessary (and, thus, undesirable) burden. The quotation from General Kiszely suggests that the greater the number and variety of members, the more difficult is the coordination and more strained are logistics pipelines weighed down with personnel and materiel excess to needs. Yet, many are the coalitions that would never exist were effectiveness and efficiency the sole determinants of participation. The United States arguably had little need for the tactical capabilities added by regional military units’ participation during 1983 operations in Grenada. Some countries sent forces to 1992 Somalia, 1999 East Timor, and 2003 Iraq lacking in even basic necessities, causing logistical problems that outweighed the immediate tactical value of their soldiers. Military leaders from wealthier countries would have found the going easier if their political leaders had forgone the opportunity to bring these less-endowed nations into the collective fold.

But their political leaders did not forgo the opportunity. They instead sought out broader membership. Operational effectiveness without diplomatic legitimacy is a dangerous tool to wield in today’s world. Andrew Pierre of Georgetown University notes, “politically, a coalition, especially a broadly based one, will be perceived by the international community as acting with

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11 Kiszely (2008b, p. 4).
12 Mike Jackson (2008, p. 266).
greater legitimacy than the actions of a single state, especially if the coalition is supported by an international mandate such as a United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution.”

Why is legitimacy crucial? Pierre goes on:

The political advantages of coalitions are . . . greatly increasing. . . . Public opinion polls consistently show that the American public feels much more comfortable with the use of U.S. forces when done in conjunction with allies, especially nations that are democracies and subject to their own democratic processes. At home, coalitions can be facilitators that are helpful, perhaps even a prerequisite, for assuring congressional and domestic political support. Internationally, coalitions can serve as political force multipliers.

Diplomacy and domestic politics ace military efficiency. In coalitions, as in war, policy dictates to the military.

Factors Affecting the Cohesion and Stability of Coalitions

There is almost a paradox in that it is when the coalition is close to achieving its goals that it is most difficult to maintain [its] solidarity. When the common threat recedes and the individual members start looking past the current conflict, the inherent differences between partners are most likely to reassert themselves.

—Keith Powell, An Historical Examination of International Coalitions

Having considered the initial two questions of “What is a coalition?” and “What motivates its formation?” we turn to our third query: “What forces act as adhesives, and which instead tend to dissolve the bonds holding participating countries together?” Relative to an alliance, a coalition is an impermanent entity. It consistently experiences forces that act to bind on the one hand even as others work to rend it asunder. Cultural ties, moral obligations, promises of reward, and immediate financial or other inducements join any shared objectives as some of the elements that can act to keep nations cooperating. Adapting a list from the U.S. Army’s Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) provides a partial catalog of divisive elements that can instead work to loosen coalition ties:

- ulterior goals, different interpretations of the shared goal, or goals that change over time
- logistical support, either the cost of its provision or the perception that expected support is not forthcoming
- differences in capabilities that interfere with operational efficiency or that marginalize one or more participants, making them unable to maintain a position of sufficient substance in the coalition, such as variations in training and level of professionalism and quality and quantity of equipment and its capacity to interoperate with other member nations
- dissimilarities in operational doctrines
- willingness to share intelligence
- language
- disagreements regarding leadership and command relationships

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• culture, including religion, class and gender distinctions, discipline, tolerance (e.g., willingness to accept friendly-force, noncombatant, or even enemy casualties), work ethic, expectations regarding standards of living or dissatisfaction with differences observed during a deployment, and national traditions.16

An example of culture impeding cohesiveness comes from recent U.S.-Philippine operations. A special force (SF) captain commanding an operational detachment alpha (ODA) during my recent visit to that theater related a lesson he identified during his service as adviser to an Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) battalion. The captain originally planned to break down his trainers by staff section:

I would send my S3 [operations sergeant] to his S3 [an officer in the AFP]. No, you have to go through the battalion commander, then the XO [executive officer], and then he goes to the S3 rather than us ever coordinating with him directly. And it is always the team leader [the SF captain] that has to go to the battalion commander.17

Differences in social mores—in this case, the Americans being less rank conscious than their counterparts—meant that an expert coordinating directly with his staff opposite was disallowed. Recommendations had to pass through the senior officer in the battalion, later to be channeled via the second in charge and only then to reach their intended target. The extra time consumed and chances of miscommunication would be frustrating and a cause of concern even in a nonthreatening environment. (Readers will recall the grade-school exercise of passing a whispered message from person to person and then comparing the original with the final, often-quite-different outcome.) A further observation by our captain points to one of the many ways of improving coalition cooperation, one to which we will return later—familiarity born of previous association: “If one of their officers has been trained in the U.S., he is much more likely to support staff-on-staff coordination.”

Arguably, no factor influences coalition cohesion more than the extent of threat facing the collective effort. Mortal danger is strong glue. It is, therefore, unsurprising that the challenges to holding a coalition together increase in the aftermath of conventional wartime combat, once the adversary has been defeated. Some erstwhile partners lack a unifying compulsion of sufficient importance to override the costs of continued participation. National political, economic, cultural, and other factors come to the fore and act to divide the once-close collaborators. Victory on a battlefield often only sets the preconditions for accomplishing ultimate goals; this disintegration can therefore deny coalition members the collective ends for which they originally came together.

16 Bowman (1997, pp. 9–11; emphasis in original).
17 ODA 925 interview with Russell W. Glenn, Tugas and Jolo, Philippines, January 13, 2007. In keeping with policy of U.S. Special Operations Command, Pacific, the speaker is not identified by name.
Coalitions 102: More Observations Regarding Coalition Cohesion

Power within a coalition is never absolute.
—Raymond D. Barrett, “Coalition Dynamics”

The burdens borne in a coalition are seldom equal. Related to this point is this: Relationships within a coalition are likewise seldom based on perfect equality. Some members are willing or able to risk more or provide more to the cooperative venture. Greater commitment generally translates to increased influence, if not the lead role, in a coalition. Yet, increased influence does not, in turn, imply domination. The ad hoc and transient quality of coalitions means that members are likely to terminate participation fairly quickly when the price of continuing affiliation exceeds perceived benefits of continued membership. Turning once again to Pierre: “Rarely will each party totally get its way.”19 As difficult as forming a coalition might be, its maintenance will be at least as challenging. Coalitions are not fire-and-forget entities. They may not run like a finely tuned sports car, but they require no less maintenance.

The nature of coalitions is therefore little different from most cooperative ventures: There are expectations of reciprocity. No member should believe that it will get something for nothing, and the extent of payback must be in keeping with the relative commitment. An example from a nonmilitary, bilateral coalition provides an example. Agreeing to work together in dealing with illegal-drug threats to their two nations, government authorities in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom formed a coalition to combat narcotics smugglers operating between Amsterdam and London. The Dutch confronted their coalition partners as operations progressed, observing that, as they saw it,

We’re both running intercept operations. We give our intercept material to you, and you say, “Thank you very much. Not only will we use this for intelligence purposes, but actually might produce it in court.” But when we ask you for your intercept material, you give us the intelligence product and say we can exploit it but don’t allow us actually to use it in our courts. This is not mutual assistance; this is a one-sided thing.20

Members of a coalition should expect that they eventually will have to pay their bills.

Yet, a coalition leader must ever remember the primacy of politics; domestic considerations may preclude a coalition contingent from fully meeting what other members feel to be justified expectations. The extent to which this is true will vary over time—e.g., during periods before elections—just as it will depend on the extent to which a country’s leaders feel that they can assume domestic risk. U.S. secretary of defense Robert Gates’ public questioning of other NATO contingents’ effectiveness in southern Afghanistan precipitated an immediate backlash and an equally rapid softening of the secretary’s comments. Speaking the day after his inflammatory remarks, Gates reportedly “toned down his public criticism of NATO nations only because many of them, including Canada, have minority governments where support for

18 Barrett (1992, p. 34).
20 Albiston (2007).
the mission is ‘fragile.’”

Similar remarks attributed to Combined Joint Task Force 76 U.S. commander MG Benjamin Freakley to elements of the multinational brigade based in Kandahar, Afghanistan, likewise infuriated coalition members. Describing the event, Patrick Bishop reported that Freakley “made it clear that, in his view, the British were not doing enough. In fact, given their superior numbers and weight of equipment, they were doing less than any of the other Coalition partners in the province.” Lt Col Stuart Tootal, commanding the British 3rd Parachute Battalion, challenged Freakley on the spot, replying, “The British had gone far beyond the task they were originally given and had dangerously stretched their resources.”

Coalition leaders at any echelon cannot afford to view partner performance in light of in-theater conditions alone. They must similarly take a broad view of how any remarks they make will affect a situation much as they would gauge the consequences of each tactical maneuver when planning a combat operation. As noted in a January 29, 2009, article, “After the death of 320 British soldiers in America’s ‘war on terror,’ such jokes are especially wounding.”

Coalitions are consequently dynamic institutions, evolving over time as they respond to changes in an operational theater or influences from the home front. That a member retains affiliation does not mean that its level or nature of commitment remain constant. The ends sought in participation—which may differ considerably between parties even at the outset of operations—can also change. A coalition leader wishing to sustain partnerships must constantly monitor the conditions affecting each member’s involvement. Pierre advises that leading a coalition therefore requires listening attentively to coalition partners and having an appreciation of their interests, making judgments about competing priorities, accepting compromise when necessary, identifying and stating clear objectives, and staying focused on the central aim of the coalition.

The Pages Ahead

Because of their ad hoc character, coalitions start out much as does a pickup football game (that regardless of whether the football is round or oblong). Players have varying degrees of knowledge regarding others on their side; friends having a better grasp of each other’s talents than those with whom they have had less previous association. Initial play is likely to be tentative and not particularly effective. The self-centered player may, over time, be brought in line by appropriate comments or marginalized by being denied possession of the ball. Likewise, one less blessed with speed may be assigned as a blocker (in American football) or put in goal (in soccer). Participants have to adapt to member preferences, some favoring aggressive offense, others defense. Assignments will tend to align with talents and level of commitment given the passage of time. The capability of the whole will come to exceed the sum of its individual parts, synergy having been achieved as each participant molds play to that of others.

21 Campion-Smith (2008).
24 Larson et al. (2003, p. 26).
Yet, the sports analogy eventually fails us, at least in the case of stability operations following a conventional conflict. Victorious players depart after their win during an athletic contest, commitment free and with no need to maintain ties. Members of today’s coalitions rarely have the option of severing ties so easily. Victory on a battlefield may be the least demanding of the challenges confronting them. Theirs will likely be the responsibility to govern or rebuild (if not both) a nation in the aftermath of conflict. Some members will indeed walk away, unwilling or unable to assist with the new challenges. Others, the United States and its closest partners among them, will find that choice impractical and immoral if not impossible. The desired ends may be less clear than they were during the combat just completed. This will challenge coalition leaders having to mold the capabilities of remaining members or the resources of those joining it anew. Dangers of internal friction and dissolution will loom as a greater threat than during the initial competition. The leaders’ greatest challenges lay ahead.

It is to those challenges that the remainder of this monograph turns. Chapter Two briefly reviews the histories of two recent stability operations, that in East Timor involving a coalition initially headed by the Australian military and a second in the Balkans, where NATO served as the foundation for coalitions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. Chapters following thereafter consider three aspects of coalition leadership, each selected because of its dramatic impact on collective success: coalition structure (Chapter Three), unity of command (Chapter Four), and the personal characteristics vital in those leaders (Chapter Five). The final chapter investigates the implications of those before with respect to future coalition undertakings. Discoveries made along the way include few surprises. Alliances and coalitions have, after all, received considerable attention in the past. It is to be expected that available references have, therefore, to some extent, addressed the inherent leadership challenges. It is in the analysis of how stability operations affect coalition leadership that a reader might find fresh nuance or original insights during consideration of lessons drawn from two case studies and from other of history’s offerings. The extent of the challenges involved suggests that there is value in making those insights available to those who might be tasked as leaders in the future.
Chapter Two
Supporting Case Studies: East Timor and the Balkans

Case Study 1: East Timor

This summary of events in East Timor draws from a range of sources beyond those specifically cited elsewhere.1

Background
Timor-Leste (known as East Timor prior to formal recognition of the country as an independent state on May 20, 2002) is a nation occupying portions of the island of Timor, off the northwest Australia coastline. (See Figures 2.1 and 2.2. The lighter color in the second figure designates the two noncontiguous parts of Timor-Leste.) After a lengthy colonial history and more than a decade of restive efforts to gain independence in the aftermath of Indonesia’s usurpation of the land and peoples, Indonesian president Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie declared in May 1999 that the East Timorese would be permitted to vote in August of that year on whether to remain a part of Indonesia or become an independent nation. Voting took place under the supervision of the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET). An overwhelming choice for independence precipitated violence that the Indonesian military did little to suppress (and, evidence suggests, in some instances, supported). The consequence was a September 15, 1999, United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1264 establishing the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET), a peacekeeping force tasked “to restore peace and security in East Timor, to protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its tasks and, within force capabilities, to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations. . . .”2 It is the leadership challenges associated with the INTERFET coalition that are the foci of this case study, including those inherent in the transition to and replacement of the force by the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) peacekeeping force in early 2000.

Military units from the lead nation of Australia and other INTERFET participants landed in East Timor’s capital of Dili five days after the signing of the UNSCR. Later that year, nations from around the world joined Australian coalition commander GEN Peter Cosgrove in operations committed to the restoration of peace and building of the new nation’s

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capacity to govern itself.3 A lengthy passage from John Ballard’s *Triumph of Self-Determination: Operation Stabilise and United Nations Peacemaking in East Timor* is helpful in reflecting the wide scope and heterogeneous nature of the challenges confronting INTERFET leaders and likewise varied nature of support its members provided:

By mid October [1999], the international coalition supporting INTERFET in East Timor numbered twenty-five nations but included widely varying levels of support from the countries involved. Several nations deployed forces to add to the Australian brigade (which by then included some 4,500 troops, light helicopters, and the HMAS [Her Majesty’s Australian Ship] Jervis Bay and HMAS Tobruk). Brazil had deployed 50 military policemen, plus an infantry company and logistical support. Canada sent 600 troops, plus infrastructure and logistical support, the HMCS [Her Majesty’s Canadian Ship] Protector

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3 The number of nations changed over time, as did the countries participating. For example, Kenya, Jordan, and Egypt all deployed military personnel late in the INTERFET period in preparation for the transition to the peacemaking force supporting UNTAET (M. G. Smith and Dec. 2003, pp. 46–47). The U.S. role was one generally unfamiliar; James Glynn notes, “For the first time, U.S. forces assumed a strictly supporting role for an actual contingency. Designated Commander USFORINTERFET [U.S. Forces, INTERFET], Brigadier General (BGen) John G. Castellaw, USMC [U.S. Marine Corps], III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) Deputy Commanding General/Commanding General 3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade, was issued the following mission: ‘When directed, COMUSFORINTERFET [commander, USFORINTERFET] will provide unique U.S. capabilities to COMINTERFET [commander, INTERFET] in order to facilitate INTERFET operations to restore peace in East Timor’” (Glynn, 2001, p. 13). Glynn is not entirely correct in this passage. The United States supported British forces during the 1982 Falklands War, for example. Glynn later recognizes such support in his work.
(replenishment ship), and a C-130 aircraft. Fiji had committed 180 soldiers. Finland had donated $1 million in aid. The French had deployed a company of special forces troops, the frigate Vendemiaire, and an assault landing ship with some light helicopters from nearby New Caledonia. The British had contributed 270 Gurkhas and the HMS [Her Majesty’s Ship] Glasgow and had donated $5 million. Malaysia had a team of military officers already in INTERFET and planned for a battalion of 800–1,000 soldiers. New Zealand had given the tanker HMNZS [Her Majesty’s New Zealand Ship] Endeavour, the frigate HMNZS Te Kaha, and 800 troops. Norway sent 5 officers to the INTERFET staff. Portugal had deployed a 71-member medical team with three ambulances, three logistical support/command vehicles, and a rear-area field hospital (but no combat troops) to Darwin on September 17. The Republic of Korea sent over 200 combat troops and a similar number of medical staff, engineers, and communications specialists. Singapore deployed 21 medical personnel plus required logistical support and some military observers, 250 military personnel, and two landing ships. The United States had over 450 servicemen supporting INTERFET, mainly to provide airlift, communications, and intelligence; additionally the USS [U.S. Ship] Mobile Bay, (the Aegis cruiser) and the USNS [U.S. Naval Ship] Kilauea remained, along with the helicopter carrier Belleau Wood with four CH-53 helicopters, which were also providing direct support. Four American C-130 Hercules transport aircraft were deployed in Australia for airlift support at the long end of a strategic transporta-
tion link that assisted with the arrival of several of the other international contingents. The U.S. also committed $55 million for peacekeeping support.\(^4\)

Thailand had already deployed its 33-member advance team, which was to be followed by over 1,500 soldiers, including engineers and security officers, medical teams, and psychological warfare experts. Argentina, Bangladesh, and Pakistan had also promised troops. The People’s Republic of China had promised civilian police. Germany had promised a medical group and humanitarian aid. Italy had indicated it would deploy 600 infantrymen, including 200 paratroops, and amphibious naval unit, and a transport aircraft, plus logistics support and two ships. Japan pledged $2 million in aid to refugees (principally through the UNHCR [United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees] and the World Food Programme), as well as logistics support. The Republic of the Philippines pledged an initial team of some 200 doctors, dentists, and army engineers, to be followed by 1,200 more support troops and 120 special forces troops (provisionally to be stationed in Baucau). Sweden was to send 10 civilian police plus $1.2 million in aid. Taiwan promised unspecified relief aid as well.\(^5\)

Oxfam International, World Vision, and the International Committee of the Red Cross were among the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) whose efforts complemented these national efforts to aid both those in East Timor and refugees across the border in Indonesian West Timor.\(^6\)

Ballard’s observations regarding the impact of U.S. participation beyond its military presence and fiscal commitments are particularly interesting:

The U.S. force provided much more than transport helicopters and a superpower flag among the multinational colors of INTERFET. With the deployment of U.S. forces to East Timor, General Cosgrove had much more political leverage over the more numerous Indonesian forces. He could also take advantage of important aspects of U.S. technology, including command and control, and communications assets and sensors.\(^7\)

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\(^4\) Ballard (2008, p. 93). I thank Professor Ballard for his allowing use of this extensive passage.


\(^6\) U.S. doctrine defines a nongovernmental organization as

a private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. (JP 1-02, 2001 [2008a], p. 377)

An intergovernmental organization is instead

an organization created by a formal agreement (e.g. a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the African Union. (JP 1-02, 2001 [2008a], p. 273)

\(^7\) Ballard (2008, p. 93).
Leadership During INTERFET

Operating under a UN Chapter VII mandate, INTERFET was authorized to employ “all necessary measures” needed to restore stability. Ultimately effective in accomplishing its task, the coalition’s establishment and deployment were, in truth, stopgap measures, collective efforts serving only until the UN could organize and deploy its own peacekeeping force. INTERFET would, at its largest, consist of some 11,693 personnel, the lead nation of Australia providing 5,697 of that number. The coalition overlapped and remained separate from UNTAET until the military arm of that UN mission was able to assume security responsibilities. The handover took place several months after UNTAET’s special representative of the secretary-general (SRSG) Sergio Vieira de Mello assumed responsibilities from his UNAMET predecessor in November 1999. (INTERFET formally conducted operations between September 20, 1999, and the transfer of military authority to UNTAET in February 2000.) The overlap and sharing of assistance responsibilities by Vieira de Mello and Cosgrove was necessitated by the continued threat of violence posed by militia and Indonesian forces in West Timor combined with slowness in deploying the UN peacekeeping force. This meant that there was no clear supremo overseeing all aspects of operations until Cosgrove’s departure in February 2000. It was a situation that worked because Vieira de Mello and Cosgrove sustained a relationship characterized by “close collaboration” while heading their respective organizations.

Early INTERFET success benefited from several of its key members—Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States—having long worked together as part of the American, British, Canadian, Australian Armies’ Standardization (ABCA) Program (New Zealand joined the original four members in 2006). Cosgrove’s good military judgment in not overstretching his force during the initial days further benefited ultimate perseverance. He initially focused on control of East Timor’s capital of Dili while his coalition’s numbers were limited and newly arriving contingents were as of yet unfamiliar with the terrain and their coalition partners. It was an approach deliberately patterned after the oil-spot approach well known to those familiar with counterinsurgency (COIN) theory. The Oecussi enclave was the last area to see coalition presence, its occupation coming on October 22, 1999. (The enclave is that portion of the island enclosing Pante Makasar in Figure 2.2). Falintil, the longtime East Timor insurgent force, further abetted restoration of security by cooperating with INTERFET, restricting itself to four locations during the period preceding the elections and agreeing to suspend military operations. Falintil continued to demonstrate restraint even during postelection violence, a cooperation that played a significant role in limiting the complexity of the challenges confronted by coalition leaders.

Transition to the UNTAET Peacekeeping Force

Though the blue-bereted UNTAET force would not assume its responsibilities until early 2000, the United Nations was well represented by the organization’s humanitarian initiatives taken in the aftermath of the September 1999 violence. Its support and that of NGOs world-

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8 UN (1945). Chapter VII is “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression.”
9 M. G. Smith and Dee (2003, p. 45).
10 M. G. Smith and Dee (2003, p. 60).
11 For example, see McCuen (1965, p. 60).
wide was another important resource for a population in which roughly 70 percent of the people had been displaced by the postelection violence, a statistic that translated to more than half a million men, women, and children. Twenty-three of the more than 60 NGOs working on Timor were from the United Nations. The large number of groups in so small an area with such a broad span of challenges meant that effective coordination would be crucial to minimizing redundant efforts and waste. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) organized the UN Humanitarian Operations Centre (UNHOC) for this purpose. Given that UNSCR 1264 directed that INTERFET was to both restore security and facilitate “humanitarian assistance operations within force capabilities,” cooperation between Cosgrove’s soldiers and humanitarian agencies was in the interest of all parties present. The Australian military’s limited civil-affairs capabilities (the country’s army had no designated civil-affairs specialists in 1999) benefited from both coordination with the UNHOC and augmentation by U.S. Army civil-affairs personnel. In addressing the implications of his security mission, limited resources, and both the short- and long-term needs of the East Timorese, Cosgrove allowed humanitarian organizations the maximum feasible operational independence. He also sought to ensure that his coalition military forces did not establish dependencies in civilian communities that would be unsustainable once the military departed. These actions could not prevent East Timor recovery and development being hindered by a mismatch between on-the-ground requirements and UN responsiveness. For example, lethargy in requisitioning needed materials—in part due to the UN administrative regulations ill-suited to timely response—meant that INTERFET construction capabilities stood idle as supplies essential to building and repair were unavailable.

In setting up UNTAET, Vieira de Mello employed a structure resting on three primary pillars: (1) security, (2) humanitarian aid and emergency rehabilitation (HAER), and (3) governance and public administration (GPA). The speed of response and coordinating mechanisms of the first two were generally satisfactory, despite funding and other challenges. Progress in the GPA realm was hampered in part due to Indonesian and Timorese civil-service members having either departed or been displaced by the violence in the aftermath of the elections. Those responsible for GPA initiatives were also accused of focusing too greatly on activities in the nation’s capital city to the detriment of requirements elsewhere (a problem we will see again regarding operations in Iraq). The loss of capability due to the departure of key administrators conspired with early UN neglect of GPA needs to preclude development of an effective strategic plan spanning all three pillars, a deficiency that had significant and longstanding consequences as those working within each pillar too often failed to coordinate their actions with activities in the other two. The lack of an overarching campaign plan could have had even greater repercussions. That they did not come to fruition was, in considerable part, due to the continuity provided by coalition members that allowed their military forces to remain as part of the UNTAET blue-beret force. Seventy percent of INTERFET’s personnel traded their national headgear for the blue berets of the United Nations when Cosgrove handed over to UNTAET on February 23, 2000. Their units then fell under the command of the peacekeeping force (PKF) commander, Lt Gen Jaime de los Santos of the Philippines, who was formally subordinate to SRSG Vieira de Mello.

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12 M. G. Smith and Dee (2003, pp. 50–51). It is also notable that the Australian Defence Force and some NGOs train together; thus, there exists at least a modicum of familiarity prior to deployments (Moon, 2003).
The INTERFET-to-PKF transition nevertheless precipitated a degradation of the East Timor security situation. The PKF headquarters had only 75 of 200 authorized personnel initially on hand. Early effectiveness was further complicated in that these 75 personnel, few of whom had previously worked together, represented 15 nations. Rules of engagement (ROEs) were another trouble area in the aftermath of the handover:

The UN mandate for INTERFET provided for robust ROE, and General Cosgrove ensured this was so. Because 70 percent of INTERFET transitioned to the PKF and because the role of the PKF was a continuation of INTERFET’s fine achievements, it was essential that the ROE for the PKF be equally robust. This was ultimately achieved but not without some rancor. In October 1999, an Australian military liaison team in New York assisted the Military Planning Service in drafting the ROE and requested that these be cleared with the Office of Legal Affairs and with troop-contributing nations before transition. The UN format was used, but considerable care was taken to ensure that there was no major change from INTERFET for the soldiers on the ground. Unfortunately, the draft ROE were not received in Dili until the eve of the change of command. These ROE showed little resemblance to those that had been drafted in New York, reflecting the name of another UN mission and being inappropriate for conditions [in] East Timor. Following a hectic period of amendment, the [UN] Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) provided the PKF with acceptable ROE.\footnote{M. G. Smith and Dee (2003, p. 71).}

Yet, retention of experienced INTERFET personnel ensured that these problems did not become crippling ones. Militias in West Timor were aware of the change of command. Infiltrations across the East Timor–West Timor border increased during the spring of 2000 to trigger renewed civilian evacuations. The transfer of key INTERFET personnel to the PKF staff and two well-executed operations by the Portuguese battalion familiar with the border region were key to the effectiveness of the ensuing UN response. Innovative UNTAET coalition leaders also turned the disadvantage of reduced aviation support to advantage. Lacking the helicopter support available to INTERFET, PKF commanders compensated by increasing contact with local citizens via the use of more outposts and increased patrolling. Both actions seized on the opportunity to expand the extent of information gained from civilians and the coalition’s good relations with Falintil, the latter spurring analysts to note, “The PKF’s greater use of Falintil for information gathering and as liaison officers and guides proved invaluable in helping retain the trust of the people. It also helped reinforce respect between the PKF and Falintil.”\footnote{M. G. Smith and Dee (2003, pp. 70–71).}

The UNTAET security and GPA pillars together suffered problems in creating a civilian policing capability and coordination of its activities with those of the military. Vieira de Mello directed that police responsibilities be separate from East Timor military duties in order to emphasize the differences in each group’s charter. Unfortunately, the separation was not accompanied by mechanisms that ensured that the two continue to coordinate their actions. Resulting problems were exacerbated by the overly slow deployment of those responsible for training the police.\footnote{Ashdown (2007, p. 40).} Smooth transition of Falintil militia members into East Timor society, develop-
ment of an effective judicial system, and establishment of a viable prison establishment likewise suffered from this lack of timely assistance. All would later have serious repercussions.

Additional Coalition Leadership Challenges During INTERFET
Coalition lead-nation commanders benefit in remembering that their frustrations in dealing with partner members are felt no less strongly in return. Australians comprised roughly half of INTERFET numbers at its peak strength. Led by a professional, results-oriented officer corps in many ways not unlike that of the United States, its military tended to post orders and move out smartly toward mission accomplishment. This is commendable, but it is not always the most effective approach when language and cultural differences are at play. Australian analyst Alan Ryan recorded that “senior officers from various contingents in Dili repeatedly observed that Australian briefing officers spoke too quickly, used too much jargon and left little time for questions,”16 a situation that reminds us how important compensating for various levels of fluency is and that even one fluent in English may be uncomprehending of another nation’s military jargon or the acronyms that tend to play a large role in briefings conducted by armed-forces personnel (and that should be avoided to the extent possible in a coalition environment).

We noted that ROEs were a problem during the transition from INTERFET to UNTAET. Initial ROEs for INTERFET were similarly troublesome, though for a different reason. Australians share with the United States an operational willingness to employ lethal force to protect property, e.g., military equipment. It is a policy by no means universally supported. New Zealand, Canada, and the United Kingdom do not concur, for example. Those three nations made it known to General Cosgrove’s staff that they considered employing lethal force permissible only when such use was for the protection of human life. Such caveats had a direct impact on where INTERFET could assign a given nation’s personnel. Author Michael Kelly noted, for example, that such differences in national policy would influence which nation’s personnel could be assigned airfield security duties.17

Compromise may also be called on to resolve issues regarding coalition personnel assignments. The British ground-force contingent to East Timor consisted of approximately 200 personnel, roughly twice company strength. A lieutenant colonel led those men and women when they arrived. Though majors command companies in the British Army, the increase of one rank in this case was likely appropriate, given the diplomatic, coordination, logistics, and other demands that remote deployment of a ground force entails. London also dispatched a brigadier to serve in the role of commander of its joint national forces. Cosgrove felt himself faced with a dilemma in this case. His own chief of staff was a colonel, and the INTERFET commander was chary of putting a partner nation’s officer beneath an Australian of subordinate rank. Cosgrove was also hesitant to replace his senior staff member—with whom he was well familiar—with someone less known to him who had also not previously worked with the INTERFET staff. The issue was resolved without undue ill will when the British “frocked” (temporarily promoted) the lieutenant colonel to colonel, thereby increasing his influence in the multinational environment as well as within the British joint force. The brigadier turned over his responsibilities to the newly frocked officer before departing for duties elsewhere.18

The implications of this seemingly minor matter are worth considering further. It is true that officers whose ranks may seem excessive for their responsibilities are sometimes sent to support a coalition. Yet, the discussion in the previous paragraph reflects that there can be justifiable reasons for these assignments. A national contingent commander is often responsible for all facets of his or her country’s military operations—service, diplomatic, and otherwise—while the lead-nation headquarters (in this case, Australia) may oversee only military concerns. Second, the dispatching of a force to a remote and underdeveloped theater requires special expertise that a more junior representative may not possess. While coalition partners should be sensitive to the rank structure that will exist during operations, it behooves a coalition leader not to be overly tied to the dictates of traditional military protocol. To have an individual of the same rank working for a peer is not particularly unusual in professional militaries when superior skill, applicable experience, or familiarity with the mission at hand makes it a logical choice. It is uncommon, but by no means unheard of, for an individual of lesser rank to have one or more of higher grade assigned in a subordinate role. Both lead nations and those otherwise supporting a coalition must understand that setting the formalities of protocol aside and simply making things work sometimes better serves operational requirements. In cases in which national sensitivities absolutely preclude such steps, a solution may be found in creating a special position that preserves good relations without undermining field effectiveness. Looking back on his experience as coalition commander, Cosgrove found it crucial to establish and meet the needs and concerns of each troop-contributing nation, to achieve understanding and congruence—frequently by give and take—and vitally, good will and cooperation. . . . Even in those first few weeks when the operational imperative was driving every waking moment, we all had to remind ourselves that every member of the coalition had to be valued and embraced.19

Conscious that capitalizing on the success of INTERFET relied on the effectiveness of the force replacing his own, Cosgrove argued for a gradual rather than instantaneous transition of responsibility between his command and the PKF. He suggested to General de los Santos that the UNTAET staff first assume control of forces only in the eastern portion of East Timor, a region where experienced units from the Philippines, Thailand, and South Korea operated and one that was stable at the time. Santos accepted the offer, the gradual transition providing him and his staff a chance to work out the bugs that an organization inevitably experiences on first arriving in a new theater.20

Timor-Leste continues to struggle after independence and the departure of INTERFET, demonstrating that building a nation takes more than initial military success alone. Internal bickering and factional fighting flared into exchanges of gunfire, looting, and rioting on May 25, 2006.21 It was not the first sign that the country has far to go before achieving lasting peace and stability. Nor was it the last. Problems with integrating members of different factions into security forces and issues regarding the viability of the prison system are among the reasons that Australia and New Zealand have had to return repeatedly to restore quiet in the

21 New Zealand Army (2009).
troubled nation, reflecting that some members of a coalition may have residual responsibilities after dissolution of the original collective enterprise.

At this point, we turn our attention to challenges confronted by leaders during recent operations in the Balkans to see what additional insights they offer coalition leaders during 21st-century stability operations.

Case Study 2: The Balkans

One must always bear in mind that the glue that holds a coalition together is a common enemy, not a common desired political outcome. There must, therefore, be measures put in place to cover the loss of cohesion that results from victory.

—General Sir Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force

Background

The centuries-old, tumultuous history of the Balkans suffered a series of further eruptions in the closing years of the 20th century. Declarations of independence from Yugoslavia by Slovenia and Croatia led to fighting in both of the new countries in 1991. (See Figure 2.3.) Yugoslav army forces withdrew from Slovenia within a month without accomplishing their mission while combat between Croatian forces and indigenous Serbs supported by the Yugoslav army continued. Sporadic fighting between the sides and atrocities against civilians would continue into 1995, despite UN imposition of an arms embargo in September 1991, formal recognition of both Slovenia and Croatia by European Community members in December of that year, and UN mediator Cyrus Vance obtaining an early January 1992 agreement between Croatia’s President Franjo Tudjman and Yugoslavia’s President Slobodan Milosevic to allow a UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) of 14,000 UN soldiers to provide security for civilians—primarily Serbs—in three protected areas of Croatia.

Adjacent to Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina devolved into civil war in the aftermath of its February 29, 1992, declaration of independence from rump Yugoslavia. Bosnian Serb politicians declared a separate country within Bosnia and Herzegovina, causing a split along ethnic lines with Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and Muslims fighting a three-way war or, later, Croats and Muslims aligning to combat Bosnian Serb units. (Bosnian Croats and Muslims would sign a U.S.-assisted peace accord in March 1994.) Bosnian Serbs besieged Sarajevo with artillery and mortars beginning in April, the Yugoslav army relinquishing control of an estimated 100,000 of its soldiers to the Bosnian Serb political entity the following month. Members of all three factions conducted ethnic cleansing, that despite the presence of UNPROFOR and other efforts to restore peace. UNPROFOR, hamstrung by ROEs designed for maintaining (rather than enforcing) peace, was largely ineffective, causing British Gen Mike Jackson to observe that the


23 The description of events in the Balkans relies primarily on the following sources: Albright (2003); Ashdown (2007); Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik (2004); "Chronology: 1990–1995" (undated); Clark (2002); Dobbins, McGinn, et al. (2003); Dobbins, Jones, et al. (2008); Mike Jackson (2008); U.S. Department of State (1999); MacKenzie (1994); Nardulli et al. (2002); and R. Smith (2005).

24 UNPROFOR was authorized by UNSCR 749 signed in April 1992.
commander of the Bosnian Serb Army, General Ratko Mladić’s “contempt for UNPROFOR was obvious. From his point of view, UNPROFOR was just an irritation, without the strength or the authority to impose itself in any meaningful way.”

Halting atrocities was further hin-

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dered by repeated UN declarations of satisfaction with what proved to be false reports of efforts by Serb forces to meet UN demands regarding the removal of heavy weapons and halting attacks on civilians. Bosnian Serb units detained 55 Canadian peacekeepers in late November 1994 and continued to ignore UN demands, precipitating NATO air strikes against a Serb ammunition dump in late May 1995 that, in turn, led to Serb seizure of more than 370 UN peacekeepers and additional shelling of six cities (Bihac, Gorazde, Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Tuzla, and Zepa) previously declared as safe areas by the UN Security Council in spring 1993. It was the death and wounding of more than 100 Sarajevo civilians in a Serb mortar attack on August 28, 1995, that finally initiated wider NATO bombing in the form of Operation Deliberate Force.\footnote{Madeleine Albright (2003, p. 241), U.S. ambassador to the UN at the time, describes the response as “at the time . . . the largest NATO military action ever.” See also AFSOUTH (undated); Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik (2004, p. 85); and Mike Jackson (2008, p. 244).} NATO bombing continued until September 14, 1995, the military action having helped to bring about initial agreements by the three factions that included a willingness to meet for peace negotiations in Dayton, Ohio, on November 1, 1995. A peace accord allocating 51 percent of the country to a Muslim-Croat federation and 49 percent to Bosnian Serbs was signed in Dayton three weeks later. UNPROFOR transferred its peacekeeping responsibilities to NATO on December 15, 1995, the NATO-led implementation force (IFOR) formally assuming responsibility on December 20. Unlike the lightly armed and overly constrained UN soldiers, IFOR served “with much tougher rules of engagement—and, moreover, with plenty of firepower . . . including of course the threat of air strikes. UNPROFOR had possessed no heavy armour, and little enough artillery.”\footnote{Mike Jackson (2008, p. 251).}

**Kosovo**

Activities in Kosovo (see Figure 2.4) received relatively little attention from the outside world during fighting in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the internecine slaughter in the regions to the north overshadowing Serbian coercion of Kosovo and, in particular, Kosovar Albanians. A 1992 declaration of independence by the latter group was declared void by authorities in Belgrade.

Serbian police brutality and Belgrade’s continued policy of repression led to more-frequent violence between police and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in 1996. The March 31, 1998, UNSCR 1160 condemned Serbian police violence and dictated imposition of a limited embargo against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Extensive U.S., European Union (EU), and Russian diplomatic efforts to halt Serbian and KLA violence failed repeatedly during the spring and summer of that year. On September 23, the UN Security Council approved resolution 1199 calling for an end to hostilities. By the end of that month, the UNHCR estimated that as many as 200,000 civilians had been displaced by the conflict, 60,000 of whom lacked shelter as winter weather approached.

Continued efforts to end the violence failed. On March 22, 1999, the political governing body of NATO, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), authorized NATO Secretary General Javier Solana to begin air strikes under the guidance of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) GEN Wesley Clark. NATO plans for a ground attack to accompany NATO air strikes resulted in the deployment of further alliance forces to the region. On June 8, Russia
announced that it was making preparations to send 10,000 peacekeepers into Kosovo that would not be subordinated to NATO. Secretary General Solana halted air operations on June 10 after Serbian officials signed a military technical agreement and began withdrawing their security forces from Kosovo. Promising not to enter Kosovo before NATO peacekeepers did, Russian units from Bosnia nonetheless occupied Pristina International Airport on June 12, 1999, prior to the entry of any alliance forces and thereafter refused to allow British and French units to occupy the airport facility. The intercession of U.S. President William Clinton was necessary to ease tensions and establish negotiations resulting in Russia’s agreeing to join the coalition. Solana officially terminated the NATO bombing campaign on June 20, after Serb security forces completed their withdrawal from Kosovo in accordance with the military technical agreement previously signed on June 9, 1999.

Alliance and Coalition Leadership Challenges During Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo

Early Operations: UNPROFOR

Shashi Tharoor, then special assistant to the undersecretary of state for peacekeeping operations, analysed the matter well in noting that the resolutions “required the parties to treat them as ‘safe,’ imposed no obligation on their inhabitants and defenders, deployed UN troops in them but expected their mere presence to ‘deter attack,’ carefully avoided asking
the peacekeepers to ‘defend’ or ‘protect’ these areas, but authorized them to call in air power ‘in self defence’—a masterpiece of diplomatic drafting but largely unimplementable as an operational directive.”

—Gen Sir Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force

Shashi Tharoor’s deft description leaves little question as to why many analysts reviewing early UN initiatives in the Balkans consider UNPROFOR as an example from which to draw “never again” lessons rather than ones meriting repetition. Rupert Smith would further observe, “the UN force was not expected to use force to change the situation, but only to protect itself; and the states that sent in their forces did not intend them to fight except to defend themselves.”

Resulting events, Smith noted, “held within them all the components of UNPROFOR’s involvement in the sorry tale of the subsequent two and a half years.” Tasked with keeping the peace when there was little peace to be kept, soldiers stood by as faction military forces slaughtered each other and innocent civilians. Severely restricted with respect to the types of equipment and weaponry they could deploy (they were allowed no tanks and little artillery), the alleged peacekeepers were largely reliant on air support. The aircraft flying those missions did so in a UN-declared but NATO-enforced no-fly zone (NFZ) imposed to protect U.S. aircraft dropping supplies and to prevent Serbian Armed Forces pilots from attacking refugee columns. The aircraft enforcing the NFZ were therefore not necessarily in the same chain of command as those on which the peacekeepers would have to call if attacked, meaning that NATO planners had to find a way to link the two command chains so that UN-authorized flights were not attacked, and when NATO attacks were made UN units were alerted to the possibility of retaliatory attacks. NATO’s solution came to be called the “dual key” procedures, within which both the senior NATO and UNPROFOR commander in the region had to approve a NATO operation. The command arrangements devised by NATO were workable provided [that] the threatened UN force had the communications and competent men to guide the aircraft onto the target. If the contingent in question came from a NATO nation then this could be expected, since they were used to working together, but a UN force is not only found from NATO nations and I was never confident that these other contingents were covered adequately.

31 Mike Jackson (2008, p. 251). MGen Lewis MacKenzie (1994, pp. 304–305), writing about his experiences with UNPROFOR, spoke to his commander regarding the need to bolster the force’s ability to protect Sarajevo International Airport, an essential hub for delivery of relief supplies and a key to returning peace to Sarajevo. In the conversation, he tells his fellow general how the Canadians and French would manage to have sufficient firepower on hand to accomplish that task successfully: “The battalion that goes to Sarajevo will have to have presence—by that, I mean lots of armoured vehicles with mounted weapons and highly disciplined and well-led troops. You have two battalions in your command right now that [qualify]: the French and the Canadians. They both cheated and brought a lot more APCs [armored personnel carriers] than the fifteen the UN directed. The French brought eighty and the Canadians managed eighty-three.” MacKenzie goes on to relate, “The UN never did authorize us to bring the missiles for the TOW [tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided] [missile]. We were authorized to bring the vehicle. . . . In the end, we cheated and brought the missiles anyway. Can you imagine telling soldiers to bring the weapon but not the ammunition?”
Obtaining intelligence was another source of frustration. As a UN (versus national) commander, Canadian MGen Lewis MacKenzie could not rely on the sophisticated intelligence assets of NATO or its member nations. Confronted with atrocities committed against civilians that various factions would then blame on each other, he

requested UN New York to provide us with satellite or reconnaissance-plane imagery so that I could prove who was cheating and where, but my request had been rejected. . . . In the good old days of peacekeeping, it had rightfully been considered bad taste to spy on the people you were trying to help. Bosnia was different, but UN rules hadn’t caught up with the new challenges we were facing.33

The result was a UN force assigned a mission inappropriate for the security conditions as they existed, ill-equipped to meet even the task of defending themselves, and—potentially—unable to call on the only outside assistance available for timely support should it be put in harm’s way.

“Cry ‘Havoc,’ and [Slightly] Let Slip the Dogs of War”: IFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina

[Ambassador] Albright. “Why don’t you just give the commander the authority to use force whenever he feels it’s necessary to do so?”

[GEN Clark:] [Ambassador Richard Holbrooke and I] took the thought and turned it into what became known as the “silver bullet” clause: “IFOR has the right and is authorized to (a) complete from any location in Bosnia Herzegovina the removal, withdrawal, or relocations of forces or weapons and (b) compel the cessation of any activities that IFOR deems a threat or potential threat to itself or its mission, or to another Party. Forces resisting IFOR action in these regard shall be subject to the use of necessary force by IFOR.” With this [clause] we had stood the weakness of UNPROFOR exactly on [its] head. Under UNPROFOR, the obligations of the force had been unlimited—protect civilians, assist aid deliveries, secure safe zone, and so on—but its authority was very limited. Under our agreement, we were seeking to limit the obligations of the military—you can’t do everything with military forces—but to give the commander unlimited authority to accomplish these limited obligations. . . . We were never allowed to call it a war. But it was, of course. This was modern war.

—Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War34

In a reverse of the East Timor case, during which many INTERFET troops donned the blue berets of the United Nations as UNTAET assumed security responsibilities, a good number of UNPROFOR units remained in the Balkans, this time storing those berets in duffle bags and replacing them with the hats and helmets of their national armies. Unlike in Timor, however, the transition in Europe was accompanied by a dramatic change in the ROEs. IFOR was on the ground to enforce the Dayton agreement and change the behavior of any party not willing to honor the terms therein.

Wesley K. Clark would write after his involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, “Any event in modern war has four distinct, unequal components: tactical, operational, strategic,

Band of Brothers or Dysfunctional Family?

and political."³⁵ Paddy Ashdown, UN High Representative to Bosnia and Herzegovina from late 2002 to mid-2006, noted that more than the levels of war and politics interacted. Intermeshed responsibilities also hindered UN and NATO efforts. Civilian coalition leaders in the Office of the High Representative (OHR) found that their counterparts in the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) had responsibilities sometimes similar to their own. Both Ashdown’s OHR and leaders of the stabilization force (SFOR) had duties involving reform of the country’s armed forces, this nearly a decade after the signing at Dayton.³⁶ (IFOR was redesignated SFOR in January 1996, the new organization having the same ROEs but less manpower; SFOR would, in turn, transfer its responsibilities to the European Military Force [EUFOR] on December 2, 2005.)³⁷ The OHR represented the United Nations and addressed diplomatic and political concerns internal to Bosnia and Herzegovina. IFOR (and later SFOR) military leaders were to “deter hostilities and stabilise the peace [by] providing a continued military presence” while also assisting civil organizations.³⁸ Other entities—some affiliated with the UN, some not—provided aid, the extent of their coordinating with the OHR and military leaders often being a matter of individual leader personality. These overlapping responsibilities introduced inefficiencies, confused Bosnians trying to work with the foreigners, and provided individuals opposing peace implementation with fissures they could exploit to create further tensions.³⁹ Some confusion was perhaps inevitable, given the absence of an organization responsible for overseeing all aspects of enforcing the Dayton agreement. Though operating under the auspices of the United Nations, NATO’s political entity, the NAC, could not purport to represent all political perspectives given that the IFOR/SFOR coalition included members from outside the alliance. There was thus no single entity responsible for providing political guidance given the UN’s not assuming the role.

Though there were difficulties regarding responsibilities, British Gen Sir Mike Jackson (who served in both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo) complimented the authors of the Dayton agreement, finding that it

³⁷ Simon (1997); NATO (2007).
³⁸ NATO (2007).
⁴⁰ Mike Jackson (2007, p. 253).

laid out an end-state to which all the parties had agreed, with a clear mechanism for getting from start to finish. This clarity would prove invaluable in the weeks and months to follow. Dayton also stipulated strict timelines: what had to be done by D+30, D+60, D+90. For us, the Dayton Agreement became a kind of “bible” to which I would refer whenever any kind of dispute arose. I carried a copy of Dayton with me everywhere.⁴⁰

Stability operations, no less than wars as described by Clausewitz, are extensions of policy. Dayton—at least in the view of Jackson—provided coalition leaders with guidance they could readily translate to the operations seeking to make the conditions of the agreement a reality. Unfortunately, he found that the clarity of guidance did not always translate to smooth operations on the ground:
Unlike us, Carl [Bildt, the Swede who succeeded Kofi Annan as SRSG in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996] had virtually to beg, steal and borrow what he needed to do his job. He also had to contend with an attitude in IFOR’s senior leadership which very largely shunned any civil dimension. . . . There is a deep understanding in the British Army of how to run a post-conflict situation. . . . This understanding was shared by the Overseas Development Agency . . . , then a sub-set of the Foreign Office, which has a positive, can-do approach and welcomed partnership with the military.41

Jackson would similarly observe that political guidance regarding coalition operations in Kosovo lacked the clarity of the Dayton agreement, which dictated responsibilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Kosovo,

we didn’t have rules telling us how to deal with the KLA on entry, as we had in our dealing with the Serb armed forces. . . . The Serb withdrawal resulted in a dangerous vacuum. . . . Despite our best efforts, different KFOR [Kosovo Force, the NATO-led coalition] brigades took different national lines with the KLA. The British wanted . . . KLA fighters disarmed, which annoyed them no end. The Germans and the Dutch, on the other hand, were somewhat cozy with them—too cozy, in my opinion.42

While NATO aircraft had supported KLA ground operations prior to the departure of Serb forces, coalition leaders were aware that the organization fell short of what an autonomous or independent Kosovo would need in postconflict leadership. In the blunt words of U.S. secretary of state Madeleine Albright, “there did not appear to be much Jeffersonian thinking within the KLA.”43

This lack of overarching political authority had parallels elsewhere. Though the commander of IFOR had operational control over forces assigned to him, one author estimates that up to 10,000 military personnel in and around Bosnia and Herzegovina remained exclusively under national command.44 Even within NATO nations, there were separate chains of command for some units. U.S. psychological operations (PSYOP) units were not assigned to the IFOR commander, for instance, remaining instead under U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), a situation that, at times, disrupted the effectiveness of his function.45 To complicate matters further, NATO nations hesitated to fully support the United Nations with intelligence, fearing that some nations would compromise sensitive material.46

Despite these disconnects, even within the NATO alliance, the established familiarity of the 19 nations comprising that organization and the procedures commonly understood by all helped to smooth the assumption of security responsibilities from UNPROFOR. This “agreement on essential minimums,” to quote Wesley Clark, meant that a considerable segment of the military representation already understood the capabilities and limitations of various mem-

41 Mike Jackson (2008, p. 267). “Overseas Development Agency” appears to be an error. Jackson refers to the forerunner of the Department for International Development (DFID), which was the “Overseas Development Administration.” See DFID (undated).
42 Mike Jackson (2008, p. 352).
43 Albright (2003, p. 491).
bers. Jackson believed that one of the most important tasks for military commanders working in an alliance is

putting a force together to fulfill a particular task. I make the analogy with an orchestra: its make-up will vary depending on the piece of music you want to play; similarly, the make-up of a force will vary depending on the requirements of the task. Just as for a piece of chamber music you might need only a string quartet, for example, so for a limited operation you might only need Special Forces. There are certain constants: in an orchestra you will always need violins, and in any operation you’ll almost always need infantry.\(^{48}\)

The task of a commander is much eased if one or more of the components of his or her orchestra have already long rehearsed together, as had the members of the NATO alliance. (Military readers familiar with George S. Patton’s similar metaphor will be encouraged to see further reinforcement of the truth that proficiency for conventional combat involving the orchestration of various arms, services, and nations is no less applicable to stability operations. The reverse is, of course, also true: Those who have failed to plan, train, and otherwise cooperate prior to an operation are likely to suffer difficulties given their unfamiliarity with each other.\(^{49}\)

The IFOR coalition provided but one component of the international orchestra attempting to compose a symphony of peace. Coalition leaders had to bring the whole together, a task requiring no little patience and understanding. Mike Jackson recognized the importance of not seeing the faction as uniform entities. The Bosnian Serbs were by no means the only perpetrators of violence, but theirs seemed the more numerous and often were the more heinous crimes. Jackson recognized that the moderate Bosnian Serb faction headquartered in Banja Luka was the key to stabilizing the situation, an end in which the more extreme Pale faction had little interest. He therefore located his headquarters in Banja Luka to lend legitimacy to and facilitate coordination with Bosnian Serbs there.\(^{50}\)

Such understanding is key to successful coalition leadership. So is patience. Wesley Clark was not alone in struggling with dithering by the United Nations and some European nations while thousands of civilians died. When Bosnian Serb forces seized Žepa, the smallest of the six UN-mandated safe areas,

there were some who insisted that the Serbs didn’t mean to take the enclave, for that would entail too great a cost in international approbation. Others asserted that perhaps the Serbs could be successfully restrained through a combination of limited force and diplomacy.\(^{51}\)


\(^{49}\) See CALL (1990). This short essay quotes and draws on MG George S. Patton’s 1941 observation that there is still a tendency in each separate unit . . . to be a one-handed puncher. By that I mean the rifleman wants to shoot, the tanker to charge, the artilleryman to fire . . . That is not the way to win battles. If the band played a piece first with the piccolo, then with the brass horn, then with the clarinet, and then with the trumpet there would be a hell of a lot of noise but no music. To get harmony in music each instrument must support the others. To get harmony in battle, each weapon must support the other. Team play wins. You musicians of Mars . . . must come into the concert at the proper place and at the proper time.

\(^{50}\) Mike Jackson (2008, pp. 262, 264).

\(^{51}\) Clark (2002, p. 50).
Jackson kept his views in check when he found members of the UN staff living in an upscale Zagreb hotel, their many fine, pristine, all-terrain sport-utility vehicles parked and seeming to serve no purpose other than as transport between the hotel and places of work.\(^{52}\) Military members of the coalition in East Timor similarly observed that too many from that international body took advantage of the comforts their excellent funding purchased them, often with apparently little result coming from their services. There, too, however, soldiers recognized that the less dedicated no more represented the UN as a whole than did the Pale government reflect the attitudes of all Bosnian Serbs. And, as in East Timor when Indonesian bureaucrats departed in the aftermath of elections, the support of UN aid workers and those from other organizations was invaluable when Serb doctors departed Kosovo during the evaluation of Serb army units.\(^{53}\)

Stability operations often bestow multiple hats on senior military leaders, and with them can come conflicting responsibilities. Rupert Smith found that he had to assert his UN coalition persona when told by British prime minister John Major that Smith was to direct the bombing of any Bosnian Serbs attacking British forces posted to the enclave of Goražde. Smith immediately brought it to Major’s attention that not all coalition forces were permitted the same protection, and, thus, for him to show such favoritism was impossible ethically. Smith asked himself,

“How was I, a UN commander, to differentiate between enclaves? How was I, a British commander of a multinational force, going to deal with all my subordinates when a different reaction was threatened if British force were attacked rather than those of other allies?\(^{54}\)"

Kosovo

At first blush, it would appear that NATO’s campaign in Kosovo had but two heads much as in East Timor: Javier Solana, the NATO secretary general, and SACEUR GEN Wesley K. Clark. As in East Timor, the two men cooperated well, Solana generally bowing to Clark’s greater military expertise, while Clark operated within the political constraints identified by the secretary general. That first blush quickly fades, however, to reveal a far more complex leadership environment. Like Rupert Smith, Clark wore multiple hats. He was answerable both to NATO as SACEUR and to a U.S. chain of command given his additional responsibilities as commander of USEUCOM. As commander of Operation Allied Force in Kosovo and the surrounding region, he also led forces not belonging to NATO—in particular, a Russian contingent whose leaders refused to subordinate their units to NATO. Clark therefore found himself receiving guidance both from NATO and Washington, D.C., guidance that was not always coordinated and was, at times, conflicting. Clark also found himself—a military leader whose responsibilities dictated significant civilian policy and diplomatic awareness—at odds with authorities in his nation’s capital who took umbrage when he went “out of his lane” and addressed military issues with individuals not in the Department of Defense.\(^{55}\)

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\(^{52}\) Mike Jackson (2008, p. 248).

\(^{53}\) Mike Jackson (2008, p. 344).

\(^{54}\) R. Smith (2005, p. 359).

\(^{55}\) Clark (2002, p. 113).
Clark were not the only ones to suffer less-than-helpful support from governments at home. Mike Jackson recalled that

Clare Short, Secretary of State for International Development, arrived in Skopje on Easter Sunday. She successfully bullied the Macedonians into allowing the refugees to leave no-man’s land and to be dispersed into camps. Less helpfully, she tried to bully me too. . . . I explained to her the facts of life—that I had at that time approximately eight thousand soldiers under my command to oppose a Serb army more than twenty times that number; moreover, that we had only twenty or so tanks, a mere 380 fewer than the Serbs.\(^{56}\)

These multiple authority channels were only one element that precluded unity of command. As is true in virtually any alliance or coalition, military contingent leaders coordinated with civilian authorities in their respective countries. This ever-present linkage meant that each national component operated with caveats that precluded its commander from having sole authority over his or her own forces and, in reality, multiplied the number of voices influencing leaders at the highest echelons of a coalition. Orders from Clark violating national leader guidance could result in the country’s senior military representative playing a red card—i.e., refusing to obey due to the nation-specific caveat. Despite the NATO nations having worked together for many years, none suffered a threat to its survival in the Balkans, a situation that helps explain why Clark found “on some issues there were almost as many viewpoints as there were nations.”\(^{57}\) Leaders, military and civilian, quickly learned “how difficult it is for a nineteen-nation alliance to wage a coherent military campaign.”\(^{58}\) Despite Solana’s efforts to leave military matters to Clark, ultimate choices of the weapons employed and targets struck by NATO aircraft were debated and, to a large extent, dictated by the political leadership of those 19 countries’ capitals.\(^{59}\) Were the international challenges insufficient, Clark—and NATO by extension—too frequently suffered as U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense authorities attempted to influence policy, each serving internal agendas as it did so.\(^{60}\) Operation Allied Force coalition leaders hoping that Mike Jackson’s analogy of a “rope to describe peace support operations in a post-conflict situation [in which once the] strands are woven together, the rope is stronger than the sum of its parts” would hold true instead found that the weave was, at times, a very loose one.

Kosovo was indeed a war, in both Clark’s modern terms and those of Clausewitz. Policy—the dictates of civilian leaders—provided macro guidance and influenced tactics by permitting or denying the striking of specific targets. National agendas overrode coalition objectives and concerns regarding cohesion. As they were with stability operations in East Timor, leaders were much challenged not only by their adversaries but also very much by the difficulties inherent in coalition operations. It is to these challenges that we now turn our full attention, looking first at those related to a coalition’s structure and organization and later at others involving the issues of unity of command and the character of leadership demanded during such contingencies.

\(^{56}\) Mike Jackson (2008, p. 298).
\(^{58}\) Clark (2002, p. xxxiv).
\(^{60}\) Clark (2002, pp. xlii, 104).
CHAPTER THREE
Coalition Leadership: The Influence of Structure

Introduction: A Further Look at the Ties That Bind and Those That Divide

The truths of conventional war usually do not apply for irregular warfare: (1) rarely is a “vital national interest” at stake; (2) often there is not popular support; (3) usually there is no declaration of war; (4) there is rarely an exit strategy; and (5) the application of overwhelming force against a critical mass is replaced by protracted presence of stability forces.

—Sam Holliday, “Success in Irregular Warfare: Structures and Strategies Needed”

I think my first point would be that coalitions are not military by nature; they are political by nature... And if we misunderstand that then we risk forgetting that a fundamental requirement is the need to maintain the coalition. Sometimes the “flag on the map” is far more important than whether a division or three dog handlers turn up... We all need to remember that as military officers... To that end, military leaders of coalition need to remember that they are holding together a political entity and that cohesion will have a value all of its own.

—Lt Col Tom Copinger-Symes, British Army

It is fair to say that peacekeeping operations will only be politically sustainable if the levels of risk involved for the peacekeepers are not disproportionately high in relation to the goals of their mission.

—Dame Pauline Neville-Jones, Peacekeeping Intelligence: Emerging Concepts for the Future

Such conflicts as World War II threaten national survival and bind alliances and coalitions. Even more limited conflicts, such as that of March–May 2003 in Iraq put large numbers of a country’s men and women at life’s risk. Not so in stability operations. Not only are countries rarely mortally threatened when undertaking such ventures; chances are good that participation in a coalition means putting citizens in harm’s way to no particularly vital end. Little wonder that withdrawal of continued support from populations at home can lead to a country’s...
precipitous departure. The challenge for a coalition leader is one of ever being ready to com-
pensate for the loss of one or more significant participants.

With national survival unthreatened, the motivations for committing forces are less. The
world has changed considerably in this regard. Militaries today are not infrequently deployed
for humanitarian and similarly less historically compelling reasons. That makes it no less a sig-
ificant decision to put citizens in harm’s way. Indeed, it may magnify the domestic political
risk to decisionmakers.

The reasons for joining a coalition can—and likely will—range widely given the lack of a
threat that could destroy or seriously compromise the security of participating nations. Australia,
New Zealand, and other regional nations saw a need to return stability to East Timor and
felt an ethical obligation to protect the lives and welfare of an East Timorese population long
subjected to harsh treatment at the hands of Indonesia. European leaders perceived there to be
both security and humanitarian interests in lending assistance to the peoples of the Balkans
region. Those assisting in Afghanistan and Iraq recognize that it is in their national interests to
have stability in central Asia and the Middle East. In all of the coalitions involved in these con-
tingencies, however, there are nations whose participation depends more on expected financial
gain, benefits of improved diplomatic relationships, or support for political and military initia-
tives, such as membership in NATO, than on any compulsion driven by immediate security or
humanitarian matters. The lack of a significant, shared, and unifying threat means that subtle
changes in conditions can weaken or remove incentives for remaining in a coalition.

It is therefore a mistake to believe that all members of a coalition share a common reason
for participation. Members may have very different objectives and care little about the ben-
efits accrued to the whole or to other participants. Governments are not entirely unlike busi-
ness enterprises; joining or discontinuing support for an alliance or coalition may be simply a
matter of increasing national power or a country’s, regime’s, or administration’s wealth, influ-
ence, or prestige. Thus, for some, participation is a security or moral obligation; for others, it
is an opportunity. It may instead be attributable to a combination of factors. As Gen Rupert
Smith noted in the aftermath of his experiences with coalitions in the Balkans and elsewhere,
“One of the characteristics of multinational operations of this nature . . . is that the institu-
tions of each state are not responsible for the collective outcome, but only for the national assets
committed to achieving it.” Thus, only a few—the lead and other primary participants—may
feel compelled to work in the interest of the collective whole.

It is an oxymoron to speak of political interference and coalition operations. Though their
purpose for existence may, at times, seem primarily directed toward military, aid, or other
types of operations, we must remind ourselves that coalitions are foremost political ventures.
Politics is the environment in which they operate. That the politics of multiple nations and
other organizations are at work complicates interactions within an alliance or coalition all the
more. Politics internal to a country are no more homogeneous than those of the various nations
participating. Analyst George Tanham noted that a leader must understand the multiple per-
escpectives at play even within his or her own government. Writing with an eye to his experiences
in Thailand, Tanham reminds us of the tribulations General Clark suffered during operations
in Kosovo,

It is difficult for an Ambassador to orchestrate the activities of the diverse agencies in his Mission. . . . Each of the Mission elements has its own institutional loyalties, each of the parent agencies in Washington has its own goals and interests, and its own private channels of communication, as well as a congressional constituency to [serve]. Even when a Mission can speak with a single voice from the field, there is no single listener in Washington.\(^6\)

How to mold these many diverse parts—those internal to a leader’s own government, others multinational, even some other than those associated with a particular nation—into a functioning whole is one of a coalition leader’s primary challenges. It is on these structural challenges that the remainder of this chapter concentrates. Each of the following components of a coalition’s makeup receives attention in turn:

- use of alliances as the sole or a component of the capabilities brought to bear
- interactions with and influences of national governments
- potential participants beyond those representing nation-state agencies
- factors in building cohesion
- the role of a campaign plan.

### Alliances as Coalition Components

Interagency operations are the most critical part of a counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign. A unilateral military operation means unilateral failure.

> Adrian T. Bogart, Block by Block: Civic Action in the Battle of Baghdad, January–November 2006\(^7\)

I think best practices are that, if you want to deploy a multinational headquarters, then have it as a standing headquarters in peacetime.

> Col Graham R. Le Fevre, British Army\(^8\)

Any means of reducing friction within a coalition should be given consideration. Formally tied by long-term agreements, military leaders within an alliance are familiar with each other’s armed forces’ organizations, doctrines, and equipment types. Exercises, conferences, and other training events further aid familiarity, allowing individuals to develop friendships that provide means for overcoming obstacles otherwise likely to hinder operational effectiveness. Established logistical arrangements and administrative processes further underlie a readiness to conduct successful operations. Alliances, even those predominantly military in nature, also provide a portal to other capabilities possessed by participating nations, resources potentially lending increased effectiveness across the entire spectrum of challenges.

One form of alliance participation in a coalition would be that involving a single alliance in a role similar to that assumed by NATO in Kosovo. There, NATO assumed the role of lead

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\(^6\) Tanham (1974, p. 119).

\(^7\) Bogart (2007, p. 39).

\(^8\) Le Fevre (2008).
organization, much as Australia served as lead nation in East Timor. It takes little thought to identify other ways in which alliances could play a part. An extreme would actually not qualify as a coalition at all: operations conducted entirely within the construct of an alliance. It is likely that so exclusive an option is not desirable during a stability operation. UN agencies and other intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and NGOs will participate even in cases in which the alliance is not conducting operations under the auspices of a Security Council resolution. Their integration into predeployment planning and other preparations as well as during in-theater operations will ideally be more intimate than has characterized such relations in the past—i.e., they, too, should be either members or affiliates of the coalition (on which more later). A third possibility would involve two or more alliances as parts of a coalition. All might be subordinate to a lead nation. Alternatively, one could assume senior status while others assume responsibility for a given line of operation (LOO) or portion thereof. Developing closer ties with UN agencies or other organizations that coordinate the activities of multiple NGOs would constitute such a coalition. GEN Wesley Clark’s agreement to incorporate the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) headquarters in the Kosovo coalition put that alliance organization in a role subordinate to NATO. Such coalitions of alliances offer immediately apparent advantages. They reduce liaison burdens on the lead alliance (or other element, should an alliance not be in the lead role). They can also mitigate frictions between the lead organization and other elements within subordinate alliances, any prospective tensions being dealt with at the junior alliance level, where familiarity with members would help to ease problem solving.

The high regard most nations hold for the United Nations as a legitimizing organization is sometimes not matched by an equivalent respect for its military prowess. Authors Michael Smith and Moreen Dee note,

The failure of key member states to assign their forces to UN operations demonstrates a desire to maintain sovereign control over national forces, but it also conveys a lack of confidence and trust in the UN’s ability to mount military operations successfully.

Leaders seeking to form a coalition could benefit by recognizing the possible willingness of some countries, and conceivably some nonstate organizations, to subordinate or otherwise affiliate their personnel to an alliance with an established reputation for successful leadership and ability to provide logistical support in lieu of a UN-led enterprise. Similarly, though perhaps lacking the legitimizing power of a UNSCR, those same countries might consider an enterprise as sufficiently legitimate if led by alliance, whereas one headed by a single nation or bilaterally could be perceived as falling short in that regard. Other possible ways in which an alliance could benefit coalition operations include influencing a campaign without formal alliance participation, e.g.,

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9 Mike Jackson (2008, p. 291). The ARRC formally recognizes the possibility of such subordination to another command in its mission:

HQ ARRC, as a High Readiness Force (Land) HQ, is to be prepared to deploy under NATO, EU, coalition or national auspices to a designated area, to undertake combined and joint operations across the operational spectrum as: a Corps HQ, a Land Component HQ, a Land Component HQ for the NRF, a Combined Joint Land Component HQ for land centric operations, in order to support crisis management options or the sustainment of current operations. (ARRC, undated)

10 M. G. Smith and Dee (2003, p. 124).
• In East Timor, several NATO members worked together, benefiting from familiarity with each other despite no formal involvement by NATO itself.
• Alliance members could similarly provide informal support for another that joined a coalition that lacks the alliance’s formal involvement. The case of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) during the Vietnam War provides an example in this regard. Commitment of SEATO as an alliance required unanimous approval of its members. France and the Philippines initially vetoed the organization’s participation in Vietnam, France (in conjunction with Pakistan) doing so later in response to a second invitation. Individual SEATO members did participate in combat operations in Southeast Asia, however.11 Though SEATO members therefore never supported fellow partner nations in the conflict, cases did exist of non–SEATO-sponsored cooperation, e.g., that provided by the Philippines for U.S. efforts to establish community-development programs.12

By and large, the benefits outweigh the shortcomings when the opportunity to include one or more alliances in a coalition offers itself. It is important, however, for a coalition leader to understand the potential disadvantages so as to reduce their potential detrimental effects.

Alliance Participation in a Coalition: Shortcomings
General Clark’s experiences during operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo make it clear that providing the NATO military force with coherent and consistent political guidance proved difficult, given the division of authorities among the United Nations, NATO, the United States, and other participants. One analyst noted,

When the most powerful military alliance in history entered its first war, no one in the military leadership of NATO had received any political guidance or developed any strategy for what the situation in Kosovo should be like after war. In effect, NATO had not planned for the war it was about to start.13

The lesson for the coalition leader is only too clear: Seek political guidance and encourage the various parties giving it to coordinate their efforts, but be prepared to operate in the absence of clarity in this regard. Doing so will dictate a need for flexibility in planning and execution in addition to patience with coalition-partner military leaders suffering an equivalent deficit in guidance at the national level.

Clausewitz likened action in war to “movement in a resistant element. Just as the simplest and most natural of movements, walking, cannot easily be performed in water, so in war it is difficult for normal efforts to achieve even moderate results.”14 The number of additional hindrances introduced during coalition operations compound the difficulties, making them more akin to attempting a sprint in heavy oil than moving in water. Coalition leaders need to adapt accordingly. Those in the ARRC, for example, recognized that the longstanding tradition of

11 I thank colleague James Quinlivan for bringing the example of SEATO to my attention.
14 Clausewitz (1976, p. 120).
allocating two-thirds of available planning time to subordinate units for their own preparation was inadequate. Language and other differences still acted to slow their cooperative actions, even after decades of working together. ARRC leaders therefore adopted a one-quarter–to–three-quarters policy instead, retaining but one-fourth of planning time for themselves while giving more to lower-echelon units likely to be less familiar with the language of the original order, perhaps less familiar with ARRC procedures, and less practiced in preparing orders.\textsuperscript{15}

Membership can bestow benefits even when an alliance is not participating in military operations. NATO is a vital part of member nations’ security strategies even in the absence of a Warsaw Pact threat. Participation inherently reaps economic and political rewards for many—e.g., shared costs for weapon-system research, design, and manufacture. Ironically, but understandably, maintenance of the alliance can therefore take precedence over operational effectiveness for some members. Ian Westerman concluded that such was the case in 2008 Afghanistan. In his view,

whereas the US context for Afghanistan has been about the strategic interest that the US has in that region, this is an outlook that is not shared by NATO in any form. Instead, within the NATO context, it has become much more about the preservation of NATO itself.\textsuperscript{16}

National Governments: Bones of a Coalition Skeleton

You get a lot of pushback. . . . Some feel very, very threatened when any other department comes in. . . . Their fear is that any bureaucratic endeavor that threatens the power of their chief is viewed as undermining their status in [Washington,] D.C.

—Anonymous 3

The demand for fuel and energy [in Iraq] was rising, and our ability to fix it wasn’t there. And this was where it all started to go wrong. The whole of government process wasn’t there. . . . DFID was headed up by a politician who was against the war, and she prohibited them from participating. . . . So we were left in holding the bag. . . . That summer it got bloody hot. The queues outside the petrol stations grew longer, and it all went pear-shaped one afternoon and the locals rose against us. That’s when the locals realized we couldn’t deliver. . . . The military side responded. They sent two more battalions. . . . That permitted us to get back on the front foot for security, but it didn’t allow us to handle the other issues.

—Lt Col James Landon, British Army\textsuperscript{17}

As would be expected given their political nature, national governments influence virtually every aspect of coalition operations. The tensions between the U.S. Departments of State and

\textsuperscript{15} Glenn and Kingston (2005, p. 45).
\textsuperscript{16} Westerman (2008a, p. 17).
\textsuperscript{17} Landon (2008).
Defense during operations in Kosovo provide a negative example in this regard, as does the case of the UK’s DFID in Lt Col Landon’s quote.

The role a country assumes within a coalition dramatically affects its responsibilities and the leaders of national contingents. Token participation carries lesser obligations; premature departure obviously has relatively limited consequences for the cooperative enterprise (though the economic and diplomatic repercussions of leaving can be significant for the exiting country). Lead-nation or other primary-participant status bestows greater obligations. Length of commitment, expectations of financial outlays, and diplomatic responsibility for the actions of the coalition tend to increase with more-dominant roles. Australia, lead nation both in East Timor and later in the Solomon Islands, has repeatedly redeployed forces to both nations during periods of instability after initial security challenges were met. It has thereby demonstrated a continued commitment while other nations with lesser involvement neither participated during the subsequent flare-ups nor were expected to do so. For them, the responsibilities essentially ended with the termination of the original operation. For Australia, failing to follow up risked both a return of instability in the affected countries and a loss of regional prestige.

Leaders of major coalition contributors will also be expected to assume any slack when other participants fail to meet their obligations. National contributions—especially from states not used to deploying on short notice—can lag theater demands no less than did those of the United Nations in East Timor during INTERFET operations. The early presence of civilian experts is crucial to the timely meeting of requirements. Yet few are the nonmilitary elements in government whose responsibilities include a capability to deploy with a rapidity matching that of the armed forces. The delay denies a coalition much-needed expertise. Britain’s senior civilian representative to Multi-National Division South East (MND [SE]) in Iraq, Ambassador Hilary Synnott, noted that it was only after “our civilian experts started to trickle into the country [that] the deeper, structural problems over agriculture, health, education, and legal systems emerged.”18 That was, of course, not because those problems did not previously exist. Rather, the keen insight necessary to detect such shortcomings was not present until the right people arrived. Vital as they are, and despite U.S. State Department initiatives (such as those to double its number of diplomats and develop a reserve corps of personnel ready to deploy on short notice), the preponderance of governmental expenditure and personnel remains overwhelmingly focused in the Department of Defense (and its close kin, the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs). A recent article noted, “the White House wants to spend $515 billion on the Defense Department (not including the supplemental requests for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan), but only $38 billion on the State Department.”19 The security responsibilities of the 21st century dictate a reevaluation if the United States is to both meet its own commitments as a coalition leader and have the ability to “hold the line.” In the past, civilian agencies could wait until combat ended before undertaking rebuilding. Stability operations tolerate no such sequencing; the soldier, statesman, and aid provider must all be prepared to plan together, deploy together, and support each other once on the ground.

Developing national structures better capable of meeting these varied coalition operational requirements during stability operations will take more than increased funding. There must also be mechanisms in place to improve cooperation and coordination so that intragovernment-

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tal operations reinforce rather than oppose each other. The initiatives by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice begun in the closing months of the George W. Bush administration are notable in this regard, guided as they were by a desire to improve cooperation between the Departments of Defense and State. The UK’s Gen Mike Jackson found that his own government had taken a step in the opposite direction when it disbanded its responsive Overseas Development Administration and replaced it with the DFID. The frustration apparent in the quote regarding DFID is, at least in part, attributable to the organization’s leadership at times defining its mission to lead “the British government’s fight against world poverty” so narrowly as to cause disconnects between its operations and British military objectives during force commitments. Rather than being a partner with other UK government agencies in meeting security and long-term stability objectives, DFID, during the critical early months of British operations in southeastern Iraq following conventional combat in 2003, seemed to some little other than a nationally sponsored aid organization.

The Canadian government recently took a notable step forward in efforts to at once meet the country’s alliance and coalition commitments and ensure that its armed-services activities remained aligned with national political interests via the formation of the Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM). A military headquarters, CEFCOM is currently tasked with making sure that the nation’s armed forces’ performance is in keeping with the dual masters of NATO (due to Canadian forces’ participation as part of the International Security Assistance Force [ISAF] in Afghanistan) and the government in Ottawa. At the time of this writing, Col Peter Williams, head of CEFCOM Plans,

has the responsibility of ensuring that the objectives of the two are not in conflict. My job is to make sure there is coherence in all these operations, and it can be quite difficult. . . . We need to make sure what we are telling them to do is not in conflict with what NATO is telling them.22

Assigning this responsibility to a headquarters in Canada relieves those on the ground in Afghanistan of a considerable burden, placing it instead in an organization closer to and therefore more knowledgeable with regard to policies in the capital. The country’s military leadership in central Asia can thus refer to a single organization that should address any questions regarding compatibility between ISAF orders and at-home policy. Williams goes on to note that his government has taken a further step to lessen chances of any NATO–home government friction while also ensuring that Ottawa is kept abreast of conditions in Afghanistan:

We have a woman . . . the Representative of Canada in Kandahar, the RoCK, and now, when plans come out, they have to be signed off by both the general [commanding Canadian forces in southern Afghanistan] and the RoCK. This is a first for us. . . . I think that this whole-of-government approach is beginning to bear fruit. She is to make sure the governance and development initiatives are in consonance with security operations, so she is

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20 Organizations within the U.S. Department of Defense are also making efforts to improve interagency understanding and cooperation, U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) and the U.S. Army’s Combined Arms Center among them. See, e.g., Brannen (2009).

21 Mike Jackson (2008, p. 277); FCO (undated).

22 P. Williams (2008).
linked with Brigadier General Denis Thompson, [current] commander of JTF [Joint Task Force] Afghanistan.23

Notably, CEFCOM officers, such as Colonel Williams, have recently returned from deployments and thus are familiar with in-theater conditions from a military perspective. They are thus familiar with the demands influencing Canadians overseas as well as those in Ottawa.

Increases in U.S. funding and personnel to enhance Department of State responsiveness to operational deployments are commendable. The result will hopefully be broader and timelier reactions to field needs. Early arrival of these civilian counterparts is vital to gaining the initiative during stability operations. Late, understaffed, and underresourced they might have been, but USMC Lt. Col. Michael Manning nonetheless found U.S. State Department participation in Iraq vital:

The Department of State . . . started behind everybody else. They didn’t show up with everybody. They didn’t bring everything they needed. . . . We didn’t know how to handle them [but when they did get there] they figured out how to contribute money, expertise . . . better negotiating with the sheikhs, it really took hold. They really took things to the next level.24

Expanding What Is Meant by “Coalition”: Nonstate Entities as Members or Affiliates

Civic organizations can make contributions . . . that are nothing short of awe-inspiring.
—Napoleon Valeriano and Charles T. R. Bohannan, Counter-Guerrilla Operations25

The significance of other-than–national government participants in international efforts to rebuild East Timor is impossible to miss in any reading regarding the events of 1999 and beyond. That INTERFET gave way to a UN organization headed by a civilian emphasizes the point: The military establishes the conditions for rebuilding a country (or building a country, in the case of East Timor), but it has the resources to, at best, only assist in that rebuilding. Part of what the military does—training indigenous security forces, for example—obviously has longer-term capacity-building consequences. So too do armed forces’ civil projects, given that they are well conducted and appropriately integrated with the receiving nation’s broader needs. But even in these vital roles, the military is ultimately only a part of any LOO, one of several components on which stability and legitimate government rely.

Great Britain’s Paddy Ashdown recalled that early operations in East Timor suffered “from one of the UN’s most persistent state-building deficiencies, the slow deployment of civilian administrators and civilian police after the fighting ended.”26 Fortunately, there are orga-

23 P. Williams (2008).
25 Valeriano and Bohannan (1962, p. 66).
nizations that can sometimes fill gaps left when national or UN agencies are a bit deliberate in deploying. At times, a military leader will find these NGOs already on the ground when armed forces arrive. The assets they can bring to bear are impressive:

The top five international NGOs now have a combined annual budget of nearly $5 billion. The largest—World Vision—alone has a yearly budget of $2.1 billion. . . . This is larger than the GCP [gross cell product] of many African countries and even European countries such as Andorra ($1.8 billion), Liechtenstein ($1.7 billion), and San Marino ($1 billion). In terms of resources, these NGOs can now compete with international institutions in many contexts. The United Nations, for example, spends around $15 billion per annum, but this amount is spread over a much wider range of countries and issues than for many NGOs.27

Yet, we will recall that these organizations do not fit within the U.S. armed forces’ doctrinal construct of a coalition, “an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action” (emphasis added). Inclusion of such aid agencies’ resources, or those of any component of the United Nations, for that matter, could very likely fall outside formal coalition planning despite their considerable potential as partners in meeting shared objectives. Reality trumps doctrine. If a coalition leader wants to bring all relevant assets to bear on the problems at hand and seeks the synergy that makes a collective whole more valuable than the sum of its separate parts, he or she must incorporate organizations regardless of their definitional inclusion. Contrarily, one might argue that adding these parties to cooperative ventures only exacerbates frictions with which coalitions deal now. It is undeniable that having a greater number of participants increases the difficulties of planning and maintaining cooperative effectiveness. But, to blindly accept the status quo of “nations only” is to ignore much of what history tells us. Military and other government agency leaders already share areas of operation with NGOs, IGOs, security companies, local governments and populations, militias, and other groups formally outside the scope of what comprises a coalition. The relationships are often characterized by inefficiencies, refusals to work together, and misunderstandings that confuse locals and undermine efforts to help those in need. Not attempting to improve these associations ensures degraded service of coalition objectives. This is not to suggest that all such organizations should be incorporated as full members of a coalition or that all will agree to participation. Just as all nations are not equal partners in a coalition, so will the relationships differ when these additional groups more or less formally establish ties. Some will become members little distinguished from various state partners. Others will choose—or merit—a less robust relationship, becoming what are described better as coalition affiliates than as members. Ideally, all would participate to some extent in coalition planning, training, and coordination in the field. In reality, that is unlikely; that state of affairs rarely exists even within the auspices of coalitions as currently defined. Yet, there are many actions short of full membership that will have benefits that outweigh the drawbacks of expanded affiliations.

Resulting frictions will take several forms. Some NGOs fear that working too closely with the military puts their people at risk of attack by coalition enemies. NGO organizations, at times, insist on hiring locals of dubious character as guards despite coalition efforts to disarm civilians. Increasing the extent of these organizations’ participation in early coalition planning

and on-the-ground coordination would be a step in the direction of improving mutual understanding and reducing in-theater friction.

Both history and ongoing operations worldwide suggest that expanding the standing definition of coalition is overdue. Hereafter, in this document, therefore, use of coalition should be taken to mean “an ad hoc cooperative arrangement between two or more organizations in the interest of supporting a common action.”

The following subsections consider implications in adopting this definition for several categories of organizations.

**Nongovernmental and Intergovernmental Organizations**

Within weeks of seizing Baghdad, U.S. soldiers recognized that their inability to address basic human needs and meet fundamental living requirements was turning citizens against them. “We are dying for help from the NGOs, and we get zero from OCPA [the office of the Coalition Provisional Authority],” said one. “You can feel it out on the streets; people are frustrated, and we’re getting rocks thrown at us in neighborhoods where we never did before.”

—Stephen R. Dalzell, “Where the Streets Have No Names”

While assigned to the Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF-I) in 2008, British Army Col Alexander Alderson regretted

the absence of the UN aside from its liaison mission, UNAMI, United Nations Assistance [Mission for] Iraq . . . and the absence of other humanitarian organizations. [It] was an inhibitor. The international NGOs act as a conduit between the international coalition and the host nation . . . . The International Red Cross deals with those government representatives dealing with the medical. [It was] unavoidable, but their absence denied us the presence that would have accelerated the process of security and stabilization.

Alderson’s observation adds to our list of benefits supporting inclusion of NGOs and IGOs in a coalition. Exchanges between these organizations and indigenous-government agencies can assist a coalition in better tailoring aid delivery, thereby helping to reduce redundant efforts that waste resources. As noted, aid organizations are frequently on the ground prior to the arrival of military units and other government agency representatives in a coalition. Taking advantage of this in-place expertise—ideally, early in the planning process and certainly when determining the sequence of deploying assets—not only better serves the common interest of providing humanitarian aid; it can also be a conduit for opening valuable nation-state and local connections. Operations in Kosovo offer but one example of the inefficiencies introduced when such coordination is lacking. Airfield capacity and transportation within the theater were, as is frequently the case in such situations, valuable commodities in too-short supply. One coalition representative recalled his frustrations when the failure to coordinate coalition and NGO efforts to deliver aid resulted in cargo arriving unannounced, with the expectation that the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) would assume responsibility

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for distribution. Even if the resources to do so had been at hand, the task would have been complicated by USAID having had no information regarding the contents of the cargo.30

Expanding coalitions to include these organizations—either as members or simply through informal affiliations prior to and following deployment—will incur costs that, in part, offset the benefits available. Interestingly, however, there is evidence to show that those may not include increased risks for members of NGOs or IGOs. A study conducted from 1997 to 2006

found that violence against aid workers was no more or less likely to occur in relation to the presence of a UN integrated mission, or interventions by the United States or other permanent-five (P-5) forces, or the presence of global terrorist cells. This finding surprised many humanitarian policy staff and practitioners, who had previously argued that the correlation was undeniable,
suggesting that the subject merits further attention.31

Among the costs that will be most dramatically felt at the tactical and operational levels is a potential increase in the number of liaison officers (LOs) that organizations will have to both provide and accept. Commanding his battalion in East Timor, LTCOL Peter Singh remembered that he “had about half of the LOs I could have used” due to the increased burden of coordinating with NGOs.32 The burden includes more than that on manpower allocated for LOs alone (positions currently not included at all in lower-echelon organizational structures and in limited numbers even at higher levels). Deploying LOs to other organizations generally means equipping them with at least a vehicle and radio. Depending on the robustness of the theater, tents and other life support will also be essential. Better-resourced nations may find themselves expected to provide housing and other logistical support for LOs sent by other members of a coalition.

Coalition leaders should expect and plan for exceptional demands for liaison during a stability operation. NGOs are a fact of life in all but today’s most threatening theaters. The United Nations estimated that there were 37,000 international NGOs in the year 2000 in addition to those working exclusively within single countries. That they are so significant a part of capacity building and aid provision today is evident in their representing $27 billion of the $84 billion spent on aid worldwide in 2005.33

30 Anonymous 3.
31 Harmer (2008, p. 533). There is some ambiguity in the statistics, though it does not appear that this changes the fundamental conclusion regarding the relationship between military forces and aid organizations. Harmer continues, The one exception to that finding was for international aid workers in the presence of UN peacekeeping missions or UN-sanctioned peace support operations (not necessarily integrated missions). In these contexts, violence against international aid workers showed a slight, but statistically significant, increase, as compared to the violence against national workers, which declined over the same period. A somewhat speculative conclusion that may be drawn from this is that internationals become more exposed to violence when a peacekeeping force is present, because international agencies assume that the military force provides a measure of ambient security that allows them to extend their operational presence, giving them more freedom of movement than they would otherwise have. Importantly, the same finding was not evident in relations to the presence of US or other P-5 forces, suggesting that internationals are more cautious in these contexts, rather than that international aid workers are more likely to be targeted specifically in peacekeeping contexts. (pp. 533–534)
Fortunately, the NGOs or IGOs involved have, in some cases, reduced the liaison burden by cooperating among themselves. UN agencies, in particular, frequently assume the burden of coordinating NGO and other IGO activities. They also provide support via allocation of funds and inspecting these organizations’ performance, the latter a significant issue given violations of neutral status that have occurred during some contingencies.34 The UNHCR coordinates with approximately 300 NGOs and can act in a coordination capacity in the field. The UN World Food Programme likewise works hand in hand with relevant organizations to deliver foodstuffs and other essential provisions. Other of the world body’s institutions as well as USAID and its equivalents have assumed similar roles. Among non-governmental agencies outside the auspices of the United Nations, the American Council for Voluntary International Action (InterAction) is itself a coalition with a charter that includes supporting information exchanges among member NGOs as well as acting in a liaison role between them and the U.S. government.35 A similar organization is “the Interagency Working Group (I[A]WG), aimed at increasing collaboration among Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE), Catholic Relief Services, International Rescue Committee, Mercy Corps, Oxfam GB, Save the Children USA, and World Vision International.”36 Coalitions that bring international and indigenous NGOs together could further reduce the number of organizations that coalition leaders (including those from the NGOs themselves) must provide in order to effectively coordinate their activities. Military, other government, nongovernmental, and intergovernmental organizations all benefit by cooperating in reducing the number of liaison personnel needed. Doing so cuts costs, decreases import requirements, and reduces demands on such scarce resources as translators.37

Limited efforts have been made to include NGOs in training, planning, and more fully incorporating them in ongoing operations. Integration of these organizations’ representatives prior to deployment is somewhat routine in the United States and the United Kingdom, but participation in exercises, planning sessions, or rehearsals at higher levels rarely consists of more than token involvement. Better than no involvement, this limited visibility does little to expose deploying military or other federal agency leaders to the breadth of character, scope of challenges, and potential range of benefits that NGOs and IGOs bring to a theater with their presence. Nor, as a result, do coalition plans fully represent the resources needed to integrate their activities or the full extent to which the organizations can assist the common cause.

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34 For example, “Nahed Rashid Ahmed Attalah, director of food supplies for Gaza Strip refugees . . . admitted to using his U.N. . . . vehicle on multiple occasions that summer to transport arms, explosives, and armed PRC [Popular Resistance Committee] activists to carry out terrorist attacks” (Levitt, 2006, p. 95).

35 Perito (2007a, pp. 130–131). For more information about InterAction, see InterAction (undated). InterAction describes itself as

the largest coalition of U.S.-based international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) focused on the world’s poor and most vulnerable people. Collectively, InterAction’s 175 members work in every developing country to do the following: Promote a bold agenda to focus U.S. development and humanitarian assistance on improving the conditions of the world’s poor and most vulnerable. Engage with the USG [U.S. government] to advance poverty alleviation and humanitarian relief as major independent US foreign assistance priorities. . . . Demonstrate and enhance NGO accountability and impact in development and humanitarian action. Be the voice and prime representative of US international NGOs in building alliances and common agendas with NGO networks around the world and with other strategic partners.

36 Perito (2007a, p. 130).

37 Perito (2007a, p. 130).
No coalition leader wants a military unit, agency representative, indigenous security force, or other organization operating in his or her area of operations unbeknownst to him. Ignorance invites risks of inadvertently causing casualties in addition to the waste and confusion resulting from not coordinating aid and other activities. The rapid restoration of security in East Timor and decision not to use artillery or air bombardment during INTERFET operations meant that NGO failures to coordinate were less likely to risk accidental engagements there. Armed clashes were similarly rare in Bosnia and Herzegovina, though coalition air support posed a danger not found in East Timor. Coalition leaders—military in this case—did encourage NGOs to keep the leadership informed of NGO activities. In at least one case, an unwilling NGO representative was involuntarily escorted to a nearby headquarters for a briefing on why at least minimal exchanges of information were vital to the safety of his personnel.

The dangers posed by threat elements in Afghanistan and Iraq make such coordination significantly more important. Various entities, including those shown in Table 3.1, were available to coordinate movements into Iraq and other activities soon after the coalition’s arrival in the theater. Such initiatives as these potentially benefit organizations other than NGOs and IGOs as well. Encouraging multinational military and other-agency parties to provide information to these liaison elements or draw on them before movements can reduce the likelihood of disasters, such as that in Iraq’s Al Amarah in April 2004. There, only a few hours after a major engagement between the PWRR [Princess of Wales’s Royal Regiment] and insurgents... a U.S. convoy was ambushed as it went through the town. No prior notification of movement was given and U.S. forces were unaware that they were transiting during such a period of tension.38

Table 3.1
NGO Coordinating Mechanisms in Iraq, Spring 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Liaison Element</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA)</td>
<td>Initially the overall office in Iraq for managing coalition humanitarian and reconstruction efforts; provided high-level policy priorities and guidance and conducted limited liaison at high levels with UN and NGO coordination bodies. Based in Baghdad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian-assistance coordination center (HACC)</td>
<td>Source of information for the general public and the humanitarian community; self-stated purpose is to “facilitate stabilization and recovery by coordinating humanitarian assistance across the I Marine Expeditionary Force area of operations.” Based in four regional areas (Baghdad, north, south and west).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Iraqi Assistance Center (NIAC)</td>
<td>Provided services similar to those of the HACC; location for coordination with focus on providing information about assets available in theater; based in Baghdad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian operations center (HOC)</td>
<td>Comanaged by the Kuwaiti government and the U.S. military and later by a British commander. Was the primary coordination point for the humanitarian community and coalition forces before humanitarian elements entered Iraq; based in Kuwait City.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


One-way provision of information helps protect NGO and IGO personnel and reduce other negative consequences of coalition forces accidentally causing casualties to members of these organizations. NGO and IGO input is also valuable—e.g., the provision of information regarding the numbers and condition of refugees in Kosovo helped the coalition to better provide for the displaced. A number of such organizations avoid interacting with military units out of fear that their actions will be perceived as a violation of their neutrality. Others recognize that some degree of coordination is wise. The International Committee of the Red Cross’s (ICRC’s) Michael Khambatta is one who understood the distinction between reasonable coordination and violations of NGO impartiality. Despite his strong defense of his organization’s neutrality, he found it appropriate “to share information regarding humanitarian needs.” Simply establishing a reasonable forum for exchanging information, one that minimizes the appearance of military-NGO affiliation, may be all that is necessary to encourage this vital coordination with more-standoffish organizations. Other NGOs are less reluctant to directly involve themselves when the end served is better support for those in need. This can include substantive participation in planning. Edward Artis, head of the NGO Knightsbridge International, believed “with everything that’s in me that the establishment of a pre-deployment group of NGOs and military civil affairs that are going to be in an advisory capacity is a good thing.”

Extended contacts can carry with them some risk that coalition foes misinterpret coordination as fraternizing with the enemy. Less-endowed organizations may rely on coalition assets for transportation, distribution of aid, and other resources beyond their own means, however, meaning that even extensive interaction should not be seen as a violation of impartiality norms. Including messages along these lines during communications with an indigenous population may be advisable, as such information will almost surely be monitored by threat representatives.

Even partial success in NGO/IGO coordination will bring benefits. It therefore behooves a coalition commander to determine which organizations are willing to coordinate in the interest of safety and more effective provision of services. Task-force commander LTC Anthony Cucolo and NGOs worked to mutual benefit in Bosnia and Herzegovina. His PSYOP personnel provided NGOs with demographic information. We put information packets together for newly arriving NGOs, and they appreciated that. I would invite NGOs to my meetings with the members of the competing factions. . . . It was building trust and confidence, and seizing opportunities.

Another leader recalled,

when I was in Kosovo, still in the army, there were lots of examples of NGOs [that] were quite happy on a working level to meet for coffee in Pristina and sit over a map and discuss, “Which village do want us to go to?” . . . The NGOs didn’t want to be putting houses in the same village and were quite happy to be coordinating . . . at a lower level to the extent

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40 Artis (2008).
41 Cucolo (2008).
that . . . security would be provided or a truck would be provided, or . . . information on route clearance would be provided.42

In Somalia, Pär Eriksson of Sweden’s National Defence Research Establishment found that,

despite some difficulties in relations between NGOs and the military operation, the NGOs indeed proved their value by providing important information and insight to the military peace operation, not only on the humanitarian situation but also on the political situation and the security situation,

thereby potentially assisting competing parties to better understand avenues of possible resolution.43

Artis is a firm believer in establishing relationships in-country as well as during preliminary planning, but he emphasizes that cooperation in helping those in need by no means implies participation in other activities. He and his colleagues would occasionally drop in on coalition units for a visit and found that the units would

have the coffee brewing . . . and we’d lay out where we are going . . . and they’d go off and talk amongst themselves. . . . A couple of times they made very casual suggestions that maybe we didn’t want to go that way today. And we changed our plans. . . . We just don’t want [the military] to use us to draw in your enemy. Don’t use us for bait.44

Improved NGO and IGO relationships regarding planning and in-theater activities obviously carry benefits. They can pose challenges for the coalition commander as well, their objectives sometimes inadvertently being in conflict with security concerns. Australian historian Bob Breen described one such episode involving the Australian Army’s service in Somalia. His description provides a “What now, lieutenant?”–type exercise in thinking both for junior officers and for the leaders and staff responsible for planning their operations:

World Vision staff had visited the main recipient villages a few days before the convoy had set out, telling the locals that they would return in two or three days’ time. They had asked the villagers to convey news of the distribution to outlying communities, a useful approach aimed at ensuring that all those who need assistance were there to receive it. From a security perspective, however, it was less than ideal as it meant that numbers of recipients would be hard to predict. This advance notice also allowed those who sought to interfere with the distribution process to plan ahead.45

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42 Anonymous 1.
43 Eriksson (1997, n. 20).
44 Artis (2008).
45 Breen and McCauley (2008, pp. 60–61). The Australian solution was to provide military escorts and site security for these aid efforts. In one case, the operation led to intelligence that, in turn, precipitated contact with a local bandit gang. While the Australians inflicted losses on the armed bandits, they did so in a village from which the bandits came, leading to some uncomfortable moments prior to the soldiers extracting themselves, fortunately without friendly casualties. See pp. 61–71.
Breen highlighted a further difficulty common in dealing with NGOs in theaters where the organizations feel compelled to provide themselves with protection:

The Australians were keen to dominate Baidoa to deter criminals and bandits from attacking expatriate aid agency staff and looting humanitarian supplies. They had quickly realized that the guards hired by inexperienced aid agencies were their main opponents. These men were intimidating their employers and looting warehouses. By mid-February the Australians had forced NGO managers to sack many of these rogue guards. Diggers [Australian soldiers] now occupied compounds permanently to increase their control.46

It must have been an unwelcome decision for the Australian commander finding it necessary to commit his personnel to providing aid agencies with security, given that (1) guarding sites ties down soldiers and thereby makes them stationary targets, (2) he now lacks assets that could be addressing other requirements, and (3) there is a related need for contingency procedures to provision and plan for reinforcing these personnel that adds further to operational burdens and risks. Potential military shortcomings notwithstanding, such duties may constitute a wise allocation of the forces available. Even reliable security personnel create another armed presence in an area of operations, one that, at a minimum, may impede efforts to disarm the local population.

While the issue of operations security (OPSEC) receives more attention in the section later that addresses intelligence concerns, it is appropriate to note here that improving coalition ties with members of the local population, NGOs, IGOs, and others will incur security risks. Normal OPSEC procedures, such as having classified displays in a separate part of a headquarters, will mitigate the more obvious of such concerns, but there will inevitably be instances in which a leader will have to assess the relative risks of making information available versus the cost of not sharing with parties that can provide operational advantages. Canada’s LCol Peter Williams was not overly tolerant of those who would use security as an excuse for not coordinating more closely with organizations that could help achieve common objectives. Recalling his 2006 tour in southern Afghanistan, he concluded, “We need to bring them into our organizations more. . . . Some might say there are operational security concerns, but those are issues that we need to come to grips with.”47 COL James Linder took steps to do so as commander of the Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines (JSOTF-P). Linder turned to the embassy for help, recognizing the value in working with NGOs but concerned that his own headquarters lacked the resources to distinguish legitimate organizations from those otherwise. Ultimately, he dictated that JSOTF-P not “deal with the NGO unless [it had been] vetted by the embassy. The Country Team still ran things; USAID vetted them.”48

There is, in addition, the negative impact that ill-disciplined or poorly advised spending can have on struggling indigenous economies and capacity building. Australia’s AID/WATCH organization, discussing UN spending in 2001 East Timor, observed,

the power and high incomes of UN staff and consultants have generated considerable resentment. The UN presence has created a serious dual economy with UN staff paid 30

47 P. Williams (2008).
and 40 times more than East Timorese public servants, regardless of skills. A number of restaurants in Dili have no East Timorese customers. And a fair amount of the small business operations in Dili are directed at these usually friendly but also aloof and very wealthy temporary residents. This is a highly artificial situation.49

Afghanistan provides a similar example:

Approximately 280,000 civil servants work in the government bureaucracy and receive an average salary of $50 per month. Meanwhile, approximately 50,000 work for NGOs, the United Nations, and bilateral and multilateral agencies, where support staff can earn up to $1,000 per month. Unsurprisingly, there has been a brain drain from the government’s managerial tier to menial positions in the aid system. If the disparity in wages resulted from a competitive market, then people might consider it fair. The problem is that the finances of the aid complex generally fund both bureaucracies, and the rules for remuneration are set by bureaucratic fiat rather than by open processes of competition.50

Paying above-market rates for rental properties, hiring local staff at salaries greatly in excess of what local governments and commercial enterprises can pay, and purchasing goods and services at exorbitant rates are practices that undermine the economic stability that such organizations should be helping to establish. Further, the disproportionately high salaries paid to local personnel attract the best and brightest to the lamplight of increased income. This eases life for the visitors but deprives the indigenous government of the human capital essential to building a capacity to serve local citizenry effectively.

The problem is not limited to NGO and IGO personnel. Less-savvy military and other government leaders have been similarly guilty, further argument for establishing uniform salary, market price, and other standards. NGOs, IGOs, civilian contractors, and military units themselves may have contacts that will help determine equitable criteria in this regard. The learning experience of a Dutch provincial reconstruction team (PRT) in Afghanistan lends insight to the potential benefits of leaders taking advantages of such resources:

By involving only a few constructors [contractors] in the selection process, NL [Netherlands] PRT did not create significant competition. As a result, NL PRT often paid relatively high prices for construction activities. For example, while personnel of the civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) branch during the second rotation were satisfied with the arrangements of bulldozers for US$50 per hour, a local interpreter of NL PRT arranged the same bulldozer within ten minutes for only US$20 per hour. In addition to increased competition, involving more constructors encourages more efficient work and spreads the benefits through the population.51

Sometimes, the fault lies not in ignorance of local prices but in policies not tailored to local conditions. A Japanese aid organization in Nepal, for example,

bought bricks on the market at 150 rupees per unit through its particular procurement system, whereas the Nepali government could have obtained the same bricks for 6 rupees

49 “Aidwatch Briefing Note” (2001).
50 Ghani and Lockhart (2008, p. 100).
per unit if allowed to use its own procurement system. Under the project rules, however, the Japanese procurement system had to be used.52

Herein, we see potential benefits in including two additional groups in our expanded definition of coalitions: representatives of the indigenous government and those from a local population.

The Host Nation

Faced with the emergence of the firebrand cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army militia, Bremer was in no doubt that such groups were unmitigated menaces and should be stamped out. If this were true in the Baghdad region, the key to stability, then, in line with Bremer’s overall approach, it must be true elsewhere. He ruled that militias of any form were not to be tolerated.

—Hilary Synnott, Bad Days in Basra53

Messages were much more effective when Afghan leaders cooperated and spoke directly to the people.

—Patrick Donahue and Michael Fenzel, “Combating a Modern Insurgency”54

The decision of when and to what extent to include a host-nation government, indigenous NGOs, militias, community groups, and other representatives of the host country in an alliance or coalition is a vital one. Premature inclusion may come at considerable cost in coalition influence and freedom of action as local officials assert their sovereignty. Countering these drawbacks is the requirement for the coalition to ultimately turn over responsibility for governing to the host government and its people (or, alternatively, to an international body, such as the United Nations, another reason for expanding the concept of coalition to include IGOs).

East Timor, Kosovo, 2003 Iraq, and post-Taliban Afghanistan are all notable for having had at most fledgling governments on arrival of the coalitions that undertook to assist in building those nations. Fortunately, there are normally structures at the local level that can assume some of the day-to-day governing burdens. Yet, a coalition leader risks further difficulties tomorrow by accepting the expediency of relying on tribal structures, clan representatives, militias, or other local authorities in the short term. Support today translates to advantage when more-permanent governments are seated in the future much as a congressional incumbent benefits during U.S. elections. Determining which individuals or groups represent an acceptable balance between a legitimate desire to serve the people and those promoting their own ends can be extraordinarily tricky. Yet, even a suboptimal choice seasoned with a coalition leader’s reasonable judgment is likely to yield better results than that of an outsider attempting to impose projects and processes without the assistance of those they are meant to serve. Lack of coordination is magnified if NGOs and IGOs likewise do not coordinate their efforts with the coalition and local authorities. The harm done includes more than squandered resources. An Afghan official rightly noted

that if a PRT’s military component builds schools without first coordinating with the Department of Education for teachers and materials, the oversight is most likely to be attributed by the public to the incompetence of the government rather than poor planning on the part of the PRT.55

Paddy Ashdown drew on his experiences in Bosnia and Herzegovina to provide further reason for building the capacity of local governing bodies:

It is better, if you can, to reform the institution before you start reforming the people—for example it is better to create a modern police structure before trying to create modern policemen; better to reform judicial systems, before reforming judges; better to reform political systems than to hope for the emergence of reformed politicians. Doing it the other way around risks having the good people who have been trained to new standards being quickly corrupted by the old practices of the as yet unreformed institutions in which they have to work.56

Ashdown’s observations are legitimate, but the coalition leader seeking to build government capacity will likely find reformation of institutions and those who serve in them to be simultaneous rather than successive operations.

Ashdown likewise saw value in maintaining contact with members of the local population other than government officials. Staying the night with a Bosnian Serb, the ambassador found that his host taught me something none of my advisers could have told me. That his own Republika Srpska government was ripping off their own Serb refugees, diverting international aid given to them to help refugees like [his host] Uros return to their homes, and using it instead to support Serb refugees from Bosnian Muslim areas to stay where they were in Republika Srpska. Uros said to me: “You foreigners—you are very well-meaning giving our politicians all this money, but you do not know this country well enough to see what happens to the money afterwards. And so it ends up doing exactly the opposite of what you intended—helping refugees stay where they are, when you are trying to reverse it. Instead of employing lots of foreigners who do not know enough about what is happening here to check up on where the money is going, why don’t you give the job to us? . . . We know what our politicians are up to. Let us act as your watchdogs.”57

Uros’ advice offers lessons for alliance and coalition leaders anywhere. Hard as they will try, outsiders will not always make the right choices when setting up initial governing structures in an area. Some of those appointed will represent selfish interests, have dubious pasts, or otherwise undermine long-term success. Establishing community groups to inform coalition leaders’ decisions helps to balance the guidance received while reinforcing the concepts of democratic representation and public responsibility. It also provides a way for the coalition to avoid being the only recipient of blame for bad appointments. Bringing several such groups into the coalition fold—allowing them to influence aid planning, funds expenditure, and selections of

55 Abbaszadeh et al. (2008, pp. 11–12).
56 Ashdown (2007, p. 98).
individuals for key positions, and doing so in conjunction with NGOs, PRTs, and other organizations whose efforts should be incorporated—will further help offset biases that may exist were only one or two such groups relied on. U.S. Army MSG Gregory Doles saw wisdom in GEN David Petraeus’ early establishment of human-terrain teams tasked with assisting the building of such sources of information for the coalition in Iraq and Afghanistan. Petraeus and Doles recognized that “aid becomes a bargaining chip and the influencer can use our aid as a way of explaining his contact with us to the community.” Doles also reminds us that “the objective is at least in part to build grass roots support for the government in Kabul.”

Some of a coalition’s potentially most difficult challenges will involve militias. Synnott’s passage at the beginning of this section suggests caution: Not all militias are equal. That those in one region are troublesome does not mean that others will not serve vital ends, as did local defense groups in Brunei during the post–World War II conflict between British and Indonesian forces described by James and Sheil-Small:

Later, C Company left Miri in a Shell LCT [landing craft, tank; a type of small ship] arriving in Niah by 1800. They found that the two Survey Officers had organized the villagers into a Home Guard, armed with shotguns, to defend the place until their arrival. Although the houses along the river downstream from Niah were shut, the troops were enthusiastically welcomed in the villages. One platoon occupied Niah, and another went farther upriver to Rumah Pasang where a member of the Survey Team and Mrs. Harrisson had organized a similar defense. . . . These irregular bodies of tribesmen grew to a strength of nearly two thousand and played a major role in blocking the rebel escape routes, and in providing an early warning screen in the event of any Indonesian infiltration.

Cosgrove was fortunate in that the Falintil voluntarily sidelined itself on arrival of INTERFET; events were similarly auspicious for Clark and Solana in Kosovo, given the KLA’s eventual agreement to voluntarily disarm its members. Militia groups help to provide village security on Sulu island in the southern Philippines; their members have fought alongside AFP forces against insurgents, this despite militia members sharing the Muslim religion with the enemy they combated while serving alongside the predominantly Catholic members of the AFP. The Sons of Iraq have been key to Sunni segments of Iraq’s population working with the coalition and ousting al Qaeda from previously strongly anti-coalition regions. Contrarily, tribal militias purged southern Iraqi urban areas of Saddamist factions as coalition forces bypassed villages, towns, or cities in 2003. Local populations were unimpressed when coalition forces later returned to assume responsibility, leaving coalitions leaders caught between allowing the militias to continue their security duties despite obvious ties to local factions or ousting the armed groups, thereby risking local ill will and the turning of those armed groups against coalition forces. Militias aligned with Muqtada al-Sadr perpetrated violence throughout Iraq in 2004, causing the deaths of innocents and undermining efforts to bring stability to the country. Ultimately, a coalition will have to either deal with militia elements itself or leave the challenge to an indigenous government that does not need the additional burden as it attempts to establish legitimacy and provide for its people.

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Coalition leaders must always keep the long-term objective of their own departure in mind. A question that should be answered in conjunction with any coalition initiative is, will this move the coalition toward accomplishment of its objectives? If, as in Iraq and Afghanistan, those objectives include establishment of effective self-government, the question may become, will this move the indigenous population toward successful self-government? Ongoing operations in those two countries reveal that no and not far enough are sometimes the truthful responses. An observer writing in early 2008 found that there are still no PRTs with more than a token representation from the Afghan government within them, and such individuals that do exist are mere liaison officers and can scarcely be considered to be the first stage in any genuine handover of responsibilities.60

Leaders have to do more to build both the governing structures and the talents of the men and women who will serve in them. They must also be cautious not to take for granted the support of the people on whom the government will ultimately depend. The ally of today can become the adversary of tomorrow if coalition personnel do not continuously cultivate popular backing. The observation of a Philippine farmer during that nation’s ultimately successful effort to rid itself of the post–World War II Huk rebellion makes the point:

The Huks are even better treated than we by the government. When a Huk surrenders, he is given a house and a piece of farmland in Mindanao. And when he is captured, he is fed and given shelter and does not have to work and worry about his next meal. I might as well become a Huk and then surrender.61

Commercial Enterprises

I believe that DoD [the U.S. Department of Defense] and MOD [UK Ministry of Defence] should cooperate and establish values and standards for private security companies . . . and most of the top-end private security companies are crying out for it. . . . After being shot up by U.S. forces, several of the companies said that, if they could have Blue Force Tracker [a system that shows the location of friendly units to others in the area], not on receive mode, but only transmit, with the private security companies’ icons in a particular color, it could help stop the military engaging the security companies. . . . I think we need to get a bit more clever on establishing values and standards for PSCs [private security companies].

—Col Andrew Cuthbert, British Army62

If something happened out there, we’d have to go get them anyway, so it didn’t make any sense not to give them what we could.

—Lt. Col. Michael Manning, USMC63

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60 Westerman (2008a, p. 19).
61 Valeriano and Bohannan (1962, p. 34).
63 M. Manning (2008).
Our previous discussion of security guards hired by NGOs points to implications that commercial organizations can have for a coalition military commander during stability operations. In addition to the risks inherent in having another armed force in an area of operations, they can have undesirable influences on local civilians. Recalling his experiences in Afghanistan, the U.S. Army’s COL Richard S. Williams recalled,

We had a couple of private security companies that were providing convoy security. Some were Western private security contractors and some were Afghan, basically local warlords. You see these jingle trucks coming down the road with guys with RPGs [rocket-propelled grenades] hanging off the vehicles. You need to know what they are doing and how they operate within your AOR [area of responsibility]. They hit the people. The people know they aren’t Taliban, so they [undermine what you are doing].64

Commercial enterprises interacting with members of a coalition include the many contractors brought from member nations to provide essential support, local companies to provide private security personnel, and members of the media. The attitude of “live and let live” with respect to commercial interests has proven noticeably unhelpful in Iraq, where such organizations have, at times, conducted themselves with less restraint than is necessary in “winning hearts and minds.” There is thus ample motivation for coalition leaders to establish closer affiliations with—and maintain closer oversight of—these enterprises. Certainly, there are instances in which not incorporating them is simply foolish, an extreme example being the instance of ORHA director LTG Jay Garner’s bodyguard not being able to obtain force protection–related intelligence. Garner’s executive officer explained:

I told the . . . intelligence officer that he should brief [Garner’s] protection team on the local threats from now on. Like others in the intelligence community, he refused to share intelligence briefs with the South African [protection team] because they didn’t have the appropriate security clearance.65

The officer making the decision to deny vital intelligence to those protecting the coalition’s senior civilian obviously did not consider the local and international repercussions if Garner were to be injured or killed. Regardless of its outcome, the trial of Xe (formerly Blackwater) employees accused of murdering Iraqi civilians further points to the need to better provide guidelines regarding and supervision of commercial entities working in coalition areas of operation.

Lt. Col. Michael Manning’s observation at the head of this section identifies another baseline reason for wanting private enterprise, NGOs, IGOs, and other types of organizations to share their plans for future operations with coalition forces: It is coalition forces that will have to rescue them should the contractors come to ill. We previously noted that knowledge of where these organizations are also reduces the likelihood of an accidental engagement. Further, the sheer number of commercial groups and their disparate activities make them valuable sources of information relevant to both security operations and general environmental awareness. Coalition leaders who promote regular reporting, occasional meetings, and other affiliations stand to benefit, as do the commercial organizations partaking of these opportunities.

64 R. Williams (2008).
The instance of four Xe contractors having ill advisedly driven into Fallujah in late January 2004 is perhaps the most infamous instance of contractors both endangering themselves (all were killed) and dramatically undermining coalition operations at the operational as well as tactical levels. Coalition plans for a deliberate hearts-and-minds operation to deny popular support to the insurgents went for naught when local forces were ordered to attack militia forces in the city.

The media are a commercial enterprise meriting special note. Largely for-profit enterprises, their motivations ultimately incorporate competition with others in their vocation. While the resulting product is generally beneficial in advising audiences with a fair degree of accuracy, the influence wielded by its representatives is, at times, disproportionately great in comparison to the depth of understanding they have of matters on which they report and in light of the ultimate effect they can have on coalition operations. (British forces in the southeastern Iraqi city of Al Basrah, for example, came under widespread attack after the British *Daily Mirror* published photographs of apparent Iraqi prisoner abuse by soldiers in a British Army unit. The newspaper later admitted, “[T]here is now sufficient evidence to suggest that these pictures are fakes and that the *Daily Mirror* has been the subject of a calculated and malicious hoax.”66) It therefore behooves both media organizations and coalition leaders to establish affiliations that better serve not only the objectives of each but, ideally, also those of the local population. The British Army’s Maj Gen Andrew Farquhar emphasized the dangers for a coalition of not doing so:

> Dealing with the media is a line of operation in its own right. It is almost a war in its own right. Fighting for the perceptions of the home audience is a really serious business. . . . It has to be part of your campaign plan, because if you get your info ops wrong [you are never going to achieve your desired ends]. The media in the Balkans forced politicians and the UN to create protected zones . . . and it fixed the UN force which was absolutely unhelpful. . . . That’s the effect media can have on an operation if you don’t bring them into the coalition.67

Media freedom to move about the battlefield can pose problems much like those that concern leaders with respect to NGOs: They put themselves at risk of being inadvertently killed or wounded by coalition forces. There are potential benefits in addition to the value gained in getting the coalition story out to the world from an independent source. The experiences and ability to move between echelons mean that some media representatives are particularly well informed. Squad leader SSG David Bellavia found Australian reporter Michael Ware’s descriptions of the enemy in November 2004 Fallujah more enlightening than information provided by his own intelligence section. Ware also provided updates on the friendly-force situation of which Bellavia was unaware.68 Former head of U.S. Army Public Affairs MG Anthony Cucolo summed up a healthy relationship between coalition leadership and members of the media as “an understanding between two professionals,” one based on mutual appreciation.69

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66 “Editor Sacked over ‘Hoax’ Photos” (2004).
69 Cucolo (2008).
Retired U.S. Army LTG Patrick M. Hughes provides an example touching on an additional way in which private enterprises in general can reduce the personnel and logistical burdens on a deployed force:

I remember the Mogadishu port not being represented by an NGO, not being represented by the United Nations, but by a Somali group. . . . We haven’t codified or institutionalized this to the extent we should in order to properly conduct operations. I saw it missing in Haiti and, I think, missing in Bosnia.70

Developing commercial management skills and supporting the growth of local businesses is no less a part of readying a country to stand on its own than is building governmental capacity. This might mean encouraging the development of local entrepreneurs with training and seed money or instilling the business ethics that underlie effective economies. U.S. engineers in JSOTF-P recognized the importance of their role in influencing the future of commercial business practices in the southern portions of the country. The U.S. Navy’s CDR Steven K. Kelley took it upon himself to introduce competitive bidding by qualified builders from Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. Rather than simply continue business as usual, Kelley took the extra step toward establishing a better foundation for the local economy once the United States departs the region.71

**Structural Factors Influencing Coalition Cohesion**

The terminology; it took us four days to even start coming together on terminology. A target pact was something different. Even “target” was different. . . . Even within the STANAG [standardization agreement] there’s room for movement.

—Richard William Kelly, squadron leader, Royal Air Force72

Military leaders are taught early in their careers to consider a situation not only from their perspective but also from that of the enemy. Doing so forces one to contemplate how best to prepare for any likely contingency. Those working with coalitions should expand the lesson so that their consideration encompasses all partner members and other pertinent parties. Consideration of cultures, language abilities, professional educations, familiarity with doctrine, and other relevant factors should cause individuals conducting orders briefings to understand when embarrassment might solicit a nod of apparent understanding instead of a question. Formulating questions during a briefing is more difficult for those less comfortable with a language, doctrine, or organization. They need to first work through what they are hearing, then attempt to articulate any queries in a coherent manner. The previous example of the difficulties experienced when Australian INTERFET briefers spoke too rapidly or failed to provide sufficient

70 Hughes (2008).
71 Kelley (2007).
72 Kelly (2008).
time for questions when finished reminds us that a staff officer or commander who too hastily dismisses an audience puts the mission at risk.73

Drawing on history’s lessons can assist in identifying ways to structure coalitions for improved effectiveness. LOOs became a popular way of organizing the functions inherent in the stability operations being conducted in later 2003 Iraq. (See Figure 3.1.) They struck many as innovative when introduced, yet Figure 3.2 demonstrates that two practitioners of COIN in the post–World War II Philippines used much the same means of organizing activities a half-century before. Developed as a visual means of depicting Ramon Magsaysay’s approach to dealing with the Hukbalahap insurgency, it provides a striking example from the pantheon of historical examples on which tomorrow’s planners can draw for wisdom.

Figure 3.1
Lines of Operation, Notional Example

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73 Language is only the most obvious difficulty confronting a multinational alliance or coalition. It is one that constantly requires a coalition commander’s attention, however. Paddy Ashdown took extraordinary steps to ensure common understanding during his service as UNHCR in Bosnia and Herzegovina:

When we looked at the Serb translation of the deal . . . we immediately saw it had a flaw. Don had, as we agreed, conceded that the entities should have the right to audit the operation of the state customs service. But because the Serb language uses the same word for “audit” and “control,” what their version of the agreement meant was that they retained control of state customs. I sent a swift message back thanking them for their movement on this, but insisting that we still had to go further to meet the EU’s requirements. It was not the last time that an issue of great importance was nearly lost on a matter of translation. (Ashdown, 2007, p. 264)

Ashdown’s concerns with avoiding failures potentially introduced by translation had their roots in previous experiences in which his words were given unintended interpretations during public appearances. Having to speak in English to a Bosnian audience, he had his English remarks translated to Bosnian then retranslated to English. It was the second version of his remarks that he gave, those more likely to be translated with appropriate Bosnian terms.
The LOO construct continues to serve well as an aid in coordinating the many capabilities available to a coalition commander during a stability operation. The case of Australian Reconstruction Task Forces (RTFs) in the Afghan theater offers an example of how they might be employed in the field. RTFs are a combination of engineers, mounted infantry and other enablers [that] can deliver development in remote and hazardous areas. The RTF’s integral close protection troops allow engineers to employ soft-power in areas that only hard-power would dare to tread. . . . Australia’s ability to deliver development in non-permissive areas is valued by the locals and acknowledged as well-considered and meaningful assistance.74

Though they bring capabilities to regions where NGOs and IGOs otherwise fear to go, Australian leaders recognize that RTFs are not the ultimate solution to aid delivery or capability development. Just as the desired goal during COIN is reaching that point at which police can take over day-to-day responsibility for public safety from the armed forces, so do Australian commanders eventually seek to turn over the several LOOs addressed by their RTFs to indigenous security forces, government agencies, commercial contractors, or aid organizations. Measuring progress in each LOO allows leaders to gauge when such transitions are feasible and to plan for them so that responsibilities are not surrendered prematurely or, conversely, coalition forces do not wear out their welcome with a local population.

74 Frewen (2008, p. 31).
The Special Case of Intelligence

Intelligence operations have historically been particularly challenging during coalition operations. Driven by imagined or real dangers regarding compromise of sources, national intelligence organizations operate virtually autonomously, striving to maintain rigid control of products until they are delivered to those at top echelons. British Gen Sir Gerald Templer made coordinating intelligence a top priority during his Malayan COIN campaign in the aftermath of the Second World War. He understood that success was impossible as long as the military, police, and other sectors of government refused to cooperate in this regard.75 Napoleon Valeriano and Charles Bohannan, a Filipino and American intimately involved in efforts to defeat the Huk rebellion in the Philippines, reinforce the wisdom of Templer’s initiative:

The intelligence picture in the Philippines from 1946 to 1950 would have frightened any organization-minded intelligence officer. The Philippine Constabulary was charged with police action against the Huk and maintained its own intelligence organization. The Philippine Army, as the principal instrument of national defense, had its Military Intelligence Service (MIS), with branches for collecting intelligence about the enemy and for counterintelligence. The National Bureau of Investigation [NBI] (counterpart of the United States FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation]) felt that since the FBI was charged with investigation of U.S. Communists, the NBI should also have this same function in the Philippines, so it maintained its investigating branch. Since the center of Communist activities was in the capital, Manila, the Manila Police Department believed it had a primary interest in collecting intelligence about the Communists. Nearly a dozen other agencies, ranging from the special agents of the Office of the President to the Customs Secret Service, thought they had a proper role in the collection of intelligence about Communists, or the Huk, or both, and they too engaged in it. The overlapping was, of course, phenomenal; jealousy was rampant.76

Though the authors concluded that coordination between agencies was respectable despite the plethora of agencies, they unsurprisingly also noted, “Dissemination downward was poor. All agencies were eager to pass information up; they were reluctant to pass information down, especially if it meant going through an organization other than their own.”77

The consequences of overcaution in protecting intelligence include putting coalition-partner soldiers at mortal risk, a situation that has occurred repeatedly in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Pär Eriksson reveals that the consequences can also be counterintuitive:

The traditional view on UN peacekeeping operations is that they do not need an intelligence service that provides long-term predictions. . . . This kind of information service is hardly sufficient today. . . . The UN and other international organisations cannot afford to have less knowledge of the parties’ intentions and activities than the parties themselves. . . . At the very least, the peacekeeping organisation must not invite the use of bluffing tactics, and must also be able to prove responsibility and/or intent behind events. Fourthly, considering the great powers’ vast intelligence capacity, the parties may actually believe that the world

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76 Valeriano and Bohannan (1962, pp. 138–139).
77 Valeriano and Bohannan (1962, p. 139).
community knows more than it really does. For instance, a party might then interpret a lack of reaction to a massacre in progress as a carte blanche rather than just ignorance.  

A glance at participant comments during Reaction Royale, a Canadian interagency exercise held in the spring of 2007, reveals that problems remain when it comes to providing intelligence support to other coalition members:

- Participants seemed to fear that the other organizations were not completely open regarding objectives sought.
- Representatives found it difficult to satisfy themselves with respect to the credibility and reliability of intelligence received from other participating organizations.
- There was a concern regarding the extent of risk inherent in information sharing similar to concerns about the risk of not sharing.
- Differences in procedures and information needs meant that organizations had difficulties in extracting the desired level of situational awareness when input came from a dissimilar agency.
- Some information of operational value was not shared.
- One law-enforcement agency refused to share intelligence within its own organization, much less with other members.

Steps Toward Facilitating Wider Distribution of Intelligence Within a Coalition

Sharing intelligence in a SASO [stability and support operation] environment is so inherently complex that cold war policies and systems adversely affect the quality of intelligence. . . . The dynamic tension between the intelligence battlefield operating system providing actionable near–real-time intelligence to commanders for coalition synchronization and the requirement to protect national sources and methods is untenable in stability and support operations.

—Barrett K. Peavie, “Intelligence Sharing in Bosnia”

A way to deal with the challenge of fragmented intelligence efforts and inadequate sharing—albeit one beyond the scope of any one coalition—is through a quantum change in intelligence-handling procedures; replacing the current “need to know” as the primary filter for sharing with its obverse “need to share” is gaining support in some circles. Other solutions include development of reliable software that employs tear lines, boundaries that permit a given user to see material up to and including that for which he or she is cleared while otherwise blocking access. Additional alternatives also exist. The solution most often used in the field is allowing informal access to those with an operational need to know despite their not having the requisite clearances or permissions to see given material. The individual initiating the sharing does so at risk; generally, that person is in a position that facilitates an appropriate decision

78 Eriksson (1997; emphasis added).
81 For a further discussion of the need-to-share concept, see Glenn and Gayton (2008).
in light of the broad range of relevant circumstances and consequences. Often, the assumption of risk would be unnecessary were others more disciplined in applying classifications or handling restrictions. To paraphrase an oft-cited defense for such conservative decisions, “No one ever got in trouble for overly restricting access to intelligence, but many have suffered from being too liberal with release.” Such expediency leads to such situations as that cited by James Spencer:

> When people set up their computers for the release screen, they set up the default as NOFORN [not releasable to foreign nationals], and people who are lazy will not do the extra work of changing documents. I would like to see a policy such that computers do not allow NOFORN as a default.82

Coalition leaders should consider such defaults when developing policies within their AORs, the objective being to facilitate rather than deny access to information by those in need.

Encouragingly, one of the most dramatic U.S. policy adaptations in recent years has reportedly been a willingness to share intelligence more widely with coalition members (albeit members in the sense of the current doctrinal definition of coalition). A report on coalition experiences in Bosnia noted,

> U.S. actions taken in response to . . . initiatives to improve intelligence sharing and dissemination had a significant impact on the coalition community. NATO, IFOR, and even U.S. units and officials in theater reported that they saw a fundamental shift at the U.S. national level to support intelligence sharing with IFOR and NATO. The United States was seen as disclosing unprecedented amounts of operational intelligence from the U.S. national to the theater level. U.S. and IFOR members noticed the change and were impressed not only by the revised U.S. intelligence disclosure policies regarding operational intelligence, but by the rapid implementation of these policies.83

Another option for widening access is to ease the capabilities needed to downgrade, declassify, or selectively release sensitive materials. An international officer admired

> Americans we are dealing with [who] have officers who are specifically trained in the downgrading or declassification of intelligence. And it worked. You could take a bit of information to them and they could decide whether it could be downgraded and provided to the troops on the ground. Other nations did not have that.84

These individuals, called foreign disclosure officers (FDOs), are specially trained and subsequently authorized to declassify materials in the field. Steve White of the National Ground Intelligence Center proposed increasing the number of FDOs as a key to solving the problem of too little and too slow a release of intelligence to coalition partners.85 Steve Manning came to the same conclusion in his *Improved Intelligence Support to Our Coalition Partners at the*
Operational Level, recommending “an immediate increase of qualified personnel with corresponding skills to ensure that the downgrading of classified information is carried out in the most expeditious manner possible.”

Obviously, not all coalition partners will be treated equally when it comes to sharing sensitive material. Some will be effectively treated as compatriots. Others will receive only less sensitive products, the extent of release being influenced by previous relationships, the recipients’ ties to other parties in the region, and additional factors. There will be partners who share information only to the extent essential to minimize unnecessary exposure to danger. An NGO in which no one has a security clearance or one unwilling to have more than minimal contact with coalition security representatives might be asked to do nothing more than inform a HOC of where its personnel will be operating in the next 72 hours. HOC representatives could then review the material provided, in turn suggesting that NGO vehicles travel only on certain routes or avoid others without providing the reasons for the advice, much as did the units with which Edward Artis made contact. British establishment of tactical coordination groups (TCGs) in Northern Ireland provided a similar yet more broadly ranging management asset. Developed because police, military, and special operations personnel were, at times, stumbling over each other during missions—with potentially lethal consequences—TCGs consisted of highly trusted representatives from relevant organizations who ensured that their counterparts knew of their organizations’ pending activities. Procedures could then be worked out to minimize the risk of fratricide—e.g., via declaring a given area as off limits for patrolling by anyone other than members of a specific unit. Andrew Farquhar recalled the period when TCGs were being originated:

Basically, it was trying to get everybody who was collecting intelligence and everyone who was acting on that intelligence and put them in the same location . . . so everyone could act on the intelligence . . . and that’s how the TCG got started . . . They were all around the table and that’s how we worked. I would be lying to you if I told you it worked perfectly from the start. There were still meetings within a group in the back room where they shared everything with themselves and decided what they were going to share out there with everyone, but it was a 1,000 percent better than it was.

Adapting the TCG concept today would logically provide for its being staffed only by those with the requisite security clearances, but their warnings and guidance could be distributed to coalition partners or affiliates via the use of off-limits areas, closed routes, or other means passed through HOC and similar channels.

The closer the working relationship, the more comfortable coalition members are likely to become when sharing intelligence is the issue. Major General Farquhar felt that, under the right conditions, “you can, broadly speaking, trust coalition partners with virtually everything. You can keep something locked up for about 48 hours. We need to be a little more comfortable with taking risk in a coalition.” However, he concluded, “things are different when you start talking about working with the indigenous government, [though] you ultimately have to share intelligence with the host nation because the host nation is your exit strategy.”

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87 Farquhar (2008).
and other organizations fall into a similarly gray area. The danger of a blanket policy was evident in Afghanistan, where a stringer for a respected international news agency was found to be sympathetic to, if not a member of, the Taliban.\footnote{Cucolo (2008).} Yet, many are the cases both during ongoing and past campaigns in which classified or other sensitive information has successfully been entrusted to media personnel with the understanding that it was not to be released until as agreed by the provider.

**Making Technology a Facilitator Rather Than Divider**

The capability of technology to alter organizational relationships may be invaluable or dysfunctional based on the effect it has on the organism.

—General Charles Horner, comments on Expeditionary Force Experiment 98\footnote{C. Allen (2002, p. 31).}

It is well known that the technological advantages possessed by the United States can pose bewildering problems for the nation’s foes. That they also present difficulties within coalitions in which the United States is a participant is also common knowledge. The United States offers only what is perhaps the most extreme case when it comes to relative technological capabilities between partners in a coalition. Differences in technology, like those in training, level of professionalism, and financial resources, vary for every member of a coalition to a greater or lesser extent. All can challenge a coalition leader seeking effectiveness.

Leaders and staff assigning tasks to coalition members have to know the strengths and weaknesses of each coalition contingent. Urban bombing missions, for example, might be limited to those countries possessing precision munitions, the cost of civilian casualties during a stability operation due to a “dumb” bomb going astray being too high to risk. Other challenges will directly affect military members of a coalition on the ground—e.g., whether to share the most advanced technologies for neutralizing improvised explosive devices (IEDs), knowing that compromise of the capability would greatly aid those constructing the weapons.

**Hand in Glove Rather Than Oil and Water: Smoothing Coalition Transitions**

That UNTAET retained 70 percent of the forces assigned to INTERFET was a boon from the perspective of maintaining continuity at a sensitive time in early Timor-Leste history. Continuity in personnel also assists in maintaining consistency of message with the local government and population, essential to maintaining confidence as coalition and country progress toward the objective of an ultimate transition to successful indigenous rule. Transitions are both an opportunity to demonstrate to those concerned that a coalition will stay the course and a chance to introduce desired adjustments that might be otherwise politically inexpedient. They are, therefore, at once periods of danger, as less experienced personnel take over from others intimately familiar with the situations at hand, and occasions to improve the effectiveness of a coalition enterprise. Cosgrove’s precautions in suggesting a gradual rather than sudden and comprehensive handover were well considered, as was his moving several of his staff into the headquarters assuming responsibility. He surely recognized the potential difficulties inherent in a new commander and staff coming in with forces that have not previously operated in an area and who very likely know little of the tactics and procedures of those from whom they are
taking control. It is to his credit that the exchange of responsibilities did not result in a precipitous withdrawal, just as it is commendable that his successor agreed to Cosgrove remaining at hand even as responsibility for the military component became his own. Formal transfer of responsibility might have been instantaneous; transfer of commitment to the cause of East Timorese security was not.

**Plans: Architectural Guidance for a Coalition Structure**

Insurgency can only be successfully countered by a government programme in which the activities of the country’s security forces are closely tied into an overall campaign consisting of political, economic and psychological measures. . . . It is quite useless trying to coordinate a campaign at national level and then send instructions through different ministries to their representatives throughout the country and hope that a properly coordinated campaign will happen at local level.

—Frank Kitson, Directing Operations

I observed that we British unfortunately had no experience of American accounting procedures, and hence we were unfamiliar with the various regulations and acronyms to which [the U.S. administrator] had referred. Indeed, most of us had no experience with accounting procedures of any kind; therefore, it might prove difficult for us to conform to the Office of Management and Budget’s wishes. I hoped that, in view of the CPA [Coalition Provisional Authority] Administrator’s repeated exhortations to us to spend quickly, the Office might be lenient towards us if we failed to conform precisely to its rules. [However,] the response was uncompromising: no conformity, no money. . . . If we had a problem with that, then Baghdad would send us some American accountants to help us out. . . . But it was not just the new accounting regime which caused us frustration. Just as we started to get our heads around the new procedures, they would be changed again. We eventually managed to impress upon Baghdad that we simply could not realistically fulfill US accounting procedures with which our multinational team were completely unfamiliar.

—Hilary Synnott, Bad Days in Basra

Coalition success is not a miasma, a spirit drifting in the ether awaiting capture and bottling. It is an end the attainment of which follows carefully crafted actions that bring art and science together in the service of sought-after objectives. Well-advised plans that facilitate effective coalition structures and procedures support objective achievement. Plans that do not coordinate all parts of a coalition ensure rudderless meanderings buffeted by forces against which the collective enterprise can only react.

Agreement on the way ahead was a constant source of friction even for the big three leaders of the Second World War. It is therefore hardly surprising that Solana and Clark found constructing a plan for operations in Kosovo so difficult when the entirety of NATO and several other nations participated. Too often, coalitions undertaking stability operations cannot even agree on a common goal, much less detailed procedures for its attainment. The synergy

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91 Kitson (1989, p. 50).
that should be characteristic of every coalition is virtually impossible to achieve in the absence of such a plan; in the worst case, its parts may be working at cross-purposes, their combined efforts less than the sum of members’ individual capabilities.

LTG Ricardo Sanchez related that he never saw a U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) plan for postcombat operations during his time in 2003–2004 Iraq.\textsuperscript{93} Fortunately, there has been progress in this regard. Britain’s Col Alexander Alderson served on the MNF-I planning staff in 2008. He described the recent history of campaign-plan development from his perspective five years after the cessation of conventional combat in the country:

Its first appearance as a truly joint, interagency, multinational plan was April 07. The first military campaign plan writing started in April 04 . . . put in place by [GEN George W.] Casey . . . [GEN David H.] Petraeus introduced [such a plan,] which resulted in another revision of the campaign plan published in Dec 07 . . . But it was coalition specific. . . . Missing was a campaign plan that incorporated the Iraqi perspective as well. There were practical reasons at that point in the campaign such that it was [unfortunately] not practical to write a campaign plan with the Iraqis.\textsuperscript{94}

Sir Robert Thompson reminds us that the inability to form a comprehensive plan during stability operations is not a new phenomenon. Writing four decades ago, his observation applies no less to those desiring to synchronize efforts across LOOs today:

There was all through the period an unfortunate tendency to regard the war as being three wars—nation building, pacification and military operations. In so far as they were co-ordinated there was a further tendency for it to be thought that the nation building and pacification were secondary and important only in so far as they made it easier for the military to win the victory. It was never understood that nation building was the offensive constructive programme designed to strengthen the government’s assets and eliminate its weaknesses, while the military operations were defensive and destructive designed to hold the ring for the constructive programme, and, in so doing, to weaken the enemy’s military assets. The programme which linked these two together was pacification. . . .\textsuperscript{95}

Lacking a plan, there is an absence of central guidance. Activities within each LOO remain uncoordinated with those in others. Key direction—such as that regarding policy with respect to the KLA once coalition forces entered Kosovo—fails to appear, as there is no planning process to provide for identification of the need. The result is akin to creating a town with the building of schools, paving of roads, and design of housing estates each being done in ignorance of the other activities. The end result fails to meet the needs of people who live there. Civil-military projects “go their own way” under such conditions, as do those of NGOs and IGOs unaware of coalition actions or those of each other. During operations in the Balkans, “national interests, such as the German desire to resettle Kosovar refugees from Germany, took precedence over strategic considerations. Furthermore, the lead agency, UNHCR, was not closely involved in planning, while most other humanitarian organizations were left out

\textsuperscript{94} Alderson (2008).
\textsuperscript{95} Thompson (1969, p. 149).
entirely.” The same later occurred in Afghanistan when “the Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense agreed on the execution of seven projects. However, most projects were not embedded in larger civil programs (e.g., National Priority Programs) and did not contain clear objectives,” leading to wasted resources.

British Army Maj Gen Paul Newton understood that considering the issue from the perspectives of other, nonmilitary coalition members helps to explain why some organizations are unwilling to coordinate:

Militaries do lots of planning, and it bemuses and bewilders many of the other players. As I see it this is mainly because of our obsession with this curious taxonomy, in a world of our own, where we talk about “supporting effects” and “end states”—it just isn’t how these other organizations function. Even within the U.S., trying to get the people in the State Department to use military based campaign planning tools is problematic with no shared doctrine on which to base the discussion. . . . Even the word campaign is a military term packed full of implied meaning that others may not get.

Newton is correct. His observation causes us to question seemingly fundamental assumptions: that the military approach to planning be adopted regardless of the type of operation and that armed-forces staff lead the process. Interestingly, it was a comment from a war game sponsored by the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) that questioned this:

For a population-oriented campaign, USAID’s planning approach may have more value than the military decision-making process. The USAID approach encourages planning from the host country’s perspective, not the U.S. perspective, and with a longer timeframe than traditional military planning timelines (i.e. years, not months).

Whether military led or otherwise, the desirability of planning-process participation by all relevant members is virtually unquestionable. Broad participation guards against an end product with too narrow a scope. Just as the UNTAET governance and public-administration representatives were accused of remaining too centered on concerns regarding Dili, General Sanchez noted, the CPA “was almost completely focused on Baghdad, to the point where it did not understand the dynamics of the rest of the country.” Ambassador Synnott, based in Al Basrah, had similar concerns regarding the CPA’s overfocus on Baghdad. “There may be good reason for limiting initial operations to a nation’s capital. Broad participation during planning ensures that such a decision is a conscious choice, one that withstands serious questioning prior to acceptance.

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96 Mockaitis (2004, p. 27).
98 Newton (2008a).
Planning to Succeed

Structural engineers increasingly recognize the need not only to build their end product to meet stated specifications but also to ensure that, if failure occurs, it is not of a catastrophic character. A bridge may be built to carry traffic weighing thousands of tons, thereby meeting the overt specification for load capacity. It should also incorporate design features such that the span does not entirely collapse if failure occurs at any one or two points. The wise coalition leader will approach planning for stability operations similarly.

Simplicity remains as a U.S. principle of war. As coalitions naturally tend to push operations toward the complex end of the operational spectrum, any counters to that trend have potential benefit. Writing on multinational stability operations, Eric Price went so far as to conclude, “Unity of purpose in multinational operations is derived largely from simplicity—that is, plans must be developed with the training, doctrine, equipment, and culture of the coalition contingents in mind.”102 The CPA’s insistence on enforcing overly complicated regulations regarding fund release—and the frequent changing of such requirements—was in blatant violation of this principle.103 Unfortunately, the problem did not stop there. Synnott recalled, the industrious CPA bureaucracy in Baghdad had busied themselves in drawing up a plethora of Orders, Regulations, Memoranda and Public Notices. Once approved, they were dispatched to the Regional offices. . . . But only rarely were they translated into Arabic. Each region therefore had to arrange for its own translation, which inevitably differed. Many of these instructions were fiercely contested by Iraqis. Having no explanation of their rationale, we could do little to deal with objections. Most of them therefore were just ignored. In December, I informed Baghdad that, since our efforts had become destructive, we would cease to circulate any untranslated and unexplained directives. I had no response, no doubt because there was no available answer. But the directives kept coming.104

Synnott, to his credit, nonetheless advised future coalition members, “[M]ost important, however, is that everyone conforms to the procedures which are laid down, even if you do not necessarily agree with them,” thereby doing his part to lubricate rather than further complicate CPA operations.105

A well-considered plan is an architectural drawing that guides the actions of each part of a coalition and how those many parts should operate as part of an effective system. Whether it is coordinating aspects of a particularly adept, engineering-oriented NGO’s oversight of road construction or assigning a military unit from a risk-averse nation to guarding sites distant from likely combat, it is in the planning stage that compromises are made at the least cost and cooperation has its start. A well-constructed plan that incorporates the participation of all significant coalition members means that members will know what resources they are expected to contribute, when they are to arrive in theater, and how they will be employed. Yet, coalition leaders must not become enamored with the planning process itself; the plan is, after all, merely a mechanism in the service of coordination.

104Synnott (2008, p. 239).
Concluding Remarks

To conclude, the structural considerations that a coalition leader must contemplate during stability operations can be succinctly summed up with an observation made by five of NATO’s once most senior leaders: “That a coalition is ad hoc by definition need not mean its operations are ad hoc.”106

The loose or nonexistent affiliations between coalitions and NGOs, IGOs, commercial entities, and indigenous representatives are insufficient for the demands of today’s stability operations. Revising what is meant by coalition and seeking to more formally involve these other vital elements in every aspect of a coalition’s operations serves the interests of all parties and the collective whole. Doing so will introduce new challenges, but they, by and large, will be ones requiring adaptation of current procedures rather than solutions created from scratch. Ad hoc need not mean unprepared.

106Naumann et al. (2007, p. 131).
That you have to have all agencies integrated at all levels still holds good to me. . . . If you don’t have that in the more complex, faster paced operations of today, we are always going to be operating with one arm tied behind our back.

—Maj Gen Andrew P. Farquhar, British Army

When General Templer said to his coalition, “We’re all going to focus on that. Turn right. These are my priorities,” the whole institution turned right. When I as a coalition commander said that in Kabul, a large number might say, “Who are you to tell me anything?”

—Gen David Richards, British Army

Today’s coalition commander actually commands very little.

—Lt Gen Sir John Kiszely, “Coalition Command in Contemporary Operations”

Why Unity of Command?

The single most difficult principle to gain in combined warfare. . . . Relinquishing national command and control of force is an act of trust and confidence that is unequaled in relations between nations. In a coalition it is achieved by constructing command arrangements and task-organizing forces to ensure that responsibilities match contributions and efforts. . . . It is cardinal that compromises not be permitted to outweigh warfighting requirements.

—James A. Winnefeld and Dana J. Johnson, “Unity of Control: Joint Air Operations in the Gulf”

Unity of command, another of the U.S. Army’s principles of war, is an ideal seldom met aside from when a single country’s armed forces conduct operations together (and, even in those cases, service parochialism or personalities may impinge on the ideal). Its achievement becomes

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1 Farquhar (2008).
2 Richards (2008).
3 Kiszely (2008b, p. 15).
4 Winnefeld and Johnson (1993, p. 67).
increasingly difficult as the number and type of participants increases. Little wonder that it existed neither in East Timor nor in Bosnia and Herzegovina nor in Kosovo. It also does not exist in Iraq or Afghanistan. National and other organizational interests take precedence over the benefits that alliance or coalition members would accrue were they to agree to unity of command. Those benefits could include the orchestration of plans and activities in the interest of increased collective effectiveness, improved allocation of scarce resources, more-responsive personnel and logistics systems, and greater responsiveness to changing conditions. Lack of unity of command is often accompanied by delays in decisionmaking and—in the worst cases—operational paralysis. Rome burned while Nero fiddled; thousands in the Balkans died as the United Nations and NATO dithered.

The recommendation to expand the notion of coalition is obviously in tension with the desire to achieve unity of command: Having more members makes unity of command tougher to achieve. It therefore behooves us to consider how a coalition can, at least in part, reap the benefits of unity of command even as increasing its membership works in opposition.

Fortunately, there are mechanisms that push a coalition toward supporting some measure of unity of command even as other forces work to opposite effect. We understand that no organization joins (or affiliates itself with) a coalition unless it believes that it has something to gain by doing so. The key for a coalition leader will be convincing members that sacrificing some control will reinforce the benefits of membership to a greater extent than it detracts from them. Though unqualified commitment to unity of command is unlikely, partial agreement is within the realm of the possible. Unity of command therefore becomes a matter of degree rather than an absolute of existence or nonexistence. The wise leader will adjust his or her expectations accordingly.

Unity of command can be thought of as encompassing the components of unity of effort and unity of message. Understanding that individual organizational interests will deny unity of command, a leader can nonetheless enhance the effectiveness of a coalition by achieving cooperation with respect to working toward similar ends (effort) and seeking through media and action to communicate a uniform coalition message. Maximizing success in this regard reduces the extent to which coalition members work at cross-purposes and promotes mutual cooperation.

History offers several lessons regarding how a coalition leader can better approximate unity of command.

**Historical Solutions Addressing Unity of Command**

Cohesion here is the key. Success can come only from a joined-up, cross-agency approach which extends from the bottom to the top, is holistic in its application, international in character and views the continuum of peacemaking as a “seamless garment” stretching from prevention right through to the final exit of the interveners.

—*Paddy Ashdown*, Swords and Ploughshares

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Selecting the Right Individual: The Role of Personality

You will pick the targets you want to strike. You will keep me informed, and I would like to know if the targets will be in Belgrade. If there are difficulties, I will tell you, but I will support you, and you will pick the targets. You will take your responsibility and you will accept the consequences. Do you understand?

—Javier Solana to GEN Wesley Clark, March 31, 1999

You will be better served by progressively devolving authority and acting more like a guide than a god.

—Molly Phee, senior Coalition Provisional Authority representative to Maysan province, Iraq

The 1999–2000 period in which the responsibilities of UNTAET and INTERFET overlapped left neither Sergio Vieira de Mello nor Peter Cosgrove fully in charge of operations in East Timor. Fortunately, theirs was a relationship characterized by cooperation rather than competition, a credit to both men and perhaps more of a boon to the people of East Timor than it might, at first glance, appear. While it may seem that their responsibilities were separate rather than coincident, a more careful look demonstrates otherwise. Security is a function of police activities (the responsibility for which was Vieira de Mello’s), armed-forces operations (Cosgrove), intelligence (both), functioning infrastructure (both), peaceful coexistence of rival factions (both), effective governance (primarily Vieira de Mello’s), and many other factors. Successes during the period of overlap and the relatively smooth transition in passing the functions of INTERFET to UNTAET in early 2000 were due to both men’s commitment to the task at hand in lieu of personal aggrandizement of personal power and status. Wesley Clark benefited from a similarly cooperative relationship with Javier Solana during operations in the Balkans.

Such cooperation is not inevitable. Lesser compatibility plagued relations between UN special envoy to Iraq Lakhdar Brahimi and U.S. ambassador Paul Bremer who headed the CPA in Iraq, diminishing cooperation that potentially would have benefited both organizations’ agendas and the people of that nation in 2003–2004. The relationship between Ambassador Bremer and LTG Ricardo Sanchez in 2003 Iraq further demonstrated that such compatibility is by no means to be taken for granted. (That ambassador Ryan Crocker and GEN David Petraeus were later a much closer team in Baghdad is frequently cited as one of the reasons that the MNF-I coalition had such success in 2007 and 2008.) We saw earlier that air operations over Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1993–1995 also suffered from a lack of unified command. Targets identified during Operation Deny Flight could be struck only if both NATO and UN representatives approved them. This dual-key approach to targeting hindered operations and,

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7 Phee (undated).
8 Sanchez and Phillips (2008, p. 320). Though Brahimi and Bremer may not have seen eye-to-eye on a number of issues, they nonetheless did cooperate in at least one key instance. Brahimi desired that the interim Iraqi government be led by technocrats without binding ties to a given political party. Bremer, who ultimately had approval authority over appointments to the government, overcame considerable resistance from indigenous interest groups to appoint the secular Shi’a politician Ayad Allawi to the position of prime minister (Wright and Reese, 2008, p. 41).
in many cases, precluded effective action altogether, at times putting coalition personnel on the
ground at mortal risk.\footnote{9 Ucko et al. (2007, p. 166).}

The role of personality is no less important at lower echelons. The point is so obvious that
extended discussion is unnecessary, yet not so widely recognized that it can be left without
mention. Selection of leaders whose responsibilities are likely to entail extensive interactions
with those from outside their own military should include consideration of the social skills pert-
tinent to success in those environments. Long-told tales of George Patton’s missteps regarding
allies and Bernard Montgomery’s abrasive interactions with those from other nations would
make any student of World War II history scoff at the suggestion that either should have been
chosen to command operations in Eisenhower’s stead, even given the common objective of
defeating Nazi Germany. That a leader’s deft touch will be even more important when the
 glue holding a coalition together is less strong—as will tend to be the case during stability
operations—is a given. Tactical acumen, success in the Pentagon, and even popularity with
one’s troops (a notable characteristic of Montgomery’s) are insufficient qualifications for alli-
ce or coalition leadership. The friction in 2003 Baghdad and previously cited disagreements
in southern Afghanistan suggest that it has yet to be given sufficient weight during the selec-
tion of both military and civilian leaders.

**Building for Success: The Impact of Structure on Unity of Command**

The problem of coordination within any but very small organizations is always one of the
most difficult to solve. Once solved, the problem of permitting innovation within the exist-
ing bureaucratic structures must be tackled, particularly in fast-moving situations like an
insurgency.

> —George K. Tanham, Trial in Thailand\footnote{10 Tanham (1974, p. 129).}

Units of section size—roughly nine soldiers—would come back to rest and recuperate for
two days, then receive training at the [unit] school before going back into the field. This
addressed internal issues, but my officers were coming to me and saying, “Don’t let the
Special Forces come into the Oecussi enclave. They are not using our procedures. They are
compromising our operations by not coordinating their actions with us. All their coordina-
tion is done at higher levels.”

> —LTCOL Peter Singh, commander, Third Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment\footnote{11 Paraphrased from Singh (2003).}

Lead nation, such as we saw in East Timor with INTERFET in its earlier weeks, is one of
several possible structures available when forming a coalition. (*Lead organization*, a term not
combinantly seen, would de facto describe the equivalent in the Balkans when NATO headed
operations in Kosovo, that despite not all members in the coalition agreeing to subordinate
their forces to the alliance. Given our expanded definition of *coalition*, it could also include
leadership by other than an alliance—e.g., the United Nations.) Two alternatives are parallel
command (involving a sharing of leadership akin to that by Cosgrove and Vieira de Mello
in East Timor after the latter’s arrival) and a hybrid solution (in which there are separate
blocks of states cooperating in a joint venture). An example of the hybrid construct is that used during the 1991 Gulf War. U.S. GEN Norman Schwarzkopf led non–Arab-country contingents while regional forces fell under the command of Saudi Arabia’s Lieutenant General Khalid bin Sultan. The potential dangers in these two latter alternatives are obvious. They could include inconsistent guidance, failure to coordinate available resources, and working at cross-purposes, albeit hopefully to a lesser extent than were there no synchronization of efforts at all. There are steps that can be taken to reduce the risks. Creation of a coalition coordination, communication, and integration center (C3IC) to support operations during the 1991 Gulf War helped to orchestrate the efforts of the 25 national contingents under Khalid and 12 under U.S. GEN Norman Schwarzkopf. Assigning those contingents separate geographical areas of operation and agreeing to missions in keeping with member nations’ expectations further mitigated confusion.

The French provide a fourth alternative coalition structure, believing that there may be instances in which there will be created a “group of Lead Nations”—this is certainly possible if one nation has the strategic lead, one has the operational lead, and one the tactical lead, for example. Another instance would be a “division of labor” among nations at any or all of the levels to take advantage of some special efficiency or capability.

The suggestions are particularly interesting in light of stability operations given the very real possibility that a nonmilitary organization could be in charge of activities within a given LOO—e.g., humanitarian assistance or government capacity building.

The French proposals need not inherently undermine efforts to approximate unity of command. Within their construct, a member could be a lead party in one area of specialization even while another is lead nation or lead organization overall. We saw an interagency version of this situation in the Solomon Islands during which the ten participating countries agreed that Australia was the lead nation for the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). Within the coalition, however, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) had the lead at the operational and strategic levels, while the country’s federal police were in charge at the tactical level. The key was that the DFAT representative, Nick Warner, was unequivocally in charge overall despite the division of responsibilities.

We recall the problems experienced by General Clark when dealing with his own government. Though a coalition leader might be able to do little to mitigate the infighting between agencies in his or her capital, with responsibility may come the opportunity to influence the extent of unity of command accomplished within the coalition:

In Vietnam in 1967, [Robert] Komer’s early attempts to create a single civil-military chain of command for the entire pacification effort was met with a great deal of suspicion and resentment by many on both sides. However, one of his biggest assets proved to be the unwavering backing of [GEN William] Westmoreland himself. Despite having been one of the greatest proponents of the more aggressive search and destroy approach, Westmoreland now [threw] himself totally behind Komer’s efforts and publicly supported him. Almost

uniquely, Westmoreland in effect made Komer, a civilian, a component commander in his own right and delegated to him full authority to act as his deputy in the pacification area.\textsuperscript{15}

Centralize Coordination, Decentralize Cooperation

Mike Jackson’s bristling at Wesley Clark’s use of “the long screwdriver” encourages a coalition leader to consider the capabilities and expectations of those serving in subordinate positions. Despite doctrine that advises otherwise, U.S. commanders tend to involve themselves with the details of subordinates’ operations more than is the case in other professional officer corps. British military doctrine encourages a “philosophy of command that promotes unity of effort, the duty and authority to act, and initiative to subordinate commanders.”\textsuperscript{16} British leaders lend especial weight to the last element, their doctrine going on to note “this approach requires a style of command that promotes decentralized command, freedom and speed of action and initiative, but which is responsive to superior direction when a subordinate overreaches himself.”\textsuperscript{17} Perhaps unaware of this latter clause, Clark’s retention of execution authority and involvement with details seemingly below his grade could have been perceived as a lack of confidence in his British coalition leaders during operations in Kosovo. Overcentralization does more than merely frustrate; it can actively work against accomplishment of coalition objectives and, ultimately, precipitate failure. There is a need to allow those dispersed throughout a theater of operations the freedom to capitalize on their local expertise and incorporate insights available only from residents familiar with conditions there. There is need to find a happy medium, one in which leaders provide centralized guidance sufficient to abet consistency across the area spanned by a coalition while not unduly impinging on the initiative of those better able to serve its interests in their particular AORs (whether those areas are geographic or functional).

Gen Sir Gerald Templer was the central point of all authority and responsibility in Malaya after his arrival in 1952. He quickly recognized his predecessor Gen Sir Harold Briggs’ wisdom and relied on Briggs’ already-established structure for joining individual expertise and facilitating coordination. Briggs had established a collective hierarchy headed by the Federal War Council (FWC, the ruling council at Malaya’s highest echelon). All subordinate committees emulated the joining of political, military, and police representatives as found in the FWC. The organization was an act of genius, as was Templer’s realization to leave well enough alone and take advantage of what was already in place. It gave him a mechanism for transmitting his centralized guidance to each echelon (the various interagency committees) while allowing local jurisdictions to shape their actions to both policies from higher and regional conditions. Figure 4.1 shows the structure that facilitated this. The FWC dealt with similarly formed state war-executive committees (SWECs) that, in turn, reached down to like-constructed district war-executive committees (DWECs). Each such organization could include local-population and other governmental representatives in addition to those from the military, police, and political arms. Each also included its own joint operations room staffed by police, army, navy, and air representatives who linked intelligence and field operations; it was they who were responsible for receiving, analyzing, and distributing the former and

\textsuperscript{15} Westerman (2008a, p. 18).

\textsuperscript{16} Chuka (2008, p. 4).

\textsuperscript{17} Chuka (2008, p. 4; emphasis added).
coordinating the latter.\footnote{Ladwig (2007, p. 62).} At the macro level, Templer’s intelligence, security, and information assets reported to one individual, his deputy director for operations, further facilitating unity of message and effort across these very diverse disciplines and throughout Malaya’s geographic regions.

Templer realized that relying on a structure alone was insufficient. People would either cooperate to make the system work or be the cause of its failure given even the best of organizational configurations. He therefore ensured that those who would have to coordinate their actions were in close proximity. Collocation became the standard. Templer directed the construction of intelligence-directorate buildings next to those for police headquarters. The deputy director for operations and combined planning staff also occupied the building, and the offices for the special branch (whose sensitive work required that they be in a separate structure) was close by.\footnote{Cloake (1985, p. 251).} Templer applied the same philosophy to all echelons, to the SWECs and DWECs as well as his main headquarters. And there was yet further guidance. Members of all SWECs and DWECs were to meet every day, not formally, necessarily, but at least over a drink, to discuss the day’s events (which offers a worthy argument for tempering the number of hours spent
on duty in many coalition theaters today). Intelligence sections for military units were mixed with police staff in operations rooms at these lower echelons.

All three of these actions—(1) joining the civil, military, and police organizationally; (2) collocating them physically; and (3) demanding that key members meet at least once daily—were parts of an important whole. They were together parts of an effective system, one that would have been less valuable or even inoperable without all three elements. Subsequent efforts trying to emulate the success of the British in Malaya often included only one or two of the trio, which might help to explain why that success has been so hard to replicate. Bolstering intelligence capabilities in early 1970s Northern Ireland failed to achieve full potential, at least in part as a result of not providing centralized guidance and the degree of oversight achieved via the director of operations in Malaya. Further, whereas Templer demanded cooperation, relations between the military and police (the Royal Ulster Constabulary, or RUC) in Northern Ireland were often strained. Further, committees at lower echelons lacked civilian representatives from the political side.

Lastly, efforts to defeat the insurgency in Northern Ireland suffered from a mistake repeated with surprising frequency in other civil-military operations, including early Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), that of failing to ensure that military units drew their tactical boundaries to coincide with those administrative demarcations used by local police or other civil jurisdictions. It is one less likely to be made if the various parties are brought together early in the coalition planning and exercise process.

The separation that routinely exists between regular and special operations forces (SOFs) is a seam that has proven similarly hard to close. That is true both for operations within a given country’s armed forces and in broader coalition environments. The cooperation of the two is essential to maintaining consistency of message with local populations. Yet, here too, the extent of that cooperation in Iraq and Afghanistan frequently remains a matter of the personalities involved. (Though the details will not be provided here, differences between SOF and regular units have regularly been a source of friction in southern Afghanistan for several years.) A similar problem plagued operations in Malaya, this despite Templer’s efforts to unify operations. He addressed it by employing a technique still found in use nearly three score decades later—that of designating no-go areas, such as those mentioned previously in conjunction with TCG control measures. While this technique offered a solution to a tactical problem, however, it did not address the larger issue of mutual understanding and cooperation:

Special branch on occasion would declare an area “frozen,” which meant that operations could not be conducted in it for a stated time. Such an order, which was disseminated by the appropriate war executive committee, would be binding on both police and army. The purpose was to allow Special Branch agents to move freely. . . . The fact that the avowed primary aim of operations in Malaya was to further the penetration of the guerrilla movement by Special Branch created certain difficulties in the relations between Special Branch and the military, the more so as Special Branch did not always feel free to confide in the military, whatever its relations may have been with other parts of the police organization. One officer recalled that Special Branch had been a problem to him as a battalion com-

21 Sunderland (1964, p. 29).
mander by repeatedly having him carry out futile operations as covers for their cherished projects. This caused a lack of faith in Special Branch among the military for which there was no compensation in any results of which he was aware. 24

Similar to the challenge in Malaya, it is less tactical coordination than interference with regular-unit hearts-and-minds campaigns that has spawned friction in Afghanistan. SOF operations to strike or capture high-value targets (HVTs), for example, can undo weeks or months of cultivating local goodwill if they are not coordinated with the unit responsible for the area of operations or if the results cause what is perceived as unnecessary death, injury, or damage. (This is especially true if no compensation or effort to repair the destruction is made. Preliminary coordination carries with it the added benefit of allowing the regular-force organization to prepare the materials and personnel necessary to address such situations in a timely fashion after a SOF operation.) Other operations—e.g., aerial bombardment—can have like effects.

The regular-SOF divide was a concern in Cosgrove’s East Timor much as it was in Templer’s Malaya. Mark Evans, ground-force commander for INTERFET in East Timor, recalled,

> I think that there is a disinclination by the special forces; they want to be controlled at the highest levels. SF was controlled at INTERFET. I was the ground-force commander, and I was aware that there were SF operations in my areas going on that I wasn’t aware of. These weren’t our special forces, but they belonged to our SF. I was worried about blue-on-blue. 25

Evans believed, when “you’re commander of an area, that you should own everything that’s in that area, or have some kind of command relationship with everything that’s in your area.” 26

Similar to Malaya, where Templer gave the special branch precedence for the compilation and analysis of intelligence, it was the RUC rather than the military that was responsible for the oversight of the TCGs in Northern Ireland. 27 Over time, TCG responsibilities expanded to include additional tasks similar to those that were routinely part of daily committee operations in Malaya. 28 There have been some efforts in other theaters to improve regular force–SOF coordination and thereby to also increase the efficacy of operations as a whole through replication of the TCGs. These organizations have had a more limited charter than Templer’s SWECs or DWECs, however, focusing primarily on the coordination of tactical combat operations involving police, SOFs, and regular military units.

Templer’s wide-ranging efforts to improve cooperation and coordination were generally effective in serving to pass guidance downward and ensure that political, police, and military authorities were both informed of his policies and able to collectively adapt them to local conditions. Unity of effort and message therefore accompanied unity of command. This centralization of guidance was not allowed to overly constrain the demonstration of initiative at lower

24 Sunderland (1964, pp. 52–54).
25 Evans (2003). Blue on blue is another term for fratricide, or casualties caused by forces on one’s own side.
27 OFT and MOD (2007, p. 49).
28 OFT and MOD (2007, p. 49).
echelons, however. Individual DWECs adapted guidance from seniors to meet the demands of their sections, thereby fitting into a system that, by and large, managed to linger around the right balance point between centralization and local innovation.

**Carts and Horses: The Relationship with the Host Nation**

John Frewen noted on return from service in Afghanistan that establishing “a democratic government before the insurgency is defeated . . . sets a weak platform for robust and unequivocal action against those defying the new government or operating outside the law.”29 The political and diplomatic reasons for moving quickly toward such a transition of authority are numerous. Yet, Colonel Frewen’s observation encourages coalition leaders to contemplate whether such a decision is wise when neither those who will govern nor the population that will vote for them are yet sufficiently prepared. The consequences of too hasty a surrender of authority—whether at national or local levels—include coalition loss of control vital to long-term success. The coalition may lose the ability to control military operations or make political decisions that would, in the longer run, both work to the indigenous nation’s benefit and hasten the ultimate withdrawal of coalition assets. Competing against a more deliberate transition is impatience on the part of those who would desire to have power in their own hands as quickly as possible and coalition-nation domestic pressures to bring their men and women home.

One potential element in a solution may be a gradual and piecemeal transition of responsibility, authority, and sovereignty to indigenous representatives. Local governments can assume control as they prove themselves ready, even while further preparation takes place at a national level. Similarly, departments or sections of departments within a government at any given level can take charge even as others still in training remain under coalition control. Ultimately, the decision of whether a coalition departs can be left to the indigenous government, as is the case in Iraq. While risking a premature exit, it benefits from the decision being in the hands of those who must assume the full burden of governing once their partners in transition depart.

**Recognize Opportunity in Informal Contacts**

It is possible (though not often wise) to conclude that it is inappropriate to have contact with the elected representatives of a foreign country or entity—as, for instance, many Western countries have decided in the case of Hamas in Palestine. . . . But as Britain discovered with Sinn Fein in Northern Ireland and the Coalition are rediscovering in Iraq, if a group is supported by a substantial swathe of public opinion, particularly if they have been elected, then in the end they must be heard and, if possible, incorporated into the solution, if they are not to become an even more intractable part of the problem.

—*Paddy Ashdown, Swords and Ploughshares*30

The process of political bargaining goes on in every society during such conflicts. The goal in Afghanistan must be to separate, as often as possible, the global jihadist from the accidental guerrilla. In America, this has turned into a somewhat ideological debate about “talking to the Taliban.” Critics rage that this would be doing business with evil people. But in a country like Afghanistan—one of the poorest in the world—politics is often less

about ideology and more about a share of the spoils. While some members of the Taliban are hard-core Islamic extremists, others are concerned with gaining a measure of local power.

—Fareed Zakaria, “A Turnaround Strategy”

The ad hoc character of a coalition provides its leaders with opportunities that might be unavailable were only a single nation or an alliance involved instead. The public quarrels between the U.S. Departments of Defense and State during operations in Kosovo notwithstanding, national governments are expected to present a uniform front. Alliances can tolerate greater ambiguity given their multinational character, but the formality of the ties that bind members means that differences tend to be ones of nuance. The technological superiority and obviously “more equal among equals” status of the United States in NATO freed NATO from the degree of approval the alliance might otherwise have received due to unilateral U.S. bombing of targets in Serbia (on which more in Chapter Five). It is widely recognized that the seams binding members of a coalition are looser. Therein can lie opportunity for the coalition commander.

The controversial issue of communicating with the enemy provides ample material for discussion in this regard. History reflects that opposition leaders during insurgencies have repeatedly emerged in the aftermath of conflict to assume the reins as heads of state. Jomo Kenyatta and Georgios Grivas are two such cases. Incorporation of resistance groups into a country’s legitimate government can serve as a significant step toward mending the divides that underlie an insurgency. Yet, member-nation formal policies or the weakness of the indigenous government that a coalition supports may make it infeasible for coalition leaders to participate in formal negotiations with rivals. Whereas unilateral action can, in some cases, undermine the cohesion of the whole, seemingly independent actions by a coalition member may provide a channel for interactions that do not appear to implicate the collective membership. That could be the case especially if the coalition member or affiliate making the approach is an IGO or NGO whose charter supports such action and whose ties to a coalition constitute no more than a loose affiliation. Unity of effort and message suffer minimal degradation.

Two British diplomats expelled from Afghanistan in late 2007 provide a case in point. Both were regional experts familiar with the political and social conditions at hand. Their objective was to “turn” a senior Taliban commander. . . . They held secret meetings with Mansoor Dadullah—a thorn in the side of British military in Helmand province—to try to persuade him to break with the Taliban and form his own political party and militia, according to Afghan government sources. If they had succeeded it would have been a coup for the western allies shoring up the government of Hamid Karzai in Kabul. Instead, Mervyn Patterson, a high-ranking UN official, and Michael Semple, the acting head of the EU mission to Afghanistan, were expelled after an Afghan national “confessed” to Afghan intelligence that he had accompanied the two to a secret meeting with Dadullah [Akhund, the Taliban’s senior military commander until his death in 2007] in Musa Qala.”

This points to the risks involved and potential cautions that a coalition leader ought to consider. There is no evidence that the actions of the two British envoys was anything but a

31 Zakaria (2009).
unilateral initiative. Despite the loss of two valuable experts and some embarrassment borne by their government, it is possible that the initiative was not without benefits if it had the effect of opening the Afghan government in Kabul to the idea of bringing selected Taliban elements into the fold, led to cultivation of ties with more-moderate Taliban elements, or acted in keeping with Sun-tzu’s observation cited at the opening of this book: “the highest realization of warfare is to attack the enemy’s plans; next is to attack [its] alliances.”33 A coalition representative doing so with the implicit understanding of the host-nation leadership offers the indigenous government a conduit for negotiation without formally granting recognition to insurgent leaders (which could potentially undermine the sitting government’s legitimacy and strengthen the opposition’s claims to power). As Colonel Frewen explained:

Attempts by Taliban-affiliated militias to “join” the government ranks and by senior Taliban leaders to enter legitimate political processes such as “peace jirgas” (Afghan councils) are an indication that the Taliban are losing faith in their ability to seize power by force. Among Coalition forces these moves are a cause for some optimism. The broader question of whether the Taliban should be engaged in dialogue and reintegrated as yet finds no consensus. It is likely to be a topic of debate in 2008 among Coalition nations, and inside the Afghan government.34

Concluding Thoughts on Unity of Command

In parallel, and in the light of experience gained in Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Iraq, it became evident that coherence could only be achieved if strategic processes, planning and objectives were harmonized across all instruments and agencies . . . the Comprehensive Approach (CA).

—“The Comprehensive Approach,” Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre35

By far the best solution is to have a single unified command structure, preferably under civilian command. In Bosnia, the Dayton Peace Agreement created a double-headed monster with a NATO general responsible for the implementation of the military aspects, and the High Representative responsible for the civilian aspects of the Agreement. This caused considerable problems from the earliest days of the international intervention in that country. Before I arrived in Bosnia there was barely disguised hostility between NATO and the Office of the High Representative.

—Paddy Ashdown, Swords and Ploughshares36

Any individual—military or otherwise—who believes him- or herself able to control the behaviors of all members of a coalition is delusional. Even achieving basic coordination can prove a daunting task, one that will be harder still if a coalition makes the effort to bring all vital play-

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33 Sun-tzu (1994, p. 177).
34 Frewen (2008, p. 27).
ers into the fold, thereby increasing the number of members or affiliates. Having commanded in Sierra Leone under conditions that allowed him to dictate most aspects of coalition policy, Gen David Richards arrived in Afghanistan to find that

there was no mechanism for a joined-up coalition in the widest sense—government, Afghanistan . . . NATO, the ambassadors—there was no mechanism for bringing us all together to resolve urgent issues, let alone develop a long-term campaign plan. . . . The trick of the coalition commander is to make sure that those worthwhile individual efforts aren’t Balkanizing your campaign. And so you needed a concept that brought them together. . . . We came up with something called the Afghan development zone concept, or the ADZ, which was essentially combining our efforts across the coalition, not just military . . . which allowed them to understand the requirement to concentrate activity synergistically.37

Canadian MGen David Fraser similarly found his expectations as a coalition commander challenged on arrival in Afghanistan. He had put together a campaign plan for his multinational brigade in southern Afghanistan, initially believing that

it was going to be a prescriptive document. The reality was, it became an intent document. . . . I thought by having everybody to sign up onto the plan, that I could get away from intent and become more prescriptive. . . . I deceived myself, probably, by listening to nations saying, “Yes, we agree to it.”38

General Richards created a structure to assist in melding the capabilities necessary to coalition success. General Fraser found himself in possession of a well-established military structure but nevertheless having to compromise in a manner quite different from that of a military commander leading only forces from his or her own services. The comments by General Richards and those of General Fraser reflect recognition that unity of command is indeed measured in degrees rather than absolutes. That is just as likely to be true at echelons below those of general officer. Fraser’s logistics officer, LCol John Conrad, discovered,

there are some nations that want to pool all logistics assets into a centralized potluck. We [the Canadian element] resist that. NATO wants a big pile; we try to keep it small. For financial reasons, we want it that way. And, tactically, I’d be uncomfortable with it otherwise.39

Even while the Canadian Fraser sought a more robust unity of command, his fellow countryman recognized that other Canadian Forces Land Force Command commanders would be ill at ease were that taken to the extreme. Competing forces will constantly buffet efforts to enhance unity of command; cooperation and compromise will be necessary to establish its appropriate extent at any given time.

Conrad’s further remarks reinforce the value of cooperation in the service of unity of effort. Conrad found himself in a Bosnian port facility during a previous tour:

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38 Fraser (2008).
The French would get in there and try to set something up and then we’d come in and put a bid in and the price would go way up. Well, that’s one great thing about the development of coalitions now. [In Afghanistan,] we have a centralized contracting capability, so if the Dutch come along and want gravel, we have someone who can say, “Okay, we’ve got a great gravel contract. Here’s where to go.” And we don’t corrupt the Afghan economy that way. . . . Certainly, some things lend themselves to being pooled. Blood is a good example. Parts for LAVs [light amphibious vehicles] and Strykers are another one and we did exchange parts [for them]. These are nice problems to have, having allies. But there are allies [that lead you to] think you have a resource and it’s not there on game day. . . . The big players in NATO are always there for you.40

Both Richards and Fraser recognized the impossibility of unity of command in Afghanistan; they took what steps they could to find the balance point that approximated sufficient control and acceptable compromise. Conrad reminds us that it may be possible to attain a considerably greater degree of unity of effort even when the extent of unity of command is quite limited. Recognizing that cooperation and compromise are inseparable, that doors closed in one arena may be open in another, that unity of effort and message offer channels toward accomplishing coalition objectives that are not open via unity of command, is a talent not all possess. Successful coalition leadership demands more than the skills of a warrior. The demands on a leader are, in many ways, broader still when the coalition confronts a stability operation. It is to the special capabilities that a coalition leader should possess that we now turn.

40 Conrad (2008).
Dear Lyttelton,

Malaya
We must have a plan.
Secondly we must have a man.
When we have a plan and a man, we shall succeed: not otherwise.
Yours sincerely,

[signed] Montgomery (F.M.)

—FM Bernard Montgomery, Britain’s chief of the Imperial General Staff, writing to Oliver Lyttelton, secretary of state for the colonies, regarding the Malayan insurgency in 1951

In international complications where naval and army officers may be called upon to act for their governments, the senior officers should be chosen for their knowledge of political and diplomatic affairs as well as for their knowledge of the art of war.

—Calvin P. Titus, “The China Relief Expedition, 1900”

The Chapter Two case studies of East Timor and the Balkans make it evident that the effectiveness of those in leadership positions rests on considering C2 more in terms of cooperation and compromise than command and control. So how can our senior political and military leaders identify the right men and women for coalition leadership during stability operations, individuals possessing Medal of Honor winner Calvin Titus’s recommended blend of political, diplomatic, and warrior skills? Given that we have a plan, as recommended by Field Marshal Montgomery and substantiated by the discussion in Chapter Three, how can we ensure that we have a man or woman who possesses the talents needed?

No matter how great the need for political awareness, no matter how loud the call for diplomatic savvy, the military man or woman assigned to coalition responsibilities must possess the basics of good leadership to complement these other skills. Ambassador Paddy Ashdown perhaps unconsciously reinforces this observation with his observation that, while preparing “a plan for the first hundred days of my mandate” as UNHCR for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the coalition would “have to establish an early track record for success. We specifically planned

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a series of small victories we could win early in my mandate.”\(^3\) The value of building team confidence was not lost on the man many consider Britain’s finest Second World War general. FM William Slim observed, as his 14th Army prepared to counterattack from India after a withdrawal in the face of repeated Japanese victories,

> Having developed the confidence of the individual man in his superiority over the enemy [via aggressive patrolling], we had now to extend that to the corporate confidence of units. . . . This was done in a series of carefully planned minor offensive operations . . . in greatly preponderating strength. . . . We could not at this stage risk even small failures. We had very few. . . . We had laid the first of our intellectual foundations of morale. . . . Our object was attainable.\(^4\)

Given that the talents of the warrior constitute, at most, only a part of the resume required for a coalition leader’s success, the task of identifying the right individual for the job is made no easier in recognizing that good performance in previous stability operations is no guarantee of future achievement. An open mind, one able to adapt, is another essential. Oman is justifiably cited as one of the 20th century’s most notable COIN successes, yet the leader of the Sultan’s Armed Forces during the Dhofar Rebellion, Lt Gen Sir Timothy Creasey, was considerably less successful when later dealing with the civil-military coalition in 1978 Northern Ireland. Success on the Arabian Peninsula proved no assurance of the ability to adapt once Creasey arrived as general officer commanding the province. His shortfalls in the latter coalition environment included an unwillingness to consider subordinating military forces to the RUC (a step later taken successfully).\(^5\)

Nor should we forget Gen Sir Gerald Templer (who proved to be the man whom Montgomery advised must be found) and his guidelines for success during a COIN involving an interagency coalition:

- Get the priorities right.
- Get the instructions right.
- Get the organization right.
- Get the right people into the organization.
- Get the right spirit into the people.
- Leave them to get on with it.\(^6\)

His instructions not only serve to reinforce several aspects of our previous discussions; his fourth point also reminds us that selecting leaders for coalition assignment during stability operations means doing so at all echelons, not just that at the top.

With this foundation established—a consciousness that warrior prowess is of itself not a sufficient skill, that an open mind able to adapt is critical, and that effective coalition leadership is needed at all levels—we can now turn to three additional characteristics that are

\(^3\) Ashdown (2007, p. 226).
\(^4\) Slim (1956 [2009], p. 189).
very likely to be of particular importance when leading a collective enterprise during stability operations:

- understanding the culture of coalitions
- coalition vision: the ability to see through the eyes of others
- transparency: inspiring trust.

Understanding the Culture of Coalitions

It is a curse of multinational operations that governments impose constraints on their national contingents, usually for domestic political reasons. Some may do this or that, some may not: the outcome is a complicated matrix of permitted actions for each nationality—and this is the bane of a multinational commander’s life.

—Gen Mike Jackson, Soldier: The Autobiography of General Sir Mike Jackson

No one doubts the importance of understanding the indigenous culture during a stability operation. Yet, few write of the need for leaders to comprehend the social mores, motivations, and beliefs that together lend understanding not only of its members but of the unique being that is a given coalition. Understanding the culture of a coalition means more than being familiar with the organizations that constitute its parts. An identical collection of nations, agencies, NGOs, and commercial businesses operating during conventional combat operations will have an entirely different ethos once the fighting ends or the conflict undergoes metamorphosis to become irregular warfare. The coalition’s culture will also have subcultures—tribes of NGOs, clans of nations, factions of commercial enterprises, and interest groups—whose character is, in some ways, a consequence of how coalition leaders structure their organizations. Templer forced his coalition of military, political, and police officials to develop a social as well as professional cohesion that served to bond the parts into a system. Cosgrove assigned units from New Zealand, Fiji, Ireland, and Canada to work with Brig Mark Evans’ otherwise-Australian brigade, understanding that commonality of language, familiarity born of past training exercises, and the very fact that being strangers among other strangers would serve to bind the whole better than scattering these units separately across East Timor. (John Frewen, perhaps drawing on these lessons later, chose to embed Pacific Island soldiers in Australian and New Zealand units in the Solomon Islands in 2003 rather than assigning separate country sectors, thereby emphasizing unity while also capitalizing on the dispersion of soldiers with cultures akin to those of the indigenous population.) The perceptive coalition leader must understand the culture of a coalition even as he or she takes steps to influence its character.

An understanding of leaders and capabilities is inherent in comprehending the culture of the collective. General Clark’s requirement to have the UK’s Mike Jackson brief him on the latter’s plan to occupy Pristina airfield would not have caused a ripple in a U.S.-only operation, in which centralized control is frequently the leadership climate. We have seen that such was far from the case in Kosovo, when the subordinate was a British officer not used to the long screwdriver of close control. During stability operations—when actions tend to be less directly

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7 Mike Jackson (2008, p. 250).
reliant on the support of other units than is the case during conventional warfare—recognition
not only that some subordinates are competent but that they expect to be left to their own
devices will both inspire confidence in those trusted and likely precipitate a general environ-
ment of more trust and open exchange.

Accurately gauging a fellow leader’s personal and professional limits will similarly build
rather than forestall coalition cohesion. Mike Jackson later refused to block the runways of Pris-
tina airfield after its occupation by Russian units, believing that the action could precipitate an
armed exchange between the NATO units and later members of the coalition. His playing of a
red card\(^8\) might have been unnecessary had Clark better understood his fellow general officer’s
professional expectations. Diplomatic savvy will help (1) minimize another leader’s compul-
sion to play a red card, or (2) if such play is necessary, minimize the antipathy with which the
action takes place. The approach taken by Canadian David Fraser offers a decided contrast to
Clark’s more assertive command style, Fraser’s being an approach that demonstrates the close
ties between the desirable leader characteristics of having an open mind, ability to compro-
mise, and diplomatic polish. He made it personal policy to ask coalition-partner representa-
tives what aspects of an operation they could or desired to include in their countries’ missions.
Soon after arriving in southern Afghanistan, Fraser brought his multinational subordinates
together to inquire, what are you allowed to do?—a question directed at identifying potential
red flags early so that his staff could then plan each force’s deployment accordingly.\(^9\) Writing
on the topic, General Kiszely noted that such diplomacy, cooperation, and desire to avoid con-
frontation have become commonplace despite the caveats under which national-contingent
commanders operate. Sensitivity to those caveats and other aspects of national character will
provide a forum for resolving problems before they overtly assert themselves. The wise coal-
tion leader will heed Kiszely’s observation that “the rareness with which the red card is played
openly does not mean that it is seldom a factor.”\(^10\)

Understanding the forces at work within a coalition helps motivate leaders to find solu-
tions rather than create confrontations. Understanding the conditions under which another
leader must function means that the aware coalition commander can work with his or her col-
leagues to find a solution that addresses both collective and national objectives. A British officer
serving in the Balkans recalled asking a coalition leader from another NATO nation why his
soldiers were unable to support an ongoing operation. The latter,

who was quite embarrassed, said, “This is a police operation and our lawyer says that search-
ing the boots [trunks] of cars is not something the military can do.” And the lawyer said,
“This is a police operation, and it is against our national policy to do this.” Well, I asked, “If
we change the order to read that this is a search for weapons, will that change things? Will
that make things okay?” And the [partner nation’s] commander said, “Yes.”\(^11\)

Cooperation and compromise can be the source of solutions when more directive C2
leave only refusal as an option. Understanding the culture of a coalition allows a leader to
determine when the former pair is called for versus the latter.

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\(^8\) Refusing to direct that the mission be undertaken.
\(^9\) P. Williams (2008).
\(^10\) Kiszely (2008b, p. 9).
Coalition Vision: Seeing Through the Eyes of Others

If I had to make a generic comment about . . . coalition command, I’d say it’s patience. . . . Hey, take it easy. It’s not going to happen on your watch. Look at the British in Malaya. They had the perfect plan and it still took a very long time. . . . It’s quite counterproductive when you don’t have that patience.

—Col Fred Lewis, Canadian Army

It is trite to note that Americans are anxious to come to the point of a meeting and are therefore sometimes less effective than they might be were they willing to spend the long hours of casual conversation expected in some cultures before confronting the business at hand. U.S. leaders in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere may initially bridle at the seeming inefficiency of their having to adapt in such a manner; those who are ultimately successful realize that establishing fruit-bearing relationships is one of the several ways in which they have to adapt to others’ views of the world.13 Coalition leadership during stability operations means similarly freeing oneself to view situations from the perspectives of the many parties in, working with, or otherwise involved in operations.

Lt Col Stuart Tootal admired Gen David Richards’ abilities in this regard during the latter’s tenure as senior NATO commander in Afghanistan. Tootal, commander of the British Army’s Third Battalion, the parachute regiment, remembered Richards as

equally adept with an Italian deputy as he is with the press corps. [A coalition leader] has to be more than a politician. He has to be a credible combat commander as well. But being one or the other isn’t enough. . . . You have to have not only the key characteristics of diplomacy, but you also have to have huge patience. . . . I would not grip [correct] a foreign soldier in the same way I would grip one of my own.14

We noted in the previous section that open-mindedness is part and parcel of coalition-leader success. Richard W. Anderschat expands on the nature of vision needed, finding that a leader must possess a broad mind as well as an open one, a mind able to

understand not only the policy of the alliance, and also the policy of his own country, but also the national policy of each of the other members of the coalition. In addition, he has to then be sensitive to their views, which may differ from his.15

14 Tootal (2008a). Canada’s Brig David Fraser commanded the ISAF multinational brigade during much of 2006. The presence of the British Army’s Brig Ed Butler confronted the initial ISAF commander (General Fraser’s senior) with a conundrum, as he felt it diplomatically inappropriate to have Butler subordinate to another of similar rank (a concern of questionable validity as we have earlier noted; such same-rank senior-subordinate relationships are not at all unusual during military operations). In this case, the solution was one made via decisive action and willingness to put operational necessity above personal considerations. On assuming command of ISAF, British Gen David Richards quickly assigned Butler to command British forces within Fraser’s brigade, subordinating his fellow countryman to the Canadian in an action that capitalized on Butler’s considerable talents—and a readiness to put mission first. It was also David Richards, who, as a brigadier in Timor-Leste, departed after General Cosgrove could not find a position for him. Further details of Richards’ decision can be found in Bishop (2007, p. 45).
15 Anderschat (1986, p. 35).
This being able to walk around the table to view an issue from all relevant participants’ perspectives is vital to coalition leadership. USCENTCOM representatives demonstrated their appreciation for this in the development of the C3IC during Operation Desert Shield in 1990. The word command was deliberately excluded from the title. USCENTCOM understood that asserting itself overtly as the dominant war-fighting entity could have undermined its partner in the parallel-structure coalition (Saudi Arabia), thereby risking its and other regional countries’ support.  

The infighting between the U.S. Departments of Defense and State during operations in Kosovo undermined Clark as commander, negatively affected coalition operations, and had no discernable positive effect. Unfortunately, neither department appeared to have addressed its misbehavior by 2003, when

the apparent inability of U.S. government agencies to collaborate or even cooperate in the approach to the 2003 intervention in Iraq had acquired almost paradigmatic status as the way not to conduct a counterinsurgency. It is not uncommon to find the State Department and the Department of Defense described as being in a “state of war” during these months.  

Bureaucratic jealousy will, unfortunately, be a cancer in any coalition enterprise. It behooves a leader both to take steps to contain its ill effects (via early coordination with key players) and to plan for its interference despite such efforts. Such precautions are necessary at virtually any echelon, given that even senior noncommissioned officers and second lieutenants will find themselves personally responsible for dealing with local and coalition government representatives during a stability operation. The following example describes one such event, albeit one at a level well above that of sergeant or lieutenant. It further suggests that a coalition leader’s staff may need to war-game its interactions with difficult partners (including those within its own government) much as it does battles, using those exercises to outline possible courses of action, allocate responsibilities, and determine what resources might be necessary to fill gaps due to an inability to fully rely on some partners.  

The civilian agencies . . . were absolutely part of the coalition [in Iraq], but I don’t believe that they necessarily saw that they were. I’ll give you an example. [LTG Peter] Chiarelli decided to create an effects branch in the corps headquarters—good, sound military thinking, [and he was thinking in terms of effects beyond fire, maneuver, and others beyond their traditional combat conception]. It was actually an Iraqi adviser who Chiarelli had drawn into this effects branch . . . an Iraqi civilian [who] said, “You want an effect? I’ll give you an effect. You need to sort the date crop out.” And there was this sort of slightly stunned silence. The majors especially were still thinking of bombing them somewhere and sort of looked at him as though he’d gone completely bonkers. They said, “What do you mean?” He said, “Iraqi dates are the best in the Middle East, but, for the past three years, we’ve haven’t been able to spray the date farms, which means that [insects come along and ruin] the crop. So, not only have we not got the dates to export, but we haven’t got the ability to build our reputation as the provider of the best dates in the Middle East.”

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16 Silkett (1993).

17 Cornish (2009, p. 75).
He drew a few things on the map and said, “Look, this is where the date farms are. . . . If you’re really smart and you can get them sprayed. . . . This is where the wheat’s growing, and you can spray that as well.” . . . Pete Chiarelli . . . saw that this was a wonderful opportunity to achieve terrific effect. So he took it up to the U.S. Embassy in the Green Zone and failed to get all the different agencies to buy into it. . . . There was an element of “not invented here.” They wanted ownership of the idea as well as everything else. They thought, “This is the military stepping outside their territory.” And it was a huge frustration. In the end, we persuaded the embassy team to allow us to set this up, and we ran it as a military operation. It was all done with the money that we currently had control of. . . . That was not a coalition working—that was a military coalition fighting against civilian agencies. . . . How do you solve that? You solve that through training, through education, through coexistence, through living your lives as you will fight the conflict. Let me give you an example, and it’s nothing to do with Iraq or Afghanistan, but in terms of UK resilience: We had a massive area of flooding up in the Gloucestershire area—thousands of people put out of their houses, electricity lost, and very close to losing some major substations that would have blacked out all of Birmingham and Manchester—major national catastrophe. All the agencies involved worked together. A proper coalition of different agencies—much smaller scale than we’re talking about in Iraq and Afghanistan. And they did that because there was a unifying purpose, and they all knew each other—they all knew the strengths and weaknesses of each other’s organizations, and they were comfortable working together. And there wasn’t a competitive element, which I think is what I saw in Baghdad. There was no suspicion of each other.18

The latter part of this passage recalls Templer and his requiring the collocation of coalition members and daily socializing in Malaya. The social drink and daily routine of working together established the same kind of appreciation for each other’s perspectives that those in Gloucestershire possessed. The specific example notwithstanding, the benefits of such association will likely benefit all participants, civilian representatives’ different perspectives and contacts often providing insights of value to military personnel.

Appreciating the perspectives of others associated with a coalition will be more difficult the greater the professional divide. Diplomats from one country may better appreciate the perspectives of fellow foreign-affairs experts from other nations than they do their own military. The reverse is also true; the chasms are wider yet when governmental representatives deal with NGOs, IGOs, or commercial enterprises. Michael Khambatta of the ICRC provided the following response to a question regarding the hypothetical case of whether members of his organization would inform opposing sides regarding the location of IEDs. It will give most military personnel reason for pause, yet his logic merits consideration even if one does not ultimately agree with it:

Very difficult dilemma. . . . If we see indiscriminate use of weaponry, we would approach the side that is laying them first to try and reduce that. . . . We would share with the humanitarian community our concerns about security. . . . We would be very careful about how we share that kind of information with the military because we’re giving the military an advantage if we inform them of the weapons that are laid to ambush them. . . . Largely, the important questions are, if we see indiscriminate weapons being laid, we approach the people who are laying them and try to get that to be stopped. . . . As a matter of principle,

18 Everson (2008).
we wouldn’t inform the military. . . . It’s important that we say these things out loud and clearly. . . . I think the military also have to understand that if we were perceived as providing information of military value to them that would be the end of our operation in the area. It would be the end of any opportunity we would have to assist prisoners. It would be the end of any opportunity we have to assist wounded. . . . The military should not rely on us for their intelligence. . . . We are the people who will be the neutral intermediary. . . . We have to preserve that role.19

Edward A. Artis of the NGO Knightsbridge International responded quite differently when discussing the issue. His views provide an important reminder to a coalition leader who might view the world from a perspective of “us” and “them,” seeing all NGOs as a homogenous whole with like views:

In the olden days, that would have been a true statement, correct, but this ain’t the olden days. . . . Our enemies don’t give a [expletive deleted] about NGOs or anybody else. . . . When somebody is at risk, you warn them. There are ways of doing that without it biting you in the ass.20

Anna Prouse of the Italian Red Cross reinforces the differences a leader may find between similar organizations, and even between national representatives of the same organization, with her recollection of the disparate views on security held by those at an Italian Red Cross facility and others at the ICRC main headquarters in Baghdad. Naively, in her mind, those at the senior facility disagreed with the policies of the national contingent when the latter employed the use of armed Italian military police for security:

I didn’t expect such a degree of hostility. I thought we were one big family. When [the camp commander] and I arrive at the . . . ICRC office, however, we are treated very coldly indeed. Their expressions speak clearly. We are not welcome here. . . . I don’t see which of the seven principles—humanity, neutrality, impartiality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality—we are disobeying. . . . They think that being neutral makes you immune to such horror.21

There are several lessons for the coalition leader here. Amicable coalition working relationships may require an open-mindedness well beyond what would be demanded during conventional combat operations. Second, the responses from one component of another military, civilian agency, NGO, or other organization may not represent the views of others (a realization that potentially opens negotiation channels that otherwise might seem to be blocked). Finally, the requirement for coalition leaders at all echelons to see through others’ eyes implies making predeployment contacts with other organizations and considerable training of subordinates to encourage tolerance, patience, and an expanded world view that they may have had too little life experience to appreciate without such instruction.

20 Artis (2008).
21 Prouse (2005, pp. 19, 63).
Transparency: Inspiring Trust

In 1999 NATO possessed nineteen member states. Of these, the United States, France and Turkey were not signatories to Protocol I of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. While NATO, as a body, had asserted that its members would respect Protocol I, tension quickly emerged. . . . As a result, NATO policy permitted member states to refuse bombing assignments if they regarded a particular target as being illegitimate. In theory, if a NATO member refused to strike a particular target, the mission could not be reassigned to another alliance member. In practice, however, most of the Serbian targets that were rejected by various NATO members were subsequently attacked by the Americans. A good example was the bombing of the RTS television studio in Belgrade; this incident resulted in the deaths of sixteen civilians.

—Michael Kelly, “Legal Factors in Military Planning for Coalition Warfare and Military Interoperability”

While retaining the formal power to promulgate and enforce laws, the state has entered into relationships with other players—corporations, universities, civil society movements—to determine the type of rules necessary and mechanisms of credible reinforcement. . . . The most significant asset in this process is trust.

—Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, Fixing Failed States

Concerns regarding some members of NATO putting the welfare of the alliance before coalition objectives in Afghanistan have a counterpart. Basing a coalition on an alliance is not without risk of the formal association suffering a loosening of ties due to tensions brought about during a stability operation. Such was the case when the United States planned and conducted air operations over Serbia prior to ground forces moving into Kosovo. U.S. aircraft essentially conducted an independent air campaign, one outside of the collective enterprise and therefore free of coalition constraints. They attempted to do so covertly, not only failing to coordinate with other NATO members, but not informing them of missions altogether.24 Dag Henriksen described the consequences of the unilateral action in NATO’s Gamble: Combining Diplomacy and Airpower in the Kosovo Crisis 1998–1999:

The chief of defense of the second-largest contributor to OAF [Operation Allied Freedom], France, General [Jean-Pierre] Kelche, later said that he had been completely unaware of the U.S. operation. . . . “It was just incredible. It was quite foolish, because the whole of NATO shared a political responsibility and accountability.” . . .

Due to the lack of coordination, on numerous occasions allied forces ended up striking the same targets. Later commenting on the U.S. unilateral operation, [U.S. Air Force, or USAF] Lieutenant General Short admitted:

“If we are a team, we can’t just be a team on paper. . . . We should never again, never again, run a U.S.-only command structure inside of a NATO alliance. . . . We can never do that again to our allies, or we will not have allies.”

The imperfect coincidence of common and member objectives means that some form of unilateral action by one or more groups in a coalition is almost unavoidable. The issue is less whether such transgressions—if they amount to that—will occur than whether those committing them ensure that their actions remain of a character acceptable within the grander construct of the cooperative endeavor. While some audiences will recognize that the operations of a particular member reflect decisions made by leaders from that country alone, observers outside the coalition may interpret the behaviors of any one of its representatives as reflecting the intentions of the whole. It is therefore important to keep independent actions within limits, limits that will almost inevitably be self-imposed, and to ensure that they do not violate the desirable tenets of unity of effort and unity of message any more than is necessary.

At times, even significant differences can exist without unduly undermining coalition operations. Agreement that any member can play a red card to excuse it from participating in some activity may frustrate others, but, as all nations have the option available—and such a choice may be fundamental to a member’s participation—we have noted that it has become an accepted practice in modern cooperative ventures. The refusal of New Zealand, Canadian, British, and other militaries to use lethal force for the purpose of protecting property in East Timor increased the security burden on Australian units; the overt nature of the differences in policy did not threaten cooperation in other regards. Australian and British acceptance of the Ottawa Treaty’s prohibition on the employment of antipersonnel mines led to the interesting red card of Australian pilots in Iraq not being able to refuel U.S. aircraft dropping GATOR munitions that included both antipersonnel and antitank mines.

Trust can become an issue when a member deliberately obfuscates its intentions. Savvy leaders, such as David Richards and David Fraser, sought early identification of national constraints to establish a common understanding of participant limits and reduce the degree of disruption they would cause if first revealed during an operation. Difficulties regarding U.S. unilateral air bombing in Serbia arose not because the Americans accepted missions that other nations would not but rather due to the U.S. extending the scope of its bombing beyond what coalition members considered legitimate military targets to those that some deemed political and economic. Sensitivities were exacerbated due to the bombings not having the approval of the United Nations, Russia and China being among the countries opposing the action. The issue led Clark’s deputy NATO commander, Gen Rupert Smith, to do some serious soul-searching:

In early 1999, we awaited the decision as to whether or not NATO was to bomb Serbia and Serbian forces in order to coerce Slobodan Milošević into withdrawing his forces from Kosovo, a province of Serbia, where they were oppressing the Kosovars. This was to be done without the licence of a UN Security Council resolution, and I was in some doubt as to the legitimacy of our intended actions—and whether I, the DSACEUR [Deputy Supreme

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26 Kelly (2005, p. 165). GATOR is an aerially delivered mine system.
Allied Commander Europe], should be taking any part in the operation. I reflected deeply on the matter and finally decided that it was legitimate simply on the moral grounds.27

A later failure to keep member nations informed led to ill feelings in Iraq when the United States decided to hasten the transfer of sovereignty to the indigenous government without coordinating the decision with others in the coalition.28

A government’s decision to subordinate military personnel to another country or organization’s leadership is one fraught with political risk and no little sacrifice of sovereign oversight. The decision to conduct unilateral air operations—whether Clark’s or another’s—eroded the trust that lay behind troop commitments that might not have been made were the command one led by the United Nations, an alliance other than NATO, or an individual nation. Trust, like courage, is not an endless resource. The fragility of coalition participation during stability operations suggests that coalition leaders should not draw from that well too often.


With the capitulation of Canada, the task of the Commander in Chief ceased to be the simple and direct one of defeating French regulars, but became less self-defining and more diffuse, less strenuous but more difficult. The problems he faced concerned money, manpower, the Caribbean, the Indians, and his position at home. None of them promised any glory for a satisfactory solution; all promised trouble if fumbled. As Amherst tried to solve them, he found that each affected the others in some way.

—John Shy, Toward Lexington

Overwhelming military force may achieve victory, but it may not achieve peace.

—Tim Foy, DFID, United Kingdom

Every person, soldier or civilian, must be an agent of all branches of government and prepared to back up or fill in where needed.

—Richard L. Clutterbuck,

The Long Long War: Counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam

Backdrop: Afghanistan—Room for Progress Ahead

The opening lines of this book cited operations in Afghanistan and Iraq as opportunities to improve U.S. leadership of coalitions. Operational success in Iraq demonstrates that shortcomings in collective partnerships do not preclude achieving sought-after ends. Even a cursory study of coalition operations there demonstrates that there are lessons available for any leader wishing to make similar future enterprises more efficient, more effective, and less a strain on relationships with countries that include those that have long been among the United States’ most reliable of international partners. That the United States continues to dig at the self-inflicted wound of suboptimal coalition operations in Afghanistan rather than binding and salving the injury is cause for introspection.

1 Shy (1965, p. 96).
3 Clutterbuck (1966, p. ix).
ISAF seeks
to assist the Government of Afghanistan and the International Community in maintain-
ing security within its area of operation. ISAF supports the Government of Afghanistan in expanding its authority to the rest of the country, and in providing a safe and secure envi-
ronment conducive to free and fair elections, the spread of the rule of law, and the recon-
struction of the country.\(^4\)

Those executing U.S. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in the country continue to pursue the original objective
to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations, and to attack the military capability of the Taliban regime [to] make it more difficult for the terror network to train new recruits and coordinate their evil plans.\(^5\)

This mission was subsequently expanded to include

the wider issues of Afghan stability and development, governance and security, and democ-
ratization. Its intent was to deal with these issues in a way that terrorist or terrorist-linked movements could no longer find refuge or a base in that country.\(^6\)

COIN theory and doctrine posit that the support of the indigenous population is essen-
tial to the eventual defeat of an insurgency. It is, therefore, crucial to minimize the number of avoidable civilian casualties and the destruction of private property. The objectives for the counterinsurgent are fundamentally different from those of the counterterrorist. As one writer notes,

consequences still matter in counterterrorism, but they are calculated differently. The civil-
ian population is not the center of gravity—terrorist capability is. Counterterrorism stresses offensive measures to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. A focus on capturing and killing terrorists may conflict with the primacy of civilian protection that marks successful counterinsurgency campaigns.\(^7\)

The negative impact can be immediate and, as previously noted, undo months of efforts to cultivate public support when a raid to nab HVTs on a terrorist’s list leads to breaking into a home or bombing a village and causing extensive damage. A British officer described his frustra-
tion with the divergence between U.S. and his own country’s approaches in Afghanistan, recalling “that differences in tactics were such that [I] asked American Special Forces teams to pull out of the town of Sangin, in Helmand, because they were causing so many casualties and undermining support for reconstruction projects.”\(^8\) Such differences affect coalition transitions

\(^4\) NATO (undated).
\(^6\) Back (2004).
\(^7\) Sewall (2007).
\(^8\) Albone (2007).
as well as day-to-day operations. Dutch Lt Col Johan Van Houten remembered when the ISAF multinational brigade in southern Afghanistan of which he was a part took over on the first of August [2006]. In July, there had been a big sweep operation in the Baluchi Valley by Australian and U.S. SOF. . . . It took us a couple of months to win back their support. The SOF in Uruzgan Province were still under OEF rules of engagement, while we were under ISAF ROE, and this in a very small province.9

Our previous discussion makes it clear that frictions caused by operational divides between various elements in a coalition—whether regular force–SOF or otherwise—are not a new problem. Remember that TCGs were created in Northern Ireland in part to prevent repeat cases of the near misses when SOF, regular forces, and police surprised each other during operations. There remains an outstanding requirement to better meld ISAF and OEF missions and the operations that support them. More disturbing are the instances of U.S. leaders fomenting a “we-they” divide in the Afghan coalition when they should be seeking to strengthen the ties that bind the United States with countries among the most steadfast in the extraordinarily difficult operations that characterize both ISAF and OEF. There is opportunity for progress. Coalition leaders will have to be at the forefront of any changes made. It is hoped that the following recommendations, drawn in considerable part from the experiences of those who have recently served in coalitions worldwide, will serve to advise those changes.

Bridging the Divides: Ongoing Initiatives to Improve Coordination During Stability Operations

[When I arrived in Al Basrah, Iraq,] there were no sheets, towel or soap: no one had thought that I might need them, while I had unwisely expected some sort of basic hotel accommodation which would include such necessities. . . . On the inside [of the shower] another sign ordered users to conform to “ship’s routine:” “Strip off; tap on; wet down; tap off; soap up; rinse off.” Impossible to conform: I had no soap.

—Hilary Synnott, Bad Days in Basra10

Such was the senior British civilian’s welcome to his headquarters for his tour of service. Synnott went on to say that he also had no computer or telephone on arrival in Al Basrah. He provides an example of the differences in expectation that should be considered by coalition leaders readying operations. U.S. State Department representative Molly Phee, the CPA’s senior civilian in Maysan province in southeastern Iraq, received a similar dearth of guidance as she prepared to deploy, the advice to “bring a dressing gown” being the extent of insight offered when she asked how to prepare for work alongside the British who commanded the multinational division responsible for her area.11

Synnott and Phee’s difficulties were but minor inconveniences. The consequences of not better thinking through preparations for coalition operations have, in other instances, proven

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9 Van Houten (2007).
10 Synnott (2008, p. 27).
11 Phee (undated).
more serious, as was the case when U.S., Pakistani, and Malaysian units first came together during the crisis situation in October 1993 Mogadishu. The U.S. light infantry required the support of the other two nations’ mechanized and armor forces if it was to move through a deluge of small-arms and antitank fire to rescue besieged U.S. Rangers. LT Mark Hollis, platoon leader with the U.S. Army’s 10th Mountain Division, considered the situation as the multinational force prepared to move out:

Pakistani tanks would lead Malaysian [German Condor armored personnel carriers] carrying [U.S.] 2d Battalion soldiers. Company A would attack to break through to [Task Force] Ranger. The column began movement around 2145 hours, with the Pakistani T55 tanks in the lead. . . . I had never seen or heard of a German Condor until the day of execution. Finding out how to open the door to a vehicle 15 minutes before rolling out the gate is not the way to start a mission. A platoon leader needs to coordinate through his company commander to arrange a time when the allied forces can come over and teach his soldiers about their equipment. This is particularly significant at a time when operations with other United Nations forces are becoming more frequent.12

Divisions in Vietnam overcame new arrivals' lack of familiarity with the environment by conducting courses for newly arriving soldiers so that they could be brought up to date on recent lessons learned, have an opportunity to acclimatize, be allowed to zero their weapons, and otherwise prepare for the dangers that lie ahead. That divisions considered this instruction important is apparent in their staffing the training facilities out of hide—i.e., trainer positions for these schools were not part of authorized personnel allocations and, thus, other jobs were left vacant in order to provide the instructors and other staff needed.13

Fortunately, there have been initial steps taken toward better readying the U.S. for coalition operations. Presidential decision directive (PDD) 56 of 1997 was designed “to force interagency cooperation and synchronization among government agencies.”14 Similarly encouraging is the U.S. Department of State’s creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and the department’s accompanying efforts to form a triumvirate of resources to support future deployments: the active, standby, and reserve components of the Civilian Response Corps (CRC).15 A potentially significant step toward greater interagency cooperation is secretary of defense Robert Gates’ agreement to allow USAID’s formal participation in development of DoD guidance for the employment of the force (GEF).16 Congress has also been party to the progress (e.g., its 2003 legislation to provide support to international liaison personnel assigned to combatant command headquarters, such as USCENTCOM and USSOCOM in Tampa, Florida).17

13 For further discussion of division schools in Vietnam, see Glenn (2000).
16 Sheikh (2009).
17 GAO (2004, cover page). Unfortunately, the news is not all good in this regard:

GAO could find no evidence that DOD had issued any guidance to combatant commanders on how to implement this legislation. . . . Without DOD guidance, should other commands choose to use the authority granted by this legislation, there is no assurance that they will implement it in a uniform and prudent manner. (GAO, 2004, cover page, p. 10)
Exercises that bring existing alliance and prospective coalition members together have been a longstanding way of increasing familiarity. U.S. Pacific Command sponsored or otherwise participated in more than 1,700 multinational exercises in 2006. The benefits accrued from these events in helping to prepare for stability operations have been evident during the more than 20 multiple-nation recovery operations that have taken place since 1996.\textsuperscript{18} U.S. military schools likewise conduct exercises that are a forum for better understanding of potential coalition partners. The U.S. Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) conducted a valuable domestic disaster-response exercise in the mid-1990s involving a notional earthquake on the midwestern U.S. New Madrid Fault Line. Graduates of the program moved on to assignments as planners key throughout the Army and joint U.S. service communities. While the civilian counterparts that met during the event surely also assumed other responsibilities in many cases, the appreciation gained for each other’s efforts and the knowledge of what office to call in the case of a domestic emergency built a reservoir of expertise that stood ready for domestic crises that might arise.

These mechanisms have lower-tactical echelon counterparts. U.S. and Filipino leaders conducting COIN operations in the Sulu Archipelago at the extreme southern end of the Philippines have established civil-affairs buildings where local political leaders can post notices regarding their communities’ needs. The simple facilities provide a centralized resource available to government officials, local aid groups, and international contributors that seek to lend assistance.\textsuperscript{19} The expedient of simply allowing the posting of community requirements therefore serves both as notification and as a potential means for coordinating humanitarian efforts. We have previously highlighted the work of military civil-affairs specialists working with U.S. brigade-level units to similar effect in other theaters. These men and women provide assessments of indigenous requirements, conduct project planning, coordinate with NGOs, and oversee the conduct of civil-military operations.\textsuperscript{20}

Building New Bridges: Recommendations for Improving Coalition Effectiveness

Develop Coalition Doctrine, Training, and Lessons-Learned Capabilities

While an Australian staff sergeant crouched down with his patrol in defilade, observing an Iraqi military convoy moving toward his position, he called for support using [the] airborne warning and control system, or Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). The AWACS aircraft on station that night happened to have a British crew, who guided a flight of American F-15s onto the enemy targets within eight minutes of the initial call for close air support (CAS).

Thorough training made this example one of dozens of successful contacts with the enemy. CAS procedures and new control techniques were rehearsed and developed with U.S. SF, coalition ground units and U.S. and British air forces during three major joint exercises.

\textsuperscript{18} USPACOM (undated).
\textsuperscript{19} Linder (2008).
\textsuperscript{20} Wright and Reese (2008, p. 370).
conducted prior to deployment and in theater during the weeks leading up to OIF. . . . Commanders believe [that] this training made the difference during the opening weeks of the war in Iraq.

—Mark C. Arnold, “Special-Operations Forces’ Interoperability with Coalition Forces”21

On the civilian side, however, there is a definite tendency to skimp the training.

—Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency22

No comprehensive guidance currently exists for the conduct of coalition operations involving the full complement of possible members. Though ad hoc by definition, formation of a coalition should not mean having to reinvent the wheel on every occasion on which such a collective enterprise is undertaken. There are aspects of leadership, organization, planning, procedures, training, communication, and virtually every other aspect of coalition operations that have common elements. A detailed study of alliance and coalition operations in the past is sure to reveal many valuable insights in this regard. After-action interviews and studies of ongoing coalition efforts would add invaluably to the historical database.

Compilation of this guidance would establish a foundation for effectively structuring coalitions, including addressing issues that have, in the past, proven particularly difficult. Among these are intelligence sharing, liaison procedures, planning and briefing processes, leader selection, predeployment and in-theater training requirements, policies regarding commercial representatives, and the establishment of relationships with organizations sharing areas of operation but unwilling to formally join a coalition. Much of this doctrine would be completely original—e.g., that dealing with the transfer of responsibilities between military and other organizations during a campaign or guidance regarding the leadership of and procedures for planning when applying a CA to coalition operations.

A primary element in the development of this new doctrine would be the expansion of the current definition to provide for both formal inclusion and less-formal affiliation with nonstate entities, such as NGOs, IGOs, commercial organizations, and relevant elements of an indigenous population. The timing and procedures for the integration of an indigenous government—in part or total—would likewise be included. The doctrine should provide guidelines regarding how to capitalize on the inclusion of one or more alliances in a coalition and the alternative command structures available to support coalition objectives (e.g., lead nation, lead organization, parallel, hybrid, and variations thereof). The latter would incorporate advice on developing coalitions within coalitions to (1) take advantage of similar capabilities during planning and execution, (2) maximize the effectiveness of operations within LOOs, and (3) facilitate overall unity of effort and message via such techniques as structuring internal coalition relationships to minimize liaison burdens.

A significant portion of this coalition doctrine should address training and other forms of predeployment preparation. The latter would include the issues of appropriate levels and numbers of representatives from organizations that would ideally participate in planning, exercises, and rehearsals and later assist with the updating of plans that are on the shelf or need adaptation immediately preceding a deployment.

Individual, organization, and collective training would comprise a substantial part of the coalition doctrine. In addition to exercises, the guidance should also include suggestions regarding exchange programs between organizations, attendance at government courses, and degrees pertinent for those whose future responsibilities will include coalition liaison, staff exchange, or leadership positions.

Establishing a mobile training team for predeployment coalition training would serve to polish individual and collective capabilities before undertaking an operation. This team could be patterned after those currently employed by the U.S. Army’s Battle Command Training Center (BCTC) in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. (The BCTC currently has several teams, one of which specializes in joint operations.) This team would send representatives to organizations readying for an operation, the objective being to assist with their pending mergers into a coalition.

Training should include opportunities for organizations to send their prospective liaison officers to multiorganizational courses or, at a minimum, complete remote learning instruction. Those chosen for key coalition-leader and staff-position training should be selected from the best and brightest. Malaya once again offers us an example to emulate, this from the world of intelligence. Knowing the importance that Templer attached to intelligence, it was predictable that he would assign specially qualified personnel to liaise between military and civil intelligence organizations. These men were able to translate for various intelligence agencies that otherwise found it difficult to exchange vital materials due to differences in jargon or procedures. His 30 special military intelligence officers “undertook to collect operational intelligence as it passed through Special Branch channels, to process it in a form useful to the military, and to see that it reached the army in time for operations.”

Serious consideration should be given to creation of an interagency staff college to educate midlevel executives (i.e., equivalent to majors or lieutenant colonels in the armed forces) from all branches of government and representatives of NGOs or other organizations as appropriate. Assignment to interagency positions akin to military joint assignments would logically follow attendance. Policies regarding promotions and other personnel matters—whether dictated by the executive branch or Congress—would likely be necessary to enhance the desirability of such assignments and preclude the professional marginalization of those serving in them.

Training exchange tours and those involving personnel serving in organizations other than their own further serve as valuable preparation for later interorganization service. We can attribute the fine performance of Mark Evans’ INTERFET brigade of Australians, New Zealanders, Fijians, Irish, and Canadians at least in part to the leaders of military units from those nations having previously attended schools together or participated in exercises with each other. A few years later, in the Solomon Islands, the ten nations that together formed RAMSI would likewise benefit from such exchanges and prior training events. The U.S. Army’s recent increase in the number of other-U.S. department representatives attending its Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth is notable in this regard. (Expansion of the program there and in other schools to include representatives from NGOs and IGOs would mark further advances.) The CGSC is already commendable for the large number of international military officers attending. An international officer arriving at the course is assigned

23 Sunderland (1964, p. 28).

24 I thank Lt. Col. (ret.) John Allison, USMC, for suggesting inclusion of an interagency staff college as another means of providing preparation for coalition operations.
a U.S. military sponsor. The procedure is replicated in other service and joint institutions throughout the country’s armed forces. Some of these relationships remain close for years afterward; others end at the termination of the study year. Voluntary continuation of relationships can be valuable during future contingencies that bring the individuals back in contact; more should be done to capitalize on the potential operational benefits of these associations. There is little effort to retain records of such past relationships in service or other agency files. Further, no central database exists that would allow individuals to update their contact information and serve as a basis for reinitiating links with a former contact—e.g., to put individuals back in touch when operations would benefit from their renewing ties. Personnel record-keeping procedures merit adaptation to redress the deficiency.

It is inevitable that not all prospective members of a coalition will be able to partake of preparation prior to being assigned to a coalition. There will thus be demand for in-theater education much as was the case for units in Vietnam. Coalition leaders should direct development of in-theater schools to address this contingency. Courses would be short (those in Vietnam were normally two to three weeks in length) and designed to provide both generic guidance of value to any entering the theater and training more specific to pending responsibilities (perhaps organized like LOOs). Ideally, they would include collective training linking those who will work together after course completion. Similar initiatives in the past may offer lessons for those tasked with developing doctrine or courses regarding such instruction. Templer directed the establishment of formal classes for political, military, and police personnel working in DWECS. On an individual basis, on-the-job training by the individual whom a new arrival is replacing or a cadre of instructors tasked with easing integration into a coalition are alternative means of providing in-country instruction.

Whether prior to deployment or in-theater, preparation should incorporate instruction regarding the culture of coalitions. Coalition doctrine and training must address the importance of appreciating other parties’ perspectives, capabilities, and limitations. They must provide guidance regarding how to deal with challenges that may, in some cases, be met with a single solution that is amenable to all members and others in which one partner might react in a manner entirely different than would a representative from another—e.g., the subordination of an officer of senior rank to one junior. The importance of appreciating the complexity of coalition relationships to successful leadership emphasizes the criticality of even the most-senior leaders receiving this training.

The bottom line: Representatives from national and nonstate organizations that may have to cooperate during active operations should train together as often as is feasible prior to deployment. Those who have not or cannot do so should train together as soon as possible once they enter a theater.

It is recommended that USJFCOM assume oversight of the initial writing of coalition doctrine and design of relevant training due to its assigned responsibilities within DoD and that department’s relatively robust personnel level. Participation by other agencies through-

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25 James Corum disagrees that a military headquarters ought to be in charge of writing coalition doctrine. As Paul Cornish (2009, p. 76) wrote, In Corum’s view, “the most glaring gap in American efforts to combat insurgencies and assist threatened nations is the lack of any coherent doctrine to coordinate the efforts of the non-military government agencies.” To be successful, this government-wide doctrine-writing project could not be led by the US armed forces (where doctrine-writing is, nevertheless, a well-developed art) but would have to be orchestrated, directed and disseminated by central government.
out the processes would be essential; the expanded concept of coalitions requires participation by NGO, IGO, and other pertinent representatives. Subsequent to USJFCOM’s creation of initial products, assigning the responsibilities for coalition doctrine and training to a supradepartmental government agency or, better yet, an independent enterprise outside of government would be preferable from the standpoint of avoiding bureaucratic tensions. As no suitable overarching entity currently exists, the urgency of the requirement makes it advisable to capitalize on the human resources and expertise extant in USJFCOM for at least the first iteration of development.

It has become popular in the past several years to suggest passing an interagency equivalent to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which mandated U.S. armed services’ joint cooperation. There are a number of difficulties inherent in such a proposal, not least of which is that bearing the cost of participating in exchanges is far easier when an organization is drawing on the relatively vast human resources of the military than difficulties faced by other, less robustly resourced agencies. That does not mean that these programs are not attractive or should not be mandated. It may, in fact, be wise to ask whether such proposals are ambitious enough. Any serious consideration of an undertaking in this regard would be well advised to expand its scope to include exchanges of a year or more with selected NGOs and IGOs. The resulting familiarization would be particularly beneficial not only for military personnel but also those in USAID or other components of the departments of State, Justice, or Health and Human Services at a minimum. As with Goldwater-Nichols, participation would have to incorporate career incentives. Otherwise, leaders with limited vision will inevitably consider time away from the parent organization wasteful; those spending a year or more outside the mainstream will resultantly find their professional advancement in jeopardy.

Build Coalition Teams Prior to Deployment

Units from different arms and services strive to meld their capabilities well before they are called on to perform during active contingencies. These organizations form habitual relationships whenever possible, the infantry commander thereby becoming familiar with his or her armor, engineer, artillery, or other counterpart as well as these members of the combined-arms team coming to know each other well.

Cost and other practical matters will make similar relationships between nonmilitary governmental agencies and other organizations far less likely than is possible within a country’s military structure. However, training together just prior to deployment and dispatching the whole as a team would provide many of the same benefits. Ideally, these teams would remain together for the duration of their service. Cedric Thornberry reminds us of the Templer spirit with his advice that the inconveniences of collocation are worth the sacrifice “in order to ensure that the leaders and senior staffs on military and civilian sides take coffee with each other and can easily do business throughout the day.” The organizational proximity characterized by regular personal contacts may even be more important than geographically collo-
cating capabilities, in Thornberry’s view. The potential benefits of collocation may be largely wasted without accompanying interactions, such as “morning prayers” (daily update meetings during which a commander can clarify his or her intentions) or occasions to share a drink (alcoholic or otherwise).\textsuperscript{28} Familiarity is far more likely to breed effectiveness than is contempt when it comes to coalition operational leadership.

Establishing these relationships before deployment or as soon thereafter as possible should also promote unity of effort, message, and—possibly, given the opportunity to develop trust and gauge ability—unity of command. (Such establishment would ideally include countries or organizations that may join a coalition quite late—if at all. Better to have prepared for an eventuality that does not occur than attempt to initiate an association belatedly.) While the structuring of most such cross-organizational teams would be done with an eye to their continued collocation once in-theater, others might serve as advance parties. These more temporary teams would prepare and deploy together, departing prior to the bulk of a coalition’s personnel. Their collective responsibility would be to identify what requirements their respective government agency, NGO, or other organization could address; coordinate with fellow advance-party members to draw on complementary capabilities and reduce redundancy of effort; and then return to their separate organizations to assist in deployment of the main body while maintaining ties with their former advance-party associates during final preparations for deployment. Coalition leaders (including those responsible for a given LOO or part thereof) would assign representatives to the advance party to determine initial ambitions of others in the coalition and make early identification of red flags (e.g., a country’s refusing to send a military unit into a high-threat part of the theater).

Building an effective coalition team to conduct stability operations will also mean providing effective leadership. That, in turn, means selecting the right individuals both at the seniormost levels and those below. Authoritarianism, supreme confidence, and single-mindedness may be what are called for when conventional warfare dominates the tasks at hand. Coalition leaders during stability operations will likely find greater success in their ability to cooperate, compromise when necessary, view issues from the perspectives of all significant parties, and a willingness to understand the cultures of both the indigenous population and the coalition of which they are a part. The choice of a man or woman comfortable with ambiguity in command relationships but possessing a keen sense of how to achieve the requisite measures of unity of command, effort, and message may be critical to the accomplishment of collective objectives and avoiding unnecessary delays while doing so.


\textbf{Rethink Procurement and Other Regulations That Impede Coalition Effectiveness}

It would be hugely significant were an effort made to adapt relevant national and IGO regulations so that (1) procedures designed to facilitate operations during conventional war also apply during stability operations, and (2) peacetime regulations, such as those that delayed UN procurement of engineer materials in East Timor and U.S. rules that plagued coalition partners in Iraq, are modified or replaced to better serve coalition objectives. The progress made in better sharing intelligence seen during operations in the Balkans should be sustained. Technologies to provide for rapid access of data to the level allowed require perfection. Coalition leaders should establish internal policies to promote greater partner and affiliate access to informa-

\textsuperscript{28} Thornberry (1997, p. 34).
tion rather than allowing subordinates to overclassify or create restrictive default settings that unnecessarily deny use. Serious consideration should be given to significantly expanding the number of FDOs, given the number and lengthy duration of U.S. coalition commitments. Domestic assignments for these individuals should include military and other training facilities to allow timely review and release of materials to students from other nations, agencies, and organizations preparing for assignments to coalition operations.

**Demonstrate Commitment to Readying Indigenous Capabilities and Wisdom in Surrendering Authority**

Near Gardez, Afghanistan we came back after building a well and found a cache of weapons in the well. So we blew the well after the village head couldn’t explain the cache. Then we came back two weeks later and there was a new key leader.

> --MSG Gregory Doles, U.S. Army

Although Americans were only advisers to the programs, CORDS [Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support] often had the power to see to it [that] the offending officials lost all financial support or were transferred out.

> --Dale Andradé, Ashes to Ashes

Combat dominated the conflict in Vietnam. Coalition armed forces persevered on virtually every battlefield on which they fought. The precipitous departure of the United States and other coalition members in the face of the indigenous government’s collapse demonstrated the inadequacy of measuring success in terms of military operations alone. The continued presence of coalition forces in East Timor, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq reflects that stability operations will demand lengthy commitments by at least the major parties in a coalition. Duration will not guarantee success, but it will likely be a necessary condition for its achievement.

The question is not whether indigenous-government representatives should be incorporated into a coalition, but when, how, and to what extent. T. E. Lawrence’s advice to “not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly” has nearly attained the status of principle. Yet, the situations confronted in Iraq and Afghanistan encourage us to ask whether a rush to surrender control to an indigenous government may be more harmful than beneficial to indigenous nation and coalition alike. Maj Simon Soskin addressed one aspect of the question by asking,

> to what extent should you take their decisions for them, and to what extent should you, as T. E. Lawrence said, let them go out on their own and make their own mistakes and help them later if they need to do better? . . . If you’re trying to put an Afghan platoon on the ground with a British platoon on the left and an Estonian platoon on the right, and U.S. planes overhead, and British helicopters supporting them . . . you can’t afford to allow them

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29 Doles (2008).


31 Lawrence (1917).
to make mistakes, because if they make a mistake, we are bringing our people home [as casualties].

Unfortunately, determining when an organization is ready to go it alone can be considerably more difficult at the strategic level. Permitting an interim government to exercise its sovereignty by demanding the withdrawal of forces from Fallujah in early 2004 resulted in the city falling under the influence of insurgent control soon after the departure of coalition forces and necessitated a costly second attack into the urban area in November of that year. Corruption has undermined efforts to build security forces in Afghanistan to the extent that being able to turn over police and military responsibilities remains as much a question of whether it will be possible as when it will occur. With the tremendous pressures to put governing in the hands of those from the country governed, political leaders backing a coalition ought to ask whether an overanxiousness in this regard may do more damage than good. Paddy Ashdown found,

In my own organization, OHR, there were Bosnians who were qualified and extremely gifted, working for international bosses who were frequently less qualified and gifted and always less knowledgeable about the country. One of my aims, we decided, should be to open up OHR by imposing a recruitment presumption for all posts in favour of Bosnians, unless there was a security reason for having to have an international, or we could find no Bosnians with the right qualifications. The result of this policy was that, by the time I left Bosnia nearly four years later, I found myself working with a team, mostly of young Bosnians, who were the most able and dedicated I have ever had the privilege to work with.

The passage merits contemplation for at least two reasons. First, it rightfully gives notice that there are indigenous men and women capable of handling aspects of their country’s administration. Second, the Bosnians whom Ashdown compliments were working for his UN entity rather than indigenous Bosnia and Herzegovina government bodies. These individuals likely received valuable training in governing; it must be hoped that others in fledgling local and state institutions were likewise being prepared for their future responsibilities. Coalition leaders must have a strategy that constantly moves them less toward departure as an end in itself than as a consequence of having worked themselves out of a job. As in the Solomon Islands, this may mean years of coalition representatives working side-by-side with indigenous-government administrators, increasingly releasing responsibility and authority as their counterparts refine their skills. Too early a release can create bureaucratic obstacles virtually impossible to overcome if a coalition has prematurely surrendered the authority necessary to address them.

The unattractive truth is that there will be times when an individual or organization in a coalition will need to be coerced or removed if ultimate success is to be achieved. This may include senior government representatives of the indigenous government. One need not venture far into recent history to find examples of desirable changes, such as land reform, expansion of the political base and other forms of power sharing, or reductions in corruption being resisted by officials of a government that a coalition seeks to assist. Unfortunately, the

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34 Obviously, the potential consequences resulting from such actions require extensive preliminary analysis to maximize the likelihood of achieving coalition objectives, including serving the short- and long-term welfare of the indigenous population.
solution will rarely be as straightforward as that described by Master Sergeant Doles in the quote opening this section. It therefore behooves coalition leadership to design leverage into its relationships with coalition members likely to impede progress toward sought-after objectives. There is nothing inherently unsavory in doing so, given that the means of influence are used in keeping with the coalition’s culture and not abused. The means may be (but need not be) overtly coercive. They include providing financial incentives and assignment of forces to less dangerous regions in addition to withholding funds or others less positive. Entry into a coalition leadership role without some form of influence in dealing with recalcitrant members constitutes poor diplomacy and a disservice to other members of the collective. The key will be in using the resource fairly, sparingly, and only after careful investigation to ensure that other measures have been exhausted and that the tool selected is appropriate.

Designing for such leverage can be difficult. Its maintenance will tend to be a dynamic rather than static process. What might be an effective means of influence at one point in time will wax or wane as conditions change. For example, a country devastated by conflict and without alternative means of funding will be more responsive to threats of withdrawing aid monies than the same nation after it has broadened diplomatic ties to include alternative donors or reestablished means of generating public capital. Determining what elements of leverage are likely to be effective at any given point in time will require war-gaming possible reactions and considerable sophistication in gauging second-, third-, and higher-order effects. For example, though coalition members may provide the bulk of aid provided to a host nation, threats of withdrawing that aid may be counterproductive if there is an alternative provider waiting in the wings, one whose increase in influence would bring with it negative consequences for the coalition venture. Similarly, threatening to withdraw security forces or other coalition assets is viable only if following through on the threat will not do greater damage to those proposing the action than to the interests of the threatened. In short, finding effective means of coercion will demand the best minds and constant attention.

Conclusion

**Intergovernmental Agreement on Aims.** The overall plan of campaign will be a function of government. Before HMG [Her Majesty’s Government] agrees to support an ally in a counterinsurgency campaign the two governments would need to agree on the overall aims, the role British forces will play and whether there are any constraints on their employment.

**A British Force Commander’s Position vis-à-vis an Ally.** A British commander of a force invited [by] an allied government will only be able to advise his ally. If he needs further guidance in what will probably be a complex situation, or if his advice is ignored he will be able to consult or have recourse to appeal through the senior British political representative, probably the Ambassador or High Commissioner. If there is still disagreement on an important matter of principle the question would be referred to HMG for decision. In an extreme case, if no agreement can be reached, this might lead to the withdrawal of forces.

— *Counter Insurgency Operations, British Army field manual*[^55]

[I]ncreasing the number of stakeholders is critical to success. This insight emerged several months into our time in Iraq as we began to realize that more important than our winning Iraqi hearts and minds was doing all that we could to ensure that as many Iraqis as possible felt a stake in the success of the new Iraq.

—GEN David H. Petraeus, Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq

We recall that the George W. Bush administration in Washington, D.C., wanted “to spend $515 billion on the Defense Department (not including the supplemental requests for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan), but only $38 billion on the State Department.” Given that USAID and much of the nonmilitary aid that the U.S. government provides internationally falls under the auspices of the Department of State and other agencies, 21st-century security challenges suggest that a reevaluation of these expenditures may be in order. That is not necessarily to suggest that the allocations for the Department of Defense are too high, but rather that those for State and other departments whose capabilities are vital to the conduct of stability operations will require greater support if they are to provide coalition leaders the resources they require during such undertakings. Today’s diplomatic environment demands that virtually any campaign other than the most limited of duration and narrowest of aims will be a multinational one. The cooperative venture that undertakes it will likely be a coalition, one that will find itself sharing its area of operation with, at a minimum, the local population and its governing bodies and probably with local and international aid organizations as well. It behooves U.S. leaders, then, whether in Washington, D.C., a combatant command, or on the ground in-theater, to cultivate relationships that will assist in moving the coalition toward its goals. It is no less important to preserve those relationships that have strengthened collective pursuits in the past. In a world in which the loss of even a single soldier or other citizen has, in many nations, fortunately, become an event much to be decried, coalition leaders should be quick to remind themselves that it benefits both those abroad and at home to prepare for the coalitions to come.

36 Petraeus (2006, p. 5; emphasis in original).

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