A RESERVE COMPONENT FORCE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

BY

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**Title:** A Reserve Component Force for the 21st Century

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**Abstract:**
Based on the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the military must adjust to meet anticipated and directed threats to U.S. national security. The active component of the U.S. Army is addressing these issues by building a more expeditionary, modular force, capable of projecting power with a rapid response. Army Chief of Staff General George Casey directed a review on transitioning the U.S. Army Reserves and National Guard into an operational forces, while the U.S. is engaged in two major conflicts and preparing for cuts to the military budget. Historically, discussions on dealing with the current and future threats with a limited budget and an adaptive global enemy do not appeal when the discussion pertains to force restructuring. Currently, one of the areas under review is the U.S. Army’s approach to enterprise management and the alleviation of duplicated missions. Secretary Gates proposed the elimination of Joint Forces Command, a reduction of this one headquarters will save the U.S. roughly $230 million dollars a year. Another area of duplication is within the U.S. Army’s Reserve Components, where both the Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserves reside. The question is why does the Army maintain two Reserve Components and should the nation combine this force into one?
USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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Based on the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the military must adjust to meet anticipated and directed threats to U.S. national security. The active component of the U.S. Army is addressing these issues by building a more expeditionary, modular force, capable of projecting power with a rapid response. Army Chief of Staff General George Casey directed a review on transitioning the U.S. Army Reserves and National Guard into an operational forces, while the U.S. is engaged in two major conflicts and preparing for cuts to the military budget. Historically, discussions on dealing with the current and future threats with a limited budget and an adaptive global enemy do not appeal when the discussion pertains to force restructuring. Currently, one of the areas under review is the U.S. Army’s approach to enterprise management and the alleviation of duplicated missions. Secretary Gates proposed the elimination of Joint Forces Command, a reduction of this one headquarters will save the U.S. roughly $230 million dollars a year. Another area of duplication is within the U.S. Army’s Reserve Components, where both the Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserves reside. The question is why does the Army maintain two Reserve Components and should the nation combine this force into one?
The United States is a nation at war, having sustained combat operations for ten years since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Some would argue that it has been almost twenty years, beginning with our first incursion into the Middle East for Desert Shield/Storm, through Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans and now U.S. persistent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Through all of these continued engagements the U.S. military has undergone significant adjustments, from the drawdown of military forces after Desert Storm, to the “Off-Site Agreement” reorganizing the Reserve Components in 1993; to the recent creation of the rapid deployable and modular force brigade combat team. Throughout them all, U.S. Army evolves and will continue to evolve. This is not new, changes happen, before, during, and after every major conflict of the last century. Organizationally, it seems the U.S. military is adjusting force structure, equipment, and a unit prior to the current conflict has ended or the next initiated. The Army National Guard has been a part of the fabric of society for three hundred and seventy four years, while the U.S. Army Reserves are a part of the U.S. military structure for over one hundred years. As is the case in most governments and bureaucracies, these two forces continue to grow and now compete for U.S. national resources. This paper suggests that combining the U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard will provide benefits regarding resources and missions. The question of resources will focus on current U.S. national economic issues and the human capital required to fill these units. The question of mission will look at the redundancy of missions and the requirement to have all reserve forces available to secure the homeland. It is apparent there will be tremendous political implications that such a
move would create, but as a Nation, dialogue is required to protect this Nation at home and protect the Nation’s interests abroad.⁵

Making a recommendation that makes a drastic change to the structure of the U.S. Army requires critical thinking, a deep examination of the problem and, strategic leadership to break the paradigm. It also requires a thorough understanding of the history of both elements and each component’s purpose.

**Army Reserve Component History**

The history of the Army National Guard is diverse and historically significant in the establishment of America. The Army National Guard traces its beginning back to those early settlers, who laid down their axes and fought for the separate colonies as militiamen during the Revolutionary War.⁶ Since the shot at Bunker Hill, the Army National Guard has been involved in every major conflict this country has faced. In fact forty percent of the American forces that fought in World War I were from the Army National Guard. All eighteen Army National Guard Divisions mobilized, fought in World War II and during Desert Shield and Desert Storm over seventy five thousand Army National Guard troops were mobilized.⁷ Since September 11, 2001 the U.S. has mobilized over 250,000 Army National Guard troops in support of overseas operations.⁸ The Army National Guard has transitioned from a Cold War high of 27 divisions in 1963 and end strength of 457,000 in 1980 to a force structure of 367,000 at the end of 1997.⁹ The current evolving force is a result of the 1993 “Off-Site” and the Army National Guard Division Redesign Study as a result of the Commission on Roles and Missions. Understanding this “Off-Site” agreement is critical to the current composition of today’s Reserve Component. In 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin directed that DOD conduct a bottom up review to strengthen the roles and readiness of the military
especially within the Reserve Components through the process of stabilization of the Army. Three major agreements resulted from this meeting. First, the stabilization of the end strength of the Reserve Components; second, Army National Guard forces would be a balanced force with a composition of combat, combat support, and combat service support units with embedded domestic response capabilities; and third, the U.S. Army Reserve aligned around the core capability of combat support and combat service support. The Army National Guard’s overall forces structure authorization may not have drastically changed since the 1993 “Off-Site”, but the allocation of the force has morphed into the current structure.

The U.S. Army Reserve traces its legacy back to 1908, when Congress passed legislation authorizing the Army to establish a reserve of medical officer corps. Starting with a governmental act in 1912 and proceeding over the next four years, National Defense Act of 1916 established, by statute, the Officers Reserve Corps, the Enlisted Reserve Corps and the Reserve Officers Training Corps as the force known today as the U.S. Army Reserves. Like the Army National Guard, soldiers from the U.S. Army Reserve served in every conflict since their inception. U.S. Army Reserve soldiers participated with over 170,000 in World War I; over 200,000 in World War II; 240,000 for Korea, 69,000 for the Berlin Airlift, and 84,000 for Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The U.S. Army Reserves, like the Army National Guard, mobilized relatively small numbers of soldiers for Vietnam. This low Reserve component participation led former Army Chief of Staff General C. Abrams to determine that it was a mistake to go to war without the Reserve Component forces. Since 9/11 the U.S. Army Reserves have mobilized over 175,000 soldiers to support operations around the world in support
of the global war on terror. The number of soldiers mobilized since 9/11 signifying the importance General Abrams placed on maintaining a Reserve Component that served the Nation during times of wars, and kept the citizens involved through the geographical locations of the Army Reserve Components.

Throughout the post-World II period, the Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserves have maintained separate organizational structures but with like missions. The proposal to merge both forces is not new and numerous studies explored the concept previously. In examining prior attempts in this area, the review of these efforts to restructure and their outcomes can facilitate the necessary background to understand the recommended change to the Army Reserve Components. The first was the period directly after World War II, followed by the early to mid-sixties just prior to Vietnam, and third post-Vietnam period.

Organizational History of the Reserve Components

*Legislative History.* Two distinct laws passed by Congress directly affect the organization of the Army Reserve Components. The National Security Act in 1947 and 1948 dealt with structure and formation and how the President ordered/mobilized these forces to duty. These two laws established the initial understanding of utilization and structure of the Army Reserve Components. These two laws established the organizations required for the national security in excess of those of the active Army components of the Ground and the Air Forces, and those in active service, the National Guard of the United States, both Ground and Air … “together with such units of the Reserve Components as are necessary for a balanced force, shall be ordered to active federal service and continued therein so long as such necessity exists.”19
Following the laws enacted after World War II, and while the U.S. conducted the Korean War, Congress made significant changes to the structure and role of the total Army. Congress determined from the growing threat of the Soviet Union and the concerns of stopping the spread of Communism led to the beginnings of the Cold War. This new threat required changes to transform the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) to meet this threat. This new organization divided the force into a Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve and Retired Reserve. Under this law, Congress authorized the President to order up to one million Reservists, of all services, to active duty to combat the growing threat of Communism.

Reserve Component Restructure Historical Perspectives. The recommendation to restructure the Reserve Components is not new, historically since World War II three major initiatives attempted to accomplish Reserve Component reform. In 1947 Secretary of Defense James Forrestal convened a panel that the Department of Defense designated the "Gray Board" with a charter to identify ways to abolish the National Guard. The final report was prepared and presented in June 1948 and the Gray Board recommended the merger of the National Guard and the Reserves into a federally controlled force called the "National Guard of the United States." However, the Army National Guard and the National Guard Association of the United States successfully lobbied Congress against the Gray Board’s recommendations. Due to political pressure and the changes in the plan that diverged from his original plan, Secretary Forrestal did not endorse the Gray Board’s recommendations.

In 1964, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara recommended merging all Reserve Components of the Army under the management of the National Guard.
McNamara believed in the need to maximize the experience of the force into one organization. Secretary McNamara background was in business and he constantly looked for areas of duplication and areas to become efficient, similar to DOD current plans of implementing enterprise management. Under McNamara’s proposal, all of the Reserve Components of the Army would be placed under the management of the Army National Guard. The overall tenets of McNamara’s recommendations were the following four main points.  

1). The force structure would consist exclusively of units, for which there is a military requirement, including combat and combat support units together with base mobilization base units such as training divisions, garrison detachments and reception station augmentation detachments and would require paid drill strength estimated at 550,000 soldiers.

2). Five independent brigades would be added to the 11 currently in the structure, making a total of 16 independent brigades, which could be deployed as such or in association with other forces in the structure.

3). The entire force would be included in the structure for which the army purchases equipment; as a result equipment would be authorized for two additional divisions and five additional brigades.

4). The unit structure of the Guard and Reserve would be merged under the management of the National Guard. Under McNamara’s plan the benefit of this merger would result in increased combat readiness, streamlined management, and a $150 million dollar savings in annual cost.
The plan provided a detailed chart to Congress quantifying troop levels in various units, before and after the proposed restructuring.\(^29\)

Congress rejected the proposal, in part because Secretary McNamara neglected to consult with Congressional leadership prior to leaking his plan to the public.\(^30\) By failing to consult with them, Congress alleged Secretary McNamara violated the Constitution, and due to the release of information the proposal faced intense resistance from the Reserve Officers Association, which had lobbied Congress to oppose the issue.\(^31\) Even though Secretary McNamara’s original plan was defeated by Congress, Secretary McNamara continued to push legislation that would accomplish the goal of merging the Reserve Component forces. Secretary McNamara spent the remainder of his tenure advocating Reserve Component reform as a way to streamline and reduce redundancy in the force. As Secretary of Defense McNamara discovered, taking on a project with large political implications, a strong advocacy, and creates a significant paradigm shift, is not always an easy proposition.

Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird initiated a review of the military in 1972, which specifically identified the Army Reserve Components as the principle augmentation of the active component forces in times of National emergencies. General Abrams took this guidance and produced the Total Force Policy;\(^32\) this policy required the United States to maintain an active force capable of maintaining peace and deterring aggression, by reinforcing the active force with a well-trained, well-equipped Reserve Component force. Using Secretary Laird’s intent, General Abrams shifted the military focus from one of manpower to a focus on National security, and searched out areas to maintain capabilities while still reducing the overall Army.\(^33\) General Abrams realized
there is a direct a correlation in career fields between the civilian world and the military occupational specialties in combat service support (CSS) operations to members of the Reserve Components. Some reserve soldiers actually practice their military wartime tasks on a daily basis in their civilian careers. General Abrams also realized the Army internal ability to conduct sustainment operations in Vietnam, allowed the Army the ability not to activate several reserve combat service support units for the war effort. This military action prevented an extensive call-up of the U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard for this conflict. This troubled General Abrams, and prompted General Abrams to come up with a force composition and capabilities distribution that would force the active Army to utilize the Reserve Components during conflict. The first was that the U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard receive initial training from the Army’s active component in specialties that required civilian applications. The second would force the President to mobilize Reserve Component units to conduct operations that required those sustainment forces which a majority found in the Reserve Components. This would end the President's ability to commit a substantial number of forces without Congressional approval. General Abrams also felt this would keep the American people connected to its military during times of conflicts, this view became known as the “Abrams Doctrine.” This policy approval was a monumental achievement, cementing the importance of the Reserve Components role in our Nation’s national security.

Secretary of Defense Cohen initiated a plan that created a Total Army for the 21st Century. Taking Secretary Cohen guidance, Army Chief of Staff General Dennis Reimer in 1997 authored a thesis entitled, “One Team, One Fight, and One Future”,

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General Reimer recognized the inevitable issues that faced the United States in the future not only throughout the world, but especially on the domestic home front. From Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans, to Waco and Oklahoma; General Reimer understood the asymmetrical environment the Nation currently faced and the challenges which were ahead. General Reimer’s concern with the mobilizing of the Reserve Component for these types of contingencies prompted him to push for a better way to conduct mobilization. This established a memorandum of agreement that integrated two active Army and Army National Guard Divisions. This was a historic agreement and one that clearly established the base of reliance from the active Army to the Army National Guard. General Reimer’s goal was not just an “Integrated Army” but a “Seamless Army” that could fully utilize all measures of its combat power.  

Financial Implications on the Reserve Component

In August 2010, while addressing a group in Detroit, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen stated, “The greatest risk to our national security is our nation’s debt.” A statement such as this from the most senior military man in the U.S. declaring that not China or Iran, but our debt is the greatest threat to our security is unimaginable. Again in October 2010, Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn met with Wall Street analysts to determine ways that the Pentagon could find ways to save money. During this meeting, a brief described that the U.S. is running a deficit, which the Nation will pay over 200 billion dollars in interest in 2011 just on this debt. This rate of debt is completely unsustainable, cutting the defense budget will have to be part of the solution. This serious economic issue currently facing the U.S. is a leading proponent for civilian and military leaders exploring areas for reduction and areas of duplication.
The current national debt is almost fifteen trillion dollars, a staggering sum. Other than World War II and its immediate aftermath, the United States has never been so indebted. Since 2000 the military budget has increased from 300 billion to approximately 600 billion dollars. This amount is more per GDP than Russia, Japan, France, and Germany spend combined on their defense. Public debt of this magnitude is not sustainable. Recently, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates directed that the Pentagon find 100 billion dollars of savings during the current budget year to help reduce the overall national debt. Figure 1 is a visual example on how much the Army budget will have to reduce over the next ten years if current DOD figure is realized.

Figure 1:
Figure 1 illustrates growth of over thirty billion dollars from FY 11 to FY 20; this is a very optimistic projection. With the current economic issues facing the U.S. any growth within discretionary funding is suspect and Congress will likely target these funds for reduction instead of growth.

DOD requested 600 billion dollar Defense Budget, the Army’s portion is $143.4 billion for Fiscal Year 2011 and an additional $102.2 billion for overseas contingency operations. These requests are part of the overall defense request of $549 billion in its base budget and $159 for overseas operations, primarily in Afghanistan and Iraq. “This represents 1.8 percent real growth,” Adm. Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told reporters Feb. 1. The base budget funds active component end strength of 547,000; Army National Guard end strength of 358,200 and the U.S. Army Reserve end strength of 205,000. This end strength allots for the Army National Guard’s budget to be approximately 25.3 billion dollars for fiscal year 2011, while the Reserves will receive 18.8 billion. There is a delta between the two reserve forces of 6.5 billion dollars. The difference between the two Army Reserve Components seems like a large disparity. The disparity shrinks in light of the fact that the Army National Guard has 153,200 more soldiers than the U.S. Army Reserves; higher maintenance costs due to equipment; and the number of facilities operated by the National Guard. The combined amount between the two forces makes up 1% of the DOD National Defense budget and makes up 3.2% of the Army’s TY 11 budget.

Cost comparison of combining the two forces would create a savings of over two billion dollars. These generated savings by the reduction of 23,200 soldiers from the Reserve Component upon completion of the merger. This takes the average of a cost
comparison of under current budget projections of the average cost for each Reserve Component soldier estimated in FY 2011 at 81,500 dollars times the 23,200 spaces eliminated. Additional savings will incur across the Reserve Components during the merger in savings from military construction, equipment maintenance, and base restructuring.

**Reserve Component Capabilities**

United States Code Title 32 and Title 10 constitute the main laws depicting the responsibilities of the Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserves. The missions and composition of these two forces is very diverse. As mentioned earlier, the 1993 off-site analyzed the missions of both Reserve Components, within the Army, both Reserve Components make several contributions, varying from combat, combat support, and combat service support to the Nation’s security requirements. Both forces are key contributors to the Nation’s federal mission; however the National Guard is now required as the DOD lead agency for Homeland Security. A breakout of the two components and their makeup is important in understanding the importance of their Title 10 requirements.

The National Guard is made up of 44 percent Combat Arms (CA) units, 19 percent of Combat Support (CS), and 27 percent of Combat Service Support (CSS) within the Army’s total structure.

The U.S. Army Reserves represent the following within the Army structure, 1 percent of Army Combat Arms Units, 30 percent of Combat Support, and 38 percent of Combat Service Support. A critical element of the U.S. Army Reserves is the amount of Title 10 total mission capability that they conduct. U.S. Army Reserves represent 100 percent of railway units, engineer commands, training and exercise divisions, and judge
advocate general units; 75 percent of civil affair units, psychological operations
battalions, logistics battalions, ordnance battalions, chaplain detachments, military
history detachments, petroleum groups, and medical brigades. The U.S. Army
Reserves also compose up to 50 percent of all medical commands, adjutant general
units, transportations battalions, military police commands, and information operations
units. All of these are critical elements for the Title 10 mission, without which the active
Army could not conduct its Title 10 mission. This capability found in the U.S. Army
Reserve, which is insufficient in the Army National Guard, is a critical function needed in
conducting the Title 32 mission, addressing Homeland Security and Defense Support to
Civil Authorities (DSCA). The transition of these forces to the Army National Guard
would create a significant advantage when conducting domestic operations, but would
still remain as an integral part of the title ten requirements. DOD should direct DA,
USARC, and NGB to conduct a significant study to determine force structure distribution
of this additional CS and CSS capability in the Army National Guard. From the DOD
directive, these three entities will initiate another off-site type study with the questions
answered for roles and mission, demographic distribution, and command and control
integration.

Reserve Components Missions and Authorities

DOD through NORTHCOM CONPLANs rely heavily on the Reserve
Components, especially the Army National Guard for its required support for DSCA.
First an understanding of Homeland Security, the governmental entity
responsible, and the role of the Reserve Component in this mission, is critical to the
discussion of transitioning to one Reserve Component. Department of Homeland
Security, which is the lead agency for Homeland Security defines DHS mission as; “We
will lead the unified national effort to secure America. We will prevent and deter terrorist attacks and protect against and respond to threats and hazards to the Nation. We will secure our national borders while welcoming lawful immigrants, visitors, and trade.” 59

The Army National Guard is assigned the role as a lead DOD agency in the Homeland Defense mission. In order to fully integrate into this critical mission, the Army National Guard is working with U.S. NORTHCOM, to synchronize and facilitate the activities associated with many of these new emerging missions. This is not a new role for the Army National Guard; in fact the role the Army National Guard will assume in homeland security is directed by law and over time has become a core competency for the Army National Guard. In fact the roles and responsibilities of the Army National Guard is codified in law. Title 32 of the U.S. Code, Section 102 states, “In accordance with the military policy of the United States, it is essential that the strength and organization of the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard as an integral part of the first line defenses of the United States be maintained and assured at all times.” 60 This code is the essential aspect of National Guard maintaining its capabilities to conduct not only the federal mission but also the domestic mission. The code also stipulates that “Congress determines that more units and organizations are required for the national security than are in the regular components of the ground and air forces, the National Guard of the United States… shall be ordered to active Federal duty and retained as long as so needed.” 61 Under this policy the National Guard is utilized for any emergency deemed appropriate by the Governor of a State or the President for a region of the country. Title 32 of the U.S. Code, Chapter Nine clarifies the ability of the Governors and the Secretary of Defense to act jointly in utilizing the National Guard for
Homeland Defense activities. “The Secretary of Defense may provide funds to a Governor to employ National Guard units or members to conduct homeland defense activities that the Secretary, determines to be necessary and appropriate for participation by the National Guard units or members, as the case may be,” Homeland Defense activities described as “an activity undertaken for the military protection of the territory or domestic population of the United States, or of infrastructure or other assets of the United States determined by the Secretary of Defense as being critical to national security, from a threat or aggression against the United States.” Under Title 32, Chapter 9 the National Guard can be utilized for Homeland Defense activities and emergency deemed appropriate by the Governor of a State and the Secretary of Defense (and by inference the President) for any state or territory. It is also wholly noteworthy that this chapter does not apply to the U.S. Army Reserves, leaving their role in Homeland Defense undefined. As mentioned previously, the critical piece in this equation is the type of units in the Army National Guard and those in the U.S. Army Reserves. The Army National Guard has adequate forces to accomplish required missions, but the majority of the units trained and better equipped for Homeland Defense and natural disasters reside in the U.S. Army Reserves, but as stated by law the Army National Guard is directed to conduct the mission. The Army National Guard remissioned and retrained units to conduct the additional missions of Chemical, Biological, Radiological/Nuclear, and Explosive (CBRN); and Chemical Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP). These two units provide to each Governor an immediate response capability, able to search an incident site, to include damaged buildings; rescue casualties, decontaminate victims, and perform medical triage. This
mission is additional and does not replace a unit’s requirement for its Title 10 role. With this additional requirement added to the Army National Guard in the last ten years, it demonstrates another example the need to have all the Reserve Component resources under one command. This unity of command would facilitate the Homeland Defense mission to the Reserve Component per law and all roles, capabilities, and equipment needed for mission accomplishment would reside within that component.

Another area that deals with Homeland Security is the status of the Reserve Components during these missions. Each component is individually titled by the U.S. Code to achieve certain roles and functions. The U.S. Army Reserve operates strictly under the authorities of Title 10. The National Guard primarily a state entity is controlled under both Title 10 and Title 32. As such Title 10, Section 10102, states that: “The purpose of each Reserve Component is to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require, to fill the needs of the armed forces whenever more units and persons are needed than are in the regular components.” It does not say the National Guard or the U.S. Army Reserves; the law states Reserve Component. There are numerous areas in Title 10 and Title 32 that apply to both Reserve Components. In fact, Title 10, Section 10105, states: “The Army National Guard of the United States is the Reserve Component of the Army that consists of—

- Federally recognized units and organizations of the Army National Guard
- Members of the Army National Guard who are also Reserves of the Army.”
This is critical in understanding that by combining both Reserve Components, there is not a loss of Title 10 capability to the active Army component. Then finally Title 32, Section 110, states: “The President shall prescribe regulations, and issue orders, necessary to organize, discipline, and govern the National Guard. Additionally in the mobilization statues, Title 10 123 01(a), 12302, and 12304, gubernatorial consent is not required to mobilize the reserves. In both titles of the U.S. Code the forces are available to the President or the Nation in time of national emergency. The President does not need to garner the permission of a state Governor to activate the required force. Thus combining the U.S. Army Reserves into the Army National Guard would not prevent the active component Army from accessing the forces it requires when needed to conduct and accomplish U.S. national security objectives.

Reserve Component Recruitment

Another issue affecting the Reserve Component is competition in recruitment. The U.S. Army Reserves and Army National Guard mission, except for the combat role, is similar; and the demographic array and general appeal to the populace make the two components hard to distinguish. Both components provide the recruit the ability to serve the Nation, develop themselves, and earn benefits, but joining the Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserves is not entirely the same. Within the U.S. Army Reserves recruits do not join a unit, they sign up and enlist for an occupation, while in the Army National Guard recruits join and enlist into units. Additionally, Army National Guard members assume dual responsibilities, with a corresponding state and federal obligation under oath. The merger into one force would allow recruiters to transition into two categories, active Army component and Army National Guard recruitment. The savings in recruiting dollars would be significant and the focus from two reserves
entities into one with state allegiance and a specific knowledge that recruits will serve their state and nation will have intrinsic benefits.

With today’s technological advancements, recruits make informed decisions about joining the military. Viable transportation modes allow for a three to four hour commute creating a 240 mile recruiting zone. The principle issue with recruits is the shrinking numbers of individuals who can meet the requirements necessary to join the military. Today about 75 percent of the country’s 17-24 year olds are ineligible for military service.  

There are numerous reasons for this significant number, but the bottom line is that you have three Army components competing with each other, and with the other remaining services, for that remaining 25 percent. In actuality, that 25 percent will grow smaller during future years increasing further the competition. The National Research Council on behalf of the Department of Defense put together an extensive study researching numerous issues dealing with military recruitment. Of all the factors facing the Nation, the requirement and need for human capital and their ability to serve in our services with the shrinking growth of the U.S. population is a strategic issue.  

In this study, using U.S. Census data, the number of 18 year-olds in 2015 is estimated to be just over 4 million. As stated previously if only 25 percent are available then that only leaves 1 million 18 year olds to recruit. The number for 19-24 year-olds is very similar to that of the 18 year old data. Taking into account all of the additional issues facing our youth, this number is projected to continue a downward trend into 2025.  

A personal example of how demographics and competition come into reality when recruiting for the Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserves. These
demographics are occurring in a small rural area of Kingwood, West Virginia. Kingwood is typical small-town America, with a population of 3,045 and 1,391 being males and 1,654 females, with a median age of 42 years. In this small town there is two company sized Engineer units, one Army National Guard and one U.S. Army Reserve. A town this small with two similar units recruiting for the same demography of residents does not make sense and is unsustainable. The author believes that this is a trend that probably repeats itself across America and requires further research, and gives credence to the thesis of combining the Reserve Components into the Army National Guard. With the aging population, diminishing number of youth available, the Nation cannot afford nor provide the human treasure required to man two Army Reserve Components.

Recommendation

With today’s economic issues, the requirement for additional forces to focus on Homeland Security and Homeland Defense, and the competition of a dwindling pool of recruits, the Nation must determine ways that it can facilitate these challenges during a difficult time in our history. The merging of the U.S Army Reserves into the Army National Guard needs to be considered with serious dialogue and research. If the combining of these two components is not politically attainable, then serious consideration needs to be given to provisions in which as the reserve units that are geographically located in each state can be used for natural disasters and FEMA declared emergencies in that state. This could be accomplished with a memorandum of agreement between NGB and USARC, with Department of the Army G-3 maintaining oversight of the MOA and its usage. Serious consideration should also be given to the duplication of recruiting efforts and again provisions established that allow for an Army
recruiter be titled as a Reserve Component Recruiting specialist allowing this individual
the ability to place recruits into either the Army National Guard or U.S. Army Reserves
and dictate equitable quotas for a fair and balanced mission for that recruiter. Without
the combining of these two forces and the elimination of one headquarters and its staff
and bureaucracy, then other areas within the National Guard and Reserves will need to
be eliminated during these difficult economical times.

In conclusion, the proposition of this paper is not popular and is not politically
palatable to the 200,000 current serving U.S. Army Reservist. But as this Nation
struggles to meet the security requirements abroad and domestically; and faces a deficit
of historical proportions; military components which continue to compete over human
capital; the desire is to create dialogue that shows legitimate options available to our
civilian and military leaders ways to reduce redundancy and duplication. Only by a
healthy and detailed debate can our Nation move our military forces into the coming
century. Just as Secretary of Defense Gates made his courageous move, ordering all
of DOD to find ways to stream line the bureaucracy, cut unneeded headquarters, and
replace redundancy, this merger can accomplish those steps, and abolish a paradigm
and create real change for our nation.

Endnotes

1 MG William A. Navas, Jr., Army National Guard Posture Statement, Fiscal Year 1993,


(accessed December 3, 2010).

6 Ibid., 3.


9 Ibid., 18.


11 Ibid., 2.


13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

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