STANDARDIZING READINESS AND RESPONSE IN DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES

BY

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In Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) the military strives to ensure that planning, coordination and execution are synchronized when preparing for and responding to a disaster. To preclude repeating frequent failures in timeliness, preparation and coordination a standard framework must be developed to synchronize existing and evolving processes and capabilities. In addressing these inadequacies, an Adaptive Battle Staff Concept for domestic response is recommended.
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Historically, government response to major natural disaster is frequently hindered by issues of timeliness, lack of preparation, and failures in coordination. When responding to a DSCA situation, the military strives to address these shortcomings, but has, itself, been encumbered by a lack of standardization in organizing, training and equipping specifically for domestic ends. By implementing the Adaptive Battle Staff Concept into contingency planning and operational staff functions the military is better postured to respond to the needs of the nation in times of duress.

**Historical Background**

When most Americans think of the worst natural disaster on US soil in recent history they immediately think of Hurricane Katrina. Hurricane Katrina is likely the most dreadful example of how not to plan or prepare for an impending disaster. The US had not seen such devastation from a hurricane since Hurricane Andrew hit Miami some 13 years earlier and seemed to be unaware of what was about to unfold.

Accounts from the military personnel supporting the relief effort noted this was clearly not the situation anyone had planned for and certainly not the outcome anyone desired. Response efforts were not coordinated, non-standard and joint efforts were not
synchronized between the DOD, National Guard and First Responders.\textsuperscript{1} As noted by Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul McHale, “National Guard plans were not well integrated with overall DOD plans [prior to the storm]. However, the Joint Staff acknowledged that the NGB was providing timely and accurate reports, but Northern Command was apparently more focused on active operations and therefore did not have a well informed view of the significant National Guard effort in the region.”\textsuperscript{2} Both active and National Guard forces lacked unity of effort before and during the relief operations.\textsuperscript{3}

While the above indicates some level of operational dysfunction between the active and reserve components, Congressional reports recognized the roles and contribution of both components in response to this disaster. Their comments zero in on the distinct command and control of the National Guard under the Governor which is considered the strength of the Guard in DSCA operations.

The active and reserve components of the United States armed forces have a long and proud history of providing essential aid to the civilian populace of this country in the aftermath of natural disasters. There are several reasons the nation continues to rely on the military to perform this role. One is that the military is able to provide essential, life saving services more quickly and more comprehensively than any other entity when local and state response capabilities are overwhelmed, including the ability to provide helicopter and boat rescue, shelter, food, water, and medical support. Importantly, much of this capability is vested with the National Guard, and is thus an asset under the control of the governor of each respective state or territory and the District of Columbia.\textsuperscript{4}

These comments positively reflect upon the character and ability of the National Guard as a military partner and response multiplier for every state in the nation during engaged in a disaster situation.

The most recent event encapsulating poor planning, lack of vision, hesitancy to use the DOD in response efforts and coordination is the Deep Water Horizon Oil Spill.
The government response at all levels exemplified confusion, poor coordination between responders, lack of preparedness, and a disjointed federal response effort. This was an opportunity for the current administration to exercise and demonstrate new leadership and effectiveness in disaster situation. However, their analysis of the problem, timeliness of response and strategic message were insufficient to instill confidence in the public. The residents of the Gulf Coast quickly realized the impending disaster about to overtake their shores and marshlands and voiced concerns in the media about the Government response to this disaster.

Taking a lesson learned from Hurricane Katrina, the Governor of Louisiana immediately requested Federal support to fund a call up of the National Guard and engage the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to mitigate the impending environmental disaster that was about to overtake the state. However, the bureaucracy involved in getting appropriate assistance to the Gulf Coast states proved to be slow, untimely and disjointed. This highlights the need for timely response with the military in a DSCA situation.

Natural disasters and manmade threats continue to threaten US national security and economic stability. The National Response Framework (NRF) does an excellent job detailing the threats, response mechanisms and programs established to prepare the nation for the next disaster. The military is a vital resource the government should use to mitigate the effects of such disasters. The guidelines presented in the NRF are as applicable to the military as they are to all disaster response agencies. Considering the magnitude of a disaster requiring DSCA, how can the military do a better job integrating and fusing their capabilities with their civilian partners?
By applying standard processes promoting timely response, preparedness, and interagency coordination. The recommended method to achieve these results will be discussed further in this writing.

**Federal Guidelines**

The Stafford Act, The National Response Framework (NRF), The National Incident Management System (NIMS), the 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR), and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) are doctrinal guidelines based upon lessons learned from recent history. The NRF is replete with the virtues of unity of effort in all levels of preparedness, planning, response, and coordination. Figure 1 from the NRF shows how to build capability at all levels with the Preparedness Planning Cycle.⁹

![The Preparedness Cycle Builds Capabilities](image)

*Figure 1: NRF Preparedness Planning Cycle.*

The preparedness cycle starts with contingency planning, establishing organizational training, and resources in preparation to respond to an event. Then exercising and refining the process to improve the overall product the military provides
to the nation. As Figure 1 indicates, the process is iterative, evolutionary, and continuous. As a “living document,” the NRF is one of the most thorough yet based upon lessons learned, and, as such, is an important resource that complements military DSCA planning processes.¹⁰

Neustadt and May in their book “Thinking in Time” suggest that, in order to look ahead we have to look back to gain the proper perspective on how successful and failed operations and strategies worked; then utilize that perspective to shape plans, policies and procedures with some predictive measure towards the future.¹¹ Planning is a national priority according to the NRF.¹² Successful planning means drawing information from all available sources and applying those ends, ways and means to address and remedy the problem at hand.

Using national policy strategy, doctrine, and lessons learned the military strives to be a learning organization in all facets of DSCA operations. As such, there are suggested methods the military should employ to facilitate the learning process. Inadequate preparation, timely response and failure to coordinate between military and civilian response entities are all lessons learned from recent DSCA operations.¹³ Standardizing the process based upon lessons learned precludes repeating these same mistakes for effective response. These responses should include: 1) Establishing a library or reference data base for planners to use in preparation for DSCA; 2) Developing pre-deployment Set, Kits and Outfits (SKO) for use in DSCA to expedite a timely response capability; 3) Exercising the plan, regularly, with all potential responders, updating response methods or capability, and facilitating coordination
processes and practices. Thus, the potential benefit of standardization is timeliness of response, preparedness, and interagency coordination.

**State Application**

“States are sovereign entities, and the Governor has responsibility for public safety and welfare.” When a situation overcomes any state or civil authority’s capacity to provide the adequate response to an event the Governor of that state typically intervenes and calls upon the National Guard to conduct DSCA as seen in Figure 2.

![Governor Call Up of the National Guard](image)

Figure 2: The National Guard Call Up.

Regardless of the situation, natural or manmade disaster, the National Guard typically provides a scalable support package to be integrated into ongoing support efforts to meet the needs of the civil authorities engaged in disaster relief efforts. However, it is not just the National Guard providing this support. DOD Title 10 and the interagency support (federal, state, local) engage in this collaborative process rendering necessary assistance to the public in a disaster situation as a part of the broader national strategy. DOD guidance to the National Guard flows from OSD, through
NORTHCOM to National Guard Bureau and then down to the Joint Forces Headquarters (JFHQ) in the each state.\textsuperscript{17}

The National Guard charter is to be prepared to support civil authorities in response to a DSCA event. While the National Guard is usually the lead military agency responding to natural disasters, the roles between active duty forces and the National Guard change in the event of a terrorist attack.

The scenario that would override this would be if “the [active] military [responded] to an emergency involving the use of a weapon of mass destruction, or a terrorist attack, or threatened terrorist attack that results, or could result, in a significant loss of life or property if the President determines that the requirements for emergency response exceed the capabilities of the local, state, and federal agencies.”\textsuperscript{18} This information is pertinent to understand distinction in responsibilities between the lead military agencies responding to natural and manmade disasters.

\textbf{DSCA Imperatives}

The DSCA process ensures that when our local authorities are overcome by the magnitude of a disaster they have a higher level of support they can call upon to mitigate the effects of the disaster at the point of need. This process, while being continually enhanced, still has some gaps to fill in order to provide timely and appropriate response. Recent, historical analysis of DSCA prompted both DOD and Congress to consider where gaps in support exist and how efforts can be implemented to shore up response capability.\textsuperscript{19} Analysis suggests that due to frequent response requirements the National Guard and DOD are actually well prepared for events like hurricanes, floods and other meteorological phenomena.\textsuperscript{20}
Preparing for potential threats to the US by terrorist factions require further consideration to deter or respond to such a threat. Regardless of US vigilance along the border, in airports, and seaports the government cannot be realistically expected to respond, deter, or interdict terrorist activities all areas due to the enormity of that task.

In light of the recent attempts by radical Islamist to attack the homeland, Congress recognized the potential for gaps in coverage to exist. While these were mostly single actors evidence suggests they were influenced by Al Qaeda and groups whose aim is to attack the US.

Hence, Congress commissioned a recent study looking at ways to respond to such events. When military forces are employed either to respond or preempt an attack there are certain essential actions undertaken ensuring unity of effort.

The Congressionally mandated Advisory Panel on Department of Defense Capabilities for Support of Civil Authorities After Certain Incidents conducted a study titled, “Before Disaster Strikes: Imperatives for Enhancing Defense Support of Civil Authorities.” This document cites significant areas of concern regarding military preparedness for a potential WMD event in the US.

These specific areas of concern, regarding DOD function and oversight, address preparedness, resources (equipping and logistical), force structure, plans, and employment strategy. These concerns require further research and must be answered back to Congress by the Executive Branch, including DOD. However, as of this writing there has not been adequate time for the Executive Branch or DOD to reply back to Congress regarding these concerns. This does not diminish the importance of
this study but highlights the requirement to improve military preparedness, timely response, and coordination issues.

The military has taken measures to standardize, and source force packages in response to a WMD event. These forces will be discussed in the next section of this study. As these capabilities continue to evolve, the proper structure, manning issues and readiness factors should be implemented to meet mission requirements, and mitigate evolving threats.

The Evolving Process

The Unified Command Plan dated 17 December 2008 directs US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) to “assign tasks to, and direct coordination among, subordinate commands to ensure unified action.” While the National Guard is not a subordinate command under NORTHCOM they are a strategic partner in the development of strategic plans, processes and coordination measure that expedite support to the nation in a disaster or crisis situation.

The DSCA response capability of the National Guard is a force multiplier for the DOD. This fosters an environment where Title 10 Active Duty forces and Title 32 National Guard forces work together responding to all hazards, and meet the disaster preparation, and response needs of the nation. Moreover, this enables Title 10 Active Duty forces to focus on the war fight, and defend the homeland in the enemy’s backyard.

The evolution of the National Guard’s response capability significantly increased since 9/11 by focusing on DSCA preparations, and support on an all hazards response capability. Since that time the National Guard has an entire enterprise dedicated to WMD, specifically, Chemical, Biological, Radiological Nuclear and high yield Explosive
(CBRNE) response. Identification of these hazards and the forces able to respond to these threats, events and consequences has given rise to this latest force structure in the National Guard, and DOD at large. The new arsenal of units capable of responding to these threats enables the military to field a standardized quick response capability addressing potential WMD threats. The CBRNE response enterprise can be broken down between state and federal level response forces.

At some state, and mostly regional levels the National Guard sourced response forces consist of Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST), and CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package (CERF-P). At the Federal level are the Defense CBRNE Response Force (DCRF), and Consequence Management Command and Control Elements (C2CRE).

However, for this study, the WMD response focus remains at the state National Guard level. While these forces and their unique capabilities are critical to respond to a WMD event their ability to fully cover down on the homeland is suspect. A potential gap exists, whereby; there are insufficient resources and manpower to meet this requirement.

Additionally, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) asserts that the DOD must “field faster, more flexible consequence management response forces.” Thus, the Homeland Response Force (HRF) concept was born. Their charter is to fill the gaps existing in response capability within the ten Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regions in the US. To date the newly organized HRF is undergoing fielding, Manning and training. In the near future the HRF will be fully operational and ready to
operate alongside the other National Guard sourced CBRNE Consequence Management forces mentioned above.\textsuperscript{31}

How does this capability provide the necessary standardization that promotes unity of effort in DSCA events? A closer look at the organizational structure where these forces are aligned provides the appropriate insight to foster a standardized employment and utilization. The focus remains on the organization of the National Guard as the DOD’s primary response force for DSCA.

**Organizational Standardization**

General Craig McKinley, Chief National Guard Bureau stated in his treatise, “National Guard: A Great Value for America” in July of 2010;

“One of the cornerstones of National Guard value is its ability to respond quickly during domestic emergencies, providing Defense Support to Civil Authorities. For this domestic mission, the National Guard is a source of ready, trained, mission-oriented manpower without peer. Ten core competencies, known as the “Essential 10,” are employed in support of civil authorities: command and control; chemical, biological, and radiological detection; engineering; communications; ground transportation; aviation; medical support; security; logistics; and maintenance. Each of these “Essential 10” capabilities can be a scaled to provide military assistance during a crisis response of any size or magnitude.\textsuperscript{32}

These ten core competencies are the pre-operational focus for the states to prepare for DSCA missions. These scalable packages standardize the response capability the National Guard provides during any disaster or hazard mitigation situation. There must be a component of the force structure conducting the planning, preparation and coordination for the employment of forces to support these core competencies.

The critical link within the National Guard to streamline staffing and preparation processes is the Joint Forces Headquarters (JFHQ) Staff in each state. This structure is vitally important to the successful function of the organization. The JFHQ “coordinates
[the] planning, training, and execution of [National Guard] homeland defense, [DSCA], and other domestic emergency missions within the United States.\textsuperscript{33}

**State Joint Force Headquarters**

![Diagram of State Joint Forces Headquarters](image)

* Proposed Joint Forces Air Component Commander and Joint Forces Land Component Commander structure
** Conceptual phase
***Assigned to CNGB, with duty at the state or territory. Essential to joint staff actions.

Figure 3: State Joint Forces Headquarters.\textsuperscript{34}

The JFHQ (Figure 3) coordinates with local Emergency Management Agencies (EMA), first responders, and other agencies to ensure integrated planning processes are accomplished.\textsuperscript{35} These planners determine how and where resources (manpower, supplies and special equipment) are integrated into the plan, and then rehearse, exercise, and adjust the plan to ensure unity of effort.

One of the concerns of the National Guard leadership is that given the events of the past year on a global and national level--oil spills, earthquakes, and volcanoes--and more--there is no excuse for not having a response capability ready to deal with these contingencies.\textsuperscript{36} While the aforementioned concerns, are notable not all states have
established a standard planning, preparation, and operational framework within their JFHQ to address these concerns. Within the framework of the JFHQ there needs to be a subordinate cell whose focus is driven by planning, synchronizing, and adapting personnel, and resources responding to disasters in, and outside of the state.

An Adaptive Battle Staff (ABS) framework is a means to posture these organizations for an all hazards response planning and staffing capability within the respective states. While this structure is not the norm within the JFHQ of most National Guard states it is a worthy model for military planners to consider as the standard organizational structure to operate in the DSCA environment.

The architects of this framework selected the most effective processes mainly from DOD doctrine, inter-agency and first responder processes to effectively operate in today’s threat environment. The ABS should be integrated into the JFHQ under the Joint Task Force Commander who works directly for the Adjutant General in a DSCA situation. The ABS functions evolve beyond the traditional J-code organization; creating a joint response HQ based upon improved, cross-functional processes and increased spatial understanding. Figure 4 shows the functional areas of the ABS Headquarters.
This structure provides decisional effectiveness during operations and deliberate planning. During most normal, non-crisis, activities the JFHQ functions in the traditional J-code organizational structure. However, the JFHQ transitions to the ABS construct in response to contingences, preplanned events, or potential events, as directed by the Commander (usually the Adjutant General).

The ABS highlights the vital NIMS components for JFHQ operations supporting Joint Task Forces (JTF) and is the JFHQ’s adaptation of NIMS complying with Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD5). By design certain parallels exist between NIMS, and the ABS. Modifications have been made to accommodate unique JFHQ mission, staffing and statutory requirements. The ABS format is intended to
facilitate training and serve as a quick reference during planning, and execution of operations, thus facilitating preparation.  

The overall ABS design consists of the following divisions created to guide, and direct the battle staff during contingency operations: The Adjutant General’s Executive Board (TEB), Joint Operations Group (JOG), Joint Support Group (JSG), and the Joint Interagency Group (JIG). The ABS is broken down by functional area, and senior leader guidance is provided by the TEB to the functional area directors. TEB members advise the TAG, and provide input regarding issues affecting the state, and JFHQ. TEB members collaborate to facilitate commander decisions and provide functional area expertise and awareness. The TEB facilitates timely response in staff requirements for DSCA operations. The JOG is the main effort when activated and is supported by the JFHQ staffs, JSG, JIG, and all state military components.

Further broken down within the ABS are three main functional components (Figure 4). A Group Director is designated to provide overarching leadership for each ABS sub-component and to be the functional process owner. The three functional areas and their directors are: 1) Current Operations Group led by JFHQ-J3; 2) Joint Support Group led by the JFHQ-J4 and; 3) Joint Interagency Group led by the JFHQ-J9.

The JOG supervises and controls the integration and coordination of all military assets in supporting Requests for Assistance (RFA) by the state Emergency Management Agency (EMA), and other interagency partners, and stakeholders. The JOG supports all mission requests to provide DSCA. The JOG manages current and future operations in support of the Adjutant General to deter, defeat, and mitigate
threats, and aggression aimed at the state and other partners when so ordered by the Governor and/or the President. The JOG addresses the previously discussed issues of timely response, and preparation shortfalls that degrade DSCA operations.

The JSG formulates logistical plans and coordinates the delivery of supplies, transportation, procurement, maintenance, mortuary affairs, personnel, resource management, and health services. The JSG coordinates execution of the JTF commander’s directives, and guidance. Additionally, the JSG develops policies ensuring effective support for all forces engaged in the DSCA operations. JSG actions should facilitate the preparation, and logistical coordination aspects of DSCA to promote unity of effort.

The JIG is responsible for vetting raw intelligence information, and providing military leaders, and interagency partners with timely information, and shared knowledge to the maximum extent possible. Through affiliation with other agencies they shape and manage strategic communications (STRATCOM) information for the military. The JIG facilitates senior leader decision making, and synchronizes efforts with non-military interagency partners. The JIG supports the commander’s intent by providing oversight of the knowledge management policies, guidance, and STRATCOM focus for the military. The JIG facilitates the coordination in operations to unify efforts with interagency and military components. Figure 5 below shows the JIG environment.
Figure 5: JFHQ ABS Joint Interagency Environment

Specified training for each ABS group should be documented and maintained within each group and the J5/7. The minimum training requirements for ABS personnel should include: NIMS 200/300, NIMS 700/800, Joint Information Exchange Environment (JIEE), ETeam, Joint Operations Center 101, DSCA PH I/II and the Joint Staff Training Course (JSTC).55

ABS construct should be continuously upgraded, routinely exercised, and revised to ensure relevancy and preparedness for emerging threats. The design improves planning, efficient response preparation, and coordination for all hazards response.

During the conduct of consequence management the magnitude of the event may exceed a state’s capability, and require a larger force to support the mission. If the situation warrants, a Request for Forces (RFF) goes from the state to NGB or other
force providers (states or Title 10 forces), shown in Figure 5, and EMAC forces are sent to the state to be integrated into the response force. Just like the organic forces, EMAC forces go through Joint, Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (JRSOI), and are pushed forward to affected areas. These forces are incorporated in the support efforts and fall under the Command and Control of the Joint Task Force(s) commander. The endstate is achieved once the situation is stabilized such that state/local authorities no longer need the assistance of the National Guard/DOD forces. Once these forces are stood down, they go through a reverse JRSOI process, and return to their point of origin.

The ABS construct serves as the operational core for and tasking, communications, and information dissemination. By supporting state and federal agencies the ABS provides a standard staffing element with the responsibility to plan, prepare, liaison, coordinate, and develop a common operating picture for use by all agencies in the event of a DCSA situation. The ABS provides an effective and efficient military component of the National Incident Management System. It serves as a better mechanism for the military’s interaction through the Incident Command System. It is not a process itself: it is a means of better coordination in supporting these existing processes.

The expected results from ABS functions are: unity of effort; a joint logistics environment along with synchronized logistic movements; and rapid and precise force applications and responses. Properly conducted, the fruit born of this process is the mitigation of human suffering, further damage to property, infrastructure and the local economy; thus instilling confidence in the local, state and national government during a
crisis event. These results all promote the effect of preparation, timeliness of response and synchronized coordination between the military and the rest of the Interagencies.

Most active component forces outside of NORTHCOM do not train or prepare for DSCA events because their main focus is the warfight. However, further education, training and awareness need to occur within DOD fostering an environment of understanding, cooperation and unity of effort in the event that conditions warrant their services.

In the past there existed reluctance within the active military component to place their forces under the command and control of the National Guard in a DSCA situation. Real or imagined, these perceptions are reality to the forces on the ground, and generate concerns regarding command and control. This brought up the need to have a system to integrate active forces in a DSCA scenario that fosters unity of effort through unity of command. The linchpin to integrate the active component forces into a National Guard DSCA effort is the recently approved Dual Status Commander concept.

**Dual Status Command Authority**

The Dual Status Command (DSC) concept fixes the concerns both the active component (Title 10) and the Reserve Component (National Guard Title 32) have regarding state sovereignty and dual chains of command. The DSC now has the ability during a DSCA situation to command both Title 10 and Title 32 forces. This eliminates two chains of command that do not answer to each other; have different Commander’s in Chief, and different ideas about how to best support a DSCA operation. The National Guard is well suited for this responsibility due to their regular DSCA focus and experience in this realm.\(^{56}\)
In the five years since Hurricane Katrina, there is a bevy of literature commissioned by various branches of government highlighting lessons learned. Two notable studies are the 2007 Rand Study, “Hurricane Katrina: Lessons for Army Planning and Operations” and “Before Disaster Strikes: Imperatives for Enhancing Defense Support of Civil Authorities.” These documents discuss the need for unity of command within DOD and the National Guard in DSCA operations. These studies highlight learning points revolving less around the methods of support, and more on the command and control of the forces supporting the effort. Since 2005 many Governors suggested the National Guard be authorized dual command status of Title 10 and Title 32 forces responding to a DSCA event where federal forces are required.

In January 2010, “President Obama issued an Executive Order establishing a council of governors charged with forming working groups to address proper integration of military forces during domestic operations.” The working groups concluded that for “no-notice events” a Contingency Dual Status Commander would facilitate unity of effort during DSCA by unifying the command structures responding to the event.

Employing a Dual Status Commander (DSC) during a no-notice event provides a cooperative and innovative approach to increase unity of effort and purpose for state military and federal military support to states by establishing standardized procedures for commanding and integrating state and federal military forces for contingency or no-notice operations. The end result is an agreed upon command and control construct which eliminates the time consuming task of synchronizing organizational structures and procedures under crisis conditions.

This DSC has been used eight times since 2004. One specific example is during the G8 Conference in Georgia in 2004. The current Adjutant General (TAG) Georgia, then Brigadier General William T. Nesbitt, was the first National Guard officer to receive approval from the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) to command both Title 10 and Title
32 forces during this operation. The success of this concept paved the way for future efforts to use this command and control configuration. Other operations included the Democratic and Republican National Conventions and Operation Winter Freeze, a border security mission. The benefits of this construct are multi-faceted. By using this design and operating method military entities share a common operating picture, establish unity of effort, and align operational and strategic priorities through the DSC.

The DSC facilitates resolving many of the coordination, and command and control issues affecting DSCA operations, when there are dual chains of command. Further, it provides both Federal and State military forces the means, and method of establishing trust, building partnerships, and tapping into the expertise the National Guard provides in DSCA operations.

This standardized method of command and control solidifies state and federal relationships, and fosters unity of effort through unified command. When applying this authority to the ABS model, the DSC most likely becomes the JTF commander and directs the planning, coordination and response efforts through the ABS process. During a recent proof of concept exercise in November 2010, representatives from the active component, National Guard and non-DOD agencies tested this concept during a table top exercise concluded that the Dual Status Commander Concept will improve unity of effort in DSCA operations.

**Developing Common Operating Pictures**

At all levels, Local, State and Federal planners are using innovative ways to develop intelligence, process real-time information, and provide a single point of reference across the spectrum of agencies supporting a homeland security event.
Currently, there is a lack of standard processes from state to state, and within the interagency, ensuring access to information across the organizations involved in supporting a DSCA event. Efforts to provide leaders, and stakeholders, with standardized systems provide the answer to fuse information, resources, and response efforts to achieve unity of effort.

An example of civil and military organizations working together to standardize their COP could be a state’s National Guard and the state’s Emergency Management Agency (EMA). Using the model of a National Guard ABS, these organizations could work closely together sharing timely information enabling leaders to make decisions and apply resources where necessary to support the mission. Two COP software tools, in particular, that produce timely information sharing and requirements are the Joint Information Exchange Environment (JIEE), for mission tracking, and supplementing that data with the Emergency (E) Team program. Both programs provide situational awareness and enhance timely response capability for leaders and incorporate well into the ABS JIG.

The COP should provide situational awareness for the principle decision makers and their staff. The COP exists to provide leaders the answer regarding what the state and National Guard are doing to support a contingency.

The system uses near real time data extracted from databases, spreadsheets, JIEE, ETeam, along with various reports and plans. Additionally, the Joint Operations Center (JOC) uses the archived COP data to document the actions of the state and the military, providing a validated start point for future requirements and requests for funds.
Lastly, the COP systems allow the ABS JIG to vet and analyze information keeping the command informed and providing near real time sources to issue STRATCOMs to the public during a DCSA event.

Critical to the success of this function are the thorough processes and software systems facilitating knowledge management. Information fusion, analysis, and institutional knowledge foments a picture ensuring leaders at all levels can make decisions with the most current, and relevant information available.

**Performance Measures**

Thus far, developing enduring structure and processes improving unity of effort in DSCA is managed through adaptive staff processes, command and control, and knowledge management. To ensure this entire process functions as designed, performance measures should be developed to ensure the efficacy of the process. How is this concept tested and evaluated?

At present, many states routinely exercise their forces to respond to a particular hazard that may regularly occur in their state. For example, many hurricane impacted states conduct annual exercises with their state, and bring in local authorities, to work through a multitude of potential support issues.

By continuing to conducting exercises, gaps are exposed, and processes are refined to address those particular needs. The essential elements that must be exercised include: JRSOI, Intermediate Staging Base (ISB) activities supplying and operationally preparing units for integration into the supporting force; Area of Operations Reconnaissance; Reconstitution of Forces and Recovery to Home Station; Search and Rescue (SAR); Security Assistance; Medical Functionality and Access; Transportation; and Communications; and Coordination with local authorities.
Upon completion of these exercises After Actions Review (AAR) of the events should be conducted, which potentially leads to an improved system, program, or process. The standard AAR process covers the areas to sustain and improve leveraging the fresh experience of the event to craft the strategy for improvement and learning. Hence, all participants go through the cyclical process mentioned earlier in Figure 1, thus, fashioning a living plan that evolves with, and more importantly, stays ahead of potential threats to the nation.

Future Impacts

Budget Cuts. As the Chief of National Guard Bureau surveys the potential missions of the National Guard in a Homeland Security/Defense role he cannot help but have concerns regarding the future of the force. The current economic situation brings with it tremendous concerns regarding a drawn down of forces and the loss of potential capability to respond to a homeland contingency. Further, the SECDEF is looking for ways to trim the budget without reducing capability. In a recent article by the New York Times, Secretary Robert Gates agreed to look for excesses in the budget, but not to cut more than 9 billion dollars from the budget. While the Secretary is fighting to preclude the cuts from going deeper, essential funding for National Security and Homeland Defense programs could possibly be reduced.

Budget impacts are being felt right now in the National Guard for units like the HRF. HRFs undergoing fielding, manning, and equipping are currently under funded, and in need of resources to become fully operational. The future impact upon readiness is yet to be determined.

Standard Equipment Packages. NGB is concerned that many states lack standard equipment packages to use during DSCA operations. States are seeking to
get funding for communications, medical, and engineering equipment. Not all units are configured with the required set, kits and outfits (SKO) listed in the Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE). Standard communications equipment interoperable with first responders is an issue for many states. States are requesting funding from NGB to standardize their response capability to fill this gap.

**Interagency Cultural Awareness**

As part of a joint command and control liaison process it is essential that all players actively participate in the process; a common theme throughout this writing. Key personnel at all levels of response must be a part of the planning, training, execution, and refinement of response plans to properly resource, and achieve the desired endstate. Within the ABS, liaison with all supporting entities is a critical component of coordination process, to be exercised before, during and after all DSCA operations. By continually exercising liaison, and coordination processes expectations are managed across the spectrum of support, control measures are implemented, support costs are estimated, and graduated response levels are understood. The cultural chasms existing between the military and interagency are bridged the more they work, plan, and exercise response methods together, with the respective ABS elements. Leader exchange programs similar to those used by the US Military War Colleges could go a long way to foster trust, learning, and develop cultural awareness between the military and interagency(s).

**Conclusion**

In order to standardize response processes while achieving unity of effort in DSCA operations the military must focus on the following: 1) Continuous preparation including evolving planning processes; 2) Timeliness of support; 3) Fostering an
environment of interagency cooperation and coordination. These should be enduring processes, and develop a baseline of best practices.

Standard response force and equipment packages, Adaptive Battle Staffs, Dual Status Command authority for the National Guard in a DSCA environment, training together, exchanging ideas and sharing information regularly, and establishing trust within agencies, all work toward unity of effort.

This study reviewed some of the historical flaws inherent in the military’s ability to successfully conduct Defense Support of Civil Authorities. By developing processes that foster timely response, preparation, and coordination with interagency partners, and stakeholders a successful framework is erected and future operations may be postured for success.

Further, the analysis and development of standardized response packages, processes and methods to incorporate into Defense Support of Civil Authorities are necessary to effectively utilize military forces in the event of a natural or manmade disaster. By studying the current doctrine, and embracing evolving processes, the military provides necessary support to the homeland, when reality strikes and they are called upon to protect, support, and defend this great nation.

Endnotes


3 Ibid.
Ibid, 201.


6 Ibid, 9.


8 Ibid, 7.


10 Ibid, 71.


17 Department of Defense Directive 5105.83 states, “The National Guard Bureau (NGB) shall facilitate coordination between DOD Components, NG JFHQ-State, and the NG of the several States to enhance unity of effort.”


Ibid.


Ibid, List of Key Recommendations by Entity.


“HRFs will be a key element of the new DOD CBRN Response Enterprise, which also will include: One Defense CBRNE Response Force (DCRF), formerly CCMRF1; Two Command and Control CBRNE Response Elements (C2CREs); 57 Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs); 17 BBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFPs). The HRFs will operate alongside other National Guard sourced CBRNE Consequence Management forces like WMD-CSTs and CERFPs, as well as federal controlled elements of the enterprise, including DCRF, C2CREs, and follow-on forces, when necessary. When not deployed for CBRNE consequence management operations HRF personnel will focus on planning, training, and exercising at the regional level.” LTC Lawhorn, NGB J35, Homeland Response Force: Draft Pre-Decisional, November 18, 2010.


Ibid.


“In January 2010, the Secretary of Defense signed Resource Management Decision (RMD 700) authorizing the establishment of 10 units to create a new Homeland Response Force (HRF). These 10 units would be part of a larger CBRNE Consequence Management plan being developed by USNORTHCOM. These 10 National Guard HRF units would be a national asset based throughout the country ready to respond to a CBRNE or all hazards event within 12 hours. There would be 1 HRF unit per FEMA region. Most units would be MTOE based traditional National Guard units. Some units could be TDA. Units would be given the HRF mission in addition to their normal war time mission. The HRF mission would last three years. One year to train and two years on mission. These units would be part of the larger CBRNE Consequence Management plan with USNORTHCOM that includes state CSTs, CERFPs, the new HRFs and Title 10 forces. The HRFs are a stop gap measure between the state first responders and the Title 10 federal response.” National Guard Bureau, J-55 Strategic Plans,

31 Department of Defense Homeland Response Force (HRF) Fact Sheet, 1.


34 Claire Henline, NGB-ARZ-G5, ARNG 101, July 2010.


37 In the recent Joint Publication 5-0 (Revision Final Coordination Draft 10 September 2010) the Strategic Direction and Joint Operation Planning chapter uses the Adaptive Planning and Execution System (APEX). APEX uses an adaptive planning model similar to ABS to address national strategic response plans, contingency operations and inter-agency communication and interoperability. This process is not yet doctrine within the DOD but many Combatant Commands are familiar with the process and may soon rely on this model to develop contingency plans.


40 Ibid, 2.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.


44 Adaptive Battle Staff SOP Draft, 9.


48 Ibid, 21.

49 Ibid, 18.

50 Ga DOD Adaptive Battle Staff Update Brief, 9.

51 Ibid, 13.

52 “A Failure of Initiative,” Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 219.

53 Ga DOD Adaptive Battle Staff Update Brief, 18.

54 Ibid, 22.

55 Ibid, 14.


60 Ibid 4.

61 Ibid.


63 Ibid.

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid, 4.

66 “ETeam is a web based system used to gain situational awareness and exchange of information. The system has access to multiple logs, resources, mapping, and printed
reference material. The ETeam tool is used by the GDCO and ABS to monitor JOA SA and anticipate requirements. The State Emergency Operations Center Liaison has the primary interface between the state and the JFHQ JOC. Joint Information Exchange Environment (JIEE): A National Guard based information platform used primarily to track Requests for Assistance (RFA) and Requests for Information (RFI).” Adaptive Battle Staff SOP Draft, 80-81.

67 “The COP end state will integrate information relevant to the State’s tactical situation through strategic levels of command and may include, but is not limited to, geographically oriented data, planning data, readiness data, intelligence data, threat stream, CBNRE affects, weather, and current employment of local, county, state, contractor, and military forces. The COP facilitates collaborative planning and assists all echelons to achieve situational awareness by channeling relevant information to a focused point shared by more than one command.” Adaptive Battle Staff SOP Draft, 41.

68 Ibid, 40.

69 By serving as the single command and coordination ingress/egress function for unassigned and completed actions, the JFHQ-GA JOC drives synergy within the ABS and Joint Staff. The initial interface of information and data, or a request for the same, is accomplished through the JOC who receives that information and then manages its course of events to ensure visibility by the joint staff. This is primarily accomplished through posting information and data to JIEE, ETeam, and USNORTHCOM information portals. Under proper authority the JOC staff facilitates the Adjutant General’s command and coordination in the deployment and support of a National Guard task force(s) to perform Defense Support to Civil Authorities operations. Ibid, 40.


71 Ibid.