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On November 5, 2009, a lone attacker strode into the deployment center at Fort Hood, Texas. Moments later, 13 Department of Defense (DoD) employees were dead and another 32 were wounded in the worst terrorist attack on U.S. soil since September 11, 2001.

The U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs launched an investigation of the events preceding the attack with two purposes: (1) to assess the information that the U.S. government possessed prior to the attack and the actions that it took or failed to take in response to that information; and (2) to identify steps necessary to protect the United States against future acts of terrorism by homegrown violent Islamist extremists. This investigation flows from the Committee’s four-year, bipartisan review of the threat of violent Islamist extremism to our homeland which has included numerous briefings, hearings, consultations, and the publication of a staff report in 2008 concerning the internet and terrorism.

In our investigation of the Fort Hood attack, we have been cognizant of the record of success by DoD and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the ten years since 9/11. We recognize that detection and interdiction of lone wolf terrorists is one of the most difficult challenges facing our law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Every day, these agencies are presented with myriad leads that require the exercise of sound judgment to determine which to pursue and which to close out. Leaders must allocate their time, attention, and inherently limited resources on the highest priority cases. In addition, the individual accused on the Fort Hood attack, Army Major Nidal Malik Hasan, is a U.S. citizen. Even where there is evidence that a U.S. citizen may be radicalizing, the Constitution appropriately limits the actions that government can take.
In presenting our findings and recommendations below, we are grateful for the service given by our nation’s military, law enforcement, and intelligence personnel. Our aim in this investigation was not to single out individual negligent judgment; such instances are for the agencies to deal with, as appropriate. Nor do we seek to second-guess reasonable judgments. Instead, we act under our Constitutional duty to oversee the Executive Branch’s performance and thus to determine – independently from the Executive Branch’s own assessment – what, if any, systemic issues are exposed by the Hasan case. The specific facts uncovered by the Committee’s investigation necessarily led us to focus our key findings and recommendations on DoD and the FBI. But the Hasan case also evidences the need for a more comprehensive and coordinated approach to counter-radicalization and homegrown terrorism across all agencies, including federal, state, and local entities, which are critical to keeping our country safe.

Our basic conclusion is as follows: Although neither DoD nor the FBI had specific information concerning the time, place, or nature of the attack, they collectively had sufficient information to have detected Hasan’s radicalization to violent Islamist extremism but failed both to understand and to act on it. Our investigation found specific and systemic failures in the government’s handling of the case and raises additional concerns about what may be broader systemic issues.

Both the FBI and DoD possessed information indicating Hasan’s radicalization to violent Islamist extremism. And, to the FBI’s credit, it flagged Hasan from among the chaff of intelligence collection for additional scrutiny. However, the FBI and DoD together failed to recognize and to link the information that they possessed about Hasan: (1) Hasan was a military officer who lived under a regimented system with strict officership and security standards, standards which his behavior during his military medical training violated; and (2) the government had communications from Hasan to a suspected terrorist who was involved in anti-American activities and the subject of an unrelated FBI terrorism investigation. Although both the public and the private signs of Hasan’s radicalization to violent Islamist extremism while on active duty were known to government officials, a string of failures prevented these officials from intervening against him prior to the attack.

- Evidence of Hasan’s radicalization to violent Islamist extremism was on full display to his superiors and colleagues during his military medical training. An instructor and a colleague each referred to Hasan as a “ticking time bomb.” Not only was no action taken to discipline or discharge him, but also his Officer Evaluation Reports sanitized his obsession with violent Islamist extremism into praiseworthy research on counterterrorism.

- FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) are units in FBI Field offices that conduct counterterrorism investigations and are staffed by FBI agents and employees from other federal, state, and local agencies. A JTTF learned that Hasan was communicating with the suspected terrorist, flagged Hasan’s initial communications for further review, and passed them to a...
second JTTF for an inquiry. However, the ensuing inquiry failed to identify the totality of Hasan’s communications and to inform Hasan’s military chain of command and Army security officials of the fact that he was communicating with a suspected violent Islamist extremist – a shocking course of conduct for a U.S. military officer. Instead, the JTTF inquiry relied on Hasan’s erroneous Officer Evaluation Reports and ultimately dismissed communications as legitimate research.

- The JTTF that had reviewed the initial communications dismissed the second JTTF’s work as “slim” but eventually dropped the matter rather than cause a bureaucratic confrontation. The JTTFs now even dispute the extent to which they were in contact with each other in this case. Nonetheless, the JTTFs never raised the dispute to FBI headquarters for resolution, and entities in FBI headquarters responsible for coordination among field offices never acted. As a result, the FBI’s inquiry into Hasan ended prematurely.

As noted, DoD possessed compelling evidence that Hasan embraced views so extreme that it should have disciplined him or discharged him from the military, but DoD failed to take action against him. Indeed, a number of policies on commander’ authority, extremism, and personnel gave supervisors in his chain of command the authority to take such actions. It is clear from this failure that DoD lacks the institutional culture, through updated policies and training, sufficient to inform commanders and all levels of servicemembers how to identify radicalization to violent Islamist extremism and to distinguish this ideology from the peaceful practice of Islam.

To address this failure, DoD should confront the threat of radicalization to violent Islamist extremism among servicemembers explicitly and directly and strengthen associated policies and training. DoD launched an extensive internal review after the Fort Hood attack by commissioning a review led by two former senior DoD officials (former Army Secretary Togo West and retired Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Vernon Clark) and requiring multiple reviews across the military services of force protection and related issues. DoD has also instituted a regimented process for instituting and monitoring implementation of recommendations from these reviews, which included two memoranda from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates assessing and adopting particular recommendations from the West/Clark review. However, DoD – including Secretary Gates’s memoranda – still has not specifically named the threat represented by the Fort Hood attack as what it is: violent Islamist extremism. Instead, DoD’s approach subsumes this threat within workplace violence or undefined “violent extremism” more generally. DoD’s failure to identify the threat of violent Islamist extremism explicitly and directly conflicts with DoD’s history of directly confronting white supremacism and other threatening activity among servicemembers. DoD should revise its policies and training in order to confront the threat of violent Islamist extremism directly.

More specifically, DoD should update its policies on extremism and religious accommodation to ensure that violent Islamist
extremism is not tolerated. DoD should also train servicemembers on violent Islamist extremism and how it differs from the Islamic religious belief and practices. Without this improved guidance and training, the behavioral tendency among superiors could be to avoid proper application of the current general policies to situations involving violent Islamist extremism.

The 9/11 attacks led the FBI Director, Robert Mueller, to act to transform the FBI’s institutional and operational architecture. He declared that the FBI’s top priority would henceforth be preventing domestic terrorist attacks and that the FBI needed to become an intelligence-centric rather than purely law-enforcement-centric organization. The FBI has made substantial progress in transforming itself in these ways. The FBI is more focused on producing counterterrorism intelligence and more integrated than it had been. Its initiatives are headed in the right direction. To its credit, the FBI moved swiftly after the Fort Hood attack to conduct an internal review; identify gaps, and implement changes in response; the FBI also commissioned an outside review by former FBI Director and Director of Central Intelligence Judge William Webster. Nonetheless, our investigation found that the

To its credit, the FBI moved swiftly after the Fort Hood attack to conduct an internal review... Nonetheless, our investigation found that the Fort Hood attack is an indicator that the current status of the FBI’s transformation to become intelligence-driven is incomplete and that the FBI faces internal challenges – which may include cultural barriers – that can frustrate the on-going institutional reforms. The FBI needs to accelerate its transformation.

- In the Hasan case, two JTTFs (each located in a different field office) disputed the significance of Hasan’s communications with the suspected terrorist and how vigorously he should be investigated. The JTTF that was less concerned about Hasan controlled the inquiry and ended it prematurely after an insufficient examination. Two key headquarters units – the Counterterrorism Division (the “National JTTF” created specifically to be the hub among JTTFs), and the Directorate of Intelligence – were not made aware of the dispute. This unresolved conflict raises concerns that, despite the more assertive role that FBI headquarters now plays, especially since 9/11 in what historically has been a decentralized organization, field offices still prize and protect their autonomy from headquarters. FBI headquarters also does not have a written plan that articulates the division of labor and hierarchy of command-and-control authorities among its headquarters units, field office, and the JTTFs. This issue must be addressed to ensure that headquarters establishes more effective strategic control of its field office operations.

- In the Hasan case, the FBI did not effectively utilize intelligence analysts who could have provided a different perspective given the evidence that it had. The FBI’s inquiry focused narrowly on whether Hasan was engaged in terrorist activity – as opposed to whether he was radicalizing to violent Islamist extremism and whether
this radicalization might pose counterintelligence or other threats (e.g., Hasan might spy for the Taliban if he was deployed to Afghanistan). This critical mistake may have been avoided if intelligence analysts were appropriately engaged in the inquiry. Since 9/11, the FBI has increased its intelligence focus by creating a Directorate of Intelligence and Field Intelligence Groups in the field offices and hiring thousands of new and better qualified analysts. However, the FBI must ensure that these analysts are effectively utilized, including that they achieve significant stature in the FBI. The FBI must also ensure that all of its agents and analysts are trained to understand violent Islamist extremism.

- In the Hasan case, the FBI did not identify the need to update its tradecraft (i.e., the methods and processes for conducting investigative or intelligence activities) regarding the processing and analysis of communications until after the Fort Hood attack. This delay led to a failure to identify all of Hasan’s communications with the suspected terrorist and the extent of the threat contained within them. The FBI has had numerous successes against homegrown terrorist cells and individuals since 9/11 that have saved countless American lives. However, the FBI should still ensure that all of its tradecraft is systemically examined so that flaws can be corrected prior to failures. The FBI leadership should continue to oversee this element of its transformation to a first-class, intelligence-driven counterterrorism organization.

- In the Hasan case, the JTTF model did not live up to the FBI’s strong vision of JTTFs as an effective interagency information-sharing and operational coordination mechanism. JTTFs have been expanded significantly since 9/11 and are now the principal domestic federal operational arm for counterterrorism investigations and intelligence collection. However, the specific handling of the Hasan case, and systemic disputes between DoD and the FBI concerning JTTFs which remain unresolved, raise concerns that the JTTF model requires additional review and improvement in order for JTTFs to function as effectively as our nation requires.

Finally, we suggest that the National Security Council and Homeland Security Council lead in the development of an integrated approach to law enforcement and intelligence domestically and a comprehensive national approach to countering homegrown radicalization to violent Islamist extremism. The threat of homegrown radicalization goes beyond the capabilities of the law enforcement, intelligence, and homeland security agencies and requires a response from a broad range of our government which will produce plans to translate and implement this comprehensive national approach into specific, coordinated, and measurable actions across the government and in cooperation with the Muslim-American community. **IAJ**
The challenge facing our institutions is to adapt to new realities while preserving those core competencies and institutional traits that have made them so successful in the past.¹

Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense

Introduction

Because winning the Nation’s wars is as much political as it is military, it is a matter of national security and priority that the Nation’s leaders do everything they can to ensure lasting interagency cooperation and unity of effort. Failing in this, the hard lessons learned from the sacrifices of DoD personnel and personnel of other U.S. government agencies will atrophy and have to be learned again at a terrible cost. Since September 11, 2001, the Department of Defense (DoD) and its complementary soft-power interagency partner, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), have been asked to take on more diverse roles across a full spectrum of operations that include reconstructing bridges and schools, stabilizing governments, and creating economic development. While these missions and tasks are not necessarily new, lessons learned from recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq should be applied vigorously so the DoD and USAID will not need to relearn them in the future.

Proposed and Current Measures to Improve Interagency Cooperation

forming a civil service interagency cadre called the National Security Service Corps, which would allow individuals to obtain “rotational assignments and professional education” to “hold certain positions or to be promoted . . .” In July 2005, the Center for Strategic and International Studies also proposed a “national security career path that would give career professionals incentives to seek out interagency experience, education, and training.” It further recommended that Congress provide civilian agencies an additional 10 percent float in manpower billets in order for the program to work.3

A July 2008 Congressional Research Service report for Congress calls for an institutional approach to building a permanent “interagency cadre of national security professionals . . . aimed to adjust the organizational cultures of all agencies with national security responsibilities, in order to make interagency collaboration and integration second nature.” In doing so, it attempts to create a National Security Professional Development Program that would entail education, training, and exchange tours to gain “a better understanding of the mandates, capabilities, and cultures of other agencies.”4 However, taking such action requires Congressional funding and support, which has been difficult to come by in light of the recent economic difficulties facing the nation. There currently is still a gap to be filled.

In their November 2008 report “Forging a New Shield,” the Project on National Security Reform characterized the interagency system as being “grossly imbalanced . . . [and] supporting strong departmental capabilities at the expense of integrating mechanisms.” Thus, it also put forth a number of recommendations for interagency reform by calling for a new concept of national security and began work on a draft for a new National Security Act.

Despite these “high level” recommendations, there has not been much progress or funding support to properly implement them. Given the current gap, the agencies have had to once again defer to ad hoc efforts in the pursuit of unity of effort. One example is an initiative by the Army National Training Center to employ former USAID personnel with Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) experience to assist in pre-deployment PRT training. Fort Bragg, NC, has also implemented a program to train PRT commanders for up to six months prior to deployment, including training opportunities with interagency partners. In 2009, USAID began offering a three-day USAID familiarization course for military personnel and the Foreign Service Institute offered several reconstruction and stabilization training courses for civilians and military.5 While these and similar training opportunities represent progress toward improved cooperation, they are born of pressing necessities for immediate integration prior to deployments to Afghanistan or Iraq.

From the strategic perspective, the State Department’s creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) did bring about a Washington-based, interagency, decision-making body supported by a full interagency secretariat that performs planning and operations functions. S/CRS, however, has been resource constrained and has not evolved as designed; thus, it continues to lack a comprehensive capability to fully
integrate interagency efforts. Although DoD Instruction 3000.05 is clear in its guidance on the relationship between stability operations and combat operations, as well as broad language for supporting the agencies, it does not explicitly address interagency cooperation with USAID. What is missing is a “joint-interagency” policy memorandum between the DoD and USAID to solidify the commitment for improved interagency cooperation. From the operational perspective, the Office of Provincial Affairs and Multi-National Corps-Iraq published a unified common plan (UCP) in April 16, 2009, with the aim to usurp independent stove-piped efforts that were at times counterproductive and duplicative. The UCP brought together a formalized interagency planning and execution framework to “build civil capacity at the regional, provincial, and local level in Iraq.” And while the sum of recent measures indicates a degree of commitment, initiative, and leadership in the right direction, these measures are, by themselves, ad hoc efforts once again at risk of atrophy similar to what took place after successful interagency cooperation efforts post-WWII in Japan and successful CORDS operations in Vietnam.

For lasting improvement in interagency cooperation and the achievement of unity of effort, there must be institutional and structural changes in how the agencies operate. Sometimes such institutional changes must be forced, as seen by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which forced joint coordination and cross-pollination by the military services. However, as effective as the U.S. military has been in combat, it does not adequately address current national security needs that require interagency cooperation and the application of soft power, which in some situations can be as potent as the application of hard power. Absent a similar act for the agencies to force cooperation, it is still possible to improve interagency cooperation if given Presidential commitment and adequate Congressional funding support. The following recommendations are meant to improve unity of effort between the DoD and USAID as part of the whole-of-government approach. While senior DoD leaders such as Admiral Mullen have admitted “we are a good decade away from creating a capability in our other departments,” the time to act is now.6

Recommendations

Presidential commitment and Congressional funding support are requisite ingredients to provide the foundation for lasting unity of effort by U.S. government departments and agencies. Therefore, the President must reiterate his commitment to strengthening the nation’s soft-power capabilities and interagency cooperation with a cover letter to accompany an “Interagency Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy” between the DoD and the Department of State. This interagency policy with signatures from DoD, State, and USAID is necessary to put the weight and flexibility of the military and the policy direction of the State Department behind interagency cooperation with USAID. The signature requirements will also strengthen the State Department and USAID’s cooperation commitment toward the DoD. Although current DoD Instruction 3000.05 and USAID’s Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy call for increased cooperation, this interagency policy with specific implementation guidance, to include
a formal interagency exchange program, is the
next critical step to merge and integrate each
agency’s policy intents. Details of the proposed
formal interagency exchange program are as
follows.

**Proposed DoD and USAID Interagency
Exchange Program Guidance**

To advance achieving unity of effort, the
DoD and USAID should work in partnership and
with S/CRS to further develop and implement
a formal Interagency Exchange Program for
DoD and USAID personnel to enhance the
employment of soft-power effects required by
national imperatives. Just as joint assignments
have served the DoD extremely well by
integrating combined arms for maximum lethal
effects, cross-flow assignments between the
DoD and USAID will create the opportunity for
both military and civilian professionals to better
leverage each other’s core competencies through
shared information and expertise. Interagency
assignments will be considered important by
the participating agencies, and officers selected
to participate will be duly chosen and developed
for advancement.

The exchange program should be designed
to immediately leverage limited resources
and expertise to close the current soft-power
capabilities gap created by the national security
landscape and internal policy directives. At
the same time, it should have the foresight to
develop longer-term capabilities. While current
operations allow ample opportunities for DoD
and USAID personnel to work side by side at
the PRT level in Afghanistan and Iraq, they
must sustaining and safeguard current gains
for the future to prevent atrophy. Thus, the
interagency exchange program between the
DoD and USAID represents an important step
in this direction.

An interagency cadre including
representation from the State Department,
USAID, and all services within the DoD should
manage the program. The interagency cadre’s
charter would provide leadership, management,
and program development. The agencies should
take the initiative by calling for an initial cadre
of volunteers interested in developing soft-
power skills to further support and develop the
proposed exchange program. The cadre should
conduct a cost estimate to determine program
funding requirements to cover additional billets,
education and training programs, and other
operational funding needs. Once finished, the
cadre would work to submit the total funding
requirement as part of the President’s annual
budget request to Congress.

**Proposed Exchange Program
Manpower Staffing**

The program should be designed with
additional interagency manpower billets and
given staffing priority. Officers selected for
the program should be designated with a skill
identifier to enable effective management for
career and long-term development. A
sustainable, functional, and learning organization must have
a proper mix of experienced personnel and
novices in the pipeline willing to serve. For
long-term viability, the program must put a
premium on developing not just senior officers
and professionals, but those at the junior to mid-
grade levels as well.

**Proposed Education and Training Program**

The U.S. government must decisively act
to reverse years of imbalance in education and

...the DoD and USAID should work in partnership and with S/CRS to further develop and implement a formal Interagency Exchange Program for DoD and USAID personnel...
training programs for soft power. Interagency education program levels should mirror current military professional education levels. Opportunities to receive interagency training and development should be available at the appropriate time and years of service. The program should include current interagency opportunities, such as the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, but also expand to include other on-the-job and operational cross-flow assignments. These opportunities will translate into faster integration at all levels and will help achieve unity of effort in future operations.

...the recommendation for education and training to close the knowledge, skills, and abilities gap should include a certification program.

For both DoD and USAID officers identified to participate in the interagency exchange program, the recommendation for education and training to close the knowledge, skills, and abilities gap should include a certification program. This certification program should be designed to maintain foreign language fluency, area and cultural knowledge, leadership and management ability, negotiating skills, public diplomacy know-how, and job-specific functional expertise spelled out in DoD Instruction 3000.05. This program would include the skills required to rebuild indigenous institutions, judicial systems, private sectors, economic sectors, necessary infrastructures, and representative governmental institutions. The interagency exchange training program would work directly with the State Department’s Foreign Service Institute and the Army’s National Training Center to ensure the current deployment training programs endure.

Proposed Interagency Exchange Activities

In addition to training and education, activities related to interagency exchange positions should have a strong operational focus with the aim of improving unity of effort in the context of civil military operations and its associated soft-power effects. These activities would be designed to further improve operational integration as follow on to time spent in education and training environments. For instance, a program already exists to send civil service personnel on overseas excursion tours when there are no foreign service volunteers. There is also a program that allows civil service personnel to convert permanently to the foreign service. These programs could also be temporarily supplemented with military personnel with the right mix of skill sets, experience, and additional foreign service training provided by USAID. Finally, a capstone operational assignment for an O-5 DoD officer could be a position as a PRT commander followed by an assignment to a higher headquarters, where operational experience gained at the PRT level can be reintegrated to further improve policies or plans.

An operational assignment exchange for USAID would be a position at a geographic combatant command’s Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) or its equivalent to assist with regional- and country-specific planning. USAID Disaster Assistant Response Teams who provide specialists trained in a variety of relief skills to assist U.S. embassies and USAID manage the U.S. government response to international disasters could be integrated into JIACGs. These experts understand the needs of the embassy and USAID mission and have access to other government and non-governmental organization networks that understand the cultural norms.
and practices of the affected country. They can offer valuable advice to commanders during planning. Combatant command planning for reconstruction and stabilization should also take into account the balance of security, governance, economic development, and societal or cultural norms, a notion that requires the involvement of both military and civilian expertise. This USAID expertise added to the combatant command staff would assist with cultural planning and should eliminate some of the initial obstacles and counterproductive effects seen by those first on the ground in recent conflicts.

The interagency cadre should also work with exchange program participants to develop an Interagency Universal Joint Task List (IUJTL) specific to reconstruction and stability operations in order to have a common language for task planning, training, and prioritization. Currently S/CRS has an essential task matrix that provides a framework for contingency reconstruction planning. This task matrix should be converted into an IUJTL for interagency use. This set of tasks would facilitate a common understanding of tasks and terms and will help the DoD and USAID team members integrate quickly into a training environment, as well as when deployed.

Further, the interagency exchange program participants should be given the responsibility to capture lessons learned and best practices from the operational environments. For example, a similar version of the Office of Provincial Affairs and Multi-National Corps-Iraq UCP could also be implemented in Afghanistan. Lest the U.S. government interagency system repeats the mistakes made in the earlier days of PRT implementation, lessons learned should be captured, institutionalized, and archived.

Development of and participation in training and exercises will create a common set of standing operating procedures to improve on the fragile successes achieved in the neighborhoods of Iraq and provinces of Afghanistan. The agencies must “practice like they play.” Although each operation may be inherently different and will come with unique challenges, it will be helpful to establish and codify in doctrine and applicable training manuals a notional PRT task organization that DoD personnel and foreign service officers can learn and train on. One of the strengths of the DoD’s organizational structure is its use of command relationships compared to the USAID practice of a formal coordinating relationship. The DoD’s command structure offers an unambiguous chain of responsibility resulting in clearly defined relationships and levels of authority. To this end, interagency exchange cadre would support the development of two PRT-like command structures—one with a military lead and one with a civilian lead. Whether one is preferred over another would depend on the level of security in the area of operation. This structure further ensures unity of effort by assigning interagency personnel under one chain of command, similar to the CORDS structure used during the Vietnam War. As a note of emphasis and in keeping with the views of the Secretary of Defense to guard against the perception of “creeping militarization” of U.S. foreign policy, an exercise with a notional PRT structure should have the military in a lead role to start. As the exercise progresses, it is critical to practice transferring authority to a civilian counterpart as the environment becomes more benign. The rationale for this is to help the military overcome the friction and reluctance of being subordinate to a civilian leader in an active war zone, as was seen in both Afghanistan and Iraq PRTs.
Exchange Program Funding

To achieve long-term unity of effort, executive branch departments and agencies must have the support of the President and funding from Congress. A redirection of monetary support to programs aimed at improving interagency cooperation should come from the President, Congress, and the agencies, including DoD and USAID. Without a commitment to long-term funding, the interagency exchange program will fail before it even begins. This cannot and must not be allowed if the nation is to begin strengthening its soft-power capabilities. To be clear, the U.S. military was fully funded, organized, trained, and equipped with the latest technical means to employ lethal effects on the eve of September 11, 2001; however, the destruction witnessed that morning offers a humbling reminder that no matter how well the nation’s conventional forces were funded for lethal effects, it did not ensure the protection of its citizens from acts of terror by those non-state actors who were willing to commit them.

Additional Research

For future research, the U.S. government should explore specific USAID, DoD, or service-specific billets and skills most suitable for the interagency exchange program and conduct an analysis to include other State Department billets in the exchange program. In addition, as monetary constraints have often impeded interagency cooperation, U.S. government should conduct additional research on the current fiscal funding process with the goal of improving flexibility and efficiencies. As it stands, current fiscal law is fairly restrictive and cumbersome to execute. It is not conducive to the flexible sharing of resources across appropriations within a single agency, much less the sharing of resources between agencies. Moreover, the Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction website has a number of comprehensive audit reports pointing to even more potential areas for research, including reports on PRT performance and issues related to reconstruction efforts in Iraq.

Finally, for further comparative analysis on the whole-of-government’s role in conducting stability operations in a counterinsurgency fight, U.S. government planners could further analyze counterinsurgency from the perception of the local population. Most discussions involving counterinsurgency operations take a U.S.-centric view. However, to win a counterinsurgency fight, the U.S. government must not look at nation building from its own view, but the view of the local population. In this type of protracted struggle, the center of gravity is the will of the people to either support the host government or the insurgency. The will
of the people, attained through their hearts and minds, is grounded in culture and history and is not likely to change overnight or even over the course of a few years. This counterinsurgency center of gravity is supported by three elements: an effective military that can provide security; an effective civil capacity to provide governance and well-being; and long-term capital resources to sustain the effort. Instability in any one of these elements will result in an unstable peace.

Summary

The paramount importance of achieving unity of effort can be summed up in the words of an anonymous PRT member, “We need to do everything we can to ensure the PRTs can do their work. When we succeed, the Iraqis can run the country themselves and we can go home. We are, in a sense, the exit strategy.”

Interagency cooperation must start months, if not years, before the first boots hit the ground, in order to win the battle for the hearts and minds of the local population in a far away land. Improved unity of effort between the DoD and USAID can be achieved with a continued shift in interagency coordination and collaboration, not only in thinking but also in practice, and supported by adequate resources. The implementation of a joint-interagency policy followed by the proposed formal interagency exchange program between the DoD and USAID would represent a serious commitment on the part of the nation’s leaders to generate lasting soft-power capabilities to complement its unrivaled hard-power capabilities. The promise for interagency cooperation during peace might in fact be proven to be a powerful institutional lever to achieve unity of effort during a contingency or during times of war. IAJ

Notes


4 Dale, p. 1.


Introduction

The U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) is a unique entity. It has been referred to by some Department of Defense (DoD) officials as a combatant command “plus.” Unlike other geographic combatant commands, AFRICOM focuses on building partner-nation security capacity with a priority on par with combat operations. According to its website, AFRICOM’s mission is:

In concert with other U.S. government agencies and international partners, conducts sustained security engagement through military-to-military programs, military sponsored activities, and other military operations as directed to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy.

In order to promote interagency cooperation and integration, AFRICOM has a complement of non-DoD staff from various U.S. government agencies, notably the Department of State, with Ambassador J. Anthony Holmes as the Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities and Raymond L. Brown as the commander’s Foreign Policy Advisor. The command structure of AFRICOM conforms to the 2008 National Defense Strategy, the 2010 National Security Strategy, and the FY 2007-2010 State Department Strategic plan, all of which stress a whole-of-government approach. General William “Kip” Ward, the former Commander of AFRICOM, views the DoD role in Africa as:

...part of a “three-pronged” U.S. government approach, with DoD through AFRICOM, taking the lead on security issues, but playing a supporting role to the
Department of State, which conducts diplomacy, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which implements development programs. General Ward’s view, as well as AFRICOM’s mission, firmly places DoD as a single element within the whole-of-government approach that supports the State Department’s lead in U.S. foreign policy.

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton has advocated the three-pronged method in what she terms a “smart approach” to foreign policy. In the Nov/Dec 2010 issue of Foreign Affairs magazine, she reiterates her belief that the State Department (diplomacy) and USAID (development) must take leading roles in the whole-of-government effort. In the State/USAID strategic plan for fiscal years 2007-2012, former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice saw the need for incorporating the military in diplomatic activities, placing the military in the lead for security when needed, and participating in interagency planning. Both Secretary Clinton and former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates have stated the necessity of DoD integrating with the State Department and USAID, yet both maintain that the leadership of interagency efforts and direction of diplomacy is the responsibility of the State Department. In other words, AFRICOM does not have the authority to act within an African nation (or any nation) without approval of the U.S. ambassador or chief of mission in that country.

Theresa Whelan, Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, speaking before a panel of the Foreign and Defense Policy Studies at The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research also said of AFRICOM:

The creation of U.S. Africa Command does not in any way subordinate U.S. ambassadors to the command, or the DoD, or put the command in any position to be able to dictate to those ambassadors what they will or will not do. The command, just like European Command today, Central Command today, Pacific Command today...will continue to be a supporting effort to those ambassadors in regards to peacetime mil-to-mil relations with the countries in which those ambassadors serve. The second piece of that, of course, is foreign policy will continue to be executed through and led by the Department of State. Again, one of the things we’ve been accused of is militarizing U.S. foreign policy by the creation of this command: that this command will essentially dominate U.S. foreign policy on the continent. The opposite is actually true. If you look at the focus of U.S. policy toward Africa in the last five to seven years, the bulk of our efforts on the continent are focused in non-security areas.

Ms. Whelan and AFRICOM officials have continued to make similar statements reiterating the command’s role in U.S. foreign policy.

Criticism and concerns persist among African states, in spite of the numerous clarifications addressing the role of AFRICOM in supporting and not leading U.S. foreign policy. Many African states, as well as states outside Africa, believe that AFRICOM is merely a means for the U.S. to establish a military presence on the African continent to promote its own interests with little regard for African
states. Three issues exacerbate this perception of AFRICOM:

- Mission statement confusion/evolution and ongoing military activities.
- Insufficient interagency staffing or integration.
- Lack of interagency integration in planning processes.

If left unaddressed, these issues will significantly hinder the command’s effectiveness and intensify the perception of the militarization of U.S. foreign policy in Africa.

The evolution of the AFRICOM mission statement between 2007 and 2008 took the command from a point of emphasizing the whole-of-government approach to focusing on more traditional military activities.

**Mission Statement Evolution and Military Activities**

The evolution of the AFRICOM mission statement between 2007 and 2008 took the command from a point of emphasizing the whole-of-government approach to focusing on more traditional military activities. When first announced, the draft mission statement read as follows:

U.S. Africa Command promotes U.S. National Security objectives by working with African states and regional organizations to help strengthen stability and security in the area of responsibility. U.S. Africa Command leads the in-theater DoD response to support other U.S. government agencies in implementing U.S. government security policies and strategies. In concert with other U.S. government agencies and other international partners, U.S. Africa Command conducts theater security cooperation activities to assist in building security capacity and improve accountable governance. As directed, U.S. Africa Command conducts military operations to deter aggression and respond to crises.5

The wording implied that AFRICOM would be leading efforts in Africa. Terms such as “combatant command” seemed to emphasize a war-fighting role, and Africa “command” led Africans to believe that the U.S. was looking to command Africans. The wording confused even officials within the State Department. As such, they had difficulty in responding to African concerns regarding the intent of AFRICOM.6 In much the same way, the draft AFRICOM mission statement conjured concerns and confusion; high-profile military activities on the continent reinforced the impression of many Africans that the U.S. military was to lead U.S. efforts in Africa. For example, when AFRICOM became an independent unified command on October 1, 2008, it inherited over 100 activities that had previously been under the direction of three separate combatant commands.7 The two most prominent and high-profile activities are Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, which is the U.S. effort to combat piracy and terrorism in East Africa, and the African Partnership Station (APS), which trains partner nations on maritime law and security. Although each program has extensive involvement from the State Department and the interagency as a whole, because they are primarily security-based operations they are viewed as U.S. military activities independent of diplomacy and development.

State Department and USAID personnel as well as some U.S. congressional representatives have also expressed concerns that AFRICOM’s
non-military activities are indeed blurring the lines between defense, development, and diplomacy. For example, Representative John Tierney stated, “If we’re going to have an integrated approach, why is the United States leading with the Department of Defense in charge as opposed to leading with diplomacy… why are we leading with our fists…” Finally, many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have expressed concerns that AFRICOM will use humanitarian aid as a means to promote its own goals and interests further militarizing activities on the continent. As such, NGOs feel that they will be put in danger if their efforts are perceived to be associated with military efforts.

**Interagency Staffing and Integration**

By October 1, 2008, AFRICOM had only thirteen staff and leadership positions filled. Agencies represented included the State Department; USAID; Departments of Homeland Security, Treasury, and Commerce; and Director for National Intelligence. The most notable leadership position was the Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities (DCMA). The DCMA is responsible for many civil-military programs, some security cooperation initiatives, initiatives that support U.S. foreign policy, and humanitarian assistance and disaster response.

AFRICOM would like to add non-DoD civilian senior leadership positions, senior advisor positions, and subject matter experts to its command structure and has taken steps to identify these needs, as well as how to best integrate them. However, it has yet to determine to what extent is necessary. On a positive note, U.S. government agencies are sending personnel to AFRICOM on a temporary basis to better understand the command in order to assist in identifying proper staffing and integration requirements. In the past, DoD requested State Department input only after the positions had been established.

As of June 2010 the interagency representation on the AFRICOM staff has grown to 27 personnel, which constitutes merely 2 percent of the headquarters overall staff. AFRICOM has reported that it plans to integrate an additional five State Department foreign policy advisors, and that it has signed memorandums of understanding with nine federal agencies to incorporate additional personnel. The command currently would like to include as many as 52 interagency positions within the command structure beyond those traditionally assigned to combatant commands.

In addition to problems creating appropriate staff positions, AFRICOM has had difficulty staffing its headquarters with already authorized personnel. Reasons for this include the lack of perceived career enhancement of an AFRICOM assignment, incompatible personnel systems, and a shortage of interagency talent. Furthermore, a recent interagency survey highlighted interagency personnel dissatisfaction with their roles/contributions and the military culture within AFRICOM, likely making assignments with AFRICOM even less desirable.

Embedded interagency staff members have stated that there is little incentive to take a position at AFRICOM because it will not enhance their careers upon return to their parent agencies. AFRICOM positions are outside the normal career path for many interagency personnel assigned there. Exacerbating the career enhancement issue are the personnel systems within interagency organizations.
Many of the systems do not recognize the interagency positions within AFRICOM outside of traditional, liaison positions. As a result, assignments are not seen as developmental. Additionally, the personnel systems do not recognize these non-standard positions and fail to fund them. However, the most significant issue is the shortage of available talent, particularly from the State Department.

When planning for the level of interagency participation, AFRICOM failed to take into account the shortfalls within the very agencies it expected to draw from. In 2009 the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that according to State officials “they would not likely be able to provide active employees to fill the positions requested by AFRICOM because they were already facing a 25 percent shortfall in mid-level personnel.” As noted above, AFRICOM is working to revise their interagency personnel requirements; however, shortfalls still exist. Prized personnel with desirable skill sets and experience needed by AFRICOM are often needed to fill other State Department assignments.

Congress has approved funding for 1,108 new foreign service and civil service officers and USAID is doubling its development staff by hiring 1,200 new foreign service officers. It remains to be seen if any of these new hires will be sent to work in interagency positions within AFRICOM and whether the command will be able to effectively integrate them into operations.

**Integrated Interagency Planning**

AFRICOM must do a better job including the interagency in its planning processes, not only with interagency personnel within the command, but also with the parent agencies themselves.

DoD’s 2010 *Quadrennial Defense Review* states that the department will continue to advocate for an improved interagency strategic planning process. However, several federal agency officials said that AFRICOM tends to plan activities first and then engage partners, rather than including interagency perspectives during the initial planning efforts.

Although AFRICOM has improved its inclusion of the interagency in planning, results have been mixed. Two examples of interagency planning, APS and Operation Natural Fire 10, provide a negative and positive example of the current state of affairs. APS did not include interagency planning, which caused unnecessary delays, confusion, and turmoil with the U.S. embassy in Ghana during a 2009 port visit by the *USS Nashville*. The ship arrived in port prepared to provide partnership training to the Ghana Navy unbeknownst to the embassy team. In other words, DoD efforts were underway without the chief of mission’s knowledge or approval. As a result, the embassy had to work with AFRICOM to create a new training plan because the scheduled training did not meet the needs of the Ghana Navy. This situation could have been avoided if AFRICOM and APS had worked with the embassy team in the formative stages of the planning process.

On the other hand, the 2009 Operation Natural Fire 10 exercise, a humanitarian and disaster relief exercise (influenza pandemic), in Uganda is considered a success. Prior to planning, DoD and USAID signed an interagency agreement to streamline collaboration in enhancing African military capacity to respond to an influenza pandemic. USAID was included in all stages of planning.
planning along with the Uganda embassy team. The exercise was considered a success because it had a long-term focus and was conducted more like a USAID than a DoD operation.24

Government Accountability Office (GAO) report 10-794 released July 28, 2010, noted that although AFRICOM has established a comprehensive strategy, many of the supporting plans remain unfinished (see Figure 1). U.S. Africa Command completed its theater strategy and theater campaign plan in September 2008 and May 2009 respectively; however, supporting plans from the component commands, AFRICOM’s regional engagement plans, and supporting country work plans remain incomplete or have not been approved. The GAO report goes on to say that many of the supporting plans were postponed for over two years.

Regional engagement plans and country work plans ensure the inclusion of the interagency in planning, and that planning supports U.S. diplomacy and development efforts. Regional plans support the theater campaign plan that includes regional planning guidance, a two-year calendar for security cooperation engagements, and the country work plans. The work plans are critical operational documents that provide unity of effort and include a list of detailed activities and a resource plan to accomplish objectives that support State Department goals. The lack of completed strategic guidance and supporting plans may also be a factor in the integration, staffing, and expertise issues surrounding the interagency component of the command.

According to the July 2011 GAO report, interagency participation within AFRICOM is also not well coordinated, leaving many personnel unsure of their roles or contributions. The report

![Figure 1: AFRICOM Strategic Guidance and Plans](image-url)
thus concludes: “By conducting activities without having specific plans in place to guide activity planning and implementation, AFRICOM risks not fully supporting its mission or objectives.” One USAID employee formerly embedded in AFRICOM expressed his frustration saying, “USAID-embedded officials have to ask how they can help the command.” Even though he believed, “military officials should be asking how AFRICOM can provide support to USAID.”

Because of its stark contrast to the more collaborative and informal nature of the interagency process, interagency personnel have also expressed dissatisfaction with AFRICOM’s hierarchical structure and decision-making process. Personnel feel they have to forcefully inject themselves into the planning and decision-making process.25

**Conclusion**

AFRICOM is a unique organization that has been touted as a model for interagency and the whole-of-government approach in support of U.S. foreign policy. However, AFRICOM is not living up to expectations regarding interagency integration, staffing, and coordinated planning. This situation has led to persistent criticism that AFRICOM is militarizing U.S. foreign policy.

AFRICOM’s theater strategy and theater campaign plan have been completed with input from the State/USAID Joint Strategic Plan, State Africa Bureau Strategic Plan, and the USAID Strategic Plan for Africa; however, none of the subordinate plans are complete. This poses a fundamental problem, since the theater campaign plan only provides overarching guidance and is devoid of any detail on planning of subordinate efforts. The lack of completed plans adversely affects how subordinate commands support the theater campaign plan; how AFRICOM will interact in each African region and with each partner country; and ultimately, how AFRICOM will build its staff and supporting directorates.

Although there is no compulsory mandate for the interagency to provide personnel, agencies appear willing to assign professionals to AFRICOM for properly vetted positions. Steps are being taken to do just that, which should lead to interagency personnel system adjustments that facilitate/accommodate AFRICOM staffing. Part of the vetting process should be the concurrent development of career enhancement criteria for serving with AFRICOM and other combatant commands. Funding justification for these added personnel assignments will emerge naturally from the process. Finally, if the aforementioned issues are properly addressed, an AFRICOM culture will emerge that truly represents the whole-of-government aspirations of U.S. leaders and the perceptions of a militarized AFRICOM will fade away. *IAJ*

**Notes**

1 Whole-of-government approach is defined by U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations*, as “an approach that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States Government to achieve unit of effort toward a shared goal.” Agencies must be willing to share resources to accomplish these efforts. Resources include but are not limited to financial, military, intelligence, law enforcement, diplomatic, developmental, and strategic communications.


Ploch, p. 1.


Ibid., p. 4.

Ploch, p. 9.

Ibid., p. 19.

GAO-10-794, p. 29.

Ibid.


GAO-10-794, pp. 36-37.

Ibid., p. 36.

Ibid, p. 13, AFRICOM has committed to paying the salaries for these positions.

GAO-10-794, p. 36.

GAO-08-947T, p. 13.

Clinton, p. 13.

GAO-10-794, pp. 31-32.

Ibid., p. 33.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 35.
Where are the JIACGs today?

by Jan Schwarzenberg

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States held in its findings “The 9/11 Commission Report” that a contribution to the events of September 11th, 2001 was the inability of government agencies to cooperate with each other on terrorism. Focus and budgets had been concentrated more upon criminal activities. Furthermore, barriers had been in place actually preventing information sharing amongst federal agencies. Subsequent to the attacks of September 11, the President directed all federal agencies to plan and execute counterterrorist activities jointly and fully share information and intelligence. What had heretofore been an olio of independently functioning agencies were now being forced into a new paradigm of collaborative action and sharing. The Department of Defense (DoD) approached this mandate by creating internal organizations peppered with representatives from the other federal departments and agencies. This article takes advantage of the passage of time to review how the military’s geographic combatant commands around the globe implemented the mandate by creating Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG) and how those initial efforts evolved over time.

While the JIACGs all started from the same concept they have diverged greatly due to bureaucratic pressures and different approaches by individual combatant commanders. They were originally conceived and organized to support the DoD counterterrorism mission, but have since morphed into supporting the full-spectrum of military operations. As they evolved since 9/11 each has followed a different path: from robust to essentially non-existent at Pacific Command (PACOM); to simply a means of communication and coordination in the event of a national disaster in Northern Command (NORTHCOM); to integrating U.S. government activities in an active combat zone in Central Command (CENTCOM); to exploring a completely new paradigm in Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) analogous to a mega-embassy where day-to-day operations of many agencies functioning in the region are closely coordinated with each other. Such vigorous
participation in activities beyond the traditional role of the military raises the question of the degree to which the military is affecting the international engagement of the United States. And in so doing, is DoD perceived as usurping the State Department’s traditional diplomatic role, or indeed supporting it through active participation?

One answer to the latter question is testimony offered to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in July 2008 by then Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Ambassador Eric Edelman. Ambassador Edelman described the ultimate in interagency mutual support. He cited then Secretary of Defense Gates, in command of the “hard tools” of national power, as one of the largest advocates of program funding for the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), instruments of “soft tools.” Ambassador Edelman averred that success in conflicts will extend beyond any one agency by saying: “We cannot afford to make bureaucratic distinctions between war and the use of armed forces and the essential peacetime activities once the sole purview of diplomats, but must integrate our political and military tools into a cohesive national effort.”

Comparing the JIACG structures at the different combatant commands, it is important to utilize two viewpoints – then and now. When the JIACGs were first established, two factors were readily apparent as indicators of future success. First, the status and rank of the JIACG leader, and secondly, to whom the JIACG reported. At five of the six geographic combatant commands, the JIACG was led by a member of the federal Senior Executive Service (SES); the equivalent of a military admiral or general officer. Add to that mix the civilian representatives from other agencies, primarily the Departments of State, Justice, and Treasury, all working side-by-side with the military. Going beyond merely contributing their expertise to a decisional process, the JIACG civilians helped the commands execute their policies and programs in a manner complementary to other agencies’ efforts in executing foreign policy. To what extent this is still true today will be individually examined.

When it was first designed, Africa Command (AFRICOM) included in its organizational chart a JIACG reporting directly to the Deputy Commander, who was intended to be a Senior Foreign Service Officer, to ensure clear guidance from senior levels while also encouraging achieving cooperative results at the action officer level. Since then, however, the most senior of the Senior Foreign Service officers, one of four at AFRICOM, has stepped aside to assume the position of deputy to the commander for civil-military activities. Likewise, the interagency representatives were to all be located within the JIACG and work across directorate lines and activities encompassing all the directorates’ different efforts with their own agency goals. Today, the approximately thirty representatives from thirteen different agencies are spread throughout the staff directorates with AFRICOM claiming itself to be but a part an interagency team representing United States interests in the region.

However, as frequently happens, there are detractors questioning the presence of interagency representatives at AFRICOM as

When the JIACGs were first established, two factors were readily apparent as indicators of future success. First, the status and rank of the JIACG leader, and secondly, to whom the JIACG reported.
well as its stated mission purpose posted on its website: “U.S. AFRICOM, in concert with other U.S. government agencies and international partners, conducts sustained security engagement through military-to-military programs, military-sponsored activities, and other military operations as directed to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy.” Specifically, in a letter to then Secretary of Defense Gates, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs echoed a complaint from the House Armed Services Committee that AFRICOM is usurping the foreign policy role of the State Department and USAID. Under the guise of interagency cooperation, employees detailed from other federal agencies are actually employees falling under the DoD chain of command and cease representing their parent organizations. Further, the Committee asserts that foreign assistance projects undertaken by the military do not fall under the purview of the Foreign Affairs committee, thus they actually undermine the authority and efforts of diplomatic leaders to support local governments. It alleges the danger lies in the confusing situation of the U.S. military bolstering local militaries when in fact U.S. foreign policy might be to buttress local civilian agencies to provide humanitarian assistance.1

In his excellent article “Why AFRICOM?” Ambassador (Retired) Edward Marks notes the military attempt to better U.S. government efforts in Africa, but fears the process as proposed by AFRICOM will over-militarize U.S. policies and programs. Marks contends that security is not enhanced by better equipped and trained military forces but rather by better governance. Military engagement as a means of institution building will be counter-productive unless “subordinated to broader political and economic developments.”2 While military-to-military programs are one good means to build partner relationships, they are not the goal in themselves. Such programs should be undertaken by the military only when they support U.S. foreign policy as determined by the civilian leadership. In Marks’ view, AFRICOM effectively presents itself as the center or focal point of U.S. foreign policy in Africa, which is exactly the wrong image for the United States to promote overseas. He also wryly notes that an organization of some 2,000 military personnel with only 30 civilian non-DoD government officers, can hardly claim to be a balanced representation of government policy that is anything other than military in nature.3

In a similar fashion, experimenting with the relatively new concept of a JIACG, SOUTHCOM transformed itself entirely into a civilian-military mix of interagency cooperation in 2007. Rather than being touted as a military command with liaison officers from civilian agencies, performing both oversight and coordination, SOUTHCOM proudly pointed to its unified stance of whole-government response to international events in the southern hemisphere.4 From Southern Command’s Strategic Plan for 2018 (written in 2007) came the statement of its intent to mold itself into “an interagency oriented organization seeking to support security and stability in the Americas.”5 Applicable here is the adage about leaning so far forward as to fall on one’s face. The cited...
statement suspiciously resembles the purpose for an embassy. In ensuring cooperative U.S. partner relationships, SOUTHCOM will “work with interagency partners on U.S. government actions to strengthen and form strategic partnerships with key regional nations.”\(^6\)

SOUTHCOM was enmeshing itself as an equal partner in developing national policy vis-à-vis international relationships, well outside the realm of simple war fighting. From its strategic plan came the directive “Engage interagency partner decision-makers and integrate personnel from these agencies into the SOUTHCOM staff while providing similar liaisons to our partners’ staffs.”\(^7\) SOUTHCOM embraced not just civilian oversight of its plans and actions but also detailed involvement of civilians in the very development of its policies. At the same time, it demonstrated its commitment by reducing its own staff, relocating those officers to other agencies and departments of the government, lending their knowledge and expertise to pre- and post-conflict nation development.

In the last two years, however, SOUTHCOM has reorganized itself again, creating a Partnering Directorate, whose goal is to foster “…whole-of-government solutions… by integrating U.S. government, private sector, and public-private organizations into the shared mission of ensuring security, enhancing stability, and enabling prosperity.”\(^8\) Such a statement can lead one to surmise SOUTHCOM is interested in molding interagency solutions that contribute to its mission, but not necessarily the other way around.

Following the example of the other geographic combatant commands and riding the wave created by Secretary Rumsfeld in establishing JIACGs, the PACOM JIACG initially translated national level decisions made by civilian leadership into military plans, which were then implemented through synchronized execution of military programs. The possibility of multiple military programs, diplomatic plans, and international agreements executed by separate agencies arriving at the same end goal might seem highly unlikely. However, that the efforts arrived at the finish line together and not successively, as in diplomacy first followed by military, indicated that committed professionals were sharing and coordinating their expertise in a complementary manner across agency boundaries.

Cleverly designed were the different programs or “lines of operation” by which PACOM engaged foreign partners. Instead of representing them as being the responsibility of the operations directorate or training directorate, etc., they were known simply by their program names, making them a shared responsibility of the entire command. This further embraced the concept of a single-voiced DoD effort engaging as a full partner in the daily execution of foreign policy, occasionally presumptively assuming the role of senior partner. PACOM believed that with an area of responsibility covering fifty-one percent of the earth’s surface and over forty countries, the regular interaction and cooperation amongst militaries builds bridges of communication and partnership that help to prevent miscommunication and the onset of conflict. In addition, the U.S. military is able to provide resources, especially in the domain of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, which directly support diplomatic and strategic communication policies. Where U.S. government aid is intended to win favor with other governments, it is the military which...
is often tasked with delivering that aid, in the form of building projects, medical assistance, security training, etc.

Previously there had been a clear demarcation between the Departments of State and Defense, with the combatant commander speaking only with the ambassador, and the officers in the staff directorates speaking directly to the military officers within the embassies. The PACOM JIACG, however, interacted with both the entire embassy country teams and the State Department Bureaus in Washington. Originally, any plan developed by the military requiring interaction within a specific country had to first go up the military chain for approval to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, then cross over to the Secretary of State for review by the appropriate State Department Bureau, and then reverse its course with whatever response was being offered. Instead, the PACOM JIACG was able to communicate directly with State Department entities normally at a higher level. These relationships eventually reached such levels of success, particularly with the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Counter Terrorism and the East Asia Pacific Bureau, that the PACOM JIACG was admonished to perhaps try to achieve the same level of cooperation and communication with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, ostensibly in their own military chain of command!

Sadly, with changing leadership and a preference to return to business as it has been doctrinally known, the PACOM JIACG bounced between the J3 Operations and J5 Plans directorates and now exists in name only as just one division within the new J9 Outreach Directorate, with only one officer assigned, and military at that. The directorate is chaired by a Senior Foreign Service officer who also oversees the Public Diplomacy Advisor, Legislative Affairs and the Washington Liaison Office. Those other agency representatives that do still exist at PACOM work independently with the staff divisions where they are located, and not in a coordinated manner via the JIACG.

European Command (EUCOM) took a slightly different approach. Getting away from the term “JIACG” they adopted a new term from the beginning – Commander’s Interagency Engagement Group (CIEG). It too hints of an “us vs. them” mentality with the military engaging the rest of the government while forgetting, or overlooking, that DoD is a part of the interagency, not apart from it. Nonetheless, a wide spread of other agency representation is located within the CIEG, available as a resource for the EUCOM staff to tap into as they develop their military support plans for the region, providing contextual reference without committal authority for their parent organizations. In this role, the interagency representatives act as advisors to the commander’s efforts in executing theater security cooperation. EUCOM interagency officers are contributors to the decision process and execution of foreign policy, but not necessarily partners at the table. They are engaging their interagency colleagues, but not necessarily cooperating with them. EUCOM is developing and executing military plans and efforts, utilizing the other agency representatives to ensure they remain coordinated, without always returning the favor of supporting non-DoD plans, efforts, or programs.
In time this has become even clearer with the transformation of the CIEG into the ECJ9, Interagency Partnering Directorate, with an SES director. The purpose of this “new” division is to lead the EUCOM effort to integrate interagency, academia, NGOs, and private sector partners to better execute the EUCOM mission through a “whole-of-society” approach. Its intent is to accomplish this by actively building relationships to create a network of key Pentagon, EUCOM, interagency, and external actors that work together to advance EUCOM goals. Attention is invited to the emphasis on EUCOM goals and not what U.S. goals EUCOM may contribute to. From EUCOM’s website describing the directorate comes the statement the members of the ECJ9 are “to protect EUCOM equities at interagency meetings, shape agendas and advocate EUCOM positions.”

NORTHCOM, with responsibility for the military component of homeland defense, understandably has the largest contingent of non-military agency representatives. Included on its roster are state, local, and tribal authorities, along with non-governmental and private sector organizations. Participating whole-heartedly in execution of national policy, NORTHCOM puts itself forward as the agent of many principals. Its JIACG has evolved into the Interagency Coordination Directorate which provides interagency context to the commander’s decision process. Furthermore, this directorate provides interagency perspective to the entire NORTHCOM staff while simultaneously offering military perspective to their partner civilian agencies. NORTHCOM’s JIACG and its current manifestation always was and remains under the direction of an SES officer.

CENTCOM was the first combatant command to formally organize a JIACG in accordance with Secretary of Defense direction. Understandable, insofar as CENTCOM was engaged in combat operations first in Afghanistan and then Iraq. At one point, the CENTCOM JIACG encompassed four subordinate offices around Iraq, manned by representatives from many U.S. government agencies, primarily intelligence and law enforcement with 70 FBI agents alone. The CENTCOM JIACG’s greatest contribution was to serve as an intelligence fusion center. As assigned members came across forensic information and intelligence in the course of their activities, it would be shared with intelligence analysts who were able to build whole pictures. With agents from FBI, Customs and Border Protection, the State Department’s Diplomatic Security Service, New York Joint Terrorism Task Force, Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms, and others, the combined efforts achieved results out of all proportion to its size. When he visited the JIACG offices in Bagram, Afghanistan in February 2002, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers said: “This is exactly what the Secretary [of Defense] and I had in mind.”

Since its initial inception, the CENTCOM JIACG has learned, as have all the JIACGs, that the changing face of the enemy and the complex global environment demand constant internal adaptation. Having passed through the early experimental stages, and groped its way through the paradigm shattering points of open cooperation with other agencies, which heretofore had jealously guarded their agendas
and jurisdictions, the CENTCOM JIACG has moved even further in embracing interagency cooperation.

In moving from a joint organization serving as a fusion cell sharing information and intelligence amongst representatives from different agencies, the CENTCOM JIACG has evolved into the Interagency Task Force for Irregular Warfare (IATF-IW). It is fair to say that in prosecuting foreign policy which currently includes open warfare, CENTCOM has moved even further in its interaction and synergy as part of a total, combined, whole-of-government approach toward execution of U.S. policy. It has gone beyond merely being an advisor participating in the development of foreign policy plans. With the introduction of the IATF-IW, CENTCOM is actively developing and promoting plans in conjunction with the civilian entities of government.

The conflict, or danger, in Iraq is that the military was effectively the government in Iraq. With the Ba’ath party out of power, there was a vacuum that permeated all facets of life in Iraq. It fell primarily to the military to re-build the infrastructure, to turn on the lights, and get the water flowing. It was also necessary to reconstitute a police force and local governance. To its credit, in short order more communities in Iraq enjoyed electricity, fresh water, and sewage than they had known in years under Saddam. But relegating the majority of development decisions to the military could be fraught with peril in that it potentially precludes initiating long-term programs more aligned with the U.S. government policy approach.

Rather than expressing an attitude of executing a military mission with subsequent occupation and perhaps reparation, CENTCOM went fully to the opposite extreme, in the IATF-IW being the agent of the State Department. This subordination to State Department lead ensured rebuilding Iraq would occur according to a U.S. government view rather than a U.S. military view.

**Conclusion**

The over-riding question remains: Where is our military today and what has it learned in using the JIACGs as a vehicle to contribute to the execution of coordinated foreign policy?

I would submit the current crop of military leadership has learned it must be intimately involved in the development and application of foreign policy. The military must be involved upon the international stage long before any application of traditional military arms is administered. The civilian leadership has equally learned the value of military skills in developing plans and the very deep resource and capability pockets of the Department of Defense. JIACGs have demonstrated in the last decade that they are a highly effective means to jointly and interactively conduct whole-of-government operations successfully, when they are allowed to fully function.

Considering how relatively new and recent are the appearance of the JIACGs, there is a dearth of academic research available. Compounding the complexity of producing or developing any academic foundation for JIACGs is how quickly they adapt. First, in that no two are alike, their mission dependent wholly upon the regional demands in which they operate. And secondly, as world events and politics change, so do the JIACGs.
Some quarters have interpreted Clausewitz to say that the military exists to resolve foreign conflict once diplomacy has ceased or failed. The 21st century modern military has effectively put that mindset to rest. While the military professionals are certainly expected to continue to be the recognized experts in the military realm, their duties, and consequently contributions, encompass much more now.

Utilizing the military to engage in efforts beyond the conduct of war has brought the military into the circle of coordinated international efforts. Training the military to conduct peace keeping or stability operations, versus projecting warfare, is but one element of the entire government toolchest of foreign policy. Creating a career path for service members who engage local inhabitants in restructuring or building their capacity for self-sufficiency is to develop a skill set entirely different from the warrior’s manual of arms. Providing academic outlets, at many levels, that pursue avenues other than simply the science of warfare ensures that military officers with highly credentialed backgrounds are able to assume positions within the State Department as well as interact with all the U.S. government agencies whilst developing and executing foreign policy according to the dictates and guidance of our civilian leadership. By the same token, attendance at military staff colleges by civilian government officers from the Departments of State, Justice, Treasury, and Commerce, just to name a few, creates a cadre of civilians who can effectively influence combatant commands by their knowledge of military organization and priorities.

The JIACG concept is the product of a military that has matured to the point of realizing its full potential. While the Congress expressed its concern to Secretary Gates that the military is usurping foreign policy in hosting JIACGs, the military is actually further subordinating itself to civilian control while contributing to the execution of national policy in the foreign arena. Rather than being the objective body awaiting dispatch, the military is, through the coordinated actions of the JIACGs, helping to create, develop, enhance, and implement foreign policy.

In an environment of programs competing for ever shrinking resources, it will be those projects that have been tried and tested which will survive. The JIACG’s are still relatively too new for any professional officer to gamble their career and potential for promotion. Just as it took two generations of officers for the tenets of Goldwater-Nichols and joint duty to be fully accepted, if the JIACG’s survive at all it will be many years before they are allowed to fully demonstrate their worth. Until then, it will take a small cadre of dedicated leaders, more interested in being effective in their assignments and willing to put their own advancement at risk in favor of promoting the entire U.S. government’s goals. Then only will the JIACG’s become a normal and accepted method of integrating the United States military’s capabilities into the larger foreign policy team.

Notes


3 Ibid., pp. 150-151.

4 David H. Gurney, “An Interview with John G. Stavridis”, Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 50, 3rd Quarter
2008, pg. 128.


6 Ibid., p. 13

7 Ibid., p. 15


Mechanics of Governance Approach to Capacity Development

by Matthew C. Johnson, William L. Smith, and William N. Farmen

Introduction

Capacity development is as widely practiced as it is misunderstood. And in spite of nearly every prominent international development agency revering the concept for its tenets of sustainability and empowerment, over 20 years of debate have yet to even yield consensus on a definition. Past performance is not any more encouraging, with substantial international capacity development efforts producing far more failures and misgivings than they have success and praise. The combination of repeated performance shortfalls and enduring external challenges makes it easy to doubt that capacity development will ever contribute to substantive and sustainable improvements around the globe. However, with the Fund for Peace Failed State Index listing as many as 35 weak or failing states at risk of conflict or collapse and many more lacking critical government services and capabilities, the need for effective capacity development has never been greater.

Despite these unfortunate circumstances, the first 20 years of experience still allow better understanding of what does and does not work in capacity development. Toward this end, a review of the writing and practice of capacity development revealed that the implementation of the “nuts and bolts” enablers of governance is oftentimes ad hoc and underemphasized. These repeatable processes, which include logistics, contracting, budgeting, and strategic planning, are the mechanics of governance. And as the person at the end of a payroll line or the patient waiting for delayed medication will tell you, sound mechanics of governance are essential to overcome the major development challenges facing the world today.

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Admittedly, no general approach can offer comprehensive guidance on setting and implementing the appropriate mechanics of governance for the diverse range of operational contexts. However, just as the capacity development frameworks of the World Bank and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) articulate a generalized but actionable approach to institutional change management, a systemic approach to the development and implementation of the mechanics of governance is both necessary and practical. This article introduces one such approach.

**What Is Capacity Development?**

The concept of capacity development emerged in the international development community in the late 1980s from the notion that development initiatives should be sustainable, owned, and driven by internal stakeholders. As an umbrella concept for the predominant development themes of the past half-century, capacity development has been used to describe myriad initiatives to collaborate with individuals, organizations, or governments to achieve a range of professional, economic, political, and security goals. Example initiatives include a nongovernmental organization (NGO) program to train young professionals on water security, the U.S. Department of Defense Ministry of Defense Advisors Program to cultivate effective and accountable defense ministries in Afghanistan, and a UNDP initiative to improve the entire Timor-Leste judiciary system.

With such a broad scope of capacity development activities, articulating a meaningful definition has been both difficult and controversial. This point is highlighted in a recent article by longtime development practitioner Sue Soal, where she references an excerpt of a report published 15 years ago by the Community Development Resource Association (her South African NGO), which still rings true today:

> Donor agencies, international and indigenous NGOs, and many governments in developing countries recognize the importance of capacity building for development. Yet even while they claim to be practicing it, their concepts and practice often remain confused and vague. The greatest area of agreement appears to be that we do not really know what capacity building is.²

Despite the difficulty in crafting an unambiguous definition of capacity development, there has been no shortage of attempts. A good example, provided by the Australian Agency for International Development, defines capacity development as “the process of developing competencies and capabilities in individuals, groups, organizations, sectors or countries which will lead to sustained and self-generating performance improvement.”

Admittedly, this definition is not actionable, as it encapsulates countless activities and initiatives that seek to develop “competencies and capabilities.” Given the inherently broad nature of the concept, it is unlikely that one sentence will ever convey a significantly better understanding of what capacity development is. However, capacity development in practice is neither vague nor far removed from concrete action. It is about developing an ability to provide good education to children, ensure protection from terrorist groups, deliver adequate healthcare, manage natural resources, ensure security and justice, and offer corruption-free banking services. The challenge for the capacity development practitioner is to translate these vague, working definitions into practice by selecting effective projects, stakeholders, means, and objectives. Unfortunately, the past 20 years of experience suggest this is a monumental challenge.
**The Critiques and Challenges of Past Capacity Development Work**

Whether it is renewed conflict in Somalia or enduring corruption in Haiti, the failures of capacity development far outnumber successes. Recognizing a need to change this situation, a growing number of development actors, including the United Nations (UN), World Bank, NGOs, and national development agencies and militaries, have bolstered their collective capacity development efforts. In fact, the Organization for Economic Cooperation estimates that roughly 15 percent ($18 billion) of annual international development assistance is now devoted to capacity development programs and projects. Regrettably, these increased financial and human resources have not yielded commensurate development gains, with University of York professors Sultan Barakat and Margaret Chard observing that the “enormous amounts of effort and money… expended over decades on institutional development and capacity building … resulted in very little improvement in the economic and social conditions of the now called ‘developing nations.”3 A combination of repeated performance shortfalls and external challenges impelled this persistent poor performance.

**Capacity development critiques**

A robust body of literature, evaluating past capacity development initiatives has emerged, profiling an alarming pattern of strategic and operational deficiencies. Despite improved understanding of these historical shortfalls, professors Barakat and Chard affirm that “records of actual practice over the past three decades show that, with few exceptions, there has been remarkably little change.” The longstanding critiques of capacity development in practice mirror those of past state-building efforts articulated by James Stephenson, et al., in a peace building article in the second issue of PRISM, outlined in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capacity Development Critique</th>
<th>Example</th>
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<tr>
<td>Overemphasis on short-term goals</td>
<td>Emphasis on rushed elections in Angola was a catalyst for renewed conflict in 1992.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited outreach to local communities</td>
<td>The failure to engage local stakeholders and recognize existing institutions while developing new credit groups in Uganda in the 1990s resulted in the intended beneficiaries receiving no financial improvement.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Premature withdrawal</td>
<td>Following 6 years of effective institutional development in Timor-Leste from 1999 to 2005, the international community began to phase out development initiatives. Shortly after violence broke out and the state institutions deteriorated.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>No overarching strategic framework</td>
<td>International capacity development efforts in Rwanda since the late 1990s were not guided by a common national strategy, which has resulted in a less effective, uncoordinated, and project-centric approach to capacity development.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncoordinated efforts</td>
<td>Fragmented development efforts in Tajikistan have slowed the process of institutional development and diminished the country’s ownership of its own economic and political progress.8</td>
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Capacity development challenges

Even capacity development efforts with none of the deficiencies listed above would still face considerable external obstacles. A mature understanding of the following challenges underscores the immense difficulty of capacity development in general.

Security—A safe and secure environment is a necessary end state to begin building host nation capacity. For example, despite there being a pool of 11,000 freshly trained Afghan civil servants, only 25 percent of the key government jobs in Kandahar and Helmand provinces are filled.9 Most are unable or unwilling to work in those areas due to security risks in being associated with the Afghan government. Unfortunately, adverse security conditions are common in most capacity development operational environments.

Lack of domestic demand—Other than security, a lack of domestic demand for institutional development is the largest challenge facing capacity development today. Without a significant and sustained desire by the host stakeholder to participate, no capacity development initiative will succeed. And domestic demand cannot be forced, as external attempts to create demand through conditionality or coercive pressure have been largely unsuccessful.10

Budgets and accountability—International development initiatives are predominately funded by short, fixed-term budgets, which are accountable to taxpayers or other external stakeholders. This practice has led to development programs and priorities that are not synchronized with local needs and timeframes.

Spoilers—Individuals or groups acting as spoilers in most conflict-affected countries have an interest in perpetuating state failure by opposing the development of a functioning government authority. An example of this is found in Somalia, where businesspeople persistently work to block the development of a strong central government for fear that a new authority will be repressive and predatory at their expense.

Conflicting outcomes of aid and capacity development—There is growing evidence that dependence-relationship and decreased government accountability inherent in traditional humanitarian aid is destructive to the governance capacity of the host nation. As a Center for Global Development working paper reports, “a large and sustained volume of aid can have negative effects on the development of good public institutions.”11

Capacity development is a lengthy process—Using World Bank data from 1977–2000, Lisa Chauvet and Paul Collier found the probability of a turnaround starting for a failing state in any given year to be 1.85 percent, resulting in an expected duration of 54 years.12 While certain interventions, such as technical training and education initiatives, decreased the expected turnaround time, capacity development is still a long-term process. An unfortunate implication of this is that very few international donors are willing to agree to fund a program lasting longer than a few years.


In view of the gap between past performance and the present need for capacity development, it is natural to inquire about the best way ahead. Unfortunately, as is the case with most international policy challenges, there is no “silver bullet” solution. Given the confluence
of variables affecting the success of capacity development, improved practice requires multiple development actors employing a host of strategic, budgetary, programmatic, and implementation reforms. To guide these efforts, it is constructive to recognize the following three principles:

**Effective public institutions are the critical variable in capacity development**—Emerging consensus and empirical evidence confirm effective public institutions are the decisive variable in successful capacity development. A Center for Global Development working paper observes that the critical importance of sound public institutions to the development process has become “an article of faith” among political scientists and economists.\(^\text{13}\) There is also growing recognition of the value of sound public institutions in U.S. foreign policy circles, as indicated by the emphasis on public institution capacity development in the new Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development. In view of this evidence and consensus, the primary objective for capacity development actors should be to leverage the capabilities of multiple stakeholders to strengthen and improve public institutions.

**Good public institutions rely on sound mechanics of governance**—The mechanics of governance are the repeatable processes necessary to equip public institutions to effectively deliver core government functions. By analogy, if public institutions are a rail system, the mechanics of governance are the measures that ensure the trains run on time. For example, some of the mechanics of governance required to issue small business licenses include establishing necessary licenses and permits, setting license requirements and classifications, developing an application procedure, creating necessary paperwork, and identifying appropriate human and technological resources to process applications. Sound public institutions and hence broader capacity development achievements require effective and efficient mechanics of governance. A good example was reported in 1989 by economist Hernando De Soto in Lima, Peru. De Soto discovered that it took 300 days, 11 offices, and $1,200 to acquire a small business license.\(^\text{14}\) These arduous requirements drove many poor entrepreneurs into an informal employment sector. However, following the implementation of a proposal that De Soto himself developed, the government of Peru employed more efficient processes to reduce the application procedure to one day, one office, and $174. This improvement of the mechanics of governance resulted in an additional 671,300 small business licenses between 1991 and 1997. Without those enhanced processes, the broader goal of legitimizing and regulating the informal small business sector would have been unattainable.

**Greater emphasis on the mechanics of governance is needed**—A number of capacity development actors have demonstrated competence in the design and implementation of sound mechanics of governance. For example, in 2002 the UN facilitated the development of the government authorities, panels, regulations, procedures, websites, and manuals necessary for a vastly improved public procurement system in Sierra Leone.\(^\text{15}\) However, there are also numerous cases where the mechanics of governance were not sufficient to support overarching capacity development goals. For instance, when members of the international community recently set out to improve education for girls in and around Bagram, Afghanistan,
they built three schools without fostering the development of the necessary governance structures, payroll procedures, logistics and procurement systems, or security personnel. As a result, these schools are reportedly now only attended by “a bored security guard, pigeons, and squirrels.”

This variation in past performances can be largely attributed to the fact that most prominent capacity development actors do not have a systemic approach to the development and implementation of suitable mechanics of governance. While the majority of the existing capacity development frameworks and policy documents articulate structured approaches to institutional change management, cultural understanding, and program monitoring and evaluation, there is very minimal guidance on the determination and implementation of the necessary mechanics of governance. In practice, this has resulted in a frequent reliance on the expertise and experience of individual development workers to produce and implement ad hoc governance processes and procedures. A more formal approach to the mechanics of governance is needed.

A Mechanics of Governance Approach to Capacity Development

Admittedly, no formal approach can offer comprehensive guidance on setting and implementing the appropriate mechanics of governance for the diverse range of operational contexts. The repeatable processes needed to support the improvement of primary healthcare in Malawi will differ greatly from those needed to enhance the maintenance of police vehicles in Iraq. However, just as the capacity development frameworks of the World Bank and UNDP articulate a generalized but actionable approach to institutional change management, a systemic approach to the development and implementation of the mechanics of governance is both necessary and practical.

The following approach outlined in LMI’s Capacity Development Assistance Model: A Guide to Building Ministerial Capacity, (2009), was adapted from an existing capacity development assistance model. It represents a formalized, four-phased mechanics of governance methodology that can be used to amend existing capacity development frameworks.

Translate overarching development goal to requisite functions and processes—LMI has identified five core functions of a government institution (strategic planning, financial and resource management, human resources, logistics and procurement, and information management) and three supporting functions (communications, accountability, and security). Each of these functions has numerous supporting processes. A broad capacity development goal will embody a set of governance capabilities that can be represented with a subset of these functions and supporting processes, which are identified in this step of the approach. Consider a capacity development initiative to assist the Cameroon Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization in developing a national disaster alert system to give citizens advance warning of a volcanic eruption or toxic gas emission. Like most capacity development efforts, this initiative would involve multiple functions of government and a number of supporting processes. In this example, an initiative will likely require strategic planning to develop disaster alert plans and organizational requirements; financial and resource management to establish the program budget and purchasing contracts; human resources to train and assign employees; logistics and procurement to acquire and distribute alert infrastructure; information management to develop electronic disaster monitoring and alert system; communications to draft and implement public information campaign; and accountability to implement...
performance auditing mechanisms. These processes represent a small share of the necessary mechanics of governance.

Assess maturity of existing functions and processes—After assembling a complete list of requisite functions and processes, a maturity model is used to assess them. To do this, a questionnaire is developed that consists of a series of tailored queries evaluating host capabilities against required functions and processes. These responses will be compiled to assign a maturity level to each requisite function and process, from level one (ad hoc) to level five (optimized). In the Cameroon scenario, a sample question to assess financial and resource management function might be “Does the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization have any discretionary funds available or a formal budget authorization process to fund this new initiative?” This maturity assessment will provide a macro view of the capability gaps related to the necessary government functions and processes.

Set appropriate maturity goals—Using the maturity assessment, it is possible to identify points of weakness for the purpose of developing a prioritized list of function and process maturity goals. This phase of the process requires feedback from a concurrent analysis of the enabling environment and host culture to ensure that appropriate maturity goals are established. For example, in Cameroon there are two official languages (English and French) and approximately 250 local languages; each must be understood before setting maturity goals related to the public information campaign process.

Plan and execute mechanics of governance—The final step of this approach is to facilitate the planning and execution of specific measures aimed to achieve the function and process maturity goals. In ideal circumstances, this will result in the sound and repeatable mechanics of governance necessary to achieve the overarching development goal. Regarding Cameroon, this step would result in a coordinated set of processes that advance the broader goal of an effective national disaster alert system.

Conclusion

The question remains whether capacity development will ever generate the significant and sustained development gains needed around the globe. The first 20 years of policy and practice are marred with persistent performance shortfalls and enduring external challenges—during a period that has seen protracted global hunger, poverty, terrorism, conflict, and corruption. This collective experience suggests that if capacity development is ever going to be effective, multiple development actors must employ a series of strategic, budgetary, programmatic, and tactical reforms. To ensure that these reforms are not only sound in theory, but also effective in practice, an increased emphasis on the mechanics of governance is needed. That is, with a formalized approach to the development and implementation of sound, repeatable mechanics of governance, there is hope that capacity development will generate the necessary global change in the next 20 years. IAJ

The authors gratefully acknowledge the important contributions and feedback of Claudia T. Muñoz.

NOTES

1 Charles Lusthaus, Marie-Helene Adrien, Mark Perstinger, “Capacity Development: Definitions, Issues and Implications for Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation,” Universalia Occassional Paper, No. 35,
September 1999, p. 817. The development concepts referenced include institution building in the 1950s and 60s, institutional strengthening in the 1960s and 70s, public administration development of the 1970s, human resource development in the 1970s and 80s, and new institutionalism in the 1980s and 90s.

2 Sue Soal, “The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same?” *Institute of Development Bulletin*, Vol. 41, Issue 3, May 2010, p. 129. In this excerpt, Soal uses the term “capacity building,” whereas this article uses “capacity development.” Some organizations equate these two terms, while others make a distinction between the two (i.e., capacity building insinuates building capacities from nothing, where capacity development leverages existing capabilities to improve capacity). In either case, Soal’s excerpt highlights the underlying point that defining this capacity development (or building) is difficult and contentious.


5 Barakat and Chard, p. 825.


7 The Republic of Rwanda, *The Vision and Strategic Framework for the Multi-Sector Capacity Building Programme in Rwanda*, May 2003, p. 34.


13 Todd Moss, Gunilla Petersson, and Nicolas van de Walle, p. 3.


A Legacy of Vietnam:  

*Lessons from CORDS*

by Mandy Honn, Farrah Meisel, Jacleen Mowery, and Jennifer Smolin with contributions from Minhye Ha

**Introduction**

During a 1965 speech, President Lyndon Johnson famously called for winning “the other war” of pacification in Vietnam—the war for the Vietnamese hearts and minds. This initiative to build up popular support for the South Vietnamese government while simultaneously breaking down the Viet Cong infrastructure evolved into the largest interagency civil-military program to date. Implemented in 1967, the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support program (CORDS), later changed to the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support program, integrated military operations and development activities under a single chain of command, operating in parallel but separate structures. Multiple agencies including the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Defense (DoD), and the Department of State worked together on infrastructure, economic, and agricultural development; refugee resettlement; psychological operations; and police and public administration training.

To understand how CORDS developed, its overall impact, and how the lessons learned during this period can inform strategy for present-day operations, the authors conducted an extensive review of the CORDS program as part of the Trachtenberg School of Public Policy’s master’s program at George Washington University and compiled a report for the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation. The review analyzed the role of development in a military-led counterinsurgency operation. Extracted from that report, this article summarizes the successes and limitations of the CORDS program and specifically focuses on development activities as part of the overall CORDS

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structure. Despite its eventual defeat on the battlefield, it is important to recognize that key components of the U.S. effort were successful in pacifying the South Vietnamese.

Research Design and Methodology

The underlying research consisted of an extensive literature review of journal articles, books, congressional hearings, government reports, and declassified Vietnam-era documents. The authors also conducted key informant interviews with development personnel who worked in the CORDS program and with program evaluation experts to determine the feasibility and potential effectiveness of similar interagency programs in present-day counterinsurgency operations.

Before creating a CORDS-like model, decision-makers must recognize that though a CORDS interagency framework may be necessary, it is not sufficient on its own.

The development personnel interview sample was made up of civilian development workers and Foreign Service officers who were involved in the CORDS program. Because of the focus on the “role of development” from a “development perspective,” military staff members who worked side-by-side with USAID on this effort and could have provided valuable information on CORDS development activities were not included in the sample.

This research effort faced the following limiting factors:

- The final interview sample consisted of only five respondents.
- CORDS participants were not clearly identifiable.
- Time constraints limited the ability for an exhaustive review of available archival and recently declassified material.
- There was an inadequate number of immediate post-evaluations completed by development personnel.

Despite these limitations, sufficient information was available and reviewed to validate the insights and recommendations presented below.

Recommendations

Based on the research of the CORDS model, eight main recommendations have become apparent for how a similar model could be implemented in present-day and future insurgency conflicts. Each proposed recommendation tackles a different aspect of the program’s cycle and addresses a particular weakness that still exists today.

Before creating a CORDS-like model, decision-makers must recognize that though a CORDS interagency framework may be necessary, it is not sufficient on its own. The model by itself will not be a primary determinant on the outcome of a counterinsurgency operation. More importantly, the host country should have a reasonable level of political legitimacy, and there must be mass support from the host nation population for a U.S.-supported government. These recommendations are more easily implemented if senior-level leaders of both the U.S. and the host country are fully committed to a successful pacification or counterinsurgency effort that includes creating a more integrated structure of host country and U.S. personnel to counterbalance the inadequate access to resources, both human and financial.
Establish Security Prior to Development Programs

“Whether security is ten percent of the total problem or ninety percent, it is inescapably the first percent of the first ninety percent.” As stated by senior CORDS administrator John Paul Vann, CORDS workers were very aware that security must be the first priority before any long-term sustainability efforts are pursued. Though CORDS was essentially a non-military program, its main goal of pacification was very much intertwined with the success of military operations.1

During CORDS, the most pressing and urgent security issue related to pacification in Vietnam was attacking the Viet Cong infrastructure in the rural areas of the south; however, CORDS participants also worked on aspects of security as it related to development projects. For example, the CORDS workers supported the national police force by helping to create the infrastructure for systems such as telecommunications and helped to update the South Vietnamese correction centers. With this support, the Vietnamese national police force increased from 75,000 in 1967 to 114,000 in January 1972.2

The CORDS program made a great effort to enhance security in South Vietnam, but in doing so the program’s staff unintentionally neglected district towns and other areas that were already marked as “secure.” According to Tran Ngoc Chau, the first head of South Vietnam’s Revolutionary Development Cadre Program, in his testimony before the U.S. Senate, there was an “improper selection of areas to be pacified.” He acknowledges that this failure resulted from the push to progress rapidly in order to show a greater degree of progress in pacification.3 As a result of the need to show great progress, this program was mainly implemented in relatively safe regions instead of problem areas.

The lesson here is that without security, neither the U.S. nor the host country will be able to effectively implement and maintain development programs. After the establishment of a secure area, coordination between the military and civilians is critical to beginning development activities. Once a secure area is established, civilian development staff can begin to advise and partner with local governments on long-term programs to establish a sustainable capacity within the host country government that provides safety, a stable governance, the rule of law, economic development, and basic needs and services for the population.

Enhance Training Mechanisms

All CORDS workers in organizational positions in Vietnam came from a military or a civilian agency and received common training at the Vietnam Training Center (VTC) at the Foreign Service Institute in Arlington, VA. The VTC was established to teach a variety of courses to prepare CORDS workers for deployment. Funded by USAID, VTC training received high praise from civilian leaders in Vietnam for providing them with qualified staff. Advisers in the CORDS program received Vietnamese language training; an orientation on Vietnamese history including religion, traditions, and political and economic development; and a course in Vietnamese culture.4

While this curriculum existed and was praised overall, there was limited briefing of CORDS volunteers about their colleagues in the field; most importantly, there was little if any training of civilians in either military matters or military culture. This became problematic...
as it forced many civilians to learn how to work effectively with their military colleagues only after arriving in Vietnam, which delayed program progress.\textsuperscript{5}

The program was also critiqued for the lack of a sufficient cultural component in the pre-deployment training. The result was a cultural collision between the Vietnamese civilians and the U.S. forces. When American advisors were unable to persuade the Vietnamese peasants to give up their traditional practices and “modernize,” they at times succumbed to racist attitudes about the inferiority of Southeast Asians. Upon encountering this Vietnamese “lack of interest” in the modernization practices the Americans were advocating, advisers often stopped advising and did the job themselves.\textsuperscript{6}

The CORDS experience highlighted the importance of understanding indigenous cultures and institutions in the success of development projects in foreign settings. Especially in conflict regions, it is crucial that development workers and researchers make the effort to understand the society in which they are working. This critical weakness prohibited timely responses to the ongoing conflict, as development personnel were not prepared to respond to certain cultural concerns of the Vietnamese population. One potential solution is a continuous assessment of individuals while they are in the field as a tool to evaluate the effectiveness of the pre-deployment training and to determine if the skills and knowledge learned were sufficient. The results of this assessment could be used to ensure that the gaps are filled and myths are dispelled when training future workers.

Many other pre-deployment training weaknesses found in the CORDS program continue in the present day. Currently, training for civilians and military generally occurs separately and does not focus on ensuring a mutual understanding of each other’s roles in the operation. Clearer identification of expectations for the entire team and introductory courses on how the military and civilians should partner together will enhance their productivity in the field. Civilian training and understanding of the military culture prior to arrival in the host country would drastically improve the civilians’ performance as they could immediately focus on their objectives and not spend the first few months trying to adapt to military culture.

Training must be seen as a priority for effective and successful operations. Therefore, adequate resources must be made available for both civilian and military pre-deployment training. Staffers should be assessed prior to deployment to establish their baseline of understanding and knowledge of the mission. That baseline can then be used for later comparisons.

In addition, the training of host country personnel is a first-step in breaking the U.S. pattern of acting as a patron and creating dependency. Training will encourage the host country to take ownership of activities on the ground. Training could include maintaining a proper budget, managing personnel within the various ministries, conducting refugee operations, and combating corruption.

Integrate Civil and Military Structures

The creation of the CORDS program synchronized the development efforts of the military and civilian agencies by merging...
them into one structure, under one leadership chain, and with one mission. Recognizing the expertise of both, a civilian assigned to a key position worked alongside a military deputy and vice versa. Furthermore, at each level within CORDS, this integration assisted in detaching both the military and the civilian staffers from their home agency structures. Each staffer worked under the direction of the senior CORDS adviser (civilian or military) at his/her level, which ultimately allowed the staff to focus on the end goals of the program. As a result, their loyalty was primarily to the CORDS program. This method provided the CORDS senior advisers with operational and technical expertise and logistical support of various home agencies without having to respond to their direction and interference. This integrated effort afforded development personnel with new human and financial resources normally reserved for the military and provided the equipment and tools necessary to complete and improve activities. The fact that funds for CORDS were pooled into one overarching budget was an additional way in which development and military activities worked together seamlessly for pacification efforts.

The integrated civil-military operations were stressed as an integral feature of CORDS, or as an interviewee stated: “[It was the] one thing that made CORDS work.” While the civilians and military had separate roles and performed different activities with various success rates, the whole was greater than the sum of its parts. Another respondent highlighted the importance of unity of command: “The integrated command structure of the program played a major part to insure that personalities do not get in the way [of collaborative success].”

There is a recognized need for a different approach toward a “unity of effort” within the current U.S. government. In his 2006 remarks at the Department of State and Department of Defense Counterinsurgent Conference, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Eric Edelman stated the experiences from Iraq and Afghanistan serve to reinforce the need for a better integration model while developing non-military capabilities. During the key informant interviews, the respondents also discussed the lack of coordination between DoD and USAID that has hindered the progress of current programs. USAID is simply more effective than DoD at certain things and vice-versa. Pooling the resources of the respective agencies is likely to not only enhance efficiency, but also increase success.

...the experiences from Iraq and Afghanistan serve to reinforce the need for a better integration model while developing non-military capabilities.

Institute Local Ownership

The relationship between the U.S.-led program and the foreign government are of specific importance to development programs like CORDS. In order for the programs implemented under CORDS to be effective, the South Vietnamese government needed to be as invested in the projects as the U.S. government. Robert Komer explained in his 1970 paper, “Impact of Pacification on Insurgency in South Vietnam,” that with the exception of one or two all operational programs were staffed and managed by Vietnamese. He felt this was necessitated by the U.S. military’s assumption of the primary role in the offensive. An additional factor that speaks to the importance of greater host country ownership and participation in development activities is the difficulty in finding qualified U.S. civilians for these jobs. Civilian commitment was an issue during the CORDS
program and remains a problem in present-day civil-military operations. Longer deployments were more successful, as staffs had more time to build upon what they learned in their training and establish effective working relationships; however, longer deployments were harder to fill with qualified staff.

The large number of civilians on the ground in Vietnam was and still is a unique feature when compared to other counterinsurgency operations. According to State Department records, there were a total of 2,685 civilian personnel in Vietnam in 1969, including personnel from the State Department, USAID, and the U.S. Information Agency. Of this number, about half were working for CORDS. Comparatively, 384 civilians worked in provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) in Afghanistan, and 907 civilians worked in PRTs in Iraq in 2008. Additionally, many of the civilians today in Afghanistan and Iraq are contractors; whereas, CORDS staff was comprised primarily of government personnel.

The tour duration of civilians is also a major difference between CORDS and PRTs. A year-long tour was not uncommon for CORDS development staff. On the other hand, PRT tours can be as short as three to six months, a policy established to entice volunteers who may not want to spend longer periods in country. Such short tours do not allow team members to establish working relationships and many times lead to gaps within key PRT positions, since former members may not immediately be replaced by their agencies. These gaps with key PRT positions further complicate the mission when institutional memory is not effectively transferred to relieving units.

While it is clear from the specific success of CORDS programs that the establishment of a parallel structure within the South Vietnamese government was vital to pacification efforts, the U.S. must be cautious of becoming a patron of the host government in this type of parallel establishment and instead focus on acting as a partner. Although local ownership is a necessary requisite for a self-sustaining country, the U.S. must be aware of the capacity of the local government before overwhelming it with too much responsibility. In addition, knowledge of the local language will assist deployment staff in discussing the budget and the personnel capacity of the local government in order to determine if the U.S. and host government are staffed accordingly to manage and deliver planned programs.

**Create Quantitative and Qualitative Evaluation Metrics**

One of the first full attempts at evaluation of a development program was the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) started in 1967 by the Military Assistance Command in Vietnam. This evaluation was developed in response to the unsatisfactory reporting system used by the U.S. to evaluate progress in Vietnam in 1966. HES surveys collected more data than ever before. This data provided the ability to show “trends of pacification,” which allowed development workers to see what was working in which areas and to adjust their actions accordingly. As Komer remarked in his paper, it was created out of an “emphasis on generating detailed factual reporting rather than subjective evaluations.”

In addition to the need for evaluation metrics, it is also important to mitigate data...
collection bias. Under CORDS, the U.S. transferred the data collection and reporting process over to the Vietnamese, which led to serious concerns about the data’s validity. As the Vietnamese government had the most at stake when reporting the data, there was increased potential for inflated and exaggerated results. Having independent collection agencies gather and analyze the data would help to preserve the integrity of the data.

Staff and contributors should also complete an assessment upon their return to the U.S. to determine what improvements can be made to the in-country programs in the future. This assessment can also be compared to the baseline data collected prior to the worker’s deployment. This comparative analysis would be helpful in determining future policy considerations.

**Provide Leadership at the Highest Levels**

The leadership and formation of CORDS came from the highest levels. Senior-level officials in both the U.S. and South Vietnamese governments proved through the dedication of resources and personnel that they were politically committed to achieving success through the CORDS program. Such a large-scale effort and overhaul of the command structure required support from the President as well as from the high-level actors directing the civil and military operations in Vietnam. President Johnson prioritized the non-military pacification activities and emphasized the need to always be informed of the pacification’s progress.

Other crucial champions of the pacification program included the senior officials who were orchestrating both the military and civil efforts. General William Westmoreland was very supportive of the interagency approach and worked closely with Ambassador Komer to ensure successful pacification activities. Westmoreland’s flexibility was an important attribute that opened up opportunities for Komer and other civilian senior staff to modify programs that otherwise might have been restricted to military personnel. Generally, Westmoreland supported Komer “on every issue that did not involve taking something away in the way of military forces.”

Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu and Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky were also essential supporters of CORDS. President Thieu stated in 1966 that the Government of the Republic of Vietnam set a similar agenda “balancing military needs and national development, increasing government efficiency, and refocusing the state on social reforms.”

Although corruption and political instability were constant obstacles, the backing of civil-military pacification operations by high-level Vietnamese government officials was necessary for CORDS to gain both a large number of committed Vietnamese staff at the local and district levels as well as the corresponding senior officials working on the pacification efforts alongside the U.S.

**Promote Institution Building**

According to the U.S. National Security Council, “deep-seated” corruption was endemic in the Saigon regime during the entire course of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam and had been identified as a major factor in the ultimate collapse...
of South Vietnam. The political corruption and instability in the South Vietnamese government was a fundamental problem that hampered the success of the CORDS program as well as the U.S.'s ultimate goal of pacification. Individual CORDS workers found that many of their Vietnamese counterparts were more interested in their own personal wealth and well-being than in pacification or the implementation of development projects.

Corruption was not only widespread among the ruling elite but at all levels of the civil service, including police officers and bureaucrats alike, due to low morale and low wages. As discussed in the interviews, corruption in the central Vietnamese government and among higher-level Vietnamese officials was harmful to the overall operations, but corruption at the local levels was most destructive for development work. As long as corruption in the local governments was controlled, the development efforts were able to move forward.

There was an effort made by CORDS to reduce the often arbitrary and potentially corrupt actions of the central government and of the regional Vietnamese military commands. The civilian members of CORDS were tasked with developing the local governments, which became a successful aspect of the pacification effort. In giving a voice to elected hamlet and village officials, the influence of the central government was reduced. Prior to this effort, village councils generally had little to do with pacification and development activities. The majority of the local programs were operated by the South Vietnamese government at the hamlet level (a rural area too small to be considered a village) and independent of the village government by teams who were unwilling to share their responsibilities with the village chiefs.

The detrimental effect that corruption and political instability had on counterinsurgency and development programs is a lesson from Vietnam that continues to echo into the 21st century. One of the few things the governments in Baghdad and Kabul share with the South Vietnamese regimes is a reputation for corruption and an uneasy relationship with their U.S. ally. While the U.S. may have nation-building plans in Iraq and Afghanistan—as they did in Vietnam—it is important those plans support and promote uncorrupt, participatory, and politically legitimate governments, which can only be supplied by the citizens of those governments. Though institution building is an expensive, time consuming, and oftentimes unpopular effort, it is a fundamental aspect of long-term success in counterinsurgency situations.

**Establish Balance between Program Flexibility and Controls**

According to CORDS participants, part of the success of the program stemmed from its ability to quickly change programs to fit needs on the ground as well as the flexibility to find and try creative solutions. CORDS leaders constantly looked for new and creative ideas to achieve their goals, and it was because of these innovative ideas that CORDS was able to make many of its programs successful. It is generally understood that bureaucratic controls serve as constraints to program modification and implementation. Since these controls always...
exist across a spectrum, program managers need to carefully weigh how much control they are willing to risk against the degree of flexibility necessary to achieve the goals sought.

**Conclusion**

The CORDS program was an innovative whole-of-government approach to achieving rural pacification through development activities strategically coordinated with military operations. Overall, the program was successful at integrating the civilian and military efforts under one command structure. With the support of the President and senior government officials, the CORDS program was able to break down the bureaucratic process and institute unified activities focusing on the goal of the mission as opposed to each individual agency’s objectives. The success of particular development activities in influencing the pacification efforts can be attributed to the effectiveness of the specific activity; however, it is also essential to recognize that the integrated structure of CORDS was a major factor in achieving that success.

It is important to realize that although there are lessons that can enhance current whole-of-government approaches, the environment in which CORDS was deployed is drastically different than today’s environment. The U.S. has become one of a multitude of players with a vested interest in the counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, complicating an already complex situation. Furthermore, the U.S. military is not conducting traditional conventional military operations as tactics have adapted to fight advanced insurgencies.

The comparison between CORDS and today’s environment is unfair in several ways. First, the U.S. was welcomed as an ally in Vietnam; today, the U.S. government is often viewed as an invader. Second, security was heavily present in Vietnam. Today’s civilian components of the PRTs are behind barricades, resulting in an inability to work in the field as freely as CORDS workers.15 Furthermore, there exists a lack of institutional knowledge that inhibits sharing lessons learned or successes among civilian workers.

The lessons that can be taken from the CORDS program to apply to present-day U.S. government counterinsurgency operations include adopting the strengths of the program and learning from its limitations. A clear voice from top officials promoting and leading an interagency program would greatly increase the success of U.S. efforts. For the model to succeed there must be a significant overhaul of the bureaucratic process and agency structure to enable the participants in stabilization and reconstruction activities to focus on overarching goals instead of individual agency objectives. *IAJ*

**Notes**


3 United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Vietnam: Policy and Prospects, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate on Civil Operations and Rural Development Support Program, February 17-20 and March 3,4,17, and 19, 1970, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, Govern-

4 “The Third Year Begins: FSI’s Viet-Nam Training Center,” State Department Newsletter, Department of State, Washington, DC, 1969, p. 16.


12 Fisher, p. 35.


A Civilian Guide to
Military Planning

by Brett Doyle

Compared with civilian agencies, the military is often viewed as investing a striking amount of time and energy into planning. Civilians often report initial skepticism of military planning efforts, but then come to appreciate them as an asset for decision makers. The military’s planning method can prevent surprise and provide for tactical flexibility.

This article is intended to provide civilian professionals working with military partners with an overview of the military planning and order issuing process, particularly in planning stability operations. It is not intended as a comprehensive primer on military planning. This article highlights how civilians can approach interacting with the military planning and order development process and provides a basic idea of when and with whom to engage. Tips or concepts to keep in mind are also supplied.

Why Civilians Might Participate in Military Planning

Military actors sharing the same space as civilians can affect civilian activities and objectives. Typically, the military has substantially more money and manpower than civilian counterparts to apply to planning its operations. Ideally, these military planning resources can support and reinforce civilian actors, or, less positively, stand at cross-purposes with some civilian activities. The military uses its plans and orders process to allocate its resources, which can include synchronizing them with civilian actors. By engaging with the military planning and orders process, civilians can ensure that military partners are fully aware of and reinforcing civilian objectives and goals within their areas of responsibility.

Doctrine requires the military to plan for its involvement in stability operations, and military planners often aggressively seek out civilian input where possible. Unfortunately, there are often...
an inadequate number of civilians available to contribute to and inform all of the military’s planning activities. Additionally, operational urgencies often compress planning times, which greatly limits the window of opportunity to solicit civilian input. The result is that military planning often lacks adequate input from knowledgeable civilian representatives and experts to shape effective operational activities. As a result of these constraints, military planners often make assumptions about U.S. civilian officials’ work.

Additionally, the process of planning itself can be beneficial to civilian agencies. It clarifies roles and responsibilities, particularly as to who should take what actions in time of emergencies. It can foster a common understanding of the problems at hand, as well as a common picture of assumptions and the operating environment. A common quote that sums this up is “it’s not the plan; it’s the planning.” The planning and orders process establishes parameters for when or, often just as importantly, when not to act. Examples of military plans that can significantly affect civilian operations include orders regarding the limits of military support for elections, and orders setting parameters for military involvement in engaging provincial or local government.

**The most relevant plans for civilians operating with military partners are: Campaign plans, Operations plans, Branches, and Sequels.**

**Types of Military Plans**

Military plans come in many forms and vary in scope, complexity, and length of planning horizons. Strategic plans establish national and multinational military objectives and include multiple subordinate plans to support those objectives. Operational-level or campaign plans cover a series of related military operations and activities aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. Pragmatically, operational plans provide a bridge from strategic goals and objectives to tactical planning for “on-the-ground” activities and tasks. Tactical plans cover the employment of units in operations, including the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other and to the enemy within the framework of an operational-level or campaign plan. There are several types of plans and the most relevant for civilians operating with military partners are:

**Campaign plan** - A joint operation plan aimed at achieving strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space. These plans are issued by joint headquarters, with embassy input in a civilian-military environment.

**Operation plan (OPLAN)** - Any plan for the conduct of military operations prepared in response to actual and potential contingencies. An OPLAN may address an extended period connecting a series of objectives and operations, or it may be developed for a single part or phase of a long-term operation. An OPLAN becomes an operational order, or OPORD, when the commander sets an execution time or designates an event that triggers the operation. OPLANs are developed by field units, such as divisions or brigades, and are potentially the most important type of military plan for civilians in field locations.

**Branch** - Describes the contingency options built into the base plan.

**Sequel** - A follow-up to an existing plan.
Executing Plans through Orders

Military plans are implemented through orders. Commanders issue these orders orally or in writing. The five-paragraph format (situation, mission, execution, sustainment, and command and control) is the standard for issuing orders.

There are three types of orders:

Operation order (OPORD) - Issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. Commanders issue OPORDs to direct the execution of long-term operations as well as the execution of discrete short-term operations within the framework of a long-range OPORD.

Fragmentary order (FRAGO) - An abbreviated form of an operation order, issued as needed to change or modify an existing order or to execute a branch or sequel to that order. FRAGOs provide brief and specific instructions, and they only address parts of the original OPORD that have changed. Pragmatically, FRAGOs tend to be the most common planning output of most military units operating in the field. The planning activities can be abbreviated in that the focus is mostly on the change or deviation from the fundamental OPORD.

Warning order (WARNO) - A preliminary notice of an order or action that is to follow. WARNOS help subordinate units and staff prepare for new missions by describing the situation, providing initial planning guidance, and directing preparation activities. WARNOs increase subordinate units’ planning time, provide details of the impending operation, and list key events that accompany preparation and execution.

How Plans and Orders are Made: the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP)

Military plans and orders are developed using what is called the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). The MDMP is an iterative planning methodology that integrates the activities of the commander, staff, subordinate headquarters, and other partners to share their understanding of the situation, to participate in course of action development and decision making, and to resolve conflicts before producing an operation plan or order for execution.

Preceding any deliberative planning, commanders must develop an understanding of the operational environment, frame the problem, define an end state, and develop an operational approach to achieve the end state. This is the “design” component. Unlike planning for combat operations, planning for stability operations requires a more conceptual design component where the commander must address and visualize less tangible aspects for which the more deliberate and detailed planning occurs. It is essential that commanders appreciate and understand the interrelationships among military and non-military perspectives and activities. Civilian partners are a primary source for the non-military perspective.

Throughout the process there is discussion and feedback between the military commander and his or her staff. The MDMP is a deliberate, analytical process organized into seven steps with an enhanced design component for civilian-
intensive stability operations. Simplified, there are four planning categories:

**Design-Visualization** - In stability operations ‘pre-step,’ commanders must come to understand the interrelationships of military and non-military perspectives and activities before conceptualizing the military mission to achieve the end state.

**Mission** - Steps 1 & 2 include Mission Receipt and Mission Analysis. In these steps, the military unit receives and analyzes the overall objectives and restates them in terms that relate to it.

**Courses of Action (COA)** - Steps 3-6 include COA Development, Analysis, Comparison, and Approval. These steps explore potential actions, produce estimates, and develop contingencies.

**Orders Production** - The commander’s selected COA is issued in Step 7 in the form of a plan or order.

This process can often be time and staff intensive. The various steps are often compressed depending on the need to adapt to changing battlefield conditions.

Key players in the MDMP process are:

**Commander** - The commander is the most important participant in the MDMP. More than simply decision-makers, commanders use their experience, knowledge, and judgment to guide the staff’s planning efforts. Commanders remain aware of the current status of the planning effort, participate during critical periods of the process, and make sound decisions based on the detailed work of the staff.

**Chief of Staff (CoS) or Executive Officer (XO)** - The CoS/XO manages and coordinates the staff’s work and provides quality control during the MDMP. He or she supervises the entire process, provides timelines to the staff, establishes briefing times and locations, and provides any instructions necessary to complete the plan.

**Staff** – The staff’s effort during the MDMP focuses on helping the commander understand the situation, make decisions, and synchronize those decisions into a fully developed plan or order. During COA development and comparison, the staff provides recommendations to support the commander in selecting a COA. After the commander makes a decision, the staff prepares the plan or order that reflects the commander’s intent.

**Engaging the Process**

Civilian staff working with military partners should keep these concepts in mind as they interact or participate in military planning and order development:

**Command vs. Consensus Based Styles** – Civilians interacting with military planning can often be frustrated by the planning style. Likewise, the typical civilian style of deliberative decision making, characterized by consensus, can be frustrating for military partners. The MDMP is designed to move forward in a time-efficient, linear manner. Revisiting prior steps involves substantial staff resources, time and generally can only be ordered by a commander. This differs substantially from the typical civilian decision-making style in which prior work or decisions can be subject to repeated review, particularly as new participants or new information are identified. As a result, civilians who are brought into an ongoing military planning process can feel that they are unable to address prior steps, or that they are being “left behind.”

From the other perspective, the military sees civilians as preferring to discuss issues in depth, repeatedly, and in different forums before deciding whether to act. Deciding how to act also appears to be a lengthy process. However
once these decisions are made, military partners can appreciate quick civilian application of intelligent solutions to difficult problems.

**Earlier is better** - Key civilian U.S. government representatives have the greatest opportunity to shape and influence the commander’s concept of military operations at the design stage, prior to the commander issuing mission or planning guidance to the staff. Each step of the process narrows the range of possibilities in subsequent steps. In order to have the greatest impact on the process, civilians should engage as early as possible.

**Timeframes** - Military partners focus on shorter time cycles, often seeking immediate effects, or on projects that could be finished within the duration of their tours. State Department personnel tend to have longer time frames, while USAID personnel have even longer time frames for approaching development outcomes. Each of these perspectives incorporates valid operational imperatives. A recommended approach to balance these imperatives is for civilians, particularly leadership, to attempt to balance actions with immediate results while continuing to think about the intermediate and long-term impacts.

This humorous quote, though a bit exaggerated, captures the divide in perspectives: “We joked that while the military thought of changes that could be made before the next daily Battle Update Brief to the division leadership, USAID thought about how its activities would impact the next generation!”

**Planning Location** - Civilian and military planning can take place at different locations and levels of hierarchy, which can cause confusion. Most civilian foreign assistance planning is done at the national or embassy level. Civilians in field locations are often working on implementation rather than planning. For the military, field commands are responsible for planning operations, including the allocation of resources and sequencing events for their respective regions.

**Views on Resources** - Often civilian style planning begins with available resources, which informs all further planning. Indeed, civilians do not begin to conduct significant planning activities until after resources have been decided. For the military, as outlined above, planning begins with a mission (step 1), and resources are assessed and applied as needed throughout the planning process. These differences in approach can cause consternation for those not aware of them. This can lead the military to perceive that civilians are delaying the planning, while civilians are left wondering why the military is intent on starting so early.

**Planning Manpower** - Often, civilians will have substantially fewer staff members dedicated to planning than the military. Civilian planners are frequently individuals or small cells of a few people focused primarily on planning. The military often has entire offices dedicated to the process. This is particularly true in field locations, where civilians may not have full-time planners stationed at all. As a result, civilians can feel overwhelmed when attempting to engage with military counterparts. While this

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**Often civilian style planning begins with available resources...**

*For the military, planning begins with a mission and resources are assessed and applied as needed throughout the planning process. These differences in approach can cause consternation for those not aware of them.*
might be unavoidable, engaging early and enlisting (often eager) military colleagues in dividing up labor can be a useful approach. Also in some cases, military commanders have even been known to co-locate or second military planners to civilian staff to promote integrated planning.

**Conclusion**

Successfully interacting with the military planning process can be challenging. The military approach is complex, rigorous, and robust. It can easily overwhelm civilians unfamiliar with the MDMP. However, when considering stability operations, the military’s own doctrine requires it to seek out and integrate non-military perspectives. Daunting as it may be, civilian participation and input is essential, but success requires flexibility on both sides.

When effectively integrated, civilian experts can make essential contributions to the military planning process. Such a process appropriately incorporates civilian equities and can bring civilian expertise and problem solving approaches to shared challenges. Furthermore, this approach can help avoid friction in implementing activities across multiple lines of operation. This can be achieved by de-conflicting related activities and through fostering a common assessment of the challenges and a shared understanding of how they are to be tackled.

Civilian-military planning today remains a challenge. However, time and practice will institutionalize civilian-military collaboration, especially in stability operations. In the meantime, meeting this challenge will produce results that more than make collaboration worthwhile. These ongoing efforts will set the stage for making future civilian participation a rule rather than an exception. *IAJ*

The author extends special thanks to Ted Kanamine, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and Afghanistan civilian-military training specialist at the U.S. Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, for invaluable input into this article.

**Notes**

1 See Field Manual (FM) 5.0 *The Operations Process*, Appendix E, March 2010 for more information on military plans.


3 See Field Manual (FM) 3-07, *Stability Operations*, Chapter 4, “Planning for Stability Operations.” This section addresses how military commanders must consider visualizing the synchronized arrangement of military and non-military forces and capabilities to achieve the desired end state that is formulated through more collaborative MDMP.

4 From Howard Van Vranken’s “Civil Affairs and the QDR: Opportunity and Challenge”.
Interview with the

Honorable Ronald E. Neumann
Former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan

In April 2011, Simons Center contributor Lawrence "Chip" Levine sat down with Ronald E. Neumann, President of the American Academy of Diplomacy, to discuss his views on progress in Afghanistan. Ambassador Neumann traveled throughout Afghanistan in 1967 when his father was ambassador there and again in 2005-07 during his own tenure as ambassador. He also served as U.S. ambassador to Algeria (1994-97) and to Bahrain (2001-04). During 2004-05, he served in Baghdad with the Coalition Provisional Authority and was the Political/Military Counselor in U.S. Embassy Baghdad as principal interlocutor with the Multinational Command where he coordinated political aspects of military action. At the time of this meeting Ambassador Neumann had recently returned from a visit to Afghanistan.

Levine: Ambassador, you’ve just returned from a trip to Afghanistan that included meetings with President Hamid Karzai, General Petraeus, Major General Campbell, and others. What are some of your key observations and insights from this trip?

Neumann: The incongruence between Karzai and many of his opponents is they don’t understand what we’re doing.

Levine: Is that our problem?

Neumann: That is our problem. We have not articulated in a clear fashion what we want in Afghanistan. We have articulated a lot about our strategy and not enough about our goals. The adaptation of “defeat Al Qaeda” as a goal adds to the confusion because it does not tell Afghans what exactly we want. Does that mean we want to stay? Does that mean we want to go? Do we want to conduct counterterrorism and just kill people, which might meet our counterterrorism goals but offers nothing to Afghans except endless fighting? From their perspective there is no end to the war. They don’t understand. And since it is a traumatized nation where people focus on survival, when they don’t understand the goal they fill it in with conspiracy theories, and they adopt hedging strategies to protect themselves.

This theme “we don’t know what you want” was one I heard from [President Hamid] Karzai; [Dr.] Abdullah; [Mohammad Hanif] Atmar; [Amrullah] Saleh; [Mohammad Ehsan] Zia, former Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development; [Enayatullah] Kasimi, former Minister of Transportation; Major General Khaliq; and private Afghans. When I say it’s universal, it’s universal.

Levine: Which General Khaliq?

Neumann: The former Deputy Minister of the Interior. What we need to clarify is a basic, simple statement: We want to take most of our troops home, leave some of our troops as long as you (Afghans) need them to help support your army handle whatever residual violence there is, and maintain economic support for the indefinite future to help build a stable government. Period. We
need a simple statement like that. Probably need to add that we do not intend to project power from there into their neighbors.

And that’s it. Our desire to hang “Christmas tree ornaments” on a statement will destroy the clarity. Because as soon as we start talking about democracy and equality and justice and gender rights, and transport and who knows what else, Afghans will examine every single ornament we put on the tree, put it under a microscope, and try to figure out why is it really there. By the time they are done with that process you will have no clarity left.

Levine: Those additional topics are concerns for some senior leaders in the U.S. Do we explain to them we need to state very clearly our purpose and objectives and defer all of those things to later phases of our civil-military strategy?

Neumann: All of those things can be part of our strategy. We need a statement of our goals. We get so wrapped up in strategy we forget it is a way to reach an objective; it is not a definition of the objective itself. So we talk about strategy as though the strategy itself is a goal.

Levine: What is our larger end state in the region? One of the things I found interesting when at U.S. Central Command [CENTCOM] was a focus on Central Asia and the idea that Afghanistan is only one piece of a larger puzzle.

Neumann: I’m not sure we have an end state in Central Asia. We have a Russian influence; we have a policy toward Iran, which has its own interests; and we have democracy goals in Central Asia that may compete with our goals for resetting our relations with Russia. Then we have negative goals, things we do not want to happen. We certainly want to see Pakistan moving against extremism. But I think there is a legitimate question that can be asked about whether there is an end state because it goes to this idea that the planning process we have—that the military has—is suitable for all problems. Some problems do not have definable end states. If they do not have a definable end state, is the planning process suitable? We have reached a cultural point where we think this planning process is our hammer that makes every problem a nail.

What is the end state of U.S.-Franco relations? What is the end state of democracy in America? There are dozens of problems which do not have definable end states. They go on, they are dynamic, they continue. You are doing something today, you are doing something tomorrow to manage a problem or improve a situation, but the situations continue to evolve. They do not have end states. You can sometimes take pieces out of them that you plan for that have end states, and that is legitimate. But sometimes you have direction without an end state.

Improved Security

Levine: You know the U.S. Army loves its doctrine. It has its counterinsurgency doctrine that says intelligence drives the operation.

Neumann: And then we have the reality.

Levine: And the lens through which we view that reality has been primarily military. So we have driven a decision-making process, a thought process, what General McChrystal called a “mindset” that is primarily military. The challenge becomes how you begin to influence that mindset balancing civil along with the military concerns.

Neumann: There really is improved security in a number of parts of Afghanistan. And I feel
comfortable saying that because I heard it from enough Afghans and not just our always optimistic military.

But, everybody—military, civilian, Afghan, foreign—all said we are going to have heavy fighting this spring and summer. That is not exactly a stroke of revelation. It does suggest to me that we need to reframe our public discourse. Because the line of “progress that it is fragile and reversible” needs now to say we expect heavy fighting in the spring and summer, and we will be able to make a better judgment in the fall.

We need to give a context to the fighting. Otherwise, every battle or action that goes bad this fighting season will be taken by the press as showing that the progress either is not real or is being reversed. We have a line, without framing public context, which sets us up for “every bad action” to be a sort of Tet 2011 potential. We ought to get ahead of that.

Police Training

Neumann: I came back pretty comfortable with the Afghan Local Police (ALP) program. I saw three ALP sites, one in southern Arghandab [District of Kandahar Province], one up in Kunduz, and one in Chamkani District in Paktya.

There is the real ALP, which is being run by special operations forces, and then there are bits and pieces out there, village security, that have sort of grown up in other respects. The ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] Joint Command [IJC] is supposed to be doing an evaluation of these other bits and pieces to decide whether to move them into the mainstream ALP program, turn them into facilities protection forces of some sort, or disband them. I am very nervous about that, because I don’t necessarily believe the IJC will have the ability and the right people to look at each group closely and know what they are looking at.

If you have gotten to the parts in my book dealing with the Afghan National Auxiliary Police [ANAP], there’s a good example there of how with the best will in the world people doing a job were not able to know what it was they were doing until we sent other people to look at it. The ANAP plan began as a rather desperate expedient to meet the offensive we knew would come in 2006 when we—ISAF, Combined Forced Command-Afghanistan, the major embassies, and the Afghan government—knew we were not going to get additional troop reinforcements. The plan was to recruit individuals and place them under the police chain of command so that we would avoid creating militias. Then the ANAP recruits would get a minimal amount of training and be used as static security. The early reports from our trainers said the program was going well. But when we organized a mixed team of officers from the embassy, the coalition training command, and others to take an in-depth look we found all sorts of problems: militias being hired, recruits from one ethnic group being sent to work in areas of a different group, one tribe being favored over another in the same area, and so on. Nobody was trying to lie about the program. The problem was that the military and police training personnel lacked the political training to really know who they were training.

Rating the Afghan Army

Levine: I was in Afghanistan in 2008, and listening to the things you went through between 2005 and 2007 was like “déjà vu all over again”.

Neumann: Part of that is our tour length. One thing I think our military has to deal with somehow
is the recurring phenomena that “it was screwed up when my unit got here and it was better when I left.”

Because after 10 years of seeing that cycle in the same places, we have to say “Are you not fixing it? Are the problems different? Is the perception a victim of a commander’s desire to always make things better? But how trustworthy is our most honest analysis if we continue to watch this cycle? I think this also goes to how we rate the Afghan Army. We have a particular problem there because the training part is done by NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan [NTM-A] with a lot of transparency and public information. Yet the most important element of developing a real fighting force is the partnering, and that is under IJC authority. They do have an evaluations branch which is getting better, though I think they have some problems, but it is not tasked or resourced to produce transparency. Therefore, there is no public reporting on the most important part of developing a qualified Afghan Army, and therefore, you should expect your credibility to be called into question.

Levine: Does this imply we have a strategic communications problem?

Neumann: This has been messed up since the beginning. Anthony Cordesman with the Center for Strategic and International Studies has been fulminating about the lack of metrics and reporting on the military for years; it is not a new subject.

You should not expect to have credibility on the Afghan Army when you do not report to the public about progress and problems. There are all kinds of reporting from NTM-A which are very good. But it does not go to the question of the fighting quality of the Afghan units. There are some problems with reporting—how one assesses progress. Moving from milestone reporting to combat unit assessment is probably better, but still, I do not think it is perfect, still think it has a problem. Too much of it is self-rating by people who are partnered.

I agree the U.S. partners are hard-headed and trying to be professional about this. But there is no other place in the U.S. Army where we think we do not need separate inspectors; they are self-rating. Why do we think in the most critical mission of the war we do not need a well-resourced and adequately staffed inspection regimen?

Levine: You brought that up in your book. You talked about how we are measuring the wrong things: inputs and not outputs. Is this from your Vietnam experience as an infantry officer? Did you partner in Vietnam?

Neumann: I had one brief experience where we partnered a couple of times with some popular force platoons (local militia that protected its home villages). It was interesting. We did it twice; my particular platoon partnered twice. One unit had this old noncommissioned officer who fought with the French, and his was a very squared-away platoon. The second time there was a young Vietnamese lieutenant who sat on the bank and pitched grenades into the river to fish. My conclusion was that performance was totally dependent on the quality of the leader.

Levine: So that suggests that leadership is one of the metrics we should be looking at. But we tend to be focused more on logistics and did we get them the right number of vehicles.

Neumann: That is what the “mileposts” were. They have moved away from that. My favorite joke is that using the milepost system, the 20th Maine was clearly not able to fight at Little Round Top during the battle of Gettysburg, much too under-strength, under-equipped, and therefore combat ineffective.
Promotions Based on Merit

Levine: That is interesting. When you said General Khaliq, I thought you meant the Afghan 203rd Corps Commander. This guy is squared away. You could see the benefit over time of successive U.S. trainers and advisors. He has had guys like [Major General John] “Mick” Nicholson when he was a colonel commanding the 3rd Brigade 10th Mountain Division advising him. I’m an old armor officer, and we looked at crews. Having tanks and people and bullets did not make you qualified. You had to have worked together as a team, which is a more intangible metric. What you could see on General Khaliq’s staff were guys who had been with him for several years.

Neumann: This is an important point. This is very anecdotal and fragmentary. We went out to one training base and talked to people about some of the teams that we bumped into. We asked their opinion of merit promotions and removal of bad officers.

What was interesting was that we found a bifurcated process. Getting rid of poor people is hard. They tend to be moved around rather than relieved. On the other hand, everyone I talked to knows of cases where qualified Afghan officers are getting promoted on merit to more responsible positions. What you have is an old system protecting losers because of patronage networks, but not necessarily inhibiting promotion from what I can gather. Now that is a very anecdotal impression—really, a hypothesis that needs to be tested.

And there is a whole new development. They just signed or they just implemented the first stage of the new retirement law. There was something in the press recently that they had just retired the first 50 general officers, and there were some more coming behind them. As far as I could understand from people I talked to, it is not that somebody is kept in a position, but that he is kept employed—he has a safety net. So if you could pay him through a retirement plan, much of that problem would go away. We will see.

Critical Issue for This Year and Next—Credible Transition

Neumann: I came away feeling that the critical issue for this year and the beginning of next year is the south and southwest. My sense is [Major General] Nicholson, [General] Petraeus, and [Lieutenant General] Rodriguez all understand that. This is almost a single point of failure. If we can transfer many of our troops out of the south and southwest, and the Afghans can mostly hold the security of the population there, then transition begins to have credibility.

If we either cannot or will not transfer troops, either because we do not believe we can afford to or the Afghans cannot hold, then I think there will be no chance of putting credibility back into transition. You will have lost it.

So by the middle of next year, you have got to transfer substantial portions of the south to Afghan control. It will not be a total turnover since we will still be in overwatch and providing support. But it has got to be really, really, Afghans running it. And that means we have to start taking the training wheels off. They have to be able to get a bloody nose, but not necessarily a broken head.

There are some counter-cultural things we will have to deal with, as well as our risk assessment. Because people often will not want to transfer responsibility until the Afghans are really good. So we are going to have to look very, very closely at the quality of the Afghan fighting force; who we have there in terms of the Afghans and very careful supervision in terms of the Americans. Whether you are on a road to transfer or on the road to a cliff edge where you step back and hope they do not go over. How do you manage that? How are you going to test that without the test
Levine: The leadership is obviously critical. So if we are moving out older generals and promoting by merit, doesn’t that start to lay a solid foundation?

Neumann: I do not profess to be an expert, though I know enough about it to occasionally find things. I was very impressed with Lieutenant General Bill Caldwell, commander of the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan.

President Karzai

Neumann: I met with President Karzai for about an hour, most of it alone. I believe he is the same man he always was. I do not believe any of this stuff about he is off his meds. But we have a major problem, and at least 50 percent of it is our own creation. He does not know what we are about, but he is reasonably convinced that we are against him and that we have deliberately tried to undermine him and weaken his legitimacy, and he does not know if we are staying or not.

So Karzai is to my mind pursuing two basic policy paths, both of which are totally logical from his point of view. One is to build a network of supporters who will fight for him if we leave. That means he has no intention of moving those people or firing them because they happen to be corrupt or rapacious. And the other is he is trying to define himself separately as something other than the American puppet. Foreign puppets do not survive very well in Afghanistan.

We are acting as if we either do not understand the motivations or as if the motivations are irrelevant to what we want. That means we are in a constant head-butting contest. And every time we butt our heads, he assumes there is another purpose and the relationship goes down. That does not mean some of his behavior is not incredibly frustrating, but our approach to it I think is heavily flawed. It may be a little better now, but it is still basically flawed.

Levine: Better with General Petraeus? What is the improvement?

Neumann: He does not have a great relationship with Petraeus, and he has no personal relationship, of course, with Ambassador Eikenberry, which has been completely torn by various leaks. The Petraeus/Karzai relationship is nowhere equivalent to the McChrystal relationship. I do not think it is as negative as it is with Eikenberry, but it is not positive.

Levine: One of the impressive, first things I saw that General McChrystal did was when he brought in the head of Afghan Army intelligence, General Karimi, to the American operations center and gave him a briefing. It sent a strong message of partnership and seemed to change the tenor of the relationship.

Neumann: I came away from this trip thinking more people are now thinking about potential civil war than has ever been the case before.

Levine: Have we created those conditions?

Neumann: Only in the sense of our lack of clarity. The immediate thing that is pushing those is fear that Karzai will make a bad deal with the Taliban that brings them back to real power. That fear is quite explicit with some people.
Reintegration/Peace Council

Levine: What are your thoughts on reconciliation/reintegration? What is the right path to follow?

Neumann: I can only talk about the problem conceptually. To have any kind of negotiation or meeting, you have to keep the meeting group pretty small. On the other hand, Karzai has a major need to reassure people who are nervous about what he is going to do, which is at tension with keeping the group small. Forget the peace council, I think, it has no credibility for that mission.

Levine: Too big?

Neumann: It is the wrong people. It is clearly a group stacked and manipulated by Karzai for his purposes and, therefore, is not going to be able to reassure the Northern Alliance. Then you can talk about how to do reassurance. Part of that is we need to have a seat at the negotiation, and we have to be talking to a lot of people who are not in the negotiations. They have to have a sense from us that they are being listened to and that we understand what things scare them. And if we are not very specific about our red lines to everybody in the world, we need to understand that we could be a block to this kind of help and reassurance. I think we are moving to that position, but right now we do not have anybody to talk to.

Levine: I had the pleasure of having lunch with an Afghan businessman in his home in Kabul last year. When I arrived, he was sitting in his living room with a former Taliban commander. After his guest left, he said the coalition needed to speak directly with elders without the presence of government officials, who he said many elders did not trust. In referring to the former Taliban commander he said, “This guy can connect us with many elders.” What do you think about our efforts at reintegration?

Neumann: It is in its very early days and it is very cautious, but I have a great deal of respect for what Phil Jones, is doing on that, the British Major General who is the International Security Assistance Force Advisor on Reintegration. He is on at least his second tour in Afghanistan. He was the Military Advisor to the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative when I was there, then the British Army Attaché here in the U.S. He is a very smart guy who travels around Afghanistan all the time.

And then, of course, there is the question of whether there is some larger negotiation to be had, which may happen when we find people to talk to. But I think we have got at least to the point where we will talk to them.

Now the question is not about the theory, the question is if we have someone to talk to who wants to talk to us. My own suspicion is two-fold. By all means, we should start talking. Understand, this is a process of multiple years. If you look at Guatemala or Cambodia or Namibia, pick your place, where you finally came to a negotiated settlement: Paris peace talks, the American Revolution, etc. They all took many years to complete. Do not expect this to be an alternative to fighting. This is a two-, three-, five-year process that you are hesitantly beginning. So fine, begin it, keep talking, and keep fighting. You should not give away a single thing on the battlefield for atmospherics. For the sound of conversation you get paid with the sound of conversation. You do not get hard cash. Do not get confused about it.

The second thing about it is just take it a step at a time. We need to be at the table because too many people are afraid of Karzai. By the way, on a separate subject, I do not think we are doing a good job of tracking the patronage networks of the government figures or of senior military figures.
Patronage Networks and Corruption

Levine: Did you get to see Brigadier General H.R. McMaster while you were there?

Neumann: Yes, and H.R. has such a strong presentation you have to dig down to get to some of the subtleties some times. I think H.R. is going to get frustrated. We have the guidance which has come out now, which he is following, targeting the counter-corruption efforts much more narrowly on people that are a menace to the war.

Levine: Which seems to be a step in the right direction?

Neumann: I think it is a step in the right direction, but we have a political vulnerability. We have talked to Congress and the public, but we have not told them we are not trying to clean the whole stable. So you have a vulnerability. We have shifted focus, and the shift is right, but lack of explanation is a potential vulnerability. I still think most of what H.R. is stuck with is wrong-headed. It is an attempt to make this a juridical issue in the middle of what is a political problem.

When I was in Bagram, Major General John Campbell [U.S. Commander of Regional Command East] asked me how we should deal with Juma Khan Hamdard, Governor of Paktia, and a major problem on Petraeus’s list. He raises the issue with Karzai frequently. I said, okay, you cannot do a strategy out of the blue. Why do you understand the man to be there? What do you think he is about? Answer: Well we think it has something to do with blocking Atta. I thought the answer was vague. Just for the heck of it I reached back overnight to a couple of people and ended up with a long memo about Hamdard, tracking him back into the 1980s. Born in Balkh, he is a Hezb-e-Islami commander going back into the 1980s, and he is clearly, when you read this stuff, part of a major effort to rebuild Hezb-e Islami influence and diminish Jamaat-e Islami influence.

Now, with that clear background and assumed purpose, you are not going to get Karzai to move him just because he is rapacious. You either stop cracking your head against a hard object or figure out another strategy. Are you going to side with him? You have a number of potential ways you can go, none of which may be effective. Maybe you have to pay him off, maybe you have to try to stake out something—if you will leave certain areas alone or be more efficient about them, I will leave you alone. You have got to figure it out. But first of all you have got to start by figuring out what you are about. And our counter-corruption strategy does not start asking those questions often enough, in my view.

Levine: I spent a couple of weeks in Gardez last year, and spoke with Major General Abdul Khaliq [Commanding General, Afghan 203rd Corps] and his staff, and was told about conflicts between him and Governor Hamdard.

Neumann: [reviews memo, which included information on the relationship between Governor Hamdard and General Dostam, and how Hamdard, who is a Pashtun, facilitated the return of Dostam and defeat of Taliban in the north in 1997 by convincing Balk Pashtuns who were pro-Taliban to realign with him.] You have a strategy, but your operational level can not be superficial. You have to apply the same level of political understanding and finesse in designing your tactics and your political operations as you do to the military piece. And we do not, by and large.

Levine: General McChrystal and General Petraeus both spoke about the importance of understanding the “human terrain.” General McChrystal categorized it as paramount, and General Petraeus called it the “decisive terrain” during his confirmation hearings. How can we do this better?
Neumann: I did the research on Hamdard partly to test what is available, because I reached back and got this from a friend in 24 hours. But this is the level of detail we should have for every governor there. It is the level of detail we ought to have on every Afghan corps and brigade commander at a minimum, if not battalion commanders. If the guy is not brand new, he has a history. What is his history? Saying he is a Tajik does not tell you who he fought with or who he fought against or who he betrayed or what his loyalty network is. We are not tracking patronage networks and thinking about civil war. It would be really smart if we would track this.

I give that to you as an example of what I think is the depth of information that you need. You read that and you think about what is the tactic for dealing with Hamdard. And it is not just going in and telling President Karzai “Hey, this guy is corrupt.”

Levine: Another problem I understood was his Police Chief. He was setting up illegal checkpoints and running counter to what our strategy and objectives were. As you say, we are taking a juridical approach. How do we use him as an influential actor and modify his behavior to support the objective of establishing government legitimacy in the eyes of the population? Instead we threw him in jail, but this runs counter to what I think you are saying should be our approach. In the midst of an insurgency that could spin into a civil war, are we using our heads? Are we being smart?

Neumann: We sometimes have trouble using our heads, because we have institutional processes. Once you have evidence that something is in violation of U.S. law, you are very likely to have a U.S. investigation or grand-jury case started. Once you do that you probably cannot even hand over evidence. You may lose all political control. There are some cases where maybe you do want to do that. Take it to a higher authority. There are some cases where you want to try to use political influence to control things, as you say. There is no single scripted answer.

There is a bigger issue that we have never found a real way to deal with. A lot of the corrupt people in the police are part of a larger issue of political networks. So when you are trying to treat it as a technical issue of political corruption, you do not really understand it. Have you ever heard of a city in which you had a corrupt city government and an honest police force?

Levine: I grew up in New Jersey.

Neumann: There have been cases where clean city government cleaned up corrupt police forces. I have never heard of a case where a corrupt city government cleaned up the police force. The shorthand of the conversation I would like to have with President Karzai at greater length than I did, and it would have to be couched a little differently, is that if you are going to have a Mafia, you have got to be the Don. You have got to exercise control and influence. If your control is so loose that people do not depend on you, that you depend on them more than they depend on you, you have not really assured something. It is more a discussion about efficiency than corruption.

Final Thoughts

Levine: What are your final thoughts on our strategic communications or messaging—not selling, but how we are informing?

Neumann: It is not Lieutenant General Bill Caldwell’s piece, it’s the IJC piece. Caldwell’s piece, NTM-A, gets well disseminated. He does a lot of stuff. The problem is his piece is only half of the job. None of the partnering with Afghan units is with Caldwell. You cannot partner whole American battalions and brigades with Afghan units under NTM-A management and fight battles under IJC.
I understand that. But the partnering effort is where a lot of the professional development of the Afghan forces is actually going to come from the military advisors. And the IJC piece has no public visibility.

**Levine:** And needs to.

**Neumann:** Yes.

**Levine:** What would be your message to Congress?

**Neumann:** Focus on the south and southwest instead of the numbers of withdrawal. That is where the viability of our strategy is going to be tested.

**Levine:** That is in the Security line of operations under the ISAF campaign plan. What about the Governance and Development lines of operations?

**Neumann:** I think we actually have too much money in the south and probably need more in the north, west, and center. I think this is a sub-problem of the fact that there has been a very, very hard learning curve about the pace at which you can do change in governance and development.

And I think that was made much worse by the administration’s July 2011 deadline decision, now fortunately pushed off, because it created this: “I have got to have this. Do not tell me you cannot do it. I need 40 districts developed by next year, and that is the requirement. And why can’t the State Department, USAID, and the rest of your guys produce?” Well, I am sorry, this is where the inability of the situation to fit an end state leads to totally messed up planning. You are talking about social transformation. It does not happen at that rate. And willing it, commanders demanding that you “get with it,” reaches a point at which this shades off to King Canute telling the sea to stay put.

There are certain things that fit this model and there are certain things that do not. I think we need to focus on the security piece. We do what we can. There are things that are working on the governance piece. The effort to assess ministries so as to flow more money through the Afghan government is a right effort. It has an awful lot of moving parts. It is going in the right direction. What the Independent Directorate of Local Governance is doing at the local level in local development has lots of good pieces, but they do not make a good whole yet.

**Levine:** And that goes back to your points on strategy and simplicity.

**Neumann:** Right.  

**NOTES**


Interagency Efforts in Southern Sudan

South Sudan’s recent transition to independence serves as a testament to the people of the new nation and their tireless pursuit of peace and self-determination. In the referendum on independence and the run-up to statehood, the United States supported the semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan and helped mitigate conflict.

As part of an effort across the U.S. government, the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and its Civilian Response Corps (CRC) sent about 50 officers to Southern Sudan over the course of the last year. The CRC is the U.S. government’s cadre of trained, deployable civilian experts drawn from nine agencies that has worked in more than two dozen countries. These officers work alongside U.S. diplomats, development personnel, and U.S. service members in fragile and conflicted environments overseas. The intensified diplomatic and development effort in Southern Sudan serves as a model for interagency collaboration to prevent conflict and promote regional stability.

Though the CRC’s work in Sudan dates back to 2006, the recent effort focused on Southern Sudan began in April 2010, when the State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs and the U.S. Consulate in Juba sought support in advance of national elections and the January 2011 referendum. S/CRS and the CRC supported a diplomatic expansion that extended the U.S. reach throughout Southern Sudan’s 10 states, enhanced political reporting, helped advise the Government of Southern Sudan, and aided in mediating local disputes. For example, a U.S. Census Bureau official and USAID democracy experts helped the Southern Sudanese establish procedures to tally the vote fairly and accurately. This was vital to the success of the referendum: If the country could not determine how many voters it had, it could not determine what percentage supported breaking off to become a separate country. Later, the same official helped mediate a dispute that was threatening to escalate to violence.

Following a peaceful, credible referendum, S/CRS and the CRC continued to deploy interagency stabilization teams to work on a semi-permanent basis throughout the Southern region. Teams from State and USAID, some living in Southern Sudan’s state capitals, strengthened U.S. relationships with Southern Sudanese government and civil society at the local level. The teams continue to support conflict prevention activities such as promoting inter-tribal dialogue, identifying emerging tensions, and monitoring land allocation to displaced people. An analysis unit in Juba supports these teams, which also provide conflict-focused reporting to inform policymaking in Washington. To ensure officers’ security and self-sufficiency in very austere conditions, S/CRS provides modest but secure working and living space, mobile communications, and vehicles so that these people do not take resources from the U.S. post.

The CRC also provides subject-matter experts, such as an anti-corruption adviser and a policing expert from the Department of Justice. These experts are providing important insights to the U.S. Embassy in Juba and technical capacity building to the nascent government of South Sudan.

As with all such engagements, S/CRS and the CRC operate under the Chief of Mission and
work to provide the U.S. country team with tools to operate more effectively. In the months ahead, S/CRS and the CRC will continue to contribute to U.S. efforts to support the emergence of South Sudan and growth of an inclusive, democratic government capable of responding to the needs of its people. **IAJ**

**The State-Defense Initiative: An Interagency Solution**

In recent years, the evolution of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan has underlined the need for U.S. civilian agencies to train with the Department of Defense (DoD) as part of the wider U.S. effort to leverage whole-of-government solutions to emerging global security challenges. As a result, DoD now regularly invites civilian agencies such as the State Department and USAID to participate in training, exercises, education, experiments and war games (TE3).

In this context, the State-Defense Integration branch (SDI) has emerged as a key conduit between diplomacy and defense. Established by the Office of International Security Operations in the Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/ISO), SDI provides personnel to support DoD TE3, seminar, and conference requests. In doing so, it draws from the State Department’s Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review for its objectives: bringing together the unique contributions of our civilians to advance US interests; building greater civilian capacity to prevent and respond to crisis; providing our military the civilian partner(s) it needs and deserves; and, changing the way we do business by working smarter.

Through the Interagency Working Group of the Worldwide Joint Training & Scheduling Conference (WJTSC), civilian departments and agencies, combatant commands, the military services and combat support agencies developed business rules for DoD requests for interagency participation in military exercises, as well as for how those requests are funneled through the Joint Staff/J7. These rules have been in place for approximately three years, during which the State Department created SDI to fulfill requests while ensuring State’s equities are met.

As a result of the SDI evolution, PM/ISO has become the primary coordination point-of-entry for a variety of DoD support requests. A newly developed data system undergirds a circular coordination process which enhances communication across the Joint Exercise Life Cycle (JELC) and maximizes support to DoD. The SDI team analyzes, clarifies and shapes the initial support request; identifies and deploys appropriate State Department personnel; solicits after action reports; and identifies lessons learned, which are incorporated into the Joint Lessons Learned Information System and used to shape future interactions.

This process has significantly improved communication, coordination, and State Department support to DoD. As of July 14, 2011, more than 220 requests for in excess of 3,000 man-hours have been received for calendar year 2011. More than 85 requests have already been supported, an estimated 400 percent improvement over the previous calendar year.

While SDI has helped make the challenge of identifying and placing exercise participants more efficient, it continually strives to improve the process. Despite State Department procedures that require support requests go through PM/ISO, independent requests by combatant commands, the military services, and specific units, occasionally continue. As the SDI process matures and both the State Department and DoD are able to apply the rules consistently, such requests are expected to decline.
These gains extend across multiple levels within both organizations. At the strategic level, the SDI increases integration, synergy, and efficiency; supports senior-level guidance and priorities; enables and enhances cross-organizational integration and coordination; promotes the systematic capture of lessons learned, prompt implementation of corrective actions, and increased understanding of shared equities, capability gaps, and support requirements; and, applies integration feedback to inform policy, operational, and resource decisions across State.

At the operational level, the SDI enables cross-fertilization of organizational planning, personnel, and processes by: informing DoD planning as it relates to U.S. foreign policy; enhancing State Department understanding of DoD goals and mission objectives; identifying shared equities; and providing a forum to share learning experiences and associated lessons learned.

Finally, at the tactical level, the SDI improves understanding and coordination in the field at the action officer level; increases familiarity with respective institutions, cultures, and processes; builds relationships; fosters learning and trust, including through sharing of best practices; and supports the strategic and operational imperatives of senior leaders.

Since its implementation, the SDI’s structured approach toward enhancing the integration and synergy of diplomacy and defense has proven beneficial to both organizations by providing a mechanism to produce measurable results which can be used to shape State-Defense relations at the strategic level while empowering personnel at the operational and tactical levels.

**Joint Publication 3-08**

*Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff released in June 2011 a new edition of Joint Publication 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*. This updated single-volume publication replaces the two-volume March 2006 edition, entitled *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations*.

The newly released capstone document sets forth doctrine governing the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States for coordination of military operations with U.S. government agencies; state, local, and tribal governments; and intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector. Its contents apply to the joint staff, commanders of combatant commands, sub-unified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, and the military Services during both domestic and foreign operations.

The document is intended to enhance interorganizational coordination to help achieve desired end states by facilitating cooperation in areas of common interest or avoiding unintended negative consequences when working in conjunction with or in the same areas as other stakeholders. Such coordination, it states, enables participants to form a common understanding of each other’s roles, responsibilities, interests, and equities; facilitate unity of effort in their actions and activities; and efficiently achieve common objectives.

Covered in this new edition are the foundations of intergovernmental organizational coordination, guidelines for conducting such coordination, and considerations for both domestic and foreign environments. Offered within it are updated discussions on the National Security Council, Homeland Security Council, and National Security Staff; descriptions of federal agencies,
intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations; and federal interagency coordination during homeland defense and civil support operations inside the U.S. and its territories.

New to this publication and the body of doctrinal work are discussions on a whole-of-government approach, strategic communications, the private sector, and formation of a joint interagency task force. One of the more helpful additions from the previous version is the inclusion of numerous appendices providing expanded explanations of the various U.S. government agencies, joint military organizations, and intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations. Also provided are detailed discussions of the interagency management system, the conflict assessment framework, guidelines for relations between the U.S. Armed Forces and other organizations, and the U.S. Agency for International Development’s civilian-military cooperation policy.

Since the guidance in JP 3-08 is authoritative to the Armed Forces and must be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise, this new publication is an essential read and reference for all involved in domestic or foreign operations involving U.S. military forces and the Department of Defense.

**SOF Interagency Counterterrorism Reference Manual**

Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) recently revised and republished its *SOF Interagency Counterterrorism Reference Manual*. In the past, this manual has provided a valuable reference for JSOU students, SOF staff officers, and partners in the interagency process. It is a practical, quick-reference guide to the interagency counterterrorism community and has been used by the Department of State’s Foreign Service Institute, the National Center for Combating Terrorism, and other members of the interagency community.

By focusing on the counterterrorism mission it is not all inclusive. However, it does provide an outline of organizations, missions, relationships, and processes that comprise the U.S. government’s national security apparatus involved in countering terrorism.

New information added to this revised edition are expanded discussions of the interagency counterterrorism roles of the Department of State, particularly the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism; the Intelligence Community and other intelligence resources; the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security; and other U.S. agencies.

**Professional Diplomatic Education and Training**

In February 2011, the American Academy of Diplomacy and the Stimson Center completed their study of professional diplomatic education and training and published their findings in *Forging a 21st-Century Diplomatic Service for the United States through Professional Education and Training*. The study examines the diplomacy/defense imbalance and recommends additional funding, education, and training to ensure the successful future of the U.S. Foreign Service.

For over a decade, the “smart power” equation has been out of balance in America’s Foreign Service. Under-investment in diplomacy over the last ten years has left the U.S. Foreign Service overstretched and underprepared. This has led in many cases to the military taking on the diplomatic and developmental roles of Foreign Service officers. The Department of Defense points to two root causes to the diplomacy/defense imbalance. The first is a lack of broad understanding about the
value of diplomacy and development at this point in history and what diplomacy and development require. The second is the lack of resources allocated to the State Department and other foreign affairs agencies.

There is a need to dramatically increase spending in non-military foreign-affairs programs. Hiring initiatives at the State Department and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) intend to increase the size of the Foreign Service by 25% at State and 100% at USAID by 2014. This would allow the State Department to fill longstanding vacancies and USAID to reduce its reliance on contractors and rebuild its own expertise. Still, more resources will be required to provide the diverse diplomatic service a common professional formation, including ongoing education and training.

The nature of the Foreign Service elevates the importance of a commitment to early and professional education and training. Professional education and training are essential to the overall level of performance of the Foreign Service and thus, diplomatic efforts. Foreign Service officers’ primary responsibility must be to manage change and minimize instability and conflict, and to take the leading role in post-conflict stabilization when conflict occurs.

Formal training has grown in importance as on-the-job training and guidance from senior officers has lost its effectiveness. Hiring shortfalls have led to gaps in the mid-level ranks, causing a shortage of officers who would ideally provide practical advice and hands-on training to the rising generation of officers. Education and training would ensure Foreign Service officers have a clear understanding of their roles as protectors of national interests through negotiation whenever possible and in post-conflict stabilization (when required). Like military officers and corporate leaders, Foreign Service officers require the ability to think beyond the moment and tactical needs. They need to act strategically; plan and execute complex operations and policy initiatives; and lead effectively in a vastly varied foreign affairs environment. Professional development should include a comprehensive and well-articulated curriculum to be accomplished over time, with the goal of producing greater intellectual and operational breadth and a wider command of the great issues of the day affecting U.S. national security and global interests.

The study made three initial recommendations to address the resources and decisions essential for progress. The first recommendation was to redress the diplomacy/defense imbalance by fully funding State Department and USAID hiring initiatives. The second recommendation was to provide and sustain a 15% level of personnel above that required for regular assignment to create positions for training. The third recommendation was a long-term commitment to investing in the professional education and training needed to build a 21st-century diplomatic service that would enable the U.S. to meet complex challenges. Other recommendations proposed by the study include requiring Foreign Service officers complete courses currently recommended as preparation for those positions, giving education and training priority as resources become available, and establishing a corps of roving counselors to aid in training diplomats. IAJ

**Interagency Symposium on Transitions**

In February 2011 the Army Combined Arms Center hosted their third annual Interagency Symposium. This year’s event, co-hosted by the United States Institute for Peace and the Simons Center for the Study of Interagency Cooperation, brought experts from the Department of State, Department of Defense, and non-governmental organizations to discuss “Interagency Transitions
in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Beyond.”

As U.S. and coalition military forces begin to shrink their size and involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan a wide range of responsibilities are increasingly being transitioned to U.S., international, and host nation civilian institutions. This requires significant vision, planning, and interagency interaction.

The Symposium’s panels showed that providing an overarching vision and developing a whole-of-government approach is easier to say than enact, however. Agency cultures and lack of planning capacity within all pertinent institutions frequently thwart whole-of-government approaches. Additionally, working with host nation officials is even more difficult – success goes beyond acquiring host nation buy-in to U.S.-led programs; these governments must set their own priorities and assume the lead role in economic development and security.

Three key issues of transition were identified and debated during the Symposium: timelines for withdrawal; conditions for transitions; and funding transitions. Overall, panel members agreed that mandated timelines provided primarily a positive effect; forcing planning and cooperation by offering fixed dates around which plans can be built and, if honored, help establish credibility.

Conditions for transition were also seen as positive, given that the parties involved could agree upon them. Like timelines, conditions set boundaries, helping define objectives and prioritize U.S. efforts and spending. However, different agency cultures and focus, along with the host nation’s ability to achieve political, economic, and security progress, make agreement upon the proper conditions for transition difficult.

Finally, the Symposium discussed the challenges of funding transitions. Funding mechanisms are often the bane of long-range planning for transitions. Single-year funding cycles encourage short-term priorities and a “use it or lose it” mentality, which often leads to wasteful expenditures and loss of political leverage as local officials know money must be spent.

Results of the Symposium will be published as a “Leader’s Handbook on Interagency Transitions.”

Note from the InterAgency Journal Editors

Effective with this edition, we will publish the InterAgency Journal in “Winter” and “Summer” versus “Fall” and “Winter” editions. The Winter edition will continue to be published in February with the Summer edition being printed in August.

Special thanks to all of our readers and contributors for your patience as we refine our publications and printing cycles.