DEFENSE SECTOR REFORM AND CIVILIAN PROTECTION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

by

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September 2011

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The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) was deployed as a multidimensional peacekeeping force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) from 1999 until 2010. During this time, violence continued to plague the eastern part of the country. In response to continued civilian casualties, MONUC made civilian protection a core component of its mission. While MONUC never succeeded in adequately protecting civilians, a close examination of its mandate and operations reveals a continual process of adjustment, ultimately leading to an attempt by MONUC to assist in defense sector reform. The evidence reveals that MONUCs adjustments had a slight effect on reducing ethnic violence from 2003-2007, but violence against civilians by the FARDC and rebels did not decrease from 2007-2010. This thesis attempts to explain why MONUC did not succeed in the end at increasing civilian protection. MONUCs actions to reform the FARDC were not efficacious because MONUC lacked capacity to fully carry through with its strategy combined with a lack of wholehearted Congolese government support. The answers are important because they may help future civilian protection missions succeed.
Defense Sector Reform and Civilian Protection in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

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Subject Terms: Democratic Republic of the Congo, MONUC, Peacekeeping, Security Sector Reform

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ABSTRACT

The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) was deployed as a multidimensional peacekeeping force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) from 1999 until 2010. During this time, violence continued to plague the eastern part of the country. In response to continued civilian casualties, MONUC made civilian protection a core component of its mission. While MONUC never succeeded in adequately protecting civilians, a close examination of its mandate and operations reveals a continual process of adjustment, ultimately leading to an attempt by MONUC to assist in defense sector reform. The evidence reveals that MONUC’s adjustments had a slight effect on reducing ethnic violence from 2003–2007, but violence against civilians by the FARDC and rebels did not decrease from 2007–2010. This thesis attempts to explain why MONUC did not succeed in the end at increasing civilian protection. MONUC’s actions to reform the FARDC were not efficacious because MONUC lacked capacity to fully carry through with its strategy combined with a lack of wholehearted Congolese government support. The answers are important because they may help future civilian protection missions succeed.
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<tr>
<td>AFDL</td>
<td>Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo-Zaire</td>
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<td>CAS</td>
<td>Close Air Support</td>
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<td>CNDP</td>
<td>National Congress for the Defense of the People</td>
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<td>DDRRR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, and Resettlement or Repatriation</td>
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<td>DCR</td>
<td>Disarmament Community Reinsertion</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>DSR</td>
<td>Defense Sector Reform</td>
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<td>EUPOL</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission (DR Congo)</td>
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<td>EUSEC</td>
<td>European Union Security Sector Reform Mission (DR Congo)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAC</td>
<td>Congolese Armed Forces</td>
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<td>FAPC</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Congolese People</td>
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<tr>
<td>FARDC</td>
<td>Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo</td>
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<td>FAR</td>
<td>Armed Forces of Rwanda</td>
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<td>FDLR</td>
<td>Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda</td>
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<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
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<td>IEMF</td>
<td>Interim Emergency Multinational Force</td>
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<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<td>IRC</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
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<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<td>JMC</td>
<td>Joint Military Commission</td>
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<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
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<td>MLC</td>
<td>Movement for the Liberation of the Congo</td>
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<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>PARECO</td>
<td>Congolese Patriotic Resistance</td>
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<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>PNC</td>
<td>National Congolese Police</td>
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<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
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<td>RCD-G</td>
<td>Rally for Congolese Democracy - Goma</td>
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<td>RCD - N</td>
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<td>RCD – ML</td>
<td>Rally for Congolese Democracy – Movement for Liberation</td>
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<td>RDF</td>
<td>Rwandan Defense Force</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>UN/African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur</td>
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<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>UNSG</td>
<td>United Nations Secretary-General</td>
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<tr>
<td>UPC/L</td>
<td>Union of Congolese Patriots of Thomas Lubanga</td>
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<td>UPDF</td>
<td>Ugandan People’s Defense Force</td>
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I. INTRODUCTION

The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)\(^1\) was created in 1999 as a traditional peacekeeping operation to observe a ceasefire agreement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Because the DRC was devastated by two successive wars in the 1990s, involving a mix of regional, national, and local level grievances and actors, MONUC faced a difficult and complex environment. Over time, the mission evolved into a large and expensive multidimensional peacekeeping force, and civilian protection became a core component of its mandate. Civilian protection was not a new concept for the UN; however, it was within the first two years of MONUC’s deployment that civilian protection evolved into an integral part of UN rhetoric. The Brahimi Report published in 2000 made it unofficial doctrine that peacekeepers should stop violence against civilians, within their means, and in 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), a commission created to generate an international agreement, followed with a report titled *The Responsibility to Protect*.\(^2\) Since the advent of the R2P mission, the UN has been faced with a myriad of issues and challenges relating to civilian protection, both within the mandate and in practice. UN missions are forced to look at underlying issues that fuel the conflict in order to determine the best strategies to protect civilians. MONUC was no exception. MONUC spent the better part of a decade determining how to improve civilian protection.

The complexities of the situation in the DRC during MONUC’s deployment were numerous. Over a decade of conflict in the DRC produced the most civilian deaths since World War II, with over 5.4 million conflict-related casualties. The first civil war in the DRC (1996–1997) ousted the predatory President Mobuto Sese Seko. During his 32-year reign, Mobutu plundered state resources to finance his own endeavors and to maintain loyal clients, but as the economy eroded in the 1990s, he lost his tight grip on the state,

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creating a power vacuum that was “filled by predatory neighbors, and armed groups.”

To combat cross-border attacks from eastern DRC by former genocidaires, known as the *Interahamwe*, Rwanda formed an anti-Mobutu alliance with Uganda, Angola, Burundi, and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army of southern Sudan, and created the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo-Zaire (AFDL) within DRC to remove Mobutu from power. The AFDL easily marched into Kinshasa and inserted Laurent-Désiré Kabila into power.

Kabila’s legitimacy was severely compromised by his Rwandese backing, leading him to break with the external anti-Mobutu alliance almost immediately. He then began recruiting *Interahamwe* into his new army, further antagonizing Rwanda while fueling decades of local ethnic grievances over land issues, immigration, refugees, and citizenship rights in the East. New rebel groups, the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) and the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) formed from a mix of these local, political, and regional grievances. In 1998, another war of local, regional, and international grievances and actors began on Congolese soil. Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi backed the rebels but Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia now entered in support of the Kabila government, shifting the military balance of power. Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda sought to remove Kabila because, like Mobutu, he provided sanctuary for rebels fighting each of these governments. All backed the RCD, while Uganda also backed the MLC. Angola supported Kabila because his government had cooperated more effectively in removing Angolan rebels from Congolese territory, and because it feared the chaos and economic losses that might ensue if he were overthrown. Zimbabwe intervened largely as an act of political and economic aggrandizement by President Robert Mugabe.

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Namibia’s much more limited intervention was to provide a Southern African Development Community (SADC) cover to Zimbabwe’s actions.\(^7\)

By mid-1999, rebels and government forces were in a stalemate, and participating in ceasefire talks brokered by the U.S., EU and UN. The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, which called for a national dialogue to establish a peace agreement, the establishment of a Joint Military Commission (JMC) to oversee security concerns, and the creation of a UN peacekeeping force, was signed by the Kabila government, the RCD and MLC, and Rwanda, Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia in July-August 1999.\(^8\) However, the ceasefire did not stop the fighting, which continued unabated between the armed groups, causing further displacement and civilian deaths.\(^9\)

In August 1999, MONUC was created to “oversee the withdrawal of foreign armies and disarm Congolese and foreign rebels.”\(^10\) Despite the fact that the ceasefire was not being followed, in November 1999, the first UN military liaison officers, acting under UN mandate 1258, arrived in the DRC to monitor the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and assist with Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, and Resettlement or Repatriation (DDRRR).\(^11\) On 24 February 2000, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorized expansion to 5,537 military personnel (including 500 military observers), to act within their capability to defend themselves and their infrastructure as well as “protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.”\(^12\) However, in late 2000, MONUC still had only 566 people in the DRC, of which 218 were unarmed.


military observers and only 26 were soldiers, distributed among 7 military observer teams located in Kinshasa, Gemena, Isiro, Kananga, Kindu, Kisangani, and Mbandaka.\textsuperscript{13}

President Laurent Kabila was killed on 16 January 2001, in a failed coup attempt. His son Joseph, Chief of Staff of the Army, assumed power, paving the way for new peace talks, known as the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (October 2001-April 2003).\textsuperscript{14} Joseph quickly secured international support by agreeing to start the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. Without substantial support from his father’s cohorts, Joseph needed to balance domestic and international support.\textsuperscript{15} With international support behind the new president, Rwanda and Uganda began to work with Joseph to develop an exit plan under tremendous pressure from the international community to withdrawal their forces.\textsuperscript{16} The rebel groups committed themselves to comply with the ceasefire and join the dialogue if a power-sharing government was created.\textsuperscript{17} Rwanda and Uganda signed bilateral agreements with the DRC government. A result of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in December 2002 created a plan for integrating Kabila’s Army, the Congolese Armed Forces (FAC), the MLC and RCD forces into the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC).\textsuperscript{18} The Final Act in Sun City (April 2003) provided for a power sharing government and a two-year transition plan for the restoration of peace and sovereignty, ending the Dialogue and marking the official end of hostilities.

From its initial deployment through the end of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, MONUC played no real role in civilian protection. MONUC limited its activities to

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Prunier, \textit{Africa’s World War}, 258.
\item Ibid., iii.
\end{enumerate}
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monitoring troop withdrawals and DDRRR.\textsuperscript{19} Despite having a Chapter VII mandate\textsuperscript{20} and the advent of R2P, MONUC was mandated only to protect civilians when it had the capacity to do so. This meant MONUC could stop isolated violence but would not get between armed groups to protect civilians more systematically. MONUC expressed “grave concern” about the potential for ethnic conflict in Ituri and the Kivus, but it did little to preemptively set up protection for the population.\textsuperscript{21} As the Inter-Congolese Dialogue drew to an end in 2003, MONUC still had only 4,200 troops and a limited mandate.

In 2003, MONUC’s concerns became a reality as ethnic violence, human rights violations, and internal displacement beset the eastern DRC as a result of longstanding local issues such as land rights.\textsuperscript{22} With limited capacity and authority in the east, the Congolese government did little to stop it. Large-scale militia violence between ethnic Hema and Lendu in Bunia, Ituri in May 2003 was the tipping point for MONUC to adjust its mandate, increase its size, and get seriously involved in civilian protection for the first time. MONUC reacted to the events in Bunia and began taking proactive measures to preempt ethnic violence in the Kivus. By 2004, fighting had erupted between the FARDC, the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR), primarily composed of Rwandan Hutu, and the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), a rebel group created by General Laurent Nkunda to protect the Tutsi population. These rebels, and the newly formed FARDC became involved in organized looting, murder, and sexual violence against civilians as they fought each other for control of territory.\textsuperscript{23} In response,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{20} Chapter VII refers to the chapter in the UN Charter that gives the UN the right to take offensive military action to establish and/or restore peace. \textit{UN Charter Chapter 7}, http://www.un-documents.net/ch-07.htm (accessed 23 June 2011).
\item \textsuperscript{22} \textit{OCHA DRC Fast Facts}, http://ochaonline.un.org/ (accessed 2 Dec 2010).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
MONUC adopted the full scope of a third generation Peacekeeping Operation (PKO). It began offensive actions and preemptive measures to protect civilians from violence.

How did MONUC respond to the evolution of the threat to civilians after the official end of the war from local ethnic militias, to the FARDC and additional rebel groups? What impact did this have on civilian protection and why?

The adoption of the civilian protection component of UN missions has increased demands on the peacekeeping forces, raising questions about the UN’s ability to develop comprehensive protection strategies in complex situations. Since MONUC was established in 1999, the Security Council has created 11 new peacekeeping missions, eight of which are on the continent of Africa. This brings the total number of active peacekeeping missions to 15, with 30% of all UN peacekeeping missions now lasting more than 10 years and most encompassing a civilian protection clause in their mandate. In both UN and non-UN mission around the world, civilian protection remains integral to mission mandates, and is increasingly linked with security sector reform (SSR). It is important to understand the causes of the UN’s performance in reducing violence against civilians, given the emphasis on civilian protection and R2P over the last decade and most likely in the future. There is a consensus in the literature that MONUC performed poorly on civilian protection in the DRC, but a debate about why the results were such. One camp suggests that the MONUC failed to develop a civilian protection strategy geared toward the true nature of the violence against civilians. Autesserre, Wright, and Carayannis argue that the UN focused its effort on national and international issues, and thus failed to address the local grievances over land and ethnicity.

24 According to Doyle and Sambanis, 1st Generation peacekeeping operations encompassed traditional operations between states in which the UN is neutral and merely provides an observation force. Second Generation Peacekeeping operations are complex and multidimensional missions that encompass policing and military action. Third generation is also complex multidimensional but includes a humanitarian aspect as well as peace enforcement. Michael Doyle and Sambanis Nicholas, Making War and Building Peace (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 10–16.


that drove violence against civilians. Prunier argues that MONUC recognized the nature of the threat against civilians, but was too “timid” to make radical changes in its strategy to deal with it because of the poor relations with the government of the DRC. Thus, like the others in this camp, he maintains that MONUC did not react to the local threats in the east. A second camp argues that MONUC made strides in adapting its strategy to protect civilians, but ultimately failed because of structural limitations, such as size and strength of its force. This camp suggests that capacity was the primary reason for poor civilian protection results.

This thesis tests these two hypotheses against the available evidence from field research. Hypothesis one is that MONUC failed to protect civilians because its strategy was not adapted to the nature of the threat against civilians on the ground. Hypothesis two is that MONUC failed to protect civilians because it lacked the capacity to do so. Since these are not necessarily mutually exclusive hypotheses, hypothesis three is that both weaknesses in both strategy and capabilities contributed to the failure to protect civilians. This thesis will trace events over time to determine what factors contributed to MONUC’s overall effectiveness or lack thereof of civilian protection.

Chapter II focuses on 2003–2006, when the primary threat against civilians came from militia violence. Chapter III focuses on 2007–2010, when the primary threat against civilians came from rebels and the FARDC. Each chapter looks at whether strategy, capability, or both factored into MONUC’s civilian protection results. Chapter IV draws conclusions based on the findings of Chapters II and III, and discusses the


implications of the findings for our understanding of the performance of MONUC and civilian protection missions in general, as well as the policy implications of the research.
II. UN RESPONSES TO VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS
(2003–2006)

Beginning in 2003, MONUC adjusted from a traditional peacekeeping force to a robust force with civilian protection as a core component of its mandate. With the signing of the final peace agreements in 2003, new threats to civilians emerged in the East from groups not previously part of the war. The violence in Bunia, Ituri, in May 2003 demonstrated the serious threat facing civilians in the post-war period, and became a catalyst for MONUC and the UNSC’s change in strategy and mandate. In the short term, because MONUC was not structured to deal with this type of violence against civilians, the European Union was mandated by the UNSC to deploy its newly created rapid reaction force to secure Bunia. However, by the end of 2003 the UNSC had expanded MONUC’s mandate, and MONUC had created a civilian protection strategy based on the success of the EU intervention. This innovative strategy, which centered on patrols and protection zones to secure the population against armed militia, improved civilian protection. However, the improvements were limited by MONUC’s small—even after its troop levels were tripled—size. This chapter will examine both MONUC’s strategy adjustments as well as changes in its capability from 2003–2006 to determine which best explains MONUC’s overall level of civilian protection during this time period. This chapter will argue that MONUC responded aggressively and appropriately to changes in the nature and scope of violence directed at civilians, demonstrating a significant level of effort to adjust its strategy as well as increase its capability to accomplish its mandate of protection within the limits of its resources.

MONUC’s civilian protection strategy did lead to a significant improvement in civilian security between 2003–4 and 2006–7, as civilian deaths from violence in the east


fell from 14,000 to 5,000. Although the reduction is partly attributable to the fading effects of the civil war, International Rescue Committee fieldwork suggests that it was also partly a result of “a more robust UN peacekeeping effort by MONUC.” The local population in Ituri reported in mid-2005 that MONUC’s presence had reduced civilian insecurity, despite the resurgence of rebel activity. Although the strategy appears to have been less effective in the Kivus, especially by 2006–2007, overall civilian deaths from violence in the east as a whole nevertheless fell by nearly two-thirds. The evidence will show that both MONUC’s change in strategy as well as its capability led to the decline in violent deaths, but it is also MONUC’s capability deficiencies that caused MONUC ultimately to fail to eliminate violent deaths further.

A. STRATEGIC ADAPTATIONS AND CAPACITY BUILDING

In April 2003, MONUC deployed 700 (of its 3500) peacekeepers to Ituri, near Bunia, to monitor the withdrawal of 9,000 Uganda Peoples Defense Forces (UPDF) troops in accordance with the peace agreement. Its mandate was to assist local community leaders with developing a security plan, while protecting only civilians under imminent threat. Although aware of a high potential for large-scale violence against civilians, MONUC did nothing preemptive. Its December 2002 mandate (1445) simply authorized the deployment of an unspecified number of troops to the Ituri region if the need arose. At this time, MONUC and the UNSC were reactive and not committed to proactive civilian protection. Immediately after the 6 May UPDF withdrawal, systematic killing and looting by ethnic militias began, as longstanding tensions over land rights

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32 Data derived from the International Rescue Committee Survey, Mortality in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.


flared in the security vacuum created by the withdrawal.\textsuperscript{37} MONUC set up roadblocks to protect civilians from rampaging militia, but abandoned this effort after its troops were overwhelmed.\textsuperscript{38} Within two weeks, 500 civilians had been killed and 75,000 displaced in Bunia in tit for tat attacks by ethnic Hema and Lendu militias.\textsuperscript{39} Because MONUC lacked the capacity to rapidly deploy a force capable of protecting the population from the surging violence,\textsuperscript{40} the UNSG called for deployment of a “well-trained and highly equipped multinational force” to provide interim civilian protection.\textsuperscript{41} The EU, with the French as the lead, accepted the challenge to provide a force to secure Bunia while MONUC could transition more troops to the area and prepare them for more robust action. Its Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) was given a chapter VII mandate by the UNSC, including leave to use “all necessary measures to fulfill its mandate” of restoring security, protecting the airport, and protecting IDPs and civilians.\textsuperscript{42} MONUC troops did participate in the operation, but mainly were limited to providing airport security. Having failed to prepare appropriately, the strong mandate showed the UNSC at least willing to innovate to facilitate civilian protection by others.

IEMF deployed its 1,400 troops in June, declaring Bunia a “weapons invisible” zone, meaning that weapons had to be kept at home. Violations were met with force, immediately establishing IEMF credibility. It positioned its troops strategically in conflict hot spots to prevent a flare up of violence, patrolled actively by conducting house searches, and reduced the flow of arms by monitoring airport traffic.\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{37} International Crisis Group, Congo Crisis: Military Intervention in Ituri (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 13 June 2003), 12.

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid, 12.


\textsuperscript{40} There were 700 Congolese National Police (PNC) who were sent to the area in early 2003, but they quickly abandoned their posts when fighting broke out between militias. International Crisis Group, Congo Crisis: Military Intervention in Ituri, 11.

\textsuperscript{41} UN Security Council, 14th Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC, UN Doc S/2003/1098, 17 Nov 2003, 2.


(CAS) from its Mirage aircraft operating out of Uganda acted as a force multiplier. Its Special Forces destroyed stockpiles of weapons and disarmed militia. Order was restored within Bunia by July, and the force withdrawn in September.

From this point on, the UNSC took a more aggressive stance on civilian protection. It increased MONUC’s total troop level from 4,700 in May to 10,415 in November 2003, and made MONUC a more robust and offensive force, meaning it was to take active and aggressive measures to protect the population. It also had a new mandate to stabilize the security situation in Ituri and protect civilians, including but not limited to the 500,000 IDPs. In addition, UNSC Resolution 1493 of July 2003, authorized MONUC to “use all necessary means to fulfill its mandate in the Ituri district and, as it deems within its capabilities, in North and South Kivu.” It thus became more proactive, although in a tentative way. MONUC was less tentative. It radically adjusted its forces and its operations, in line with lessons learned from the IEMF, to improve its civilian protection capabilities within the limits imposed by the UNSC. With the fresh supply of troops, it increased its strength in Ituri from 700 in May to 4,800 in November 2003, with 2,400 stationed in the town of Bunia alone. By the end of 2003, it had shifted 80 percent of its force (8,300 troops) to Ituri and the Kivus. At the same time, it developed an aggressive civilian protection strategy based on the IEMF operation, and applied it throughout Ituri Provence. It announced that, like IEMF, its troops would now use force to secure the area and protect civilians. In addition to strong rhetoric followed by forceful implementation, MONUC adopted the IEMF’s offensive operations to find and dispel/disarm the militia. It actively patrolled for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, added 24-hour foot patrols, deployed to seven new locations in Ituri (in addition to Bunia), and brought in attack helicopters for CAS. Brigadier General Jern

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44 UN Security Council, 14th Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC, 22.
46 UN Security Council, 14th Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC, 2.
47 Prunier, Africa’s World War, 296.
Isberg of the Ituri Brigade declared in late 2003: “We are capable of countering any attack... We must act according to our new mandate of Chapter Seven immediately and without hesitation, to be ready to use force when the situation dictates...” Thus, MONUC showed substantial willingness to use the resources at its disposal to protect civilians from militia violence. Although it did not fully control the entire province because MONUC did not have the capacity to position itself in all areas, militia strength was reduced in the areas in which it operated. Militia violence did not stop, but MONUC use strategic adaptation to build upon the initial success in Bunia.

MONUC took proactive measures to implement its Ituri strategy in the Kivus to preempt a similar escalation of ethnic violence there, although limited by the UNSC’s instruction to do so within the limits of its existing capabilities. As in Ituri, ethnic conflict in the Kivus continued to simmer after the withdrawal of foreign (in this case Rwandan) forces in July 2002. However, in the Kivus armed non-state actors were rebel armies not the youthful militia of Ituri. The RCD and Mai-Mai vied for control of territory despite the peace agreements, and many integrated soldiers continued their loyalties to other rebel leaders. MONUC had undertaken local conflict resolution efforts in the Kivus since September 2003, but again as in Ituri, did not engage in active civilian protection. In early 2004, it restructured its force to establish a full brigade (roughly 3,000 troops) in North Kivu and a battalion (roughly 1,000 troops) in South Kivu, adding an entire brigade worth of troops in the Kivus. At the same time, it attempted to provide civilian security while quickly disarming RCD and Mai-Mai forces. In March 2004, in response to increased ethnic tension in Bukavu (South Kivu)

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52 UN Security Council, 14th Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC, 4.


54 Ibid., 8–9.
and several skirmishes, it increased its troop levels around Bukavu from 450 to 1000 and began actively patrolling to search for weapons and reduce militia activity in the town.\footnote{Ibid., 9.} MONUC’s proactive attempt to implement its Ituri civilian-protection strategy in the Kivus, in the absence of the increased capacity the UNSC gave it there, failed to prevent a blow up in Bukavu. In May-June 2004, 4,000 dissident FARDC soldiers, newly integrated from the General Laurent Nkunda’s RCD rebel forces, occupied Bukavu, killing several hundred civilians.\footnote{“Massive abuses’ in DR Congo,” \textit{BBC News}, June 4, 2004, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/.} Armed non-state actors in the Kivus were larger, more organized, and more aggressive than MONUC was capable of handling. According to the ICG, MONUC was not structurally capable with its present capacity at the time to deal with the threat in the Kivus.\footnote{International Crisis Group, \textit{Back to the Brink in the Congo} (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 24 January 2003), 2.} The rebel groups like the RCD, the FDLR, and the Mai-Mai were too aggressive for MONUC’s 4,000 troops. MONUC did assist in brokering a deal with Nkunda in mid-June 2004 under which he withdrew his troops from Bukavu,\footnote{“South Kivu: June 2004: Situation report and recommendations for engagement,” \textit{Africa Initiative Programme}, June 2004, http://www.fewer-international.org/images/lib/(accessed 10 June 2011).} but antagonism between ethnic groups and rebel activity continued throughout the Kivus.

In August 2004, MONUC expanded from one brigade plus a battalion (roughly 4,000 troops) to two brigades (roughly 6,000 troops) in the Kivus, and requested a doubling of its troop level to 20,000 for additional patrols.\footnote{UN Security Council, \textit{3rd Special Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC}, 25.} Additionally, MONUC created a civil-military joint mission analysis cell to assess and anticipate ethnic conflict.\footnote{Ibid., 25.} This was a forceful step by MONUC, who was using both its civilian as well as military contingent, to deal with deep seated local level issues. It used the information that it gathered to reinforce its presence in Lubero (North Kivu), where its analysis suggested a significant potential for violence against civilians.\footnote{The size of the reinforcements was not reported. UN Security Council, \textit{16th Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC}, UN Doc S/2004/1034, 31 December 2004, 5.} Lastly, It brokered...
ceasefires between dissident ex-RCD-Goma and the FARDC in an attempt to dissuade additional violence. These quick and aggressive actions coupled with the significant measures taken by MONUC to address local level issues show that MONUC was engaged in local conflict drivers. In October the UNSC added 5,900 troops, roughly half the number requested by MONUC, again increasing emphasis on civilian protection. By expanding the mandate while refusing to provide sufficient resource to accomplish it, the UNSC was setting MONUC up to fail.

Despite MONUC’s intentions and measures, violence against civilians continued. In December 2004, clashes between integrated ex-RCD units and other FARDC units caused displacement and looting in Kanyabayonga (North Kivu). In May 2005, the village of Ihembe (South Kivu) and areas within the Walunga territory (South Kivu) were attacked by FDLR elements. In August, ethnic clashes broke out in Rutshuru (North Kivu) between ex-RCD-G troops waiting to go through the brassage process and Mai-Mai militia, again threatening civilians and leading to more displacement. From September through December 2005, there were reprisal attacks in South Kivu by FDLR forces and generalized insecurity among civilians caused by rogue FARDC elements. Military operations by militia groups were also increasing again in 2005, as groups fought over access to illegal business at the Ugandan border.

MONUC attempted to combat the increasingly aggressive threat to civilians in the east by making its own strategy more forceful. It increased patrols, created security zones and village vigilance committees to protect civilians throughout the Kivus, and threatened offensive action against any armed group that threatened civilians. Desperately short

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66 UN Security Council, 18th Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC, 5.
of troops as a result of the UNSC’s decision, MONUC took the radical step of including the FARDC in its civilian protection efforts. In Ituri, it coordinated with the FARDC to increase disarmament, destroy militia camps, and reinforce IDP camp security in the interests of civilian protection.\textsuperscript{68} MONUC and FARDC patrols severely weakened rebels.\textsuperscript{69} Similarly, in the Kivus MONUC worked with the FARDC to decrease rebel activity and forcefully disarm them,\textsuperscript{70} increasing “area domination and cordon-and-search operations” as well as day and night patrols.\textsuperscript{71} Using the FARDC as a force multiplier in civilian protection demonstrates MONUC’s commitment to accomplishing its task of civilian protection, even without adequate UNSC support.

However, the strategy proved to too radical. In 2006, additional FARDC integrated brigades were sent to the Kivus to reduce rebel activity. In January, it engaged in heavy fighting in North Kivu against Laurent Nkunda’s newly formed National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), causing over 40 civilian casualties and the displacement of 200,000.\textsuperscript{72} MONUC reported attacks by the FARDC 5\textsuperscript{th} integrated brigade on civilians in the CNDP area of operation led the CNDP and the FARDC 83\textsuperscript{rd} integrated brigade, which included former troops of Nkunda, to attack the 5\textsuperscript{th} brigade.\textsuperscript{73} Similar intra-FARDC clashes and attacks on civilians occurred near Goma (North Kivu) in August.\textsuperscript{74} Because the FARDC lacked the professionalism and neutrality of UN forces, it quickly became the single largest threat to civilians, rather than an extension of MONUC civilian protection capacity. By mid-2006, 40% of all human rights violations in the Kivus, including killings, beatings, illegal arrests, and rapes, were committed by

\begin{footnotes}
\item[68] UN Security Council, \textit{18th Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC}, 5.
\item[69] Ibid., 5.
\item[70] Ibid., 7.
\item[71] UN Security Council, \textit{19th Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC}, 5.
\end{footnotes}
the FARDC.\textsuperscript{75} With the nature of the threat to civilians now fundamentally changed from what it was in Ituri in 2003, the time had come for another fundamental shift in MONUC’s civilian protection strategy.

B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS OF IMPROVED CIVILIAN PROTECTION: BOTH STRATEGY AND CAPABILITY

MONUC’s civilian protection strategy was aggressive, innovative, and most importantly designed to counter the local sources of violence against civilians. The steps it took to adjust the strategy, in light of the evolution of that threat to civilians, especially in the Kivus, against demonstrates its close engagement with the drivers of local conflicts that ultimately produced civilians causalities. Active patrolling to locate militia and keep them away from civilians, airport surveillance and cordon and search operations to limit availability of weapons to those who might join the militias reduced attacks on civilians. The aggressiveness with which the strategy was implemented was key to its relative success, in that it created a deterrent, at least in Ituri, without which its force size might have further limited its effectiveness. For instance, it responded to a deadly militia ambush of one of its patrols in February 2005 by arresting several hundred militia fighters and confiscating of several hundred weapons that same month.\textsuperscript{76} MONUC’s increased cordon and search operations after a surge in militia activity in 2005 led to the disarmament of over 10,000 of the estimated 15,000 militia combatants that year.\textsuperscript{77} Aggressive DDRRR isolated troops and increased the number of those willing to give up arms.\textsuperscript{78}

Additionally, MONUC’s capacity served both to enhance as well as limit its effectiveness. MONUC’s increase in troops and equipment enhanced MONUC’s ability to accomplish the mission, but it did not have the capacity to completely eliminate the threat of violence. Civilian deaths from violence remained over 5,000 in 2006-7 because

\textsuperscript{75} Human Rights Watch, \textit{Renewed Crisis in North Kivu}, (New York: Human Rights Watch, October 2007), 43.

\textsuperscript{76} Wolters, “Is Ituri on the Road to Stability?,” 7.

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., 1.

\textsuperscript{78} Prunier, Africa’s World War, 308.
MONUC’s effectiveness was limited by several factors, mostly notably its inadequate size. Although MONUC increased from 4,000 to over 16,000 troops between 2003 and 2005, this was still not nearly enough for its civilian protection mandate, and therefore, MONUC lacked sufficient capacity to fully protect the population. UN forces in Liberia and Sierra Leone had roughly the same number of troops at their peak (15,000 and 17,000, respectively), in countries that are 1/20 and 1/30 the size of DRC, respectively. With such a large and difficult area to cover, MONUC’s 6,000 troops in the Kivus were no match for over 24,000 experienced combatants. Although MONUC’s actions did prove to increase civilian protection from 2003-2006, the armed groups did not perceive MONUC as a deterrent. This would be a precursor for follow-on violence against civilians.

To summarize, in the years 2003–2006, MONUC aggressively designed and adjusted its civilian protection strategy in response to the evolving nature of violent threats against civilians. Adopting civilian protection as a core component of its mission after the Bunia Massacre in 2003, it developed a strategy in line with what worked for the EU there. It shifted its forces to the East and devoted them to civilian protection, showing a high level of will and effort. The UNSC, on the other hand, consistently increased MONUC’s civilian protection mandate, while denying it the resources it requested to carry out the mission. It increased MONUC’s mandated size, but not by enough to fully complete its mandated task of civilian protection. Ultimately, the evidence suggests that both the strategy as well as the capability of MONUC contributed to the improved but not perfect civilian protection. From 2003–2006, many changes were made to MONUC’s mandate, size, structure, and strategy, and each contributed to the resultant improvement in civilian protection in the East. The area was not without its share of violence, and MONUC would need to make further adjustments to deal with the shifting threat to civilians in an attempt to improve protection.

80 International Crisis Group The Congo’s Transition is Failing: Crisis in the Kivus, Africa Report #91 (International Crisis Group, 30 March 2005), 1.
81 Ibid., 24.
III. UN RESPONSES TO VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS

With the primary threat to civilians coming from organized and well-equipped rebels and the FARDC by mid-2006, MONUC continued extensive joint operations with the FARDC against the CNDP and the FDLR, but added a focus on professionalizing the FARDC. With the UNSC unwilling to provide the necessary troops, MONUC saw no alternative to working with and through the FARDC to accomplish its civilian protection mission. The dual aim of this new civilian protection strategy was to contain FARDC abuses while defeating rebel forces, a radical approach to its civilian protection strategy. This chapter will show that, in 2007, MONUC made another innovative and extensive strategy change in response to the shifting nature of violence against civilians, again demonstrating its significant willingness to protect the population by dealing with underlying local level issues. However, it all shows that this strategy was far less effective than the previous one had been, largely as a result of failure to implement fully due to constraints imposed by the UNSC and the Congolese government. Thus, ultimately, this period will show that MONUC failed to provide adequate civilian protection because it lacked the capacity to do so not because it did not properly adapt to the nature of the threat against civilians.

Unfortunately, the considerable adjustments made to protect the population that MONUC demonstrated through its innovative strategizing in 2007-2010 did not produce even the reasonable results of the 2003–2006 period. The FARDC and rebel groups continued to be the primary perpetrators of violence against civilians, and the level of such violence increased during the time period. For this period rape statistics are more reliable than death statistics (Figure 1). Although this data is still somewhat unreliable, it

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is sufficient to conclude that MONUC’s new strategy was ineffective. Consistent reporting of FARDC atrocities throughout the period also supports this conclusion. What explains this ineffectiveness?

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Figure 1. Sexual Violence in the Kivus (2007–2010)

A. STRATEGY ADJUSTMENT

In 2007, there was a surge in violence against civilians in the Kivus as a result of fighting between/amongst the FARDC and CNDP and FDLR, respectively, as well as between the CNDP and FDLR. In January, post-election violence in South Kivu between the FARDC and dissident Banyamulenge soldiers killed 200 civilians and

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83 Reporting mechanisms improved over these years, so it is possible that the increases are partly attributable to improved reporting. In addition, there is some double reporting by different NGOs of the same incidents. On the other side, logistical constraints on data collection and stigma associated with rape bias the numbers downward. Juliet Kerr, “The Limits Analysing Sexual Violence Data in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” MONUSCO Sexual Violence Unit, December 2010, http://monusco.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=4075.

84 Statistics from the UNFPA Office in the DRC.

displaced thousands. In February, over 90 civilians were killed in Bas Congo when fighting broke out between the Bunda dia Kongo sect, protesting election rigging, and the FARDC. In March, clashes between guards of defeated presidential candidate Jean-Pierra Bemba and the FARDC killed 600 civilians in Kinshasa. MONUC accused the FARDC of “indiscriminate and disproportionate” use of force in each case, and called upon the newly elected government of Joseph Kabila to prioritize DSR. It continued its own patrols and protection centers in the east as well as its efforts with the FARDC, but recognized that these measures were not sufficient to protect the civilian population from the FARDC.

In May 2007, MONUC shifted from joint patrols with the FARDC to protect civilians to direct efforts to eliminate the rebel groups and reform the FARDC in response to the changed nature of the threat to civilians. UN Secretary-General (UNSG) Ban Ki-Moon urged “the Government of the DRC and the international community to work together in creating professional security forces capable of defending the security and human rights of the people of the DRC.” The UNSC passed Resolution 1756 (May 2007) authorizing MONUC to work with the FARDC (which it had already been doing) to neutralize rebel groups (including the FDLR and CNDP), and:

Provide in the short term basic training, including in the area of human rights, international humanitarian law, child protection and the prevention of gender-based violence, to various members and units of the FARDC integrated brigades; develop the capacities of the Congolese national police and related law enforcement agencies...by providing technical assistance, training, and mentoring support; advise the government in strengthening the capacity of the judicial and correctional system; and assist in the planning process.91

86 Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo, 277.
88 Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo, 277.
In July, MONUC began 3-month training programs for 11 FARDC brigades in the east, focusing on discipline, prevention of human rights violations and sexual misconduct, operational capacity, and unit cohesion. This set the stage for large-scale joint operations against the remaining rebel groups, in which MONUC and the FARDC would for the first time conduct full-scale operational planning. As shown in Chapter II, MONUC had assisted FARDC operations against the CNDP intermittently since 2005, but their operations together were not jointly planned. Previously, MONUC would assist the FARDC in order to provide civilian protection while the FARDC made efforts to eliminate the threat. The joint operations in 2008-2010 were an intensification of the missions because MONUC was no longer just trying to disarm rebel groups through coercion; they were fighting rebel groups in combat alongside the FARDC. As in 2003, MONUC responded in a timely and aggressive manner to the shifting nature of threats against civilians, and continued to revise its strategy in response to immediate lessons learned.

Beginning in mid-2007, MONUC worked to implement its new strategy to reform/train the FARDC while beefing up the use of force against rebels. By August 2008, MONUC had provided ethics, human rights, tactics, and weapons training for 12 of the 33 FARDC battalions (about 12,000 total troops trained) located in North and South Kivu. Recognizing that this strategy was long shot, it redeployed two battalions of its own troops to the east, increasing the total from 15 of 17 battalions, by the end of 2008, and set up additional mobile operating bases to extend its patrols throughout the region. The number of mobile operation bases in the Kivus grew from 18 in January 2008 to 48 in July 2008. In so spreading out its own forces, it was stretching itself much thinner in a desperate effort to protect civilians with an inadequately sized force, while hoping that

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95 UN Security Council, 26th Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC, 7.
its efforts with the FARDC would reduce the threat to them. The new strategy thus sought to increase the supply and reduce the demand for civilian protection.

The first large-scale joint FARDC/MONUC operation, in August-January 2008, sought to keep the CNDP out of population centers. MONUC helped the FARDC push back the CNDP when it threatened to take over Sake (North Kivu) in September. In October 2008, MONUC provided attack helicopters for CAS and armored units to the FARDC to prevent the CNDP from entering highly populated areas around Goma. The FARDC nevertheless dispersed, wreaking havoc on the civilian population as it retreated, leaving MONUC to defend Goma. Throughout this operation, MONUC assisted the FARDC with keeping the CNDP at bay, but despite this, without a consistent chain of command and professionalized soldiers, the FARDC continued its own abuses on the population.

MONUC saw this as largely a failure of leadership, and thus intensified its professionalization efforts with a new focus on leadership. It requested an additional 200 trainers/advisors for the FARDC in November 2008, and conducted officer training for 70 officers as well as train-the-trainer courses in December 2008. It was unable to train more battalion-sized units because the FARDC refused to cooperate. Consistently, the FARDC reported that it was unable to send more battalions for training because they were wrapped up in their missions against the CNDP. This caused MONUC to tweak its DSR strategy further.

The joint operation ended in January 2009 when Rwanda arrested CNDP leader Laurent Nkunda and political talks began, leading to the integration of the CNDP into the FARDC immediately. Ultimately, the collapse of the CNDP was a giant step forward toward eliminating threats in the East, and it allowed the FARDC to continue its fight against other rebel groups. MONUC’s strategy adjustment did succeed in accomplishing

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97 Ibid., 2.
one goal of its new strategy, neutralization of a rebel group, but ultimately was insufficient to reduce violence against civilians.

The FARDC then turned its attention to the FDLR, with MONUC assistance. The joint FARDC-MONUC campaign, known as Kimia II (Quiet in Swahili), ran from March to December 2009. MONUC’s goal for the operation was to “to ensure that all FARDC units involved in those operations abide by international humanitarian law and prioritize the protection of civilians.” As a result of the joint operation, the FARDC gained control of all major population centers as well as territorial capitals in North and South Kivu, pushing the FDLR into sparsely populated areas away from illegal mining and trading centers, and reduced the strength of the FDLR from 6,000 to 3,000, through desertion, economic deprivation, and rebels turning in their weapons to participate in DDRRR. Although the mission did have some limited success at reducing the size of the FDLR, ultimately, it did not accomplish the goals of MONUC. It neither decreased the violence against civilians nor did it eliminate the threat from the rebel group.

During Kimia II, MONUC further enhanced the DSR component of its civilian protection strategy in response to the poor performance of the FARDC during the previous operation. Having seen that existing human rights training was insufficient, MONUC commander General Babacar Gaye concluded that civilian protection under conditions prevailing in the region required MONUC to work alongside FARDC to reinforce human rights measures. Under this “mentorship” strategy, MONUC units were embedded within FARDC battalions for the first time. During Kimia II, MONUC agreed to support and mentor 16,000 out of 60,000 FARDC troops. Given that MONUC had roughly 15,000 troops assigned in the Kivus, MONUC had nearly a 1:1 ratio devoted

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100 This followed a one-month joint campaign with the FARDC and Rwanda, which was unsuccessful at defeating the FDLR.


to mentoring.\textsuperscript{104} Although, MONUC was only mentoring one-quarter of FARDC troops in the East, there were a significant number of MONUC troops assigned to mentoring FARDC troops.

In response to civilian protection failures caused by strictly military action in the previous operation, MONUC also created Joint Protection Teams (JTPs), comprised of both civilian and military staff, to coordinate with local communities to determine their security needs at the local level. In 2009, 25 JPTs were started in 12 different locations throughout North Kivu, each comprised a small contingent of military and civilian personnel proficient in political and civilian affairs, DDRRR, and human rights.\textsuperscript{105} These units were tasked with identifying local level issues and determining the best method of resolution. Quick reaction units were also deployed to areas deemed high risk for civilians.\textsuperscript{106} These MONUC units were created within the mobile operating bases to provide rapid protection against potential FDLR movements into populated areas without a standing protection force. MONUC was adjusting to the lesson learned that they could militarily clear an area, but they needed to provide consistent forces to hold the area. Since they were limited in troops size, the quick reaction units were used to expand the operating area.

Because continued civilian attacks by the FARDC continued despite mentorship, in June 2009, MONUC placed conditionalities on continued operational and logistical support to the FARDC to dissuade abuses against civilians.

The policy specified that MONUC would not participate in or support operations with FARDC units if there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that such units will violate international humanitarian, human rights or refugee law in the course of the operation.\textsuperscript{107}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[104] These figures were derived from MONUC’s deployment map. UN Security Council, \textit{28th Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC}, UN Doc S/2009/335, 30 June 2009, 19.
\item[105] UN Security Council, \textit{28th Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC}, 9.
\item[106] Ibid., 9.
\end{enumerate}
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It would also terminate support to any unit that allowed abuses or did not punish troops that committed violations. These refinements of MONUC’s civilian protection strategy in response to immediate lessons learned again demonstrates its considerable effort to deal with local level issues to protect civilians, within the constraints imposed upon it by the UNSC.

Kimia II ended in December 2009, without the elimination of the FDLR or the reduction in violence against civilians. Therefore, in January 2010, MONUC and the FARDC rolled right into Operation Amani Leo (Peace Now in Swahili) with the mission to “protect the civilian populations, clear strategic areas of negative forces, hold territory liberated from FDLR control, and assist in restoring State authority in these zones.” MONUC again added new measures to reinforce its DSR/civilian protection objectives. At the outset of the operation, it vetted unit commanders with the FARDC approval that were to receive support. It screened and cleared the commanders of 18 battalions that were to receive logistical support; commanders that MONUC had confidence in and had previous records indicating that they would enforce human rights policies. This was designed to improve FARDC compliance with the conditionalities adopted in June 2009, because units would only receive support if their commanders had records of upholding and respecting human rights in the past.

Thus, throughout this time period, MONUC continually reinforced its DRS/civilian protection strategy in response to lessons emerging on the ground. It tried a number of different strategies to contain FARDC abuses of civilians and adjusted its own mechanisms of protection spreading itself thin to establish a broader (if smaller) presence. It added joint protection teams and additional mobile operating bases with the hopes of better identifying local level issues. These measures clearly indicate effort to protect civilians by doing as much as it possible could with the resources available to it.

UNSC provided resources were too few, and FARDC resources extremely problematic. But these were what it had to work with.

B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS OF FAILED CIVILIAN PROTECTION: LACK OF CAPABILITY

MONUC successfully adjusted its strategy to match the threat to civilians in the East; however, it did not have the capability to fully realize its goals within its strategy. Implementation failures due to lack of capability are the primary explanation for the failure of MONUC’s innovative civilian protection strategy in these years. These failures came from two sources in this period, the UNSC and the government of DRC. First, the UNSC did not provide MONUC the assets, money, or personnel needed to implement its DSR/civilian protection strategy. In October 2008, the UNSG informed the Security Council that MONUC was overstretched and outlining its force, structure, and equipment needs to protect civilians. In October 2008, MONUC requested an additional 2,785 troops, and an increase in logistics and airlift capability noting that “the resources available to the Mission are not commensurate with the security challenges on the ground, thereby putting in question the credibility of the United Nations and the international community…” The UNSC approved the additional troops, did not prevail upon member states to provide them. For the next two years, MONUC made continual requests to the UNSC to come up with the approved troops, with no success. MONUC also never received the 16 helicopters it requested as vital in 2008. As noted in Chapter II, MONUC was simply far too small for its mission. Its 2008 budget was roughly $1 billion, compared to the UN mission in Liberia’s budget of roughly $700 million, to cover a small territory with no active militia or rebel activity. The U.S., which assumed responsibility for DSR in Liberia, had a DSR budget of $200 million for a force number 1/30th that of FARDC troops in eastern Congo alone.

110 UN Security Council, Letter dated 31 October 2008 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, 2.


This was exacerbated by the lack of cooperation from the Congolese government. Army reform needs such as pay, living conditions, and family support were not addressed, and soldiers used their extreme poverty and frustration to rationalize sexual violence against women.\textsuperscript{113} When MONUC reported in 2008 that “arbitrary execution, rape, torture and cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment by FARDC and the Congolese National Police” were a matter of “grave concern,”\textsuperscript{114} the Congolese government took steps to eliminate MONUC from its operations rather than addressing its concerns—or even defending itself against them. It made a deal with the government of Rwanda, with whom its relations had long been strained, to undertake alternate joint operations against the CNDP and FDLR, beyond the watchful eye, and conditionalities, of MONUC.\textsuperscript{115} Such evasion by the Congolese government undermined MONUC’s DSR efforts, and thus its civilian protection strategy. In 2009, MONUC had the capacity to mentor and support only 16,000 of the 60,000 FARDC troops in the Kivus because it had inadequate support from the UNSC.\textsuperscript{116} But the government refused to cooperate with even this limited training plan, refusing to send units for training on the grounds that forces could not be spared in the field. As a result the DSR process stalled entirely.\textsuperscript{117}

If strongly implemented, the conditionality policy, which required few resources and little government cooperation, might have filled the gap. However, the conditionality policy did not act as a deterrent to violence against civilians because it remained largely unimplemented. Despite widespread, well-documented violations by FARDC, only one unit was suspended from logistical support for gross human rights violations, and then only in November as the operation was drawing to a close.\textsuperscript{118} MONUC turned a blind


\textsuperscript{114} UN Security Council, \textit{Fourth Special Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC}, 8.

\textsuperscript{115} Ultimately, MONUC was permitted to review the operational plans of Umoja Wetu to determine the risk to civilians, and provided logistical support to the FARDC. UN Security Council, \textit{27th Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC}, 3.


\textsuperscript{117} UN Security Council, \textit{28th Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC}, 13.

eye to avoid complete mission termination because it lacked the capacity to deal with the threat from both the FARDC and the rebels alone. Additionally, MONUC was faced with the reality that the FARDC was committed to the operation against the FDLR and therefore, terminating support completely would result in further rebel attacks on civilians. On the other hand, without support and mentorship, the FARDC simply displaced rebel attacks on civilians with attacks of its own. The government also exacerbated the situation by putting newly integrated leaders of the CNDP accused of gross human rights violations in charge of key elements in Kimia II.\(^{119}\) If MONUC had stopped support to all of the units committing human rights violations, the joint operations would have ground to a halt, indicating that MONUC was completely incapable of executing its mission.

MONUC’s vetting strategy suffered from the same general problems that MONUC witnessed with training and conditionality. It did not cause FARDC units to decrease their attacks on civilians, and although MONUC vetted the commanders, the units were not persuaded to respect human rights of the population. Despite vetting the commander, in June 2010, MONUSCO suspended support to the FARDC 911th battalion for failing to comply with the conditionality policy due to continued gross human rights violations.\(^{120}\) MONUC/MONUSCO’s incentive based policy did not work because the incentives were not strong enough given MONUC’s lack of resources, and the Congolese government did not put enough pressure on the FARDC to uphold the standards. Since the vetting of commanders reduced the number of FARDC soldiers receiving support from 16,000 to 1,600,\(^{121}\) it caused the FARDC to stop including MONUC on its mission planning. For instance, in South Kivu, the FARDC planned and conducted 74 missions.


without the knowledge of MONUC, violating an agreement of the joint operation. Thus, the Congolese government put a higher priority on eradicating the FDLR than reform for the FARDC. Also, MONUC lacked the capacity to continue its support for 16,000 troops because it received inadequate assistance from the UNSC. As of March 2010, MONUC had unpaid outstanding contributions amounting to $663.4 million, indicating UNSC commitment in 2010 was extremely low.

In summary, the evidence suggests that MONUC correctly adapted to the nature of the threat to civilians, but it lacked the capacity to fully realize its goals. Its reform strategy was in line with the primary threat facing civilians, the FARDC. The expanded joint missions were also in line with the rebel threat. Neither was successful in reducing violence because MONUC did not get the support that it needed.

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122 Ibid., 11.

IV. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The evidence presented in this thesis clearly shows that MONUC made a concentrated effort to protect civilians in DRC, demonstrating that despite the civilian protection results, MONUC understood and reacted accordingly to the realities on the ground. It recognized the changing nature of threats to civilians and reacted by adjusting its strategic level operations. In response to the flaring of militia attacks on civilians in the east, it expanded in size and mandate and created a robust patrol strategy using the lessons learned from the EU in Ituri. With intensified operations in the Kivus, the largest threat to civilians became the FARDC and rebel groups, and MONUC again responded by shifting its civilian protection strategy in aggressive and innovative ways, conducting joint missions and DSR in an effort to improve civilian protection. The evidence suggests, contrary to the consensus in the literature, that MONUC had a degree of success in 2003–2006, reducing militia violence against civilians. However, the evidence supports the consensus for the period after 2006, indicating a complete failure on the part of MONUC to protect civilians from rebel activity and FARDC atrocities. MONUC had the resolve to make continual adjustments to achieve its overall objective of better civilian protection, but lacked the capacity and government cooperation to carry through. Ultimately, the problem was not the failure to understand or respond to the local nature of the threat at the strategic level as some literature suggests, but rather, insufficient capacity to carry through fully on the promised strategy adopted. This thesis tested three hypotheses and found that MONUC failed to protect the population because it lacked sufficient capacity to do so.

It is important to understand which hypothesis accurately portrays the causes of MONUC’s poor civilian protection results overall because it helps give insight into the performance of MONUC. The evidence did not support the hypothesis that MONUC failed to protect civilians because it failed to adequately and appropriately respond to local level violence. On the contrary, MONUC made adjustments that were in line with the highest threat to civilians at the local level, but it lacked the capacity to follow through fully at the strategic level. Ultimately, it was unable to adequately apply its
strategy across the board, as was seen with both DSR and the joint missions. Why? The decline in effectiveness between the two periods of study suggests that missions that have limited capacity and limited cooperation from the host government can be effective up to a point, but not fully successful. Armed youth militias were affected by MONUC patrols and its more aggressive posture. Rebel groups and FARDC were not. MONUC was able to fill a security vacuum when correctly sized, mandated, and equipped, as seen in its limited success with the Ituri militia after the Bunia massacre; however, it was unable to stop attacks by rebels and army soldiers on civilians in the Kivus. MONUC was able to contain attacks on civilians by militia because it appropriately dealt with local issues on the ground without substantial host nation involvement; however, it only was able to accomplish this with support from the UNSC and contributing countries. Without sufficient host nation and UNSC support, MONUC was unable to fully realize its civilian protection goals in the east. The importance of adequate capacity is self-evident, but this thesis provides evidence to support that this was the sole reason for MONUC’s failure to realize better civilian protection results.

Recognizing that MONUC made appropriate adjustments to its strategy in line with the realities on the ground is important because it suggests that the UN needs to figure out how to adequately support missions not redesign how missions carry out its civilian protection strategies. This thesis has shown that UN missions need solid and long-term political and financial backing from the UNSC and its contributing members. MONUC did not have this. With adequate support, civilian protection depends upon recognizing the nature of threats and creating strategies that match the nature of it, which the evidence shows that MONUC did. To do this, it is necessary to understand the root causes of the conflict, to include both local level issues as well as national and regional interests. It was clear in the case of the DRC that all of these factors played into the violence. In addition to local and national drivers, regional support from various countries allowed rebel groups to get resupplied and resourced. This compounded the local issues facing the East.

Additionally, it is important to understand causal factors on civilian protection effectiveness because civilian protection missions by the UN are not going away. If
anything, they might increase, and as was the case in the DRC, there are a myriad of factors that must be addressed in order to achieve sufficient civilian protection. The UN cannot blindly adopt a civilian protection mission without adequate knowledge of who is being protected, why, and from whom. MONUC’s case shows that the UNSC needs to focus its efforts on giving missions the capacity to carry out the correctly chosen strategy for the situation, and the mission needs to make correct decisions on how develop its strategy based on the highest threat.

Lastly, it is important to understand that MONUC’s poor civilian protection results from 2007–2010 prove that host nation support in addition to capacity is vital to mission success. For instance, the international community needs host nation support in order conduct successful DSR. As MONUC witnessed, host nation support is vital because the government must also possess the resolve to achieve effective results in DSR. Although there will be outside donors from various countries and organizations, ultimately, the host nation must make a commitment toward reform. In the DRC, the government was willing to agree to the various measures toward reform, but it showed little interest in making true reform. Given the history of predatory leadership in the DRC, the military has always been seen as an enemy to the people. There are longstanding issues that need to be addressed by the Congolese government about the military. MONUC’s case provides evidence for other missions that may be in a similar defense reform environment.

The thesis attempted to clarify a debate in the literature on why MONUC performed so poorly at providing civilian protection after a period of success. The evidence shown in this thesis provide a solid explanation as to how it was possible for MONUC to correctly respond to the situation on the ground but still fail at civilian protection in the end. This thesis supports the literature that suggests MONUC was not adequately structured, sized, or supported by the UNSC. It showed the causal pathways of why the mission failed to adequately protect civilians. It added to the existing body of literature by providing evidence of some improved civilian protection during the 2003-2006 timeframe, which proved that MONUC could have a degree of success when correctly matched against the threat. Because the UNSC had a strong interest in
providing the necessary support immediately following the Bunia massacre, it gave
MONUC the tools that it needed to succeed. This support waned when the threat from
rebels and the FARDC increased. There were consistent increases in the size of
MONUC, but these were insignificant compared with the threat.

These findings are noteworthy to the UN because they provide evidence to
support what is required when undertaking a large and complex civilian protection
mission, like the one in the DRC. Without substantial support from the UNSC and
contributing countries as well as host nation backing of the mission, there is little chance
of success. Presumably, the UN should not undertake these types of missions unless they
are fully prepared to stay committed and have trusted support from the host nation.
Additionally, these findings suggest that joint operations may be required to eradicate the
primary threat to civilians; however, the mission needs sufficient capacity to undertake
these endeavors. MONUC was forced to acquiesce to the FARDC because it did not
have the capability to do more. Using MONUC as a test case, the focus of effort for
reform should be on contributing countries and host nations, not necessarily the mission
itself. Given the evidence presented in this thesis, organizations like Human Rights
Watch (HRW) and the ICG should focus their fact-finding efforts on contributing nations
support, not just critiquing the mission itself.

This thesis has shown the importance of understanding the nature of the threat,
and there can be future research done both in the DRC and elsewhere to determine
whether the UN has accurately observed and reacted to the correct threat. Although it is
not exclusively related to civilian protection results, when combined with adequate
capacity, it does factor in on mission success.

Although there is a dearth of literature on DSR and SSR in conflict, this thesis
provides a basis for further research on comparison of DSR throughout post-conflict
countries. In light of the failures with the conditionality policies and the realities on the
ground, there was no commitment to uphold the standards within MONUC’s policies or
get commitment from the host nation to follow them. Second, the UN needs to set
policies for DSR that incorporates the host nation, the UN, and donor nations.
Coordination with donors, the UN, and the host nation should not be an afterthought.
Additionally, the UN should address policies that stipulate adequate troop levels given the size of the area, the threat, and the size of the population it is intending to protect. Civilian protection is a cornerstone of recent peacekeeping missions, and the UN needs policies and procedures in place to effectively conduct this mission. It is unrealistic to expect militaries to be able to fight enemies while protecting civilians from harm without proper training and tactics. MONUC proved this. Peacekeepers need enhanced training, tactics, and procedures to conduct this mission. Lastly, the UN should have procedures/policies in place to deal with a lack of host nation support.

What lessons does this experience offer to future peacekeeping endeavors? Without substantial support from both the international community as well as the host nation government, the mission has little chance of prolonged success at civilian protection. MONUC did not have support from the government, who viewed MONUC as an occupying force, and they failed to get the support that they needed from the international community. Next, peacekeeping missions require flexibility and must be willing to adapt when an initiative is not working. MONUC remained committed to its goal of civilian protection and despite failures it was willing to make changes to realize its goals. Third, peacekeeping forces must understand the local context of the situation. MONUC had to deal with a vast array of local grievances and longstanding ethnic agendas. This led to MONUC’s inability to fully implement change within the ranks of the highly divisive FARDC. Lastly, as the second highly complex and controversial UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC, MONUC’s mission provides a lesson for future peacekeeping endeavors that the a peacekeeping force alone cannot solve the problems. MONUC’s initial reaction to the violence was to increase in size, but it quickly realized that although expansion might be required, it alone wouldn’t solve the problems. Despite MONUC’s inability to fully implement reform, it stands as a lesson that DSR is required for stability.

This thesis attempted to understand how MONUC responded to the situation it faced, and why it had some initial success but ultimately failed to realize its goal of civilian protection. This study is important for future peacekeeping operations because it sheds the light on some issues that transcend the boundaries of all operations. MONUC
expanded in size and strengthened its mandate, which did reduce attacks on civilians. This evidence shows that peacekeeping missions need proper strategies as well as capacity. Civilians continue to suffer in the East because DSR has not been realized because MONUC’s strategy, good in design, was not fully realized. MONUC’s experience shows that a coordinated and both bottom-up and top-down approach is needed. MONUC needed to understand local concerns, but it also needed cooperation from the Congolese government. Without these, MONUC could not achieve the success that it desired. Ultimately, MONUC will serve as a future example both good and bad for all multidimensional peacekeeping missions.
LIST OF REFERENCES


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