THE INFLUENCE OF CULTURE ON STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING IN JAPAN AND CHINA

by

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THE INFLUENCE OF CULTURE ON STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING
IN JAPAN AND CHINA

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. OBJECTIVES AND RELEVANCE OF THIS THESIS

This thesis will attempt to increase understanding of the extent to which characteristics of the theories of strategic culture and operational code were exhibited in the historical decision-making processes of China and Japan. It will attempt to answer and illustrate the question “Do these theories show different characterizations of decision making in each country, and how did they differ, both by case and by theory?” This will be accomplished by applying each theory to historical cases to develop a better overall characterization of the decision-making process. The value of assessing two cases is that it not only allows for an interesting comparison that adds value to our understanding of actors facing similar pressures, but it also allows for a critical evaluation of these two perspectives. Importantly, it also allows for the analysis of whether cultural factors influence decision making and how they do so.

The objectives of this thesis are therefore threefold: first, to determine whether it is possible to generate a clearer view of decision making in Japan and China viewed through these lenses of analysis; second, to determine how the cases differ and what that means for the broader study of decision making; third, to determine whether different theories give different characterizations of decision making within each case, or whether decision making shows common characteristics when viewed through different lenses. I will consider two specific historical events: the Japanese decision to declare war on the United States in 1941 and the Chinese decision making in relation to the Geneva Conference in 1954.

This thesis has relevance for modern decision makers and strategists. First, it examines the decision-making processes of states facing difficult strategic choices. Understanding the influence of cultural factors on decision making can help predict how an adversary will address difficult strategic problems, making it easier to craft a response. This is true whether or not there is a cultural influence. Second, it examines two countries of great importance in Asia: Japan and China. As China grows, there is the possibility
that it will attempt to become a regional hegemon. Despite its current difficulties, Japan has growing military capabilities and significant economic potential for regional influence, particularly if China stumbles in the future. Assessing decision making in the two cases will lead to a better understanding of when states decide to engage in conflict and how they assess peace opportunities, particularly if deep strategic cultural arguments find support in the subsequent analysis. In this way it should shed light on the significance of culture in decision making.

Another reason this thesis is relevant to modern decision makers is because of its methodology. The perspectives of strategic culture and operational code were chosen for their relevance to the study of culture in the realm of decision making. Cultural factors like those described by these lenses are difficult to quantify, which makes researching them difficult. But if cultural factors could be isolated and demonstrated to have a significant effect on decision making, it would be valuable for considering modern-day decision making. Cultural factors are not just ones based on history, but those based on shared practices and beliefs that stretch back hundreds of years and which should persist to the present. While situations change and culture adapts to that, a kernel of a shared culture is said to persist across time, and if that can be isolated in Japanese and Chinese decision making, it should be very valuable for strategic interactions in the present. If culture is not found, there is still value for modern decision making, as strategists can rely upon other theories of international relations to think about how to engage with these states.

This thesis is important for several other reasons. First, it will add to the understanding of Japanese and Chinese decision making during the time periods under analysis. It will attempt to create a clearer picture of decision making on the basis of the three theories used. The existing literature explains the decisions to some extent, but it does not adequately address cultural or organizational aspects of decision making for either case. These aspects could be important for understanding these cases, where the countries share cultural traditions very different from those in the west.
B. SELECTION OF CASES

Why are Japan and China suitable for comparison? Japan and China exhibited similar characteristics during the periods in question. They were both authoritarian regimes dominated by deeply held traditions tracing their roots to thousands of years they had both recently experienced military success, and they both had expansionist aims. Moreover, they both faced strong opposition to their military and political objectives from regional actors and larger powers in the international system. Most importantly, at some levels, their decision-making processes were similar. Both states used a central committee of military and government leaders for major decisions. These bodies would deliberate in the same general way to arrive at a political decision. A comparison between the two cases, which involve different states with similar strategic constraints, should allow for a better understanding of decision making in both. If they face similar strategic constraints but exhibit different decision-making styles, the influence of non-structural variables should be important.

This comparison is important for a second reason. It allows one to characterize the relative strengths and weaknesses of the lenses of analysis, not to determine which theory is superior, but to better understand the circumstances and types of data under which they can be used. Put another way, this thesis will test the theories to determine their relative validity with respect to the chosen cases and the available data. This is another reason why it is important to consider two cases; the cases differ greatly in their context and the data available, and the extent to which different or consistent results are generated by application of these theories have a bearing not only on the relevance of the theories, but also on the historical interpretation of the cases themselves.

Third, this thesis will demonstrate how the usage of multiple lenses of analysis adds value to the analysis of decision making. Decision making is based not just on structural pressures facing state actors, but also individual belief systems, socialization, cultural norms, and organizational processes. This thesis will demonstrate how those intervening variables enrich assessments of decision making. Traditional theories of international politics may explain state behavior much of the time, but for those
circumstances where states make “irrational” choices, it is worthwhile to consider whether other schools of thought can shed light on choices.

This thesis will therefore have methodological, historical, and substantive significance, as it seeks to strengthen knowledge about historical decision making and tests the channels by which that analysis is conducted. It does not claim to generate a predictive, unified theory of decision making, but it will shed light on different ways to analyze decision making and make some historical discoveries along the way.

The remainder of this introduction consists of a literature review followed by a discussion of data and research methodology. An outline of the thesis concludes this chapter.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

The academic literature has addressed both Japanese and Chinese decision making in the cases in question, but has never considered them through the viewpoints used in this thesis. In fact, some of the viewpoints considered in this thesis have rarely been applied to historical cases, when it has been shown that it would be valuable to do so. Therefore, the contribution of this study will fill a gap not only in the historiography of these cases, but also in larger debates about methodological approaches.

Past authors have taken a dim view of Japanese decision making prior to the declaration of the Pacific War, describing it variously as irrational,\(^1\) subordinate to the aggressive tendencies of the army,\(^2\) dysfunctional in its execution,\(^3\) and schizophrenic in its approach to doctrine.\(^4\) Other scholars have suggested that the Japanese army also seemed to exhibit a rigidity and lack of imagination that was complemented by a cultural


resistance to change. Bix has written a biography of Hirohito that considers the ways in which his imperial upbringing influenced the way he thought, as well as how he influenced the Japanese decision-making process. Hirohito is portrayed as having much more influence in war planning than previous authors have claimed.

Decision making is often addressed in the standard histories of the Pacific War, but discussion often leaves out cultural or behavioral considerations, focusing more on personality and its interaction with structural pressures facing the Japanese government. Other studies have sought out other factors affecting decision making, including the influence of advisors or the rise of the army as a dominant political actor. Few studies so far have considered in detail the influence of intervening variables like culture or an operational code on decision making.

Chinese decision making at the Geneva Conference in 1954, on the other hand, has received less attention in the literature, probably due to the relative lack of primary source data when compared to the Japanese case. Unlike Japan, China has not opened all of its state archives to scholars interested in obtaining telegrams, minutes, journals, and the like. Past histories of Chinese involvement with the Indochina War have de-emphasized its role at the Geneva Conference, or have considered its involvement from the perspective of another participating state, such as the United States or the United

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Kingdom. Elsewhere, discussion of Chinese diplomacy in this period is considered only in the context of interaction with another state, most often the United States. Many of these works emphasize the importance of Communist ideology driving Chinese decision making to support the Vietminh, but this is likely a reflection of the Cold War environment in which many of these were written. However, Zhai’s treatment of China’s involvement in Vietnam still considers ideology as important.

With respect to the conference specifically, Zhai has produced an assessment of Chinese involvement with the Indochina Conference based on newly released documents from the early 1990s. He describes in detail the relationship between the Chinese and the Vietminh prior to the conference on the basis of Chinese documents. He then offers a narrative history of the conference and Chinese involvement, focusing on the Chinese contribution to its settlement and motivations for Chinese action. He emphasizes the importance of Zhou Enlai and his relationship with the Politburo in negotiating a settlement. He then discusses how attendance at the conference influenced China’s relations with the other attendees. The paper produces the clearest depiction of Chinese involvement at the conference in the literature, but it does not consider the decision-making process, which this thesis will attempt to do. It also needs to be updated to account for new documents that have been released. Finally, it does not evaluate the potential contributions of culture, organization, or operational code as intervening variables affecting behavior. None of the histories of China during this period adequately incorporate this level of analysis.


To summarize the contributions to the literature so far, Japanese decision making prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War has been considered in detail, while Chinese decision making in relation to the 1954 Geneva Conference has been considered in less detail. Japanese decision making has been characterized to be irrational and dominated by bureaucratic infighting, although more recent work has shown the influence of the Emperor in a way that has not been shown before. Chinese decision making has been shown to be centralized around the Politburo and driven by personality and ideology. Past work has emphasized the importance of developing narrative histories of what happened, but they have not sought explanations involving culture, organizations, or operational code. This study seeks to add that level of complexity to fill gaps in both literatures. With respect to Japan, the gap lies in the lack of attention paid to the influence of these three variables on the decision-making process. With respect to China, the gap lies in a lack of an updated study that incorporates new documents and views decision making in the context of these variables.

The need to add this level of complexity is clear. Recent psychological research\textsuperscript{13} has shown that members of different cultural groups react to problems differently. The strategic culture literature, to some extent, captures this point of view. Its major contribution is to treat culture as an instrumental variable in determining state behavior, and this study will seek to apply it at the individual level through the study of national leaders. Johnston has developed a model of analysis for strategic culture\textsuperscript{14} that is useful for framing this discussion.

\section*{D. DATA AND METHODOLOGY}

Assessing decision making in this way is a complex task. This job will be made easier with the inclusion of primary source material. In Japan, decision making prior to the war was conducted by Imperial Liaison conferences, which brought together members of the military with Cabinet ministers to develop policy and discuss issues.


These conferences were the primary policy-making bodies in Japan at the time. After the Japanese defeat, various actors declassified, retrieved, and translated the records of these meetings, and they were published in a 1967 volume incorporating the records of 65 conferences held in 1941, all before the declaration of war. Access to these records provides a wealth of data with which to analyze this case.

Unlike Japan, China has never published transcripts of its meeting minutes in an easily accessible way. But some documents have still been made available to the general public and translated into English. The Cold War International History Project maintains an online archive of Chinese foreign policy documents, with a large section on the 1954 Geneva Conference, which includes memorandums, telegrams, and minutes of meetings between various actors. These new documents should add value to the analysis of this case in a way not available to earlier researchers, and this study will rely heavily upon these communications in considering how the Chinese made decisions. These are essentially unmined in the scholarly literature. Along with other secondary source data, the availability of primary sources for both of these cases is sufficient to begin to fill the gap in the research. In both cases, there is some uncertainty associated with the documents, as there is always ambiguity in translations. However, since both sets of documents were translated by native speakers this problem should be minimized.

The theory of strategic culture indicates that the decisions states make will be conditioned by their history, geography, and national culture. It predicts that each state has a unique decision-making culture that shapes the choices it is faced with and ultimately makes. It also predicts that this strategic culture is one of the most important things to consider when thinking about what a state will do in any given situation. Conventional wisdom suggests that this theory should hold; it is hard to imagine a situation where culture would not influence decision making. But this effect is difficult to quantify, and it is worth testing the strategic culture theory to understand not only whether it is accurate, but through what channels it operates.

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It is also important to consider the debates within the strategic culture school and how strategic culture is received by other international relations scholars. This provides proper context for research design and the relationship between strategic culture and operational code. Within strategic culture there are three generations of research. The first generation focused on differences in historical experiences, geography, and political culture and how those yielded different nuclear strategies between the United States and the Soviet Union. The main challenge it faced was that it was sometime too broad: too many factors were considered to be inputs in strategic culture when all of the different inputs could be separate explanations of strategic choice. There was also the implication that strategic culture always led to consistent behavior, when in actuality thoughts and actions were often inconsistent with each other.

The second generation of theory focused on how strategic culture could be used as a tool of political hegemony. Strategic culture is therefore used instrumentally by elites to justify operational strategy and to silence or mislead potential political challengers. The key issue with this generation of research was that the relationship between culture and behavior was not clear, and that it is not clear whether we should expect the strategic discourse containing strategic culture to influence behavior.

The third generation uses strategic culture as an intervening variable to focus on particular strategic decisions as dependent variables. Different kinds of culture are used, such as military, political-military, or organizational. It excludes behavior as an element in an attempt to avoid “the tautological traps of the first generation.” It is explicitly committed to competitive theory testing.

Strategic culture as a concept is not without its critics. These critics challenge both the fundamental concept of strategic culture and the way the research is conducted. Desch argues that “the central problem with the new culturalism in security studies is that its theories, by themselves, do not provide much additional explanatory power beyond

17 Ibid., 37.
18 Ibid., 37.
19 Ibid., 41.
existing structural theories.”

Put another way, there are ways for culture to supplement existing theories in international security by “explaining lags between structural changes and state behavior, accounting for deviant state behavior, and explaining behavior in structurally indeterminate environments.”

Twomey notes that strategic culture theory has persuasive work on organizationally derived military culture, as well as for explanations of variation in national identity that depend on constructed, ideational sources. However, he argues that there is a middle ground between these two kinds of work—this middle group he calls a “core” that “takes national-level cultures and uses them to explain tendencies in national ‘ways of war’ or grand strategies.” However, he argues, the literature is marred by overdetermined predictions, by explaining universal practices, and by politicized studies.

Glenn takes the optimistic view that there can be areas for strategic culture and neorealist theory to intersect. That is, strategic culture theory should not be cast aside as irrelevant, and that there are areas where much could be gained from examination of alternative explanations of state behavior. Glenn argues that two conceptions of strategic culture, epiphenomenal approaches that explain deviations of state behavior from general patterns predicted by neorealism and conventional constructivist conceptions, could have meaningful collaboration with neorealism.

There are two common threads in this literature. First there is a concern over the question of how culture relates to other theories of international relations. The second is more relevant to this thesis, which is the extent to which it is possible to think of culture as a factor in influencing behavior—what kind of behavior, through what channels, and how great of an effect? To consider Japanese and Chinese decision making, this thesis will try to overcome these methodological challenges through a blending of strategic culture and operational code analysis.

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For strategic culture analysis, this thesis will loosely follow the general research design proposed by Johnston to avoid the methodological pitfalls he identifies in existing strategic culture work.\textsuperscript{24} It is first necessary to identify culture-based factors that influence assumptions held by decision-makers. This means it is necessary to discern the central elements of a strategic culture by conducting research on history and shared perceptions. With an identified strategic culture in hand, it is then necessary to evaluate its links to behavior by testing for its presence in policy documents and in the minds of decision-makers. It will be necessary to attempt to control of non-cultural variables, which will be a challenge. This thesis will conceptualize the relationship between strategic culture and decision making as a filter; strategic culture allows a decision-maker facing a choice opportunity to view the world and his options for dealing with a problem in a certain way.

Against this theory, this thesis will also lay out the argument of a more general theory of offensive realism, developed by John Mearsheimer.\textsuperscript{25} Realism posits that state behavior is driven by a desire to accumulate power to survive in an anarchic international system. Offensive realism goes on to suggest that states will seize power from other states to make themselves more secure. In Chapter Two, this thesis describes elements of offensive realism in how they pertain to the actions of Japan and China during the periods under analysis. In effect, it will suggest alternative courses of action for both cases supported by realist theory. There is value in this: realism goes a long way in explaining state behavior, and it has been alleged that strategic culture theory adds little to academic discussion that is not already explained by realism.

Another way to think about decision making is through the operational code model of analysis. Developed by Nathan Leites, operational code analysis is an attempt to identify shared response repertoires, decision-making rules, and the spirit of a ruling group.\textsuperscript{26} Due to its complexity, it has sometimes been neglected by analysts when

\textsuperscript{24} Johnston, “Thinking About Strategic Culture,” 52–4.
studying decision making despite its utility. This thesis will take elements from operational code analysis in assessing decision making to understand its utility and the basic characteristics of a Japanese and Chinese operational code. Walker has compiled a list of “philosophical” and “instrumental” questions to help determine “boundaries” for decision making that are influenced by an operational code. These questions and Walker’s overview of how to conduct operational code analysis will be instrumental in identifying the elements of the codes. The operational code should differ in the two cases because of the different ideologies underpinning their political systems, and this should affect decision making differently in both cases.

This thesis will begin with individual application of these lenses to each case. It will consider what these different methods of analysis say about the individual cases, and it will then consider how they are complementary. Strategic culture and operational code have the same foundational idea—to consider the habits and mindset of a ruling group typically bound by a common culture or belief system. However, the ways those belief systems are manifested differ depending on the lens of analysis used. This thesis will consider the extent to which strategic culture and operational code could be complementary—is strategic culture analysis supported by findings of operational code analysis and vice-versa? The relationship between these two lenses could illuminate some aspects about decision making and how to conduct decision-making research.

E. ROADMAP

This thesis will be organized as follows. In Chapter II, strategic culture will be applied to the Japanese and Chinese cases and the results will be assessed. In Chapter III, operational code analysis will be applied to the cases and the results assessed. In Chapter IV, the results the analysis will be analyzed together, as will the extent to which the theories are complementary. Chapter V will conclude this thesis with an analysis of its contributions and possibilities for future research.

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II. STRATEGIC CULTURE

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter considers the influence of culture as it is manifest in Japan and China’s strategic culture. The idea of culture in influencing international relations is often discussed in international relations literature. For example, Rosen has written on the influence of social structures in how societies generate military power. 29 Julienne has also written on the limitations of applying western frameworks, such as realism, to analyze structures developed in societies that are very different, signaling a need for a cultural approach. 30 The theory of strategic culture proposes that the decisions states make will be conditioned by their history, geography, and national culture. It suggests that each state has a unique decision-making culture that shapes the choices it is faced with, and ultimately makes. It also suggests that this strategic culture is one of the most important things to consider when thinking about what a state will do in any given situation. This paper will test the theory of strategic culture under this definition, and specifically, the first generation of the theory.

Many authors 31 have written on the influence of a national decision-making culture on a state’s choices. The first generation of strategic culture theory argues that differences in the way national leaders think about strategy were caused by variations in three levels of analysis: macroenvironmental variables such as geography, ethnocultural characteristics, and history; societal variables like social, economic, and political structures of a society; and micro-level variables consisting of military institutions and

30 Francois Jullien, Treatise on Efficacy: Between Western and Chinese Thinking (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 2004).
characteristics of civil-military relations. It suggests that there are dominant national beliefs that produce peculiarly national approaches to strategy. There are two further generations of the theory that emphasize strategic culture’s utility as a tool of political hegemony and considering organizational culture as an intervening variable, but the first generation is the simplest, “classic” theory.

This chapter proceeds as follows. Indications for behavior stemming from strategic culture in both cases are presented. Evidence for strategic culture is then presented for both cases. An analysis of the validity of strategic culture theory in both cases then follows, as well as comparisons of how decision making differs in both cases.

B. HYPOTHESES

To conduct strategic culture analysis, it is necessary to develop hypotheses about how strategic culture will be manifested in behavior. To that end, it is easiest to do that by developing predictions about behavior, which this section will do for both cases. These predictions rely heavily on assessments of Japanese and Chinese culture made by experts writing about the periods in question, so as to not cloud the analysis with personal biases.

1. Japan

For the Japanese case, there are three key elements of Japanese strategic culture that this thesis will emphasize. First, elements of conservatism that led to reticence, unwillingness to accept negative data, and a general lack of innovation and strong sense of risk aversion. Second, a culture of militarism that favored military solutions to problems over other solutions. Third, a culture of deference that could compound militaristic tendencies.

Several authors have considered Japanese strategic culture during the Pacific War period. Ford claims that Japanese Army culture was imbued with a “conservatism that hindered any significant transformation, even when wartime experiences proved beyond a doubt that its ways were not adequate,” and describes general strategic culture as stagnant and insistent upon an adherence to set beliefs and practices. Because of this, Japanese leaders did not scrutinize their situation carefully or in an objective manner, and misconceptions of the enemy led the Japanese on a course toward defeat. In the transcripts, this would lead to reticence to act and unwillingness to accept negative data. In fact, there is evidence that later in the war poor statistics, fraud from military contractors, and a growing black market made enforcement of quotas “virtually impossible, as most members of the Planning Board admitted after the war.” This is consistent with the idea that conservatism would lead to stagnation, which would enable all of the above to occur.

Another characteristic of prewar Japanese thinking was militarism. In this sense, militarism meant that Japanese leadership was convinced that military solutions were the default options for engagement with the international community. While leaders would pursue cooperation and peace, they only do so when they are unclear whether military action would work. Militarists would choose military action exclusively and resort to cooperation strategies when forced to do so. Planning revolved around how military actions should succeed, and planning for how to engage in diplomatic activities was conducted on the fly.

It is not unreasonable to think that rational leaders would take a balanced approached and sometimes plan for military action and sometimes plan for cooperation, depending on the circumstances and what they expect to work. This is contested in the academic literature, with classic studies arguing that military dictatorships are actually

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34 Ford, “Strategic Culture Intelligence Assessment and the Conduct of the Pacific War,” 65.

less war prone than non-dictatorships.  

36 Recent research, however, contends this hypothesis, with quantitative analysis showing that states with strong civilian control of the military because civilian leaders can punish the military for misadventures.  

In this case, this thesis proposes that Japanese leaders would always plan for military action and prefer it over anything else.

Smethurst has commented on how the extent to which militaristic thinking was imbued in the Japanese populace through a strong reservist association and military education.  

Militarism became a part of the fabric of Japanese society, leading to a culture favoring aggressive expansion and Japanese expeditions abroad. Japanese leaders would have viewed Japan expanding by force as the state of nature; it would have been unusual for Japan to not wish to expand. For example, Toland notes that “military leaders…could almost always override the civilians; their resignation would bring the government down…Military monopoly had become a tradition and was rarely questioned.”

It is important to observe that militarism of this kind does not necessarily arise because of military control. A military dictatorship naturally creates conditions where the military position and solutions have precedence over civilian leadership. By that basic definition, any military dictatorship will show militaristic tendencies, and the Japanese case is no exception. This does not mean they are more likely to declare war, but that they are more likely to show tendencies for hostility as a means of resolution to conflict and to suggest it more in discussions about key issues. This thesis additionally argues that militarism in this case is transmitted culturally, permeating through all levels of society, and supported by not just the military. It was not just the military or military-controlled leaders who drove Japan to war –the civilian apparatus that fed them information, the education apparatus that taught Japanese militarism from a young age, the civilian leaders


attending Liaison Conferences and Cabinet meetings, and the Emperor and his entourage all supported militarism. Whether or not this was caused by the military being in power is important, but the ultimate point is that militarism had its roots in and was perpetuated by elements of a national culture that was manifest at all levels.

Schom argues that “Japan’s senior war leaders were neither realistic enough, nor sufficiently open-minded, and in consequence were intent on blind military adventurism, confident in the superiority of their genius.”40 He poses a few basic questions that are obvious in hindsight, but that Japanese leaders did not ask when planning for war, such as where to find officers to fill a manpower shortage and where to source various resources and spare parts. A combination of a conservatism that led to unwillingness to ask the right questions and a push for military activity seem to have existed and it is right to explore their manifestation.

We should also see a strong tendency toward unity in general, and particularly after decisions were made. There would be deference toward superiors and a general lack of difficult questions to superiors. This includes the Emperor, as every person in Japan should consider him as a fatherlike and divine figure. Bix’s biography of Hirohito demonstrates this well. Hirohito’s grandfather, Emperor Meiji, “was propagandized as the very touchstone of all virtue.”41 This could lead to decisions being made on the basis of personality, not data, as underlings respect the men they work for more than the positions they hold. This submissiveness is related to, as Smethurst notes, the idea of sacrificing for the “good of the nation.”42 Individual interests would be subordinated to the interests of the group, and challenges to unity would be morally wrong.

While nationalism and authoritarianism could have been factors in driving this, there is evidence that it was something that Japanese leaders simply felt was right. For example, in January 1938 when the Cabinet had decided to expand military operations in China, an Army Vice-Chief of Staff Tada Hayao opposed the ruling of the Cabinet and argued strenuously against the policy. He even sought a meeting with the Emperor, which

42 Smethurst, A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism, 179.
was denied. Navy Minister Yonai Mitsumasa even suggested that “if Tada could not agree with cabinet policy as sanctioned by the Emperor, his resignation was in order.”\textsuperscript{43} Tada eventually was forced to relent and give his official sanction to the planned operations.

2. China

For the Chinese case, I will focus on two areas where Chinese culture should have influenced decision making: perceptions of national security interests and perceptions of foreigners. By way of background, it can generally be said that China was a country that in 1954 had suffered centuries of invasions by foreign aggressors, was a land power for much of its history, had a long tradition of strategic and military thought, and had a government characterized by nationalistic and ideological thinking.\textsuperscript{44} Zhang has written about Chinese strategic culture during this period, and the following borrows from his work.

China’s national security interests in 1954 were characterized by an irrational insistence on border security and national autonomy, and particularly the threat of foreign invasion and control over China. Every state experiences this to some extent, but most have this reaction to a actual threat. For example, Poland’s experiences with Germany and Russia would have led the Polish government to revolve planning around those countries. The French construction of the Maginot Line during the interwar period was a clear reaction to perceived German aggression. For the Chinese case, there was no specific threat during this period beyond the United States and its proxies, leading it to be specifically concerned about them in relation to its borders. A realist perspective would generate a view of the world that takes challenger power into account, not an irrational view of power that inflates their capabilities and intentions. Chinese leaders were strongly concerned about U.S. intentions toward it even when the capability did not exist. This fear was probably driven by a view of history through a lens of ideology and culture.

\textsuperscript{43} Barnhart, \textit{Japan Prepares for Total War}, 105.

\textsuperscript{44} Shu Guang Zhang, \textit{Deterrence and Strategic Culture} (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 272.
According to Zhang, “China’s status as a land power, its bitter experience of foreign intervention, and its traditional self-image of being at the center of the universe dictate that the Chinese defense establishment would focus on physical survival and national autonomy.”\(^{45}\) The influence of foreign invasion seemed to be strong, and China’s national sovereignty was a major concern for decision-makers. This would have led to concern about possible foreign expansion near China, including the establishment of military bases or the stationing of troops nearby. In terms of international discussions, Chinese leaders would have emphasized threats, real or imagined, in their dealings with other participants at Geneva, interpreting any desire to station foreign military forces nearby as a possible threat. In their conversations with other states, they would have been reluctant to open up Chinese borders or allow foreigners access to Chinese soldiers.

This is related to Chinese perceptions of foreigners. During this period, the Chinese regarded “foreign barbarians” as untrustworthy. On the basis of their dealings with Americans, CCP leaders did not believe they could trust the “Meiguolao” (American devils), claiming that Marshall had cheated them in mediation in 1946 and that Truman had lied on Taiwan in early 1950.\(^{46}\) For Chinese leaders, the United States was another in a long line of imperial powers who sought to dominate Asia and China. This xenophobia would have led to general distrust of foreign intentions at Geneva. In internal discussions, Chinese leaders would have referenced their distrust of foreign intentions and would have been reluctant to agree to proposals without firm evidence that it would not harm China. In discussions with other participants, Chinese leaders would have been cautious and calculated with what information they agreed to share and the extent to which they would agree to multilateral action.

3. **Realism as a Baseline**

What would a baseline for these cases look like? That is, what is the typical behavior that should be expected of these governments in the absence of cultural factors like these? The theory of offensive realism presumes that the international system exists

\(^{45}\) Zhang, *Deterrence and Strategic Culture*, 273.

\(^{46}\) Zhang, *Deterrence and Strategic Culture*, 275.
in a state of anarchy and that in order for states to survive in such a system, they must maximize their share of world power. This should serve as a hedge against other states that may have some offensive intention that is difficult to see. Sometimes, maximizing power means going to war against another state. Mearsheimer shows that in unbalanced multipolar systems, like the world Japan existed in in 1941, war is much more likely due to greater potential for conflict situation and disparity of great-minor power dyads.47 The same is true for the strategic situation facing the Chinese government in 1954.

As discussed in Chapter I, offensive realism will be used as a baseline measure of behavior for both the Japanese and Chinese cases. The world it describes seems to fit those of the cases, and it describes basic behavior concerning rational actors. In this world, both Chinese and Japanese leaders would pursue power maximization strategies because of insecurity they feel in the international system. Both states would pursue strategies like offensive military action, alliance building, or coercive diplomacy in an effort to ensure their survival and continued security. However, both of these states were also relatively weak actors in the international community; China was still reeling from the effects of its decade of war, and Japan was stretched militarily and suffered from critical resource shortages and a lack of manufacturing capability. A rational actor in that position would have sought strong allies and would probably have avoided conflict strategies due to relative military weakness. However, Mearsheimer does note that in the case of multipolarity states are more likely to “underestimate the resolve of rival states and the strength of opposing coalitions,” which could explain deviations from this rational position.48

C. CASE STUDY: JAPAN

There is some evidence from the transcripts that Japanese decision making exhibited some elements of strategic culture. Several of the meetings concerned nonsubstantive matters, so five of the 57 transcripts were unsuitable for analysis. Of the


remainder, 78% of the documents contained evidence for conservatism impeding decision making. Sixty-eight percent demonstrated evidence for conflict strategies being advocated over cooperation strategies. Thirty-two percent demonstrated evidence for the idea of unity playing a role in discussions. In this section, I discuss some relevant excerpts from the documents that demonstrate the type of evidence in them and then assess possible reasons for the relative proportion of evidence in the sample.

Liaison Conferences in late June demonstrated Japanese militarism. At the Liaison Conferences of 25 June–1 July 1941, prior to the important Imperial Conference of 2 July, the government and military considered policies about military operations in French Indochina. These conferences also had the objective of dealing with the possibility of war with the Soviet Union. Foreign Minister Matsuoka repeatedly argued for war with the Soviet Union, stating on 25 June that “when Germany wins and disposes of the Soviet Union, we can’t take the fruits of victory without having done something. We have to either shed blood or engage in diplomacy. It’s best to shed blood.”49 Realist thinking would lead to a balanced approach that probably would not advocate shedding blood above diplomacy.

Other ministers argued for war as well. At an Imperial Conference on 2 July 1941, in front of the Emperor, President of the Privy Council Hara Takashi made the following point:

Some people say that it would be improper for Japan to attack the Soviet Union in view of the Neutrality Pact; but the Soviet Union is notorious for her habitual acts of betrayal. If we were to attack the Soviet Union, no one would regard it as treachery. I am eagerly waiting for the opportunity to attack the Soviet Union.50

Hara’s desire for quick military action against the Soviet Union was supported by other attendees at the conference, despite the fact that Japan was actively prosecuting a war in China and planning for military operations against the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, while simultaneously preparing for war with the United States. This is less an issue of miscalculation and related more to principles; Hara’s reference to habitual

50 Ike, *Japan’s Decision for War*, 87.
betrayals and treachery shows that there is a moral or ideological component to his argument. This demonstrates a strong influence of militarism in Japanese leadership. While all of these problems could have been resolved through other means, military action was always favored. This is underscored by the fact that the Foreign Minister was the biggest supporter of war even while he “pursued” peace talks with the Soviet Union and the United States. In Japan’s situation at the time, a realist position probably would not have advocated for war so strongly given resource constraints and the strength of the enemy.

General conservatism was also shown. War Minister Tojo on 29 May 1941 reported that it would be necessary for the government to exercise greater control over the expression of opinions that criticize the government. Foreign Minister Matsuoka agreed, noting that “Yesterday the newspaper Hochi printed a statement by Muto Teiichi saying that the United States should enter the war in alliance with Japan. I do not think such remarks are appropriate.”51 Minister of Home Affairs Hiranuma noted that “a certain person of fairly high status visited my house and remarked, ‘It is outrageous that Wang Ching-Wei should be coming to Japan in June,’ a statement contrary to the view of the Government. It is not appropriate to express opinions that run counter to measures taken by the Government.”52 As no solutions were available to deal with this matter, the participants stopped discussion and put it off for a later date. This episode also shows a reference to the idea of unity referenced in the introduction. Japanese leaders expected that the Japanese people, particularly those of high status that could be politically influential, would think the same way.

An inability to confront adverse data was a common problem as the summer went on. A continuing problem decision-makers faced was a lack of resources with which to conduct war. At a meeting on 1 July 1941, there was discussion about preparations for a possible war with the Soviet Union. Minister of Commerce and Industry Kobayashi stated bluntly “I do not think we have sufficient strength, so far as resources are concerned, to support a war. Both the Army and Navy can resort to force, but we do not

51 Ike, Japan’s Decision for War, 45.
52 Ike, Japan’s Decision for War, 45.
have materials for war on both land and sea.” 53 Did the other participants make any note of this discussion, which could have led to any campaign grinding to a halt? There was no vetting or response to this information in a way like Schom suggested, asking basic questions about sustainability or operational planning. Rather, Army Vice Chief of Staff Tsukada Ko remarked almost immediately after: “The Foreign Minister’s drafts of the message to Germany and his statement to the Imperial Conference are well done, aren’t they?” to which Matusoka responded, “It turned out well because I listened to the opinions of all of you.” 54 Without a way to deal with this problem, the participants resorted to flippant remarks and small-talk on the eve of a major conference. A realist approach, which emphasizes rationality, would have allowed for the consideration of these problems in relation to how they would affect the outcome of operations and thereby the probability of Japanese success.

An interesting aspect of the meeting that is not captured by the official transcripts comes from Toland, who notes that when the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister pressed military leaders on whether diplomacy would be a real option, they were unable to answer. At the Imperial Conference of 6 September 1941, Emperor Hirohito, who had remained silent and a passive observer in such meetings for years, directly asked the military leadership why they were unable to respond, and then rebuked them for their silence, then reading a poem about peace written by his grandfather. As Toland notes, “the listeners sat awed by the Emperor’s censure.” 55 But this rebuke, while embarrassing, did nothing to change the actual course of decision making.

This episode demonstrates an element of strategic culture related to deference and unity. Toland describes Nagano and Sugiyama, the military chiefs, sitting paralyzed until Nagano “forced himself to stand up…humbly, head bowed.” 56 He apparently floundered in his apology to the Emperor, and he and Sugiyama quickly made an apology and reiterated their desire for peace. While the Emperor held titular power as head of

53 Ike, Japan’s Decision for War, 76.
54 Ike, Japan’s Decision for War, 77.
55 Toland, The Rising Sun, 99.
56 Toland, The Rising Sun, 99.
government, in practice it was the military chief and the civilian ministers who controlled actual operations. Cultural factors could explain why Nagano and Sugiyama cared enough about the Emperor’s opinion to go so far as to make an apology—and be afraid while doing so. In the end, the Emperor was convinced to accede to military action based on respectful lobbying by Tojo, military advisors, and members of the Privy Council. In a delicate political move, the Liaison Conference attendees respected the integrity of authority and unity of government while still pushing a militaristic agenda.

In summary, Japanese leaders during this period could have pursued a strategy that maximized power in a way that would not lead to their ultimate destruction. They could have pursued a limited cooperation strategy and even some conflict strategies when accounting for miscalculation. But a push for unity, a lack of dissension, and militaristic tendencies were factors that pushed the Japanese government on a path toward war.

D. CASE STUDY: CHINA

The archive displays an appreciable amount of evidence that strategic culture mattered for Chinese decision making at the Geneva Conference in 1954. It is first important to note that some of the documents were not suitable for this analysis, as they were routine telegrams or notes about the movement of Chinese leaders between cities, or they discussed things other than policy. There were 16 documents in this category, leaving 64 documents to analyze. Of the remainder, 40% of the documents contained evidence for a uniquely Chinese perception of national security interests. Half demonstrated evidence for Chinese distrust of foreigners, particularly the United States. In total, 55%, or 35 of 64 documents, demonstrate one of these two elements of strategic culture. In this section, I discuss some relevant excerpts from the documents that demonstrate the type of evidence in them and then assess possible reasons for the relative proportion of evidence in the sample.

The hypothesis for Chinese perception of national security interests stated that Chinese decision-makers would be unusually concerned about anything that could potentially threaten Chinese sovereignty or its borders. While this thinking is in line with realism theory, it differs in that in the Chinese example, the Chinese should not
demonstrate a desire to take offensive military action to secure borders, or to build a large military to secure them. Chinese strategic culture would call for negotiations but relatively little cooperation, as ideological differences and mistrust would preclude any sustainable agreements with foreigners. Therefore, Chinese leaders would be concerned about the presence of weapons and soldiers near borders and emphasize those points in negotiations repeatedly while shying away from strong desires to politically influence any of the actors or project power. This is shown in the evidence. For example, in Document #4, a draft policy memorandum prepared for the delegation, the Chinese officials resolved:

That from the day of the armistice, no combat plane, armored vehicle, weapons or ammunition, other military materials, or any armed force and military personnel should be allowed to enter Indochina…Within six months after the armistice, all foreign navy, ground force and air force, and military personnel should complete withdrawal from Indochina.57

It becomes clear again and again that one of the main Chinese policy goals at the meeting is to prevent a foreign military influence in Indochina, so close to Chinese borders. Zhou met later with Richard Casey, the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, as recorded in Document #40. When Casey mentioned that other countries could fear China establishing bases in Indochina, Zhou responded:

Foreign Minister Zhou asked: Did you mean that if China establishes military bases in Indochina? How could China go to Indochina and establish military bases there? We believe that no foreign countries should establish military bases in Indochina.

It is therefore clear that Chinese leaders were deeply concerned about foreign influence in Indochina, near the Chinese border, but that they did not have designs on taking the territory for themselves. Were they really concerned that bases would be used to violate Chinese sovereignty? Later in Zhou’s conversation with Casey, he noted:

Foreign Minister Zhou said, it will be difficult for us to imagine that Australia would go and establish military bases everywhere alone if the

United States had not established military bases in the western Pacific Ocean and all over Asia. We believe that only the military bases established in our own countries can be called defensive ones. Military bases established in other countries’ territories are for aggressive reasons. This is our definition.

This is consistent with the idea that Chinese leaders were influenced by their history of invasions and foreign aggression. When Japanese military bases were established in Shanghai and northern China in the 1930s, it gave the Japanese military the foothold it needed to launch a full-scale invasion. Foreign military involvement in Indochina was important from a security perspective, but also from an ideological perspective. The strategic culture of China demanded that decision-makers consider the placement of foreign soldiers in Indochina not just as a security dilemma, but as a risk to Chinese power in Asia. This is consistent with a realist viewpoint of the world.

The evidence is similar for Chinese distrust of foreigners. The hypothesis was that due to China’s history of domination by foreign powers, particularly during World War II, Chinese leaders would be more likely to demonstrate a natural distrust of foreign powers. 50% of the documents demonstrated evidence that Chinese leaders thought in this way. For example, in Document #8, a telegram from Zhou Enlai to Mao and the Central Committee describing a conversation with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, Zhou noted:

> We also asked what subjects would be specifically discussed in the restricted session. However, Eden did not answer this question. It is the British and Americans who are taking the initiative and sounding us out, and we should not react too positively except to agree to hold the meeting.

Here we see the natural cautiousness in play. Zhou was unwilling to show too much of his feelings to Eden and the western delegations, as it could have opened up an angle for them to attack the Chinese delegation later. Instead, he was cautious and deliberate in the information he took from Eden and what he gave back. Later in his telegram, Zhou noted what was really driving his concern:

> Although the United States fired many blanks on the Indochina issue, they could not scare anyone but themselves. The United States is attempting to form an alliance of invaders of Southeast Asia.
This mistrust of the United States, driven by a fear of military intervention that could lead to imperialism, drove much of the Chinese reticence to deal with the Americans. Zhou’s fear of the Americans threatening Asia was also demonstrated in his belief that the Americans were trying to sabotage conference proceedings. Toward the end of the conference, there was substantive disagreement about issues related to Korea and talks threatened to break down. In a telegram recorded in Document #29 to Mao and the Central Committee, Zhou vents his frustration at American arrogance:

The United States intended to sabotage the negotiations on the Korean issue. However, other countries did not agree. Obviously, it is the United States that intentionally creates tension both inside and outside the conference. The Americans are trying to win support under the signboard of the United Nations. They are afraid that our side will undermine the United Nations’ prestige, and that we will desperately oppose the exercise of veto over the issue of neutral nations. They are afraid that an organization of neutral nations on a footing of equality with both sides will be unfavorable to the United States.

These concerns over the United States ruled much of Zhou’s thinking and communication to Beijing after the main segment of the conference ended. He began to strategize on how to defeat the Americans, who represented the latest imperialist threat, with their support of South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. His strategy involved the following, recorded in Document #37:

Even if we cannot prevent the conference from being sabotaged, we can at least drive our counterparts into an unfavorable position. The more modest our proposals are, the more passive our counterparts will be. It will also make it more difficult and more unreasonable of them to sabotage the conference.

By continuing to be outwardly cautious toward the other powers, it would be possible for the Chinese delegation to achieve its goals without having to give in to the United States and the west, and it would expose the United States as the imperialist power that it was. All of the above quotes are consistent with the idea that Chinese decision making was influenced to an extent by its past historical experiences with foreign occupiers. This manifested in a distrust of most foreign powers, but an especially strong distrust of the United States, which Chinese leaders viewed as the newest power to try to dominate Asia.
While this all shows evidence for strategic culture in Chinese decision making, it is actually unclear whether Chinese behavior truly differed from a more traditional conception of realist behavior. Put another way, almost all of the episodes described here, as well as most of the quotes from the documents exhibit strong tendencies toward realism as described as Mearsheimer. The elements of strategic culture above are manifest in the evidence, but these elements could also all be considered realist behavior. That is, while there are good reasons from a cultural-historical perspective for Chinese behavior to be like this, it is difficult to distinguish it from realist behavior.

E. ANALYSIS

In the Japanese case, all three traits of strategic culture are demonstrated in the evidence. 78% of the documents contained evidence for conservatism impeding decision making, 68% demonstrated evidence for conflict strategies being advocated over cooperation strategies, and 32% demonstrated evidence for the idea of unity playing a role in discussions. Japanese leaders during this period could have pursued a strategy that maximized power in a way that would not lead to their ultimate destruction. They could have pursued a limited cooperation strategy and even some conflict strategies when accounting for miscalculation. But a push for unity, a lack of dissension, and militaristic tendencies that surpass even the militarism of a “normal” military dictatorship were factors that pushed the Japanese government on a path toward war.

For the Chinese case, the data are mixed. To review, 40% of the documents contained evidence for a uniquely Chinese perception of national security interests and 50% demonstrated evidence for Chinese distrust of foreigners. On the basis of the raw numbers, it seems that strategic culture could be an influence on decision making, but that realism could play just as large a role or that the effects are muddled. It is important to consider the validity of the proportions in assessing the validity of the argument. There are several reasons why these proportions could be incorrect. The researcher may have approached the documents with a bias that would lean toward strategic culture at the expense of realism, meaning that realism would be underrepresented. This is possible, as is any subjective system of “measuring” influence.
It is interesting to see how strategic culture compares in both cases. Both cases involve government leaders making strategic choices to counter the interests of western powers. In the Japanese case, the government was planning military operations abroad, while in the Chinese case the government was dealing with the ramifications of them. The similarity they share is in the extent to which a central group of leaders is able to make major decisions that influence overall foreign policy; centralized decision making allows for strategic culture to be particularly influential. The effect of strategic culture on an individual can also be identified in both cases, with Matsuoka heavily influenced by militaristic thinking and Zhou influenced by the ideology of liberation. Strategic culture seems to operate in similar channels.

What does it mean for strategic culture to be exhibited in the evidence? It does not mean that strategic culture was the overriding factor in decision making. Put another way, the presence of strategic culture should not have a major effect on other reasons for why leaders thought in different ways. In both cases, leaders pursued goals that would lead to increases in national power or security. This is in line with realist thinking. But strategic culture served as a lens that helped leaders narrow their options for any choice opportunity. Japanese militarism led Japanese leaders to pursue security through force and surprise, while Chinese distrust of foreigners led them to reject any foreign intervention or influence in Indochina. There were many other options that could have been taken in either of these situations, and leaders pursued the ones that were chosen in part due to cultural influences.
III. OPERATIONAL CODE

A. INTRODUCTION

Another framework of analyzing the foreign policy behavior of decision-makers is operational code analysis, pioneered by Nathan Leites in his studies of Soviet decision making during the Cold War. In his major work on Soviet behavior, The Operational Code of the Politburo, Leites explored the system of rules that govern decision making, creating an operational code for Soviet leaders that characterized their worldview and perceptions. Subsequent work has taken and extended the operational code construct to apply to decision making of actors as diverse as Bill Clinton and Shimon Peres, despite acknowledgement that operational code analysis has been underutilized. Methodological work has focused on refining the means by which researchers can assess a particular leader’s operational code, as it has been noted that Leites’ original method may have been underused because of its difficulty. Leites surveyed hundreds of documents and noted by hand important characteristics of an operational code, a task that many researchers are not willing to take on.

In his 1969 review of operational code research, Alexander George characterized operational code analysis as assessing political strategy in the rules of conduct and norms of behavior taken by leaders; in effect, identifying the spirit of a ruling class. George identified a number of fundamental beliefs held by a ruling class, organizing them as answers to sets of questions about philosophical and instrumental beliefs, with the former referring to assumptions about the fundamental nature of politics and the latter focusing

60 George, “The Operational Code,” 194.
on ends-means relationships in the context of political action.\textsuperscript{61} Consistent with the bounded rationality model for decision making, the answers to these questions represent the boundaries within which leaders make decisions, guides to refer to when seeking direction amidst uncertainty. Operational code research has been used the most with individual leaders. Although Leites’ original work considered the Politburo as a body, most of the work that followed him considers the speeches or writings of a single historical figure.

B. OPERATIONAL CODE AND STRATEGIC CULTURE IN COMPARISON

Operational code bears some similarities to strategic culture. Both methods consider the propensities of national leaders to be influenced in certain ways by a prevailing set of norms. The way in which these norms influence decision making differs between OC and SC. In operational code the influence is cognitive and is transmitted directly to decision making through a set of rules. In strategic culture the means differ, and due to the segmentation of the field into several schools of thought there is no consensus on the means by which strategic culture will influence decision making at different levels. The approach taken in the previous chapter was to take a more cognitive viewpoint and view strategic culture as filters that change how leaders think and operate, thereby changing behavior.

The advantage of operational code, when viewed in this way, is that it is relatively simpler and the literature is consistent on how operational code analysis should be conducted and used. Strategic culture literature has continual debates over methodological validity and whether the theory actually adds anything to the study of international relations. Its analytical power is less, however, than the potential of strategic culture. Strategic culture could potentially not only explain why leaders and states took certain actions, but could also predict the outcomes of future interactions on the basis of a consistent strategic culture. Compared to this, operational code is more descriptive and emphasizes the study of past leaders’ operational codes with an eye at influencing research on contemporary leaders. It is useful in analyzing the influence of events on

leaders’ perception, but its predictive power as a theory is much less robust than strategic culture. Surprisingly, there is little mention of the other theory in either of these bodies of literature.

With this in mind, the discussion of operational code in this chapter will be framed as a comparison to the results of the strategic culture analysis of last chapter. The discussion in this chapter, which will be elaborated in the following chapter, will consider how the research results are the same or different, effectively using operational code as an analytical baseline with which to compare strategic culture results. This should not imply that operational code is closer to reality than strategic culture, but that strategic culture is more prone to poor research design or bias. With a random data sample and a consistent methodology, operational code analysis should avoid those problems and it should be possible to use operational code methodology to assess broader strategic culture arguments.

C. CONDUCTIONG OPERATIONAL CODE ANALYSIS

The value of conducting operational code analysis versus strategic culture analysis is in the way that data is analyzed. While Leites accomplished this with painstaking manual analysis, modern operational code analysis relies on software packages that analyze speeches and documents of foreign leaders. The most widely used method is the Verbs-in-Context System (VICS) introduced by Walker et. al in their 1998 article assessing Jimmy Carter’s operational code. 62 VICS has been characterized as a coding scheme that is “reliable and reproducible,” and adheres to a theoretical conception that allows for “incoherence among beliefs…variation across individuals, learning (defined as change in beliefs) over time by a leader, and an idealized, “default statement of mind that defines the self-identity of the decision maker.”63

What does VICS do? It conducts a four-step analysis of sentences in a given text. It first identifies whether the subject referenced is the self or other. It then identifies the tense of the verb as past, present, or future and the category of the verb as positive or

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63 Crichlow, “Idealism or Pragmatism?,” 689.
negative, based on dictionary codings. It then identifies the domain as domestic or foreign and a target and a context for the statement. The software package then analyzes the balance between the frequencies of these categories and generates index variables.

For the purposes of this thesis, the documents described in the introduction and strategic chapter sections were prepared for analysis by VICS through the Profiler Plus software package. This software allows for aggregate analysis of a large number of data sources that yields results similar to Leites’ and George’s original theory while allowing for a much larger volume of data.

Similar to the methodology for strategic culture analysis, this thesis will present predictions for the answers to the philosophical and instrumental questions posed by George, and then compare them to the data generated by VICS. The predictions take the form of “operational code indices,” described by Walker et. al. as a method of linking the operational code construct with a meaningful index for comparison. This work considers the diagnostic and choice propensities because they best relate to the data and methodology. In effect, this thesis will provide predictions for index values based on how decision making has been characterized by prior research, and then conduct an analysis of this data set to see whether prior research has captured accurately the decision-making process.

The program computes the scores in a unique format that requires explanation. As mentioned, the major output is in the form of index variables that range from negative to positive. There are sixteen index variables divided between “philosophical” and “instrumental” beliefs, in line with George’s ten questions about operational code beliefs. Philosophical beliefs are denoted by P-x, where x represents the number of the question or variable and instrumental beliefs are denoted by I-x. Philosophical and instrumental beliefs are akin to the strategic versus the tactical realm. As the meanings of the variables could be unclear, I will provide some details about the philosophical variables followed by the instrumental variables.

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P-1 refers to the nature of the political universe and ranges from -0.75 to +0.75. The question here is whether the nature of the political universe is inherently hostile or friendly, with the lower score meaning hostile and the higher score meaning friendly. The idea of a spectrum like this suggests that leaders may not view conflict and cooperation entirely as opposites. P-2 refers to the ability of a leader to realize inherent political values, whether it is possible to accomplish goals in the international system or not and ranges from -0.75 to +0.75 with the low score meaning accomplishing goals are unlikely and vice-versa. P-3 refers to the predictability of the political system, whether it is possible to predict future events and power balances and ranges from 0.0 to 1.0 with the lower range meaning it is not possible and vice versa. P-4 refers to the extent to which human beings have control over the flow of history, in essence whether humans shape the world or whether the world shapes humans and ranges from 0.0 to 1.0 with the lower range meaning humans cannot shape the world and vice versa. P-5 refers to the extent to which chance plays a role in historical and political development and ranges from 0.0 to 1.0 with the lower range meaning chance plays little to no role.

I-1 refers to whether conflict or cooperation strategies are the best in the political universe and ranges from -0.75 to +0.75 with the lower range meaning conflict strategies are best. I-2 refers to whether conflict or cooperation tactics are the best in the political universe, which is closely related to but slightly different from I-1 and ranges from -0.75 to +0.75 with the lower range meaning conflict tactics are best. I-3 refers to a leader’s risk orientation, whether he is risk acceptant or risk averse and ranges from 0.0 to 1.0 with the lower range meaning he is risk averse. I-4a and I-4b refer to the extent to which political leaders are willing to shift between cooperation and conflict and words and deeds, meaning the ability of a leader to use flexibility in shifting between different kinds of tactics as a risk management technique. These range from 0.0 to 1.0, with the lower range meaning flexibility is very low. I-5 is separated into six index variables referring to the extent to which leaders are willing to utilize different means in a given political universe. These are fairly self-explanatory; appeal refers to the use of appeals or statements of
support, promise refers to the use of promises, threat refers to the use of threat, and so on. These range from 0.0 to 1.0, with the lower range meaning utility is very low and vice versa.

Scoring is done with indices. The indices have a low to high range and certain descriptions are attached to high versus low scores, which are logical: a low P-1 score means the leader feels the universe is definitely or somewhat hostile. Some of the variables are related – for example, I-1 and P-1 should probably follow each other, as should P-2 and I-2. The I-5 variables, the categories for the exercise of political power, should add to 1.0 or close to it, and the scores within the overall I-5 framework refer to the relationship between the categories. Put another way, an I-5 (Appeal) score that is double I-5 (Oppose/Resist) would mean the leader believes appeals are twice as useful as statements of opposition or resistance.
Some baseline scores are displayed in Table 1. These come from Walker et. al’s analysis of Jimmy Carter’s operational code, as well as from analyses of Bill Clinton and Lyndon Johnson’s codes. In their analysis, they examined his operational code in 1977–79 and 1980 and conducted statistical analysis to see whether it differed. They did find a

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Philosophical</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>P-1: What is the “essential” nature of political life? Is the political universe one of harmony or conflict?</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-2: What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one’s fundamental political values and aspirations?</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-3: Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?</td>
<td>.34</td>
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<td>.27</td>
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<tr>
<td>P-4: How much “control” or “mastery” can one have over historical development? What is one’s role in “moving” or “shaping” history in the desired direction?</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.62</td>
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<td>P-5: What is the role of “chance” in human affairs and in historical development?</td>
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<td>I-1: What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.69</td>
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<tr>
<td>I-2: How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>.55</td>
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<tr>
<td>I-3: How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.41</td>
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<tr>
<td>I-4a: Words/Deeds</td>
<td>.79</td>
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<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-4b: Conflict/Cooperation</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-5: Appeal</td>
<td>.02</td>
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<td>.69</td>
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<tr>
<td>I-5: Promise</td>
<td>.45</td>
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<td>.09</td>
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<td>I-5: Reward</td>
<td>.40</td>
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<td>.11</td>
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<td>I-5: Oppose</td>
<td>.01</td>
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<td>.12</td>
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<tr>
<td>I-5: Threat</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-5: Punish</td>
<td>.11</td>
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<td>.02</td>
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Table 1. United States Operational Code Scores

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statistically significant difference in the extent to which he found the political universe cooperative after the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets. They also found a significant decrease in optimism.\(^{67}\) This demonstrates the utility of the methodology in how it reflects a subject’s reaction to history. It also shows a possible danger in the methodology in that scores could be too responsive when considering individuals over long durations of time. As this thesis uses a fairly short period of time for both of the cases, this methodological pitfall should be avoided. Here, the scores for 1980 as presented as an example of what operational code output looks like. The authors demonstrate that Jimmy Carter’s operational code has:

Philosophical elements characterized by a cooperative view of the political universe (P-1), optimism regarding the realization of political goals (P-2), but a view of the universe (P-3) as relatively unpredictable due to its complex interdependence; therefore, even though he may have a relatively strong belief (P-4) in his ability to control historical development, he attributes a high value to the role of chance (P-5).

Carter’s general operational code should have instrumental elements characterized by a cooperative strategy (I-1) and cooperative tactical intensity (I-2), plus a risk orientation that is relatively risk averse because of the complexity of the world. He should be more acceptant of the risks of submission than deadlock because of a low propensity to shift his cooperative strategy and tactics (I-4a), though perhaps moderated by a higher propensity to shift between words and deeds (I-4b) to control against the risk of being exploited by others. As a cooperative moralist, Carter should have a propensity to use positive rather than negative sanctions as useful means (I-5) for exercising power.\(^{68}\)

These data should be considered a baseline for the analysis of Chinese and Japanese operational code to follow. It also serves as an example of how an operational code is describe in text. Estimates for Bill Clinton\(^ {69}\) and Lyndon Johnson’s\(^ {70}\) operational codes are also provided in Table 1 to serve as additional baselines and to demonstrate

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\(^{70}\) Stephen G. Walker and Mark Schafer, “The Political Universe of Lyndon B. Johnson and His Advisors: Diagnostic and Strategic Propensities in Their Operational Code,” Political Psychology 21 (2000): 529–543. Data from Table III.
how the range of different scores across U.S. leaders. Clinton’s code is incomplete, as the authors of that study focused only on the indices they deemed to be most relevant for discussion of source material bias. There are some differences among the baselines, particularly between Lyndon Johnson and Jimmy Carter who have wildly different scores for I-5 tactics.

D. CASE BASELINES

While there has not been significant work on a Japanese operational code, the operational code of the Chinese Politburo and Mao Zedong during the time period in question has enjoyed some attention. Robert North wrote a monograph on the subject as that addressed methodological concerns and suggested methods for investigating the Politburo’s operational code. He emphasized the value of aggregate data analysis. None of his conclusions, however, directly address the questions posed by George. This is reasonable given the George article codifying the operational code construct was published after the North monograph.

**Philosophical**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P-1: What is the &quot;essential&quot; nature of political life? Is the political universe one of harmony or conflict?</td>
<td>Negative (conflictual)</td>
<td>.43</td>
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<tr>
<td>P-2: What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one’s fundamental political values and aspirations?</td>
<td>Negative (pessimistic)</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-3: Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?</td>
<td>Greater than 0.50 (predictable)</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-4: How much “control” or “mastery” can one have over historical development? What is one’s role in “moving” or “shaping” history in the desired direction?</td>
<td>Greater than 0.50 (self locus of control)</td>
<td>.29</td>
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<tr>
<td>P-5: What is the role of “chance” in human affairs and in historical development?</td>
<td>Lower than 0.50 (Lower role of chance)</td>
<td>.97</td>
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**Instrumental**

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<th>Question</th>
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<th>China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I-1: What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?</td>
<td>Negative (conflictual strategy)</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-2: How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?</td>
<td>Negative (conflictual tactics)</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-3: How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?</td>
<td>Greater than 0.50 (Risk acceptant)</td>
<td>.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-4a: Words</td>
<td>Less than 0.50</td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-4b: Deeds</td>
<td>Greater than 0.50</td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-5: Appeal</td>
<td>Less than 0.50</td>
<td>.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-5: Promise</td>
<td>Less than 0.50</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-5: Reward</td>
<td>Less than 0.50</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-5: Oppose</td>
<td>Greater than 0.50</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-5: Threat</td>
<td>Greater than 0.50</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-5: Punish</td>
<td>Greater than 0.50</td>
<td>.17</td>
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</table>

Table 2. Hypothetical Operational Code Scores

1. **China**

A more recent monograph by Huiyun Feng considers the operational code of the Chinese Politburo in three historical periods: the Korean War (1950–1953), the Sino-Indian War (1962), and the Sino-Vietnamese War (1979). Feng uses the same VICS methodology but adds sources in native Chinese. Her assessment of Mao and Zhou’s operational codes can be found in Figure 2. These are mean scores for pre-war, war, and post-war periods in the Korean War. This thesis will take her results for post-war Zhou Enlai as baseline values for the evaluation of the CWIHP sources, which are largely composed on Zhou’s writing and speeches.
2. Japan

Analysis of a Japanese operational code does not exist. It will therefore be the contribution of this thesis to try to specify the elements of the operational code of the Japanese Imperial Liaison conferences, and then to understand how it differs from the code of the Chinese Politburo. In this way the Chinese operational code will be a sort of benchmark by which the Japanese code can be judged. Moreover, sound analysis of both the Chinese and Japanese operational codes allows for comparison with strategic culture conceptions of decision making, which could provide insight into the types of sources to analyze and the different conclusions that can be drawn from each.

To this end, this thesis proposes preliminary operational code scores on the basis of the literature on Japanese decision making. The scores are found in Table 2, along with Feng’s estimates for Zhou Enlai. Due to the lack of formal analysis, these predictions are general, pointing only in the general directions for each question. This hypothesis closely follows the hypothesis for Japanese strategic culture. In general, Japan found the international community to be a dangerous place with few prospects for cooperation. But Japanese leaders felt that they could have control over their future and to an extent shape the world. Finally, Japanese leaders felt that force was an acceptable and probably the best way to take political action in the international arena.

These statements may seem like sweeping generalizations, but they follow from the arguments about Japanese strategic culture. If operational code is meant to be a series of rules by which a ruling class operates within the world, it can be taken to be an extension of sorts, or a variation of the rules of, a strategic culture. In principle they have

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the same idea, but they are found in the data in different ways. Where strategic culture allows for close readings of data sources to generate a holistic view of a culture, operational code takes a broader approach that sacrifices depth for concreteness. In general, operational code results yield conceptions of decision making derived from a statistical model. A good research design is a prerequisite to interpret the results. It is more systematic than strategic culture, but depth is definitely lost.

The following section will present the results for the operational code analysis conducted on the data used in this thesis. It will discuss differences between the “experimental” results and the hypothesized operational code scores. It will then discuss some challenges in operational code analysis that may have influenced the results presented here.

E. RESULTS

Table 3 displays the results of the analysis conducted on the two bodies of texts. The data were minimally modified before processing; headings and page numbers were removed, as well as quotations from speakers not from the country in question. Other text added by editors during the translation process was also largely removed, including footnotes and descriptions in-text about context for meetings or speeches. What were left were single documents of almost purely quotations and documents from the leaders of both countries in question. The ProfilerPlus software package was able to process these documents with few errors using the operational code scheme provided by Social Science Automation. Chinese results will be discussed first, followed by the Japanese results.

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73 The term “experimental” is used loosely; this was not meant to be an actual experiment.
**Table 3.  Experimental Operational Code Scores**

1. **China**

    Chinese operational code demonstrates a *cooperative* view of the political universe (P-1), *slight optimism* regarding the realization of political goals (P-2), a view of the universe (P-3) as *unpredictable* due to its complex interdependence, a *weak* belief (P-4) in the ability of humans to control historical development, and accordingly a *high* value to the role of chance (P-5). China’s operational code should have instrumental elements characterized by a *cooperative* strategy (I-1) and *slightly cooperative* tactical intensity (I-2). Their risk orientation is *relatively risk acceptant* (I-3). Chinese leaders
have a strong propensity to shift cooperative strategies and tactics (I-4a) and a slightly weaker propensity to shift between words and deeds (I-4b). Chinese leaders definitely view appeals (I-5) as the best tactics to use, thereby signaling their attraction to cooperation.

The results for Chinese operational code show similarity to the results generated by Feng’s estimates for just Zhou Enlai. Feng’s analysis focused on just Zhou Enlai, and since Zhou and his team provided the majority of the evidence for this thesis, it is a ready opportunity to test the validity of operational analysis results. Chinese decision making in relation to the Geneva conference was somewhat predicated toward harmony and cooperation and somewhat optimistic possibilities toward realization of political values and control over historical development. Decision-makers were more willing to be flexible in terms of changing strategies with words than with deeds, with .51 for I-4a and .31 for I-4b. They also valued appeal strategies far more than any others, 3.4 times more than the next highest scoring strategy. In this respect they were closer to Jimmy Carter’s flexibility of action, but Lyndon Johnson’s overall tactics.

It is important to note that Chinese decision-makers seemed to be very moderate in their feelings. They did not have strong philosophical leanings in any direction, preferring a more balanced approach that would allow in practice for a wide variety of strategies to be pursued. In these results, Chinese decision-makers do not explicitly rule out any strategies, and while they favor some more than others, the extent to which they prefer them is only slightly more with the exception of I-5 (Appeal). However, when compared to Jimmy Carter’s operational code, who had a score of .06 for P-1, China’s .35 score is fairly strong inclination toward harmony, even higher than Bill Clinton and Lyndon Johnson, although only by a small amount.

The results of the CWIHP document set are not that different from Feng’s estimate of Zhou Enlai’s operational code. But the CWIHP results are less intensive toward the positive, indicating that the decision making body analyzed there is less concerned with a worldview of harmony (P-1), realization of aspirations (P-2), and control over history (P-4). But it is also much more concerned with cooperation strategies, as the I-1 score is almost doubled in the CWIHP results.
There are several reasons why this could be the case. First, an individual will likely have stronger feelings than a group. That is, organizational processes can serve to filter more radical views held by individuals such that the group view and policy is moderated. While the documents themselves were individually produced, when analyzed all together they should be considered as a product of an organization and a process. Since the CWIHP sample contains speeches and statements by actors other than just Zhou Enlai, it is possible that this expanded sample could lead to somewhat different results simply because the sample of decision-makers is larger. Second, the CWIHP sample deals exclusively with a tense strategic situation over the course of a few weeks, rather than Feng’s analysis that took place over a longer period of time. In a short period of time, the memory effects of recent history could be intensified. In the Chinese case, decision-makers should have recalled strongly the failures of aggressive strategy during the Korean War and would have been more amenable to cooperation opportunities.

It would also be interesting to consider why I-5 (Appeal) shows so strongly in this sample. This score indicates that a cooperative strategy of appealing with words to an opponent is favored much more strongly than anything else. It is possible this is the case because the document sample is drawn from a conference centered around diplomacy, where such appeals to both friends and adversaries would be natural. The above note about waning Chinese power in this period could be important as well. Appeals would be among the cooperation strategies Chinese leaders would pursue if they felt weak. Finally, several of the documents are outward facing or describe outward facing events. Put another way, since several of the documents relate to interactions with the outside world, where Chinese diplomats would probably engage in behavior that looks like appeal to the outside, but was not actually meant to be. Outward facing events are probably more likely to have elements of an appeal strategy, and that is a possible reason for why this score is so high.

2. Japan

Japanese operational code demonstrates a cooperative view of the political universe (P-1), very slight optimism regarding the realization of political goals (P-2), a
view of the universe (P-3) as *unpredictable* due to its complex interdependence, a *weak* belief (P-4) in the ability of humans to control historical development, and accordingly a *high* value to the role of chance (P-5). Japan’s operational code should have instrumental elements characterized by a *cooperative* strategy (I-1) and *slightly cooperative* tactical intensity (I-2). Their risk orientation is *very risk acceptant* (I-3). Japanese leaders have a strong propensity to shift cooperative strategies and tactics (I-4a) and a strong propensity to shift between words and deeds (I-4b). Japanese leaders view appeals (I-5) as the best tactics to use, thereby signaling their attraction to cooperation.

In contrast to the Chinese results, the Japanese results are widely different from what would be predicted by strategic culture. The examination of liaison meeting transcripts from a strategic culture perspective yielded a Japanese operational code that was anti-cooperation, in control of its destiny, and that favored aggression rather than cooperation or peaceful means. This conception comes from the overwhelming drive toward war the Japanese government demonstrated during the summer of 1941 despite failed efforts at diplomacy or compromise. The actual demonstrated operational code shows a conflicted group of leaders in many ways straddling the border between conflict and cooperation; rather than being averse to cooperation and harmony in world politics, Japanese leaders seem to be somewhat inclined toward it, and particularly inclined toward cooperative strategies and the meaning of language. It actually seems that the Japanese operational code is similar to the Chinese operational code and that both are different from Jimmy Carter’s. This would indicate a different worldview from Jimmy Carter’s, which emphasizes fence-sitting rather than strong principled stances.

Why would an operational code assessment of the same documents yield nearly the opposite results to a strategic culture analysis? The biggest reason may be the nature of strategic culture analysis. Strategic culture analysis involves identifying quotes that are illustrative of a state’s strategic culture out of a random sample, with a risk of misinterpreting evidence and discounting pieces that do not fit the analyst’s version of a country’s strategic culture. This version of operational code analysis, which uses a software package to analyze all of the evidence in a given body of data, could yield different results because it incorporates a larger body of evidence. At a conceptual level,
it could also be that operational code and strategic culture characterize the same decision-making style but in different forms. This concept will be discussed in the following chapter.

That does not answer the question of whether it would be possible for Japanese decision making to have actually exhibited these characteristics. It is strange that the Japanese scores would be so close to Chinese scores, and in particular demonstrate proclivity to cooperation. An answer could lie in the nature of Japanese decision making, in that it was relatively centralized and the opinions of all the actors were not always taken into account. Japanese leaders often talked about diplomacy and reconciliation with the United States and the other major powers, but yet still prepared for war. Due to the pushing of key attendees in the liaison conferences, such as Tojo Hideki and the various military liaison officers, Japan ultimately still went to war. Therefore, what would be exhibited in the data is a group of decision-makers striving for peace, but other pressures would prevent that from showing up in the actual historical record.

Something interesting in both the Chinese and Japanese results is a high propensity of believing in the importance of chance. For both China and Japan the results are close to 1.0, nearly the maximum. This seems unusually high, even given Feng’s high results. Compared to Jimmy Carter’s P-5 score, 0.74, values so close to 1.0 are unusual. This could be indicative of an error in data coding or in the analytical scheme. It seems wise to take this figure with skepticism.

F. ANALYSIS

This chapter has considered operational code methodology and its application to Japanese and Chinese decision making. It described the methodology used, provided preliminary operational code scores for both cases, and then conducted operational code analysis on the two sets of documents used in this thesis. The Chinese data was consistent with past research, but the Japanese data was highly inconsistent. Possible reasons were explored and will be elaborated on in the following chapter.

The central questions this thesis is meant to answer are all addressed by operational code analysis. Operational code analysis does give a clearer understanding of
Japanese and Chinese decision making; it takes primary source material and turns it into good evidence for further discussion. It also shows how Japan and China differ and how operational code and strategic culture differ, things that will be discussed in the following chapter. Future research on Japanese and Chinese operational code could use primary source material in the original languages to be more accurate, as well as utilize some of the more advanced coding techniques available in the software but not used in this thesis.
IV. ANALYSIS

A. INTRODUCTION

The prior analysis of Japanese and Chinese decision making has revealed several important results about the nature of the decision-making process and strategic mindset in a way that has not been done before. This chapter will interpret those results to paint a clearer portrait of decision making that ties together the two lenses of analyses and shows how they complement one another. It will also discuss challenges faced by using this methodology and possible ways to improve upon it. To accomplish this, this chapter is divided into five sections: first, an analysis of how strategic culture and operational differ and how they are complementary with respect to analyzing decision making; second, a general description of the Japanese decision-making process synthesizing the viewpoints of strategic culture and operational code; third, a general description of the Chinese decision-making process doing the same thing; fourth, a comparison of Japanese and Chinese decision making; and fifth, an assessment of strategic culture and operational code compared to realism.

B. STRATEGIC CULTURE AND OPERATIONAL CODE IN COMPARISON

These analytical methods illuminate different aspects of Chinese and Japanese decision making, and it is worthwhile to consider the relative strengths and weaknesses of each, where they overlap, and the best ways for them to be combined to illuminate different aspects of decision making most effectively.

Strategic culture theory’s major strength is in its ability to take the long view and consider how decision making may be affected by history. In these cases it was particularly evident in how strategic culture theory was able to demonstrate how the Chinese historical experience affected Zhou Enlai’s approach to strategy at Geneva, or how a culture of militarism and a hierarchical authority structure in Japan contributed to war-mongers taking power. Strategic culture’s emphasis on socio-cultural factors is important, as no other method of analysis incorporates such factors in such a way. Many
standard international relations theories, such as realism or liberalism, place less importance on culture and history, preferring instead to make broader or more parsimonious assumptions on what drives behavior. Methods that do include cultural factors, such as constructivism, do not emphasize analysis of social, economic, or political structures in society or aspects of geography and natural resources that strategic culture claims to shape the innate nature of a society.

Strategic culture, however, has weaknesses as well. One weakness of strategic culture is that it is often difficult to determine what exactly “counts” as strategic culture. What could be interpreted as strategic culture by one person could be interpreted as behavior driven by realism by another. This does not negate the value of strategic culture; it just makes it more difficult to argue about it relative to other theories of international relations. Another weakness is that it can be construed as giving just broad generalizations without much actual substance. China can be argued to be wary of foreigners, but what state is not? Both of these weaknesses hinge upon the fact that strategic culture interpretation is just that—interpretation. Without a frame of reference, which often is not provided, it can be difficult to understand why one researcher interprets data in one way or another.

Operational code analysis is important in the way it uses linguistics to understand behavior. As mentioned, it differs from strategic culture by analyzing an entire data sample without the possibility of leaving anything out. It is more systematic, but it sacrifices breadth for depth; it is impossible to do close readings of data samples with operational code analysis, which relies on quantitative analysis based on linguistic data. The main issue with operational code analysis is that it is reflective of the data sample used for analysis, and if the data is chosen incorrectly there could be wildly different results across analyses. A leader that feels a certain way could have a totally different feeling following a major event, leading to a reversal in operational code scores. Therefore, it seems to be most useful for time-series analysis of the extent to which leaders changed over their tenure or to tightly focused time periods where there should not be significant change.
This variability is a weakness in analysis, as choosing the wrong time period could yield nearly useless results. However, when conducted correctly, analysis should highlight not only how much scores change over time, but also why. Relating the changing scores back to the nature of shocks would demonstrate what elements of such changes are more influential, allowing for greater predictive capacity of how shocks should affect leaders of the same traits in the future.

When viewed in this way, with operational code assessing the short-term and strategic culture assessing the long-term, in a way it is possible for operational code to validate some of the results of strategic culture. Put another way, operational code acts as a check for some of the conclusions drawn by strategic culture and serves to show irregularities in the results. Operational code and strategic culture analysis should generate similar outcomes, and as they both rely on a methodology of examining similar cultural norms and patterns of behavior. If they were to differ significantly it would be cause for concern and would need to be explained. The approach taken in the rest of this chapter is to consider a broad conception of decision making for the Chinese and Japanese cases and then to consider the relationship between strategic culture and operational code within them.

C. CONCEPTION OF JAPANESE DECISION MAKING

This section will summarize and analyze the results of the analysis of Japanese decision making conducted through the lenses of strategic culture and operational code analysis. Strategic culture analysis is in line with prior results, which is due in part to the fact that the data used for this thesis was probably used for prior strategic culture analysis of Japanese decision making. Operational code analysis of the same documents shows almost the exact opposite results. It is necessary to reconcile these results before arriving at an overall picture of decision making.

To recap the results from the analysis, strategic culture analysis demonstrated that Japanese decision making exhibits three characteristics: reticence to act and unwillingness to accept negative data, a disposition toward favoring militarism to solve problems, and deference toward superiors sometimes leading to personalities dominating
discussions rather than facts. This is consistent across all of the Japanese documents examined and is supported by past research, and it seems to be a strong result. A picture of Japanese decision making painted just by the strategic culture lens would show an insular culture, focused on tradition and devoted to preserving its own culture and willing to take all steps necessary to ensure its dominance on the world stage. A strong military tradition running through Japanese culture, supplemented by state efforts to keep it alive, led to the pushes for militarism shown in the documents.

Operational code analysis emphasized/called our attention different patterns of behaviors. Rather than an insular group of leaders, operational code analysis demonstrated a conflict group of leaders more interested in cooperation than one would originally think. Japanese leaders held a relatively harmonious view of the international system, with relatively high prospects for realization of goals through peaceful means. They believed in cooperative strategies like appeals to adversaries, and on a whole they valued the meaning of words more than deeds. If viewed without context, this picture of decision making shows a leadership group that is open to negotiation, interested in peace, and seeking cooperative ventures in the international community. In some ways, it is very different from the picture painted by the strategic culture approach.

These two results need not preclude one another. Rather, these two approaches could illuminate difference aspects of the same overall decision-making model. Japanese decision making could be at once insular and militaristic, while at the same time open to the world and interested in cooperation. While the results do seem to be opposite, it is possible to look at moments in time when Japanese leaders were militaristic, such as when Foreign Minister Matsuoka pushed for war with the Soviet Union, as well as times when they were open to negotiation, such as the continued push for stabilization talks with the United States.

There are several reasons why both of these realities exist in one set of documents. First, there was a Cabinet change during the period the sources cover. As some Cabinet ministers changed, the balance of power within the liaison conferences changed, as well as the priority of topics they covered. With Matsuoka’s departure, a drive toward war with the Soviet Union was less prevalent, although a drive for war with
the United States and United Kingdom became an overriding agenda item. This change in ministers was reflected in the documents with relatively more discussion about diplomacy after Matsuoka’s departure.

Second, the selection of sources could play a role. These meetings were held during a time when the Japanese army was engaging in military operations in China. The “China Incident,” as it was called, was yet to be resolved after four years of open warfare with Chinese factions. While leadership attention was directed toward more imminent threats as the summer went on, at the beginning of the summer of 1941, Japanese leaders still sometimes discussed Chinese operations. In the operational code analysis, this would show up as a propensity toward conflict, but this effect drops off after the summer began and negotiations with other actors started in earnest.

Third, Japanese leaders were risk averse and pursued both military and diplomatic tracks as a hedging strategy. Japanese leaders wanted stability above all as Japan faced economic challenges. This disparity in results is possible because while Japanese leaders discussed military action often in their meetings, they discussed diplomatic talks with all manner of actors on a regular basis. They discussed relations with Germany, the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands while talking about a military option as a last resort. Reading the documents in a certain way could even convince a reader that Japanese leaders preferred negotiations first and only went to war when their hand was forced.

Fourth, there is a limited extent to which the liaison conferences would discuss operational or strategic aspects of conflict and military operations. While the liaison conferences laid down policy guidance to military leaders, it was the responsibility of the Imperial General Headquarters to develop operational plans. It is possible that a military option was always something that weighed heavy in the minds of Japanese leaders, and thus it did not need to be discussed in open meetings, where time could be better spent discussion diplomatic strategies that could avert war and still achieve Japanese ends. It is also possible that much discussion of military options were held outside of formal meetings, and therefore out of the scope of these sources. It may not have been politically
palatable to discuss the prospects for war in these meetings, leading ministers to develop plans independently and present them to the body only when it was absolutely necessary.

These factors probably contributed to making Japanese decision making appear two-faced when viewed through different lenses. What was the “actual” way Japanese leaders thought and made decisions? As I have hinted, it is probably a hybrid of both of these approaches. Japanese leaders did not wish for war, but they also recognized the need for Japan to become a great power to fuel its economy. Japanese thinking favored war as a baseline option for foreign interaction, but they repeatedly recognized that they probably could not defeat the industrial might of the United States and the United Kingdom in prolonged conflict. They probably thought of the world as a dangerous place, or else they would not have made such elaborate preparations for war, but they thought that cooperation could save the day, or else they would not have tried such extensive diplomatic campaigns. While this may seem like a paradox, it is a strategically-wise approach: prepare for war but try to achieve peace. Whether this approach led the Japanese down a path toward war that they could not remove themselves from is a question for future research work.

A composite view of decision making that integrates elements from both theories is desirable. However, it is difficult to create such composite looks consistently, as there is no exact formula for picking and choosing the best aspects of theory and throwing away the rest. Still, there is value from drawing from different theories in trying to explain decision making, and an attempt at moving toward a comprehensive view is worth considering, which follows. When presented with a problem, Japanese leaders would deliberate it to a certain extent, but leave much of the planning and policy analysis to middle-ranking officials. They would then come together in liaison conferences to discuss research conducted or steps taken to address problems. As a body they would discuss problems with an eye at compelling other ministers to act in certain ways. They would then take a policy document developed by consensus to the Emperor, who would give an official assent to whatever policy was in question. While this process was happening, various bureaucratic actors in the government were in action, and the process
as a whole was shaped by elements of Japanese strategic culture and operational code that led leaders to consider seriously war against the world’s major powers in the name of power and stability.

D. CONCEPTION OF CHINESE DECISION MAKING

This section will summarize and analyze the results of the analysis of Chinese decision making conducted through the lenses of strategic culture and operational code analysis. Both strategic culture and operational code analysis yield results similar to prior research. This is a sign that the analytical model used in this thesis is robust and could help to confirm the results for both Chinese and Japanese decision making. However, there are some differences in how operational code and strategic culture portray decision making that will be explored in this section. A synthesis of the strategic culture and operational code lenses yields a view of Chinese decision making that is distrustful out of the outside world but cognizant of China’s relative weakness and need for cooperation to avoid more destructive conflict.

The strategic culture analysis focused on two aspects of decision making that were driven by cultural characteristics: perceptions of national security interests and perceptions of foreigners. That is, national security interests were driven by an insistence of border security and national autonomy, and Chinese leaders were strongly distrustful of foreigners and suffered from general xenophobia. A close reading of documents from the Geneva Conference showed evidence for uniquely Chinese perceptions of both of these things, with nearly half of the documents containing supporting evidence.

As a proxy for a Chinese operational code, this thesis used an estimate of Zhou Enlai’s operational code from past research. The operational code analysis conducted on the Geneva documents shows that the operational code in effect at Geneva was similar to Zhou Enlai’s postwar code. There is slight disposition toward harmony, predictability, and cooperation. The fact that it mostly parallels Zhou Enlai’s code is due to the fact that the majority of the documents considered were penned by Zhou himself, but the fact that the results persisted even with the influence of other actors speaks to the relative validity of this methodology.
In some respects, this demonstrates that Chinese decision making, in some respects, also had two faces to it. It had the overtly anti-cooperation worldview coming from a period of humiliation by western powers, but it also had a somewhat optimistic outlook and willingness to cooperate with the west. This is with the caveat that this measures only the feeling of leaders and not necessarily how they will always act in reality; discussion does not always translate to action. This caveat holds true for all operational code results. This composite view of Chinese decision making shows that leaders, when presented with a problem, at first viewed it with caution and distrust of outside interference. Leaders then deliberated the issue and as a united front presented their findings, incorporating a more realistic worldview due to constraints on resources. Their worldview was shaped by history and culture, which was then manifest in the statements made to foreign actors and the kinds of actions undertaken. It was a centralized decision-making process that, from the outside, appeared to show unity throughout the process. There does not seem to be evidence that the foreign ministry, acting under Zhou Enlai, did anything that would run counter to Beijing’s wishes.

The main contribution of this thesis, therefore, is to show how strategic culture and operational code influenced the decision-making process. In other words, in the absence of these factors, Chinese decision making could have taken a different direction from what actually happened. If Chinese leaders were not distrustful of the United States and the other western powers at Geneva, it is possible to imagine that negotiations would have been much shorter and that China would have been more willing to allow for western involvement in repatriation and stability operations in Indochina. Further, if there were less of a concern about border integrity and the dangers of becoming surrounded in a dangerous world, it is possible that Chinese involvement in Korea could have been minimized. It is hard to say whether these trends still persist in Chinese decision making. From the movements China has made over the last decade to assert its power over the South China Sea, as well as with its expanding economic influence, beliefs such as a distrust of foreigners or a fear of invasion are consistent with the
Chinese pattern of behavior. If these two factors, among others, do persist, they should be factored into account when making strategy and policy assessments about the rise of China.

What is not seen to a great extent in these documents is a concern with Communist ideology and the people’s war. There are a few quotes that point to this belief in Zhou Enlai’s speeches, such as in Document #16, a telegram from Zhou Enlai to the Central Committee. Zhou noted that during discussion about Indochina, he rebutted a point made by the United States with the following:

We absolutely cannot agree to this point. Pham Van Dong, Molotov, and I all spoke to rebut this point, pointing out that the armed struggle for national liberation by the Cambodian and Laotian people was caused by the military intervention of France. The resistance governments in Cambodia and Laos have their own troops. Therefore an armistice means that a ceasefire should occur on the territory of their own motherlands.

Zhou’s commitment to the ideals of revolutionary struggle is exhibited here in his support for revolutionary forces. His referencing of motherlands and national liberation in opposition to foreign military intervention is an example of a reference to an ideology coming from Chinese history and culture. Moreover, Zhou’s usage of this language not only in public communication but also in private underscores his commitment to these ideals.

Other than that, however, in neither internal nor external communications is ideology referenced. This is strange given the extent to which Mao was able to shape the thought of Chinese leaders and the Chinese people with his philosophy, and the fact that the Chinese Communist Party has historically been prone to using ideology and propaganda to support its aims. It is especially strange given that many of these documents were outward-facing with prime opportunities for Zhou or other Chinese diplomats to propagate Maoist thought. It is possible that Zhou realized that foreign leaders would probably be less susceptible to such rhetoric and changed his tone of negotiation accordingly, but there probably should be some examples in internal communications and there is not. The real influence of ideology on Chinese communist thinking is a research topic that could be more fully explored.
E. COMPARING JAPANESE AND CHINESE DECISION MAKING

This section examines the relationship between Chinese and Japanese decision making. As mentioned in Chapter One, these two cases are interesting to compare for several reasons. Both involve states in difficult strategic situations facing opposition to their goals from powerful actors in the international community. Both China and Japan had authoritarian, relatively centralized governments with unprecedented control over political decisions, as well as the ability to shape and mobilize a society. They both faced the United States and United Kingdom as their principal adversaries, and the majority of the diplomatic maneuvering involved how to deal with them. Their decision-making processes were also similar; both states utilized a centralized process oriented around an appointed cabinet that made sweeping policy decisions. Both states also had fairly similar historical experiences – both had recently experienced military successes in recent memory, although the Chinese experience was far more destructive to the government and society. While the timing of the cases differs, the strategic situation and decision-making processes are similar enough for comparison. What also differs is the ideology and culture that influence both states. It would be interesting to think about whether differences in decision making could be attributed to cultural or ideological factors.

From what can be discerned from the Chinese data, it is interesting to note that when compared to the Japanese case, decisions seemed to be more easily communicated to field professionals and then executed in a manner the central government wanted. When Zhou Enlai received policy guidance from the Politburo about how to proceed at Geneva, he followed his orders and kept diversions to a minimum. On the other hand, Japanese ministers were less willing to keep to such a path. This is evidenced by Foreign Minister Matsuoka’s drive for war with the Soviet Union and even being willing to consider a non-aggression pact with the United States and even directing the ambassador in Washington to move in that path over the concerns of all other the other ministers at the liaison conference. This can be explained by cultural characteristics; the Japanese government did not operate under a cult of personality to the same extent as the Chinese government under Mao. While the Japanese Emperor was nominally worshipped by all ministers, the extent to which he had policy guidance and the loyalty of ministers like
Mao did is unclear and likely far less than in China. For this reason, ministers could have been more willing to take independent action that they felt would benefit Japan rather than toe the party line at all instances. Infighting in the liaison conferences was common, and if transcripts of Chinese Politburo meetings are ever published it would be interesting to see whether they are equally as contentious. Whether or not they are, the net effect was greater political control in the Chinese government and relatively less in the Japanese government.

Why does it appear in the operational code scoring that Japanese decision making is less prone to cooperation than Chinese? On the basis of the estimate scores, there is a significant difference between how Japanese and Chinese leaders feel. This could be attributed to several factors, with strategic culture possibly providing a good answer. The ideology of the Communist Chinese government after its consolidation of power over mainland China was to spread Maoist ideology throughout the world. Taking after the Soviet model of supporting fledgling states and gradually influencing domestic politics wherever they operated. Chinese support in Korea and Indochina is a good example of this, as the Chinese government provided men and materiel for combat operations in return for relative political loyalty. Due to this, Chinese leaders would view more opportunities for cooperation than Japanese leaders. Japanese ideology taught Japanese superiority over the rest of the world; there was no moral desire to spread the Japanese way of life or system to other places. Rather, Japanese leaders wanted to use those other places simply as tools to prop the Japanese domestic political and economic system. Without a real desire to spread Japanese values elsewhere, leaders probably would have regarded fewer interactions as cooperation opportunities, as they would evaluate other actors are prizes to be seized rather than partners with which to work.

A final example shows the extent to which different cultural characteristics played a role in influencing decision making. This is shown in how the different leadership teams acted as teams in their discussions and operations. On the basis of the evidence presented, it seems that Chinese leadership was better able to work as a team when compared to Japanese leadership. In this respect, Chinese leadership did not have as much visible infighting as did Japanese leaders, leading to somewhat negative
outcomes on the Japanese side. This is well-described above with the discussion of Zhou Enlai’s ability to toe the party line during Geneva. It is also seen in how Zhou’s team was consistent in its messaging to the French, such as when a French official asked one of Zhou’s aides why Zhou had not taken vacation time, and the aide replied with an admonishment about the importance of working hard. This is strange given that Japanese strategic culture theory predicts that Japanese leaders would be subservient to superiors.

At the ministerial level, it is possible that no one viewed each other as superiors, and all as equals. At the same level, perhaps Japanese leaders felt that it was important to compete amongst themselves to show good performance. Chinese leaders, who were united by a cult of personality and common ideology, did not face the same pressure.

F. THE CONTRAST WITH REALISM

One of the central questions raised by this discussion is whether or not strategic culture and operational code add anything to study of strategic thinking that is not already understood by realism. Put another way, is it worth it to use these methodologies, or is a more parsimonious solution like realist thinking, which emphasizes the desire to acquire power, the most useful for thinking about behavior.

With this in mind, what is the value of strategic culture for cases where it is hard to distinguish the effects? It is useful in these cases for understanding tactics—while realism can say much about the overall strategic direction of a state, strategic culture helps to shed light on elements of the tactics used to implement the strategy. For example, the Japanese push to control mainland China from 1937 onward is puzzling from a strategic perspective. By the mid-1940s the Japanese government already controlled resource-rich Manchuria, which by that point was not fully developed for economic exploitation. Why would Japan support further military action in China if its goal was to become a dominant force in Asia? From a strategic perspective, the remainder of mainland China probably has little to offer the economic, political, or military structures that would feed off any value extracted. Trying to take and hold such a large land area would have been difficult under the best of circumstances, and with
threats of conflict with the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom it seems irrational from a realist perspective to try for military solutions in China.

The strategic culture perspective would point to the culture of militarism within the Japanese government, a lack of willingness by leaders to accept difficult facts, and a sense of unity within the government all contributed to military expansion in China. Militarism made both military and political leaders amenable to conquest as an option to support hegemonic aspirations. A lack of unwillingness to accept negative data would blind leaders into thinking that actions could be successful. Unity within government meant that once the Emperor nominally approved troop movements in China, the remainder of the government was obliged to toe the line. Elements of strategic culture help explain strange tactics that when viewed rationally did not support broader strategic aims.

From the Chinese case, from a realist perspective it may not have been rational for China to be so concerned about military action by foreign forces in countries around it. The Korean War was a warning to Chinese leaders that the western powers desired influence in Asia and could inflict serious harm to Chinese interests, but it also showed that no western powers had the military capability to seriously harm China in conventional warfare. A realist would be concerned about military buildups near borders, but it seems unlikely that a realist would be as worried about the influence of the United States as much as Zhou Enlai did at Geneva.

The strategic culture perspective would consider China’s history of foreign invasions, particularly with Japan, and a cautiousness toward foreigners as reasons for why Zhou behaved in this way. While foreign militaries did not pose an existential threat to China, they could still do serious harm to Chinese society, as the Japanese invasions showed. The strategic culture approach does not entirely explain why leaders and states acted in the way they did, but it adds to understanding of interactions by showing perspectives that are missed by realism, adding context to complex issues.

The operational code approach offers fine-grained analysis of how leaders thought. Realism provides an overarching view of state desires. Operational code provides a perspective on decision making that could be missed by realism—a
perspective on the rationale behind why leaders make decisions that goes beyond structural statements. The ability to identify that leaders were more open to cooperation relative to each other or were more flexible in changing their tactics adds value to analysis of events. Realism could explain why, but it does not always explain how.

For example, the operational code perspective could partially explain why the Japanese government debated diplomatic action toward the United States and other Allies even while it prepared for war. The scores from analysis of Japanese documents showed that Japanese leaders viewed the natural state of the world as closer to harmony than conflict with scores similar to Bill Clinton and Lyndon Johnson, but that they were highly willing to change tactics from cooperative to conflictual. This willingness to shift priorities tactics, greater than the Chinese scores or Lyndon Johnson’s, implies that the Japanese were willing to pursue a hedging strategy involving diplomatic action and then return to conflictual strategies for longer than leadership groups with lower scores. This helps to explain the length of the pursuit of diplomacy, as well as its discussion in Japanese leadership meetings, which realism does not do as good of a job at discussing.

Therefore, the value of strategic culture and operational code analysis is primarily in understanding in better detail the complexities of strategic interactions and how they affect the paths that states choose. In some instances, it could even be possible to use strategic culture analysis to understand aims of states beyond acquiring security or power; understanding intermediate steps to achieve those ends could be as valuable as understanding the ends themselves. Why did the Japanese use China as a stepping stone to greatness? Such a question could be answered with a realist argument, but the understanding of why and how they did so is greatly enriched with analysis by strategic culture and operational code analysis.

From this perspective, strategic culture, operational code, and similar methods of analysis are not mutually exclusive from realism. Rather than being viewed as in opposition to realist ideas, it could be better to think of them as complementary to each other and to realism more generally. Although they may not hold primacy in predicting state behavior, they help greatly to understand state behavior, which is needed in the study of international relations as much as predictions.
V. CONCLUSION

A. SUMMARY

This thesis has examined Japanese and Chinese decision making through perspectives. By way of strategic culture and operational code analysis, it has considered aspects of decision making related to a specific historical event for each case. This thesis has shown that a holistic approach to decision making that uses elements of both lenses adds value that studies conducted focusing on just one cannot. It has also shown that research on Japanese and Chinese decision making could be improved by such this methodology, as this thesis produced somewhat different results from the literature. This chapter will summarize the contributions of this thesis, comment on the state of decision-making research more generally, and then discuss potential for future research in decision making as well as in Japanese and Chinese research. It will also relate the contributions of this thesis to the current strategic situation and discuss lessons learned that could be applied to United States interactions with Japan and China.

B. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS THESIS

This thesis makes several contributions to the study of Chinese and Japanese decision making. Some are country-specific, while others apply to the study of strategic decision making generally. First, Japanese decision making was highly influenced by a cabinet-style decision-making structure that encouraged decentralization and independent action. While the structure itself was hierarchical, driven by the prime minister and emperor, and was highly subject to militaristic tendencies. Prior analyses of decision making did not consider the importance of the cabinet structure in enabling individual ministers to take action on their own and thus drive decision making in a certain direction. In a past study, Snyder considered the reasons for Japanese overexpansion, concluding that it was caused by strategic myths, an irrational strategic gamble, domestic
institutions dominated by the military, and a cartelized political system. Apart from these factors, this thesis adds analysis of decision-making units and considers the way in which domestic institutions were dominated by civilian leaders with militarist bents, which Synder does not emphasize as much. It also argues against the idea of a cartelized, centralized decision-making system.

Past work has also neglected a quantitative approach that this thesis provided, considering the body of discussions had by Japanese leaders in a way that captured all of what they were thinking, not just focusing on important things they said. This led to the conclusion that Japanese decision making, while militaristic, was not as warlike as past research has suggested. The reason Japan went to war is possibly due to the structure of its decision-making process leaving it little other options. Put another way, when considering the social and organizational factors, it is not unreasonable to think that the Japanese were rational to declare war, and it is not surprising that they did so.

For Chinese decision making, prior analyses have focused on the dominance of Mao Zedong in shaping Chinese thought. This study showed that while Mao possibly set the tone for Chinese politics, it was clearly a team process that operated through deliberations that set policy to be carried out to the letter by those in the field. This study showed the challenges posed by the strategic culture approach, ultimately concluding that Chinese decision making did not show appreciable elements of strategic culture as posed by the existing literature, although elements of the operational code still persist. Despite the fact that strategic culture elements were not demonstrated, this thesis still showed the extent to which Chinese leaders thought in terms of their history and culture when thinking about strategic issues. Finally, this thesis showed that Chinese leaders, despite their hesitance and caution toward foreigners, were remarkably willing to engage in cooperative action when it was necessary.

The results of this thesis can also be applied to some elements of decision making in general. It shows that cultural characteristics, in general, play a large role in the ways leaders think and make decisions. While structural factors, like the balance of power in

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the international system or the amount of military power a state may possess, are important, the way they are translated into action is through the lens of culture. Culture will filter the data that leaders pay attention to and make some things appear to be more important than others; while a great deal of data may be available to leaders, they decide what to use to justify their decisions due to cultural characteristics.

C. CHALLENGES FACED BY THIS THESIS

While this research methodology has yielded results that provide for a much clearer characterization of Chinese and Japanese decision making, there are specific challenges with each of the lenses that bear comment for future improvement. Overall, the study of strategic decision making is hampered by the prevalence of institutional firewalls that prevent the sharing of information and methodology between and within disciplines. While political science research has made great strides in incorporating knowledge from other disciplines, a truly interdisciplinary approach remains elusive. The development of such a research design would greatly aid in understanding challenging strategic questions.

Strategic culture theory, as mentioned in Chapters I and II, has exhibited significant evolution in the last two decades. But there remain some challenges in “operationalizing” this set of ideas. In particular, it is often difficult to demonstrate what is and is not strategic culture. Without overt references to elements of Chinese or Japanese history or philosophy, it is difficult to argue that any individual tendency or trait is indicative of a broader strategic culture. Leaders may act cautiously just as a matter of course, not because of some desire stemming from thousands of years of history. This problem is difficult to resolve, as it limits the illuminating power of the model if only the most obvious evidence is included.

Quantitative research can be a useful tool for assessing strategic culture. When combined with the concrete criteria mentioned above and a large volume of data, statistical methods could be useful in analyzing the influence of strategic culture. One could imagine a series of regressions that take into account other factors that could have
influenced decision making. But, as mentioned, this should not be undertaken without a firm research design that accurately captures the impact of strategic culture.

The operational code analysis methodology suffers from concerns of a different nature. The first issue is the nature of sources used in this thesis: neither the Japanese nor Chinese documents speak with a unified voice. Put another way, operational code methodology in the past has been most often applied to individuals, considering the public statements and writings of a single person to determine their own operational code. Leites’ original work on operational code, of course, focused on the Soviet Politburo, but most of the subsequent work has involved individuals. In theory, this should not create major problems. Instead of determining the operational code of a single person, it would look at the code of a ruling body, in line with Leites’ original methodology.

The problem with this set of data, at least for the Chinese case, is that it does not examine an entire body of people. For the Chinese case, it focuses mostly on Zhou Enlai, with assorted statements from other members of the Chinese delegation and some policy guidance from Beijing. But this study cannot be claimed to be an example of decision making representative of the Politburo as a whole. In this thesis it was considered as decision making of the Chinese government at the Geneva Conference, which is probably the most accurate description of how operational code analysis was used. This concern should not affect the outcomes in a meaningful way, but they should be interpreted with this in mind.

The use of computer software to conduct this analysis is another concern; if the actual tool used for analysis is not well understood by the researcher, the results could be easily misinterpreted. This is a common problem among regression analysis—statistical software packages have made it easier than ever to utilize complex regressions in academic research, leading to regressions being found in many disciplines where it was never used before. Often, this sort of research suffers from fundamental flaws due to poor research design. The same could be true of the usage of operational code software here.
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR DECISION MAKING RESEARCH

There are some implications for decision-making research in general that come from this analysis. Decision-making analysis involving traditional methods goes far to explain how people think and how they make decisions. However, a criticism of this research could be the argument that it is impossible to ever capture the entirety of what leaders think and that any results only represent broad approximations of reality. While all research is like to this to some extent, an attempt to draw a general picture, when it comes to analyzing human beings it could be more difficult because of how complex individuals are. To make a representation of an individual’s thinking less approximate and more concrete, it would be necessary to know many facts about his childhood, education, family, and what other factors influence his life not just directly, but also indirectly.

This is relatively easy to do with individuals, but it is rarely individuals who make decisions that change history. They almost always work as part of a larger team and make decisions incorporating their ideas. Whether an individual is a dictator or a member of an elected cabinet, he will not be able to take unilateral action; he will always be subject to the abilities and thinking of the collective to accomplish goals. In this line of thinking, the individual is less important as a decision-maker, because while one person can have a large influence on a body, it still takes a collective to make a final decision.

What relation does this viewpoint have with decision-making analysis? It validates research methods that emphasize the importance of understanding groups. Applying strategic culture and operational code analysis to a larger group makes sense in this mindset, it is the group that decides. While Leites’ original work on operational code was done with the Soviet Politburo as a group in mind, most of the subsequent research in that field has been in looking at individuals. While that is interesting and provides some insights into why certain decisions were made, it is difficult to argue that those studies accurately capture decision-making styles or processes.

There is room for another way of thinking about decision making: decision making as expressed through organizations. Organizations are the entities that provide structure to our lives; they shape the way information is processed and how leaders have
access to both information and decision structures. Culture exists in society, but it is organizations that translate culture into something tangible with which leaders interact, serving at the same time as manifestations of culture by their very structure and transmitting cultural values both within and without.

Given the importance of organizations in determining how leaders make decisions, it is surprising that organization science has not enjoyed larger prominence in decision-making research. A possible way to improve the study of decision making could be to begin incorporating such ideas. One way of doing that is by thinking about the Garbage Can Model. The GCM, first articulated by Cohen et al. in 1972, is a model of organizational decision making that considers decision making in the context of an organized anarchy.75 From this point of view, organizations are collections of ideas looking for problems, issues and feelings looking for decision situations, solutions looking for issues, and decision-makers looking for work.

E. POSSIBILITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Within the framework of strategic culture and operational code analysis there are many directions this research could be extended aside from simply incorporating lessons from other disciplines. Other than organization science, decision-making research could draw from elements of psychology and sociology research to understand the underlying cognitive processes that drive behavior. This is in line with the idea that not only do people process information differently, but they also select which information to use and which to ignore.

For strategic culture research, more focused case study analyses like the ones presented in this thesis could be useful in developing focused conceptions of a state’s strategic culture. The problem with analysis that extends over a long period is that while breadth increases, depth decreases dramatically. It is simply not possible to consider a state’s strategic culture as well due to limitations in data and processing ability. It could also lead to confirmation bias, as a researcher could cite or focus on only the pieces of

evidence in a sample that matches his conception of strategic culture, not being willing to or being able to look at all the documents in the sample to see if the conception is true in reality.

For operational code research, a greater emphasis could be paid to considering operational code constructs of larger groups of decision-makers. This thesis has shown the value of expanding operational code analysis from an individual leader to a closer approximation of reality: a decision-making body like a cabinet. Methodological concerns remain with this approach. For example, it is unclear whether it is more valuable to assess the discussions of such a body in transcript form, or whether enough value would come from considering the policy documents such a body would produce. These are areas that future research could explore, returning operational code analysis back to its roots as Leites envisioned it capturing the spirit of a ruling body.

Research on the case study of Japanese decision making prior to the Pacific War could move forward with biographical assessments of the actors at the liaison conferences, as well as a clearer understanding of the staff structure and the extent to which middle-rankin g aides played a role in drafting policy and influencing the key decision-makers. To some extent this has been done, as biographies have been written of actors like Tojo Hideki and the Emperor Hirohito, but biographical research into the other ministers could illuminate what was in their minds as they debated the decision to go to war. Understanding structure of the staff supporting the liaison conferences would help greatly in knowing the bureaucratic politics behind decisions.

The Chinese case could be improved with a translation and analysis of the transcripts of the Politburo meetings where Chinese leaders discussed the Geneva Conference. Since the Chinese government is unlikely to release these, it would be useful, like in the Japanese case, to conduct biographical research on the actors making and enacting decisions at Geneva. Looking at memoirs they may have published, speeches they gave, and what was said about them in other contexts could be useful for understanding the context behind their decision making.
F. APPLICATION TO MODERN STRATEGIC INTERACTION

1. Japan

The thing most unique to Japan that comes out of this analysis is the idea that when nationalism is coupled with a struggling economic system and a political system that seemingly gives rewards when faced with a fait accompli, a state could be much more prone to going to war. This happened in Japan due to elements of Japanese culture and history, which included conservatism and militarism. Such factors led to authority not being challenged and militarism left unchecked.

Does militarism still exist in Japanese society? The answer is probably not – Japanese society was imbued with a strong pacifistic streak following the end of the war; the national military is called the Self-Defense Force, and aggression is not allowed under the Japanese constitution. However, this trend could be changing. Recent scholarship has examined whether or not Japanese society could soon cast off pacifism and reaffirm a commitment to offensive military action as a useful political tool.76 In the face of a weakening global economy and the rising powers of China, India, and Russia nearby, is it possible that Japanese militarism could see a return? After all, right-wing parties still exist in Japan. This may be out of the realm of possibility, but regardless, it would be wise to pay close attention to Japanese reactions to expansionist powers and economic weakening to see whether elements of decision making from 1941 resurface.

Another element of decision making that could persist is conservatism. Conservatism permeated Japanese thought in 1941. Conservatism of that sort is difficult to eliminate, and while it can argued that all leaders are to some extent risk-averse, it is possible that such aversion to risks has persisted to the present day. This would mean that Japanese leaders would be less likely to accept innovative new ideas. The extent to which the Japanese government is willing to adopt new ideas should be watched in the future, for during a crisis situation it would be useful to know whether Japanese leaders would take a known path or not.

2. China

Chinese cultural characteristics like distrust of foreigners and a desire to secure China’s geopolitical position highly influenced Chinese decision making at Geneva, and they persist to this day. Ideology highly influenced Chinese discussions internally and externally at the Geneva Conference, and while this may have softened somewhat with a new generation of leadership, it probably persists. In Chinese decision making, these factors will weighed during any interaction, with an eye at satisfying ideology and preserving those two important factors. This does not mean that Chinese leaders are blindly driven by ideology; rather, the discussions at Geneva show that Chinese leaders are savvy political actors who understand that ideology must sometimes bend in the face of reality.

Because of realities like a relative lack of military and economic power, Chinese leaders were willing to engage in cooperation with some of their greatest enemies for the sake of preserving stability and their government. One of the mantras of the modern Chinese government is stability in the name of economic development. With an imbalance in military and economic power between China and the United States existing now, though that gap is narrowing, it is possible that Chinese leaders will be willing to engage with the United States and other world powers and seek to avoid conflict, at least until the power gap narrows. For the United States this is double-edged: while it means cooperation with the Chinese government is more likely, it raises the question of whether that cooperation comes with a price or will be taken away once the Politburo determines that it is no longer necessary.
LIST OF REFERENCES


INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center
   Ft. Belvoir, Virginia

2. Dudley Knox Library
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, California