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**TWO MISSIONS, ONE SECRET SERVICE: THE VALUE
OF THE INVESTIGATIVE MISSION**

by

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September 2011

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**TWO MISSIONS, ONE SECRET SERVICE:
THE VALUE OF THE INVESTIGATIVE MISSION**

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ABSTRACT

The dual missions of the United States Secret Service, investigations and protection, appear to be without relationship or value to the other, and as a result, support and attention for the investigative mission has waned. This lack of attention to investigations is dangerous for the Secret Service and for the country it serves. To make this argument, this thesis attempts to determine whether the investigative mission is actually important to the successful performance of its protective mission.

Through the use of a hybrid research methodology, with quantitative and qualitative aspects, this thesis argues that the types of investigations performed by the Secret Service are not as important as the experiential learning, respite from the hyper-vigilance of protection, and surge capacity provided by the investigative mission. Since the investigative mission supports the protective mission in these three important ways, the Secret Service requires a robust, well-funded and substantial investigative mission to continue to properly provide protection to this nation's leaders.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

APT	Administrative, Professional and Technical
ARFORGEN	Army Force Generation
BUR	Bottom Up Review
C3	Cyber Crimes Center
CBP	Customs and Border Patrol
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
ECSP	Exceptional Case Study Project
ECTF	Electronic Crimes Task Forces
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FinCEN	Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
FLETC	Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
GAO	General Accounting Office
ICE	Immigration and Customs Enforcement
INS	Immigration and Naturalization Service
ITS	Insider Threat Study
JAQ	Job Analysis Questionnaire
JJRTC	James J. Rowley Training Center
MNO	Management and Organization Division
NPS	Naval Postgraduate School
NSSE	National Special Security Events
OPM	Office of Personnel Management
PI	Protective intelligence
PIAD	Protective Intelligence and Analysis Division
PIOC	Protective Intelligence Operations Center
PRS	Protective Research Section
QHSR	Quadrennial Homeland Security Review

SA	Special Agents
SOD	Special Operations Division
TEA	Treasury Enforcement Agency
TSD	Technical Security Division
U.S.	United States
UD	Uniformed Division Officers
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
USCIS	U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
USSS	United States Secret Service

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PROBLEM STATEMENT—BACKGROUND

The United States Secret Service (USSS) is a 145-year-old federal law enforcement agency, one of the oldest in the nation. While best known for its mission of protecting the President and other senior officials, the Secret Service was created in the Department of the Treasury at the end of the Civil War for the investigation of counterfeit currency. Regular protection of the nation's leaders by the Secret Service did not begin until 1901, and Congress did not fund protection until several years later. For much of its history, the Secret Service was secure in its dual roles as an investigative and protection agency, and developed a strong tradition and reputation within the Treasury Department.

The Secret Service continued as a Treasury agency until the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003, when the Secret Service transferred, along with other agencies, into the new department. Since 2003, the Secret Service has worked to define and defend its missions within DHS.

The Secret Service's protective mission—maintaining security for U.S. national leaders, visiting heads of state and government, and designated sites and National Special Security Events—is clear and well supported within DHS. However, it is unclear whether the first mission of the Secret Service—to investigate and safeguard the nation's financial infrastructure and payment systems and to preserve the integrity of the economy—is relevant to the stated missions of DHS.

The Secret Service's investigative mission does not fit clearly into any of the DHS stated missions in the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) (Department of Homeland Security, 2010b). The investigative budget of the Secret Service, while never very large, has not kept pace over the past few budget cycles with other investigative entities within the department, such as Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP). This shortfall is due, in part, to the Secret Service's inability to argue effectively for the need for this capability within DHS.

While the DHS continues to develop its roles in prevention and disaster mitigation, including cyber crime and transnational threats to the U.S. economy, the Secret Service investigations of important financial and computer crimes is hindered by lack of attention and funding.

Since the Secret Service is one of the primary federal government organizations devoted to the problem of financial and computer crime, this lack of attention to this important area of criminal activity could leave this nation's financial stability at risk. According to Director Mark Sullivan's recent testimony before Congress, in FY2010, the USSS efforts in combating financial crimes prevented an estimated 13.5 billion dollars in losses, of which 6.95 billion involved cyber crimes, which is "a reflection of the Secret Service's ability to adapt to emerging financial and cyber crime threats" (United States Secret Service, 2011a).

In addition and perhaps most importantly, the Secret Service argues that its investigative mission is not only complementary to its protective mission, but the investigative function is crucial to the efficiency and effectiveness of the protective responsibilities. Thus, the lack of focus on the investigative mission could have a negative impact on the ability of the Secret Service to execute its protective mission.

B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Is the investigative mission of the Secret Service of value to the protective mission? In what ways are the two missions complementary?

C. HYPOTHESES

The dual missions of the Secret Service, investigations and protection, have been in place for over 100 years. The dual missions appear to be independent, without relationship or value to the other, and as a result, support and attention for the less

glamorous investigative mission has waned. This thesis argues that this lack of attention to investigations is dangerous for the Secret Service and for the country it serves. To make this argument, this study attempts to determine whether the investigative mission of Secret Service is actually important to the successful performance of its protective mission.

The March 2011 Atlantic Magazine included an article about the Secret Service in which an argument was made for the necessity of the investigative mission:

We can't have agents standing post all year" says Robert Sica, the Deputy Special Agent in Charge of the New York field office. "The investigations are what keep the agents' minds sharp, which reinforces their effectiveness on protective details. The best protective agents are often the smartest ones, because they know how to read people. That comes from investigations." It may be true that if you designed the entire national-security apparatus from scratch, investigating financial crimes would fall outside the purview of the Secret Service. But from the agency's point of view, its hybrid nature is a feature, not a bug. (Ambinder, 2011)

In his 2011 testimony before the Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, the Director of the Secret Service, Mark Sullivan stated:

The partnerships that the Secret Service relies on to successfully perform our protection responsibilities are cultivated at the field office level. In addition to the permanent protective details dedicated solely to the protection of our nation's leaders, the backbone of the Secret Service is our network of 142 domestic and 23 international investigative field offices. These offices carry out protective intelligence and financial crimes investigations while providing the surge capacity needed to successfully carry out the Secret Service's protection responsibilities.

All Secret Service Special Agents begin their career as a criminal investigator in a field office. The training, maturity and judgment they develop as criminal investigators in their field office assignments are essential for a successful transition into the next phase of their careers—protecting our nation's leaders. During their time in the field, Special Agents are routinely assigned to temporary protective assignments. This developmental period enhances their skills in both the protective and investigative disciplines and promotes the philosophy of having a pool of well-trained and experienced agents capable of handling the Secret Service's dual mission. Through conducting criminal investigations, special agents develop relationships with local, state and federal law

enforcement partners that prove critical when the President, Vice President, or other protectees visit their district. These relationships also enhance investigations into protective intelligence investigations against Secret Service protectees. (United States Secret Service, 2011a)

From the above statements, it seems the USSS claims the investigative mission is important for several reasons. Sica indicates that investigations provide a respite from the rigors and hyper vigilant demands of protection. Sullivan is explicit in saying the experience agents gain conducting investigations is essential for a successful transition to protection. Sullivan makes additional assertions: liaison conducted by agents in investigations enhances the cooperation of other agencies when protection occurs in their district, and the agents assigned to the field provide a surge capacity needed to meet infrequent periods of extraordinary protection responsibilities, like the annual United General Assembly, the quadrennial presidential campaigns and National Special Security Events (NSSE).

In addition to the primary research questions noted above, the author intends to address the following secondary research questions.

- Does investigative experience provide competencies of value to protective tasks?
- Does a need exist for a respite from protection assignments?
- Does a need exist for a surge capacity of experienced and trained agents in the protective mission?
- Do other investigative functions support the protective mission?

D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH

The DHS continues to mature and define its goals and purposes. As it goes through this process, each agency within the department is analyzing missions for relevance towards those goals. This thesis is an effort to analyze the missions of the Secret Service and quantify the need for the investigative mission.

E. RESEARCH METHOD

The author conducts a program review of the investigative mission of the Secret Service and how investigative functions may support the protective mission. He intends to use a hybrid research methodology with quantitative and qualitative aspects by taking three different approaches.

First, he intends to conduct a case study comparing the Secret Service policy of agent transfers between investigative assignments and protective assignments to the U.S. military policy of Army Force Generation or ARFORGEN. He suspects that just as the military has learned the importance of rotation of personnel from one assignment to another, and between arduous duties overseas and less tasking assignments at home, the Secret Service has benefitted from rotating its personnel between its two primary missions.

Second, in 2007, the Secret Service contracted with a vendor to conduct a job analysis for Secret Service special agents. This study was designed to define the job of a special agent in terms of work performed and the individual characteristics and attributes required to perform that work. The goals of the analysis were to identify the tasks performed by special agents, identify the competencies and technical knowledge areas required for those tasks and provide job analytic data as the foundation for human resource practices (Swartout, O'Leary, & Pulakos, 2008). The author uses data from this study to link the competencies learned and practiced in an investigative assignment to the tasks required in protective assignments.

In the author's third approach, he intends to use statistics provided by the Secret Service's Management and Organizational Division to evaluate periods of high protective demands on the Secret Service when the agents assigned to investigations are called upon in a surge capacity to support protective events. These statistics document the increase in reported protection manhours worked during significant protection events over the past decade, such as the annual United Nations General Assembly, the quadrennial presidential campaigns, and irregular events, such as the 2002 Winter Olympics, and

designated National Special Security events. He expects to use this information to argue the need for a trained cadre of agents within the Secret Service, ready to supplement the irregular protective requirements.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

The available literature on the USSS and its roles in the DHS is relatively scarce. Some relevant literature concerning other federal law enforcement agencies, and even more on organizational transformation and adaptation does exist. The information available can be divided into four types.

The first and most common are popular books and other accounts of the Secret Service. Most of these are historical and some attempt to be analytical, while all use anecdotes as a method of argument and proof. Second are Congressional and DHS reports that document government efforts at management and oversight of the Secret Service. Apparently, no scholarly papers or books directly address the issue of the Secret Service's investigative mission. Many government reports relate to other federal law enforcement agencies much like those relating to the Secret Service. Also, a few scholarly papers address the challenges facing federal law enforcement in general and a few others focus on particular agencies. Finally, the volumes of work on organizational and government management provide general material and comparisons on the problems facing the Secret Service. The rest of this section reviews each of these categories in turn.

A. POPULAR AND MASS MARKET BOOKS

Many books on the history of the USSS provide great detail on the creation and evolution of the Secret Service. While most are historical in nature and attempt to present facts in an unbiased or positive light, a few are critical and attempt to provide an objective analysis of the Secret Service. All provide a fairly accurate history of the Secret Service.

In his book, *The Secret Service: The Hidden History of an Enigmatic Agency*, Philip Melanson makes several recommendations for the future of the Secret Service. First, he states outside consultants should evaluate the Secret Service with an eye towards determining if its dual missions of financial crimes and protection are diminishing the quality of protection it provides. He then suggests that the Secret Service's official

position, that the dual mission provides well rounded, and therefore, more effective agents, is flawed. He states the dual missions spread limited resources too thin to provide effective protection. He further argues the financial crimes mission of the Secret Service should have been left behind in the Department of Treasury when it was transferred to the DHS (Melanson & Stevens, 2002).

In the book, *In the Presidents Secret Service: Behind the Scenes with Agents in the Line of Fire and the Presidents they Protect*, Ronald Kessler argues that the increase in protection duties after the events of 9/11 has led to shortcomings in the quality of the protection provided by the Secret Service. He claims that the management of the Secret Service should either ask for more resources with the expanding missions or shed some jurisdiction and responsibilities. He implies that other agencies could assume the financial investigations conducted by the service. He agrees that having agents exposed to investigations and protection provides intangible assets to the workforce, but argues that the Secret Service is attempting to maintain its posture towards financial crime investigations to the detriment of protective services (Kessler, 2009).

In the book, *Standing Next to History: An Agent's Life inside the Secret Service*, Joseph Petro says that the connection between the Secret Service's investigations and protection is artificial and "based on a coincidence of history," but then he further argues that the combination of missions contributes to the vitality of the Secret Service and attracts better applicants. He states that maintaining the dual mission should be the main objective of any Secret Service director. Petro voices his concern that "as the Department of Homeland Security matures, administrators will eventually move investigations out of the Secret Service into the Department of Justice and limit the Secret Service to a protection function. That will be damaging." Petro does not further explore why this possible transfer of jurisdiction would be damaging (Petro & Robinson, 2005).

While these works do identify some of the challenges and issues the USSS faces, they leave unanswered questions. One of the themes of each of these books, and one of the Secret Service's major justifications for continuing the dual missions of the service, is the claim that investigations enhance the protective mission. The claim is not yet quantified and is unproven.

B. CONGRESSIONAL AND DEPARTMENTAL REPORTS

Many Congressional reports and transcripts concerning the Secret Service or the DHS exist, but very few discuss the roles of the Secret Service in relation to the DHS. Four important documents play a large role in the research for this thesis. First, the *U.S. Secret Service Strategic Plan (FY2008–FY2013)* lays out how the Secret Service perceives itself, its missions, goals, and how it intends to proceed. The second is the *Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report*, which lays out how the DHS perceives itself, its missions, its goals and how it intends to proceed. The third document is the *Homeland Security Bottom Up Review (BUR)* that determines areas in which gaps and shortcomings exist in the department’s efforts to meet its mandates. The fourth document is a Congressional Research Service Report, *The U.S. Secret Service: an Examination and Analysis of its Evolving Missions* (Reese, 2010). This report addresses issues directly related to important aspects of this thesis. The author briefly discusses each of these reports.

In the *United States Secret Service Strategic Plan FY2008–FY2013*, the Secret Service describes its mission as “to safeguard the nation’s financial infrastructure and payment systems to preserve the integrity of the economy, and to protect national leaders, visiting heads of state and government, designated sites and National Special Security Events” (U.S. Secret Service, 2008). The plan further describes the Secret Service’s relationship to the DHS. Recognizing that the Secret Service is a component of the DHS, the plan claims the Secret Service plays a critical role in programs and initiatives that support DHS priorities, such as: “protecting the homeland from dangerous people and goods; protecting critical infrastructure; building a nimble, effective emergency response system and a culture of preparedness; and strengthening and unifying DHS operations and management” (U.S. Secret Service, 2008).

According to this plan, the first strategic goal of the Secret Service is to protect the nation’s financial infrastructure, and the second goal is to protect the nation’s leaders, visiting heads of state, designated sites, and NSSE. The third goal is to enhance internal infrastructure and systems that sustain the dual missions. Part of this goal includes “a

robust dialogue with DHS” (U.S. Secret Service, 2008) and continued collaboration and information sharing with “DHS and its entities to support accomplishment of the departments goals” (U.S. Secret Service, 2008).

In the *Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic framework for a Secure Homeland* (Department of Homeland Security, 2010b), the DHS claims five main missions. The QHSR elaborates on the definition and objectives of each goal. The QHSR does not specifically mention the Secret Service or any other subordinate agency; however, a review of the goals does list as objectives some of the functions provided by the USSS. A review of these goals helps to indicate where the Secret Service fits into the overall missions that the DHS sees as most important.

The first goal, preventing terrorism and enhancing security, includes protection of the nation’s leaders as a primary objective. The second goal, securing and managing our borders, lists the disruption of international criminal organizations engaged in cross border crimes as a primary objective. The USSS is active in the investigation of trans-national electronic and financial crimes. The third goal, enforcing and administering U.S. immigration law, does not appear to touch on issues related to the USSS. The fourth goal, safeguarding and securing cyberspace, does address the prevention of cyber crimes as an objective. The USSS is one of several federal law enforcement agencies that claim cyber crime as a primary jurisdiction. The fifth goal, ensuring resilience to disasters, does not appear to touch on issues related to the USSS; however, the Secret Service’s involvement in the plans for the continuity of government and of the presidency may apply to this goal.

It is important to note that, in the Appendix A of the QHSR, entitled Roles and Responsibilities of the Homeland Security Enterprise, the Secretary of the Treasury’s primary roles are described as safeguarding the U.S. financial system, combating “financial crimes, and cutting off financial support to terrorists, WMD proliferators, drug traffickers, and other national security threats” (Department of Homeland Security, 2010b).

The DHS BUR (Department of Homeland Security, 2010a) is an effort by DHS to review its overall activities and structure in depth. It recognizes the difficulties of integrating the various entities into the new department and claims the QHSR and the BUR are deliberate and incremental steps toward “a more unified and integrated posture” (Department of Homeland Security, 2010a). The BUR states that the cornerstone of homeland security is the protection of the United States and its people from terrorism. One of the goals of this mission is “reducing the vulnerability of critical infrastructure to terrorist attacks and other hazards.” It is under this goal that the USSS is specifically mentioned for its responsibilities of protecting the nation’s leaders, security planning for NSSEs, and criminal investigations relating to the financial system integrity and counterfeit currency. The USSS is not mentioned in DHS efforts to secure cyberspace or the investigation and prevention of computer crimes. This omission is an important point in that later in the BUR, DHS cites a need to “increase the focus and integration of DHS’s operational cyber security and infrastructure resilience activities” and “strengthen DHS ability to protect cyber networks” (Department of Homeland Security, 2010a, p. 26).

The report for Congress by Shawn Reese of the Congressional Research Service, *The U. S. Secret Service: An Examination and Analysis of its Evolving Missions*, offers several policy questions about the mission and organization of the service:

Mission

1. Should Congress consider what is the optimum or preferred mission of the USSS and whether the mission should consist of both investigation and protection?
2. Is the current allocation of resources, with the majority dedicated to the protection mission, appropriate?

Organization

1. Six years after the establishment of DHS, is this department the most appropriate administrative location for the USSS?
2. What are the advantages and disadvantages of alternative organizational arrangements, including the transfer of some functions and personnel back to the Treasury Department? (Reese, 2010)

This report also offers several options for the future of the service and its missions. One option would be to allow the USSS to remain in the DHS, continue its protective operations as normal, while conducting its financial crimes investigations under the guise of the DHS mandate to protect the nation's infrastructure, which includes the banking and finance sector. A second option would be to transfer the USSS back to the Department of Treasury, where its financial crimes investigations dovetail with the Treasury's mandate to ensure the nation's financial systems. The report acknowledges that this move would require an evaluation of the USSS protective mission to determine if it would be effective while in the Treasury. The report argues that the Secret Service was a Treasury entity with both investigative and protective missions prior to its transfer to the DHS; however, the current increase in protective demands may justify maintaining the protective mission in the DHS. A third option would be for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to assume the investigative mission of the Secret Service. The report notes that the FBI may not be able to replicate the USSS proficiency in investigations of this sort without the transfer of some personnel and resources of the USSS to the FBI. A fourth suggested option would be to make the Secret Service an independent agency, coordinating financial crimes investigations with the Treasury and protection responsibilities with the DHS. While the report does briefly mention some ramifications and difficulties posed by some options, the report does not offer suggestions as to which option the author believes to be the best solution (Reese, 2010).

The Congressional and government reports also document the challenges the USSS faces, but nowhere in these papers is a clear plan or even suggestion of the best plan or strategy for the USSS to pursue.

C. SCHOLARLY PUBLICATIONS

The author has not been able to locate any scholarly publications on the history or missions of the USSS, but has located and reviewed several papers written on other federal law enforcement agencies and their individual struggles to adapt and transform.

Eric B. Smith, in his Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) thesis, *The Transformation of the FBI to Meet the Domestic Intelligence Needs of the United States*,

outlines the ongoing efforts of the FBI to transform itself from a predominantly criminal investigative agency to a predominantly intelligence agency while preserving the criminal investigative capabilities and functions. He argues that the FBI should continue in both roles as the dual missions of criminal investigation and counterterrorism are intertwined in a manner that requires all available tools to combat the issues (Smith, 2009).

Philip Wrona, in his NPS thesis, *U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement: Dysfunctional Not by Design*, examines the results of the merger between the U.S. Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). He argues for further transformation of the blended agency to push ICE towards its goals of being “efficient and focused agency” (Wrona, 2007). ICE is the second largest federal law enforcement agency after the FBI, and the largest within the DHS. ICE’s creation, by the melding of portions of the U.S. Customs Service (Customs) and INS, has not been without turmoil and controversy.

David Wolfe writes of the same problem from a different point of view in his NPS thesis, *Transforming the U.S. Immigration System after 9/11: The Impact of Organizational Change and Collaboration in the Context of Homeland Security*. Wolfe describes the organizational changes in the creation of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) from portions of the former INS. He argues for better collaboration between ICE and USCIS to further both agencies missions (Wolfe, 2008).

While these papers argue for transformation within individual agencies, Gregory Mandoli takes a holistic approach to the transformation of federal law enforcement in his NPS thesis, *The Sandbox Strategy: The Why and How of Federal Law Enforcement Integration* (Mandoli, 2006). Mandoli argues for the consolidation of all or portions of the six major federal law enforcement agencies, namely the FBI, ICE, Drug Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Internal Revenue Service-Criminal Investigative Division and the United States (U.S.) Secret Service-Office of Investigations. Mandoli claims the redundancy of investigative efforts between three executive departments hinders the U.S. Government’s overall efforts in

criminal investigation and that the nation would be better served with all of the investigative resources housed within one department and agency, the Department of Justice and the FBI.

Mandoli makes this argument even as the FBI struggles to redefine itself as a counter terror and criminal investigations agency. The FBI has wide ranging jurisdiction from bank robbery to kidnapping to auto theft; however, the national security priorities of the FBI are terrorism, counterintelligence and cybercrime. The FBI's demanding primary mission of counterterrorism has continued to require an ever increasing amount of the limited resources of the agency.

All of the federal law enforcement agencies mentioned are re-examining their roles and missions. The Secret Service is also in a period of transformation as it defines missions and roles in the new department. These theses do not directly address the issues faced by the USSS, but they do document the challenges faced by other agencies and suggest some possible avenues for the USSS to pursue.

D. ORGANIZATIONAL AND GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT

As a federal agency with the requisite bureaucracy and mandates, the USSS has many of the same management challenges and issues as do other government agencies. The author reviewed several organizational and management documents and papers that illustrate some of the issues common to government agencies and management that are of value to this discussion.

In 2003, The General Accounting Office (GAO) produced a report, "Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and Organizational Transformations," designed to "help federal agencies implement successful transformations of their cultures, as well as the new Department of Homeland Security merge its various originating components into a unified department." In this report, the GAO identified nine key practices and implementation steps agencies could use to become "more results oriented, customer focused and collaborative in nature" (United States General Accounting Office, 2003, p. 3). This GAO report is based on the

assumption that the agency in question recognizes the need for transformation. The Secret Service has struggled to maintain its unique identity and structure as the DHS has become more involved in the day-to-day workings of its subordinate agencies.

In her book, *Spying Blind*, Amy B. Zegart argues that this transformational awareness is extremely difficult to discern. She relates the consequences of the FBI's and the CIA's failure to adapt their agencies to the new threats of global terrorism. Zegart is sympathetic to the problems faced by these two agencies and goes to great lengths to explain why it was so difficult for them to adapt to the evolving threat. She argues three main components were at play in these adaptive failures: The nature of organizations, rational self-interest, and the fragmented federal government. Zegart states, "these three enduring realities....provide a basic model for understanding why U.S. Intelligence agencies failed to adapt to the terrorist threat before September 11, why they have not done much better since then and why they are unlikely to improve substantially in the future" (Zegart, 2007).

In the RAND Report, "Reorganizing U.S. Domestic Intelligence: Assessing the Options," authored by Gregory F. Treverton, a method of assessment is offered to consider the costs and benefits of organizational change. This method is applicable to any effort to change or reorganize a government agency. Treverton suggests that the potential value of reorganization depends on many factors, assumptions and the determined scope of the reorganization. He applied a framework called "break even analysis" to provide a method of considering pro and cons of agency reorganization and how different assumptions may affect the balance of those pros and cons (Treverton, 2008).

The 2010 U.S. Army Posture Statement includes an addendum on ARFORGEN. This relatively new concept is described as "... the structured progression of increased unit readiness over time, resulting in recurring periods of availability of trained, ready and cohesive....units prepared for operational deployment..." "This rotational model, which maximizes total force utilization, replaces the Army's Cold War-era, linear, tiered readiness strategic construct for force generation" (U.S. Army, 2010). The ARFORGEN model is similar to the USSS practice of hiring new agents into investigations, preparing them for protective assignments, transferring trained agents into permanent protective

assignments for a few years and then rotateing the experienced protection agents back to investigations to prepare new agents for the process. The author intends to explore this similarity in this thesis.

The last body of literature suggests that government agencies rarely willingly undergo transformation or reorganization, and that reorganizations are notoriously difficult to complete successfully; however, some of the methods described if properly and thoughtfully applied, with agency and departmental support, could transform the USSS into a viable productive and useful agency for the next century.

III. OVERVIEW OF THE SECRET SERVICE

The USSS has two primary missions, investigations and protection. The Secret Service claims these two missions are complementary. While this thesis addresses this claim in later chapters, a discussion of the responsibilities and capabilities of the Secret Service is in order. This chapter is intended to provide an overview of the Secret Service's organization and missions

The USSS was established in 1865 as a division of the Department of Treasury for combating the counterfeiting of U.S. currency and is currently a subordinate of the DHS. The USSS derives its authority primarily from Title 18 of the United States Code under statute 3056.

Beginning with 12 operatives, the Secret Service has grown over the past 146 years to almost 7,000 employees dispersed across three main categories: Special Agents (SA), Uniformed Division Officers, (UD) and Administrative, Professional and Technical employees (APT); and among three main assignments: Investigative Field Offices located throughout the world, Protection Divisions in Washington, DC. and at the residences of former Presidents, and Secret Service Headquarters in Washington, DC. Headquarters assignments in all three employee categories can be a support function, such as recruiting and training, or either investigations or protection.

The 1,387 UD officers exclusively support the protective mission, and with few exceptions, are assigned within the Washington, DC area. The APT cadre, of 1,874 employees, is concentrated at the Secret Service Headquarters, with one third of this group in field offices. APT employees provide support to both the investigative and protective missions.

The remaining 3,542 employees are special agents who support both the protective and the investigative missions, with 795 in protection assignments, 457 at Secret Service Headquarters and 2,280 in field offices. The Secret Service operates 143 domestic offices and 23 international field offices (U.S. Secret Service Work Force Planning Division, 2011).

A. INVESTIGATIONS

The Secret Service shares jurisdiction in the investigation of other financial and computer crimes, with several other federal agencies, such as the FBI, ICE, and the U.S. Postal Inspection Service. As some of these federal law enforcement agencies have reallocated assets to more pressing issues, such as counterterrorism and immigration enforcement, the Secret Service has expanded its role and importance in the investigation of all types of financial and computer crimes.

The Secret Service actively investigates the following types of crimes:

- Threats against the President and other protected persons (Protective Intelligence)
- Counterfeiting of currency (Foreign and domestic)
- Counterfeiting of U.S. Commercial Securities
- False Identification
- U.S. Treasury Check Forgery
- U.S. Bond Forgery
- Electronic Financial Transaction Fraud (commercial and consumer)
- Access Device Fraud (credit and debit card fraud)
- Computer Fraud (scams, intrusion and hacking)
- Embezzlement and misappropriation (public and private)
- Food Stamp Fraud
- Telecommunication Fraud
- Child Pornography

1. Protective Intelligence Investigations

The most important and most challenging of investigations conducted by the Secret Service are those of a protective intelligence (PI) matter, or threats and or unusual direction of interest in a protectee. A protected person, or protectee, is any person provided physical protection by the Secret Service, as authorized by law or executive order. The Secret Service considers PI cases to be the most important type of investigation and has dedicated a great deal of resources, research and personnel to

address these issues. The Secret Service has a protective intelligence and assessment division and maintains a 24-hour Protective Intelligence Operations Center (PIOC) to monitor and refer all reported threats and directions of interest. The report of a threat requires an immediate response from one of the 166 Secret Service offices around the world.

In PI cases, agents are required to conduct an investigation, not only into the prosecutive merits of a threat, but also the potential dangerousness of a subject. PI cases are a melding of the investigative mission and the protective mission. In his book, *On Being Mad or Merely Angry*, a study of John W. Hinckley, Jr. and other dangerous people, James W. Clarke states:

There are tough decisions to make. The Presidents life depends on them being made correctly—not to mention that there are constitutional and legal implications of improper arrests—and the decisions are still based largely on the intuition of Secret Service Agents; it is a ‘very difficult and subjective problem for case agents.’ (Clarke, 1990)

The case agent is required to make a threat assessment and a determination of the potential dangerousness of subjects based on his investigation of the subject and experience.

The origins of PI investigations and threat assessment, and the precursor to the PIOC, stem from the creation of the Protective Research Section (PRS) created in 1940 in response to the dramatic increase in mailed threats to President Roosevelt. The purpose of the new section was “to analyze and make available to those charged with protecting the President, information from the White House mail and other sources concerning people potentially capable of violence to the President” (Commission, 1964). After the assassination of President Kennedy, and at the recommendation of the Warren Commission, the Secret Service reorganized the PRS and included a panel of psychiatric experts along with other measures to fulfill the predictive protective mission better.

Since 1964, the Secret Service has conducted many studies in an effort to understand and predict targeted violence better. Most of these efforts have concentrated on the threat assessment of individuals that may pose a danger, as opposed to violent

groups. In 1992, the Secret Service undertook a study in an effort to examine the thinking and behavior of attackers or near attackers of prominent public figures. The goal of the study was to aid those with a protective responsibility to identify, assess, and manage persons who may pose a risk of violence toward this nation's leaders. The Exceptional Case Study Project (ECSP), published for internal use in 1997, has gone through several editions. The USSS has based its entire threat assessment and threat management process on the findings of the ECSP. Persons that come to the attention of the USSS as having an unusual direction of interest in a protected person are evaluated as to their dangerousness based on the investigative methods implemented because of this study. The purpose of the ECSP was not to determine the psychological profile of an assassin but to concentrate on identifying the thinking and behavior of a potential assassin. This information would be operationally relevant to those charged with threat assessment and physical protection.

The ECSP studied in great detail the characteristics, personal histories, and attack related behaviors of 83 persons that attacked, or approached with lethal intent, prominent American targets. This study determined that potential attackers could possibly be identified by their thinking and behaviors and, if they could be identified, they could be deterred from attacking. Surprisingly, the ECSP found that mental illness was not a critical factor. While most of the individuals studied were not "models of emotional wellbeing," mental illness did not play a major role in the attack related behaviors exhibited by the subjects (Vossekuil & Fein, 2000). Since the implementation of the findings of the ECSP, the Secret Service has identified and intervened in thousands of instances of cases involving threats and unusual interests.

2. Criminal Investigations

The Secret Service continues to have sole federal jurisdiction into the investigation of counterfeit U.S. currency. The Secret Service aggressively investigates all types of financial and computer crimes with an emphasis on organized national and transnational groups. The 2001 USA PATRIOT Act authorized the USSS to develop a

network of electronic crimes task forces (ECTF) based on the New York model established in 1995 (United States Secret Service, 2010b). According to the Secret Service,

The concept of the ECTF network is to bring together not only federal, state and local law enforcement, but also prosecutors, private industry and academia. The common purpose is the prevention, detection, mitigation and aggressive investigation of attacks on the nation's financial and critical infrastructures. (United States Secret Service, 2010b)

The Secret Service's ECTF initiatives prioritize investigative cases that involve electronic crimes. These initiatives provide necessary support and resources to field investigations that meet any one of the following criteria.

- Significant economic or community impact
- Participation of organized criminal groups involving multiple districts or transnational organizations
- Use of schemes involving new technology (United States Secret Service, 2010b)

The USSS has established 27 of these ECTFs in the United States and two international ECTFS in Rome and in London.

In the *United States Secret Service Strategic Plan FY2008–FY2013*, the Secret Service describes its mission as “to safeguard the nation’s financial infrastructure and payment systems to preserve the integrity of the economy, and to protect national leaders, visiting heads of state and government, designated sites and National Special Security Events” (U.S. Secret Service, 2008).

According to Director Mark Sullivan’s recent testimony before Congress, in FY2010, the USSS efforts in combating financial crimes prevented an estimated 13.5 billion dollars in losses, of which 6.95 billion involved cyber crimes, which is “a reflection of the Secret Service’s ability to adapt to emerging financial and cyber crime threats.” All USSS agents are trained in financial crimes and 1,400 agents are specially trained in electronic crimes investigations and computer forensics. The ECFT program, with 29 task forces in place, boasts of 4,000 private sector partners and, almost 2,500 international and domestic law enforcement partners (United States Secret Service,

2011a). In another example of melding of the two missions, agents trained in computer forensics and electronic crime often directly support the protective mission with electronic critical infrastructure protection at protected sites and events.

Success of the investigative program is not solely based on arrests and other statistics, but these figures do provide an indication of how effective the Secret Service is in executing its mission. The USSS effected 8,930 arrests with a 94% conviction rate in FY2010. The USSS claims to have prevented over 13.5 billion dollars in potential financial crimes losses, 6.5 billion dollars of which is attributed to cybercrime. The ratio of counterfeit currency to genuine currency in circulation reported to be less than one one-hundredth of one percent (United States Secret Service, 2011b). By contrast, at the end of the Civil War in 1865, an estimated one third of all currency in circulation was counterfeit (Kessler, 2009).

In 2006, Expectmore.gov conducted a detailed assessment of USSS financial and infrastructure investigations. Expectmore.gov was developed by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget to assess the performance of every federal program. At the time of this evaluation, Expectmore.gov had rated 1,015 federal programs. The USSS was one of 193 programs to receive an assessment of effective, the highest possible rating (Office of Management and Budget, 2006).

3. Personnel Security Background Investigations

All Secret Service employees are required to hold a top secret national security clearance. To meet this requirement, the Secret Service conducts full field personnel security background investigations on all prospective employees, as well as regular background updates for current employees. A security background investigation is an exhaustive inquiry into the habits and life history of the applicant or employee. Twenty-one specific factors are checked. Everything from foreign travel and contacts, school records, tax records, credit history, marital status, to police and criminal records are reviewed. Neighbors, in every place the subject has resided, college professors, at every school attended, and coworkers, at every place of employment, are interviewed in an effort to elicit any hidden flaw or misrepresentation.

Special agents assigned to investigative field offices conduct all of these investigations, protective intelligence, financial crimes and personnel security background.

B. PROTECTION

The protective mission of the USSS came about as a “coincidence of history” (Petro & Robinson, 2005). After the assassination of President Garfield in 1881, the USSS assumed part time protection of the President. At least two USSS operatives were present when President McKinley was assassinated in 1901. It was after this attack that Congress formally authorized the USSS protection of the President. The USSS initially provided simple bodyguard accompaniment to the President, but since then it has developed into a complicated protective methodology providing a protective cocoon from all hazards.

While best known for presidential protection, the USSS currently provides protection to 37 persons, including the President’s family, the Vice President and family, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of the Treasury, former presidents and their wives. The USSS also provides protection for all heads of state, and their spouses visiting the United States. Finally, the USSS is mandated to plan and implement security for any designated NSSE, for instance, presidential inaugurations, G-8 summits, Olympic Games (on U.S. soil), and national political conventions. The Secret Service also protects foreign missions in Washington, DC.

Protection for permanent protectees, the President, Vice President and former presidents are provided by details of special agents assigned to them. Temporary protectee details, such as visiting foreign heads of state or presidential candidates, are staffed with special agents on temporary assignment from investigative field offices and the dignitary protective division.

The Secret Service does not publicly discuss the specific types and methods of its security operations. According to the Secret Service website, the protection provided to a protectee is extensive and much more than a bodyguard function. Fastidious planning for

a protective event and comprehensive threat assessments contribute to the Secret Service's efforts to "prevent an incident before it occurs" (U.S. Secret Service, 2011a).

Prior to a protectee stop or visit, advance teams survey sites, determine resources, plan routes and notify local authorities. The lead advance agent plans security with all law enforcement participating in the visit. All available intelligence and pertinent information is discussed, evaluated and disseminated. Sites are secured and swept for explosives, weapons and other threats prior to the arrival of a protectee. Advance work is meticulous and thorough in an effort to identify and mitigate all potential risks.

In FY2010, the USSS provided protection for 3,926 stops or visits of domestic protectees and 2,492 stops or visits of foreign dignitaries. Two national special security events, the State of the Union address and the nuclear security summit, were planned and implemented. The Secret Service provided credentialing and other security for Super Bowl XLIV.

The protective mission has expanded with the increased threat of international terrorism and the advent of new technologies that enhance existing risks or create new vulnerabilities. Protective perimeters have increased due to advances in improvised explosive devices. The USSS has implemented enhanced detection techniques for chemical, biological and radioactive elements and uses the latest methodologies in threat assessment and mitigation (U.S. Secret Service, 2011a).

C. ANALYSIS

The protective function of the Secret Service is well established and unlikely to be usurped by another agency. Some have argued, however; that the Secret Service should have divested its investigative function as it transferred from the Department of Treasury to the DHS and have claimed that the dual mission " does not make sense nor does it afford maximally effective protection" (Melanson & Stevens, 2002, p. 338).

The Congressional Research Service report, "The U.S. Secret Service: An Examination and Analysis of its Evolving Missions," discusses the placement of the Secret Service in the DHS and the question of whether the investigative function should

remain in the DHS. The report further questions the dual missions of the Secret Service and calls for Congressional debate on the question of the Secret Service's primary mission "in order to determine where the service can most efficiently execute its mission and be appropriately supported." The report makes no conclusions on these questions (Reese, 2010, p. 16).

If Congress were to contemplate a separation of missions of the Secret Service, some key problems must be addressed: Where should the investigative mission of the service best fit in the various departments of the government? How would the Secret Service effectively provide for unusual or increased protective responsibilities?

The cyber threat confronting the United States is rapidly increasing as the number of actors with the tools and abilities to use computers against the United States or its interests is rising. The country's vulnerability is escalating as the U.S. economy and critical infrastructures become increasingly reliant on interdependent computer networks and the World Wide Web. Large scale computer attacks on our critical infrastructure and economy would have potentially devastating results. (Federal Bureau of Investigation, Cyber Crime, n.d.)

Several U.S. federal agencies investigate transnational electronic and financial crimes while competing with each other for limited resources and investigations. The FBI, the USSS and U.S. ICE, all investigate various types and forms of these crimes domestically and internationally. Each has its own computer crimes section, forensic computer labs and analysts. Each has attempted to develop its own inter disciplinary network of partnerships with state, local, private, academic and international partners. Each agency is somewhat effective; however, the overlapping of jurisdictions and investigative functions has led to a duplication of investigative efforts, redundant capabilities and confusion among domestic and international agencies as where to turn for assistance in this field.

The U.S. GAO issued a report in June of 2007 entitled "Cybercrime, Public and Private Entities face challenges in addressing cyber threats." This report catalogs the dangers of cyber crime and the U.S. Government's efforts to combat it including the overlapping jurisdictions and the redundant programs within the Department of Justice

and the DHS. Surprisingly, the report does not recommend any changes in jurisdiction or programs except for the suggestion that both the FBI and the USSS make internal policy changes to special agent career track to take advantage more fully of those agents specially trained in cyber investigations (United States Government Accountability Office, 2007).

In his NPS thesis, *The Sandbox Strategy: The Why and How of Federal Law Enforcement Integration*, Gregory Mandoli argues for the consolidation of the six major U.S. federal law enforcement agencies into the FBI. He states, “the current configuration of major law enforcement agencies within three different executive departments, Justice, Treasury and Homeland Security produces inter agency conflict, redundancy, data fragmentation, jurisdictional foreclosure, and increases civil rights violations.” He claims this diminishes the effectiveness of federal law enforcement both collectively and per agency (Mandoli, 2006).

Several possible solutions can solve this problem. The creation of a new federal financial crimes enforcement agency within the Department of Treasury is appealing, for example, a Treasury Enforcement Agency, TEA. However, the current political and budget climate make the creation of a new agency unlikely. An argument could be made for an expanded law enforcement role for Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN); however, FinCEN does not currently have law enforcement authority and functions only as a criminal intelligence service to other law enforcement agencies.

The FBI could assume all responsibility for transnational financial and cyber crime. The FBI has wide ranging jurisdiction from bank robbery to kidnapping to auto theft; however, the national security priorities of the FBI are terrorism, counterintelligence and cybercrime. The FBI’s demanding primary mission of counter terrorism has continued to require an ever increasing amount of the limited resources of the agency. The FBI’s main focuses in cyber crime investigation tends towards counter terror, counter espionage and exploited children. Within the cybercrime priority, Internet fraud and identity theft are listed as the lowest priority (Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI Strategic Plan, n.d.). According to the FBI website, the agency’s fourth mission is its traditional criminal priorities. Under these priorities, white collar crime is listed as

seventh out of eight (Federal Bureau of Investigations, “FBI About Us,” n.d.). Clearly, the FBI does not regard financial and cyber crimes as important jurisdictions. If the FBI were to receive exclusive jurisdiction in the investigation of transnational financial and computer crimes, would it be able or inclined to devote the resources to deliver the attention and efforts commensurate with the threat posed to the nation’s financial infrastructure?

ICE is charged with protecting national security by enforcing the nation’s immigration and customs laws. ICE claims that combating criminal activity conducted on or facilitated by the Internet is a leading priority, and as such, ICE has developed its own cyber crime program called the Cyber Crimes Center (C3) (Immigration and Customs Enforcement, n.d.).

According to the ICE strategic plan FY2010–2014, the main priorities for ICE are 1) preventing terrorism and enhancing security, 2) securing and managing U.S. borders, and 3) enforcing and administering U.S. immigration laws. Much like the FBI, ICE has a whole host of diverse and competing missions within its core mandates. ICE continues to focus its main efforts on border and immigration issues. ICE would face the same issues as the FBI in being able to devote the resources and attention to the emerging financial and cyber threats.

ICE is the second largest federal law enforcement agency after the FBI, and the largest within DHS. ICE’s creation, by the melding of portions of the U.S. Customs Service (Customs) and the INS, has not been without turmoil and controversy. The agency’s struggles to merge into a cohesive, efficient and singular agency are well documented in Philip Wrona’s NPS thesis, *U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement: Dysfunctional Not by Design*.

Wrona writes, “ICE is not a successful merger of INS and Customs. ICE is an inefficient agency without its own culture. The organization is stagnated in a convulsion of identities and cultures brought over from INS and Customs” (Wrona, 2007). The

internal challenges ICE faces indicates the further expansion of its mission into the primary investigative transnational computer and financial crimes investigations would not be productive or successful.

The Secret Service has been scrutinized because its dual missions can cause problems in effective prosecutions. The need for agents to be available for protective assignments has led to some criticism, and in some ways, bolsters arguments for the Secret Service to divest itself of the investigative mission in favor of other federal agencies. Field agents are not always available for grand jury or court appearances, and some investigations are slowed because of temporary protective assignments (Kessler, 2009).

While these arguments do make a case that other federal agencies could conduct the same types of investigation, concerns exist that other agencies may not be as successful as the Secret Service in this regard, and more importantly, does not address the Secret Service's need for the benefits the investigative mission provides to the protective mission. These benefits; of experiential learning, respite from the rigors of protection, and a surge capacity of well-trained agents, are explored in later chapters.

IV. A COMPARISON OF THE U.S. SECRET SERVICE AND THE U.S. ARMY PERSONNEL ROTATION POLICIES

As noted in Chapter I of this thesis, the Secret Service argues that the Secret Service's investigative mission is crucial for the effectiveness of its protective responsibilities. To an outside observer, this concept might not seem obvious: why should one agency, which is most well known for its mission of protection of the nation's leaders, also have the mission of investigating financial crimes? One of the primary reasons why the two missions are complementary is that the Secret Service has found that agents are most successful if they are rotated during their careers between the two missions.

This chapter first describes the Secret Service policy of personnel rotation, and explains its reasoning for this policy. Next, it demonstrates how this policy, and by extension, the importance of combining both missions within the service by comparing it with a similar policy employed by the U.S. Army.

A. U.S. SECRET SERVICE CAREER TRACK

The USSS does not have a formal force generation policy, but it does face issues of training, readiness and deployment. The Secret Service has developed a career track for special agents to address these resource demands. "As an international agency with diverse responsibility, the Secret Service recommends and in some career tracks requires that special agents accept multiple reassignments during the course of their career" (U.S. Secret Service, 2008, p. 1).

All new USSS special agents begin their careers with an intense period of training. They complete 12 weeks of basic criminal investigations training at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) in Glenco, Georgia and another 18 weeks of USSS special agent training at the USSS James J. Rowley Training Center (JJRTC) in Beltsville, Maryland (U.S. Secret Service, 2010). Upon completion of formal training, the new agents are sworn in and assigned to an investigative field office for on the job training through experiential learning. These agents learn the nuances of investigation

and protection from their peers and first line supervisors. As they progress in experience and institutional maturity, they are given increasingly responsible assignments of greater complexity and consequence.

After a period of several years of apprenticeship, these agents are promoted to the journeyman rate and considered prepared for a permanent protection assignment. During this period, special agents are conducting investigations, protective intelligence and criminal, participating in protective advances for lower level protectees, and providing surge capacity to the larger protective details (presidential protective division, vice presidential protective division and major foreign heads of state) and events (United Nations General Assembly, national special security events and presidential campaigns). These agents are subject to regular domestic and worldwide travel in support of both the investigative and protective missions. Journeyman special agents are transferred into a protection assignment based on longevity, aptitude and personal preference.

Permanent protection entails a verity of assignments, including the larger details, such as presidential protective division and vice presidential protective division, the smaller details, former presidents and their wives, Protective Intelligence and Analysis Division (PIAD), Technical Security Division (TSD) and Special Operations Division (SOD). The typical permanent protection assignment is for three to five years. Agents in a protective assignment provide physical protection, conduct protective advances and travel extensively domestically and worldwide in support of the protective mission (U.S. Secret Service, 2011). “Limiting protective duty to a three to five year span helps reduce stress and prevent agent burnout” according to Philip H. Melanson’s book, *The Secret Service: The Hidden History of an Enigmatic Agency* (Melanson & Stevens, 2002, p. 181). Another unidentified agent told Melanson, “I liked the divided responsibility because it was mentally challenging... There was more of a mental challenge in following the trail of counterfeiters. I enjoyed it more than Presidential protection” (Melanson & Stevens, 2002, pp. 181–182). Former Assistant Director for Protective Operations, Nick Trotta, described the demands of protection assignments in this way, “We have a responsibility to the American Public, and it comes sometimes with a price: long hours, travel, missing birthday parties, and transfers” (Kessler, 2009, p. 223).

Upon completion of the permanent protection assignment, special agents typically return to an investigative assignment or another support role (i.e., administration, training, inspection), at which they continue with investigative duties and provide surge capacity for periods of high protective demands.

As an example of the career track, special agent Tim McCarthy, who was wounded during the attack on President Reagan in 1981, began his career as a special agent in the Chicago Field Office. After several years in an investigative assignment in Chicago, he was assigned to the President's detail.

As a side note and contrary to urban myth, during the attempt on President Reagan, Agent McCarthy did not actually jump in front of a bullet to protect the president, but he certainly acted in a manner against expectations and normal human reaction. As Hinkley fired his pistol at President Reagan, McCarthy was holding open the right rear door of the limo. Hearing the shots, Press Secretary Brady, Metropolitan police officer Delahanty instinctively ducked and were wounded in the head and neck. McCarthy turned toward the sounds and stood upright, his body between the President and potential assassin, and was wounded in the chest. Had McCarthy reacted differently, that bullet would have almost certainly caused another grievous wound to the President (Petro & Robinson, 2005).

Upon his recovery, McCarthy received a much deserved transfer to his office of choice, Chicago. A short while later, he was promoted and returned to the President's detail at the request of a grateful Mrs. Reagan. After completion of this second tour on the detail, he returned to Chicago until he retired in 1993 as the special agent in charge of the Chicago field office. McCarthy's career was unusual in that he completed two tours on the President's detail. He told author Melanson that his protection stint lasted "too long" (Melanson & Stevens, 2002, p. 181).

Special Agent Joe Petro was initially assigned to the Philadelphia field office but spent almost half his career in a number of protection assignments including the President's detail, Vice President's detail, dignitary protection division and intelligence division. He also served in several field offices including Special Agent in Charge of the

Washington field office. He readily describes himself as a protection guy, but then he states, “ I would have gladly gone back to investigations.” Petro adds, “Working in the Washington Field Office meant I could enjoy the freedom that came from no longer having to travel so exhaustively” (Petro & Robinson, 2005, pp. 270, 265).

Figure 1 illustrates the career track from training through protection assignment and return to investigations. The career track does not return to a reset or training phase as the ARFORGEN model. While a short period of retraining as agents transfer from protection back to investigations occurs, agents are immediately available for investigative assignments and temporary protective assignments.



Figure 1. U.S. Secret Service Career Track

In his 2011 testimony before the Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, the Director of the Secret Service, Mark Sullivan stated:

The partnerships that the Secret Service relies on to successfully perform our protection responsibilities are cultivated at the field office level. In

addition to the permanent protective details dedicated solely to the protection of our nation's leaders, the backbone of the Secret Service is our network of 142 domestic and 23 international investigative field offices. These offices carry out protective intelligence and financial crimes investigations while providing the surge capacity needed to successfully carry out the Secret Service's protection responsibilities.

All Secret Service special agents begin their career as a criminal investigator in a field office. The training, maturity and judgment they develop as criminal investigators in their field office assignments are essential for a successful transition into the next phase of their careers – protecting our nation's leaders. During their time in the field, special agents are routinely assigned to temporary protective assignments. This developmental period enhances their skills in both the protective and investigative disciplines and promotes the philosophy of having a pool of well-trained and experienced agents capable of handling the Secret Service's dual mission. Through conducting criminal investigations, special agents develop relationships with local, state and federal law enforcement partners that prove critical when the President, Vice President, or other protectees visit their district. These relationships also enhance investigations into protective intelligence investigations against Secret Service protectees. (United States Secret Service, 2011a)

B. U.S. ARMY ARFORGEN

For much of the last decade, and for the near future, the U.S.'s armed forces, and in particular the U.S. Army, have been and will be involved in persistent conflict. This long-term level of conflict required the Army to rethink its Cold War methods of troop training, readiness and deployment. "The impetus for this change was primarily driven by the complex nature of today's threat, the reality of preparing forces on compressed time lines for extended deployments and the imperative to preserve the all volunteer force" (Campbell, 2009).

In 2006, the U.S. Army implemented a "transformational force generation model" (U.S. Army, 2010) called Army Force Generation or ARFORGEN. ARFORGEN is designed to provide a continuous supply of deployment ready troops, which is accomplished through the use of a troop rotation method called ARFORGEN force pools. Force pools include reset, train/ready and available. ARFORGEN calls for a set ratio of time deployed to time at home of one deployment rotation to two at home, or non-

deployed rotations. This deployment schedule allows for strategic surge capacity in the event of short-term increased demands and increases organizational and operational depth.

The reset pool is for soldiers returning from deployment. These troops reintegrate with families, receive and implement new equipment, and individual education and training. The train/ready pool is for soldiers undergoing unit and mission training. This period is used for unit cohesiveness, tactics training, unit exercises and other forms of experiential learning. The available pool is for equipped and trained units deployable as needed throughout the U.S. Army Command. This period is used to maintain deployment readiness and actual deployment.

Figure 2 illustrates the ARFORGEN process from reset phase through deployment and return to reset. Lt.Col. V. J. Tedesco explained the need for ARFORGEN in this way, “we had more demand for forces than we had forces available. You can sprint and sprint and sprint, but you can’t do it for 26 miles... and we are in a marathon” (Hemmerly-Brown, 2009).




Figure 2. ARFORGEN Force Pools (From: U.S. Army, 2010)

“This new process allows the Army to increase its force generation capability by simultaneously providing and supporting forces and by meeting its strategic commitments and the nation’s global military requirements” (Kenyon, 2006).

The ARFORGEN process appears to achieve its stated goals of meeting the demands for trained and ready forces at a rate that Army leadership considers sustainable, the ability to add forces to meet a spike in demand and undertake exceptional measures to meet an extreme circumstance. The ARFORGEN model and process is flexible, agile, collaborative and continuous (Campbell, 2009).

C. ANALYSIS

The U.S. Army developed the ARFORGEN model to be able to provide a steady stream of trained troops ready for deployment. As soldiers complete deployment, they return to reset, retrain, and prepare to redeploy. This model has had some success in meeting the demands for combat ready troops while providing a regular schedule of rotation, thus allowing for respite, refit and training for soldiers transitioning from the rigors of combat deployment to the reset phase while providing a surge capacity in times of national emergency and high demand for resources. The deployment phase has been described as a sprint and the mission described as a marathon. The ARFORGEN policy allows the Army to turn the marathon into a relay race, where trained and ready troops relieve the exhausted units. The program allows individual soldiers and their families to anticipate and plan for deployments on a consistent schedule.

The USSS career path also provides a steady stream of trained agents ready for protection assignments. Special agent protection assignments generally last longer than troop deployments—3 to 5 years as opposed to 1-year cycles—and agents are individually transferred unlike entire Army units. Much like the Army mission has become never ending, with a constant need for fresh, trained and ready troops, the Secret Service’s mission is perpetual and has the same need for fresh, trained and ready agents to deploy in a protection assignment as exhausted agents return to the field. The career track model is successful as is the ARFORGEN model in that it meets the needs for protection ready agents and provides a regular rotation allowing for respite from hyper vigilance and

pressures of permanent protective assignments, much like the deployment cycle of ARFORGEN. The career track model also provides a surge capacity for periods of high protective responsibility demands similar to the ready phase of ARFORGEN. The career track also allows agents and their families to anticipate and prepare for transfers on a consistent schedule.

The physical protection of a person or place can be quite demanding. The tremendous amount of travel, long work days and constant state of hyper vigilance combine to fatigue the mind and body of an individual assigned to this type of work for extended periods of time. To counter this effect, the Secret Service currently rotates its agents off permanent protection after four to five years in an assignment. If the Secret Service was to divest itself of the investigative mission and become an agency with the sole mission of protection, the quality of its protection may diminish from a dearth of experienced agents and exhaustion of its resources.

V. EVIDENCE FROM A USSS COMPREHENSIVE JOB ANALYSIS

This chapter is designed to determine whether the investigative mission of the Secret Service provides measurable value to the protective mission. In 2007, the USSS contracted with an independent firm, PDRI, to conduct a comprehensive job analysis for the special agent position. This chapter begins with a background of the PDRI study. The second section analyzes the study's data and demonstrates the linkages between investigative competencies and protective tasks.

A. THE PDRI STUDY

The PDRI study called, *United States Secret Service: Job Analysis for Special Agents in Grades GS-5 through GS-13*, was completed and delivered in a report format in October of 2008 (Swartout, O'Leary, & Pulakos, 2008). This job analysis became the foundation for a performance-based promotional test. The information gathered lends itself to a number of other uses, such as selection, training, performance management and career development. This thesis uses the data gathered in this job analysis to illuminate the linkage between competencies learned and practiced by special agents in investigative assignments to tasks performed by special agents in protective assignments. An explanation of the development of the job analysis is provided to support the validity of the underlying research.

This job analysis had three main goals.

1. Identify the tasks performed by special agents across roles and assignments
2. Identify the competencies and technical knowledge required for the performance of those tasks
3. Provide job analytic information to be used for the foundation for the development of a number of human resource applications (Swartout, O'Leary, & Pulakos, 2008)

This job analysis was conducted in a manner consistent with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's *Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection*

Procedures, The Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology's *Principles for the Validation and Use of Personnel Selection Procedures*, and the American Psychological Association's *Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing*.

First, lists of tasks, competencies and technical knowledge areas were developed. The process included the collection and review of background information. This background information consisted of a literature review of relevant available documents, such as positions classification standards, position descriptions, vacancy announcements, job analysis conducted within other federal agencies for similar jobs, Office of Personnel Management (OPM) competencies, training material, career track and promotion process information.

Next, a series of job expert interviews with experienced special agents was conducted. The interviews were designed to give the analysts "a broad understanding of the unique elements of the special agent job" (Swartout, O'Leary, & Pulakos, 2008). Eight interviews were conducted following a structured protocol. This protocol guided the participants to identify tasks, competencies and technical knowledge required in the special agent position.

Once the background information was collected and reviewed and the subject matter experts had been interviewed, this data was used to develop a draft list of tasks that comprehensively cover the work performed by special agents. The draft list underwent a series of sorting and refinements by both the subject matter experts and experienced analysts to categorize and label higher order tasks.

Using the same data and in a similar manner, the subject matter experts and the analysts developed a comprehensive draft list of competencies and technical knowledge required for the performance of special agent tasks. The subject matter experts and the analysts subjected these competencies to the same series of sorting and refinements to categorize and label the competencies.

To further validate and finalize the lists, a series of job expert workshops was held to review and revise the draft lists. Four workshops were held with a total of 38 special agents with experience in a variety of assignments and locations. The PDRI analysts

followed a structured protocol to guide the agents through reviews, comments and revisions of each list. The workshops resulted in a comprehensive list of 186 tasks arranged in 23 higher order task categories, 61 competencies arranged into 11 higher order competency categories and 21 technical knowledge areas.

Up to this point, the lists of tasks, competencies and technical knowledge had only been reviewed and commented on by a subset of subject matter experts. A Job Analysis Questionnaire (JAQ) was developed to collect information from a larger sample of special agents. The JAQ consists of three sections: task, competencies and technical knowledge. The task section was designed to evaluate task importance, time spent and difficulty. The competencies and the technical knowledge sections were designed to evaluate importance and if the competency or technical knowledge is required at entry at a particular position or grade. The technical knowledge section also evaluated the level of recall required.

A pilot test of the JAQ was administered, which revealed no major problems with the questionnaire. The JAQ was distributed to all special agents in grades GS-5 through GS-13. The questionnaire yielded 956 responses or a 34.19% overall rate. The responses were screened for quality and analyzed to assess data quality. The results were used to finalize the important tasks, competencies and technical knowledge areas.

The final step of this job analysis was to determine links between tasks performed by special agents and the competencies and technical knowledge needed to perform those tasks. Each task, competency and technical knowledge area was evaluated based on the JAQ data as to its relevance and importance. The PDRI analysts again conducted workshops with a subset of experienced special agents from a wide variety of assignments. Each special agent independently rated individual important tasks with a determination (yes/no) about the necessity of each competency and technical knowledge area in the performance of that task. Task and competency or technical knowledge areas were considered linked if 60% or more of the workshop participants agreed that they were required to perform the task.

The technical knowledge areas provided one area, USSS policies, procedures, regulations and manuals common to both protection and investigative tasks.

The job analysis report goes further to identify the competencies and technical knowledge areas that may be considered in testing in a promotion system. As this portion is not relevant to this thesis, it is not discussed further. The report also made distinctions between the tasks, competencies and technical knowledge required of special agents at the GS-5 through GS-13 levels. Typically, special agents are hired at the GS 5, 7, or 9 levels, depending on experience and education. Special agents are promoted if they are performing at an acceptable level, annually, from a GS-5, to GS-7, 9, 11, 12, and, finally GS-13. As agents progress through the series of promotions, they are assigned tasks of increasing responsibility and complexity. A GS-13 special agent is considered to be the journeyman rate and is generally fully trained and capable of any assignment. Anything above the GS-13 level is considered supervisory and agents must compete for promotion. For the purposes of this thesis, only the sections of the job analysis report pertaining to the journeyman rate, the GS-13, are evaluated.

B. ANALYSIS

As this thesis is concerned with the relationship of the investigative mission to the protective mission, the data to formulate this analysis has been limited to only those tasks identified as purely investigative or protection.

1. Investigative Tasks

- A-1 Receive investigative referrals related to USSS core violations from other agencies, police departments, financial institutions, private citizens, etc.
- A-2 Analyze available intelligence, evidence and other information to determine if a violation has occurred and whether a case should be initiated, put on hold, or terminated
- A-3 Administratively open/close an investigative case
- A-4 Identify the most effective and efficient investigative techniques and path for a given case and situation

- A-5 Plan operational activities to include strategic, tactical, and logistical considerations and contingency and worst case scenario plans
- A-6 Obtain necessary approvals for investigative procedures (e.g., surveillance, use of informants)
- A-7 Initiate case actions (e.g., serving subpoenas, obtaining warrants, preparing affidavits/Title III [wiretaps])
- A-8 Conduct background checks and investigations of subjects and applicants for employment
- A-9 Secure and canvas crime scene to locate and preserve potential evidence and locate subjects and witnesses
- A-10 Interview subjects and witnesses to elicit information and obtain statements /affidavits relevant to investigations
- A-11 Identify, assess the suitability of, develop and use individuals as cooperating sources/informants
- A-12 Perform undercover work to gather information or evidence, including building rapport and talking with suspects in an undercover capacity
- A-13 engage in surveillance activities to collect evidence and plan investigative /enforcement activities
- A-14 Evaluate the level of culpability of suspects throughout an investigation and determine a cases merit for prosecution
- A-15 Determine appropriate violations with which to charge subjects (Swartout, O'Leary, & Pulakos, 2008, pp. Appendix G 2–4)

2. Protective Tasks

- B-1 Establish agreements with protectee(s)' staff and or host committee
- B-2 Plan and coordinate logistics (e.g., transportation, lodging, scheduling, team assignments, etc.) for protective advances and operations
- B-3 Plan and conduct protective advances to identify security vulnerabilities and requirements for protective operations
- B-4 Develop detailed security plans in consultation with federal, state, county and local law enforcement, fire, rescue, and public service personnel, military personnel, and foreign counterparts
- B-5 Develop contingency, incident and crisis management plans
- B-6 Perform safety and security sweeps to identify and locate suspicious individuals or potentially dangerous parcels

- B-7 Perform physical screening procedures on persons, packages, vehicles and other materials as necessary
- B-8 Maintain assigned security post, controlling access into and around secure areas to ensure security is not breached.
- B-9 Maintain proper coverage of protectee(s) using correct formations to provide immediate physical protection
- B-10 Take necessary action to safeguard and or evacuate protectee(s) in the event of unexpected disruptions or breaches in security in accordance with USSS policies and procedures.
- B-11 Maintain control of groups or crowds
- B-12 Collect information required to evaluate protective intelligence subjects using a variety of methods (e.g., review of medical records, subject interviews, corroborative interviews)
- B-13 Assess subjects to determine level of dangerousness in accordance with the exceptional case study and the behavioral approach to threat assessment
- B-14 Drive vehicles during protective movements, executing protective driving maneuvers to ensure the safe and timely transport of protectee(s), their traveling party and their property
- B-15 Maintain the integrity of the motorcade, coordinating the movement of the motorcade through appropriate route(s) and ensuring all vehicles are in alignment
- B-16 Provide tactical support and cover for the protective detail
- B-17 Conduct counter surveillance activities to identify individuals seeking to understand and exploit the methods and procedures used by the USSS
- B-18 Monitor and relay communications during operations using appropriate frequencies and following the proper communication chain of command
- B-19 Perform security room/command post functions to include coordinating the deployment of protective state and local assets (Swartout, O'Leary, & Pulakos, 2008, pp. Appendix G 4–8)

These listed tasks are not the only tasks performed by special agents, but only those identified in the study as solely investigative or protective. By comparing these two lists, it becomes apparent that the most of the skills or competencies required to complete the investigative tasks would be the same as those required for the protective tasks. For instance, many of the skills required for the successful completion of investigative task

A-5: Plan operational activities to include strategic, tactical, and logistical considerations and contingency and worst case scenario plans—are similar to those required for protective task B-5: Develop contingency, incident and crisis management plans.

The PDRI study also identified 59 competencies required for successful special agent performance at the journeyman or GS-13 rate. This analysis illustrates the similarities of the unrelated tasks and the linked competencies required for completion of these tasks.

Table 1 demonstrates the number of investigative/protective tasks linked to an individual competency. The first column lists the 59 competencies. The second column shows for each competency how many of the 15 investigative tasks involve that competency. The third column shows how many of the 19 protective tasks involve that competency.

Competencies	Linked Investigation Tasks	Linked Protection Tasks
written communication	11	12
oral communication	14	18
listening	13	18
negotiating	10	13
influencing and persuading	9	12
collaboration	10	14
partnering	9	16
interpersonal skills	12	16
leveraging diversity	7	14
conflict management	4	15
reasoning	13	18
problem solving	12	18
judgment and decision making	14	18
creativity and innovation	2	18
learning	11	18
reading	15	13
arithmetic	2	0
memory	10	0
perceptual speed and accuracy	2	15
spatial relations	2	0
spatial orientation	0	0

Competencies	Linked Investigation Tasks	Linked Protection Tasks
mental visualization	1	0
integrity	15	18
flexibility /adaptability	11	18
stress tolerance	5	18
resilience	5	18
assertiveness	11	18
attention to detail	15	18
initiative	12	18
dependability	12	18
accountability	13	18
professionalism	14	18
rule-abiding	13	18
concentration and vigilance	11	18
physical strength	0	1
endurance and stamina	0	3
physical flexibility and agility	0	3
balance and coordination	0	6
eye-hand coordination	0	6
depth perception	0	6
peripheral vision	0	6
visual color discrimination	0	6
visual identification	7	10
organizational vision	0	2
organizational awareness	10	18
external awareness	7	1
community awareness	9	18
service orientation	12	18
technology application	2	0
information management	2	0
human resources management	0	0
resource management	0	0
planning and organizing	5	8
instructing/coaching others	0	4
leadership	4	4
firearms and ammunition	0	0
control tactics, restraint/ self defense	0	1
first response	0	0
vehicle operation	4	2

Table 1. Number of Investigative/Protective Tasks Linked to an Individual Competency

Of the 59 identified competencies required at the GS-13 rate, 47 competencies are directly linked to at least one of the 19 identified protection tasks and 41 competencies are directly linked to at least one of the 15 investigative tasks. All but five of the 41 competencies required for investigative tasks are also required for protection tasks.

Figure 3 is a chart designed to illustrate the number of investigative and protective tasks linked to each competency. For example, 11 investigative tasks and 12 protective tasks were linked to the written communication competency.




Figure 3. Competencies Linked to Tasks

Some of the competencies linked to the most investigative tasks, such as integrity, linked to 15 investigative tasks, and attention to detail, also linked to 15 investigative tasks, were also linked to a high number of protective tasks; both integrity and attention to detail are each linked to 18 protection tasks.

This did not correlate across all of the tasks. The competency of creativity and innovation is linked to just two investigative tasks, but to 18 protective tasks. Five of the competencies required for success in investigative tasks are not required for success in protection. Ten of the competencies required for success in protection tasks are not required for success in investigation. Five of the competencies required of a successful special agent at the GS-13 level are not required for the successful completion of either investigative or protection tasks.

Not surprisingly, communication, both written and oral, was linked to a high number of investigative and protection tasks. Only one of the physical competencies, visual identification, was required for investigative tasks, while all of the physical competencies were required to some extent for protection tasks.

Thirty-seven percent of the competencies are linked to 18 of the 19 identified protection tasks. Ten percent of the competencies are linked to 14 or more of the 15 identified investigative tasks. It is important to note that the competency of instructing/coaching others is not a required competency for investigative tasks, but it is directly linked to four protection tasks, which would indicate that agents conducting protective tasks are required to instruct/coach others in protective methods and procedures.

Overall, of the 41 competencies required for a special agent of the USSS at the journeyman grade of GS-13, to be successful conducting investigative tasks, 88% are also required to be successful in the performance of protective tasks. Conversely, 79% of the 47 competencies required to be successful conducting protective tasks are also required for the successful performance of investigative tasks.

It might seem to an outside observer that these two missions are little more than accidents of history, and no logical reason exists why the Secret Service should keep both

of them. However, this analysis effectively demonstrates the complementary nature of the two missions. It also shows that specific, definable skills needed for agents conducting the protective mission do exist. These skills are needed, in fact developed, and honed while agents conduct the investigative mission. Therefore, the Secret Service, and the nation's security, is better served by keeping both missions intact.

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VI. SURGE CAPACITY—PROTECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES

This chapter is designed to demonstrate the need for a cadre of trained, prepared and equipped special agents available for immediate deployment on temporary protective assignments. Protection of this nation's leaders and visiting foreign heads of state is in some ways predictable and appropriately planned; for instance, the Secret Service began planning for the 2011 Asia/Pacific Economic Summit in Honolulu several years ago, and planning is already underway for the two national party conventions in the summer of 2012. However, protectees are also often unpredictable, requiring flexibility in schedule and planning. National security and political concerns can cause unexpected protectee travel, sometimes at a moment's notice. As discussed in earlier chapters, the majority of Secret Service Agents are assigned to investigative field offices. Some of these agents are in their first assignment, others have already completed a permanent protection assignment, but all of them are equipped, trained and available to support the protective responsibilities of the service, for those planned and unplanned events.

As discussed in earlier chapters, the USSS is authorized by law to protect the president and his family, the vice president and his family, visiting foreign heads of state, the president-elect and the vice president-elect, former presidents and their spouses, other distinguished foreign visitors, certain U.S. representatives on missions abroad, and major presidential and vice presidential candidates. The USSS is further authorized to participate in the planning, coordination, and implementation of security operations at National Special security events, as determined by the president (United States Code, 2003).

The USSS maintains permanent protective details on the president and his family, the vice president and his family, former presidents and their spouses, the secretary of Homeland Security, and the Secretary of the Treasury. These details provide twenty-four hour physical protection, and conduct protective advances. The Secret Service also maintains other permanent protective support functions, such as protective intelligence and analysis division and technical security division and others. These details and

divisions are staffed with agents on permanent protective assignments for periods of three to five years. In FY2010, 795 Special Agents were assigned to permanent protection assignments.

The irregular protection responsibilities, such as details and advance teams for candidates and foreign heads of state, as well as planning and coordination of NSSE, are temporarily staffed with agents typically drawn from investigative field office assignments or “the field.” In FY2010, 2,280 special agents were assigned to the field. These field agents provide the surge capacity needed during periods of intense protective responsibilities, such as United Nations general assemblies, typically held in September of each year, and the quadrennial presidential campaigns.

In his April 7, 2011, testimony before Congress, the Director of the Secret Service, Mark Sullivan, provided the following protection statistics:

In FY2010, Secret Service protective details and field agents ensured 100 percent incident-free protection for 5,906 domestic travel stops and 515 international travel stops. Foreign dignitary protection reached a record 2,495 travel stops, including visits by 236 heads of state and government, and 107 spouses from over 147 countries. Dignitary protection also included security operations for the Nuclear Security Summit in April 2010 and the 65th anniversary of the United Nations General Assembly in September 2010. Additionally, the protective mission was supported through the completion of 7,726 protective surveys. (United States Secret Service, 2011a)

The Service’s Management and Organization Division (MNO) provides comprehensive analytical products and compiles a wide variety of statistics including reported special agent hours worked in various assignments. The following figures and charts were produced by MNO.

As seen in Figure 4, the protection manhours worked by agents in field assignments has peaks, valleys and spikes. The spike in protection hours in February 2002 is evidence of the NSSE events, Super Bowl XXXVII in New Orleans, LA, and the 2002 Winter Olympic games in Salt Lake City, UT.




Figure 4. Total Physical Protection Manhours Worked by Field Personnel (From: United States Secret Service, 2011b)

As the chart shows, an annual spike in protection hours worked by field agents occurs every September in support of the annual United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). The exception is September 2001, at which time the UNGA was postponed to November due to the September 11, 2001, attacks. During the UNGA, the Secret Service provides protective details to over 100 visiting heads of state and their spouses. Most, if not all, of the protective details consist of agents drawn from the field on temporary assignment.

The chart also shows increases in protection hours for the presidential campaign years of 2000, 2004 and 2008 over the non-campaign years of 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006 and 2007. Major presidential candidates and vice presidential candidates and their spouses receive Secret Service protection. “As defined in statute, the term “major presidential and vice presidential candidates” means those individuals identified as such by the Secretary of Homeland Security after consultation with an advisory committee consisting of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the minority leader of the House of Representatives, the majority and minority leaders of the Senate, and one additional member selected by the other members of the committee” (United States Secret Service, 2010b). As with visiting foreign heads of state, the details that provide candidate protection are staffed with agents from the field.

The USSS strives for a 60/40 ratio of investigations /protection balance for field agents. However, increases in protective responsibilities do directly impact investigations. Notice in Figure 5, the increase in protection hours in FY2008, a Presidential campaign year, compared to 2007, a non-campaign year.




Figure 5. Summary of Man Hours Worked by Field Personnel (From: United States Secret Service, 2011b)

The use of field agents for temporary protective assignments is a purposeful and efficient use of resources; however, an increase in protection hours worked by field agents also corresponds to a decrease in criminal arrests. The Secret Service made about 400 fewer arrests in FY2008, a campaign year, than in FY2010, a non-campaign year. During the same period, field agents logged almost a million more protection hours in FY2008 than in FY2010. See Figure 6.




Figure 6. Arrests Versus Protection Hours FY2008-FY2010 (From: United States Secret Service, 2010b)

It may be argued that the Secret Service could use agents from other federal agencies in those times of increased protective responsibilities, and in fact, the Secret Service has borrowed agents from other agencies to supplement protective duties in the past. This practice has had “disturbing results for the quality of protection.” The borrowed agents, while professional, do not have the same work experience or training required to be fully effective in a protective function (Melanson & Stevens, 2002, p. 153).

Agents are sometimes deployed overnight to a disaster zone for an unscheduled protectee visit, or last minute news of a visiting head of state. They travel around the world in support of protectee visits to foreign lands, often traveling in military cargo planes along with armored cars and other protective equipment. Presidential campaign years can be a series of grueling advances, bus trips and political rallies. The continued irregular expansion and contraction of the protective responsibilities of the Secret Service, demands a supply of trained, equipped and experienced agents, ready to deploy at a moment’s notice. Experience has shown that the best way to maintain that supply of

agents is to have a large cadre working on investigative missions, maintaining skills and providing a national service, but also available for redeployment to protective duties when necessary.

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VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. CONCLUSION

The investigative mission of the Secret Service was the reason for the inception of the Secret Service and it was the success and reputation of the agency that lead the Secret Service to presidential protection and later expansion of the protective role. It is through this “accident of history” (Petro & Robinson, 2005) that the Secret Service remains deeply and equally involved in what appears to be wholly divergent fields of endeavor. The Secret Service maintains that the two missions are intertwined and complementary. This thesis has been an exercise to determine if the investigative mission is of value to the now primary protective mission. This thesis sought to vindicate the Secret Service’s contention of the necessity of the dual missions in three main arguments. In this conclusion, the author first reviews the results of his analysis, and then considers what this analysis suggests for a new area that the Secret Service is becoming more involved in, cyber crime. This thesis argues that just as the investigative mission is useful for the Secret Service and makes its protective mission more effective, so will increased cyber responsibilities likely serve to complement and improve the other functions of the Secret Service.

First, a case study was conducted comparing the Secret Service’s career track, in which agents are rotated into and out of permanent protection assignments, to the U.S. Army’s ARFORGEN, whose troops are rotated into and out of deployments. Just as ARFORGEN provides trained and equipped troops for deployments, the case study demonstrates the Secret Service career track meets the need for a steady stream of trained, equipped and available agents to rotate into the exhaustive demands of a permanent protective assignment as agents who have completed their protection tours rotate back to field office assignments.

Second, an analysis was conducted using data gathered by the Secret Service in a job analysis of the special agent position. Data from this job analysis indicates many of the competencies needed for the successful performance of protection tasks by a special

agent are the same competencies required for the successful performance of investigative tasks. It makes sense, that if an agent is consistently successful in the investigative arena, that said agent would exhibit the same core competencies while performing protective tasks. It can be argued that skills learned in investigative assignments correlate directly to the success of the protective mission.

Third, an analysis was conducted using data collected by the Secret Service's management and organization division. This data included reported hours of protection work performed by agents not assigned to permanent protection. The analysis demonstrates that while these agents are not assigned to permanent protection assignments, they are needed, on an irregular basis, to supplement the protection of the nation leaders and visiting foreign heads of state. The analysis further demonstrates the need for a ready, trained cadre of Secret Service agents to provide a surge capacity in times of increased protective responsibilities.

The criminal investigations conducted by the Secret Service are important to the nation's financial infrastructure, and provide a real community impact with arrests and fraud prevention, but could arguably be folded into another agency's jurisdiction. However, through what may be organizational foresight or another accident of history, the Secret Service's foray into cybercrime over the past two decades has produced a protective benefit.

As the world has become interconnected and reliant upon computer systems for everything from power supply to elevator controls, it has also become vulnerable to attack and sabotage through the manipulation of these systems. The Secret Service has recognized the vulnerabilities in the U.S. financial system and has developed a robust cyber crime program within the investigative functions to address these issues. At the same time, the Secret Service has also recognized these same vulnerabilities as it provides protection. The Secret Service needs the ability to detect, investigate and mitigate threats and vulnerabilities directed at protectees and protected sites made over the Internet or through network systems. To meet this need, the service has developed a critical systems protection program using special agents trained as criminal computer forensic examiners. This program conducts systematic audits and technical assessment of

critical infrastructure and key resources that support a protected site, or event (U.S. Secret Service, 2011a). Without the cyber crime program, the Secret Service would not have the capability to mitigate some of these vulnerabilities.

Protective Intelligence investigations could also be conducted by some other agency, but the Warren Commission strongly argues that:

an organization shorn of its power to investigate all possibilities of danger to the President and becoming merely the recipient of information gathered by others would become limited solely to acts of physical alertness and personal courage incident to its responsibilities. So circumscribed, it could not maintain the esprit de corps or the necessary alertness for this unique and challenging responsibility. (Commission, 1964, p. 435)

Other unintended benefits have been realized from the dual missions of the Secret Service as it has been able to leverage knowledge gathered in the study of assassins in efforts to combat school violence and workplace sabotage. The groundbreaking ECSP discussed in the overview chapter yielded methodology used in a number of studies to further the field of threat assessment to schools and even the business world. After the shooting at Columbine High School in Colorado in 1999, the USSS partnered with the U.S. Department of Education to study the thinking and behavior of school attackers in an effort to “ identify information that could be obtainable or “knowable” prior to an attack” (Vossekuil, Fein, Reddy, Borum, & Modzeleski, 2004). This study was based on the research methods used to formulate the ECSP. This partnership resulted in the publication of *The Final Report and Findings of the Safe Schools Initiative and Threat Assessment in Schools* and others.

In 2001, the USSS collaborated with CERT at Carnegie Mellon University in Pittsburgh, PA in an “effort to identify, assess and manage threats to and vulnerabilities of data and critical systems” (CERT, 2008). This collaboration developed into the Insider Threat Study (ITS). The ITS applies the same research methodology used in the ECSP. “A particular focus of the study is to identify information that may have been discernable prior to the incident from both a behavioral and technical perspective” (CERT, 2008).

The Secret Service relies on the support of other federal, state and local agencies in the protection of this nation's leaders. The intelligence community provides threat information, the military provides air transportation and communications, and state and local police provide motorcade and site security to supplement to protective details. As another added benefit of the investigative mission, the service establishes relationships with these other agencies through the conduct of criminal investigations. These longstanding relationships allow for better cooperation during protective events. "Through conducting criminal investigations, special agents develop relationships with local, state and federal law enforcement partners that prove critical when the President, Vice President, or other protectees visit their district. These relationships also enhance investigations into protective intelligence investigations against Secret Service protectees" (United States Secret Service, 2011b, p. 8).

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

The investigative mission of the Secret Service has changed many times. Beginning with the suppression of counterfeiting in 1865, the Secret Service has investigated public corruption, combated fraud and financial crimes, and conducted counterintelligence activities. The types of investigations performed by the Secret Service, while they should be substantive and worthwhile of their own accord, are not as important as the experiential learning, respite from the hyper-vigilance of protection, and surge capacity provided by the investigative mission.

Certain competencies learned and practiced by special agents while conducting criminal investigations lend themselves to skills needed for the protective mission of the Secret Service. Agents learn their craft through experiential learning of investigations and conduct of protective advances, while under the tutelage of more senior detail agents or field supervisors.

The protective responsibilities of an agent assigned to a protective detail require a high level of performance throughout each work shift. Much like the need of the military to rotate troops out of combat, the Secret Service must rotate agents out of permanent protective assignments for respite.

The professional liaison and partnerships developed by agents in the field while conducting investigations directly contribute to the successful partnerships required for the protective mission in a locality. The additional manpower in the field, not assigned to a permanent protective detail, provides for a surge capacity of highly trained and experienced agents in times of extraordinary protection requirements.

Further study may be needed to determine if financial and cyber crimes investigations should continue to be included within the jurisdiction of the Secret Service. Certainly continued work in cyber security and critical infrastructure protection fit well within the mandates of the DHS. Regardless of the type of investigation conducted, the Secret Service requires a robust, well-funded and substantial investigative mission to continue to provide protection properly to this nation's leaders.

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