A REGIME LEGITIMACY EXPLANATION
OF AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING

by

Matthew Ross

September 2011

Thesis Advisor: Jessica Piombo
Co-Advisor: Sophal Ear

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The American military needs to understand what incentivizes some African nations to participate in peacekeeping in order to strengthen the incentive structure so that high levels of peacekeeping will continue. The main argument advanced in this thesis is that regimes that are attempting to increase their structural legitimacy are more likely to volunteer for peacekeeping missions to gain international political legitimacy, as well as domestic social and economic legitimacy. This hypothesis is based on a synthesis of constructivism and political economy. The constructivist perspective argues that regimes that govern societies with identities and norms based on protecting others can gain domestic legitimacy through benevolent external actions; this same argument holds true for increasing international legitimacy by following international norms. This hypothesis is also based on a political economy argument that the monetary benefits from peacekeeping are transmitted throughout the military and society, resulting in domestic legitimacy. Quantitative results show that a state’s structural legitimacy is correlated to its level of peacekeeping in a U-shaped curve, meaning that states attempting to increase their legitimacy participate at a higher-than-expected level. Likewise, the case study of Rwanda’s involvement in the United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur illustrates that the Rwandan Patriotic Front government reaps economic, social and political benefits from peacekeeping that strengthen that regime’s legitimacy.
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Matthew Ross
Second Lieutenant, United States Air Force
B.S., Political Science, United States Air Force Academy, 2010

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Author: Matthew Ross

Approved by: Jessica Piombo, PhD
Thesis Advisor

Sophal Ear, PhD
Co-Advisor

Harold Trinkunas, PhD
Chair, Department of National Security
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<td>AFDL</td>
<td><em>Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo</em></td>
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<td>ALiR</td>
<td><em>Armée pour la Libération du Rwanda</em></td>
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<td>UNAMID</td>
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<td>UNDPKO</td>
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I. INTRODUCTION

Just 14 years after the genocide of at least a half million Rwandans, Rwanda deployed 3,800 peacekeepers to the joint United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), the second largest contribution of peacekeepers to that mission.¹ A high level of participation in peacekeeping missions is not limited to Rwanda; the percentage of United Nations peacekeepers coming from African countries has increased from 8% in 1991 to 28% in 2011. Of the 100,000 UN peacekeepers and 8,000 African Union peacekeepers supplied by 115 nations around the world in January of 2011, African states contributed 38,000 of those soldiers. However, only 17 of the 48 Sub-Saharan African states contributed peacekeeping troops and the size of those contributions varied widely. Thus, what are the determinants that convince Sub-Saharan African states to participate at a certain level in peacekeeping missions?

Since the end of the Cold War, and specifically after the American involvement in Somalia in the early 1990s, the West has shied away from military involvement on the African continent. This resulted in the phrase “African Solutions to African Problems,” mainly in reference to security issues. Paul Williams asserts that now “African governments bear the primary responsibility for these conflicts… [and] they should take the lead in responding to them.”² This trend is likely to continue as international actors refuse to militarily intervene in situations that are not vital national interests.³ This trend led many authors to conclude that African militaries will be in charge of conducting even UN peacekeeping operations on the continent.⁴

UN peacekeeping missions are important but notoriously poorly executed. According to Virginia Paige Fortna, peacekeeping missions are important because, “peace lasts substantially longer when international personnel deploy than when states are left to maintain peace on their own.”\(^5\) However, UN missions are under-resourced and the personnel they do have are usually poorly trained, insufficiently equipped, and inadequately led, resulting in an inability to fulfill their mandates. In contrast, the Rwandan Defense Force (RDF) soldiers in UNAMID are motivated, well equipped and competently led.\(^6\) Therefore, it is important for the United States to understand why nations like Rwanda are willing to participate in peacekeeping so that the United States can influence other competent armies to take on a larger role in peacekeeping missions. The United States cannot influence other states without the foundational knowledge of why certain African states participate in peacekeeping missions, and unfortunately current international relations and political economy theories fall short in explaining exactly that.

Neorealism’s underlying principles of international anarchy and selfish states attempting to increase their comparative levels of power is flawed on a continent that has spent the last twenty years building and strengthening regional and continental organizations like ECOWAS and the African Union. Benedikt Franke describes the phenomenon of cooperation in Africa, where “regional awareness and a collective identity based on shared historical experiences and cultural ties provide the basis and motivation for cooperation.”\(^7\) However, those same institutions are very frail, as demonstrated by the poor performance of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) prior to the UN’s involvement. This weakness of institutions undermines institutional liberalism’s foundational theory that institutions can foster effective cooperation between states.


As to the economics of peacekeeping, the United Nations pays peacekeepers through state governments, thus creating a revenue stream of foreign reserves for every peacekeeping government, but states in similar economic situations have opposing ideas on peacekeeping; therefore, the money alone cannot explain why states participate in peacekeeping. In short, the current theories of why states participate in peacekeeping missions do not pertain to Sub-Saharan Africa and a more thorough international relations and political economy explanation is needed.

The main argument advanced in this thesis will be that regimes that are attempting to increase their structural legitimacy are more likely to volunteer for peacekeeping missions to gain international political legitimacy as well as domestic social and economic legitimacy. This hypothesis is based on a synthesis of constructivism and political economy. The constructivist perspective argues that regimes that govern societies with identities and norms based on protecting others can gain domestic legitimacy through benevolent external actions; this same argument holds for increasing international legitimacy by following international norms. This hypothesis is also based on a political economy argument that the monetary benefits from peacekeeping are transmitted throughout the military and society, resulting in domestic legitimacy. The author’s preliminary conclusion for the case study portion of this thesis is that the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) government participates in peacekeeping because political legitimacy can be attained through the socio-political and economic benefits of peacekeeping.

A. DEFINITIONS

It is necessary to define two of the most important and contentious terms that will be used throughout this thesis. These terms are peacekeeping and regime legitimacy. United Nations peacekeeping is tricky to define, as best demonstrated by former UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold, who described peacekeeping as being authorized under “chapter six and a half,” of the UN Charter. Likewise, authors cannot even agree

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on who should decide which regimes are and are not legitimate, never mind what constitutes that legitimacy. Therefore, both terms will be defined in their broadest manner, and then defined as they will be used in this thesis.

Peacekeeping and its definition has advanced through numerous iterations since the end of the Second World War. International security interventions can be envisioned on a three point scale measuring the degree of violence. Peacekeeping is the lowest on this scale, peacemaking the highest and peace enforcement in the middle. Trevor Findlay defines peacekeeping as involving three characteristics; the consent of all parties, the impartiality of the peacekeepers and the use of force as a last resort and only in self defense. Peace enforcement missions share the traits of consent and impartiality, but expand this final feature by allowing the peacekeeping force to coerce the parties to adhere to previous agreements. Findlay describes peace enforcement as peacekeepers trying “to act impartially in dealing with all the parties, in the manner of an umpire, but in doing so may be forced to penalize one or more of them, including through the use of force.” This use of force is even further expanded in peacemaking in which peacekeepers enter a warzone prior to the cessation of hostilities and use more extreme levels of force to end the conflict by bringing the warring parties to the negotiating table. The United Nations has attempted to conduct all three types of missions to varying levels of success.

For the first 45 years of its existence, UN interventions were limited to traditional peacekeeping, as understood under Chapter IV of the UN Charter. This traditional peacekeeping involved only protecting international security post conflict. In the mid-1990s, this changed when the UN’s peacekeeping guide, *The Blue Helmets*, edited their definition of peacekeeping to include protecting internal, as well as external, security post conflict. Throughout the post-Cold War era, peace enforcement also crept into UN

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interventions as the UN became more involved in more complex security issues.\footnote{Fortna and Howard, “Pitfalls and Prospects,” 285.} Finally, the UN usually does not conduct peacemaking interventions, but is allowed to under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Although the UN shies away from these highly dangerous missions, the UN does authorize regional organizations to conduct peacemaking operations. Therefore, since the UN and regional organizations conduct all three types of interventions, the term peacekeeping in this thesis will be a blanket term for all internal and international security missions endorsed by the UN either during or post conflict.

Regime legitimacy is the most contentious term used throughout this thesis. Regime is commonly defined as the set of procedures that determine how power is distributed. Regime legitimacy, as argued by Robert Lamb, involves three parts.\footnote{Lamb, Robert. “Measuring Legitimacy in Weak States.” University of Maryland: Center for International and Security Studies, 18 March 2005, 8.} The first part of legitimacy is the form of the state, or how the state is designed to interact with its different parts. The second part is the processes of the state, or how specific individuals came to lead the state. The third part is the policies of the regime, or how laws are implemented and enforced. Unfortunately, there is no agreement on how to measure legitimacy using these three parts because legitimacy is determined by the populace of each nation. Western populaces view their states as legitimate because of checks and balances between the branches of government, free and fair elections and liberal policies; other populaces also view their states as legitimate even if those states are controlled by a strong unelected Executive. These two different forms of legitimacy are named structural and contingent, respectively.

The difference between contingent and structural legitimacy is at the crux of this thesis. Contingent legitimacy is support that will remain as long as the government remains authoritarian enough. An unelected (or unfairly elected) government can sustain contingent legitimacy from the majority of its population if it can punish dissenters while offering patronage to clients.\footnote{Lamb, “Measuring Legitimacy,” 20.} In short, this is coerced support. This regime will lose its
contingent legitimacy when its revenue decreases and will no longer be able to afford to
give patronage to keep clients or quiet dissenters. In contrast, structural legitimacy is the
populace’s “belief that a regime is worthy of support, that the regime is morally right to
rule in the particular way it rules,” because the populace has a say in the manner in which
the regime governs.15 The idea that legitimacy derives from the consent of the governed
is originally from Locke and Rousseau’s theory of a social contract. The social contract
is the theory that a state is legitimate only as long as the state governs according to the
interests of the people.16

The difference between contingent and structural legitimacy is demonstrated
through the three parts of the definition of legitimacy. A contingently legitimate state can
remain contingently legitimate even when the executive undermines all other state
institutions and even through an unfair and unfree election. However, a structurally
legitimate state would lose its structural legitimacy if it undermined those institutions or
from poorly administered elections.

An unpopular policy decision will not undermine either form of legitimacy, but
for different reasons. An unpopular policy decision in a contingently legitimate state will
not influence the contingent legitimacy of the state because that form of legitimacy does
not rest on the consent of the governed. In contrast, the structural legitimate state is
legitimate because of its institutions and therefore as long as the institutions survive,
individual policy decisions can be unpopular. Vanessa Baird argues that structural
legitimacy (or what she calls diffuse support) “is the belief that although at times specific
policies can be disagreeable, the institution itself ought to be maintained—it ought to be
trusted and granted its full set of powers.”17

A contingently legitimate state can become a structurally legitimate state. The
end of the Cold War led to the end of patronage from the United States and U.S.S.R. to

University Press, 1960); Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan: Parts One and Two (New York: Liberal Arts Press,
1958).
African governments merely for their support. Instead, the United States tied aid to democratization, resulting in elections across the continent. Thus, the post-Cold War shift has been to increase the number of structurally legitimate states. However, political parties that rule contingently legitimate states can increase the state’s structural legitimacy while also not undermining the party’s monopoly on politics by creating policies that are popular and also strengthening the party’s enforcement and patrimonial institutions.

Thus, the definition of legitimacy used throughout this thesis will be based on structural legitimacy, and regime legitimacy will be measured on a continuous scale of the extent to which each regime has its populace’s consent to govern.

B. METHODOLOGY

The independent variable in this thesis is regime legitimacy. Since level of legitimacy is a continuous variable based on the populace’s views of the ruling regime, legitimacy will be measured as an interval variable. However, at times, states will be clustered into four groups based on similar legitimacy ratings. This nominal scale is, from least to most legitimate: low, slight, moderate and high. Metrics based on level of repression and how a state gains authority will be used. These are reasonable because legitimate regimes do not need to be repressive (as measured by Freedom House’s Freedom in the World metric) and must gain their legitimacy through the consent of the governed (as measured by Polity IV’s Authority Trends metric) to be structurally legitimate.

The dependent variable is level of peacekeeping participation. This will be measured in two manners. First, peacekeeping will be measured as an ordinal variable to determine the number of peacekeeping missions each state participates in. However, since participation in a UN mission can range from an individual peacekeeper to multiple battalions of soldiers, this metric does not accurately measure the level of participation. Thus, peacekeeping will also be measured as a ratio variable with the number of peacekeepers contributed to all UN missions divided by the number of soldiers in the
army of the contributing state. This not only measures how many soldiers the state deploys, but more importantly, the level of peacekeeping in comparison to the state’s ability to send peacekeepers.

The casual mechanism between the two variables is based on the constructivist and political economy theories of peacekeeping. In short, regimes will use peacekeeping in their effort to transition from contingent to structural legitimacy. Through high levels of peacekeeping, contingently legitimate regimes can increase their domestic moral authority in the political and social realms while also economically developing the country. Meanwhile, these regimes also increase their moral authority externally by adhering to, or even leading, international norms based on human security.

The methodology will be both quantitative and qualitative. In Chapter II, the thesis will outline the international relations arguments for peacekeeping by reviewing the literature while also presenting an overarching regime legitimacy argument. In Chapter III, the thesis will test three hypotheses that repression and regime legitimacy are correlated to participation in peacekeeping. A linear regression will test the first hypothesis, and then parabolic regressions will test the remaining two hypotheses. Finally, in Chapter IV, the thesis will test the correlation between the two variables using Rwanda’s participation in the UN peacekeeping mission in Darfur as a case study. Rwanda is the critical case because of its dramatic evolution in just 15 years by transitioning from genocide victim to genocide preventer.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW

A. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND PEACEKEEPING

Neorealism and institutional liberalism fail to account for the emergence of medium-powers as major peacekeepers in Sub-Saharan Africa. While neorealism discounts the peacekeeping interests of nonliberal democracies, institutional liberalism focuses on Western peacekeepers.\(^{18}\) Even the constructivists have generally ignored Africa. However, constructivism and the spread of international norms best explain this new phenomenon in African security. Alexander Wendt asserts that a “systemic process that may encourage collective identity formation is the transnational convergence of domestic values.”\(^{19}\) Those transnational values include promoting human rights and economic growth. Constructivists explain why states would want to participate in peacekeeping to become accepted members of the international community, and political economists explain the material benefits of peacekeeping; together, the constructivists and political economists agree that peacekeeping increases regime legitimacy.

Constructivists question why poor states participate in peacekeeping since peacekeeping is a public good. A public good is a non-excludable result from which uninvolved parties can profit by freeloading off of involved parties. Peacekeeping fits this definition since a few nations take the burden of peacekeeping but all nations benefit from peace in the world. Thus, since peacekeeping is a public good, there is incentive for poor states to shift the burden of peacekeeping to richer states while enjoying the benefits of stable neighbors.\(^{20}\) However, this entire thesis is focused on poor states participating in peacekeeping operations.

The constructivists explain this phenomenon by asserting that peacekeeping is not merely a public good because the participating countries can also benefit privately by

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gaining political authority in international organizations.\textsuperscript{21} Todd Sandler’s joint product model of public goods asserts that states will increase their contributions to public goods when the private benefits increase.\textsuperscript{22} Likewise, this pursuit of self-interest does not contrast with positive collective results; peacekeeping for selfish reasons still provides a necessary public good. The private benefits associated with peacekeeping include increased moral authority both internally and internationally for the regime; meanwhile, the economic benefits including higher military salaries, less state money used to fund the military and more remittances, foreign aid and foreign direct investment (FDI).

These benefits illustrate the ultimate conclusion of increasing regime legitimacy. In the mid-1990s, Laura Neack declared that the nations that benefit from the status quo of the international system will participate the most often in peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{23} However, since the 1990s, more African states that are not status quo powers have begun volunteering for peacekeeping. This is because peacekeeping is no longer the manner in which powerful states keep the international status quo, but instead, the manner in which unstable regimes keep the domestic status quo. This literature review will outline the agreements, disagreements and gaps in these schools of thought while focusing on the relationship between society, economics and regime legitimacy in African states.

B. CONSTRUCTIVISM

Constructivism is not so much a parsimonious theory of international relations as an approach to studying international relations. Unlike realism, constructivism asserts that domestic politics matter and that those politics are influenced by ideas, norms and social identity, but like realism, states remain the unit of analysis in constructivism. Alexander Wendt, the father of modern constructivism, explains the foundational principle of any constructivist research, “Idealism [is] the view that the culture of

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international life does depend on what states do—that anarchy is what states make of it—and that IR should therefore focus on showing how states create that culture and so might transform it.”

This literature review of constructivism will do exactly that; after exploring the underlying assumptions and principles of constructivism, we will look at the three manners in which domestic and international identities can change and how those changes influence regime behavior.

Constructivism’s foundational assertion is that social norms shape interests and interests determine state behavior. This is especially relevant with weak African states that are unable to project their power beyond their capitals. Christopher Clapham describes this phenomenon, “The less solid the state, the greater the need to look beyond it for an understanding of how the society that it claims to govern fits into the international system.”

How that society understands its role in the international system is based on the populace’s norms. Constructivism argues that society creates the norms of each state; norms then define identities and identities are the synthesis of common views and values that form a group conscience that thereafter sets behavior. Therefore, identities determine the material interests of the state, a direct contradiction of neorealism’s foundation in materialism.

Constructivism believes in the possibility of progress in international relations. Constructivists see the steps of progress as matching three prominent political philosophers: Hobbes, Locke and Kant; the Hobbesian culture is based on perpetual conflict, the Lockean on self-control and the Kantian on friendship. The difference between Lockean and Kantian cultures is viewpoint: the Hobbesian and even Lockean cultures see the world (or at least their region) as “Us” and “Them” while the Kantian

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28 Franke, Security Cooperation, 27.
culture sees the world as “We.” Alexander Wendt explains how this transformation is possible when societies expand their “sense of Self [to] include the group, and this group consciousness in turn creates a rudimentary capacity for other-help, not just in the passive sense of self-restrain but in the active sense of being willing to come to…other’s aid.”

Constructivists argue that this change, and progress, occurs because of ideas.

The first manner in which identities change is through the spread of novel domestic ideas, or bottom-up norm building. The quickest way in which new ideas become widely accepted is after a traumatic event affects the entire populace. This theory, that trauma can change an entire group’s identity, is based on both psychology and political science. After clinical psychology tests, Vamik Volkan concluded, “The group draws the mental representation of a traumatic event into its very identity. It passes the mental representation of the event—along with associated shared feelings of hurt and shame, and defenses against the perceived shared conflicts they initiate—from generation to generation.” The transfer of the traumatic event to future generations illustrates that this concept has become more than an idea and has extended to become an identity.

Peter Uvin agrees that spectacular violence creates social restrictions that become part of self-identity. These traumatic events can decrease differences between social groups to the point that those groups positively identify with other groups. In Mobilizing the Will to Intervene, a book that outlines why international actors did not stop the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the authors declare that civil society is responsible for persuading governments that the prevention of atrocities is in the national interest of every country. This bottom-up norm building has already succeeded in some Western countries, with Canada as the best example; Canadian public opinion polls prove that after the failures in Rwanda, Canadians became even more supportive of their military

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30 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 293.
34 Frank Chalk et al., Mobilizing the Will to Intervene: Leadership to Prevent Mass Atrocities (Montreal: McGill Queens University Press, 2010), 1.
conducting peacekeeping operations, and Canadian civil society has even coerced its
government into volunteering for peacekeeping missions that the Canadian military did
not want to join. Thus, traumatic events can create new domestic ideas that forge new
state interests. However, not all civil societies are as effective as in Canada and thus
states will not necessarily pursue these new interests at all times. Therefore, top-down
norm building must also be part of this equation.

In the second manner of norm building, top-down, leaders use history, politics
and nationalism to create a collective identity. Constructivists argue that while leaders
cannot control identity formation, leaders can move identity formation in specific
directions. Wendt states this succinctly, “States need to do certain things to secure their
identities, and it is in their nature to try to discover what these things are and act
accordingly. They may have room for interpretive license, but that does not mean they
are free to construct their interests any way they like.” Thus, regimes in post-trauma
societies have a unique opportunity to capitalize on the society’s newfound bottom-up
norm building and the regime can increase internal legitimacy by co-opting the identity-
formation process. These regimes can attempt to increase the definition of “us” for
social groups by focusing on similarities with other groups. Post-traumatic regimes
recognize peacekeeping as a means in which to increase “us” and thereby the regime’s
moral authority, both domestically and internationally.

Norms can also be disbursed through international interaction. These norms are
not top-down from strong countries or organizations, but instead international consensus
on basic ideas. This weaker form of constructivism asserts that interactions with other

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35 Pierre Martin and Michel Fortmann, “Canadian public opinion and peacekeeping in a turbulent
36 Martha Finnemore, “Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention,” in Conflict After the Cold
39 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 238.
40 Bruce Cronin, Community under Anarchy: Transnational Identity and the Evolution of Cooperation
states changes identities as the states recognize similar values.\textsuperscript{41} This creates international norms that structure interests in a coordinated manner across all states.\textsuperscript{42} International norms have changed since the end of the Cold War, specifically in the area of human rights. Governments now have a responsibility to protect not only their own citizens but also citizens who are threatened by genocide or ethnic cleansing in other countries. Promoting human rights is now a major interest to many states, including Western governments with large aid flows. Thus, regimes can supply peacekeepers to satisfy other states into supporting what is perceived as a Kantian (selfless) act. Jonah Victor argues that “African leaders—and specifically autocrats—have turned to peacekeeping opportunities as a way to win the favor of major powers in the post-Cold War era.”\textsuperscript{43} This allows regimes to increase their leverage in international organizations, like the United Nations, by showing how the regimes follow the liberal norms of the international community. Borrowing Joseph Nye’s phrase, regimes can increase their soft power by becoming leaders in peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{44} Thus, international norms incentivize regimes to use peacekeeping to gain external legitimacy.

Constructivism’s basic precept is that in foreign policy matters, regimes are constrained, but also empowered, by domestic and international societies.\textsuperscript{45} Domestic and international norms force regimes to act in a certain manner, but regimes, especially regimes in post-trauma societies, can take advantage of norms or even steer norms in a certain direction to the regime’s benefit. Since constructivism acknowledges that predicates changes in identities is difficult, it is nearly impossible to anticipate the future identity of any society. What is predictable is that regimes learn. Rousseau, perhaps the first constructivist, asserted that actions are learnt through interaction with society. Thus,

\begin{figure}
\end{figure}


\textsuperscript{42} Finnemore, “Constructing Norms,” 237.


perhaps societies that consistently participate in peacekeeping for selfish reasons will eventually internalize peacemaking as their new identity.46 Or perhaps the selfish reasons will be enough to convince these regimes to continue peacekeeping.

C. POLITICAL ECONOMY

States also participate in peacekeeping because the economic benefits of peacekeeping positively influence the populace’s image of the regime. According to Jonathan Kirshner, “All states in coming years will find their security positions increasingly influenced by political economy.”47 Therefore, regimes look for political avenues through which they can strengthen their economies. Peacekeeping is one of those political avenues. Through peacekeeping, the regime can pay its soldiers more, increase remittances to its citizens and increase its foreign reserves to pay for trade deficits. Furthermore, through the positive public image created via peacekeeping, the regime can increase the foreign aid promised to the state and foreign direct investment (FDI) for the private sector. Thus, peacekeeping has the ability to garner economic growth, and in the words of Friedrich List, “The power of creating wealth is vastly more important than wealth itself.”48

Peacekeeping is a legal way to use the military to fund itself. In states in which the government has difficulty collecting taxes, and thereby funding itself internally, states look for ways to save money. Throughout the world, intrastate wars have a criminalized component in which minerals and other resources are smuggled in order to sustain the war.49 In the Great Lakes Region of Africa specifically, this has often been through intervening in the intrastate wars of neighboring countries to claim resources. Danielle Beswick claims that “This interventionism illustrates a number of trends in African politics and interstate relations… [including] the propensity of interveners to profit

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economically through their actions.”50 Thus, African states have a history of using military interventions to fund their militaries. Along the same lines, peacekeeping is a legal way in which the state profits, the military becomes self-sufficient and the international community not only does not impose sanctions, but rewards the peacekeeper.

The first reward for peacekeeping is a United Nations stipend of $1080 per peacekeeper per month. This stipend is paid directly to the central government of the peacekeeping state and then is supposed to be redistributed to individual peacekeepers.51 The regime has three options for how to spend this money: give all, none, or some of it to the peacekeepers. The first option is to give the peacekeepers the entire UN stipend. Since the stipends are usually considerably higher than the soldier’s normal monthly salary, this option increases the structural legitimacy of the regime to the soldier. Since the peacekeepers are in post-conflict zones with poor economies, most of the stipend becomes remitted. The remittance further structurally legitimizes the regime to the recipient of the remittances since the recipient should understand where that extra money came from.

The second option for the central government is to give none of the UN stipend to the peacekeepers. This allows the military to fund itself to a greater extent by using the UN money to pay salaries and equipment expenses. However, this option also carries a risk. Max Sesay argues that the military coup in Sierra Leone in 1992, led by Valentine Strasser and other soldiers who had participated in the Liberia peacekeeping mission, was partially a result of the soldiers never being paid the ECOWAS peacekeeping stipend.52 Likewise, John Wiseman argues that the military coup two years later in the Gambia, led by Yahya Jammeh and other soldiers who had also participated in

the Liberia peacekeeping mission, had the same underlying cause.53 Thus, since the mid-1990s, governments normally do not pick this riskier option.

The third option is for the central government to give some of the UN stipend and keep the remainder. A portion of the UN stipend ($68) is earmarked by the UN to cover expenses for gear and equipment and another portion ($5) for weaponry; since all of that is government equipment, the government would have reason to keep that portion. Using this precedent, the government could keep some of the rest of the stipend to pay for other military expenses (including salaries of soldiers who are not peacekeeping). Meanwhile, the government still receives some increased structural legitimacy from the peacekeepers who are earning at least some extra pay and from the recipients of remittances. In this scenario, governments walk a fine line as their soldiers know how much of the peacekeeper’s stipend the government is keeping, possibility resulting in a repeat of the Sierra Leone/Gambia debacle. Therefore, governments must weigh the benefits of increasing their revenue with the costs associated with disillusioning their soldiers.

Regardless of which option the government picks, the state will increase its foreign reserve holdings. Every state that has a trade deficit needs foreign reserves and states do not want to have to ration their foreign reserves. Thus, regimes can increase their structural legitimacy by having excess foreign reserves. The UN sends the peacekeeping stipend in American Dollars to the state, and the state pays its peacekeepers in the local currency. Ioan Lewis and James Mayall use the example of AMISOM as an illustration of how states use peacekeeping to increase their foreign reserves, “Supplying troops was…a profitable business, especially for Third World countries short of hard currency.”54 Therefore, just from the UN stipend, the government has increased its foreign reserves and either remittances (by paying the peacekeepers all of the stipend) or budget (by paying none of the stipend), or both (by paying only some of the stipend). All three have a positive impact on regime legitimacy.

The economic explanation for peacekeeping is not shared by all researchers. Andrew Blum concludes quantitatively that lower GDP does not correlate with higher rates of participation in peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{55} Likewise, the UN is slow to pay peacekeeping governments the allotted stipend.\textsuperscript{56} Furthermore, if the money is the deciding factor, why would Burundi participate in AMIS where their peacekeepers are paid by the African Union half ($500) of what Rwanda’s peacekeepers in UNAMID ($1080) are paid? Therefore, more than the direct UN stipend must be part of the decision making process and a larger political economy explanation is necessary.

By adhering, supporting and even leading international norms, states reap economic benefits through foreign aid and FDI. Economic stability and growth is a regime security concern since economic stagnation can undermine any regime.\textsuperscript{57} For most African states, foreign aid is necessary to close budget deficits, which increases economic stability. Foreign aid can also assist short-term economic growth through the state. Foreign aid is dependent upon the donor’s goodwill, and that goodwill is based on the perception of the recipient state. The image of the recipient state is up to the regime in charge, and a poor image brought about by repressing the populace or intervening in other countries can be overcome by a Kantain act like peacekeeping. A positive image is also necessary for FDI, which fuels economic growth over the long term. Richard Rosecrance argues that,

Direct investment represents a much more permanent stake in the economic welfare of the host nation than exports to that market could ever be. Foreign productions is a more permanent economic commitment than foreign sales, because large shares of a foreign company or subsidiary could not be sold on a stock exchange.\textsuperscript{58}


\textsuperscript{57} Kirshner, “Political Economy in Security Studies,” 66.

Thus economic stability and growth is essential to regime security and foreign aid covers budget deficits while FDI increases growth potential. Both foreign aid and FDI are dependent upon the regime’s image, which the regime can strengthen through peacekeeping.

D. CONCLUSION: REGIME LEGITIMACY

Constructivism and political economy both explain how regimes can increase their domestic and internationally legitimacy by participating in peacekeeping operations. Sub-Saharan African regimes use peacekeeping to thwart political threats. Jonah Victor succinctly supports this idea that the predominant need in Sub-Saharan Africa is regime security; “African foreign policy and military policy has often been used more as a tool to promote regime security than as a response to national security threats.”59 Regimes see external disturbances as opportunities to secure their rule by bringing together society and benefitting economically; Alexander Wendt and Michael Barnett assert that “the external environment...becomes a source of opportunities for elites lacking domestic legitimacy to gain support against internal security threats.”60 Thus, international relations theory supports the hypothesis that repressive regimes, those lacking domestic legitimacy, participate in peacekeeping. The remainder of this thesis will discuss the involvement of African militaries in peacekeeping generally, and the involvement of the Rwandan military specifically.

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III. QUANTITATIVE TESTS

The argument that repressive states increase their legitimacy through peacekeeping is not shared by all. Jonah Victor argues that in Sub-Saharan Africa, regime legitimacy is positively correlated with the number of peacekeeping operations in which a state is willing to participate and that regime legitimacy has no statistical correlation to the number of peacekeepers a state sends to those missions.61 Thus, this chapter will test three hypotheses on the effect of political repression on number of peacekeeping operations, the effect of political repression on the level of participation and the effect of regime legitimacy on level of participation.

Victor’s data begins in 1978 and extends to 2001. Victor argues that “One international interaction in Africa that is not rare and has increased markedly since the Cold War is international peacekeeping by African troops.”62 That increase has continued at a dramatic rate since the end of Victor’s dataset in 2001. In that year, a little more than 7,500 African soldiers were involved in peacekeeping, but by 2011 that number had quadrupled to 30,000 African peacekeepers. Figure 1 illustrates the exponential increase in African peacekeepers since the end of Victor’s data.63

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62 Ibid., 217.
63 The data points from 1991–2011 are from the January contribution for each year from the UNDPKO website. The data points from 1978–1991 are from Victor’s research and he does not specify as to at what part of the year those totals are from, so presumably they are averages. The data can be found here: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtml.
Victor’s sample size (n) from 1981 to 2001 was a mere 39; the sample size from 2001–2011 was 147. This dramatic increase since the end of Victor’s analysis makes it necessary to retest all of Victor’s hypotheses. Victor used two separate data sets to test his two hypotheses. First, as to the number of peacekeeping operations, Victor quantified his independent variable, political repression, by totaling Freedom House’s political rights and civil liberties scores to create a Combined Freedom House Score that ranges from 2 to 14. Two represents the most “Free” states, while 14 represents those that Freedom House deemed to be the most “Not Free.” Victor’s dependent variable was the number of UN peacekeeping operations in which each state participated, as documented by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO). His method was linear regression.

The author replicated his data for 2011 to test this first hypothesis:

_Hypothesis 1: The greater the level of political repression, the greater the number of peacekeeping operations._
The linear regression is slightly negative with a slope of a mere -0.1843. This nearly horizontal slope (see Figure 2) means that a change in the independent variable along the x axis (political repression) has almost no influence on the dependent variable along the y axis (number of peacekeeping operations). Furthermore, the very low coefficient of correlation (0.0489) makes the correlation statistically insignificant, as seen in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peacekeeping Year</th>
<th>Freedom House Year</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
<th>m</th>
<th>b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>0.0489***</td>
<td>-0.1843</td>
<td>4.4895</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Statistical Results of Political Repression vs. Number of Peacekeeping Operations

![Effect of Political Repression on Number of Peacekeeping Operations, 2011](image)

Figure 2. Effect of Political Repression on Number of Peacekeeping Operations, 2011

This graph does have some significance because of the one apparent phenomenon. Every country that scored an 8 through 10 on the Combined Freedom House Scale
participated in at least one peacekeeping mission, and of those 13 states, all but Guinea Bissau participated in more than one peacekeeping mission. Thus, all of these moderately repressive regimes share this common trait of wanting to participate in peacekeeping.

**Conclusion 1:** The level of political repression does not statistically correlate to a regime’s participation in a certain number of peacekeeping operations; all moderately repressive regimes participate in peacekeeping.

Victor’s second hypothesis was that political repression would influence the number of total peacekeepers contributed by each state. For the 1981–2001 timeframe, Victor’s data was statistically insignificant and he thus came to no conclusion on this hypothesis. The author replicated Victor’s data from 1991–2011 to test Victor’s hypothesis with the new expanded data.65

**Hypothesis 2:** The level of political repression is correlated to the level of peacekeeping participation in a U-shaped curve.

The independent variable remained the same, the Combined Freedom House Score. The dependent variable was the same as Victor’s, the number of peacekeepers contributed to the UN. That contribution was measured using the “Troops” column on the UNPKO spreadsheets for country contributions for each year. The author also included peacekeepers contributed to A.U. operations. The author did not include Military Advisors because they account for less than 2% of all peacekeepers while Police account for 15% of all peacekeepers; future research may want to include these two types of forces to see if they have any influence on the statistical results.

I replicated and then updated Victor’s analysis after making three assumptions. First, states are constrained in their ability to provide a certain number of peacekeepers by the size of their military. Thus, the author normalized the number of peacekeepers contributed by each state against the size of their army to create this fraction:

64 The only other score in which all states participated in at least one peacekeeping mission was 13, in which the sample size is merely 2.

65 UNDPKO does not have the data from the one mission in 1981 and the one mission in 1989, but missing two data points from a sample size of 186 should have a negligible effect.
Ability to Contribute = \(\frac{\text{(number of peacekeepers contributed)}}{\text{(total number of soldiers in the army)}}\)

The size of the army data comes from the International Institute for Strategic Studies.\(^{66}\)

Second, most Sub-Saharan African states do not participate in peacekeeping missions. The number of states that participate ranges from a low of 2% in 1991 to a high of 42% in 2010. That states do not participate was already determined in the first hypothesis; this second hypothesis is determining the level of commitment of the regimes that do participate in peacekeeping operations. To include states that do not send any troops would merely supplant the uncertainty of the first hypothesis into the second hypothesis. Of the remaining states, those with a peacekeeper to size of army ratio of less than 0.01 were excluded as being merely nominal, instead of substantive, peacekeepers.\(^{67}\) This leaves a relatively small n, ranging from one state in 1991 to 20 states in 2010, which make serious contributions (Peacekeepers/Size of Army > 0.01) to the UN and/or A.U.

The third assumption is that the decision to send peacekeepers on an operation is made in advance of those peacekeepers being deployed. Therefore, the Freedom House scores are offset six months prior to the peacekeeper contributions. For instance, the Freedom House report from 2011 (which measures from January 2010 to December 2010, thereby averages June 2010) is compared to peacekeeping contributions in January of 2011.

Below are the results of the regression analysis. Like Victor, the original linear regression was statistically insignificant. Thus, the author switched to a polynomial regression, which explains African peacekeeping as a U-shaped phenomenon. The first column is the year of contribution, for January of each year. The second column is the year the Freedom House data measures (thus, the 2011 Freedom House report was recorded in this column as measuring 2010). The fourth column is the coefficient of


\(^{67}\) For instance, in January of 2011: Chad, Mali and Zimbabwe contributed one peacekeeper; Malawi three and Namibia five. These outliers would skew the results.
correlation with corresponding asterisk representing the two-tailed p-values for each regression (*p-value < 0.05; **p-value < 0.01; ***p-value < 0.001). The following three columns are the coefficients for the parabolas’ equations \( y = ax^2 + bx + c \). The third to last column is the axis of symmetry, or the x location of the parabola’s vertex \( (x = -a/[2b]) \). The second to last column is the y value for the parabola’s vertex \( (y = a \text{ [axis of symmetry]}^2 + b \text{ [axis of symmetry]} + c) \). The final column shows if the parabola opens up (so that the parabola looks like a U) or down (so that the parabola looks like an upside-down U). This is based off the sign of the \( a \) coefficient from column 5. The results are in Table 2, with year-by-year results from the last eight years on the upper half of the table and year groupings (such as the 1990s) on the bottom half.
Table 2. Combined Freedom House Index vs. Number of Peacekeepers/Size of Army

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CFHI Year</th>
<th>PK Year</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
<th>a</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>c</th>
<th>axis of sym</th>
<th>vertex</th>
<th>Opens:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>***0.0906</td>
<td>0.0009</td>
<td>-0.0265</td>
<td>0.2105</td>
<td>14.7222</td>
<td>0.0154</td>
<td>up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>***0.1093</td>
<td>-0.0012</td>
<td>-0.0076</td>
<td>0.2155</td>
<td>-3.1667</td>
<td>0.2275</td>
<td>down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>***0.3138</td>
<td>0.0036</td>
<td>-0.0729</td>
<td>0.3964</td>
<td>10.1250</td>
<td>0.0273</td>
<td>up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>***0.3832</td>
<td>0.0057</td>
<td>-0.1111</td>
<td>0.5702</td>
<td>9.7456</td>
<td>0.0288</td>
<td>up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>***0.5338</td>
<td>0.0103</td>
<td>-0.1880</td>
<td>0.8853</td>
<td>9.1262</td>
<td>0.0274</td>
<td>up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>***0.4987</td>
<td>0.0089</td>
<td>-0.1668</td>
<td>0.8091</td>
<td>9.3708</td>
<td>0.0276</td>
<td>up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>***0.4522</td>
<td>0.0133</td>
<td>-0.2283</td>
<td>1.0115</td>
<td>8.5827</td>
<td>0.0318</td>
<td>up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>***0.4440</td>
<td>0.0072</td>
<td>-0.1295</td>
<td>0.6266</td>
<td>8.9931</td>
<td>0.0443</td>
<td>up</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CFHI Year</th>
<th>PK Year</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
<th>a</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>c</th>
<th>axis of sym</th>
<th>vertex</th>
<th>Opens:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991–2000</td>
<td>1992–2001</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>***0.0131</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
<td>-0.0053</td>
<td>0.0660</td>
<td>13.2500</td>
<td>0.0308</td>
<td>up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001–2010</td>
<td>2002–2011</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>***0.3035</td>
<td>0.0063</td>
<td>-0.1191</td>
<td>0.6008</td>
<td>9.4523</td>
<td>0.0379</td>
<td>up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991–2010</td>
<td>1992–2011</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>***0.2914</td>
<td>0.0064</td>
<td>-0.1179</td>
<td>0.5807</td>
<td>9.2109</td>
<td>0.0377</td>
<td>up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006–2010</td>
<td>2007–2011</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>***0.4369</td>
<td>0.0088</td>
<td>-0.1606</td>
<td>0.7653</td>
<td>9.1250</td>
<td>0.0325</td>
<td>up</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This table demonstrates four important conclusions. First, every coefficient of determination is extremely significant (p-value < 0.001), which means this data is not coincidental. Second, all but one of the 12 parabolas open upwards, which means the vast majority of the parabolas form a normal U shape. Third, the 1990s and the 2000s show drastically different pictures. Compare Figure 3 (the graph of the 1990s) to Figure 4 (the graph of the 2000s).

![Effect of Political Repression on Peacekeeping, 1991-2000](image)

**Figure 3.** Effect of Political Repression on Peacekeeping, 1991–2000
The 1990s data (which includes the three new assumptions) verifies Victor’s analysis from the 1990s. The parabolic regression is essentially linear due to the extremely low a coefficient (0.0002) and the coefficient of correlation is so miniscule (0.0131) that this data is statistically insignificant. In short, in the 1990s, a state’s level of political repression had no effect on the state’s level of peacekeeping contribution. In comparison, a normal U-shaped curve developed in the 2000s and that regression has a coefficient of correlation of 0.3035, meaning 30.35% of a state’s peacekeeping contribution in the 2000s can be attributed to its level of repression.

The final conclusion from this data is that the axis of symmetry converges after 2006. The axis of symmetry represents the x value (the Combined Freedom House Score) for the lowest point on each parabola (the axis of symmetry is an invisible vertical line cut through the center of a U). This means that as a state moves further to the left or right of the axis of symmetry, those states participate at ever more increasing rates. Each year after 2006, the axis barely moves between 8 and 9, meaning the phenomenon is becoming consistent. The axis over the entire 20-year period is barely above 9.
Therefore, the countries that participate the least in peacekeeping are the slightly repressive regimes, and the countries that participate the most are those that are not repressive at all and those that are moderately repressive.

The U shape of these graphs is not typical in social science and thus must be explained. The most repressive regimes (approximate score of 12–14) do not participate at all in peacekeeping because of internal security problems and because they rely on contingent legitimacy. The immediate goal of these states is consolidating their domestic rule based on any type of legitimacy (mostly contingent). Conversely, the least repressive regimes (approximate score of 2–5) contribute the most to peacekeeping because they gain the most from international stability. These least repressive regimes are also the regimes with the most structural legitimacy. The slightly repressive regimes (approximate score of 6–8) contribute the least to peacekeeping; these regimes also already have some structural legitimacy. Finally, that leaves the moderately repressive regimes, those regimes with a combined Freedom House score between 9 and 11. These are the anomaly regimes that participate in peacekeeping to a greater extent than the slightly and highly repressive regimes. These are the threshold regimes that are attempting to transition from contingently legitimate to structurally legitimate in order to ensure the continuation of their governments. They do this by mirroring the actions of the structural legitimate regimes.

U-shaped regressions can be found elsewhere in political science. For instance, compare level of industrialization (x axis) to pollutants emitted annually (y axis). A pre-industrial society is a low polluter, an industrializing society is the highest polluter and a post-industrial society is a low polluter. Finally, a society that has not discovered fire will have zero pollutants, just like highly repressive regimes contribute zero peacekeepers. Likewise, happiness indicators (compared to age) are U-shaped worldwide.68

Conclusion 2: Political repression is correlated to the level of peacekeeping participation in a U-shaped curve.

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68 David Blanchflower and Andrew Oswald, “The U-Bend of Life,” The Economist (16 Dec 2010).
Freedom House measures political repression, but that metric does not necessarily measure regime legitimacy. Thus, the Freedom House analysis was necessary to replicate other theories but is only the first step in proving the third hypothesis.

_Hypothesis 3: The level of structural legitimacy is correlated to the level of peacekeeping participation based on a U-shaped curve._

To measure regime legitimacy, the author used the Polity IV index published by the Political Instability Task Force. This index is widely used to study the effect of regime authority on any number of dependent variables. The scores range from negative 10 (autocracy) to positive 10 (democracy) and the author argues that negative 10 represents a perfectly contingently legitimate state while positive 10 represents a perfectly structurally legitimate state. These scores measure executive recruitment, constraints on the executive, political competition and changes in governing institutions. Running this test, the author used the same three assumptions as described above: normalizing the y variable by dividing peacekeeping contribution by size of the army, that ratio must be greater than 0.01, and the same six month offset between the peacekeeping data and Polity IV score. Table 3 shows these statistical results.
Table 3. Polity IV Index vs. Number of Peacekeepers/Size of Army

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Polity IV Year</th>
<th>PK Year</th>
<th>$n$</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
<th>$a$</th>
<th>$b$</th>
<th>$c$</th>
<th>axis of sym</th>
<th>vertex</th>
<th>Opens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>***0.0637</td>
<td>0.0015</td>
<td>-0.0026</td>
<td>0.0432</td>
<td>0.8667</td>
<td>0.0421</td>
<td>up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>***0.1640</td>
<td>0.0026</td>
<td>0.0025</td>
<td>-0.0189</td>
<td>-0.4808</td>
<td>-0.0195</td>
<td>up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>*0.2483</td>
<td>0.0024</td>
<td>-0.0003</td>
<td>0.0110</td>
<td>0.0625</td>
<td>0.0110</td>
<td>up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>**0.2494</td>
<td>0.0025</td>
<td>0.0021</td>
<td>0.0233</td>
<td>-0.4200</td>
<td>0.0229</td>
<td>up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>*0.1460</td>
<td>0.0036</td>
<td>-0.0058</td>
<td>0.0224</td>
<td>0.8056</td>
<td>0.0201</td>
<td>up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>19</td>
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<td>0.0030</td>
<td>-0.0033</td>
<td>0.0318</td>
<td>0.5500</td>
<td>0.0309</td>
<td>up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>*0.1277</td>
<td>0.0035</td>
<td>-0.0060</td>
<td>0.0333</td>
<td>0.8571</td>
<td>0.0307</td>
<td>up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>*0.1063</td>
<td>0.0017</td>
<td>-0.0016</td>
<td>0.0646</td>
<td>0.4706</td>
<td>0.0642</td>
<td>up</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Polity IV Year</th>
<th>PK Year</th>
<th>$n$</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
<th>$a$</th>
<th>$b$</th>
<th>$c$</th>
<th>axis of sym</th>
<th>vertex</th>
<th>Opens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991–2000</td>
<td>1992–2001</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0.0651</td>
<td>-0.0007</td>
<td>0.0009</td>
<td>0.0626</td>
<td>0.6429</td>
<td>0.0629</td>
<td>down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001–2010</td>
<td>2002–2011</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>***0.1178</td>
<td>0.0022</td>
<td>-0.0009</td>
<td>0.0408</td>
<td>0.2045</td>
<td>0.0407</td>
<td>up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991–2010</td>
<td>1992–2011</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>***0.1126</td>
<td>0.0013</td>
<td>0.0034</td>
<td>0.0462</td>
<td>-1.3077</td>
<td>0.0440</td>
<td>up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006–2010</td>
<td>2007–2011</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>***0.1459</td>
<td>0.0028</td>
<td>-0.0029</td>
<td>0.0373</td>
<td>0.5179</td>
<td>0.0365</td>
<td>up</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This Polity IV table shares many attributes with the Freedom House table. First, in the 1990s, there is no correlation between regime legitimacy and peacekeeping contribution. Second, all of the parabolas in the 2000s are statistically significant and open upwards, demonstrating the same relationship as described above between level of legitimacy and peacekeeping contributions. Third, and most importantly, the axis of symmetry stays between -1.5 and 1.0. This means that, once again, the states that have the lowest level of participation in peacekeeping are the regimes that are moderately legitimate. Also, regimes with the lowest level of legitimacy do not contribute at all. Those that are slightly legitimate contribute to the second highest level. The graphical representation of this data is seen in Figure 5.

![Effect of Regime Legitimacy on Level of Participation, 1991-2011](image)

Contingently Legitimate \[\rightarrow\] Structurally Legitimate

**Figure 5.** Effect of Regime Legitimacy on Level of Participation, 1991–2011
Conclusion 3: Structural legitimacy is correlated to level of peacekeeping participating in a U-shaped curve.

This chapter has presented three hypotheses and conclusions in explanation of which type of Sub-sharan African states participate in peacekeeping. While there is no correlation between repression and a state choosing to participate in a certain number of missions, there is an anomaly in that all the moderately repressive regimes participate in at least one peacekeeping mission (which is not true for any other group of regimes). Furthermore, both political repression and regime legitimacy are correlated to the level of participation in those missions in a U-shaped curve. Regimes with low legitimacy and high repression do not participate in peacekeeping. The regimes with moderate legitimacy and slight repression participate to the lowest level of those states that participate, with the regimes to each side of those participating more; those with high legitimacy and low repression participate to the highest level and those that are slightly legitimate and moderately repressive participate to the second highest level. The results are illustrated in Table 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Participation</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>None</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Repression</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Slight</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural Legitimacy</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Slight</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Chad</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Level of Participation vs. Repression and Structural Legitimacy

The next chapter will explain why regime legitimacy is linked to level of peacekeeping participation in the case of Rwanda.
IV. RWANDA IN DARFUR

Throughout May, June and July of 1994, the Interahamwe, a Rwandan paramilitary organization dominated by Hutu extremists, committed genocide against at least half a million Tutsi and moderate Hutu Rwandans. After the United Nations withdrew its peacekeepers, the invasion of Rwanda by the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was the only means to end the genocide. Just 10 years after this genocide, in May of 2005, Rwanda contributed its first peacekeeper to the United Nations.\(^6\) Over the next two years, that contribution grew exponentially to over 2,000 peacekeepers and by January of 2011, Rwanda became the 8\(^{th}\) largest contributor of peacekeepers in the world.\(^7\) Rwanda contributes all of its military peacekeepers to the conflict-ridden Sudan, and the vast majority to genocide-prevention duty in Darfur.\(^8\)

Rwanda, with a current military size of only 33,000, sends 3,233 peacekeepers to the United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), an amazing 10.6% of its military.\(^9\) No other state volunteers such a high percentage of its military to peacekeeping in Darfur, and only Nigeria sends more peacekeepers to Darfur (98 more), but that numeric superiority represents a mere 3.9% of Nigeria’s much larger military. Why does Rwanda volunteer to send such a high percentage of its military to prevent genocide in Darfur? The argument here is that Rwanda participates in peacekeeping in Darfur for regime security reasons; the RPF government initially had a small power base and is losing any contingent legitimacy it originally had and therefore is using peacekeeping for its inherent benefits of gaining structural legitimacy. Those benefits are visible through top-down norm building, economic incentives for the military, treasury and populace and good-will in the international community.

This chapter will analyze why the prevailing theory on why the RPF government participates in peacekeeping is incorrect, and then how constructivism and political


\(^7\) United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Contributions to United Nations.”

\(^8\) The remainder of RDF peacekeepers are deployed in support of UNMIS.

economy theory better explain the RPF government’s involvement in peacekeeping (Note: The acronym “RPF” will denote the pre-1994 movement; “RPF government” will denote the current ruling administration; “RDF” will denote the post-1994 military.)

First, the chapter will dispute the claim that Rwanda participates in peacekeeping merely for training its military to fight external or internal threats. The chapter will show how the RPF government takes advantage of bottom-up norm building and institutes top-down norm building to highlight its moral superiority to any potential opposition parties. Finally, the economic ramifications of peacekeeping, specifically through higher pay for soldiers, increased foreign direct investment and higher foreign aid, further legitimize the rule of the RPF party.

A. WHY TRAINING IS NOT THE EXPLANATION

One contested explanation for Rwanda’s involvement in peacekeeping is free training and experience for the RDF so that the military can protect the RPF government from external or domestic threats. The RPF government is not looking for ways in which to train its soldiers. The RPF government fears political dissent and especially electoral defeat; the RPF government demonstrates this fear by undermining opposition parties, imprisoning opposition leaders and manipulating elections. The RPF government also fears widespread internal discontent leading to collective acts of violence. However, the RPF government does not recognize any external or internal military threats to its rule.

The only realistic external threat to the RPF government is from aggressor groups from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), but in 2011, the RPF government no longer recognizes a threat to the survival of their regime from these groups. The Armée pour la Libération du Rwanda (ALiR) was a surviving Hutu Power aggressor group formed by the remnants of the FAR and Interhamwe who fled Rwanda to eastern DRC after the 1994 civil war. Initially, the goal of the ALiR was to destroy the RPF government in Kigali and install a pro-Hutu government. In 1996, and again in 1998, the RPF government viewed the ALiR as a threat to the RPF’s survival and, for this reason, invaded the DRC twice. By 2002, the ALiR had merged with another Hutu Power aggressor group, the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), thereby
creating an army with a combined strength of over 15,000 combatants.\textsuperscript{73} Yet that year the RPF government no longer felt threatened and ordered the RDF to leave the DRC. The difference between 1996 and 2002 was the intent of the ALiR and FDLR. The RDF left the DRC because the FDLR had transitioned from an anti-RPF militia to a criminal organization, profiting from selling gold, cassiterite and coltan (the final two minerals are rare earth elements used in electronics). The International Crisis Group asserts that “the FDLR has become more concerned with extortion and selling minerals than destabilizing Rwanda” and also states that Rwanda is under no military pressure from the FDLR.\textsuperscript{74} This transition from an ideology-based group to criminality has eroded FDLR membership more than the RDF was ever capable of; as of late 2007, FDLR membership fell below 7,000 militants.\textsuperscript{75}

The weakening of the aggressor militias in the DRC has been combined with RPF government actions that showcase how little the RPF government feels militarily threatened. States that feel military threatened do not decrease the size of their military; as an example, the U.S. government drastically downsized after the fall of the Soviet Union, and then re-energized its military after the September 11 terrorist attacks. In comparison, since 1994, the RPF government has decreased the size of the RDF by over 40,000 members. In the late 1990s, almost 19,000 FAR and RDF soldiers were demobilized, followed by 20,000 RDF members in the early 2000s after the withdrawal from the DRC. Finally, just last year, the RPF government decided to demobilize yet another 4,000 RDF members, resulting in the military numbering less than 30,000 personnel. A state that feels threatened does not demobilize 57% of its armed forces. The RPF government is not threatened by militant external groups, and internal ethnic problems are unsolvable with military means.

If a strong military insurgency began inside Rwandan borders, the RDF would be incapable of stopping it because of the way in which the RPF waged the 1990–1994 civil


\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., 28.

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., 27.
war and the military considerations of ethnic wars. The way in which the RPF waged their war against the Habyarimana regime resulted in low politicization of the peasantry and a narrow political base. The widely-respected (in the RPF ranks) commander of the RPF, Fred Rwigyema, was killed in the first week of the war and was replaced by the untested Paul Kagame. After initial setbacks, Kagame reformed the RPF into a guerrilla group that over the next three years fought the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR, from the French spelling) to a stalemate.76 During this stalemate, the RPF did not create administrative structures in captured territory to increase their political support; instead, the RPF displaced the local population in order to halt farming in an attempt to increase the financial costs for the Habyarimana regime.77 According to Cyrus Reed, “The RPF’s unconventional guerrilla strategy was accompanied by the large-scale flight of the peasantry, rather than their politicization.”78 This strategy of increasing the financial costs to the Habyarimana regime likewise resulted in increasing the political costs to the RPF since 95% of Rwandans are peasants who work in agriculture. This lack of politicization of the peasantry exactly contradicts the successful strategy of Mao Zedong in China. However, for the short-term, the military successes of the RPF outweighed the political failures, and by August of 1993 both parties signed the Arusha Accords that outlined a joint Hutu/Tutsi transitional government, multiparty elections in 1995 and the integration of the RPF into the FAR.79 The RPF had won military victory but politically had no chance of winning a large portion of the vote in 1995.

The shooting down of Habyarimana’s plane and the quickness of the RPF victory in the ensuing civil war ensured that an RPF government would be unable to increase their political base. On 6 April 1994, Habyarimana’s plane was shot down and within hours, the Interahamwe began the genocide and set siege to a battalion of RPF soldiers who were in Kigali in terms with the Arusha Accords. On 8 April 1994, the RPF began

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its invasion of Rwanda with 15,000 soldiers against the FAR’s 39,000 soldiers. In just 4 days, the RPF won control of the entire northern half of the country and linked up with its besieged battalion in Kigali. An armistice was declared after another month of fighting. Figure 6 is a map of the RPF invasion and land control as of 9 May 1994. Notice how much land the RPF captured in just a few days of fighting.

Figure 6. RPF Offensive Thrusts and Occupied Territory as of 9 May 1994

In just four days, the RPF suddenly had to govern half the country. However, the RPF waged this part of the war no differently than previous parts and thus again limited its potential political base. The RPF was immediately presented with the problem that the North was historically the most anti-Tutsi part of Rwanda. Then, according to a

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80 34,000 of the FAR soldiers were poorly trained due to quick conscription during the civil war; United States Department of Defense, 3.
declassified U.S. Defense Department intelligence report from 9 May 1994, the areas controlled by the RPF were entirely empty of civilians either because of fleeing or forced migration by the RPF. Furthermore, the parts of the country that the RPF controlled were already some of the least densely populated sections of Rwanda, as seen in Figure 7.

Recall that the entire northeastern section, symbolized by the lightest color (meaning least dense) was the area controlled by the RPF. Reed declares about the manner of the war, “Because of the massive displacement of the local population during the war, the RPF did not effectively expand its base through the political activities which

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84 United States Department of Defense, “Rwanda,” 5
normally accompany guerrilla warfare.”

Thus, by July, when the RPF took Kigali and effectively ended the genocide, the Tutsi-led force took control of a country in which the party’s only support was for ending the genocide. Even the U.S. Defense Department intelligence report prior to the RPF’s final offensive assessed that the RPF would have to return to the bargaining table because of its “narrow political base” a base that was established in the minority Tutsi community, and more specifically, in only those Tutsis who had lived in exile. The RPF was able to win a military victory over the militant Interahamwe forces when the RPF was the aggressor, but a future ethnic war or insurgency would have to be conducted differently with the RPF government now as the defender.

To win an ethnic war or insurgency, the military must have enough personnel to control the population and land. According to the US Army Field Manual and RAND analyst James Quinlivan, a successful counterinsurgency operation requires 20 to 25 soldiers per 1,000 residents. Rwanda has a population of ten million people and the RDF will number less than 30,000 by the end of this year; this means the RDF has only three soldiers per 1,000 residents (or between 17 and 22 less than recommended by American counterinsurgency doctrine). Even excluding the Tutsi and Twa ethnicities, the RDF only increases its ratio of soldiers per 1,000 Hutu residents to 3.5. Furthermore, 95% of the rural population is Hutu and therefore much more spread out over farmland than in the denser cities. In an ethnic war, controlling the population depends on controlling territory. Rwanda is 26,338 square kilometers in total area, meaning the RDF has just over one soldier per square kilometer of land.

More important than the RDF’s inability to fight an insurgency is their realization of this; the RDF has continued to decrease its size since the RPF government came to power.86

power. A military that feels threatened does not demobilize its trained combatants. Thus, the RPF government understands that it cannot allow the situation to reach a military climax. Joel Barkan and David Gordan assert that “In Rwanda, prospects for stability turn on whether Kagame's Tutsi-based minority regime can deal with the Hutu majority politically rather than militarily.” This is exactly why the RPF government has been so politically repressive; the RPF government recognizes the only threat it can stop is in the political realm. Thus, the decreasing size of the RDF military illustrates that the RPF government is not peacekeeping to train a military that it knows would be incapable of stopping an internal insurgency; instead, peacekeeping is being conducted for the political and economic benefits so that an insurgency never begins.

B. THE CONSTRUCTIVIST EXPLANATION OF PEACEKEEPING

Constructivism can explain how the RPF government gains domestic and international legitimacy through peacekeeping. The 1994 genocide so altered Rwandan society that the norms of the society changed to the point that Rwandans want to stop other genocides. Meanwhile, through top-down norm building, the RPF government is cementing these norms into society through rhetoric that supports peacekeeping. Both of these types of norm formation influence, and are influenced by, the norms of the international system. Through bottom-up and top-down norm building, the RPF government can legitimize itself internally as a genocide-preventer, and through the international system the RPF government can legitimize itself externally as a force that leads progressive missions.

Bottom-up norm building occurs as societies change, sometimes due to dramatic events, which creates incentives for the ruling parties to alter their actions. Ideas such as culture, norms and identity are unfortunately extremely difficult to measure scientifically. One of the few metrics for measuring these ideas is through public opinion polls, which are entirely absent in the case of how the Rwandan populace views peacekeeping in

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90 Examples include the increase in the massive size of the Ethiopian, Eritrean and DRC militaries before and even after conflict.

Darfur. Another, less objective measure, is through opinion columns in local newspapers, which should represent, at the very least, the views of the intellectual elite.

Unfortunately, most media outlets in Rwanda are state owned and some that claim to be independent are also state owned. The most controversial of these is the largest English-language newspaper, The New Times, which claims to be independently-owned. However, after a New Times editorial accused Human Rights Watch of supporting genocide doubters, Human Rights Watch claimed that The New Times was state owned. 92 Human Rights Watch’s accusation is questionable as this was the first major accusation of state-ownership against The New Times and the allegation was in response to a devastating editorial against Human Rights Watch. The Rwandan Focus is a smaller English-language newspaper that claims independence, and has yet to be accused of being state-owned by any reputable source.

Thus, we are left to rely on the rhetoric of public officials and these newspapers, the true independence of which no one can be certain. President Paul Kagame asserts that Rwandans are capable of bottom-up norm building and have already changed since the genocide; claiming, “One would be making a very serious mistake to ignore the level of maturity that has been reached in the [reconciliation] process by our people.” 93 Kagame’s declaration is not surprising and may not be credible, but logically his statement corroborates that Rwandans, like all people, are capable of change and therefore capable of changing their norms and interests. That interests can change is the central precept of constructivism and therefore an underlying assumption of this thesis.

As for opinion pieces in the media, The Rwandan Focus declared immediately following the first deployment of RDF peacekeepers to Darfur, that Rwanda “has a moral obligation to stand up when genocide is happening, based on its own history.” 94 This is a perfect example of bottom-up constructivism; the Rwandan genocide dramatically

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93 Andrew Mwenda, “Kagame Speaks About His Election Victory, Claims on Political Repression,” The Independent (8 September 2010).
changed the populace of Rwanda so that those same people now support preventing genocide throughout the continent. Likewise, an editorial in *The New Times* asserted that Rwandan “participation in peacekeeping operations is mainly motivated by the need to take responsibility as an active member of the international community.” Thus, Rwandans have expanded their sense of ‘We’ to include other members of the international community who the Rwandans feel they are responsible for protecting. If this is true, then the RPF government is responding to the interests of its citizens by peacekeeping in Darfur; if this is not true, then the RPF government is being proactive by attempting to force these norms onto society. To reiterate, bottom-up norm building is extremely difficult to measure and thus, the remainder of this chapter instead focuses on how the RPF government takes advantage of changing norms.

Top-down norm creation in Rwandan can best be seen through the rhetoric of the RPF government. This begins from the very top in Kagame’s belief that the leaders of Rwanda can influence the society’s norms,

> Leadership is very important in everything. Leaders led our people to kill each other, to have genocide in this country that took a million lives of our people. But leadership that is determined to change that course will also succeed with the same people, and that is what we are experiencing under a different leadership that values the people of this country irrespective of their background, and rallying them for a common cause of building a new nation of Rwanda.96

The RPF government’s internal legitimacy is derived from the moral authority of the RPF ending the 1994 genocide. The RPF government continually uses the genocide as propaganda to remind the populace of the RPF government’s moral authority. For example, the RPF government uses the annual genocide commemorations as propaganda stunts to convert personal remembrance into collective sorrow.97 This extends to foreign affairs, in which one could argue that the RPF government takes the lead in UNAMID to

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96 Mwenda, “Kagame Speaks about his Election Victory.”
show how Rwanda has become a moral authority in Africa. In the word of Rwanda’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rosemary Museminali, Rwanda’s “involvement in Darfur reflects the Rwandan regime’s belief that preventing genocide is the responsibility of every state.”98 In short, the regime reminds the populace of the RPF government’s moral authority and strengthens its legitimacy by stopping genocide throughout Africa.99

Danielle Beswick sums up this top-down norm building by the RPF government to create regime legitimacy, “The crucial role of the RPF in ending the 1994 genocide provides the bedrock of the legitimacy and moral authority of the ruling regime, and the decision to provide troops for peacekeeping in the specific case of Darfur reinforces this moral authority.”100 To clarify, Rwanda only has military peacekeepers in Darfur, a neighboring African country that experienced genocide, and not in countries that experienced general conflict. The RPF government does not just take advantage of domestic norms, but also international norms.

The RPF government utilizes international norms of genocide-prevention and peacekeeping to increase its structural legitimacy, and also its hard power. International donors, specifically in the West, reward states that assist in strengthening international security.101 However, since 1994, the Rwandan government has been highly criticized for the way it handles external security matters. This is especially true of the two invasions of the DRC. At the same time, the regime has capitalized on its moral high ground and circumvented sanctioning by the international community, which has patiently been waiting to see if the RPF government can produce a stable state.102 One hallmark of such a stabilizing state is becoming an exporter of security. Thus, peacekeeping is an attempt by the RPF government to rehabilitate its image after the DRC incursions and secure its place in the international community.103 Kagame clearly stated this strategy of adhering

99 Ibid., 748.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid., 742.
to, and even leading, the worldwide norm of sustainable peace at a 2006 speech at Princeton University, “Unrelenting engagement with fellow Africans and the international community for sustainable peace…must remain the core of our agenda.”

This strategy has paid dividends for the regime.

International leaders, who just a few years ago criticized the RDF as an illegitimate occupying force in the DRC, are now applauding that same military. During a UN General Assembly Meeting in September of 2009, President Barack Obama praised the RDF for its role in UNAMID and described the RDF’s accomplishments as “remarkable.” The Senior Social Development Advisor for the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development in Kigali, Judy Walker, described the RDF’s involvement in UNAMID as “an encouraging sign of Rwanda’s transition to become a force for peace in the region.” In testimony to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Ambassador to Rwanda, Michael Arietti, praised the RPF government for its involvement in UNAMID and assured the U.S. Senate that the United States government supported the RPF government’s efforts. Arietti testified, “I want to stress how important it is that Rwanda, which was itself a victim of genocide, could contribute 1,800 soldiers to end genocide in Darfur…The United States strongly supports this effort and has also contributed technical and logistical support to ensure the Rwandans constitute an effective peacekeeping force in Darfur.”

Recently, foreign military assistance has been focused on increasing the RDF’s ability to train other African militaries, thereby increasing the power of the RPF government by taking on the role of the budget-strapped West while also strengthening the RPF government’s relations with its neighbors.

In August of 2009, a 21-member American advisory team, led by USAF General Joseph Ashy, studied the Rwandan military to explore how to increase cooperation

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107 “USA hails Rwanda's peacekeeping efforts in Sudan's troubled Darfur,” Rwandan News Agency (Kigali, 13 October 2005).

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between the two militaries. According to a Rwandan news source, Ashy commended the RPF government for its peacekeeping operations, which placed the interests of the people first.\textsuperscript{108} Less than a year later, Catherine Wiesner, the Principal Director of African Affairs in the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, declared, “Rwanda has been such a great example in building an indigenous peacekeeping capability and, we were talking about how to build on that, to build better capabilities in the region.”\textsuperscript{109} The first proposal to build better capabilities was to place the training hub for the peacekeeping-oriented East Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) at the Rwandan Military Academy in Gako.\textsuperscript{110} The RDF took the first step to this goal when in August of 2008 the RDF held a peacekeeping meeting in Kigali that attracted representatives from 26 African militaries.\textsuperscript{111} The RPF government is also interested in expanding the Gishali Police Training School in Rwamagana to become a regional peacekeeping hub that would train 400 Rwandan and 100 international police officers for peacekeeping missions each year.\textsuperscript{112} Thus, the RPF government has taken the first steps to create long-term, internationally-respected, regional peacekeeping institutions inside Rwanda to further increase their structural legitimacy. Through these actions the RPF government increases its moral legitimacy internationally, and likewise, through peacekeeping the RPF government increases the hard power of Rwanda.


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\begin{footnotesize}

\textsuperscript{109} James Karuhanga, “Gako Mooted for Regional Training Centre,” \textit{The New Times} (Kigali, 19 May 2010).

\textsuperscript{110} Karuhanga, “Gako Mooted for Regional Training Centre.”


\textsuperscript{112} Bosco Asiimwe, “Police to Set Up Regional Peacekeeping Centre,” \textit{The New Times} (Kigali, 12 October 2010).
\end{footnotesize}
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government-backed *Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo* (AFDL) of genocide against Hutu refugees in the DRC.\(^{113}\) The UN High Commission for Human Rights conducted this mapping exercise by interviewing 1,280 witnesses and collecting 1,500 documents resulting in finding 600 incidents of violence (the vast majority not being genocide-related), each incident had to be confirmed by a least two independent sources.\(^{114}\) The initial mapping exercise claimed to confirm genocide in the Congolese provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu, Orientale and Maniema from October 1996 to August 1997, places in which the RDF and ADLR forces made no distinction between genocidaires (the RDF claimed to be in the DRC to destroy the Interahamwe ALiR militia) and civilians, regardless of age or sex.\(^{115}\) The report describes the actions of the ADLR and RDF (abbreviated by the United Nations in its French form of APR in this passage):

> Attacks resulted in a very large number of victims, probably tens of thousands of members of the Hutu ethnic group, all nationalities combined. In the vast majority of cases reported, it was not a question of people killed unintentionally in the course of combat, but people targeted primarily by AFDL/APR forces and executed in their hundreds, often with edged weapons. The majority of the victims were children, women, elderly people and the sick, who posed no threat to the attacking forces.\(^{116}\)

The edged weapons mentioned in this paragraph imply primarily hammers, and the use of such weapons is evidence that the deaths of these bystanders were not collateral damage from fighting between the RDF/ADLR and ALiR.\(^{117}\) Specifically, the massacres in Rutshuru, on 30 October 1996, and Mugago, on 18 November 1996,


\(^{114}\) Ibid.

\(^{115}\) According to paragraph 515 of the report, the towns where the commission claimed to have confirmed genocide were: Musekera, Rutshuru, Kiringa, Rushima and Luberizi (October 1996); Mugogo, Kabaraza, Cotonco and Chimanga (November 1996); Hombo, Katoyi, Kausa, Kifuruka, Kinigi, Musenge, Mutik and Nyakariba (December 1996); Mpwe (February 1997); Kalima (March 1997); Kibumba, Kabizo and Equateur in Boende (April 1997); Kisangani (May 1997); Bengamisa (June 1997); Mushangwe (August 1997).

\(^{116}\) Ibid., para 513.

\(^{117}\) Ibid., para 515.
demonstrate that the RDF and ADLR were targeting Hutus; survivors told the UN commission that they survived because they convinced the RDF and ADLR that they were not Hutu.\textsuperscript{118} The final conclusion of the report accused the RDF of genocide, “It seems possible to infer a specific intention on the part of certain AFDL/APR commanders to partially destroy the Hutus in the DRC, and therefore to commit a crime of genocide, based on their conduct, words and the damning circumstances of the acts of violence committed by the men under their command.”\textsuperscript{119}

If this report is correct, it undermines the entire external legitimacy of the RDF that the regime has been attempting to repair through peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{120} A summary of the report, presented to the UN General Assembly succinctly declared, “The report questioned the moral status of a government previously assured global sympathy.”\textsuperscript{121} The RPF government’s response to the report was as expected, and the UN counter response demonstrates how much hard power the RPF government has gained through peacekeeping.

The RPF government lambasted the report as poorly researched and immoral, and made very specific threats regarding the report’s official release. The RPF government noted that the report admitted its methods were not stringent enough to be presented in a court of law or to meet academic standards. Furthermore, the RPF government argued that the report was biased because the researchers of the report met with over 200 NGOs,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{118} United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Democratic Republic of the Congo,” para 515.
\item \textsuperscript{119} Ibid., para 518.
\item \textsuperscript{120} No rigorous academic research has been done to determine if the RDF did actually commit genocide in the DRC. However, Philip Verwimp conducted research on the same topic for the period of April 1994–June 1994 to test the double-genocide thesis inside Rwanda. He concluded, “The term genocide should be reserved for the killings committed by the Interahamwe and the FAR, and another word should be used for the killings committed by the RPF. That word could be massacre or terror or another word, depending on the event.” Citation: Philip Verwimp, “Testing the Double-Genocide Thesis for Central and Southern Rwanda,” \textit{The Journal of Conflict Resolution} 47 (Aug 2003): 441.
\end{itemize}
but never spoke with a single Rwandan government official. The Rwandan government’s spokesperson, Ben Rutsinga asserted:

It is immoral and unacceptable that the United Nations, an organization that failed outright to prevent genocide in Rwanda and the subsequent refugees crisis that is the direct cause for so much suffering in Congo and Rwanda, now accuses the army that stopped the genocide of committing atrocities in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

While all of these counters have merit, the report likely would have been published in its entirety in spite of the RPF government’s moral and fairness based objections. However, the bombshell counter by the RPF government showed that Rwanda uses its peacekeepers as political pawns in international affairs to gain hard power. The Rwandan Foreign Minister, Louise Mushikiwabo, declared in a letter to the UN Secretary General, Ban ki-Moon, just days after the leaking of the unofficial report, “Attempts to take action on this report—either through its release or leaks to the media—will force us to withdraw Rwanda’s various commitments to the United Nations, especially in the area of peacekeeping.” The final report was amended to omit the accusation of genocide against the RDF and ADLR. The RPF government successfully used its peacekeepers as both examples of moral superiority, and devices to gain hard power. They are further used to reap economic benefits.

C. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY EXPLANATION OF PEACEKEEPING

Peacekeeping positively impacts the economy of the state that is volunteering peacekeepers. The Rwandan economy is small, with a GDP of only $5.064 billion, and is

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123 Ibid.

lacking in development, with an UNHDI below the average for Sub-Saharan Africa (and ranked 152 out of 168 countries, worldwide).\footnote{United Nations Development Program, “Rwanda,” \textit{United Nations Human Development Index 2010}, last modified January 2011, http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/RWA.html.} Therefore, the RPF government seeks ways in which to increase economic growth to secure its structural legitimacy; one manner is peacekeeping. Peacekeeping benefits the individual soldier through higher pay from the United Nations, it benefits the family and community of the soldier through remittances, it benefits the state through foreign reserves and it benefits the economy as a whole through foreign aid and foreign investment. All of these benefits are seen as a result of quality foreign policy by the RPF government and thus, the economic benefits of peacekeeping result in political benefits to the RPF government.

Learning from Machiavelli’s quote that “Money…is most necessary in a secondary place; but this necessity good soldiers will always be able to supply,” the RPF government uses its military to finance the state. In the late 1990s, shortly after the RPF government came to power, the RDF twice invaded what is now the DRC. The goal of the first invasion was to destroy the FAR and Interahamwe forces that had fled to neighboring Zaire (now called DRC) and formed the ALiR aggressor group and the stated goal of the second invasion remained the same. However, according to the United Nations Security Council’s “Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” the goal of the RPF government in the DRC was to secure property, specifically rare earth elements.\footnote{Filip Reyntjens, “Rwanda, Ten Years On: From Genocide to Dictatorship,” \textit{African Affairs} 103 (2004): 205; United Nations Security Council, “Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” S/2003/1027, last modified 23 October 2003, http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/drcongo.htm.} In 1999 alone, Rwanda is estimated to have profited US$250 million from its mining, trade and smuggling of Congolese coltan, diamonds, gold and timber.\footnote{Bjorn Willum, “Foreign Aid to Rwanda: Purely Beneficial or Contributing to War?” (PhD diss., University of Copenhagen 2001); Stein Erikson, “The Congo War and the Prospects for State Formation: Rwanda and Uganda Compared,” \textit{Third World Quarterly} 26 (2005): 1102.} Meanwhile, in the midst of this war, military expenditures...
were only 4.2% of a GDP of $1.797 billion, equaling $75.5 million. Thus, the RDF made $175 million in profits for the regime; the entire budget for the Rwandan government in 1999 was only $319 million! Furthermore, due to the professionalism of the RDF, private profiteering by individual soldiers from this plundering was limited, and instead mainly benefited the state. However, with the signing of the Pretoria Accord in July of 2002, Rwanda agreed to have the RDF leave the DRC, and therefore the RDF lost the manner in which it funded itself; the RDF needed to find a new, internationally-respected manner in which to fund itself so that it would not be a drain on Rwanda’s budget.

Less than three years later, the RDF began peacekeeping in Darfur. For the entire year of 2010, the United Nations paid Rwanda $47.5 million for its 3,667 peacekeepers in Sudan; the Rwandan military spent $49.4 million on employee costs in 2010, less than $2 million more than the United Nations gave Rwanda for peacekeeping. That UN money can be spent in one of three ways, as previously described in the literature review. In the first scenario, the government can pocket all of the UN stipend and only pay the soldier’s their normal base salary. In the second scenario, the government can pay the soldiers their normal salary and the entire UN stipend (as is the UN’s expectation). In the third scenario, the government can pay the soldiers their normal salary and some of the UN stipend.

Most countries pick the third scenario, but there is little data on which option Rwanda has taken. Geofrey Mugumya, the African Union Director of Peace and Security argues that most African states pick this option so that their soldiers in harm’s way receive some extra pay, but also the central government has left over UN money to pay

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130 Reyntjens, “Rwanda, Ten Years On: From Genocide to Dictatorship.”

the remainder of the military that is not deployed.132 As for the RDF specifically, according to the one source that discusses this issue, the Sudan Tribune, in July of 2007, “The actual amount allocated to each [RDF] soldier was being cut by the RDF.”133 Logically, the RPF government has most likely chosen this third scenario so that the peacekeepers receive their normal salary and only some of the UN stipend, while the RPF leadership uses the remainder to offset a lower budget for the RDF. Therefore, the author will assume that the RPF government gives its peacekeepers all of their monthly pay but only some of the UN monthly stipend. Thus, what are the benefits for the RPF government in giving some of the UN stipend to the peacekeepers in Darfur while keeping the rest for the state treasury?

The first benefit is keeping the military subservient to a political leader that is not especially well-respected by the RDF rank and file, and even disliked by most of the RDF leadership. In an interview with the English-language Rwandan newspaper The Newsline, an unnamed RDF intelligence officer explains Kagame’s relationship with the RDF, “Kagame was never popular among the RDF officers in 1990, when he took over. He was pushed at the top by [Ugandan President Yoweri] Museveni and [Ugandan General] Salim Saleh and the soldiers accepted him for the common good…[Kagame] has been dividing the RDF year after year.”134 Furthermore, the RDF leadership has become emboldened as of late; in April of 2010, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Charles Muhire and the Deputy Commander of UNAMID, Emmanuel Karake, publicly challenged Kagame’s foreign and domestic policies.135 In the same report, the RDF leaders allege, in reference to the second invasion of the DRC,

President Kagame is, in practice, a callous and reckless leader. His decisions, even on issues which have grave implications, are often driven, more than anything else, by his greed for absolute power. President

133 Ibid.
134 “Why Kagame is Falling Out With His Generals,” The Newsline.
135 Two weeks later, Muhire and Karake were arrested; citation: Phil Clark, “Rwanda: Kagame’s Power Struggle,” The Guardian (5 August 2010).
Kagame often makes mistakes of phenomenal proportions which lead to dire consequences for the people of Rwanda.”

How, therefore, does Kagame keep the RDF subservient to him, the party and the state?

The RDF is well paid, and receives extra pay through peacekeeping to keep them compliant to Kagame, despite the dislike of the senior ranks for the leader. In 2009, according to the United States Department of State, Rwanda’s GDP per capital was $510 a year. However, as demonstrated by an extremely high Gini coefficient (of inequality) of 0.467 for 2006 (the last year of available data), the State Department supplied GDP per capita can be assumed to be much higher than the median GDP per capita. To further highlight this difference in median GDP per capita, 76.56% of Rwandans live under the UNHDI’s poverty line of $0.58 (Purchasing Power Parity $1.25) a day. That equates to earning $208.33 a year. In comparison, the average RDF soldier earns $137 a month in base pay, or $1,644 a year. The high level of pay for military soldiers in Rwanda is best demonstrated by the two dearming, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs in the 1990s and

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138 United Nations Development Program, “Rwanda.”

139 The UNHDI’s data is supplied in purchasing power parity. Since GDP per capita in PPP is US$1102 (and not in PPP in US$510), then the multiplier is 2.16. Therefore, the UNHDI’s poverty line of US$1.25 PPP is US$0.58 non PPP).

140 This figure of US$137 a month is the amount the RDF spends on personnel divided by the number of military members. Therefore, it is not the amount of money any specific soldier at any specific rank could expect to be paid, but the general cost per soldier per month for the RDF. The data used to make this calculation are from IHS Janes.
2000s through which many soldiers became farmers, which represented both downward social and economic movement in Rwanda culture.\textsuperscript{141}

Although the base pay for RDF soldiers is high in comparison to the populace, the RPF government and Kagame still feel threatened by their own instrument of coercive power. A way in which to gain military support, while also gaining domestic support from military family members is through low-intensity peacekeeping. Peacekeeping in Darfur is a very low-intensity conflict that results in few deaths but some economic benefits to individual soldiers (albeit we do not know what exact percentage of the UN stipend individual peacekeeper receive). In the five years that Rwanda has been in Darfur, 19 Rwandan peacekeepers have been killed, most in accidents. Based on the average number of RDF soldiers in Darfur in the five years 2006–2010, the chance of an RDF soldier being killed in support of UNAMID per year is a mere 0.12\%.\textsuperscript{142} In comparison, the chance of a NATO soldier being killed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2010 was almost five times that, at 0.54\%.\textsuperscript{143}

In compensation for peacekeeping, the United Nations pays Rwanda $1080 per soldier per month. Using the assumption from earlier, that the treasury is keeping a percentage of this money and giving the remainder to the soldiers in the field, the RPF government can further incentivize the military to support the party. Not only are RDF soldiers already paid more than their civilian counterparts, but whatever extra money they

\textsuperscript{141} At the end of the civil war, the combined forces of the FAR and RPF numbered 54,000, a number well above necessary for a state the size and population of Rwanda. Thus, from 1997 to 2001, 18,692 ex-combatants were demobilized and 15,000 FAR and 15,000 RPF integrated into the new RDF. The second stage, from 2001 to 2005, consisted of shrinking the military by demobilizing another 20,000 of the integrated RDF (which included more soldiers the RDF had recruited for the two wars in the DRC). However, according to Dr. Amanuel Mehreteab, the head of the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, “Unfortunately, in the fragile Rwandan labor market the supply is larger than the demand and employment opportunities in the formal sector are rather rare.” Therefore, most soldiers became farmers, which represented downward social and economic movement. The average RDF soldier earned almost US$100 a month in the 1990’s, but as a farmer struggled to earn half that. Quote from: Amanuel Mehreteab, \textit{Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program} (Kigali: Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, 2005), 62; Pablo De Greiff, \textit{Contributing to Peace and Justice: Finding a Balance between DDR and Reparations} (Working Group on Development and Peace: Bonn, 2007).

\textsuperscript{142} Assume average number of soldiers for year equals number of soldiers in Darfur in January of the subsequent year, resulting in 2006:2646; 2007:2572; 2008:3241; 2009:3235; 2010:3233; avg:2985.4. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

\textsuperscript{143} NATO contributions were 132,203 in 2010; KIA were 711.
are given by the RPF government for peacekeeping further increases this level of inequality in their favor. Since RDF soldiers deploy for one-year peacekeeping stints, and the RDF has deployed a total of 14,908 of its 33,000 strong force, presumably 45.2% of the Rwandan military has benefitted from peacekeeping pay. Thus, peacekeeping benefits the individual soldier with little threat to his life.

Peacekeeping also benefits the family of the individual soldier, and the community where the soldier’s family lives, through remittances. Although we do not know how much of the soldier’s paychecks are being remitted, logically, much of the base pay and UN stipend must be remitted to family members in Rwanda. RDF soldiers are earning their paycheck and UN stipend in a region of Sudan that does not have the economic infrastructure to facilitate RDF soldiers being able to spend much of that money. Family members who are the recipients of their military member’s remittances benefit from Rwanda peacekeeping, thus family members are benefitting from the RPF government’s foreign policy. When those family members spend that money in the community, individuals in the community also benefit from the RPF government’s peacekeeping policy. Therefore, the Rwandan populace in this sense supports peacekeeping because of the low-level (on the individual scale) economic benefit, and these people support the RPF government because of the RPF government’s foreign policy that is good for these beneficiaries (see Appendix A to see a graph of remittances since 1994).

Regardless of how much of the UN stipend the RPF government gives to its soldiers the state treasury still benefits from handling American dollars. Rwanda has a huge import/export gap that it can only sustain with high levels of foreign reserves, some of which they get from peacekeeping. In 2010 alone, Rwanda imported $1.047 billion worth of imports but only exported $226 million, resulting in an export deficit of $821

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144 This percentage is based on the assumption that no RDF soldiers are redeployed for peacekeeping; since the RPF is attempting to increase its legitimacy in the military through peacekeeping, the RPF should be spreading the wealth through rotating deployment schedules. Also, the figure 14,908 excludes the 19 KIA.
million, in an economy only valued at $5.064 billion.\textsuperscript{145} The current account deficit alone is $489 million and is predicted to remain over 5.1% of GDP until at least 2015.\textsuperscript{146} The RPF government’s foreign reserves have precipitously decreased throughout the second half of the 2000s and thus the RPF government must find a way to increase those reserves; peacekeeping is part of this foreign reserve stream. The UN pays the Rwandan treasury the peacekeeper stipends in American dollars, which the treasury keeps and then pays the peacekeepers their stipend in Rwandan Francs (RWF). This process alone gave the treasury $47.5 million in the reserve currency of the world in 2010 (see Appendix B to see a graph of foreign reserves since 1994).

Rwanda receives foreign aid for appearing to be the stabilizing peacekeeper in the Great Lakes region. Rwanda is heavily dependent on foreign aid (i.e. in 2010, foreign aid accounted for 25% of Rwanda’s GDP and 42.8% of state revenue) so the RPF government has been doing everything in its power to increase aid.\textsuperscript{147} Since 2005, when Rwanda began peacekeeping, Rwanda has experienced a correlating and exponential increase in foreign aid.\textsuperscript{148} This increase is not surprising since the RPF government has a history of altering its behavior to match international norms in order to increase aid from the West; transitioning from invader to peacekeeper is an extreme example of altering behavior to prey on norms to gain aid (see Appendix C to see a graph of foreign aid since 1994).

RPF-led Rwanda fell out of grace with the international donor community in the early 2000s but is now receiving more foreign aid than ever before. In 2002, the United States blocked the IMF’s “Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility” disbursement to Rwanda because of the RDF’s invasion of the DRC; in response, the RDF immediately

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{145} United States Central Intelligence Agency “Rwanda.”; United Nations Development Program, “Rwanda.”
\textsuperscript{146} United States Central Intelligence Agency, “Rwanda.”
\textsuperscript{147} Reyntjens, “Constructing the Truth, Dealing with Dissent, Domesticating the World: Governance in Post Genocide Rwanda,” 18.; Erikson, 1109.; United States Department of State.; United States Central Intelligence Agency.
\end{quote}
left the DRC. Within five years, the RPF government had transitioned from an international pariah party stealing resources from the DRC to a regional peacekeeper, earning monetary resources from the United Nations. In response to this turnaround the United States added Rwanda to the Millennium Challenge Account in which the United States granted Rwanda a $24.73 million threshold grant. In short, international credibility of the RPF government is enhanced by becoming a leader in one of the West’s most lofty norms, peacekeeping to prevent genocide. That credibility due to peacekeeping also helps attract foreign investment.

Recent surges in FDI are greatly responsible for recent surges in GDP growth. The RPF government has likewise been modifying its behavior to attract FDI. The RPF government has changed its foreign policy image to the world. By altering its actions from international de-stabilizer to exporter of security to East Africa, the RPF government limits uncertainty and attracts investors. There was once again a correlating and exponential increase in FDI after Rwanda began peacekeeping in 2005. FDI in 2005 was less than $15 million, and by 2008 reached over $105 million. This FDI led to economic growth, 11.2% growth in 2008 alone. Peacekeeping again positively impact the lives of Rwandan by increasing FDI and thus growth rates. Although the Rwandan farmer likely will not link economic growth to the RPF government’s peacekeeping, the farmer will link economic growth to the RPF government’s good governance in general and thus the benefits to the RPF government, regime legitimacy, are the same regardless of the farmer’s understanding of why the growth occurred (see Appendix D for FDI since 1994).

D. CONCLUSION: PEACEKEEPING FOR REGIME-LEGITIMACY

This chapter explored the benefits for Rwanda’s participation in UN peacekeeping, and peacekeeping in UNAMID specifically. The argument that Rwanda uses peacekeeping as a training mechanism cannot be accurate; the RPF government does not see itself threatened militarily either internally or externally, as evidenced by the

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149 Reyntjens, “Constructing the Truth, Dealing with Dissent, Domesticating the World: Governance in Post Genocide Rwanda,” 20
constantly decreasing size of its military. Instead, the RPF government fears political threats. Thus, the RPF government recognizes political threats to its hegemony and counters those threats through both political repression of opposition parties and through good governance, including peacekeeping.

Peacekeeping politically benefits the RPF government through the RPF government’s claims of moral superiority. The RPF government uses the ever-adapting norms of the Rwandan populace, specifically that Rwanda should become a protector because of the horrors of the genocide, to increase its structural legitimacy. The RPF government entrenches those norms into society by constantly reminding the populace that the RPF government stopped the genocide in Rwanda and now is stopping the genocide in Darfur. Furthermore, the RPF government takes advantage of international norms to change its image from that of a regional destabilizing force to that of a preventer of genocide. This increases the legitimacy of the RPF government internationally, be it in the rhetoric of American politicians, or through the building of regional peacekeeping institutions in Rwanda. Finally, the RPF government uses its peacekeepers to gain hard power by threatening to leave Darfur if the UN undermines the RPF government’s moral legitimacy.

The RPF government also benefits economically by helping the Rwandan populace. The RPF government ensures the subservience of the military by paying the soldiers more than they could expect to make in the largely agrarian economy. On top of that, the RPF government gives the soldiers extra money for conducting a relatively safe duty for a year. This extra money is sent home, through remittances, which benefit the soldiers’ families and the overall community. Meanwhile, the state treasury increases its foreign reserves and the RPF government uses the remainder of the UN stipends to fund the military. Also, because the RPF government has shown itself to be a benevolent actor in international affairs, foreign aid and FDI have poured into the African state more than ever before. All of these consequences of peacekeeping benefit people individually and the economy as a whole, which further legitimizes the ruling party domestically.

Expect Rwanda to participate in peacekeeping missions when the missions serve to legitimize the RPF government both internationally and domestically. While the
economic benefits of peacekeeping are substantial, the RPF government will never admit it participates in peacekeeping for that reason. Instead, the RPF government claims it only engages in peacekeeping because of its moral authority and responsibility to protect, a responsibility the RPF government had to first take on in 1994 when the RPF stopped the genocide in Rwanda. Thus, the RPF government will participate in peacekeeping missions that involve genocide or massive atrocities, but do not expect Rwanda to enter post-war or stabilization operations in which the morality of the mission is less profound.
V. CONCLUSION

Social science theory must be logically consistent, empirically valid, falsifiable and parsimonious. Likewise, the purpose of a theory is to describe, explain and predict an important phenomenon. The theory outlined in this thesis was described using statistical analysis, explained using a case study of Rwanda and used to predict near-future outcomes. The importance of this theory, that African regimes with slight levels of structural legitimacy use peacekeeping to increase their domestic and international legitimacy, needs to be reiterated.

A. IMPORTANCE

The role of the United Nations and its affiliated regional organizations (like the African Union) has expanded since the end of the Cold War. The growth of peacekeeping to include peace enforcement and even peacemaking places an ever-increasing burden on contributing states. The amount of peacekeepers African states supply on their continent has likewise skyrocketed over the past decade as Western powers back off from placing their soldiers in harm’s way in Africa. Meanwhile, only about one-third of African states participate in peacekeeping and the African Union’s boldness in conducting peacemaking operations in states still in the midst of war increases the risk to individual peacekeepers and thus further jeopardizes the willingness of states to contribute. At the same time, the A.U. is attempting to create the African Standby Force (ASF), a pre-prepared multinational peacekeeping force based in each region of the continent. In short, the A.U. and the American military need to understand what incentivizes some African nations to participate in peacekeeping in order to keep in place, or strengthen, that incentive structure so that high levels of peacekeeping can continue and the creation of the ASF can be successful.

International relations theory further explains the importance of this research question. Realism explains why status quo powers, like South Africa and Nigeria, contribute high levels of their military to peacekeeping operations. However, realism predicts that non-status quo powers will freeload off of this public good. That realism
cannot explain the actions of Rwanda, Burundi and numerous other African states illustrates the limitations of this perspective. Even Stephen Walt, a defensive realist explains that constructivism may hold the answers to phenomena unexplained by realism; “Constructivist theories are best suited to the analysis of how identities and interests can change over time, thereby producing subtle shifts in international affairs…realism has little to say about these prospects, and policymakers could be blind-sided by change if they ignore these possibilities entirely.”150 The importance of the theory presented in this thesis is to reveal these other possibilities so that policymakers understand the actions of states.

B. EXPLANATIONS OF AFRICAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO PEACEKEEPING

This thesis describes why African countries contribute peacekeepers using three regression models. The first two models replicate and update Jonah Victor’s 1990s model comparing levels of repression to peacekeeping. The third model compares levels of structural legitimacy to levels of peacekeeping. The updated models lead to four conclusions.

First, the level of political repression does not statistically correlate to a regime’s participation in a certain number of peacekeeping operations, but all moderately repressive regimes participate in peacekeeping. This phenomenon contradicts the predictions of realism. Alexander Wendt and Michael Barnett have a better explanation:

In any society the identity of the self is in important part constituted by the expectations of others, and as such state formation is also a process of identity formation. States which feel their identities lacking…try to compensate for such ‘incompleteness’ by acquiring the trappings of the modern state by a process analogous to conspicuous consumption. The things acquired by such ‘symbolic self-completion’ are valued not so much for their instrumental virtues as for what they symbolize in this case, status and membership in modernity.151

Thus, regimes with low structural legitimacy are copying regimes with high structural legitimacy in order to appear similar to those legitimate regimes.

The second conclusion is that political repression is correlated to the level of peacekeeping participation in a U-shaped curve. These sections demonstrated that regimes with average levels of repression are participating the least in peacekeeping. The regimes with less repression are contributing at a higher level, as are the regimes with more repression. Regimes with extremely high levels of repression do not participate at all, likely due to an inability to do so. These results illustrate a follow-the-leader tendency as described by the Walt and Bennett quote above; repressive regimes find that peacekeeping is a manner in which they can increase their legitimacy by copying the leadership states of Africa.

Third, structural legitimacy is correlated to level of peacekeeping participation in a U-shaped curve. Here, we found that regimes with the lowest level of peacekeeping participation are again the average regimes. The regimes with more structural legitimacy participate to a higher level, and the regimes with less structural legitimacy also participate to a higher level. Like before, those regimes with no structural legitimacy do not participate at all. Once again, this graph illustrates a follow-the-leader tendency on behalf of the slightly legitimate regimes.

The final conclusion reached from the quantitative data is that these two previous correlations are becoming stronger over time. Not only has the relationship gotten stronger overall, but over time the level of political repression has begun to explain a higher proportion of a regime’s decision to participate in peacekeeping at a certain level.

With peacekeeping comes economic and social benefits that lead to political strength in the ruling regimes. Economically, governments that contribute peacekeepers can pay their soldiers more, which likely means more money in the hands of the soldiers’ families. Likewise, governments increase their foreign reserves and money available to fund the military. Meanwhile, internationally, these governments prove their allegiance
to international norms, which results in more foreign aid and a more secure environment for FDI. The regime benefits politically as their structural legitimacy increases from these economic benefits to its citizens.

In the case of Rwanda, there are also social benefits to peacekeeping. The RPF government uses the history of the party as the protector of Rwandans to create new norms to become the protector of all Africans. Danielle Beswick asserts that “Part of the Rwandan regime’s legitimacy stems from action against genocide; involvement in Darfur is a way of highlighting this moral authority domestically and internationally and may explain why Rwanda has contributed heavily to this mission in particular.”152 Meanwhile, the RPF uses its peacekeepers to gain both soft power and hard power, by both adhering to international norms and threatening to withdraw its peacekeepers. In short, the RPF government is using peacekeeping to increase its structural legitimacy internationally so that it can continue to repress opposition parties, but also domestically so that eventually the RPF will no longer have to repress the opposition and can win elections based on its accomplishments.

C. PREDICTION FOR FUTURE AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING

A fundamental premise of constructivism is that identities change, and therefore, using constructivism to predict certain events is counterintuitive. Thus, the following predictions will be based mainly on the empirical trends discovered in Chapter III and how the current identity formation process in Rwanda will affect its peacekeeping contributions in the near future.

Since the goal of this thesis is to test a theory to explain the level of participation of regimes that already participate in peacekeeping, predicting if more or less African countries will participate in peacekeeping, and which countries would participate, is beyond the scope of this work. What the author can predict based on his modeling is that if a state chooses to participate in peacekeeping, the level of participation of that state

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will be based on its level of structural legitimacy. More specifically, if a regime with only slight structural legitimacy decides to participate in peacekeeping, that regime will likely participate at a high level.

Rwanda will participate in only very specific missions that will allow the RPF government to pay tribute to its own moral legitimacy. These missions will likely be restricted to post-genocide or post-social conflict situations like Darfur. Likewise, Rwanda will likely not participate in post-war situations that do not involve mass atrocities of civilians. However, this trend could change for two reasons. First, once the UN mandate ends in Darfur, the RDF will need to look for a new manner in which to fund itself. That manner could be any UN or A.U. peacekeeping operation in which case the Darfur mission was merely a first step to gain internal approval for expansion into all peacekeeping operations. The second reason is that the nation’s identity is ever-changing and peacekeeping may no longer be part of that identity, or may become a larger part of the Rwandan identity.

D. FUTURE RESEARCH

The final section of this thesis will outline manners in which to test this theory and areas in which future research is needed. This model is falsifiable because new data can be tested each year. The author replicated Victor’s data for the decade after which his data ended; likewise, this model should be replicated for the 2010s once that data becomes available. The next ten years will likely have the added benefit of an increasing, or at the least stagnant, sample size, which will make any conclusions all the more significant. Furthermore, the data from 2011–2020 will test the trends seen especially over the last four years, specifically that the U-shape trend is strengthening.

Testing these models worldwide would be an important research question, especially to discover if worldwide results would be similar to this Sub-Saharan Africa phenomenon. Another test the author recommends once more data is available is comparing changes in political repression and structural legitimacy on the continent with changes in level of peacekeeping participation. The author attempted this model but the sample size at this point in history is much too small to have any significant conclusions.
APPENDIX A.

Figure 8. Rwanda: Remittance Receipts as a Percentage of Total Trade in Goods and Services\textsuperscript{153}

\textsuperscript{153} The data begins in 1997 because of a 45.6% devaluation of the RWF in 1995 that skewed the data from 1994-1996; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, \textit{UNCTAD Stat}.
APPENDIX B.

Figure 9. Rwanda: Number of Months of Imports in Foreign Reserves\textsuperscript{154}

APPENDIX C.

Figure 10. Rwanda: Foreign Aid

\[\text{US$ Millions (Current Prices and Exchange Rates)}\]

\[\text{YEAR}\]

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\[\text{155 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UNCTAD Stat.}\]
Figure 11. Rwanda: Foreign Direct Investment\textsuperscript{156}

\textsuperscript{156}United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, \textit{UNCTAD Stat}. 

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