State Department/Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization: Inception, Challenges, and Impact on U.S. Reconstruction and Stabilization Capacity

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# Contents

- **Introduction** ................................................................................................. 1  
- **Creation and Role of S/CRS** ..................................................................... 2  
- **S/CRS Challenges** ................................................................................... 6  
- **S/CRS’s Impact** ......................................................................................... 9  
- **The Future of S/CRS** ................................................................................ 14  
- **Conclusion** .................................................................................................. 20  
- **Endnotes** ...................................................................................................... 22
Introduction

The greatest threats to our national security will not come from emerging ambitious states but from nations unable or unwilling to meet the basic needs and aspirations of their people.

U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations

Like the post-9/11 Bush administration, the Obama administration must confront numerous security threats to U.S. national interests at home and abroad. The Obama administration, however, has the added challenge of a severe domestic economic recession. Amidst the economic quandary, President Obama and Congress must prudently go about the arduous task of determining how to best utilize U.S. resources to mitigate national security threats in a domestic environment demanding fiscal discipline.

Of the many existing threats to U.S. national security, weak and failed states are one of the gravest. In his book Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places, Paul Collier asserts that countries with an annual per capita income of less than $2,700 are more likely to incur political upheaval, insurgencies, civil war, and coups. Around the world, there are 53 countries whose average per capita gross domestic product is less than $2 per day.1 The sheer number of states that fall into this category and their caustic emanations make dealing with weak and fragile states both daunting and impossible to ignore.

In its 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, the State Department admits the U.S. government suffers from a lack of diplomatic and development personnel and an inability to apply its existing departments and agencies in a unified, complementary, and coherent manner in response to such states. In the development-promoting realm alone, the U.S. has 33 different established goals, 75 priority areas, and 247 directives, stretched over 12 departments and 25 agencies, with no national strategy linking them together.2

Two of the most notable Bush administration and congressional efforts to integrate U.S. capability in addressing weak or failed states were the establishment of the Office of the Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) within the State Department to lead and coordinate conflict prevention and responses
and making stability operations a core U.S. military operational task. While both actions seem appropriate, the following examination will indicate neither has resulted in an optimal level of capacity to stabilize weak, failing, or failed states. Additional measures are needed to develop fully the means necessary for this purpose. These measures include greater funding and staffing of S/CRS and establishing Congressional Reconstruction and Stabilization Oversight Committees in both houses of Congress.

Creation and Role of S/CRS

According to its website the S/CRS mission is:

To lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy, and a market economy.

However, the road to such a definitive mission and obtaining the actual ability to accomplish it has been long and not yet completely traveled. By 2004, U.S. difficulties in stabilizing and reconstructing Iraq, which included a lack of civilian expertise to work alongside the military and an overall governmental lack of unified effort, prompted the Bush administration to begin rectification efforts. In that same year, the National Security Council (NSC) Principals Committee approved establishment of a stabilization and reconstruction office within the U.S. government. Intergovernmental disagreement over where to place the new entity immediately surfaced. Ultimately, the decision was made to place the new organization within the State Department under the purview of the Secretary of State.

The first coordinator, Ambassador Carlos Pascual, was given responsibility for strategic reconstruction and stabilization planning as well as the mobilization and coordination of civilian expertise needed to execute the plan. Statutory authority supporting S/CRS came into existence when Public Law (P.L.) 108-447 became official law on December 8, 2004. In section 408, the law established the S/CRS within the State Department without formally amending the 1956 legislation that served as the basis of the State Department’s structure and stated the coordinator report directly to the Secretary of State. Section 408 also specified the following six functions for the S/CRS:

(1) Cataloguing and monitoring the non-military resources and capabilities of Executive agencies (as that term is defined in section
105 of Title 5, United States Code), State and local governments, and entities in the private and non-profit sectors that are available to address crises in countries or regions that are in, or transitioning from, conflict or civil strife.

(2) Monitoring political and economic instability worldwide to anticipate the need for mobilizing United States and international assistance for countries or regions described in paragraph (1).

(3) Assessing crises in countries or regions described in paragraph (1) and determining the appropriate non-military United States response, including but not limited to demobilization, policing, human rights monitoring, and public information efforts.

(4) Planning for response efforts under paragraph (3).

(5) Coordinating with relevant Executive agencies the development of interagency contingency plans for such response efforts.

(6) Coordinating the training of civilian personnel to perform stabilization and reconstruction activities in response to crises in such countries or regions described in paragraph (1).

However, by not amending the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956, the law brought the S/CRS into existence on temporary terms. Congress also failed to provide the corollary funding needed for the office to carry out its six assigned functions.

On December 7, 2005, the Bush administration issued National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44 to formalize further S/CRS’s existence and purpose. Overall, the directive was intended to “promote the security of the United States through improved coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife.” The document highlighted the criticality of anticipating, avoiding, and responding quickly to failing states through the promotion of peace, security, development, democratic practices, market economies, and rule of law when necessary. NSPD-44 specifically made the Secretary of State responsible for coordinating and leading U.S. efforts across all relevant or capable U.S. department or agencies to prepare, plan, and execute U.S. stabilization and reconstruction activities. The Secretary of State’s mandate also included “harmonization” of U.S. reconstruction and stabilization with all planned and/or ongoing U.S. military operations “across the spectrum of conflict.”

In order to achieve the objectives outlined in NSPD-44, the directive specifically authorized the Secretary of State to direct the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to “assist” the Secretary of State in completing functions ranging from development
of reconstruction and stabilization strategies to coordinating with the Secretary of Defense to ensure “harmonization” of reconstruction and stabilization planning and operations. NSPD-44 clearly made the Secretary of State responsible for a comprehensive list of activities in which he/she could seek the assistance of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to execute; however, the directive’s specific reference to S/CRS’s role is only mentioned in the context of the interagency. The directive specifically requires all “Executive Department and Agencies whose programs and personnel may be able to assist in addressing the relevant challenges” to support the Coordinator in budgeting, synchronizing, identifying expert personnel, identifying weak or fragile state situations of concern, and providing personnel for exercises, training, planning, task forces, and staffing of S/CRS.

NSPD-44 served to formalize further S/CRS’s existence within the U.S. government structure, yet its weakness lie in two points. It granted the Secretary of State too much latitude in how to lead U.S. reconstruction, which led to a failure to empower S/CRS as the lead U.S. entity for reconstruction and stabilization. Secondly, being a presidential directive as opposed to legislation, it lacked the ability to make S/CRS a permanent State Department entity or provide the State Department with the additional funding required to make S/CRS an operational element capable of “assisting” the Secretary of State in carrying out the extensive list of new responsibilities.

Lacking this necessary empowerment and an accompanying legislated budget proved problematic for S/CRS. In essence, it was left to languish on the periphery of the State Department’s sphere of influence and in its operational ability. However, with passage of the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2008 (H.R. 1084) on March 5, 2008, legislative action dealing with S/CRS finally achieved traction. H.R. 1084 proposed to authorize the President (after providing fifteen days advance notice to Congress) to provide up to $100 million annually in assistance to weak or failing states through 2010. The Act further sought to amend the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 to formally establish an S/CRS within the Department. The bill also directed the Secretary of State to develop an interagency strategy for reconstruction and stabilization operations (RSO). Finally, the bill served as the core of Title XVI of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for FY2009 (P.L. 110-417), which became U.S. law on October 14, 2008.4

P.L. 110-417 is significant for the solidification of S/CRS and overall U.S. governmental reconstruction and stabilization capacity in several ways. By amending Title 1 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956, Congress made the S/CRS a permanent...
component of State Department and U.S. government. It mandated the President with the advice and consent of the Senate appoint the position of Coordinator. P.L. 110-417 further clarified the S/ CRS’s role and added to the functions promulgated in P.L. 108-447. In addition to the original six functions, S/CRS was also made responsible for entering into arrangements with agencies to carry out RSO; ensuring that all U.S. government RSO plans are coordinated and complementary to other government, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organization plans; and maintaining the capacity to deploy interagency evaluation teams to assess situations possibly requiring RSO. While only valid for fiscal years 2009 through 2011, the new public law amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to allow the President, after giving Congress fifteen days notice, to transfer funds made available under any existing Foreign Assistance Act program. The Response Readiness Corps (RRC) consisting of active and stand-by components as well as a Civilian Response Corp (CRC) consisting of civilian volunteers with expert reconstruction and stabilization skills were also formally authorized under P.L. 110-417, and the law charged the Secretary of State with developing this capability.

Following enactment of the new law, S/CRS has led the interagency process to create the CRC. As defined by State Department and S/CRS, the CRC now encompasses the RRC and will ultimately consist of engineers, lawyers, judges, corrections officers, diplomats, development experts, public administrators, public health officials, city planners, border control officials, and economists as well as personnel from the Departments of State, Agriculture, Commerce, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Justice, and Treasury.

The CRC is broken down into three elements. The CRC-Active (CRC-A) is to be composed of 250 federal employees dedicated to conducting initial RSO interagency assessment, planning, management, administration, logistics, and resource mobilization. CRC-A personnel can be deployed within 72 hours of notification. The CRC-Standby (CRC-S) is to consist of 2,000 additional personnel from across the government, who will serve as follow-on personnel to the CRC-A deployable within 30 to 60 days of notification. The CRC-S is structured to sustain up to 25 percent of its personnel deployed at any one time. The CRC-Reserve (CRC-R) was to be composed of 2,000 state and local government and private sector personnel who possess skill sets or professional expertise that do not normally exist within the U.S. government. Similar to the U.S. military reserve system, CRC-R personnel were to volunteer for four-year commitments, attend two weeks of annual training, and be able to deploy for up to one year following two months notification.
One of the greatest obstacles S/CRS has encountered is internal State Department friction. Under Secretary of State Colin Powell, S/CRS was advised to stay clear of the nation’s two most pressing reconstruction and stabilization challenges, Iraq and Afghanistan, for fear it would become bogged down and unable to develop as an element capable of engaging the broader global weak and failing state issue. Instead, S/CRS focused on preventing conflict through early identification of instability and developing a reconstruction and stabilization framework and planning capacity. Early identification efforts included working with the National Intelligence Council and State Department geographic bureaus, but S/CRS met resistance from ambassadors and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) directors, who feared that a watch list would hinder relations with their partner nation counterparts. State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement resisted S/CRS encroachment into operational control of police training, while the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs attempted to exert control over complex contingency planning and conflict response to counterinsurgency. Moreover, the State Department geographic bureaus were reluctant to relinquish any power to the new understaffed and unfunded coordinator.

USAID administrator, Andrew Natsios, viewed S/CRS as unnecessary capacity duplication of what he was attempting to build by creating a new Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation within USAID’s Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA). He also feared that disaster assistance response teams, belonging to USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, would be pulled into S/CRS’s service. Administrator Natsios’s charge of duplicative effort between portions of USAID and S/CRS are neither completely unfounded nor completely accurate.

Established in 1994, the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), located within DCHA, was created to work in countries of U.S. national interest where it was assessed as possible to surge USAID developmental expertise and programming to successfully transition a country from a situation of conflict to peace. Since its
inception, OTI has worked in 36 countries, all of which could be considered weak or failing states. OTI programs are specifically tailored to the respective country, two/three years in duration, and designed to fill gaps created by deficient or inappropriate existing, large scale, USAID programming. Like S/CRS, OTI has lacked sufficient operational program funding. With only 50 staff members, OTI provides expert, expeditionary, stabilization capacity in extremely limited quantities. Within USAID and across the U.S. government, OTI’s role as a quick, tailored response contingent has been brought into question because of its seemingly redundant capabilities with S/CRS. Proposals to merge OTI with S/CRS have been met with internal resistance, based on concern that State Department’s bureaucratic management system would hinder OTI’s ability to act quickly.9

USAID’s Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM), like OTI, is organizationally positioned within USAID’s DCHA, and it too has some overlap with S/CRS responsibilities. Similar to S/CRS, it was designed to be “an agency that effectively prevents, mitigates, and manages the causes and consequences of violent conflict, instability, and extremism.”10 However, CMM’s mandate is solely to integrate USAID stabilization actions, whereas S/CRS is mandated to have a whole-of-government focus. Years after NSPD-44, State Department and USAID personnel still fail to accept S/CRS’s lead role in RSO.11 Aside from USAID resistance, S/CRS has lacked support from within State Department proper.

Personnel changes accompanying Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s assumption of position resulted in S/CRS losing its small but critical support within the State Department’s deputy-level ranks.12 While Secretary of State Rice intended on personally championing the S/CRS cause,13 she failed to make S/CRS the central figure in U.S. RSO. In 2005, S/CRS co-chaired a planning group that produced the first detailed and unified U.S. interagency strategy for action in Sudan. However, when the 2006 Lebanon crisis occurred, State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and the USAID administrator blocked S/CRS’s participation, and Secretary of State Rice failed to inject S/CRS into the process. In 2007, S/CRS played a minor advisory role in establishing provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) in Iraq. Its continued, limited, Iraq role consists of providing training curriculum for U.S. personnel deploying to the conflict.14 During the 2008 Democratic Republic of Georgia crisis, the U.S. government initially overlooked S/CRS for two weeks until an S/CRS planning team was sent to support the U.S. Country Team in Tbilisi.15 In 2008, S/CRS created a civil-military group within the U.S. embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, where S/CRS assisted in developing civil-military plans for all twelve American PRTs.16
While S/CRS has lacked personnel capacity due to limited funding, it certainly would appear that the executive branch of the U.S. government’s failure to place existing S/CRS capacity at the center of RSO planning conducted since its inception prevented S/CRS from gaining valuable experience and government-wide credibility.

Lack of legislative support via funding remains a core S/CRS problem. S/CRS receives its funding from the State Department’s Diplomatic and Consular Affairs budget. From the start, this arrangement put S/CRS in direct competition with other elements of the State Department, who, as previously mentioned, viewed the newly created S/CRS as either unnecessary or unwanted. In 2004, the NSC Deputies Committee recognized the need for as much as $350 million dedicated specifically for reconstruction and stabilization operational funds, to be used primarily by S/CRS; however, the NSC Principals Committee failed to agree on an actual amount. The Office of Management and Budget allocated only $100 million for a conflict response fund, with no more than $25 million allocated for S/CRS operations. The FY2006 budget appropriation did not contain any money for the conflict response fund. In 2007, President Bush called for Congressional action to create the CRC, yet his administration’s FY2008 budget request did not include a request for the requisite funding. Through supplemental appropriations in June 2008, Congress provided $30 million to the State Department specifically to develop a civilian response capacity. The amount was far short of what would be required to establish and field any significant civilian response capacity.

Including for the first time a Civilian Stabilization Initiative (CSI) funding line, the Bush administration’s FY2009 budget request sought to obtain funding sufficient to establish operational CRC capacity. However, Congress failed to fund fully the $248.6 million request. Far short of the required amount, Congress appropriated just $45 million to State Department for S/CRS and the CRC. The situation appeared to improve in FY2010, but Congress rescinded $40 million of its original $120 million dollars appropriation, leaving S/CRS and CRC two-thirds short of what was needed. Requesting $184 million in CSI in FY2011, the Obama administration was less aggressive than in the past, yet it received only $85 million. Overall, FY2009 and FY2010 budgets failed to provide any funding for the CRC-R, and the CRC-A has just over half of its authorized 250 personnel. At the beginning of 2010, the CRC-A’s authorized versus on-hand staffing break down consisted of 32 of 68 State Department personnel, 14 of 91 USAID personnel, 21 of 62 Justice Department personnel, 2 of 8 Department of Agriculture personnel, 2 of 5 Health and Human Services Department personnel, 1 of 5 Commerce Department personnel, 1 of 7 Department of Homeland...
Security Personnel, and 1 of 1 Treasury Department personnel.\textsuperscript{19} The CRC-S consists of approximately half of the desired 2,000 personnel.\textsuperscript{20} The small existing S/CRS capability has had to rely on Department of Defense (DoD) for operational funding.

Section 1207 of the FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act authorized DoD to transfer up to $100 million per fiscal year to the State Department for security, reconstruction, and stabilization activities. In light of a perception that Congress would more readily approve a DoD request than a State Department request, DoD requested Section 1207 funding. Between 2006 and 2009, Section 1207 funding transfers totaled $353 million and have been used to support fourteen weak or failing states. However, from the start, Section 1207 funding was meant to be a temporary funding mechanism (only approved for use through 2010) to support S/CRS-driven activities until Congress provided S/CRS with its own annual reconstruction and stabilization focused operational funding. In 2008, Secretary Robert Gates testified to the importance of such funding in “bringing civilian expertise to operate alongside or in place of our armed forces.” Paradoxically, one of Congress’s primary concerns is that DoD should not provide the State Department long-term funding to meet its statutory requirements, while failing to provide State Department with the funding necessary to fully staff or operationalize S/CRS and the CRC. Another DoD work-around utilizing Defense Security Cooperation Agency appropriated funding was proposed in 2010 to allow the transfer of nearly $100 million until a State Department Complex Crisis Fund was established.\textsuperscript{21} The issue remains unresolved. As a result, expeditionary civilian U.S. reconstruction and stabilization potential remains unfulfilled. Even with little in terms of resources, S/CRS has been able to increase its operational activities and has even managed to enhance U.S. RSO capacity in several meaningful ways.

**S/SCR’s Impact**

In 2009, S/CRS had an active presence in fourteen different weak or failed states. S/CRS activities included Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) assessments, RSO strategy development in conjunction with country teams, program implementation, policy support, gathering lessons learned, training, and measuring RSO effectiveness.\textsuperscript{22} S/CRS’s level of activity represents progress and momentum in the entity’s effort to fulfill its statutory responsibilities. While progress has been slow, it is not for lack of commitment on the part of S/CRS personnel.

Following its inception, S/CRS quickly initiated work with the
In April 2005, S/CRS published the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Task Matrix, which was “a compilation of individual tasks that, when taken as a whole, are intended to support a country in transition from armed conflict or civil strife to sustainable stability.”

U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) to develop a post-conflict reconstruction essential tasks matrix and a U.S. government-planning framework for reconstruction, stabilization, and conflict. In April 2005, S/CRS published the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Task Matrix (ETM), which was “a compilation of individual tasks that, when taken as a whole, are intended to support a country in transition from armed conflict or civil strife to sustainable stability.” Prior to the release of the ETM, the U.S. government did not possess such an instrument. The list provides planners with a basis for determining what tasks should be accomplished and what department, agency, or DoD component is best suited to accomplish each task. The breadth and depth of the tasks emphasize the enormity of an RSO undertaking and the multitude of different professional skill sets required. Within eight months, S/CRS produced its next contribution to enhancing unity of effort within RSO.

In December 2005, S/CRS published the “U.S. Government Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation” for review. The concept of the planning framework was to obtain direct input from U.S. military planners and department/agency representatives for developing crisis response or long-term, scenario-based, holistic U.S. RSO plans that could subsequently be turned into individual department or agency-specific implementation plans. By the nature of the process, the individual department or agency plans would be complementary and reinforcing. On May 15, 2008, the NSC Reconstruction and Stabilization Policy Coordinating Committee approved release of the “Principles of the USG Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation.” The eight-page document explains the new, four-stage interagency planning framework that consists of the following:

- Situation analysis—to understand causes of instability.
- Policy formulation—to determine policy options and their associated risks and benefits and the strategic objectives/major mission elements and to assign agency responsibility for planning actions to achieve the associated strategic objectives.
- Strategy development—to determine how RSO efforts will be prioritized and to select and synchronize the appropriate U.S. government entities.
- Interagency implementation planning—to gain separate agency input and develop a ground level executable RSO plan.
Working with personnel from USAID’s CMM, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, JFCOM, and the Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, S/CRS was instrumental in developing ICAF and the Interagency Management System (IMS)—enabling planning tools that facilitate unified execution of RSO. According to the State Department’s website, ICAF’s purpose is “to develop a commonly held understanding, across relevant U.S. departments and agencies of the dynamics driving and mitigating violent conflict within a country that informs U.S. policy and planning decisions.” ICAF provides the U.S. government with a tool for conducting comprehensive assessments of a weak or failing state to diagnose the general context of a conflict or instability, understand the core grievances and existing resiliencies, determine drivers of conflict and mitigating factors, and explain potential ways the conflict or instability may be increased or decreased. ICAF analysis is designed to be “part of the first step in any interagency planning process to inform the establishment of U.S. government goals, design or reshaping of activities, implementation or revision of programs, or re/allocation of resources.”

S/CRS is currently prepared to lead ICAF assessment teams consisting of predetermined specialists from inside and outside the government. The team can be configured to meet country specific needs. Ideally, an ICAF assessment is done on the ground within the country of concern; however, pooled experts and interagency representatives can conduct an ICAF assessment in Washington, DC. ICAF provides the U.S. government with an instrument to gain a multi-agency perspective and buy-in on the problems of a weak or failed state, which in turn should make gaining interagency consensus on appropriate action and required resources easier. From large-scale intervention to country team and geographic combat command contingency planning, ICAF has tremendous potential to enhance interagency collaboration and to enable a whole-of-government view of the problems to be confronted. The lack of an ICAF-like assessment of Afghanistan and Iraq prior to engagement in these two states highlights the U.S. government’s lack of interagency unity of effort following intervention. To date, S/CRS has led ICAF assessments in just four countries.

Approved by the NSC in March 2007, IMS was designed to provide a system for managing “high-priority and highly complex crises and operations.” The NSC determines when or if to implement the IMS. The IMS structure facilitates interagency communication, coordination, planning, and execution. It consists of three interagency groups: a country reconstruction and stabilization group (CRSG), an integration planning cell (IPC), and an advance civilian team (ACT). Located within the NSC, the CRSG is “responsible for developing
and integrating U.S. government policies, integrating civilian and military plans, and mobilizing civilian responses to stabilization and reconstruction operations.” It consists of the regionally responsible NSC policy coordination committee and a supporting secretariat consisting of staff from multiple agencies. The secretariat works in conjunction with chiefs of mission and the U.S. military to develop plans. Washington based, the CRSG is also responsible for mobilizing resources, monitoring and evaluating implementation, and coordinating with international partners.

Located at a geographical combatant command headquarters and reporting to the CRSG, the IPC coordinates and integrates U.S. civilian agencies’ plans with military plans and operations. IPC personnel are chosen based on required, situation-specific expertise. An IPC is only formed when military action is involved.

The ACT deploys to the U.S. embassy or the Joint Force Headquarters (in the event that there is no embassy) “to set up, coordinate, and conduct field operations and provide implementation planning and civilian-operations expertise to the Chief of Mission and military field commanders.” If the situation dictates, the IMS structure calls for field advance civilian teams (FACT) that can be developed to execute RSO at the provincial or local levels, thus providing a standing structure for a PRT-like entity. Under the new system, CRC personnel serve as the expert manpower to fill the IPC, ACT, and FACTs.

IMS provides a system that was needed but absent when the U.S. government planned for and initiated RSO in Afghanistan and Iraq. While the IMS has yet to be implemented in response to a real world situation, it is predicated on lessons learned in Afghanistan and Iraq.

As part of the Bush administration’s whole-of-government effort to enhance RSO capability, less than ten days prior to release of NSPD-44, DoD released departmental directive 3000.05 to provide guidance and establish DoD policy on the military’s role in stability, security, transition, and reconstruction. The directive made stability operations a core U.S. military mission that would receive the same level of prioritization as combat operations. The directive states: “Many stability operations are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.” DoD Directive 3000.05 also made it a Defense responsibility to “coordinate DoD relations” with S/CRS and to take part in stability operations policy and strategy discussions. As indicated by the previously mentioned military collaboration in developing the ETM, the “U.S. Government Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and
Conflict Transformation,” ICAF, and IMS, the U.S. military quickly acted on the directive, and by the end of 2008 its doctrine reflected S/CRS’s work.

FM 3-07, Stability Operations, thoroughly references S/CRS work and highlights the importance of a comprehensive and unified approach to stability operations across all U.S. government departments and agencies. The manual specifically states “… integrating planning efforts of all agencies and organizations involved in stability operations is essential to long-term peace and stability.” To serve as a foundation for “an integrated approach to stability operations founded on unity of effort and coordinated engagement,” FM 3-07 doctrinally establishes five military stability tasks that correspond directly to the five stability sectors established within the ETM. The manual’s Appendix B details the IMS, and Appendix D details ICAF. While the manual confirms the military’s requirement to accomplish stability tasks in the absence of U.S. civilian counterparts when discussing economic stabilization and recovery, it also denotes the need for expertise beyond internal military capability by stating: “lack of [military expertise] underscores the necessity of introducing appropriate civilian expertise as soon a practical…”

In the following excerpt from Appendix B, FM 3-07 captures the overall importance of S/CRS, the significance of its products thus far, and the need for the U.S. government to fully fund and operationalize S/CRS and the CRC:

S/CRS has led interagency partners through the development of three distinct yet tightly linked capabilities that can be customized in scale and scope. The emergence of interagency planning response capability, along with structures of the IMS, enable USG leaders to integrate the efforts of civilian agencies and, when necessary, military forces to achieve unified USG reconstruction and stabilization operations in an international context. A civilian reconstruction and stabilization capacity facilitates the development of unity of purpose across the USG and translates into unity of effort by the USG during execution. This capacity also relieved military forces of numerous reconstruction and stabilization activities best performed by civilian agencies and actors, thereby allowing greater focus on the primary mission for military forces. Ground forces rely on a robust civilian capacity for reconstruction and stabilization. Increased civilian capacity provides the USG with the ability to partner civilian and military efforts when necessary or deal with some crises without invoking military power.
In 2009, the RAND Arroyo Center conducted an Army-sponsored study to determine what U.S. government departments and agencies are best suited as lead and/or supporting agent in executing individual post-conflict reconstruction tasks derived from the ETM. The study further set out to determine what Army branches had relevant capacity to fill gaps created in the event lead and supporting agents were unable to assume responsibility. Of the 54 ETM sectored tasks, DoD was determined not to be an appropriate sole lead or sole supporting agent for any of them. The DoD shared lead responsibility with the State Department in all 7 security sector tasks, 1 of 7 governance sector tasks, 1 of 10 humanitarian assistance and social well-being sector tasks, and 2 of 10 justice and reconciliation sector tasks. Within the infrastructure sector, DoD and the Army assume a significant role due to the resident expertise contained within the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. For the remaining sector tasks, DoD, at best, was considered to have only a minor supporting role. Demonstrative of DoD’s lack of expertise and/or capacity in post-conflict reconstruction, specifically within the economic stabilization sector, the U.S. Army is categorized as only “fallback” capacity behind USAID, the Treasury Department, and “other” agency listings. The Bush administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS) and now the Obama administration’s NSS supports the need for expeditionary, civilian reconstruction and stabilization capacity making continued development of such capacity a critical U.S. government task.

The Future of S/CRS

On 10 July 2009, the Obama administration initiated the first ever Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR). The QDDR was designed to review existing U.S. diplomacy and development tools and determine how to enhance their ability to
confront 21st Century challenges in a unified and reinforcing manner. In other words, determine how to make diplomacy and development effective “pillars” of the U.S. national security apparatus. The QDDR working groups assessed everything from organizational roles and missions to capability gaps within five areas of strategic focus:

- Building a global architecture of cooperation.
- Leading and supporting whole-of-government solutions.
- Investing in the building blocks of stronger societies.
- Preventing and responding to crises and conflict.
- Building operational and resource platform for success.\(^{31}\)

S/CRS’s role, as defined by NSPD-44 and P.L. 110-417, made the organization a reviewable component in each of the five strategic focus areas.

The 2010 QDDR captures State Department’s perception of 21st Century challenges and trends. It provides broad concepts and specific organizational restructuring as a path for enhancing the State Department’s ability to meet these challenges. Directly citing 36 active conflicts, the document acknowledges the prevalence and importance of weak and failing states as well as the existing overlap between military and civilian missions.\(^{32}\) As a “driving idea,” the QDDR calls for increased civilian presence in the field overseas. It also proposes changing S/CRS’s location within the State Department’s organizational structure.

According to the QDDR, S/CRS will no longer be an office directly reporting to the Secretary of State, but rather will be subsumed by the newly created Conflict and Stabilization Operations Bureau (CSO) falling under a renamed Under Secretary for Civilian, Security, Democracy, and Human Rights, which replaces the former Under Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs. The intent is to have CSO not only expand upon S/CRS capabilities, but to broaden and deepen its capacities. CSO will:

- Build the capabilities and systems of the CRC, interagency surge teams, and other deployable assets.
- Provide expertise and operational guidance to inform policies and strategies to prevent and respond to crisis and conflict.
- Provide specialists in crisis, conflict, and state fragility to regional bureaus to serve as CSO liaisons and to integrate the political and operational work of conflict prevention across State.
The 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) does not provide clarification on how S/CRS will be “encompassed” into the new bureau, or specify what role the current Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization will play (if any) in the new structure. Of the thirty-seven pages that make up Chapter 4 in the QDDR addressing “Preventing and Responding to Crisis, Conflict, and Instability,” approximately three pages are devoted to the new CSO Bureau, and much of that talks about expanding the CRC without reference to the new bureau itself.

The document does not provide clarification on how S/CRS will be “encompassed” into the new bureau, or specify what role the current Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization will play (if any) in the new structure. Nor does it mention how the change would be reconciled to ensure compliance with P.L. 110-417. However, it does clearly assign a Deputy Secretary responsibility for the bureau containing S/CRS. With Deputy Secretary representation and influence, such a move could result in the State Department providing more resources and effort toward fulfilling the nine reconstruction and stabilization responsibilities and establishing the CRC, which P.L. 110-417 statutorily requires. It is impossible to determine if the move will combine overlapping USAID capabilities under the new State Department Bureau or what level of emphasis Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will place on being able to carry out her statutory responsibility to lead U.S. government reconstruction and stabilization efforts. Despite the current ambiguities, there are steps that can be taken to ensure that S/CRS or its successor possesses the capacity necessary to be effective.

While the IMS and ICAF parts of the overall planning framework have been approved some five years after its initial release, the parent document, “U.S. Government Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation,” still has not been fully approved and adopted. Internal State Department and USAID reasons for not agreeing to adopt the framework include the belief that it is too cumbersome, continued disagreement over who should lead and allocate reconstruction and stabilization resources, and resistance to apply a new framework to existing operations. The fact that such internal friction continues to exist and is allowed to hamper enhancement of U.S. government RSO capacity lends credence to the perception that there is a lack of senior executive leadership emphasis on affecting change within the RSO domain. One indisputable fact is that a lack of CRC-S funding and staffing limits the U.S. government’s ability to deploy FACTs. Given this situation, Congress must take action to make RSO more relevant.
and effective. The QDDR does call for the development of a new International Operational Response Framework. When developed, this framework will establish “the systems and procedures necessary to ensure transparent and accountable leadership structures and agency lines of responsibility, which, when combined, will leverage and deliver the full range of U.S. international disaster, crisis, and conflict response resources.”

Time will tell if the aforementioned problems persist.

While a broad statement, it is fundamental that Congress as a whole acknowledge in word and deed that civilian reconstruction and stabilization capacity is a critical national security issue. Over the past six years, Congress passed legislation to establish and define S/CRS and CRC responsibilities and permanently ensure its place within the State Department. Yet Congress fails to provide the funding necessary to enable complete S/CRS and CRC efficacy. This situation conveys a confusing message and is contrary to the Secretary of Defense’s advice.

Since 2008, Secretary of Defense Gates has championed the cause to create civilian reconstruction and stabilization capacity, and Secretary Clinton has been in complete agreement. In a November 2008 speech at Kansas State University, Secretary Gates clearly defined and articulated the current U.S. national security dilemma:

One of the most important lessons of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is that military success is not sufficient to win: economic development, institution-building and the rule of law, promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to the people, training and equipping indigenous military and police forces, strategic communications, and more—these, along with security, are essential ingredients for long-term success.

Both he and Secretary of State Clinton furthered this argument in recent articles published in *Foreign Affairs*. Gates reinforced his stance by opining:

…building a partner’s overall governance and oversight capacity is a shared responsibility across multiple agencies and departments of the U.S. national security apparatus—and one that requires flexible, responsive tools that provide incentives for cooperation.

Explaining civilian reconstruction and stability capacity’s affect on military effectiveness in RSO, Secretary Clinton stated, “Properly trained and equipped civilians are force multipliers.”

If funded and operational, S/CRS and the CRC serve to directly
enhance U.S. military efficacy in Afghanistan and Iraq and reduce the U.S. government’s need to rely on military personnel elsewhere in the world. The persistent lack of Congressional commitment to fully fund and develop civilian reconstruction and stabilization capacity has led to growing pessimism for positive change. The creation of a vaguely defined CSO and the proposed replacement of the CRC-R with a supposedly “more cost-effective ‘Expert Corps’ consisting of an active roster of technical experts, willing but not obligated to deploy to critical conflict zones” appears as a work around, belying the problem.

This situation has pressed the military into further expanding its functional capabilities to offset civilian capacity deficits. Nowhere is this more evident than in Carl Schramm’s Foreign Affairs article entitled “Expeditionary Economics.” Citing the centrality of a lack of economic opportunity within the “world’s trouble spots,” Schramm purports that “stabilizing a troubled country requires economic growth more than economic stability.” He states:

The U.S. military is well placed to play a leading role in bringing economic growth to devastated countries. It may have little resident economic expertise, but it has both an active presence and an active interest in places where economic growth is sorely needed. The U.S. armed forces usually are the most formidable and best-resourced entity in the troubled countries in which they operate….The U.S. military must therefore formulate a doctrine of expeditionary economics designed to spur solid growth as rapidly and effectively as possible.

Schramm goes on to propose that after establishing itself as a leader in expeditionary economics “[t]he military could then use the various means of influence at their disposal to steer international development practices in the direction of the new doctrine.” In a “Summit on Entrepreneurship and Expeditionary Economics,” hosted by the Kauffman Foundation and the Command and General Staff College Foundation, Schramm’s article served as a baseline for most of the conference. Schramm’s expeditionary economics concept may have merit in terms of solid economic approaches to stabilizing a weak or failed state. However, making the military the lead proponent for its implementation and execution directly conflicts with the results of the RAND Arroyo Center study. The study further concluded that such a plan would reduce incentives for the U.S. government to commit the necessary attention and resources required to fully develop capacity within appropriate agencies.

In a subsequent addition of Foreign Affairs, on the premise of straight logic, U.S. Congressman Howard Berman of California
succinctly countered Schramm’s argument for a military lead in expeditionary economics with the following closing statement:

What is needed, instead of a military doctrine of ‘expeditionary economics,’ is a civilian-led peace building corps that can operate in conflict zones and help local communities lay the foundations for robust economic growth. Such efforts are not the core competency of the military, nor should they be—any more than the United State’s civilian development professionals should conduct kinetic operations.42

Congressman Berman’s words provide a glimmer of hope that Congress will increasingly see value in S/CRS and the CRC’s role in promoting U.S. national security, with or without the CSO. Hopefully, it will lead to the funding necessary to completely staff and equip the CRC and provide the State Department with its own annual $100 million Crisis Response Fund. When put in the perspective of U.S. Defense expenditures, such as DoD’s $708 billion FY2011 request, it is difficult to defend not providing $400 million to meet the total staffing and operational costs of S/CRS and CRC. Providing necessary funding should be Congress’s first and immediate step; however, it must take an additional step to eliminate the other significant obstacle to achieving an effective whole-of-government effort in confronting weak or failed states. “Even though national-level goals may call for collaborative action, unless an agency has an institutional incentive to participate in such action, the extent of its participation is likely to be suboptimal from a national perspective.43

As a second step, Congress should establish Reconstruction and Stabilization Oversight Committees in both the House and Senate. Among other activities, congressional oversight is designed to:

- Ensure executive compliance with legislative intent.
- Improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and economy of governmental operations.
- Evaluate program performance.
- Prevent executive encroachment on legislative prerogatives and powers.44

Working with the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, the House and Senate Reconstruction and Stabilization Committees could also incentivize relevant department and agency leadership to support whole-of-government efforts to increase reconstruction and stabilization capacity or face increased departmental/agency budget scrutiny.
Creating House and Senate Reconstruction and Stabilization Committees would further enable Congress to investigate the causes and impact of internal executive branch friction that has hindered S/CRS effectiveness. The new committees could also provide a valuable service monitoring the U.S. government’s use of and reliance on the military to deal with such states. The committees could work to ensure that changes stemming from the QDDR do not reverse the progress that has been made within the reconstruction and stabilization realm over the past six years. Finally, department and agency leadership involved in RSO could now be held more directly accountable for their actions in compliance with P.L.110-417.

Conclusion

Given the number of existing weak and failed states, reconstructing and stabilizing such states will remain a U.S. national security issue for decades to come. The Bush administration initiated a U.S. government effort to increase government-wide capacity to conduct RSO. However, six years later the U.S. government only possesses half of the civilian reconstruction and stabilization capacity it determined it needs to be properly prepared and fully effective. The Obama administration is currently trying to determine how to enhance the State Department and USAID’s effectiveness. The situation necessitates Congressional action and commitment to fund fully S/CRS and the CRC, which in terms of the overall U.S. government budget, is truly nominal. It also requires Congressional oversight to ensure executive branch compliance with reconstruction and stabilization focused legislation. Failure to act burdens the DoD, particularly the U.S. Army, with having to execute tasks for which it is ill-suited and under-prepared.
Endnotes


5. The 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review proposes to replace the CRC-Reserve with “a more cost-effective ‘Expert Corps’ consisting of an active roster of technical experts, willing but not obligated to deploy to critical conflict zones.”


8. Ibid.


12. Ibid., p. 22.


24. Ibid., pp. xiv-xv.


28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., pp. 4-5.

30. Ibid., pp. 9-19.


34. “Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Are Needed to Develop a Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve Corps,” pp. 18-20.


40. Ibid., p. 92.


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