Expanding Chief of Mission Authority to Produce Unity of Effort

by Christopher Lamb and Edward Marks

The national security system has an authority problem. The problem was highlighted early in President Obama’s administration by the national debate over “czars,” Presidential appointees who oversee a particular issue area without Senate confirmation. The practice of appointing numerous czars was controversial but for the wrong reasons. Commentators worried that czars would create confusion and circumvent congressional oversight. What deserved greater attention is why Presidents feel the need to appoint czars in the first place and what, if anything, should be done about it. Busy Presidents appoint czars to reduce the burden of integrating the activities of the departments and agencies. When the interagency process fails to produce the cooperation among departments and agencies necessary to solve a national security (or other) problem, Presidents often designate a lead individual—czar—to do the job because they do not have enough time to do it themselves.

Both President Obama and Congress recognize the chief executive needs help integrating the diverse departments and agencies, but their past attempts to improve interagency cooperation have generally failed because they paid insufficient attention to the difficult problem of authority. New positions or organizations are often created with great fanfare and directed to ensure a coordinated response to some particular national security issue—intelligence, war fighting, reconstruction, or counterterrorism—only to fail because they lack sufficient authority. Ultimately, the departments and agencies in the national security system see little reason to follow the new organization or individual’s lead.

At the heart of the problem is the inability to reconcile a desire for a clear chain of command from the President down through the heads of the departments and agencies with the need to empower new mechanisms (individuals or organizational constructs) with sufficient authority to integrate efforts across the departments and agencies in pursuit of specified national missions. “Unity of command” down through the functional departments and agencies seems to preclude “unity of effort” for missions that are intrinsically interagency in nature and cut across those same departments and agencies.

In this article we argue that the interagency integration problem can be rectified by expanding the President’s power to delegate a modified “chief of mission” authority similar to that granted
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Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

Security Classification: Unclassified

Limited Distribution: Same as Report (SAR)

Number of Pages: 16
ambassadors to oversee and direct the activities of employees from diverse government organizations working in a foreign country. The chief of mission model requires modification to work well beyond the bilateral setting of a U.S. embassy, but it does point a way forward to escape the dilemma the current system imposes on Presidents who want unity of effort without sacrificing unified command.

The Problem

Because so many problems “cut across a swath of agencies,” according to former White House Chief of Staff John Podesta, integrating the work of multiple departments and agencies is an increasingly significant challenge for the modern presidency. The need to integrate the activities of the departments and agencies to good effect is especially urgent in the realm of national security. Even before the attacks of September 11, 2001, prestigious national blue ribbon panels like the Hart-Rudman Commission were pointing out the need for better interagency coordination. And years after 9/11 and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, blue ribbon panels are still highlighting a persistent and debilitating lack of interagency cooperation. “Everywhere we looked, we found important (and obvious) issues of interagency coordination that went unattended, sensible community-wide proposals blocked by pockets of resistance, and critical disputes left to fester.”³ Virtually all scholarly assessments of the national security system similarly conclude the national security system suffers from inadequate interagency collaboration.⁴

Impediments to interagency cooperation are rooted in the basic structure of the national security system, which is hierarchical and based upon a functional division of labor among powerful departments and agencies with authorities and prerogatives codified in law and protected by corresponding congressional committees. These departments and agencies naturally resist cooperation with one another. Department heads assert tight control over their subordinates and create strong boundaries around departmental activities, both in terms of directing their subordinates and fighting off competition from other agencies who might encroach on their “turf.” Their clear lines of authority (unity of command) from the President down through the department and agency heads and their subordinates comes at the expense of unity of effort because departments refuse to cooperate closely even on missions of national importance for fear of losing their powers, prerogatives, and budgets. Presidents have the authority to compel integrated efforts but are too busy to orchestrate the cooperation except in extraordinary circumstances. Thus the system’s basic structure favors vertical departmental lines of authority over horizontal integration across the government.

The system’s natural tendency to favor vertical integration is an increasingly acute problem because the security environment is increasingly complex and dynamic. The challenges posed by the security environment since the end of World War II and the increased transnational movement of people, knowledge, trade, investments, communications, and cultural identities over the past three decades require multidisciplinary (multi-agency) responses. In recent decades, Congress and both Democratic and Republican Presidents have implemented a wide range of reforms to improve the horizontal integration capabilities of the executive branch. So far, all the mechanisms have been wanting.

Presidential-appointed czars are one option to correct the system’s natural tendency to favor horizontal rather than vertical integration. The public often assumes czars are powerful and worry their use will lead to excessive executive power without necessary oversight.⁵ In reality, the de jure authority of czars is weak. Legal scholars argue that most czars have no statutory authority, and thus they have no legal power over other government actors.⁶ As John Harrison explained to the
Senate Judiciary Committee in October 2009, “That is not to say that members of the White House staff are not and may not be highly influential…[but] no executive actor has any obligation to follow the instructions of a member of the White House staff who lacks statutory authority, except insofar as those instructions relay the President’s.” When Presidents try to informally delegate their integration authority to a czar, they find the czar’s authority is questioned by the departments and agencies. Czars become poor facsimiles of “cajolers-in-chief.”

Some czars manage to be sporadically effective without having meaningful authority. As the Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan (the “war czar”), General Douglas Lute was charged to be the “full-time manager for the implementation and execution of our strategies for Iraq and Afghanistan” but with no control over budgets or personnel.7 He had to resort to “incessant, relentless pounding and pestering”8 to improve civilian support for operations in Iraq. Czars can also make headway if the President backs them up consistently, but such persistent Presidential attention is almost as demanding for the President as doing the job himself and tends to defeat the purpose of the czar. Thus czars are a prominent but not a particularly effective model of presidentially-delegated authority for integration. Presidents use them but recognize their limitations, as do cabinet officials.9

Another popular integration mechanism is the designation of a lead agency to coordinate the efforts of all the departments and agencies involved in solving a complex problem. For example, following the failure of the Coalition Provisional Authority to adequately provide for the reconstruction of Iraq, President Bush issued National Security Directive 44 ordering the Secretary of State to “coordinate and lead integrated U.S. government efforts, involving all U.S. departments and agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities.” This order was not accompanied by statutory authority to compel cooperation from other agencies. The Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2008 was intended to clarify and strengthen the role of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, but it only gives the State Department authority to monitor, plan, and coordinate reconstruction rather than actual operational control. The witticism is true: “Lead agency really means sole agency,” since other organizations will not follow the lead agency if its directions have a negative impact on their perceived organizational equities.10

Other innovations were initiated such as the Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG) in the Department of Defense (DoD) geographic combatant commands, but their authority is limited to information sharing and advisory functions. The creation of the new Africa Command (AFRICOM) can be viewed as an ambitious extension of the JIACG concept; however, AFRICOM leaders must continue to respect the chief of mission authority of ambassadors in Africa as well as the leadership of the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) who “have clear lines of authority as well as the comparative advantages to lead,”11 which means the command’s integration authority is actually quite limited. Similar authority issues plague the most prominent new interagency organizational construct in the field, provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan. A Congressional investigation of PRTs identified the inherently weak integration authority given to PRT leaders and highlighted the system’s preference for preserving unity of command for departments and agencies over its personnel on interagency teams like PRTs.12

The National Counterterrorism Center is another example of an under-powered organization created in the wake of 9/11 to improve interagency coordination. The new organization was placed under the authority of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), but its ability to pursue its mission is hamstrung by a lack of authority over interagency personnel, budgets, and operations.13
In addition, the current Congressional Committee structure is not equipped to oversee interagency mechanisms, resulting in confusion over jurisdiction and a lack of Congressional support.\textsuperscript{14}

The national security system’s structural deficiency in interagency coordination is persistent but not immutable. Most organizations with functional structures balance the need for a clear chain of command over functional capabilities with the need for unity of effort across functional divisions of labor. Put differently, organizations must both divide labor in order to create specialized bodies of expertise (differentiation) and then integrate those bodies of expertise to accomplish missions that require a multidisciplinary effort. Where this balancing act takes place depends on the organization’s level of centralization. Typically organizations require a mix of centralized efficiencies and decentralized responsiveness; too much centralization creates paralysis, and too much decentralization creates chaos.\textsuperscript{15}

The national security system’s labor integration problem is twofold. First, the basic authority for integrating the work of multiple departments and agencies is far too centralized in the person of the President. As a practical matter, the President does not have the time to intervene personally to provide the requisite degree of integration for multidisciplinary national security problems. The structure of the current system, built around strong departments and agencies and their cabinet-level leaders, defaults to differentiation at the expense of integration. This problem becomes much more acute in dynamic and complex environments where multidisciplinary (or intrinsically interagency) problems are increasingly the norm. The system repeatedly defaults to unity of command at the expense of unity of effort, as happened in the planning for the post-conflict reconstruction of Iraq.\textsuperscript{16}

Second, whenever Congress and the President move to embrace a more complex model of authority that balances vertical and horizontal integration, they end up backing away from and substantially curtailing integration powers. Typically they either skirt the authority issue by creating advisory positions with no real authority for integration, or they provide integration authorities that are not commensurate with the responsibilities of the position. For example, when Congress decided to create a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Czar, it gave the position substantial responsibilities for formulating interagency plans to counter WMD and terrorism and for leading interagency coordination to deal with them. However, Congress also made clear that the WMD czar was just the principal advisor to the President on issues relating to WMD and terrorism, and that even obtaining necessary expertise from the departments and agencies had to be done “with the concurrence of the Secretary of a department or head of an agency.”\textsuperscript{17}

In the case of the DNI, Congress provided more authority through the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. The Director has the authority to “manage and direct the tasking of, collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of national intelligence” and budget authority over the intelligence community. The DNI would not only develop, plan, and direct the budget but also had the power to transfer funds between different entities. The DNI could also transfer personnel within the intelligence community.\textsuperscript{18} In the Act, however, Congress offered the heads of existing departments and agencies an “escape clause,” Section 1018, which states:

The President shall issue guidelines to ensure the effective implementation and execution within the executive branch of the authorities granted to the Director of National Intelligence by this title and the amendments made by this title, in a manner that respects and does not abrogate the statutory responsibilities of the heads of the departments of the United States Government concerning such departments...(emphasis added).

Section 1018 allows departments and agencies to assert DNI initiatives impinge on their secretaries’
prerogatives, thus excusing their lack of support.

Better models of presidentially-delegated integration authority have been created, but they are rare and often short-lived. Perhaps the best known and most enduring model of presidentially-delegated authority for integration of diverse department and agency activities is the chief of mission authority generally associated with resident bilateral ambassadors. Its origin, effectiveness, and limitations merit close scrutiny because the model suggests the national security system’s problem with insufficient integration authority will not be solved until Congress provides the President with a legally sanctioned and sufficiently empowered mechanism to delegate his authority for integrating the activities of the departments and agencies for priority national missions.

The Solution

The immediate post-World War II years saw the establishment of numerous semi-autonomous special missions, the stationing abroad of representatives by many departments and agencies, and the retention of an extensive overseas military establishment. “No clear and enforceable guidance existed to coordinate local U.S. policy in countries such as Greece, where three independent U.S. Missions−diplomatic, military, and economic aid−pursued their own agendas.”19 By 1948 with the establishment of largely independent aid missions, the authority of the ambassador was at a low point. In 1949, President Hoover’s Report to President Truman concluded that the chief of mission should have “the ultimate authority overseas with respect to the foreign affairs aspects of program operations.”

The first attempt to codify this concept was a memorandum of understanding (the Clay Paper) in February 1951 in which the Departments of State and Defense and the Economic Cooperation Administration (predecessor to USAID) established the principle of the country team (although not the name) and made a clear statement of the primary position of the ambassador.20 The Clay Paper was followed by President Truman writing to Secretary of State Acheson on April 5, 1951:

At the country level, all U.S. representatives to that country must speak and act in a consistent manner. The U.S. ambassador is the representative of the President of the U.S. to the country and he is responsible for assuring a coordinated U.S. position.

President Eisenhower then initiated the practice of sending individual letters to every ambassador tasking them as chief of mission “to exercise full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all executive branch U.S. offices and personnel” with three exceptions including “personnel under the command of a U.S. area military commander.” From 1951 to today, the ambassador’s responsibility and authority as chief of mission21 were consolidated by a series of Executive Orders, Presidential letters and memoranda, and State Department instructions, all using essentially the same language.

The authority of chiefs of mission was codified in the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (Public Law 96–465), and since 1980 has existed in 22 USC 3927, Title 22, Chapter 52, Subchapter II, Section 3927, which says that under the direction of the President, the chief of mission to a foreign country:

(1) Shall have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all government executive branch employees in that country (except for employees under the command of a United States area military commander); and

(2) Shall keep fully and currently informed with respect to all activities and operations
of the government within that country, and shall insure that all government executive branch employees in that country (except for employees under the command of a United States area military commander) comply fully with all applicable directives of the chief of mission.

Section (2) above seems to reflect the familiar Congressional escape clause, “all applicable directives.” Other departments and agencies sometimes dispute what constitutes an “applicable” chief of mission directive, requiring “on-the-ground disagreements to be sent up respective chains of command, ultimately to be resolved by Cabinet-level or Presidential authority.”

Even so, several things make the chief of mission authority as it has evolved since World War II a unique model. First, the chief of mission authority is essentially the only formal inter-department executive authority below the President. Second, American embassies were until recently the only formally established composite U.S. government entities. They exist as a logical extension of the chief of mission’s authority and have been organized and operated to behave more like teams and are usually referred to as “country teams” rather than committees or coalitions of autonomous organizations.

Third, chief of mission authority is delegated explicitly by the President but also recognized by Congress in statute. The same holds true for the chief of mission’s country team concept. When Congress enacted the Mutual Security Act of 1951 it formulated the “country team” concept (although it did not use that term) by requiring the President to “assure coordination among representatives of the U.S. government in each country, under the leadership of the Chief of the U.S. Diplomatic Mission.” Fourth, chief of mission authority is not a Department of State construct but rather an extension of the President’s need for personal representation of his powers and authorities. Presidents have long conferred ambassadorial status and chief of mission authority on political appointees and other government officials, as well as career Foreign Service officers, and in one case a serving military officer. (General Lucius Clay in Berlin).

**Limitations**

From the beginning there has been some ambiguity over the interpretation of the extent of the executive authority being delegated. Other departments and agencies and their representatives have questioned if not overtly challenged the practical application of the chief of mission authority. This situation has been especially true with those departments who also conduct extensive foreign operations: USAID, DoD, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

An ambassador’s relationship with the CIA is complicated by the Agency’s concern for protecting what it calls “sources and methods,” the disclosure of which it often claims lies outside the responsibility to the chief of mission. With DoD, the relationship is complicated by the separate and somewhat overlapping authority of the regional geographic combatant commanders to control U.S. forces in the field. Conflicts between the DoD and ambassadors are nothing new, but urgent counterterrorism objectives have exacerbated the problem as has the recent dramatic expansion of DoD responsibilities in areas such as post-conflict reconstruction.

Given the mixed record, there has been much commentary over the years on the degree to which the combined chief of mission and country team model has actually been successful in managing interagency coordination. Recently, the Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction...
commented in his final report that “agency personnel always report to their department heads in Washington” which will “inevitably exert a countervailing force on interagency coordination.”

In short, while many assert that the chief of mission and country team model works well most of the time in most embassies, this is not always the case.

**Expanding the Chief of Mission Authority**

The first step in making chief of mission authority more useful to Presidents would be legislation providing for similar type authority to be delegated to specified executive branch officials. Situations that might call for this authority fall into three categories:

- Crises (political or natural) that require an expeditionary effort by the U.S. government (e.g., tsunami, earthquake, genocide, UN peacekeeping operation, or an Iraq- or Afghanistan-like crisis).
- A regional problem of sufficient import to require a special empowered executive (e.g., the Israeli-Palestine issue, Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy, or North Korean nuclear policy).
- Policy management and implementation requiring regional coordination below the global and above bi-lateral level (e.g., geographic regional affairs; ad hoc regional affairs, such as the terrorist problem in the Horn of Africa; and piracy).

Many crises in today’s world, especially natural catastrophes like the Asian tsunami or the Haitian earthquake, require the mobilization and deployment of a range of U.S. government capabilities (air and sea transport, medical assistance, emergency supplies, and reconstruction assistance) often in coordination with international organizations and other governments. Although the U.S. government has become quite skilled at responding to natural crises, as in the Asian tsunami, it is often a close-run affair with problems arising as the first needs are met. Haiti is a good example of that, where the immediate emergency needs were followed by a complicated reconstruction challenge that is still unresolved.

What happens during these crises is an invocation of a partnership between the geographic combatant commander and the ambassador on the ground. If there is no resident ambassador, as in Kosovo, then the partnership is even more ad hoc with someone from Washington drafted into the role. These partnerships generally work reasonably well, depending on the scope of the problem and the personalities involved but often in a delayed and hesitant manner as questions of authority, personnel, and funds are sorted out from scratch each time. Thus as one notably successful practitioner of interagency arts recently lamented, there is still “no effective, consistent mechanism that brings a whole interagency team to focus on a particular foreign policy issue.”

The chiefs of mission authority could be more fully utilized to lessen this learning curve. In some cases, empowering special envoys or czars with chief of mission authority might be more appropriate. For instance, the North Korean nuclear problem appears to be a likely case for a chief of mission-empowered special envoy to orchestrate U.S. policy and operations. Currently a czar appointment does not come with meaningful powers or authority and generally results in bureaucratic impotence and frustration. Equipped with such chief of mission authority, the appointee could muster and manage the necessary range of U.S. government resources to make success much more likely.
Finally, there is an argument to be made for use of chief of mission authority in the steady-state management of foreign affairs. Admittedly, expanding the use of the chief of mission authority into the Washington-based bureaucracy would be very ambitious and probably beyond current political and bureaucratic feasibility. The idea would be to use the Department of State to actually manage the thirty-some U.S. government organizations that currently have overseas representation to a higher state of collaboration. Because the Department of State, like many of its ambassadors, is not seen by other departments and agencies as bureaucratically disinterested, using it in such a role would probably require a significant rethinking of that organization as a whole. See one approach in “The Next Generation Department of State,” by Edward Marks.29

In essence, such a plan would make regional assistant secretaries “regional directors” or “regional chiefs of mission.” Each would have a dedicated executive staff to include appropriate deputies and desk officers but no functional staff, such as economic, politico-military, or public diplomacy offices. All functional staff, officials based in Washington but physically located in their home agencies, would operate in much the same manner as country teams. For instance, just as embassy country teams prepare mission performance plans, these regional teams would prepare regional performance plans, thereby providing for regional-interagency coordination at the Washington-operational level. Regional assistant secretaries of this character would be recruited as a matter of course from across the government career services as well as from public life and not just from the ranks of the Foreign Service.

Addressing Objections

Currently chief of mission authority is limited to the geographic confines of bilateral interstate relations and also allows for major exceptions such as the command of military forces and intelligence operations. The “mission” in chief of mission authority needs to be broadened and understood to mean a national security problem is intrinsically a multi-agency question for which no single department or agency has sufficient executive authority and resources. In this model, the chief of mission authority is extended for the purpose of executing a particular mission, and the authority extends only as far as the mission essential requirements for success.

Bureaucratically, heads of departments and agencies will resist direction from the President’s “mission manager.” The very chief of mission authority that makes interagency unity of effort possible by clearly putting someone in charge of the interagency mission will interfere with the unity of command relationship between the President and his Cabinet members who run the major departments and agencies of the executive branch. While bureaucratically challenging, this tension between vertical unity of command and horizontal unity of effort is a common, organizational problem that can and must be managed. The way forward can be depicted with a simple five-step process:

• The President, with the assistance of his national security advisor, determines that a particular mission of national importance is an intrinsically interagency problem that requires evoking the congressionally sanctioned chief of mission authority.

• After Senate approval, the individual empowered with enhanced chief of mission authority (the mission manager), with the support of the national security staff, quickly assembles a team of experts and begins operations.

• After investigating the problem and developing alternative strategies, assessing their associated costs and risks, and obtaining Presidential approval for a particular one, the
mission manager directs execution of the approved strategy, which serves to help define the limits of the mission manager’s presumptive authority over diverse department and agency activities.

• When the senior functional leader in the vertical chain of command (i.e., the department or agency head) believes a decision by the mission manager prevents him/her from ensuring the success of the functional mission, he/she can raise the question to the President’s attention.

• The national security staff prepares the President for the decision, and he resolves the issue.

The first step in this process is critically important. The President and his Cabinet must be convinced the mission is of national importance and an intrinsically interagency mission; meaning success is not likely or perhaps even possible without a carefully orchestrated effort from multiple agencies. If the mission were deemed largely a military and diplomatic enterprise with other departments simply supporting the effort, it would be better to organize interagency cooperation through a lead department.

Some may object that the balance between vertical integration (unified chain of command through functional organizations) and horizontal integration (unity of effort across functional organizations) proposed here is too complicated. However, it would actually facilitate clear roles and missions. The heads of departments and agencies would ensure national capabilities in their functional areas and oversee and execute missions that require primarily or exclusively their functional expertise (for example, diplomacy, military, or intelligence). The mission managers, armed with modified chief of mission authority would pursue missions that require tight integration of multiple elements of national power to accomplish a well-defined mission. They would take an end-to-end look at complex, multi-functional problems, which would free up senior leaders of functional organizations to focus on problems resident within their domains. These horizontal leaders and their teams would intervene selectively to eliminate friction and sub-optimal efforts where component parts of the organization are not collaborating to maximum effect.

Others might object that requiring the President to play traffic cop between horizontal and vertical integrators (i.e., leaders for select, priority, interagency missions and leaders responsible for ongoing functional capabilities and missions) would be unduly burdensome to the President. Quite the contrary is the case. The leaders of functional organizations would have to accommodate horizontal team decisions or make a direct appeal to the President if they think the mission manager has gone too far. However, they would only be inclined to raise the most serious and principled objections. Their dissent could not be based on petty organizational equities or their credibility with the President would diminish. If their concern was a legitimate one, it would be precisely the major kind of difficult tradeoff that a President ought to hear and resolve. For example, in 2007 President Bush had to decide whether to support his Iraq mission managers (General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker) with a troop surge in a bid to reverse a deteriorating situation, even though it arguably opened up risk on the Korean peninsula and undermined the longer-term viability of the Army.

Conclusions

Clearly sufficient authority for interagency leadership is not the only organizational challenge confronting the national security system, but it is a critical one that must eventually be confronted. The President, as chief executive, needs expanded authority to delegate executive powers for
organizational integration of effort in selected multi-agency situations. The proposal to expand the use of chief of mission authority and modify its use with supporting organizational procedures will not eliminate inter-organizational tensions. However, it is a practical way of utilizing an existing authority that continues to serve U.S. national interests relatively well.

Improving interagency collaboration is a perennial and increasingly urgent issue. Virtually all serious observers of national security affairs recognize that the current structure of the national security system militates against unified problem solving when the problem is a multi-agency issue. In response, an increasing number of informed commentators are recommending the creation of interagency teams. But just as country teams will not work well, even in a limited fashion, without chief of mission authority, interagency teams more generally will not work well without expanded and modified chief of mission authority.

One of the most basic rules in good organization is not to assign responsibilities without commensurate authority. The 9/11 Commission rightly noted that good leaders can sometimes overcome poor organization, but they ought not to have to do so. Our national security system routinely assigns leaders interagency coordination responsibilities without commensurate authority, and the unsatisfactory results repeatedly demonstrate the folly of doing so. To quote again from the Special Inspector General’s report on Iraq that identified billions of dollars of waste in post-conflict reconstruction efforts:

Executive authority below the president is necessary to ensure the effectiveness of contingency relief and reconstruction operations. The role of executive authority—and the lack thereof—over interagency coordination lies at the heart of the failures in the Iraq reconstruction program.

An expanded and modified chief of mission authority could meet the need for executive integration authority below the level of the President. It would require the cooperation of both the legislative and the executive branches, but it will also benefit both branches of government. It would not solve all the collaboration problems facing the U.S. government today, but it certainly would go a long way toward doing so and is a critical prerequisite for meaningful interagency reform. IAE


A survey of over 250 books, articles, and studies on interagency cooperation in the U.S. government found only one report that concluded that interagency cooperation is successful.


8. Ambassador Ryan Crocker, Joint Center for Operational Analysis staff interview and review of documents, December 8, 2009.


21. Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary is the internationally recognized title for the intergovernmental function. Also known as Chief of Mission, this American bureaucratic usage refers to the responsibility for the management of all internal operations. Although an Ambassador is a State Department employee for administrative purposes, he/she is the President’s personal representative during his/her posting and, therefore in a narrow sense not a Department of State representative.


23. Although the country team concept has existed for decades, there still is no statutory or regulatory basis for its composition and functions. McGeorge Bundy, President Kennedy’s National Security Advisor, allegedly coined the term “country team.”


27. Some assert the country team works better in crises and others that it is overwhelmed during crises as organizations fallback on their cultural norms. See respectively: Simmons, 1994, and David C. Litt, “Transforming America’s Collaborative Crisis Response Capability: The Executive Education Dimension,” American Diplomacy, July 21, 2009.

28. Crocker.


30. Simmons, p. 135. Simmons quotes a senior national security official asserting decades ago that interagency coordination at the operational and tactical levels is “one of the most neglected aspects of the national security process, yet it is one whose importance can hardly be overestimated.” Innumerable similar references could be cited.
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