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PART THREE

DECEMBER 1943 — JULY 1944

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HISTORY OF

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

AND

HEADQUARTERS NATCOUSA
PART III

PERIOD OF THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN

FROM THE WINTER LINE TO ROME

(1 December 1943 to 30 June 1944)
Part III of the History of AFHQ is a continuation of the History of Part II of the headquarters from December 1943 to June 1944. Part III follows the general policy of the History as a whole in that it limits its scope to a study of the administration, organization and functions of the headquarters in its relation to Combat zones and zones of Communication.

The period covered by Part III includes two incidents:
(a) the fusion of General Headquarters MIDDLE EAST with Allied Force Headquarters to the setting in motion of the machinery to transfer AFHQ from ALGIERS to CASERTA in ITALY (although the move was not completed and the headquarters was not officially opened at CASERTA until 20th July 1944); (b) a complete phase of the Italian Campaign - the advance from the Winter Line to the completion of the liberation of ROME.

The purely British staff sections continued as integral parts of AFHQ, while the American general and special staff sections for purely American matters were distinct from AFHQ in their theoretical establishment and were distributed between two American headquarters: Hq NATOUSA and Hq SOS NATOUSA. Reorganization of the two American headquarters in February and March 1944 resulted in a transferrance of the American Communication Zone command to the CG SOS NATOUSA and reduced the staff organizations of Hq NATOUSA by transferring some of their functions to American staff components in AFHQ and to Hq SOS NATOUSA.
As with Part II of the History, Part III has been reproduced in four sections in order to give the reader a book that is easily handled rather than a cumbersome tome, which would be the result were this Part to be produced in one volume.

The division of Part III into its four sections has been made so as to give as complete a division of the various subject matters as possible. Thus Section 1 is confined to the changes in the Combat Zone Command and the changes in the Communications Zone Command; Section 2 treats on the Reorganization of AFHQ, Organizations of Personnel and Intelligence; Section 3 deals with the Organizations of Operations, Supply and Transportation Staffs; while Section 4 embraces the Organizations of the various Finance, Civil Affairs, Liaison, Technical, Medical, Law, Military Police, Inspections and Morale Staffs.

Allied Force Headquarters
Caserta, Italy

1 November 1945.
PART III

PERIOD OF THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN

FROM THE WINTER LINE TO ROME

(1 December 1943 to 30 June 1944)
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Field Marshall Sir Henry Maitland Wilson

GCB, GBE, DSO, ADC

In 1944, General

Supreme Allied Commander

Mediterranean Theater
Admiral Sir John H. D. Cunningham

KCB, MVO

In 1944, Allied Naval

Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devers

In 1944, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander

Mediterranean Theater

Commanding General NATOUSA
Lieutenant General Ira C. Baker
In 1944, Air Commander-in-Chief
Mediterranean Allied Air Forces
Commanding General US AAF/MTO
Chapter XX

CHANGES IN THE ALLIED COMMAND: COMBAT ZONE

The period from December 1943 to June 1944 in the history of AFHQ was especially important for the modifications of combat command relations in the Mediterranean Theater. Not only was there a change of Commander-in-Chief and his title but also an extension of the Theater's boundaries to include nearly all territories bordering on the MEDITERRANEAN. As a consequence, for general strategy and operations, GHQ Middle East Forces likewise became a subordinate command of AFHQ, and the Air and Naval commands were also affected by these changes both in relations and appointments.

Furthermore, in this period many new national forces were brought into the Theater. To the French, Italians, and British dominion and colonial troops—which had been serving in the Mediterranean campaigns of 1943—were now added contingents of Poles, Greeks, Brazilians, Jugoslavs, and Belgians whose command relations had to be determined.

The accounts of these command changes—personal, territorial, and national—are treated chronologically in the various subsections of this chapter.

1. Union of AFHQ and GHQ Middle East Forces

The invasions of SICILY and southern ITALY had in fact been a joint effort of both the North African and Middle East theaters.
For these campaigns additional combat units had been furnished to the British 8th Army by the Middle East Command, and parts of the supplies for 8th Army had come from the MIDDLE EAST. All this time, however, the co-ordination of the efforts of the two theaters had had to be largely on a liaison basis through such agencies as the APhQ—Middle East Administrative Information Section and the personal attendance by the C-in-C MEF at the Commanders' conferences at LA MARSA. Such a system of command co-ordination was obviously much too unwieldy, improvised, and inadequate. Both American and British military practice required in this instance a much more clear-cut and unified command responsibility.

The detailed reasons, then, for considering the possibility of bringing GHQ Middle East Forces under APhQ were:

a. That GHQ MEF had scarcely any troops and yet had half the command authority.

b. That the combined operations in the MEDITERRANEAN required a unified command.

c. That the forces under the Allied C-in-C, being in ITALY and near the BALKANS, APhQ and GHQ ME would need to combine and co-ordinate their Balkan activities particularly in JUGOSLAVIA.

1. For an account of AMAIS see History of APhQ, II, 423-426; and for attendance at the La Marsa conferences see Gen Rooks's staff study for CofS APhQ, 6 Nov 43, at Discussion, par 14. (G-3 AFGQ file: 55/7).

2. DO ltr, Kennedy to Whitely, 11 Oct 43 (SGS APhQ file: 312-15). Gen Kennedy wrote: "Gen Eisenhower has nearly all the forces and half the authority whilst Gen Wilson has half of the authority and practically none of the forces."
d. That the Allied Air C-in-C, already being in command of the Air forces under both AFHQ and GHQ MEF, had in effect two different superior commanders to whom he was responsible.

e. That the Allied (Naval) C-in-C Mediterranean, while responsible for the strategic disposition of the naval forces of both the Mediterranean and Levant stations, did not have executive command of the Levant station.

f. That General Eisenhower at AFHQ reported to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in WASHINGTON, while General Wilson at GHQ MEF reported to the British Chiefs of Staff in LONDON.

With these considerations in mind a proposal to unite the two commands was made by the British Imperial General Staff to the British Chiefs of Staff in early October 1943. After deliberating during the latter part of October, they transmitted the proposal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff with their stamp of approval. While the CCS were studying the proposal, General Marshall cabled General Eisenhower a brief summary on 4 November 1943:

4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., Discussion, par 3b.
6. See footnote 2 above.
The British Chiefs of Staff propose a unified command for the entire Mediterranean Theater which would add to your responsibilities GREECE, ALBANIA, YUGOSLAVIA, BULGARIA, ROMANIA, HUNGARY, CRETE, AEGEAN ISLANDS, and TURKEY.

The three British commanders in CAIRO would remain responsible to the British Chiefs of Staff for the operation of the Middle East Command located in AFRICA, ASIA, and LEVANT (except TURKEY) and should continue to receive political guidance from the Minister of State Resident in the MIDDLE EAST.

Our views are requested. ...What is your reaction? 7

General Eisenhower immediately requested the preparation of a staff study by G-3 on the matter. In the study General Rooks dealt mainly with the question of whether efficient machinery could be established for such an extended theater. 8

The gist of General Rooks's recommendations was:

a. That the two headquarters and commands should not be consolidated.

b. That the C-in-C Ground Forces ME should merely become a subordinate command under the Allied C-in-C at AFHQ.

c. That only the strategic policy should come under the control of the Allied C-in-C (except in AFRICA, ASIA, and the LEVANT).

d. That administration and detailed operational control of all the eastern Mediterranean areas should continue under the C-in-C

7. WD Cable No 1716, Marshall to Eisenhower, 4 Nov 43 (SGS AFHQ file).
8. See the general reference in footnote 3 above.
Ground Forces ME.

e. That an Eastern Mediterranean Section should be added to the G-2 Section AFHQ.

f. That some officers from the MIDDLE EAST should be added to the strategic planning organization at AFHQ.

g. That regular liaison on the highest staff levels should be maintained on other matters.

In making his reply to General Marshall, General Eisenhower did not need to discuss all the implications contained in the staff study, but it appears that he did not accept the one recommendation which would have left the operational control with the C-in-C Ground Forces ME.

In general, replied General Eisenhower, I agree with the proposal of the British Chiefs of Staff as transmitted in your No 1716. So long as the British commanders in CAIRO remain separately responsible for the Middle East Base and administration and for those parts of the present Middle East Command located in AFRICA and ASIA, I believe that the operational control of the remainder of the MEDITERRANEAN should be centered in one headquarters. There are many detailed factors applying to this question, but I think it is sufficient to say that I have discussed this previously with my three commanders-in-chief and we are all of the opinion that this is a logical centralization of operational responsibility.

The proposed changes will tend to eliminate certain difficulties that have arisen due to the differing geographical limits of my authority as compared to the Air Chief Marshal and the C-in-C Mediterranean.

If you should desire me to give any detailed reasons on this matter, I will do so.
Upon receipt of this reply.

During November 1943 the Combined Chiefs of Staff had a directive drafted to provide for the unification of the commands; and, when it was ready to be issued in its final form, General Eisenhower on or about 25 November met with Generals Wilson and Alexander and senior members of the staff at CAIRO to discuss the implementation of the union.

I think the meeting was of the greatest value, General Whiteley wrote to General Kennedy, and contemplate no difficulties of any sort in implementing the decision about unified command. I hope that the directive will be in the simplest terms.

As a paper dealing with such an important matter, the CCS Directive 387/3 (Sextant) of 5 December 1943 was fairly brief and specific. The paragraphs directly concerned with the unification of the command are reproduced here in full:

**DIRECTIVE TO COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, ALLIED FORCES NORTH AFRICA**

1. We have decided to set up a unified command in the Mediterranean Theater on account of its geographical unity and its dependence on all bases in the area.

2. We have no intention of changing existing organization and arrangements any more.

---

9. AFHQ Cable No W-4535, Eisenhower to Marshall, 7 Nov 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 55/7).
10. DO ltr, Whiteley to Kennedy, 4 Dec 43 (SGS AFHQ file: 312-15). 5th Army Cable No 4731, Alexander to Eisenhower, 22 Nov 43 (SGS AFHQ file).
11. DO ltr, Whiteley to Kennedy, 4 Dec 43 (SGS AFHQ file: 312-15).
than is necessary to give effect to our main intention. You should assume, therefore, that all present arrangement continue with the exceptions outlined below, but you should report, as necessary, whether you consider any further changes are required in the light of experience.

3. To your present responsibilities you will add responsibility for operations in GREECE, ALBANIA, YUGOSLAVIA, BULGARIA, RUMANIA, HUNGARY, CRETE and AEGEAN ISLANDS, and TURKEY. The British and American forces allocated to you from MIDDLE EAST will be determined by the British and US Chiefs of Staff, respectively. You will have full liberty to transfer forces from one part of your command to another for the purposes of conducting operations which we have agreed. The Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East, will be under your orders for operations in these areas.

5. You will, in addition, assume responsibility for the conduct of guerrilla and subversive action in all the territories in your command and for setting up the necessary organization for the dispatch of supplies to resistance groups in occupied territories.

6. The Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East will remain directly responsible to the British Chiefs of Staff for all the territories at present in the Middle East Command situated in AFRICA, PALESTINE, SYRIA, and the LEBANON, and for the operation and security of the Middle East base with such forces as the British Chiefs of Staff may allot for this purpose from time to time.

7. You will be notified later of any adjustments which are thought necessary to the machinery by which you receive political guidance. In the meantime, in respect of the new territories in your command you should obtain any necessary political advice from the C-in-C Middle East through the channels he at present uses.

8. The system of command is shown on the attached diagram (Appendix "A"). You will note that the
PROPOSED SYSTEM OF COMMAND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
5 December 1943

Appendix "A" to CCS 387/3 (Sextant)
5 Dec 43. Directive for Unification of Command in the MEDITERRANEAN

Combined Chiefs of Staff

C-in-C Allied Forces

Deputy C-in-C Allied Forces (a)

Naval C-in-C Mediterranean

15th Army Group (AAI)

C-in-C Middle East

Commander Balkan Support

Air C-in-C MAAF

Deputy Air C-in-C (US)

Combined Operational Staff

Deputy Air C-in-C (British)

Air Officer C-in-C Middle East

Flag Officer Gibraltar (b)

Flag Officer Western Med

Flag Officer Central Med

Flag Officer Eastern Med

Reservations: The above system is subject to the reservations that the three commanders in CAIRO (FO Levant, C-in-C NE, and AO C-in-C NE) should remain responsible to the British Chiefs of Staff for:
(i) All matters pertaining to the territories of the present Middle East Command situated in AFRICA, PALESTINE, and the LEBANON, and
(ii) The operations of the Middle East Base;
and that in respect of these responsibilities they will continue to receive political guidance from the Minister of State Resident in the MIDDLE EAST.

Notes:
(a) At present acts only as C-in-C 15 Group of Armies.
(b) Flag Officer Gibraltar is responsible to C-in-C Mediterranean for area between the longitude of CAPE ST. VINCENT and longitude 3W. For the remainder of the Gibraltar Command he is responsible direct to Admalty.
(c) As from 1 Jan 1944, Fifteenth Air Force will be placed under command of USAFE for assignment of missions and for technique and tactics employed in their execution. (See also Directive to CG's NATO, ETOUSA, and USAFE dated _________.)
Mediterranean Air Command will now be known as Mediterranean Allied Air Force.

On 10 December 1943 the new decisions were put into effect by a cable to General Eisenhower from the Combined Chiefs of Staff:

The President and the Prime Minister have approved the following recommendations of the Combined Chiefs of Staff:

1. That the unification of command in the MEDITERRANEAN shall take effect from 10 December. There should be no public announcement of this change of organization.

2. ... You are designated Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Theater, effective 10 December 1943.

It will be noted that the cable not only extended the territory of the Theater but also changed its name. Hitherto it had been called the North African Theater of Operations (NATO). Now, because it extended to the MIDDLE EAST, TURKEY, the BALKANS, and ITALY, it was renamed more appropriately the Mediterranean Theater of Operations (MTO). The American theater, however, retained its designation of NATOUSA.

The changes in the Theater and in commanders-in-chief (General Wilson for General Eisenhower on 8 January 1944) brought with them a change in channels of communication.

As Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, the CCS cabled, you will be responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff through the British Chiefs of Staff, who will act as the Executive of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in

14. USFOR Cable No R-6761, CCS to Eisenhower, 10 Dec 43 (SGS AFHQ files 320.2-2).
all matters pertaining to the details of operations with which you are charged and will be the channel through which all directives will be issued. 15

Under General Eisenhower the channel had been through the US Chiefs of Staff to the CCS; now under General Wilson, a British commander, it would be to the CCS through the British Chiefs of Staff.

In announcing to his own command the changes in the Theater’s designation and territory, General Eisenhower also indicated that for the moment the existing channels and organizations were not to be modified:

3. The territories formerly in Middle East command situated in AFRICA, PALESTINE, SYRIA, and the LEBANON, and the operation of the Middle East base are excluded from the responsibility of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Theater. A more precise definition of the chain of responsibility is being sought in respect of these territories.

4. For the present, control of the BALKANS will continue as heretofore.

5. For the present, necessary political advice in respect to the new territories will be obtained from the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, through the channels now in use.

6. No immediate change is contemplated in existing organization. Such changes or arrangements as become necessary, or are desirable in the light of experience, will be published from time to time.

7. The system of command will be published at an early date.

8. Until the issue of further instructions there will be no public announcement of this change of organization, which will be treated as secret.

15. WD Cable No 6673, CCS to Allied C-in-C Med, 8 Jan 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 55/7).
16. AFHQ Staff Memo No 91, 17 Dec 43.
The unification of command brought with it a clear definition of the Theater's territory only at its eastern end (CCS 387/3, par 3). As far as the rest of the Mediterranean Theater's boundaries were concerned, unlike NATOUSA, they had not previously been defined. In March 1944, however, in order to distinguish the SAC's territorial responsibility from that of the American CG NATOUSA, General Wilson was sent the following instructions:

1. Boundary of NATO was fixed mainly for administrative reasons and does not imply an extension of the area for which you are operationally responsible.

2. Land areas in which you are responsible for operations are: French and Spanish MOROCCO, ALGERIA, TUNISIA, TURKEY, ROMANIA, BULGARIA, GREECE, HUNGARY, YUGOSLAVIA, ALBANIA, ITALY, GIBRALTAR (for certain operations) and MEDITERRANEAN ISLANDS, except CYPRUS and MALTA. You will note that this defines your southern operational boundary in relation to French WEST AFRICA.

3. You are also responsible for rendering certain assistance to SCAEF and for plans outside this area in the following two eventu-alities:

   (A) For launching any operations that may be ordered against southern FRANCE and for control of the forces engaged until such time as they pass under control of SCAEF;

   (B) If RANKIN conditions arise, for assisting SCAEF in the occupation of GERMANY and AUSTRIA and the liberation of FRANCE.

4. Your area of operational responsibility will remain as defined in paragraph 2 above, subject to such temporary adjustment as may be agreed by SCAEF for operations against southern FRANCE and RANKIN. 17

17. Air Ministry Cable No OZ 1403 (MEDCOS Cable No 63), British Chiefs of Staff to AFHQ, 16 Mar 44 (SGS AFHQ file: Boundary file).
A map of the Mediterranean Theater land areas will be found on the next page.

As was suggested by General Eisenhower's Staff Memorandum No 91 of 1943, the union of the North African and Middle East theaters into a Mediterranean theater was to have functional and organizational effects on the Air, Naval, Balkan, and American Theater commands as well as on such activities as OSS, SOE, and the G-2 and G-3 staff sections. These matters, however, will be discussed later in Part III under the separate accounts of these commands and sections.

2. General Wilson's Appointment as Allied C-in-C (SACMED)

About a month after the extension of its boundaries, the Theater had its first change of supreme Allied Commander-in-Chief. This came as a direct result of the development of a new command and headquarters for the projected invasion of northern France.

Although the Combined Chiefs of Staff as early as 25 May 1943 at the Trident Conference decided "that forces and equipment shall be established in the UNITED KINGDOM with the object of mounting an operation with target date 1 May 1944 to secure a lodgement on the CONTINENT," no commander for the operation was chosen for another six months. In the meantime the task of planning for what was soon to be called Operation OVER-

LAND AREAS UNDER COMMAND OF SAC MED IN MARCH 1944

Based on COSMED Calie No 63, Air Ministry to AAI, 16 March 1944.
LORD was entrusted to Lieutenant General F.E. Morgan (B) as Chief of Staff of the future Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC) for that northern European theater.

The first indication that General Eisenhower might be the choice for the new command was suggested on 6 December 1943 when General Marshall spoke of "the impending appointment of a British officer as your successor as Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces in the MEDITERRANEAN." Four days later came the official cable directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff:

The President and the Prime Minister have approved the following recommendations of the Combined Chiefs of Staff:

2. That General Eisenhower should hand over command of the Mediterranean Theater on 1 January or as soon after that date as General Eisenhower himself thinks desirable, having regard to the progress of the operations to capture ROME.

...Your comments as to date of turnover of command of the Mediterranean Theater to your successor are requested.

In addition to the above, the Combined Chiefs of Staff made the following recommendations which have been approved by the Prime Minister but not as yet by the President. They are furnished you at this time for information only.

3. That, if there is to be a public announcement of General Eisenhower's move from the MEDITERRANEAN to the UK his new appointment should be described as Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force.

4. That, concurrently with the above, the announcement should be made of the new Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Theater.

19. Ibid., p 5.
20. USAFIME Cable No AMSME FP44, Marshall to Eisenhower, 6 Dec 43.
21. Fan Cable No 308, CCS to Eisenhower, 10 Dec 43.
There were three matters left undetermined by this directive: the date for the advance announcement of the change, the successor to General Eisenhower, and the date of the transfer of command. However much General Eisenhower would have liked to have waited for the capture of Rome before relinquishing his Mediterranean command, he felt that there would be too much delay before such an event would take place.

The battle (in Italy) had become static with the weather at its worst for offensive warfare and the enemy firmly established in his winter line. I lacked the necessary landing craft to carry out continuous outflanking movements behind the enemy lines as the weather might permit, and I was sure that the battle for Rome would be hard and long.22

For these reasons he cabled President Roosevelt:

I am deeply appreciative of your consideration in this matter (Rome) and quite naturally, I should like, if possible, to have captured that important place before leaving here. However, I feel that impending events are of such great importance and that the date for the capture of Rome is so indeterminate that we should go ahead with the plans looking toward a transfer shortly after the first of the year. Naturally I will hope that significant progress of our land advance has been made at that time, but I do not feel that we can afford to wait too long. 23

As to the date for the public announcement of the impending change, President Roosevelt wanted to announce it in his radio broadcast of 24 December; and he and Mr. Churchill agreed

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22. SAC’s Dispatch, Italian Campaign, 3 Sep 43--8 Jan 44, p 81.
23. Amilcar Cable No 1112, Eisenhower to W.B. Smith for Roosevelt, 10 Dec 43.
24. WD Cable No 5376, Hopkins to Eisenhower for Churchill, 21 Dec 43.
to make simultaneous statements of General Eisenhower's transfer and the selection of his successor. In the cable indicating agreement comes the first mention of the name of General Eisenhower's successor:

It is agreed that you (Mr. Churchill) may at the same time, if you wish to do so, announce that Wilson will command in the Mediterranean...and that Alexander will command the Allied Armies in Italy under Wilson. 25

The announcement plans were carried out as scheduled. President Roosevelt broadcast from Hyde Park, New York, on the afternoon of 24 December 1943 that General Eisenhower would assume command of the Allied forces to be used on the "second front," and on the same day London stated that General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson (B), Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East Forces, had been appointed as General Eisenhower's successor. However, General Wilson was not officially notified of his appointment until 27 December.

After a farewell courtesy call on General de Gaulle (F) on 30 December, General Eisenhower left for a brief visit to Washington, arriving there on 2 January 1944. At the time of his departure he issued a farewell message to the Allied forces which had served under him in the Mediterranean Theater:

25. WD Cable No 5579, Roosevelt to Eisenhower for Churchill, 23 Dec 43.
27. WD Cable No 52431 MS 1, WD to Wilson, 24 Dec 43 (read, 27 Dec 43). SAC's Dispatch, Italian Campaign, 3 Sep 43 to 8 Jan 44, p 82.
28. Minute of Eisenhower--De Gaulle Interview, 30 Dec 43, (G-3 AFHQ file: 19/3).
29. WD Cable No 6243, WD to AFHQ, 2 Jan 44.
Soon I leave this theater to assume other duties assigned to me by the Allied Governments. I take my leave of you with feelings of personal regret that are equaled only by my pride in your brilliant accomplishments of the year just passed. ... 

Altogether you comprise a mighty fighting machine, which, under your new commander, will continue, as a completely unified instrument of war, to make further inroads into the enemy's defences and assist in bringing about his final collapse.

Until we meet again in the heart of the enemy's continental stronghold, I send God-speed and good luck to each of you, along with the assurance of my lasting gratitude and admiration. 30

On 8 January 1944 General Eisenhower relinquished his Mediterranean command to General Wilson. The official order, signed by the latter, announced:

I hereby assume command of Allied Forces in the Mediterranean effective at midday this date. 32

With the change in commanders came a change in command channels.

As Allied Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, the CCS cabled, you will be responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff through the British Chiefs of Staff, who will act as the Executive of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, in all matters pertaining to the details of operations with which you are charged and will be the channel through which all directives will be issued. 33

30. AG AFHQ ltr to Allied Forces in MTO, 1 Jan 44
(AG AFHQ file: 335.18-1). Organization--History of the AG Section AFHQ, pp 35-37.
31. NAP Cable No 563, Wilson to CCS, 8 Jan 44.
32. AFHQ GO No 1, 8 Jan 44.
33. FAN Cable No 317, CCS to Eisenhower, 8 Jan 44.
3. General Devers's Appointment as Deputy Allied C-in-C (DSAC)

At the Anfa Conference in January 1943 it had been decided to have a British Deputy Allied Commander-in-Chief to serve under the American Allied Commander-in-Chief, General Eisenhower. General Alexander (B) had been chosen for that assignment. Now, at the end of 1943, when the Allied Commander-in-Chief was to be a British general officer, consideration was given to the designation of an American general officer as his deputy.

For your information, General Marshall cabled General Eisenhower, the Prime Minister has proposed General W.B. Smith to be Deputy Commander-in-Chief as well as Chief of Staff Mediterranean Theater.

The possibility has been considered of leaving Smith in the MEDITERRANEAN until some time in February or March and then his joining you in the UNITED KINGDOM.

While the above message indicates the high esteem in which General W.B. Smith was held by both Mr. Churchill and General Eisenhower, the latter's desire to have an earlier transfer of his Chief of Staff to the new theater prevailed. Thus it was necessary to consider another American officer for the assignment.

The announcement of the selection came on 29 December 1943 in a cable from General Marshall:

35. USAFIME Cable No AMSME FP 44, Marshall to Eisenhower, 6 Dec 43.
36. WD Cable No 5900, Marshall to Eisenhower and Devers, 29 Dec 43 (AG NATOUSA files 323.36-303).
The President and the Prime Minister, he said, having approved...General Devers's appointment as Deputy to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Theater, orders are being issued by the War Department...assigning General Devers to the Mediterranean Theater as US Theater Commander.

Actual date of assumption of command of American Forces in the respective theaters will be as mutually arranged between General Eisenhower and General Devers. The War Department will be informed when the assumption of command is effected in each case.

Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devers (A) was at that time the Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, US Army. Consequently, his appointment to the Mediterranean assignment constituted in fact an exchange of general officers, since General Eisenhower would take command of ETOUSA and General Devers of NATOUSA in addition to his duties as Deputy Allied Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean Theater.

On 8 January 1944 came the official transfer of command. General Wilson cabled the Combined Chiefs of Staff that General Eisenhower handed over to Lieutenant General Devers the command of the North African Theater of Operations, US Army, at 1200 A hours today, 8 January 1944. At the same time General Devers assumed his duties as Deputy Allied C-in-C Med.

4. The Change in General Wilson's Title

At first in 1942 the term "Supreme Commander" had

38. NAP Cable No 584, Wilson to CCS, 8 Jan 44.
been used for the Allied commander of the forces destined to
invade NORTH AFRICA; but at the time when General Eisenhower
was officially designated for that post, he was given the title
of Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force. The word
"Expeditionary" was later omitted, however, for security reasons.
Therefore from September 1942 to March 1944 the title of his command
had remained Commander-in-Chief, Allied Force.

But, with the development of plans for change of command,
a certain confusion arose concerning the title. This may have
been due partly to the designation of the future commander of the
Normandy (OVERLORD) invasion forces as the Supreme Commander,
Allied Expeditionary Force (SCAEF). When General Wilson's appoint-
tment was announced from LONDON, the press release called him the
"Supreme Allied Commander of the Mediterranean Theater," but
the official notification to General Wilson read:
"You have been selected for the appointment of Allied Commander-
in-Chief, Mediterranean Theater." On the occasion of the
assumption of command this confusion continued. General Wilson
signed the order as "Commander-in-Chief" but informed the CCS
that "General Eisenhower handed over to General Maitland Wilson the
Supreme Command of Allied Forces... ."

39. History of APHQ, I, 3, 18
40. FAN Cable No 308, CCS to Eisenhower, 10 Dec 43.
41. The Stars and Stripes, (Naples Edition), 25
Dec 43, AFHQ Cable No 51022, AFHQ to WO, 13 Feb 44.
42. WO Cable No 52431 M51, 24 Dec 43.
43. AFHQ GO No 1, 8 Jan 44.
44. NAF Cable No 583, Wilson to CCS, 8 Jan 44.
Finally on 13 February 1944 a cable was sent to the War Office stating that "there is still uncertainty here as to the correct designation of commanders" and suggesting either "Supreme Allied Commander" or "Allied Commander-in-Chief" as General Wilson's title. The decision from LONDON was: "General Wilson to be Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater." The official order announcing the change was issued on 9 March 1944:

Announcement is hereby made that the designation of Gen H.M. Wilson, GBE, KCB, DSO, ADC, has been changed to "Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater." The same confusion existed, of course, concerning General Devers title, and this was finally clarified at the same time as that of General Wilson's:

Announcement is hereby made that the designation of Lt Gen Jacob L. Devers, US Army, CG NATOUSA, has been changed from Deputy Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean Theater to Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.

5. Reorganization of the Allied Naval Command

Admiral Sir John Cunningham (B) continued to serve as Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean during the first half of 1944.

At this point a fine distinction in titles should be noted. On 20 February 1943 the supreme Allied naval commander in the western and central MEDITERRANEAN was given the title of

45. AFHQ Cable No 15022, AFHQ to WO, 13 Feb 44.
46. WO Cable No 73655 SD2, WO to AFHQ, 3 Mar 44.
47. AFHQ GO No 12, 9 Mar 44, sect I.
48. Ibid., sect II.
"Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean."

This should not be confused with the title of his immediate superior, successively General Eisenhower and General Wilson, which, after 10 December 1943, was defined as "Allied Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean Theater."

The similarity of their titles was, however, removed on 9 March 1944 when General Wilson's title became "Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean."

One of the principal naval command changes in this period, the inclusion of the Levant Naval Command under the C-in-C Mediterranean, came with the partial unification of the ME Command with that under General Eisenhower in the western and central MEDITERRANEAN. During the period when unification was being considered, General Rooks reported to the Chief of Staff AFHQ that

C-in-C Mediterranean, while not in executive command of Levant Station, has an overall responsibility for the strategic disposition of forces to meet the requirements of Mediterranean and Levant stations. ...

From the point of view of Navy and Air, unification of command as recommended by the British Chiefs of Staff is very desirable. No difficulties would arise in either of those services in implementing the change. It is assumed that, concurrently with the unification of command, C-in-C Mediterranean's command would be extended to include Levant Station.

In General Eisenhower's cable approving the unification of commands he indicates also the approval of the C-in-C Mediterranean:

49. Naval War Diary (C-in-C Med), 20 Feb 43.
50. FAN Cable No 308, CCS to Eisenhower, 10 Dec 43.
51. AFHQ GO No 12, 9 Mar 44.
52. Staff study by Gen Rooks for CofS AFHQ, subject: "Unification of Command in the Mediterranean Theater," 6 Nov 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 55/7). This study had the concurrence of the Allied C-in-C Mediterranean.
I have discussed this previously with our three Commanders-in-Chief, and we are all of the opinion that this is a logical centralisation of operational responsibility.53

As soon as the unification was put into effect, the commanders in the MIDDLE EAST were cabled the following general instructions:

The three Commanders-in-Chief in CAIRO will be under his (General Eisenhower's) order for these operations (in the Balkan countries, HUNGARY, and TURKEY) but will remain responsible to the British Chiefs of Staff for operation of the Middle East Base and for all matters pertaining to the present Middle East Command situated in AFRICA, ASIA, and LEVANT (except TURKEY). 54

Three weeks later the following more detailed instructions were given to the various British naval commanders in the MEDITERRANEAN:

1. The whole Mediterranean Theater has now been placed under a Supreme Allied Commander. Naval command in the MEDITERRANEAN has been unified to conform, and the following changes took effect from 0001, 28th December.

2. The Mediterranean Station under the C-in-C Mediterranean is bounded on the west by a line running south from CAPE ST. VINCENT to the Moroccan Coast, thence following a high water line alongside the coast to CAPE MOGADOR on east by latitude of .015 degrees north in the RED SEA.

3. Sub-commands have been set up as follows:

A. Gibraltar and Mediterranean Approaches (under FOGMA).

53. AFRQ Cable No W4535, Eisenhower to Marshall, 7 Nov 43 (G-3 AFRQ file: 55/7).
54. Air Ministry Cable No OZ 4046, Air Ministry to C's-in-C, 10 Dec 43 (G-3 AFRQ file: 55/7).
55. Admiralty Cable No AIGI 264A, Admiralty to AFRQ, 2 Jan 44 (G-3 AFRQ file: 55/7). Naval War Diary (AFHQ), 28 Dec 43, par 5.
(1) FOGMA is responsible direct to the Admiralty for area between the new western limit of the Mediterranean Station and the former station boundary in the ATLANTIC. This area is known as the Mediterranean Approaches.

(2) SNO Azores is responsible operationally and administratively to FOGMA.

(3) FOGMA is responsible to the C-in-C Mediterranean for the area between the longitude of .003 degrees west and the western limit in the Mediterranean Station. This area is known as Gibraltar Sub-Command.

B. Western Mediterranean (under FOWM at ALGIERS).

(1) Bounded on the west by longitude .003 west and on the end by a line from the Franco-Spanish frontier to a position .040 degrees north .007 degrees 30 minutes east due south to intersect with a line drawn due west from CAPE TEULADA in the south of SARDINIA, along the Sardinian Coast between CAPE TEULADA and thence due south to meet the North African coast.

(2) Until FOWM is appointed, C-in-C Med will carry out this duty.


(1) The RED SEA northwards of latitude .015 degrees north and the Eastern MEDITERRANEAN to the eastward of a line drawn from RAS MISRATA in TRIPOLITANIA to join a line drawn due west from CAPE MATAPAN on longitude .019 degrees east.

(2) The Flag Officer Red Sea and Canal Area becomes SNO Red Sea and Canal Area (short title SNORSCA) under FOLEM.

D. Central Mediterranean (under VA Malta and FO Central Mediterranean -- short
This detailed directive brought unity of British naval command for the entire Mediterranean and Red Sea waters under the Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean. But the channels of command were split above the C-in-C Med. For operations in the BALKANS, HUNGARY, and TURKEY as well as in the central and western MEDITERRANEAN the C-in-C Med was responsible to General Eisenhower (later General Wilson); for the operation of the Middle East Base and for all matters pertaining to the present Middle East Command in AFRICA, ASIA, and the LEVANT he was responsible directly to the British Chiefs of Staff.

The transfer of command from General Eisenhower (A) to General Wilson (B) also brought about a slight modification in the command channels between the American naval forces in the MEDITERRANEAN and the C-in-C Med. With the establishment of NATOUSA, General Eisenhower, as its commanding general and as Allied C-in-C, had been given "planning and operational control, under the principle of unity of command, over US Naval Forces North-west African Waters." To have left this same authority with General Devers, who was not the Allied C-in-C, would have weakened the unity of command. General Marshall therefore suggested in his proposed new directive (paragraph 11) to General Devers (CG NATOUSA) that

56. A map showing the naval command areas appears on the next page.
Your relations with the US Navy in the Theater will be regulated by the following:
(This is being submitted to you for your comments prior to clearance with the Commander-in-Chief US Fleet.)

A. The Commander 8th Fleet (COMNAVNAW) will operate through the Naval Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean in the chain of command of the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, Mediterranean...

C. Your normal relations with this Commander will be under the principle of mutual co-operation.

D. Commander 8th Fleet will co-operate with you during training and preparatory phases to the end of adequately preparing joint task forces for carrying out planned operations...

In considering the terms of the proposed directive, General Rooks thought that paragraph 11. A. should read "will operate under (not through) the Naval Commander" and that paragraph 11. D. should read "for carrying out planned operations for which you may be responsible" (adding the last six words). Colonel Roberts (AG NATOUSA), however, advised against the use of the word "under" because this in effect would place the Commander 8th Fleet completely under the control of the Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean for administration as well as operations and prevent the Commander 8th Fleet from going direct to the Theater Commander or the US Navy Department.

He likewise disapproved the second suggestion because its effect

58. WD Cable No 6375, Marshall to Devers, 5 Jan 44.
59. Memo, Gen Rooks (G-3) to Col Roberts (AG), 10 Jan 44 (AG NATOUSA file: 323.36-303).
60. Memo, Col Roberts (AG) to Theater Commander, 12 Jan 44 (AG NATOUSA file: 323.36-303).
was not clear.

General Devers followed Colonel Roberta's recommendations and approved paragraph 11. as originally drawn.

When the final version of the directive was issued, the only change appeared in 11. D. where the CG NATOUS was instructed to co-operate with the Commander 8th Fleet instead of the latter to co-operate with the former.

This was merely a correction in form because the whole cable was a specific directive to the CG NATOUS.

The significance, then, of the new directive was that the relations between the senior commanding officers of the US Army and the US Navy respectively in the Theater were to be those of co-operation rather than of command. For operations the Commander 8th Fleet, Vice-Admiral H.K. Hewett (A), was responsible to the Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean who was in turn responsible to the Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Theater (later called Supreme Allied Commander). For supply, administration, and personnel Admiral Hewett was still responsible to the US Navy Department by the retention of the word "through" in the directive, but for training and preparing for amphibious operations he was to co-operate with the CG NATOUS.

In addition to British and American fleets, the C-in-C Mediterranean had operational command of French, Italian, Greek,

61. Ibid.
62. NATOUS Cable No W81, Devers to Marshall, 13 Jan 44 (AG NATOUS file: 323.36-303).
63. WD Cable No 9069, Marshall to Devers, 6 Feb 44 (AG NATOUS file: 323.36-303).
and Dutch units in his area during the first half of 1944.

In the beginning the command of the French naval units had been upon a basis of co-operation. Article VII of the Clark--Darlan Agreement had stated that

French warships shall operate in close co-operation with the Commanding General, United States Army or Allied representatives acting with his approval.... 64

In 1943 the "Allied representative" in this case became the C-in-C Mediterranean. With the program of French rearmament under way, which included the refitting of French warships, it was understood that such forces would be used only under the direction of the Allied Commander-in-Chief. This was significant in that it defined a command relation rather than one of mere co-operation.

In October 1943 the whole question of naval command of the French forces was reviewed by the CCS; and specific arrangements, approved also by the French authorities, were set out in a revised directive which formed the basis of Franco--Allied naval command relations in 1944. The three pertinent clauses of this directive provided as follows:

2. EMPLOYMENT OF FRENCH NAVAL VESSELS.

French naval vessels are given initial assignments to operation areas by the Combined Chiefs of Staff as stated in paragraphs 25 to 41. Future changes and initial employment of new ships assigned or

65. Ltr, Eisenhower to Giraud, 14 Dec 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 37/4).
loaned will be made as required for the most effective prosecution of the war effort as determined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. ...

10. OPERATIONAL COMMAND. French ships assigned to any operational area will operate under the operational command of the Allied naval area commander. They will be utilized to the extent of their capabilities and in the same manner as similar other Allied ships in the area, operating normally under subordinate French commanders.

11. INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION. The internal administration of the French Vessels operating under Allied control will remain vested in the appropriate French naval authorities.

There was no doubt, then, that in this period, while French vessels in the MEDITERRANEAN remained under French administration, for operational command they came under the C-in-C Mediterranean.

The command of the Italian naval forces continued in 1944 under the terms of the Cunningham--De Courten Agreement. This specifically provided that Italian naval vessels would "be used under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean... ." On important matters, however, the orders would be issued by the Italian Ministry of Marine upon receiving instructions from an Allied naval liaison officer. On minor matters Allied liaison officers were to give instructions directly to local Italian naval commanders.

As to the operational command of the Royal Jugoslav Navy, difficulty arose concerning the amalgamation of the Royal

67. Cunningham--De Courten Agreement in Cable No 570, Eisenhower (FAIRFAX REAR) to CCS, 24 Sep 43.
68. Naval War Diary (AFHQ), 27 Nov 43, par 6.
and Partisans ships and crews under one Jugoslav command which could then be placed under the C-in-C MED for operations.

Conversations between Dr. Subasic, Marshal Tito, and the British authorities had begun in June 1944, but no agreement had been reached by the end of that month (end of the period of Part III).

Units of the Royal Hellenic (Greek) Navy had been placed under the command of the British naval authorities in the Middle East as early as March 1942. Now that the command had been unified throughout the whole Mediterranean, the terms providing for such British command of Greek naval units entered into the command relations problem of AFHQ. The applicable terms of the Anglo--Greek Military Agreement of 9 Mar 1942 provided:

Article 1. The Greek Armed Forces (comprising...Sea...Forces) shall be organized and employed under the British High Command, in its character of the Allied High Command, as the Armed Forces of the Kingdom of Greece allied with the United Kingdom.

Article 3. Units of the Royal Hellenic Navy shall be employed with the Royal Navy in accordance with the conditions laid down in Appendix II of the present Agreement.

(Appendix II).

Article 1. Units of the Royal Hellenic Navy, the details of which shall be agreed upon between the British and Greek Naval Authorities, shall be attached to the Royal Navy and shall be

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69. From paper entitled "The Royal Jugoslav Navy" in the RN files (AFHQ).
70. Anglo--Greek Agreement on the Organization and Employment of the Greek Armed Forces, 9 Mar 42, Article 3. and App. II.
under the operational control of the British Naval Authorities. Any other units which may be operating under the direction of the Greek Naval Authorities shall co-operate with the Royal Navy as circumstances permit in action against the common enemy.

Article 2. All units of the Royal Hellenic Navy, under the command of Greek officers and manned by Greek crews, shall operate under the Greek flag. The Greek authorities shall be responsible for maintaining and replacing the personnel of their vessels. The British authorities shall render all possible assistance in the mobilization and training of Greek Naval reservists.

Article 3. The internal administration of all Greek vessels and their personnel shall remain the responsibility of the Greek naval authorities, but vessels attached to the Royal Navy and placed under the operational control of the British naval authorities shall act under the orders of the British commanders of the units to which they are attached.

Article 4. At the request of the Greek authorities or the commanders of Greek vessels, the British naval authorities shall meet the reasonable requirements of the Greek vessels for fuel, stores, victuals, etc. and shall arrange for Greek vessels to be repaired or refitted as may be necessary.

Thus, while matters of administration remained the responsibility of the Greek naval authorities, operational command and supply of the Greek naval units became the responsibility of the Allied C-in-C Mediterranean in the sea areas under his command.

Likewise, at times during this period certain Dutch naval vessels came under the operational command of the Allied C-in-C Mediterranean.

71. Naval War Diary (APHQ), 4 Jan 44, par 3.
6. Reorganization of the Allied Air Command

The Mediterranean Air Command, like the Allied ground and naval commands, was affected by the unification of command in the MEDITERRANEAN, but to a lesser degree. General Rooks pointed out in his staff study that already the Air C-in-C has general command in the whole Theater. ...

From the viewpoint of both the Navy and Air, unification of command as recommended by the British Chiefs of Staff is very desirable. No difficulties would arise in either of those services in implementing the change. 

Although no change in Air command channels was necessitated by this unification of command, a change in the name of the command was made at this time. On 17 February 1943 the name of the joint Allied air command had been determined as the "Mediterranean Air Command." At the time when unification was being considered, Air Chief Marshal Tedder recommended "that the Mediterranean Air Command should be renamed Mediterranean Allied Air Forces." The recommendation having received General Eisenhower's approval, the CCS on 10 December 1943 directed that "the Mediterranean Air Command will be renamed Mediterranean Allied Air Forces" (MAAF),

72. Staff Study by Gen Rooks to CofS AFHQ, subject: "Unification of Command in the Mediterranean Theater," 6 Nov 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 55/7). Air Plans approved these conclusions.
73. AFHQ GO No 20, 17 Feb 43.
74. WD Cable No 1716, Marshall to Eisenhower, 4 Nov 43.
75. AFHQ Cable No W4535, Eisenhower to Marshall, 7 Nov 43.
76. Air Ministry Cable No OZ 4046, British CofS Com to AFHQ, 10 Dec 43. AFHQ GO No 67, 20 Dec 43.
a designation which remained unchanged for the rest of the war.

When General Eisenhower went to his new assignment as SCAEF, Air Chief Marshal Tedder was likewise transferred to the new headquarters assembling in the UNITED KINGDOM. Since the Allies were reversing nationalities in the position of Allied C-in-C MTO, Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker (A) succeeded Air Chief Marshal Tedder (B) as Air C-in-C MAAF. The first announcement of General Eaker's appointment occurred on 28 December 1943 when General Marshall cabled:

The Allied Air Commander in the MEDITERRANEAN to be Lieutenant General Eaker. ... General Eaker to move to NORTH AFRICA about 12 January for the purpose of relieving Air Marshal Tedder.77

However, General Eaker was unable to arrive until 15 January 1944, and on the 17th he cabled the following announcement to his subordinate commands:

I have this date assumed command Mediterranean Allied Air Forces. Existing organizations, policies, and directives remain in force and effect. 78

Air Marshal Sir John C. Slessor (B) was appointed on 12 January 1944 as

British Deputy Air C-in-C MAAF, in which capacity you will exercise such responsibility as may by delegated to you by the Air Commander-in-Chief MAAF.

77. WD Cable No 5814, Marshall to Eisenhower, 28 Dec 43.
78. DO ltr, Whiteley to Kennedy, 16 Jan 44.
79. AFHQ Cable No 29938, Gen Eaker to his subordinate commanders, 17 Jan 44.
This cable also stated:

You are also appointed Commander of the Royal Air Force in the Mediterranean Theater and of the Middle East Command of the RAF as at present constituted. For all RAF operations in the area of responsibility of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Theater, as defined in CGS 387/3 (which included also the BALKANS, HUNGARY, and TURKEY) you will be responsible to the Air Commander-in-Chief MAAF. As regards the Middle East Command you will delegate the responsibility for air operations for the security of the MIDDLE EAST to the ACC-in-C Middle East, who will correspond direct on these matters with the British Chief of Staff, keeping you fully informed.

The units of the Middle East Command engaged in general reconnaissance and convoy escort duty in the INDIAN OCEAN will be operated by the Air Commander-in-Chief South East Asia, through the ACC IO 222 Group.

You will be responsible.

A peculiar arrangement developed in this period for the command channels of the US Army Air Forces in the Theater. The three principal American air forces in the Mediterranean Theater—the 12th US Army Air Forces, the 15th US Army Air Forces, and the US Air Transport Command—each had a different channel of command.

The 12th USAAF had the most normal command channels. For operations its commanding officer, Major General James H. Doolittle (A), was responsible to General Eaker (Air C-in-C MAAF) and through his to the SACMED.

For administration, supply, and training he was responsible

80. Air Ministry Cable No OZ 210, Air Ministry to AFHQ, 12 Jan 44.
81. Maj Gen Doolittle was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general on 13 Mar 44. (Information from Awards and Promotions Subsection of AG AFHQ).
through General Baker (CG AAF/MTO) to the CG NATOUSA.

On the other hand the command channels of the 15th USAAF, whose mission was largely strategic bombing, became involved in the establishment, on 1 January 1944, of a new command called the US Strategic Air Forces in EUROPE (USSAFE). The primary task of the strategic bombing forces was Operation POINTBLANK against German targets. This required the full utilization of US air forces in both the European and Mediterranean theaters. Consequently the USSAFE was established as a co-ordinating command over both the 8th USAAF (in the UK) and the 15th USAAF (in the MEDITERRANEAN). The definitions of channels and responsibilities of this new inter-theater command were given in the CCS Directive 400/2 of 4 December 1943, as follows:

1. Effective 1 January 1944 there will be established an air command designated "The US Strategic Air Forces in EUROPE," consisting initially of the 8th and 15th US Army Air Forces. Headquarters for this air command will be established in the UNITED KINGDOM. An officer of the US Army Air Forces will be designated Commanding General, US Strategic Air Forces in EUROPE.

2. The US Strategic Air Forces in EUROPE will come directly under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander at a date to be announced later by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

82. WD Cable No 9069, Marshall to Devers, 6 Feb 44, par 3 and 9. WD Cable No MAAF ADV 405, Arnold to Baker, 9 Feb 44.

83. CCS Directive 400/2, 4 Dec 43, enclosure as revised on 6 and 7 Dec 43 (G-3 AFHQ files: 19/9). The name of USSAFE was later changed to US Strategic Air Forces (USS/AF).
In the interim the Chief of the Air Staff RAF will continue to act as the agent of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, pending transfer of the USSAFE to the command of the SAC (SCAEF), and will be responsible under the Combined Chiefs of Staff for co-ordination of all POINTBLANK operations. Under his direction, the Commanding General, US Strategic Air Forces in Europe will be responsible for the determination of priorities of POINTBLANK targets to be attacked by the 8th and 15th Air Forces between theaters within the limits of base area facilities and available for his forces.

3. The Commanding General USSAFE will keep the Allied Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean Theater informed of his general intentions and requirements. As far as possible, consistent with the performance of his primary mission, the Commanding General USSAFE will coordinate his operations with those of the Allied Commander-in-Chief in the MEDITERRANEAN.

4. The Commanding Generals US Army Forces in the European and North African theaters of operations will continue to be responsible for the administrative control of the US Army air units in their respective areas, including the provision of base services. The Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces in the MEDITERRANEAN will provide the necessary logistical support to the 15th Air Force in performance of Operation POINTBLANK as the air operation of first priority.

5. Should a strategical or tactical emergency arise requiring such action, theater commanders may, at their discretion, utilize the strategic air forces, which are based within their respective theaters, for purposes other than their primary mission, informing the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Commanding General USSAFE of the action taken.

6. The Commanding General USSAFE will employ six heavy bombardment groups and two long range fighter groups of the 15th Air Force to meet the requirements of the Commanding General NATOUSA in operations against objectives other than those prescribed for POINTBLANK, until such time as the air base objective area, north and east of ROME, is secured, in accordance with the provisions of the directive issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 22 October (FAN 254).

Thus Major General Nathan F. Twining (A), CG 15th USAF, became responsible to three different superior author-
ties for different functions of his command. For operations in the Mediterranean Theater he was responsible to General Eaker (Air C-in-C MAAF); for administration, supply, and training he was responsible to General Eaker (CG AAF/MTO); and for Operation POINTBLANK he was responsible to Lieutenant General Carl Spaatz (A), CG USAAF (or later USSTAF).

The US Air Transport Command in the Mediterranean Theater had its own independent channel of command. The memorandum of TAG, dated 26 February 1943, which applied in this period of 1944, stated:

1. The Air Transport Command will operate under the direct supervision and control of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

4. Under the Commanding General, Air Transport Command, the commanders of Air Transport wings will have command of such personnel and control of such facilities as are attached or assigned to the Air Transport Command in their respective wings. The wing commander is responsible that all personnel under his command conform to administrative policies of the commanding general of the theater of operations. When necessary, in the enforcement of such administrative policies, the theater commander may exercise disciplinary control over Air Transport Command personnel present in his theater.

The relations, then, of the ATC in NATOUSA with the CG NATOUSA was one of co-operation and of independent enforcement within its own organization of the administrative policies of the CG NATOUSA.

While the British administered their RAF commands

84. WD Cable No MAAF ADV 405, Arnold to Eaker, 9 Feb 44.

85. TAG Memo No W95-6-43, 26 Feb 43, subject; "Air Transport Operations," par 1 and 4.
through their own separate normal administrative channels, the USAAF, which was a part of the Army forces in the Theater, had found it advisable to set up a separate headquarters subordinate to Hq NATOUSA to provide for USAAF administration. In 1943 this had been called United States Army Air Forces, North African Theater of Operations (USAAF/NATO), but on 1 January 1944 it was reorganized as the Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theater of Operations (AAF/MTO). Just as the Air C-in-C MAAF was subordinate to the SAC at AFHQ for air operations, so the CG AAF/MTO was subordinate to the CG NATOUSA for USAAF administration in the Theater. On his arrival in the Theater (15 January 1944) General Eaker announced his assumption of command as CG AAF/MTO in addition to his duties as Air C-in-C MAAF, and at the same time designated Major General Idwal H. Edwards (A) as his Deputy CG AAF/MTO upon whom would fall most of the detailed administrative responsibilities.

In addition to British and American air forces MAAF had elements of the air forces of other Allied countries under its command. In rehabilitating the French Air Force, MAAF had the responsibility for the equipment, training, and operational command of the French units. These served in the Coastal Air Force and Tactical Air Force and therefore fitted into the chain of command of those combined operational units.

86. AG NATOUSA ltr, 322/287 A-O, 22 Dec 43 (AG AAF/MTO file: 322). AAF/MTO GO No 1, 1 Jan 44.
87. AAF/MTO GO No 4, 15 Jan 44; No 12, 7 Mar 44; and No 31, 7 June 44.
88. History of MAAF, I, 37.
The success of French collaboration in this command arrangement is attested in one of General Eaker's letters:

One of the fine features about the French, wrote General Eaker, is their willingness to subordinate. They fit right into our organization willingly and cheerfully, and there is never any question about who is in command. All they want is an airplane and a bomb, and they will work in complete loyalty to anybody who will furnish them this.89

Like the French, the Greeks had a special arrangement for the Allied command of their Air Force units dating back to March 1942. This Agreement contained the following pertinent provisions:

Article 1. The Greek Armed Forces (comprising...Air Forces) shall be organized and employed under the British High Command, in its character of the Allied High Command, as the Armed Forces of the Kingdom of GREECE allied with the UNITED KINGDOM.

Article 4. (1) Units with personnel of the Royal Hellenic Air Force shall be employed with the Royal Air Force in accordance with the conditions to be agreed between the appropriate Greek authorities and the British Air Ministry.

(2) For reasons of practical convenience Greek officers and airmen will be commissioned or enlisted in the RAFVR (Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserves).

(3) Units of the Royal Hellenic Air Force shall be equipped with the ordinary scale of Royal Air Force equipment. Their supply, maintenance, and training shall be organized through the normal Royal Air Force channels.90

89. Ltr, Baker to Arnold, 21 Mar 44, quoted from History of MAAF, I, 38.
90. Anglo-Greek Military Agreement, 9 Mar 42, Articles 1. and 4.
According to these terms (which remained in force through the first half of 1944) Greek Air Force personnel and units became a part of the RAF and entered into the same channel of command in the MEDITERRANEAN as described (above) for the RAF itself.

Italian, Brazilian, and Russian air units, as well as individuals from the Royal Jugoslav Air Force, were also under the command of the Air C-in-C MAAF at certain times during this period.

In order to bring antiaircraft operations in closer coordination with over-all air defense, they were also brought under the command of the Air C-in-C MAAF in April 1944.

Under a new policy adopted in this Theater, General Eaker wrote General Arnold, as Air Commander-in-Chief MAAF, am responsible to the Supreme Allied Commander for all matters pertaining to Air Defence both in the MEDITERRANEAN and the MIDDLE EAST. As you will recall, the Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations does not exercise jurisdiction over the forces in the MIDDLE EAST, whereas MAAF does insofar as control over Army Air Force and RAF resources are concerned.

Operational command of all antiaircraft resources and troops in this theater, exclusive of task force, army, and Middle East antiaircraft elements, is delegated by me to the Air Officer Commanding, Allied Coastal Air Force. In the MIDDLE EAST, the system already in force, whereby the Air Officer Commanding in MIDDLE EAST has operational command of all permanent antiaircraft installations and resources, continues in effect. He, in turn, is

91. History of MAAF, I, 38. MAAF Staff Minutes, 1 and 8 Feb 44. Ltr, Eaker to Arnold, 19 Feb 44 (AG AAF/MTO file; 201 Eaker). CMF Cable No 5053/3/A (FS), Gen Alexander to his subordinate commands, 11 June 44.
responsible to the Air Commander-in-Chief MAAF for the Middle East situation. 92

The Air command channels in the Mediterranean Theater during the first half of 1944 are shown by the chart on the next page.

7. AFHQ and Hq Allied Armies in ITALY (AAI)

a. Redesignation of Hq 15th Army Group. As a result of the reorganization and change of command in the Mediterranean Theater General Alexander (B) was succeeded by Lieutenant General Devers (A) as Deputy Allied Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean Theater. Thus General Alexander, continuing as GOC-in-C 15th Army Group, was permitted to turn his full energies to the field and reorganize his group headquarters to cope with the many pressing problems of the Allied advance up to the mainland of ITALY.

One of the early questions considered in this period was the redesignation of General Alexander's headquarters.

92. Ltr, Eaker to Arnold, 17 Apr 44, quoted from History of MAAF, I, 39.
93. Part of the information shown on this chart was obtained from "Organizational Chart MAAF," 1 Feb 44, in History of MAAF, I, 27. History of MAAF (p 27) states that its chart "established the form of MAAF throughout the period of this history" (at least to May 45). Other sources of information were: Statement by F/Lt Bird, RAF AFHQ, 16 June 45; and statement by Maj Hoxie, Hq MAAF, on US ATC, 16 June 45.
94. It will be seen in the discussion which follows that AAI is the eventual title of the command which had successively been called 15th Army group, Allied Forces in ITALY (AFI), and Allied Central Mediterranean Force (ACMF).
95. NAF Cable No 584, Wilson to CCS, 8 Jan 44.
COMMAND CHART OF MAAF
1 February 1944

AMERICAN

USAAF

CG USAF

CG NATOUSA (D Allied C-in-C)

CG AAF/MTO
(Air C-in-C MAAF)

DCC AAF/MTO
Chief of Admin

For Operation FEATHER

12th USAF

15th USAF

90th Photo Recon Wing

AAF Service Command/MTO

AAF Engineer Command/MTO

MATS (AAF)

For Operation POD 1 BLANK

ALLIED C-in-C Med Theater (B)

Deputy Allied C-in-C Med Theater
(CG NATOUSA) (A)

Air C-in-C MAAF
(CG AAF/MTO) (A)

Deputy Air C-in-C MAAF
(Air C-in-C EAF Med & ME) (B)

Dir of Ops and Int

MATAF

MACAF

MASAF

MAYFAIR

Special Operations

RAF ME (For Med Ops only)

Signals

MATS

BRITISH

British Chiefs of Staff

C-in-C RAF Med & ME
(D Air C-in-C)

Desert Air Force

Coastal Air Force

205th Group

336th Photo Group

334th Wing

218th Group

RAF ME

214th Group

216th Group

MATS RAF

LEGEND:

Operational command.

Administration.

Co-operation and/or consultation.

Indicating from what principal administrative unit a
combined operational unit received most of its personnel and equipment.
Although there had been discussion of this subject as early as 96
21 December 1943, it was not until 11 January 1944 that the
name of Hq 15th Army Group was changed to that of Hq Allied
Forces in ITALY (Hq AFI).

However, discussion still continued concerning the designation.
At the end of another week, after his headquarters had been
moved to CASERTA on 18 January, General Alexander's headquart-
ers was officially designated Headquarters Allied Central Med-
iterranean Forces (Hq ACMF).

Before another month had passed, however, Prime Minister
Churchill indicated his preference for the title of "Allied
Armies in ITALY" (AAI) for General Alexander's command.

Therefore, on 9 March 1944, the following announcement was
made:

Headquarters Allied Central Mediterranean Force is hereby redesignated "Headquarters, Al-
lied Armies in ITALY," and the title of its commander is changed to "Commander-in-Chief,
Allied Armies in ITALY."

These last designation continued the same throughout
the remainder of General Alexander's assignment at this
level of command. Here again, as in the early days of

96. Memo, Robertson to Whiteley, 21 Dec 43 (SGS AFHQ file: 201 Whiteley); 15 Army Gp Cable No MA 920, Alexander to Wilson, 28 Dec 43 (SGS AFHQ file: Boundaries and Command).
97. AFHQ GO No 3, 11 Jan 44.
98. 15th Army Gp Cable No 01896, Hq 15th Army Gp to all concerned, 13 Jan 44 (CAO AFHQ file: 755 Locations).
99. AFHQ GO No 4, 18 Jan 44.
100. AFHQ Cable No 51022, Wilson to WD, 13 Feb 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 2/7).
101. AFHQ GO No 12, 9 Mar 44. See also AFHQ Cable No W4756/62475, AFHQ to WD, 9 Mar 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 4/12).
the Sicilian campaign, the titles of both General Alexander
and his headquarters underwent several changes.

b. Reorganization of Command. The several redesignation
of both the command and its commanding general during 1944
were paralleled by an extensive modification of the respons-
ibilities of the command and the establishment of new channels
of communication. As early as December 1943 a move was
already afoot to effect these changes. The following reasons
were set forth by General Robertson (b) on 21 December, and
reaffirmed a week later by General Alexander, for the proposed
alterations:

(1) The establishment in ITALY of the
main depots on which the 5th and 8th armies
were dependent.

(2) An increase in functions for Hq 15th
Army Group beyond that of an army group and
closely approximating functions of a force head-
quartes.

(3) A tendency for General Alexander's
headquarters to deal directly with the War Of-
office on certain matters.

Three days later the ACofS G-3 AFHQ, Major General Rooks

102. See History of AFHQ, II, 136.
103. Administrative responsibilities of Hq AAI are
discussed in History of AFHQ, III, oh XXI.
104. Memo, Robertson to Whiteley, 21 Dec 43 (SGS AFHQ
file: 201 Whitely); 15th Army Op Cable No MA 920, Alexander
to AFHQ, 28 Dec 43 (SGS AFHQ file: Boundary and Command).
(A), cabled the War Office in LONDON: "We are considering decentralization to the C-in-C Central Mediterranean Force ITALY which is proposed new title for 15th Army Group..." Three weeks later a draft instruction on decentralization was prepared and circulated to the three services. Recommendations for changes were made, and by 27 January the first of a series of directives was published which contained the following main points (concerning command in the Combat Zone) summarized below:

(1) AFHQ had many additional responsibilities, and one Allied military authority would be desirable for "direct dealing" with the Italian authorities.

(2) ACMF (later AAI) command should be extended to include SARDINIA as well as ITALY and SICILY.

(3) Naval units in these areas were and should remain under command of the Vice Admiral MALTA and the Flag Officers Western ITALY and TARANTO, who in turn should remain under command of the C-in-C Mediterranean.

105. AFHQ Cable No 22065, AFHQ to WO, 31 Dec 43 (SGS AFHQ file: Boundary and Command).
106. AFHQ ltr to GOC-in-C ACMF, 19 Jan 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 55/7).
107. Fairbanks Cable No 526, Rooks to Gammell, 26 Jan 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 55/7).
108. AFHQ ltr to GOC-in-C ACMF, 27 Jan 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 55/7). The summary here deals only with those matters affecting the Combat Zone; Communications Zone matters are discussed in the next chapter of this volume.
(4) Air forces in these areas should re-
main under command of the Air C-in-C MAAF.

(5) On operational matters, communica-
tions should be direct with the commanders des-
ignated in paragraphs (3) and (4) above.

(6) All shipping and through movement
should be controlled by AFHQ.

These proposals outlined above were to have become effect-
ive on a date agreed upon by AFHQ and Hq ACMF.

However, there were still certain controversial issues involved
which had to be settled between the two headquarters before
a final all-inclusive directive could be published and the
reorganization effected. The directive published on 10 Febr-
uary settled the problem of communication channels insofar as
General Alexander's headquarters was concerned in the Combat
Zone as well as additions to the command relationships set
forth in the draft of 27 January. This second directive
included the following:

(1) The communication channel, unless
specifically stated otherwise, was from Hq
ACMF to AFHQ.

(2) Direct communication was authorized
on operational matters to C-in-C Med, Vice Ad-
miral MALTA, and Flag Officers of Western,
Italy and TARANTO, appropriate subordinates of
Hq ACMF might also deal directly with the above-mentioned three commands when authorized by the GOC-in-C ACMF.

(3) Air matters normally would be referred by the GOC-in-C ACMF to CG Tactical Air Force, reference being made to Air C-in-C MAAF in cases of operational necessity.

(4) Coast defenses in ITALY, including those manned by the Italian Navy, were to be under the control of the GOC-in-C ACMF.

(5) Necessary facilities would be furnished by the GOC-in-C ACMF to forces which might operate, on the direction of the Allied C-in-C, from territories within ACMF command.

(6) The British Director of Training and the Brigadier RAC and Brigadier Infantry were to maintain their main offices in ITALY, serving both Hq ACMF and AFHQ, but were to remain on the latter's establishment.

With this delineation of command and communication channels given as a basis from which to start the reorganization in ITALY, General Wilson announced a fortnight later that the directive outlined above would become effective on 26 February 1944. The next day General Alexander announced:

110. See also Hq IAAI Opn Instn No 54, 25 Apr 44 (G-3 AFHQ files: 31/11).
111. For operational procedure, see AFHQ directive to all concerned, 11 Feb 44, (G-3 AFHQ files: 20/2.1).
112. AFHQ Cable No W 5515/56003, Wilson to all concerned, 24 Feb 44 (G-3 AFHQ files: 55/7).
113. Hq ACMF Opn Instn No 45, 25 Feb 44 (G-3 AFHQ files: 55/7).
With effect from 0001 hours, 26 February 1944, the area under the command of the C-in-C ACMF, which at present includes only 5th and 8th Army areas, will be extended to include ITALY, SICILY, and SARDINIA.

When Hq ACMF was redesignated as Hq AAI on 9 March 1944, the command relationships and communication channels of the former continued in effect. A chart on the next page shows the different channels used by Hq AAI in the Combat Zone in March 1944.

\( \text{o. Miscellaneous Functions of Hq AAI in the Combat Zone.} \)

Beside the numerous responsibilities added to Hq AAI during the reorganization period which ended in March 1944, described in paragraph b, above, the following miscellaneous duties were also subsequently assigned to that headquarters during the first half of 1944:

1. To co-ordinate with the CG MATAF the allocation of direct air support for ground troops and of supply by air of ground troops in "large scale" operations.

2. To assist in the supervision of the operation and development of Italian radio stations and circuits.

3. To allot antiaircraft troops to armies and to determine the necessary scales of antiaircraft defense.

114. Hq AAI Opn Instns Nos 49 and 52, dated 24 Mar and 19 Apr 44 respectively (G-3 AFHQ file: 31/11).

115. Hq AAI Opn Instn No 56, 25 May 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 31/11).

116. Ltrs, AG AFEHQ to all concerned, 22 Nov 43 and 7 Feb 44 (G-3 AFEHQ file: 46/3).

117. Hq AAI Opn Instn No 51, 14 Apr 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 31/11).
COMBAT COMMAND RELATIONS BETWEEN HEADQUARTERS AAI AND OTHER HEADQUARTERS
March 1944

AFHQ
SAC MED
Deputy SAC MED
(CG NATOUSA)

Air C-in-C MAAF
CG MAF

C-in-C AAI

C-in-C Med (Naval)
Vice Admiral MALTA
Flag Officer Western ITALY
Flag Officer TARANTO

Eighth Army
Italian Army

Fifth Army *
Italian Units

LEGEND:

Command
Co-ordination
Administration

* Administration and replacements (Am) from CG NATOUSA
and supply from CG Peninsular Base Section (PBS).
(4) To require from lower echelons sufficient reports to enable the directing of operations by the C-in-C AAI and for the transmission of information to higher headquarters.

(5) To supervise the protection of cultural monuments and works of art in designated areas.

8. Command Relationship with GHQ MEF

The command relationship between the Allied C-in-C Mediterranean and the C-in-C British Ground Forces in the MIDDLE EAST (C-in-C MEF) which resulted from the unification of the Mediterranean Theater has been discussed in section 1. of this chapter. It is therefore not considered necessary to repeat the reasons which led to the unification or the directive which authorized it. The position of GHQ MEF (hq of C-in-C MEF) as a command directly subordinate to AFHQ for the areas of the BALKANS and TURKEY necessitates, however, the inclusion of this account to show the changes of command which occurred during the first half of 1944.

General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson (b) was the C-in-C MEF when the command of the Mediterranean was unified

118. Hq AAI Opn Instn No 55, 9 May 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 31/11).
119. AFHQ Cable No 25121, MGS to WO LONDON, 7 Jan 44 (CAO AFHQ file: 1004).
120. History of AFHQ, pt III, ch XX, sect 1.
on 10 December 1943. He, however, succeeded General Eisenhower as the Allied C-in-C Mediterranean (later SACMED) on 8 January 1944, and General Sir Bernard C.T. Paget (B) became C-in-C MEF.

Hq Force 133, under the direct control of GHQ MEF, was responsible for operations in the BALKANS and GREECE prior to December 1943 and had established Advance Force 133 at BARI in November 1943 for the purpose of dispatching supplies to the DALMATION COAST. The CCS directive on 10 December 1943, however, placed the responsibility for operations in the BALKANS on the Allied C-in-C and recommended the appointment of a Commander Balkan Support directly subordinate to him.

A conference was held at AFHQ on 17 December 1943 to consider the question of Balkan Support. Representatives from both AFHQ and GHQ MEF attended this conference and, after discussing the problems involved, all agreed:

...that until further notice the command of Balkan Support should continue as now set up in the MIDDLE EAST but that this headquarters would submit a report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff outlining the necessary modifications to the reorganization chart submitted with the directive.

121. Memo, Gen Rooks to CofS AFHQ, 6 Nov 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 55/7).
122. AFHQ GO No 1, 8 Jan 44.
123. ME GO Ser No 190, 14 Jan 44.
124. Min of Mtg at AFHQ, 17 Dec 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 55/7).
125. Ibid.
126. CCS Directive 387/3 (Sextant), 5 Dec 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: Sextant Papers NATO).
127. See footnote 122 above.
128. Ibid.
The chief reasons which influenced the conference in arriving at its decision were as follows:

(a) Force 133, directly subordinate to GHQ MEF, was already established to control operations in the BALKANS.

(b) Political guidance was centered in CAIRO and the military intelligence organization was part of GHQ MEF.

(c) Marshal Tito of JUGOSLAVIA did not wish any permanent military assistance, but merely "hit and run" raids.

(d) Greek operations could not be separated from the problem of the AEGEAN and DODECANESE ISLANDS.

GHQ MEF therefore remained responsible for the detailed planning of operations under its administration, and AFHQ dealt with the broad policy affecting the MEDITERRANEAN as a whole. In order to ensure the necessary co-ordination, a Joint Planning Staff (JPS) was maintained at GHQ MEF to serve the C-in-C MEF and to examine plans at the request of JPS AFHQ. The Middle East JPS, however, corresponded on the planning level with JPS AFHQ and not with JPS LONDON.

Although a separate Balkan Support Command was not

129. Ibid.
130. AFHQ Cable No 42793, Wilson to Paget, 25 Jan 44; memo, Brig Thompson DACofS G-3 AFHQ to ACofS G-3 AFHQ, 11 Dec 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 55/7).
132. Ibid.
introduced during the first half of 1944, the control of operations in JUGOSLAVIA, ALBANIA, and HUNGARY was taken over by AFHQ as follows:

(a) The responsibility for military operations carried out by Advance Force 133 in aid of Marshall Tito was assumed by AFHQ on 4 February 1944. The title Advance Force 133 was changed to Force 266 in March 1944.

(b) Direct control of special operations across the ADRIATIC and OSS/SOE operations in JUGOSLAVIA was assumed by AFHQ, acting through Headquarters Special Operations Mediterranean Theater (SOM) on 12 April 1944.

Further changes took place in the AFHQ command channels for Balkan operations when Balkan Air Force and Land Forces Adriatic were formed on 15 June 1944. The Commander Balkan Air Force was made responsible to AFHQ for ensuring the co-ordination of the planning and of the conduct of combined amphibious operations and raids by Allied air, sea, and land forces on the islands and eastern shores of the ADRIATIC and IONIAN SEAS.

Special operations in HUNGARY, JUGOSLAVIA, and ALBANIA

133. AFHQ Cable No 47542, Wilson to Paget, 4 Feb 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 52/24).
136. AFHQ Directives to Cmdrs BAF and LFA, 10 June 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 74/34).
137. Ibid.
were also placed under his operational control.

Land Forces Adriatic was a new designation for the forces which, as part of Force 266, carried out military trans-Adriatic operations.

GHQ MEF, therefore, still performed two functions at the end of June 1944: first as a subordinate command directly responsible to the SACMED for special operations conducted by Force 133 in GREECE, RUMANIA, and BULGARIA, and secondly as a separate command responsible to the British Chiefs of Staff for those territories in the MIDDLE EAST not included in the unified Mediterranean Theater.

9. Command Relations with Foreign, Dominion, and Colonial Forces

a. Developments in Allied Command Relations with the French Forces

When the Allied governments undertook at the Anfa Conference in January 1943 to re-equip eleven French combat divisions in the Mediterranean Theater, the CCS made it the responsibility of the Allied C-in-C in the North African Theater. In return the French agreed that all troops so rearmed were to be employed in future operations under the direction of the Allied C-in-C as the representative of the CCS. Under this agreement French troops fought ably in TUNISIA, CORSICA, ELBA, and ITALY.

138. Ibid.
139. Ibid.
140. Ibid.
141. Ltr, Eisenhower to Giraud, 14 Dec 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 37/4 vol I).
142. Fifth Army History. III. 10-11.
Although there was co-operation between French and Allied troops in the field, occasional friction occurred at the high-command level between AFHQ and the French Committee of National Liberation (FCNL) which closely controlled the French military command. AFHQ, solely concerned with the military problem of effective operations, sought to bring the French command completely under the operational control of the Allied C-in-C in order to insure unity of command. The FCNL, on the other hand, was more concerned with being recognized as the French provisional government and, jealous of its prestige, sought to reserve for itself all the rights of a sovereign power. Consequently the French would not admit that they were in the position of a dependent ally instead of a strong and independent state and objected strongly to AFHQ restrictions on their freedom of military action. When the FCNL refused to permit shipment of a certain French division to ITALY, General Eisenhower found it necessary to remind the French command that he could not continue the French rearmament program unless the FCNL reassured him that the employment of French forces, once re-equipped, was subject to the final decision of the CCS through their representative in the MEDITERRANEAN, the Allied C-in-C.

While the Germans were evacuating CORSICA and SARDINIA in September 1943, General Eisenhower, unable to spare American

143. The French command had nominated the 1st Mtd Inf Div to go to ITALY, but it was unacceptable because, being British-equipped, sufficient British replacement stocks to maintain the division in combat were not available in the Theater. Gen Giraud, the French C-in-C, agreed to substitute the 9th Colonial Div, which was American-equipped, but the FCNL at first refused to allow the substitution. NAF Cable No 548 Eisenhower to CCS, 15 Dec 43.
or British troops from the crucial battle for a foothold on the Italian mainland, requested the French to reoccupy Corsican soil. Since CORSICA was vital to future operations in the Mediterranean Theater, AFHQ and the French High Command agreed in December 1943 that the French garrison on CORSICA would be under command of and directly responsible to the Allied C-in-C. All communication between AFHQ and the French commander, however, was to be through the French C-in-C.

The problem of Allied command over French forces assumed added importance in 1944 because of the vastly increased French participation in operations in the Mediterranean Theater. The most complex question during this period concerned the intended employment of the bulk of the re-equipped French forces in the projected invasion of southern FRANCE. The CCS determined at the Cairo Conference in November 1943 to launch an invasion of the Mediterranean coast of FRANCE at the same time as the main channel crossing. Since planning for this operation by AFHQ was begun immediately, General Eisenhower was anxious to secure for this invasion French agreement to the use, under Allied command, of all available French forces then being rearmed in NORTH AFRICA. Therefore, at a conference on 27 December 1943 between high Allied and French civil and military representatives the Chief of Staff AFHQ informed Generals Giraud and de Gaulle that AFHQ would employ all available re-equipped French forces in a future invasion of

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144. Ltr, Smith to Giraud, 22 Nov 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 37/4 vol I).
146. SAC's Dispatch, Invasion of Southern FRANCE, p 1.

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southern FRANCE. The bulk of these forces would be used as a full French army. Although the Allied C-in-C had desired an immediate decision on this matter, the FCNL presented for transmission to the Allied governments a long draft agreement covering the conditions under which French land, sea, and air forces would operate under Allied command in all theaters of operations. General Smith, however, observed that the conclusion of an over-all agreement was a matter for the consideration of the CCS and not of AFHQ but that for military reasons it was imperative that a local agreement for the use of French forces in the Mediterranean Theater be reached immediately. Consequently General de Gaulle consented then and there to place the French field forces at the disposal of the CCS for use by the Allied C-in-C, in consultation with the French Command, in the invasion of southern FRANCE. Still, in order to protect French interests as much as possible, the FCNL reserved for itself the right to discuss the allotment of French troops with the American and British governments and, for the French Command, the right to discuss the same problem with the Allied C-in-C.

General Eisenhower approved these reservations and also agreed with the French concerning the inclusion of French troops among the other Allied forces in the Normandy invasion and especially on the occasion of the Allied capture

147. State Dept Cable No 292, Mr Wilson to Hull, 31 Dec 43; ltr, Massigli to Mr Wilson, 28 Dec 43; ltr, Mr Wilson to Massigli, 31 Dec 43 (SGS AFHQ files 400-3 vol 13).
of PARIS. He promised to make the necessary representations to the CCS to insure the inclusion of a token French force, preferably a division, in that operation. These agreements of December 1943 provided the basis for the employment of the French field forces during most of 1944.

Then, concerning the over-all employment of French forces, AFHQ forwarded to the CCS another French proposal of late December 1943, the basic principle of which was that all military operations employing French forces must be approved by the FCNL prior to the use of such forces. The CCS substantially modified the French draft by insisting that the decisions on the use of French forces must remain with the CCS. The French command would have the right of appeal to the FCNL, if they so desired, but not in a manner to delay or jeopardize operations. The FCNL in turn disagreed with the CCS's insistence on the right of final decision concerning the employment of French forces and maintained their position that decisions regarding the use of French forces must be submitted to them before action was taken.

148. See references in footnote 147 above. The French 2nd Armd Div was later sent to ENGLAND and phased into FRANCE soon after the Normandy landings.
149. Ltr, Massigli to Mr Wilson, 28 Dec 43 (SGS AFHQ file: 400-3 vol 13) inclosing draft agreement.
150. PAN Cable No 343, CCS to Wilson, 11 Mar 44.
151. Ltr, FCNL to AFHQ, 3 Apr 43 (SGS AFHQ file: 400-3 vol 13).
As a concession to the French, AFHQ finally recommended to the CCS that general plans of future operations involving French forces be submitted in strict secrecy only to the French High Command, the President of the FCNL, and a few others "vitally concerned." Here the matter rested until it was later raised on an intergovernmental plane by Anglo-American recognition of the FCNL in August 1944 as the Provisional Government of FRANCE.

In early April 1944 the FCNL reorganized the command of the French armed forces, assuming for itself the general direction of the war and appointing its President, General Charles de Gaulle, as Chief of the Armed Forces. Since the post of Commander-in-Chief held by General Giraud, was abolished, he was offered the post of Inspector General of the Army. This General Giraud refused, and he withdrew to the active reserve without appointment. A new General Staff of National Defense, under General Marie Emilie Bethouart as Chief of Staff, was created to command the French armed forces. Thus ended the long Giraud-de Gaulle conflict for control of the French armed forces, a dispute which had begun with the invasion of NORTH AFRICA.

In view of the December agreement, which contemplated use of a French field army in the invasion of southern FRANCE, General de Gaulle appointed General de Lattre de Tassigny

152. NAF Cable No 701L Wilson to CCS, 16 May 44.
153. He assumed the powers accorded to a French premier by the law of 11 July 38. Ltr, Bethouart to Gammell, 17 Apr 44; AFHQ memo, 20 Apr 44 (G-3 AFHQ files 37/4 vol I).
as commander of a new French Army B, comprising all field forces nominated for the operation.

The SACMED (new designation for Allied C-in-C, Mediterranean Theater) accepted the concept of the establishment of a French army headquarters as soon as the two French corps contemplated for use were ashore. Even after Headquarters Army B came into command of them, however, it would still be under the US 7th Army, which would act as an army group headquarters in this respect. On 4 July 1944 French Army B passed from the direct command of AFHQ to that of 7th Army (Force 163).

When the invasion of ELBA, which was to be mounted from CORSICA by the French, was being planned, AFHQ considered direct communication with the French commander necessary for reasons of speed and security of communications. The December agreement on CORSICA, however, had stipulated that all communication between AFHQ and the French garrison there must be through the French C-in-C. General de Gaulle and the FCNL were unalterably determined to maintain the principle that French troops should operate under French command. Consequently General de Lattre de Tassigny (who, as commander of French Army B, had replaced the French C-in-C in the chain of

154. Bethouart to Wilson, 13 May 44; ltr, Wilson to Bethouart, 25 May 44; ltr Bethouart to Wilson, 27 May 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 37/4 vol II).
155. Ltr, Bethouart to Wilson, 20 Jul 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 37/4 vol II).
156. Memo, G-3 to CofS, 15 Apr 44; ltr, Gammel to Bethouart, 22 Apr 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 37/4 vol I).
command) made clear to AFHQ that, unless he was included in the chain of command, the commander on CORSICA would not accept orders and would not be able to carry out the invasion of ELBA. The SACMED agreed to his inclusion, and they worked out a procedure by which two officers of de Lattre de Tassigny's staff approved all AFHQ cables to the French forces in CORSICA.

To deal with the special problems of the resistance forces (FFI) in southern FRANCE and with the re-establishment of French administration there, the FCNL appointed General of Division (Air) Cochet as the Military Delegate for the Southern Zone on the model of the Military Delegate for the Northern Zone under SHAEF. General Cochet was under the direct command of the SACMED for immediate civilian relief supplies and for FFI operations in southern FRANCE and was indirectly under the command of the SACMED through the CG 7th Army (A), for other operations in that area. On the administrative side his functions were to assure the re-establishment of military and civil administration, the revival of economic activity, and liaison between the different echelons of the Allied command and the French administration.

157. Ltr, Bethouart to Gammelle, 25 Apr 44; Min of Mtg between Gens Gammell and the Lattre de Tassigny, 28 Apr 44 (G-3 AFHQ files: 37/4 vol I).
158. Memo, G-3 to CofS, 26 Jun 44; AFHQ Directive to Gen Cochet, 26 Jul 44 (G-3 AFHQ files: 37/4 vol II).
159. Ltr, Rooks to Patch, 3 Aug 44; AFHQ Directive to Gen Cochet, 26 Jul 44 (G-3 AFHQ files: 37/4 vol II).
160. Directive, de Gaulle to Cochet, 2 May 44; memo, Bethouart to Higgins, 4 May 44 (G-3 AFHQ files: 37/4 vol II).
Liaison between APHQ and the French High Command was a simple matter as long as the two remained adjacent to each other in ALGIERS. When APHQ moved to CASERTA in July 1944, however, other liaison arrangements had to be made. A small French Military Mission under Colonel Arnaud Laparra was established at APHQ in early August to handle French liaison with that headquarters. Liaison between APHQ and the French General Staff of National Defense was maintained by the Liaison Section Rear 161 APHQ which remained in ALGIERS.

b. New APHQ Command Channels to the Italian Army

APHQ command over the Italian Army during December 1943—June 1944 continued to be based on the Long Terms of Surrender, the comprehensive nature of which gave the Allies full control over the Italian Army for whatever purposes they might desire. 162 Although the Italian Navy and, to a lesser degree, the Italian Air Force, were in active use against Germans, it was more difficult to find scope for employment of the ground forces. APHQ policy toward Italian troops was that they would be used to the maximum consistent with their capabilities, generally as service and L of C troops but also with a small token force in combat. G-3 APHQ was made responsible for determining the allocation of Italian troops to meet the needs of 15th Army Group and other major commands.

161. Ltr, Bethouart to Wilson, 20 Jul 44; ltr, Bethouart to Wilson, 22 Jul 44 (G-3 APHQ files: 37/4 vol II); Min of Mtg between Gens de Gaulle and Wilson, 20 Jul 44 (G-3 APHQ file: 19/3).
162. NAF Cable No 426, Eisenhower to CCS, 30 Sep 43.
163. APHQ Paper No P/109 (Final), 3 Oct 43 (G-3 APHQ file: 46/1).
AFHQ had planned to maintain military liaison with the Italian Government through a land forces subcommission of the projected Allied control commission. Until the latter was established, however, liaison was carried out by the Allied Military Mission, headed by Lieutenant General F.N. Mason Macfarlane. When the ACC for ITALY was activated on 10 November 1943, it absorbed the Allied Military Mission and assumed the burden of military liaison, although a land forces subcommission was not actually established until much later. Since the small group of Italian ministers at BRINDISI, however, had hardly any contact with Italian forces in the field, 15th Army Group established a liaison mission with the Italian 7th Army, the highest Italian field command in Allied occupied ITALY. When the 7th Army was dissolved, this Military Mission to the Italian Army (MMIA) dealt directly with the Italian High Command. The division of work between MMIA and the Allied Military Mission (later ACC) was that the latter dealt with high policy matters only, while the former, representing the Allied field commander on the ground, dealt with all detailed matters affecting the actual operation of Italian forces under Allied command. The Italian Military Mission at AFHQ also continued to provide liaison between the Italian High Command and AFHQ.

164. AFHQ Instrs for the Military Mission to It Govt, 12 Sep 43 (G-5 AFHQ file: 337-4,1 vol I).
165. M.D. Taylor, CofS ACC, acted as its chief in addition to his other duties. Memo, G-3 to MGS, 6 Jan 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 46/1 vol III).
166. Memo, G-3 to MGS, 10 Jan 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 46/10 vol I).
By December 1943 it was evident that the original AFHQ policy was obsolete and that immediate co-ordination of policy regarding employment of the Italian Army and its resources was badly needed. The Italian Army was being dissipated by using small detachments of units and equipment to meet the day-to-day needs of the Allied forces. Unless this dispersion ceased and unless the drain caused by Allied requests for Italian materiel were stopped, and Italian materiel in liberated Italy were made available for Italian use, the Italian Army soon would be unable to meet the requirements set by the Allies. This situation was largely due to conflicting policies being pursued by AFHQ through ACC and by 15th Army Group through MMIA.

Therefore to stop the dispersion of Italian forces and to ensure that ACC and ACMF spoke with one voice, AFHQ decided to establish a single chain of command over the Italian Army. At this time, in January 1944, the chain of command for civil affairs was modified by placing ACC under ACMF (formerly 15th Army Group). Consequently command over the Italian Army too was centralized under ACMF.

Since ACC was now under ACMF, the Military Mission to the Italian Army was formally designated as the Land Forces Subcommission ACC, thus consolidating all relations with the Italian Army under one agency. It was charged with receiving and implementing, under the terms of AFHQ

167. Memo No 370, ACC to AFHQ, 3 Dec 43 (G-3 AFHQ files 46/1). The Italians themselves urged that the Italian Army be re-organized and re-equipped for a larger fighting role and more effective collaboration with the Allies. From ltr, Messe to ACC, 29 Nov 43 (G-3 AFHQ files 46/1).
168. Cable No CGS-244, 15 AG to AFHQ, 7 Dec 43; Cable No 940, 15 AG to AFHQ, 15 Dec 43.
directives, all demands from ACMF for Italian Army units and
for Italian resources. The senior member was designated a
member of ACC and acted as its representative with ACMF.
The new channel of command over the Italian Army is shown
in the chart on the next page.

The Italian Military Mission in ALGIERS continued to serve
as a liaison channel from the Italian High Command to AFHQ until
the latter moved to CASERTA in July 1944.
Then the Mission was withdrawn because AFHQ was near enough
to the Italian Government in ROME to make such a liaison group
no longer necessary.

c. Command of Jugoslav Forces

Prior to the unification of Command in the Mediterranean
Theater all matters pertaining to the BALKANS were handled by
GHQ and the British political authorities in the MIDDLE EAST
both as regards the Royal Jugoslav Government in EGYPT and
the Partisans. During the North African campaign, however,
many prisoners of war of Jugoslav origin were captured, and
AFHQ agreed to release those who volunteered for service with
the Royal Jugoslav Forces and who were acceptable to the
Jugoslav Government. These volunteers were established
in separate camps, and the Jugoslav Government became
responsible for their administration and pay until such time as they

169. AG AFHQ 1tr No C91,711-1 (Italian) GCT-AGM, 10 Feb 44.
170. Statement by Maj J.R. Bulmer (B) of Liaison Sect
AFHQ, 20 Sep 45.
171. Memo, G-3 AFHQ to CofS AFHQ, 20 Dec 43 (G-3 AFHQ file:
S2/23.1).
172. Memo, Lt Col Stewart to Lt Col Fullerton, 12 Mar 44
(Liaison Sect AFHQ file: CORRYS).
CHAIN OF COMMAND TO ITALIAN ARMY
February 1944

Italian Military Mission

AFHQ

ACMF

ACC

MMIA
(Land Forces Sub-commission ACC)

Italian High Command

LEGEND:
- Command channel
- Liaison channel
- Command Liaison
could be transferred to the Jugoslav forces in the MIDDLE EAST. On 8 November 1943 a Royal Jugoslav Mission to APHQ was approved by General Eisenhower to handle matters concerning these royal Jugoslav volunteers in NORTH AFRICA and ITALY.

Before the removal of these volunteers from NORTH AFRICA could be accomplished, the prominence given to the activities of the Partisans under Marshal Tito had caused dissension among the royalist forces in the MIDDLE EAST. As a result of the Jugoslav political position a meeting was held early in February 1944 between Major General F.G. Beaumont-Nesbitt, British Chief Liaison Officer MEF, and General Ranosov, Chief of Staff Jugoslav Forces Hq MEF, at which it was agreed that the Jugoslav volunteers should remain in NORTH AFRICA and be used as pioneer units by the British military authorities for three months. After the period of three months the men would either be taken over by the Jugoslav Government or left for another period of three months and so on. This agreement was confirmed at APHQ by the Royal Jugoslav Mission with the following conditions:

(a) The name of the unit to be formed by these men would include the word "Jugoslavia."

(b) The men would have the right to wear Jugoslav badges and shoulder flashes.

(c) The Jugoslav Hq would have the right to appoint one officer in the unit to act as liaison officer between the men and the British commanding officer.

173. APHQ Cable No W 4644/8185, Eisenhower to WD, 8 Nov 43 (G-3 APHQ file: 52/23).
174. See footnote 172 above.
175. Ltr, Royal Jug Mil Mission to Liaison Sect APHQ, 17 Apr 44 (Liaison Sect APHQ file: 008RYS).
176. Ibid.
(d) The period of three months would be counted from the day when the men were transferred.

(e) The equipment, supplies, and pay for these men would be provided by the British military authorities.

These troops, therefore, became part of the British forces and were subject to the normal chain of command. However, as a number indicated their desire to support the Partisan authorities, it was resolved at a meeting at AFHQ on 16 May 1944, that all Jugoslavs in NORTH AFRICA should be given the opportunity of declaring for one side or the other. In order to avoid intimidation and to ensure a fair and genuine election, the situation was explained to all troops of Jugoslav origin, and twenty-four hours later they were interrogated individually. The result of this election was that the royalist adherents remained as pioneer units in the British forces, while the pro-partisan element was established in separate camps under British command until they could be transferred to the Partisan forces.

The Allied C-in-C had no power of command over the Partisans operating in the BALKANS, but in December 1943 he was directed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to assume responsibility for supporting the Partisans with supplies, commando raids, and air operations. The necessary channels for such support had already been established by GHQ MEF through the medium of the military mission to Marshal Tito under Brigadier F.H.R. MacLean (B) and

177. Ltr, G-1(B) AFHQ to NA Dist, 17 May 44 (Liaison Sect AFHQ file: 008 RYS).
178. Ibid.
Hq Advanced Force 133 at BARI. Responsibility for military operations in support of Marshal Tito was assumed by AFHQ on 4 February 1944 through these same channels.

In the type of warfare which Marshal Tito was waging, women, children, sick and wounded had proved a great liability, and with the liberation of southernItaly the opportunity was taken to evacuate many such personnel from the partisan areas in the Balkans. Partisans also were being sent to Italy for military training and this influx of Yugoslavs created a very definite administrative problem for the Allies. Initially Hq Advanced Force 133 carried out the necessary work in conjunction with No 2 District until "Z" Military Mission was constituted on 16 March 1944 with the object of effecting liaison between the Yugoslav Military Delegation from the Yugoslav National Army of Liberation (NLAY) and the appropriate Allied authorities. All matters affecting NLAY in Italy were required to be handled through the NLAY Military Mission in BARI.

Yugoslavs were enrolled also in the RAF, and an agreement was signed in the Middle East by Air Marshal Sir Keith Park (B) on behalf of the RAF and Colonel Pirc for Marshal Tito in the spring of 1944. This agreement was purely military and based on the policy of giving full military support to the Partisans.

180. Cable No 47542, AFHQ to Mideast, 4 Feb 44 (G-3 AFHQ files: 52/24).
181. IRS, G-3 AFHQ to Liaison Sect AFHQ, 5 Apr 44 (G-3 AFHQ files: 52/24).
183. Cable No U338, Hq RAF ME to Air Ministry, 18 Apr 44; Cable No WZ 253, MAAF to RAF ME, 1 Mar 44 (G-3 AFHQ files: 52/24).
The terms of this agreement were as follows:

(a) Personnel selected by Marshal Tito and other Jugoslavs who volunteered, if suitable, would be formed into a Jugoslav contingent within the framework of the RAF.

(b) The Jugoslav contingent would be under the full operational and administrative control of the RAF.

(c) Tactical air requirements of Marshal Tito would be referred to the RAF.

(d) While the personnel remained in the RAF, political activity would be permitted only as laid down in the Air Force Act.

In addition a number of royalist Jugoslavs were employed in technical units on the same basis as the pioneer units under the army authorities.

d. Command of Polish Troops

After the German invasion of RUSSIA an agreement was made by the Polish Government with the Russians in 1942 for a Polish Army to be raised in RUSSIA from the Poles already in that country. The original intention was to form this force for operations on the Russian front, but the inability of the Russians to supply the necessary arms, equipment, and training facilities resulted in a

184. Ibid.
185. Memo, G-1(B) to Liaison Sect, 29 Mar 44 (Liaison Sect AFHQ file: 29ORYS). Ltr, Royal Jug Mil Mission to Liaison Sect AFHQ, 17 Apr 44 (Liaison Sect AFHQ file: OOB).
number of these Poles being evacuated to PERSIA to be armed and equipped by the British. Sufficient personnel were not available to form an army, but a corps was established on British lines with the necessary supporting units. This force, known as Polish 2d Corps with General W. Anders (P) as GOC, formed part of the forces of the Polish Government and was under the direct command of the Polish C-in-C in LONDON. No 26 British Liaison Unit was attached to this force by GHQ MEF in order to co-ordinate the training and operations of the Corps in the MIDDLE EAST.

Although the Polish 2d Corps was not expected to be ready for operational purposes until 1 January 1944, General Sosnkowski, Polish C-in-C, agreed to the use of the Corps among the Allied troops operating under the command of AFHQ in September 1943, subject to the following conditions:

(a) The Corps would be used as a whole under a Polish General. The 3d Carpathian Division could, however, be used in advance of the rest of the Corps if real necessity arose.

(b) In the event of the 3d Carpathian Division being used in advance, the remainder of the Corps would join it as soon as ready for battle. On no account would the Corps be split for operational purposes.

187. Ibid.
188. Ibid.
189. Cable No 72168 SD2A, WO to AFHQ, 24 Sep 43 (SGS AFHQ Cable Log IN Sep 43).
(c) Divisions would not be used in initial
assaults from the sea.

(d) Divisions would be used for operations
and not as ground troops.

General Soeankowski (P) visited the Theater in November 1943 and discussed with General Eisenhower (6 November) and General Alexander (10 November) the conditions under which the troops of the Polish Corps could be used for operations in the Mediterranean Theater. A further meeting was held by General Sir H. Maitland Wilson and General Anders, GOC Polish 2d Corps on 5 February 1944 when the Polish troops had moved to ITALY. As a result of these conferences, the conditions under which the Polish 2d Corps would operate were agreed as follows:

(a) A liaison mission from the Polish C-in-C would be attached to AFHQ to present his wishes. This mission would also represent the GOC Polish 2d Corps.

(b) The Corps would go into action as one integral whole after all its units had arrived in ITALY. Exception would only be made in case of

190. The term "ground troops" is considered to be an error in decoding this cable and probably should read "guard troops" or "garrison troops."
191. Min of Conf at AFHQ, 6 Nov 43 (SACS AFHQ file: 400-5).
192. Memo, Polish C-in-C to Gen Wilson, 5 Jan 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 52/18).
193. Min of Conf, 5 Feb 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 52/18).
194. See footnotes 191, 192, 193 above.
real necessity.

(c) The corps would be used within 8th Army.

(d) The corps, under General Anders, would be subordinated directly to the commander 8th Army and be given an independent sector of the line.

(e) The Polish commando unit operating in ITALY would be brought under the Polish Corps.

(f) The Polish sick and wounded would receive treatment in Polish hospitals.

(g) Polish prisoners of war from the German army would be made available for service with the Polish forces.

(h) GOC Polish Corps was permitted to communicate by wireless from his Advanced Hq in ITALY to his Main Hq in ME for transmission to LONDON. Such traffic was to be entirely administrative in character. All traffic regarding operational matters would be transmitted through American or British systems of communications in American or British ciphers.

(i) A base for special operations to POLAND would be established in ITALY and would be organized and operated independently of military operations. The activities of this base would be directed from LONDON.

No 25 British Liaison Unit would continue to be attached to the Polish Corps, but, in accordance with the AFHQ principle of Allied liaison, would be composed of 20% Americans and 80% British personnel. Suitable American officers would be

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195. Cable No 4311, Whitely to Scobie, 22 Nov 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 584/Org-3).
196. Do ltr, Whitely to Scobie, 22 Nov 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 400-5).
introduced into the unit as vacancies arose.

e. Command Relations with Greek Land Forces

One effect of the unification of command in the Mediterranean Theater was to bring the land forces of the Royal Hellenic Government under the operational command of the Allied C-in-C. By an agreement between the British and Greek Governments, dated 9 March 1942, the Greek land forces were placed under the command of the British C-in-C MEF. The Allied C-in-C, therefore, exercised his command over the Greek land forces through the C-in-C MEF so long as the Greek forces remained in the MIDDLE EAST.

The principal terms of the agreement, in so far as they related to army matters, were as follows:

Article 1. The Greek Armed Forces (comprising land forces) shall be organized and employed under the British High Command, in its character of the Allied High Command, as the Armed Forces of the Kingdom of GREECE allied with the UNITED KINGDOM.

Article 2. The Greek land forces shall be constituted within the Middle East Command of the British Army in accordance with the conditions laid down in Appendix I of the present agreement.

(Appendix I)

Article 1. (1) The Greek land forces shall be reconstituted out of the Greek troops which are already within the Middle East Command of the British Army, supplemented by Greek subjects who are called up for military service or who may volunteer.

(3) The Greek land forces shall retain the character of a Greek force in respect of personnel, particularly as regards discipline,

197. Anglo-Greek Military Agreement, 9 Mar 42. (Copy in files of G-3 Hist Sect APHQ).
198. Ibid.
Article 2. (1) Greek units and formations shall be commanded by Greek officers. British organizations shall be adopted, but Greek regimental colors and all distinctions of rank and badges of the Greek Army shall be retained.

(2) The Greek land forces shall be under British command, in its character as the Allied High Command, which may delegate the command to a British formation commander of appropriate rank.

Article 3. (1) The Government of the UNITED KINGDOM agrees to arm and equip the Greek land forces as soon as possible to the agreed scale.

Article 4. The British Military Authorities shall detach a suitable number of officers and non-commissioned officers of the British Army as instructors to the Greek land forces for the period of their instruction and to assist in familiarizing the Greek cadre with British materials. The Greek land forces, therefore, operated for command, equipment, and training purposes as part of the British forces and were under the command of the Allied C-in-C as such.

Although preliminary arrangements had been made to transfer a Greek brigade to ITALY sometime between February and April 1944, only one company had arrived before the end of June 1944.

f. Dominion and Colonial Forces

Troops from NEW ZEALAND, SOUTH AFRICA, INDIA, the HIGH COMMISSION TERRITORIES, CEYLON, MAURITIUS, WEST AFRICA, and PALESTINE continued to operate with the other Allied forces under the command of AFHQ in the manner described in Part II, Chapter V, Section 8 above. There was, however, a change.

199. Cable No OZ767, CCS to Wilson, 10 Feb 44; Cable No 55286, Wilson to BrCS, 22 Feb 44; memo, Secretary G-3 AFHQ to G-3 Ops, Org & Plans AFHQ, 9 Apr 44 (G-3 AFHQ files 52/8).
in the channel of command when General Wilson succeeded
200
General Eisenhower, as the Allied C-in-C, on 8 January 1944.

General Eisenhower, as an American, had exercised his power of
command over dominion and colonial troops through the GOC-in-C
15th Army Group for troops in the Army area and through the
CAO for troops in base areas. However, when General Wilson
was appointed the Allied C-in-C, as the senior British officer
in the Theater he had direct command over these forces, since
the Dominion and Colonial troops either formed part of forces
which were "serving together and acting in combination" or
else had been enlisted under the terms of the British Army Act.

The administrative powers of the dominion and Indian
201
military authorities remained unchanged; but Hq 2 New
Zealand Expeditionary Force, in order to be nearer the troops
for which it was responsible, came under the command of
AFHQ from GHQ/MEF when the NEW ZEALAND Hq moved to Casa Basilia
202
in ITALY on 4 January 1944. The C-in-C India also wished
to be more closely associated with the large body of Indian
troops in ITALY, MIDDLE EAST, and PAIC and with the C-in-C
of the Theaters concerned. A proposal for the formation of
an Indian Army Mission, which would be accredited to SAC
Mediterranean, was made by the C-in-C India on 20 February
203
1944 and approved by the War Office on 12 April 1944.

Notification that this Mission, under Major General

200. NAF Cable No 583, AFHQ to CCS, 8 Jan 44 (G-3 AFHQ
file: 55/7).
201. See History of AFHQ, II, 162-166.
202. Ltr., Hq 2 NZEF to G-3 (Hist Sect) AFHQ, 20 Dec 44
(G-3 Hist Sect AFHQ History files).
203. Cable No 5886Q/SD6 C-in-C India to WO, rptd AFHQ,
20 Feb 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 52/10).
204. Cable No 72078/SD6 WO to C-in-C India & AFHQ,
12 Apr 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 52/9).
F. W. Burch (B) had been established at Hq AAI was made on 6 June 1944. The duties of the Mission, which did not include any executive action, were limited to the following:

(a) To advise the SAC on all questions relating to the administration, use, and welfare of Indian troops. Also available to advise the C-in-C AAI, MEF and PAIC on similar matters.

(b) To keep in touch with all Indian troops in these theaters and to bring to the notice of the SAC, or to such subordinate commanders as he authorized, any matter affecting Indian troops which required consideration.

(c) To keep the C-in-C India informed of all matters concerning Indian troops and Indian Army formations.

Administration of the South African and colonial troops remained the same as in the previous period.

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205. Memo, Hq AAI to all concerned, 6 June 44 (G-3 APHQ files: ASD 368).
206. See footnotes 203, 204, and 205 above.
Chapter XXI
CHANGES IN THE ALLIED COMMAND: COMMUNICATIONS ZONE

In the seven-months between 1 December 1943 and 30 June 1944 two important reorganizations in the Communications Zone command took place. One concerned the reduction in the size and duties of Hq NATOUSA and the amalgamation of the American Communications Zone command and the command of SOS NATOUSA.

The other was a redefinition of the relations of the command of 15th Army Group (AAI) with AFHQ and certain Communication Zone organizations, particularly with FLAMBO and ACC. Although the CC NATOUSA's duties extended to both the Combat Zone and the Communications Zone, his command is discussed in this chapter because the changes in his command involved largely his Communications Zone responsibilities. The details of these command reorganizations and changes are given in the subsequent sections of this chapter.

1. Changes in NATOUSA Commands

a. General Devers Becomes CG NATOUSA. General Eisenhower's transfer to SHAPE not only left a vacancy in the Allied Mediterranean command but also in the American Theater command. The decision on the selection of the general officer to fill the latter was announces on 29 December 1943 in a War Department cable:

The President and the Prime Minister, having approved...General Devers's appointment as Deputy to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediter-
re neue Theater, orders are being issued by the War Department ....assigning General Devers to the Mediterranean Theater as US Theater Commander.

The actual date of assumption of command of the American forces in the respective theaters will be as mutually arranged between General Eisenhower and General Devers. The War Department will be informed when assumption of command is effected in each case.1

Thus in actuality, as far as the American theater commands were concerned, Generals Eisenhower and Devers were merely exchanging commands. General Eisenhower (CG NATOUSA) would replace General Devers as CG ETOUSA, while the latter would assume command of NATOUSA.

General Devers on assuming command, notified the War Department by the following cable in accordance with the instructions quoted above:

Jacob L. Devers, Lieutenant General, United States Army, relinquished command of the European Theater of Operations 8 January 1944 and assumed command of the North African Theater of Operations, United States Army, at 1200 hours, 8th January, current year.3

In addition to his duties as CG NATOUSA General Devers also served as Deputy Allied C-in-C in the Mediterranean Theater, as was indicated in the cable of 29 December.4

b. Modifications in the Authority of the CG NATOUSA.

The union of the Mediterranean and Middle East commands

1. WD cable No 590C, Marshall to Eisenhower and Devers, 29 Dec 43 (AG NATOUSA files: 323.36-303).
3. AFHQ cable No W 9664/25774, Devers to WD, 8 Jan 44 (AG NATOUSA files: 323.36-303). See also NAF cable No 584, Wilson to CCS, 8 Jan 44; AFHQ cable No 26891, AFHQ to subordinate commands, 8 Jan 44; and ltr, Gammell to Giraud, 9 Jan 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 55/7).
4. See all references in footnote 3 above.
for operations in the BALKANS, HUNGARY, and TURKEY as well as
the assumption of command as Allied C-in-C in the Mediterranean
Theater by a British general officer required some changes in
the authority of the CG NATOUSA.

It is best to begin a consideration of these changes by
presenting the actual terms of the War Department's directive
to General Devers, which became in a sense his charter of
authority. The quotation of this directive may then be
followed by an analytical comparison with the directive sent
to General Eisenhower a year earlier.

The directive of 6 February 1944 is therefore quoted here
in full with the exception of paragraph 2.A.:

Directive for CG North African Theater
of Operations:

1. You are hereby designated as Commanding
   General of the United States Army Forces which
   are now in or may henceforth be sent to the North
   African Theater of Operations.

2. (A) (Definition of Theater boundaries
to be discussed later.)

   (B) (1) TURKEY. For the present
   and until you otherwise desire, the
   responsibility for US military personnel
   and activities in TURKEY is vested in
   the CG USAFIME. Military Attache
   personnel intelligence activities in
   TURKEY will continue to be co-ordinated
   with JICAME.

   (2) FRENCH WEST AFRICA.
   The responsibility for Army Service
   Forces activities including control
   of service troops in FRENCH WEST AFRICA
   is now vested in CG USAFIME (as per
   previous agreements between CG USAFIME)
   (formerly USAFICA) and CG NATO).

5. WD Cable No 9069, Marshall to Devers, 6 Feb 44
   (AG NATOUSA file: 323.36-303).
6. See below in History of AFHQ, pt III, ch XXI,
   sect 1 c.
This may be changed by mutual agreement with CG USAFIME and War Department notified. All other responsibilities of a theater commander in that area are delegated to you.

(C) (1) All OSS activities based within your responsibility under the Allied C-in-C Mediterranean (CCS in CCS 387/3 directed that Allied C-in-C Mediterranean would be responsible for military operations in support of Balkan patriot forces).

(2) You will be responsible for the operations of all US Army Forces, including OSS and combat air forces based in the ME. Any additional troops required for support of operations from ME bases must of necessity be provided by the C-in-C Mediterranean Theater from those available to him or from such forces belonging to the CG USAFIME which may be specified for such use by the JCS. No US troop units assigned to USAFIME will be moved therefrom without concurrence of War Department. USAFIME troops in their present general location may, however, be employed to support Mediterranean operations providing no undue interference with present USAFIME activities results.

3. As Commanding General US Army Forces North African Theater of Operations you are charged with the territorial and administrative duties of a theater commander to include the authorities and duties demanded by law, regulations, orders, and customs of the UNITED STATES upon the commanders of an army in the field in time of war and of a territorial department commander in peace and war. Within the North African provinces and protectorates of FRANCE you will be limited by the agreements heretofore entered into between the French authorities and the UNITED STATES either directly or through the North African Theater of Operations Headquarters during the period command was exercised by General Eisenhower.

4. Your responsibilities for and your degree of command and control over the 16th US Army Air Forces will be as directed in CCS 400/2 of 4 December 1943.
5. After consultation with the Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Mediterranean and, if appropriate, after consultation and agreement with the proper French authorities or in consonance with the terms of the Italian Armistice, you will establish and maintain all necessary bases, lines of communications, depots, etc., and make all incidental arrangements essential to the reception, maintenance, administration, training, movement, and operations of the US Army Forces in, or entering into or departing from, the North African Theater of Operations. All authority to appoint general courts-martial under Article of War 8, subject to the provisions of Article of War 50 and one half, to exercise the power set forth in the letter of the Secretary of War, 13 February 1943 (WD 250.4) 2-12-32 (OB-S-SPJCC), to the Commanding General US Army Forces North African Theater of Operations to administer funds, supplies, or any other administrative or logistic matters previously issued to the Commanding General North African Theater of Operations insofar as these authorities apply to US Army Forces are hereby continued in effect.

6. You will supervise and control all provision of US armament for the rearming of French troops in accordance with the agreements and commitments already made by the authorized representatives of the US on the one hand and those of the French Committee of Liberation on the other.

7. You will supervise all Lease-Lend provisions from US Army sources for the account of the French or of any other political entity falling geographically within the limits of the North African Theater of Operations and will secure the interests of the US in all pertinent matters. The Joint Rearmament Commission may continue functioning in connection with French naval rearmament as mutually agreed with Commander 8th Fleet or as requested by Commander-in-Chief US Fleet.

8. You will control all funds, armaments, and equipment and supplies of all types furnished by the US Army which enter the North African Theater of Operations and will assure the exclusive use of all such funds, armament, equipment, and supplies to the military forces of the US unless such supplies have been specifically assigned to other forces by competent and superior authority through the procedure and agencies of these forces.

9. Your primary mission as the CG US Army Forces in NATO will be to prepare, organize, and
provide US Army Forces for military operations in the North African Theater of Operations against the Axis Powers, including their Allies, under the direction of the Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Mediterranean. Decision as to readiness for combat of all or any part of your command and organization of US Army Forces in NATO into armies, army corps, or task forces either for operations in co-operation with other Allied forces or for independent operations pursuant to the directives of the Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Mediterranean will rest entirely with you. In so organizing US Army Forces, the underlying idea must be kept in mind that the forces of the US are a separate and distinct component of the combined forces, the identity of which must be preserved. This fundamental rule is subject to such exceptions in particular circumstances as your judgment may approve and the overall strategic situation may demand.

10. All US Army Forces now in, or to enter, the AZORES are a part of your command. Lagos Airport, TERCEIRA, has been designated as station 15 North Atlantic Wing Air Transport Command. The Commanding Officer of US Army Forces in the AZORES has been given authority to requisition equipment, supplies, and personnel directly from the US. This personnel is chargeable to allotment of the Army Transport Command and not against the North African Theater of Operations allotment.

11. Your relations with the US Navy in the Theater will be regulated by the following:

(A) The Commander 8th Fleet (COMNAV-NAW) will operate through the Naval Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean in the chain of Command of the Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Mediterranean.

(B) The Commander 8th Fleet is the US Naval representative of the Commander-in-Chief US Fleet in the Theater.

(C) Your normal relations with this Commander will be under the principle of mutual co-operation.

(D) You will co-operate with the Commander 8th Fleet during training and preparatory phases to the end of adequately preparing joint task forces for carrying out planned operations. For the embarkation and during the joint operations of US Forces the command of the US Army and Navy Forces will be in accordance with the principle of unity of command. The shift of command from the naval task force commander to the army
commander will be arranged by those officers in accordance with the normal US joint Army—Navy procedure.

(E) Previously existing logistic arrangements and agreements which have been in effect and have been operating in the Theater between US Army and US Navy remain in full force and effect except as they may be modified by agreements between you and the Commander 8th Fleet or as arranged under the C-in-C Allied Forces Mediterranean.

(F) Staff representation on each other's staff should be arranged between yourself and Commander 8th Fleet as mutually agreeable.

(G) French Naval policy matters are covered by CCS 368. You will cooperate with Commander 8th Fleet in regard to French Naval matters in general. Commander 8th Fleet has been directed by Commander-in-Chief United States Fleet to provide naval representation as may be required on the Joint Rearmament Commission.

12. You will keep the War Department fully advised of all that concerns your command and will communicate your recommendations freely and directly to the War Department.

From an examination of the new directive to the CG NATOUSA one principal difference stands out: the elimination of operational command from the responsibilities of the CG NATOUSA.

When General Eisenhower was CG NATOUSA, he had operational command of his American forces as C-in-C Allied Force. However, when General Devers assumed command of NATOUSA, General Wilson (B) was the Allied C-in-C with operational command. Naturally, therefore, the command authority of the CG NATOUSA in 1944 was curtailed on the operational side. The directive to General Eisenhower (as CG NATOUSA) in 1943 had stated that he was "charged with the strategical and tactical duties of a theater commander" as well as territorial and administrative duties (par 5). His mission was to "carry on military operations"
as well as prepare for them (par 6).

In contrast the new directive to General Devers provided that he was charged only with "territorial and administrative duties" (par 3) and was to "make incidental arrangements essential to the ...... operations" (par 5).

His primary mission was "to prepare, organize, and provide US Army Forces for military operations, "but the operations would be "under the direction of the Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Mediterranean" (par 9). It was for him to decide, however, whether American troops were ready for combat (par 9).

In only one instance did it appear at first sight, that the CG NATOUSA had combat operational command of some American troops. Paragraph 2 (C) (2) (quoted above) stated that the CG NATOUSA would "be responsible for operations of all US Army Forces, including OSS and combat air forces, based in the MIDDLE EAST." It was probable, however, that for such operations the CG NATOUSA would actually serve as the medium for the transfer of operational command from USAFIME to the SACMED and that the unity of command for operations in the MEDITERRANEAN would remain intact.

As with ground and air forces so also with the US

7. WD Cable No ZRH2024, Marshall to Eisenhower, 20 Feb 43 (AG AFHQ files, 322.98-1). See also History of AFHQ, II, 191.
8. Cable cited in footnote 6, par 2 (C) (2). The directive to USAFIME also stated: "For all Mediterranean operations, including OSS and air forces, contemplating the MIDDLE EAST as an operational base, the CG USAFIME will be under orders of the CG NATOUSA as far as these operations are concerned." WD ltr No 323.36 (29 Jan 44) OE-S-E-M, Marshall to CG USAFIME, 7 Feb 44.
Navy in the Theater, the operational command of the latter was "through the Naval Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean in the chain of command of the Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Mediterranean" (par 11 (A)). The relations between the CG NATOUSA and the Commander of the US 8th Fleet would be under the principle of mutual cooperation" (par 11 (C)).

The other differences between NATOUSA responsibilities in 1943 and 1944 were minor ones involving mainly matters which naturally grew out of expanding areas and more varied activities, such as French rearmament, disposition of equipment, lend-lease arrangements, and French and Italian armistices and agreements.

NATOUSA's command over US Army Forces in the AZORES, stipulated in paragraph 10 of the 1944 directive, was rescinded three months later. The War Department's cable of 14 May stated:

Effective 20 May 1944, CG NATOUSA is relieved of command of USAF in the AZORES. Concurrently USAF in the AZORES is established as a separate command designated USAF in the AZORES, under CG EDC GOVERNORS ISLAND, NY.

... In local emergencies USAFAX will operate under the tactical control of SACMED through the senior Allied Commander in the AZORES.9

A chart of NATOUSA's relations with other commands appears on the next page.

9. WD Cable No WX 36636, Marshall to Devers, 11 May 44.
c. Extension of the NATOUSA Boundaries.

Included in the new directive to the CG NATOUSA was also a paragraph (2 A) defining the new boundaries of his theater. However, before the new boundaries were agreed upon, considerable exchange of views took place. A month before the directive was issued the War Department pointed out in a cable to General Devers:

The present boundaries of the North African Theater of Operations are defined in previous directives. These boundaries include certain areas in western and central AFRICA which you may wish to exclude from the new boundary. The present Theater boundaries do not include areas in the BALKANS and southeast EUROPE and therefore do not coincide with the area over which the Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Mediterranean was given operational control by Sextant (see CCS 387/3).

...We do not have any recommendations from General Eisenhower regarding boundaries and areas of operational control of NATO.

...It is desired that you recommend to the War Department... the designation of boundaries...

General Devers's recommendation of 13 January 1944 was to have the NATOUSA eastern boundaries "coincide with the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean as given by Sextant (CCS 387/3)." However, in listing the areas, his cable went on to include all of AFRICA (outside French NORTH AFRICA), SYRIA, PALESTINE, TRANS-JORDAN, IRAQ, and ARABIA, which were not a part of the Allied C-in-C's theater. On the other hand the list also omitted HUNGARY, which was within General Wilson's area.

10. WD Cable No 6375, Marshall to Devers, 5 Jan 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 56/7).
11. NATOUSA Cable No W 81, Devers to Marshall, 13 Jan 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 56/7).
The War Department, in its reply of 18 January 1944, indicated that it had thought NATOUSA might prefer to shrink rather than extent its African areas and also pointed out that the recommended boundaries still did not coincide with those of General Wilson's.

After careful reconsideration at Hq NATOUSA General Devers revised his recommendations on boundaries, giving the reasons for the previous recommendations and the subsequent revision:

...My WBL was based upon the view that, considering the small US garrison in USAFIME, the fact that operational troops in USAFIME were being employed under operational command of MIDDLE EAST and for the present would continue to be, and the facility of shifting OSS forces between the eastern and central MEDITERRANEAN, it would be advantageous to reorganize USAFIME as a base section of NATOUSA, administering it as such and passing operational command of OSS and other elements to MIDDLE EAST and Allied Central Mediterranean Force (Hq 15th Army Group/AAT). This was the recommendation of General Royce (CG USAFIME). It was my intention that USAFIME base would be administered by NATO and that such operations as were not placed under the command of MIDDLE EAST would be delegated to the base commander, they being defensive in nature. However, I repeat, I am impressed with the disadvantages you mention as to administrative and political burdens which I am anxious to avoid in order better to devote myself to operational matters.

General Devers, therefore, advised that "the boundaries of this theater remain unchanged in NORTH AFRICA and the AZORES;" that all the BALKANS (except JUGOSLAVIA), TURKEY, and HUNGARY, which the Allied C-in-C had provisionally delegated to GHQ MEF, be excluded; and that JUGOSLAVIA and all European territory west of JUGOSLAVIA and south of the DANUBE (including parts of AUSTRIA and GERMANY) plus

12. WD Cable No 7437, Marshall to Devers, 18 Jan 44 (AG NATOUSA file: 323.36-303).
SWITZERLAND and southern FRANCE be included within specifically defined boundaries.

The final decision of the War Department was to leave the western and southern boundaries of NATOUSA as they had been in 1943; to extend the northern boundary to include southern FRANCE, SWITZERLAND, and AUSTRIA; and to extend the eastern boundary to include, in addition to JUGOSLAVIA, the countries of ALBANIA, HUNGARY, ROUMANIA, BULGARIA, GREECE, and TURKEY, as well as the islands of the Mediterranean Sea (including the Aegean Islands but excluding CYPRUS). Although the boundaries were defined in detail, the War Department left room for subsequent modifications in some of them as stated in its cable of 30 January:

European boundaries, as distinguished from Balkan areas will be considered as flexible. But, for the purpose of defining areas of responsibility for various matters, European boundaries are described definitely. These will be subject to change upon mutual recommendation by you (General Devers) and General Eisenhower.15

These boundaries also revealed the additional decision that USAFIME was not to be under NATOUSA but was to remain an independent theater command. The relations between NATOUSA and USAFIME were defined in a separate paragraph of the same cable from the War Department:

1. The present USAFIME will remain as a separate theater. The Balkan areas and TURKEY are excluded from USAFIME boundaries and placed

13. Fairbanks Cable No 476, Devers to Marshall, 24 Jan 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 55/7).
14. WD Cable No 9069, Marshall to Devers, 6 Feb 44, par 2 (A) (AG NATOUSA file: 323.36-303).
15. WD Cable No 8515, Marshall to Devers, 30 Jan 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 55/7).

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within the boundaries of NATO. NATO is responsible for operations of forces based in USAFIME but employed within the new boundaries of NATO.

5. Your (CG NATOUSA) relations with CG USAFIME will be those of a parallel commander with the exceptions...set forth in the revised paragraph 2 of the directive (see preceding paragraph)...

A map of the new boundaries of NATOUSA as determined in February 1944 will be found on the next page.

d. Consolidation of Com Z and SOS NATOUSA

Between 4 June and 20 July 1943 a group of seven officers, sent out from the office of the Inspector General in the War Department, made a survey of the organization, administration, supply, and procedures within ETOUSA and NATOUSA. In the Inspector General's special report to the Deputy Chief of Staff of the US Army (6 August 1943) one conclusion was reached which seemed applicable to NATOUSA:

3. That the non-T/O overhead for service installations is excessive in both theaters (ETOUSA and NATOUSA), and that such overhead should be more carefully regulated.

The non-T/O overhead allotment in NATOUSA included American personnel in the AFHQ—NATOUSA headquarters organizations as well as that of Hq SOS NATOUSA. Consequently, two days after the submission of this report, on 8 August 1943, consideration was already being given to some sort of consolidation of the American part of AFHQ with a view to economizing on overhead personnel.

16. Ibid.
17. Memo No 333.9—North Africa Operations, the IG to DCoS WD, 6 Aug 43, par 1 h (3).
General Davis, AG AFHQ, proposed the abolition of a separate American theater headquarters, leaving in its place an American component, like the British, in AFHQ, and a Hq SOS NATOUSA to parallel the British Line of Communication.

According to General Davis, the Theater staff would be washed out completely, placing on the US side of general and special staff sections of AFHQ the responsibility for the development and general supervision of policies affecting the US activities in the Theater.18

Definitive action on this proposal was not taken, however, until after the change of command in 1944. The solution was somewhat of a compromise by which most of Hq NATOUSA functions were distributed to AFHQ (on the policy and combat operations side) and to SOS NATOUSA (on the territorial, supply, and administration side).

Although Hq NATOUSA remained in name with a commander, chief of staff, and staff sections, its operational staff sections were the American components of those of AFHQ along with a few purely American sections, such as G-1 and AG, dealing with general policy matters. The office of Deputy Theater Commander was abolished, and the CG SOS NATOUSA also became CG Com Z NATOUSA in addition to his other duties. Thus Hq SOS NATOUSA became actually the Hq Com Z NATOUSA, but it was, for convenience, to continue to be referred to as SOS NATOUSA.

NATOUSA General Order No 12 provided that:

18. Memo, Gen Davis to Gen Smith (CofS AFHQ), 8 Aug 43 (SOS AFHQ file: 320.2-2).
19. Maj Gen Everett S. Hughes, DTC, was relieved of his command and assigned to 5th Army on 22 Feb 44. NATOUSA Ltr Order, 22 Feb 44.
Effective at 0001A hours, 24 February 1944, all duties and responsibilities of the Commanding General, Communications Zone, North African Theater of Operations, US Army, are delegated to and will be assumed by the Commanding General, Services of Supply, North African Theater of Operations, US Army, together with such other duties as may be assigned to him from time to time.

A detailed analysis of the significance of the reorganization and the shift of command responsibilities was issued the same day in an administrative memorandum, and the parts dealing with command are reproduced here to complete the details of the new command picture.

1. The information set forth below is published for the guidance of all concerned in connection with the reorganization of this theater which has been effected in the interests of efficient operations and the conservation of personnel and material resources.

3. By virtue of General Order Number 12, this headquarters, as, the Commanding General, Services of Supply, NATCUSA, has in addition to his other duties assumed command of the Communications Zone, North African Theater. For brevity in communications, and in order not to disturb existing nomenclature, reference to that headquarters will continue to be "Commanding General, SOS, NATCUSA."

6. It is expected that the Commanding General, SOS NATCUSA, will relieve the Commanding General, North African Theater, of those administrative functions normal to the Communications Zone and such others as may be assigned or delegated under broad theater policies and directives.

A fuller discussion of the effects of this consolidation on the staff sections of Hq NATCUSA and Hq SOS NATCUSA will be found in Chapter XXII below. This section of the History is limited to the treatment of command responsibilities.

20. NATOUSA/GO No 12, 20 Feb 44.
21. NATOUSA/Adm Memo No 2, 20 Feb 44.
2. Headquarters AAI in the Communications Zone

a. Assumption of Increased Administrative Functions. As described in Chapter XX above, General Alexander's Hq AAI (formerly Hq 15th Army Group) continued in 1944 to have operational control over all the Allied ground troops within its geographical area. Since AFHQ had decided to decentralize some of its own administrative responsibilities to Hq AAI during 1944, AFHQ made several studies, wrote draft memoranda and published a number of directives to clarify this transfer of functions. After an early study, AFHQ prepared the draft memorandum of 19 January, circulated it to the three services at AFHQ, and then forwarded it to Hq ACMF, (later Hq AAI) as the directive of 27 January. Its references to general administrative matters are segregated and briefly summarized here:

(1) One Allied military authority was desired for "direct dealing" with the Italian authorities.

(2) ACMF command would be extended to include SARDINIA as well as ITALY and SICILY.

(3) The Allied Garrison Commander of SARDINIA would report directly to Hq ACMF (later Hq AAI) instead of to AFHQ as theretofore.

22. Hq AAI in this period was called successively Hq 15th Army Group, Hq ACMF, and Hq AAI.

23. AFHQ ltr to GOC-in-C ACMF, 19 Jan 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 55/7).

24. AFHQ ltr to GOC-in-C ACMF, 27 Jan 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 55/7). For a discussion of FLAMBO see below in section 3 of this chapter.
(4) AA defense would remain under the MG AA and CD AFHQ for the areas behind army rear boundaries.

(5) Direct communication would be authorized with GHQ MEF on non-policy matters connected with Indian and colonial troops.

(6) British organization and administration would be changed in order to permit Hq ACMF to handle AG (B) matters, the majority of promotions up to and including brigadiers, confidential reports of officers up to and including lieutenant colonels, immediate awards, and some financial matters. Directors of services would remain at AFHQ.

Although the directive outlined above was to have become effective on a date agreed upon by AFHQ and Hq ACMF, there were still two main controversial issues which had yet to be settled:

(1) Details of British Administration.

(2) Relations between Hq ACMF and American base sections.

At the meeting of 31 January 1944 held at AFHQ, details of British administration were worked out and another draft memorandum was prepared. This became the directive of 10 February when published and contained in summary the following main points:

25. Ltr, Alexander to AFHQ, 29 Jan 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 61/1).
27. Ltr, AFHQ to GOC-in-C ACMF, 31 Jan 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 55/7).
28. Ltr, AFHQ to GOC-in-C ACMF, 10 Feb 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 55/7).
(1) The GOC-in-C ACMF (AAI) would control all coast defences in ITALY, including those in the Communications Zone.

(2) The GOC-in-C ACMF (AAI) might authorize British war establishments within certain prescribed limitations.

(3) British AG matters from units under command of Hq ACMF (AAI) would be submitted to that headquarters and not directly to AFHQ.

(4) Appointments and promotions (British) would be vested largely in Hq ACMF (AAI), but AFHQ would be consulted and advised in certain cases. AFHQ would retain overriding authority on all MS matters and could also introduce officers for absorption into ACMF (AAI).

(5) British officers' records (O2E) would remain in NORTH AFRICA; while confidential reports concerning British officers would be referred directly to the War Office, except those concerning colonels and above, which would go to AFHQ.

(6) Immediate awards would be made to all troops in the ACMF (AAI) command by the GOC-in-C ACMF (AAI), while periodic awards would be coordinated with AFHQ.

(7) British finance matters would be largely centralized at AFHQ.

(8) AFHQ would retain control of all shipping and through movements in the Communi-
cations Zone as well as of military railways and transportation, which might be subject to later decentralization. The Director General of MBS would report to Hq ACMF (AAI) for matters affecting the operation of railways in territories under command of Hq ACMF (AAI).

These general administrative arrangements became effective on 26 February 1944. Later again, when these were restated on 4 March, AAI's responsibilities were augmented to include the placing of the British districts (Nos 1, 2, and 3) under the direct command of General Alexander.

These arrangements remained in effect throughout the rest of this period of Part III.

The problem of the relations between Hq ACMF (AAI) and the American base sections, which had given General Alexander some concern during the early winter offensive of January 1944, was not settled definitely until March.

While General Alexander had operational command over American troops of the 5th Army, he had no control, other than the DCAO FLAMEO's limited co-ordination, over PBS which furnished supplies for American troops in his geographical area.

General Alexander cited two instances in which such a separation of responsibility was detrimental: (1) the ammunition supply difficulty during the 1943--1944 offensive; (2) the independent issuance by the CG PBS of instructions making PBS responsible for the operation of the port of CIVITAVECCHIA.

29. Hq ACMF Opn Instn No 45, 25 Feb 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 31/11).
30. Ltr, AFHQ to C-in-C ACMF, 4 Mar 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 55/7).
in anticipation of its capture. Then, in addition, difficulties were encountered in regard to intelligence matters, since the American base sections (PBS and IBS) were responsible to Hq NATOUSA and not to Hq ACMF (AAI).

To obviate these difficulties (wrote General Alexander) I ask that the US base sections and areas should be placed directly under my command and should receive instructions from me through the US staff under me... 32

AFHQ did not take definite action on this request until after most of the details of British administration had been settled on 10 February. However, three weeks later, on 4 March, a satisfactory solution was reached when AFHQ published another directive from which the following is a pertinent extract:

Except as otherwise stated in this directive, Peninsular Base Section (PBS) and Island Base Section (IBS) will be under command of CG NATOUSA, except for such functions as he may delegate to CG SOS NATOUSA.

CG Peninsular Base Section will be responsible to your headquarters (ACMF, later AAI) for the ground defense of his area. You (General Alexander) will place under his command such combat troops, Allied or Italian, as are required and are available for this purpose. Channels for communication for intelligence and counterintelligence instructions may be direct between your headquarters and Headquarters Peninsular Base Section.

In addition to settling the relations between Hq ACMF (AAI) and the American base sections, the directive contained decisions on two other important matters. In regard to communication facilities within AAI territory it provided that AFHQ would retain the right to determine the

31. Ltr, Alexander to AFHQ, 29 Jan 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 61/1).
32. Ibid.
33. See footnote 30 above.
controlling agency of these facilities from among the army, navy, or air forces using these items. In matters concerning the command relations with SARDINIA, it stipulated that the Allied Garrison Commander of SARDINIA would come directly under the command of the GOC-in-C AGMF (AAI).

Other administrative functions which came within the scope of General Alexander's reorganized headquarters during the first half of 1944 included the following:

1. To assist in the supervision of the operation and development of Italian radio stations and circuits.

2. To allot antiaircraft troops to commands in rear areas not under the SAC's direct command as well as to determine the necessary scales of defense.

3. To require sufficient reports from lower echelons for the transmission of information to higher headquarters.

4. To take direct command of Hq Rome Allied Area Command (RAAC) when it became established and to issue the necessary directives for its establishment.

5. To supervise the protection of cultural

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34. See footnote 30 above.
35. Ltrs, AG AFHQ to All Concerned, 22 Nov 43 and 7 Feb 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 46/3).
36. Hq AAI Opn Instn No 61, 14 Apr 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 31/11).
37. Hq AAI Opn Instn No 55, 9 May 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 31/11).
38. Hq AAI Adm Instn No 36, 23 June 44 (G-3 Org AFHQ file: HSD/421).
monuments and works of art in designated areas.

(6) To supervise through Hq ACC the return of areas in liberated ITALY to Italian administration.

The chart on the next page shows the Communications Zone command relation of Hq AAI with other headquarters during March 1944 after the reorganization had taken place. There were no further changes during the first half of 1944.

b. Relations with ACC and AMG. During 1944 it became apparent at AFHQ that control of the civil affairs in ITALY could best be maintained by the Allied military headquarters already established on the mainland. The discussion of the transfer of operational responsibility from AFHQ to Hq AAI (formerly Hq 15th Army Group) is to be found below in section 4 of this chapter.

3. Absorption of FLAMBO into Hq AAI

AFHQ Advanced Administrative Echelon (FLAMBO) continued in its administrative role as an AFHQ agency on the mainland of ITALY from the end of 1943 to the end of February 1944.

However, as the program developed for the decentral-

39. AFHQ Cable No 25121, MGS to WO LONDON, 7 Jan 44 (CAO AFHQ file: 1004).
40. Draft History of G-5, ch V, sect 2. Cable No 691, 15 A Gp to AFHQ, 16 Nov 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 46/5.2). Fatima Cable No 1948, Joyce to MGS, 12 Jan 44 (CAO AFHQ file: 1004). Penbase Cable No PBS 8410, MaoFarlane to MGS, 15 Feb 45 (CAO AFHQ file: 1004).
COMMUNICATIONS ZONE COMMAND RELATIONS BETWEEN HEADQUARTERS AAI AND OTHER HEADQUARTERS
March 1944

AFHQ
SAC MED
Deputy SAC MED (CG NATOUSA)
C-in-C AAI

NATOUSA
CG NATOUSA (Deputy SAC MED)
CG SOS NATOUSA
American Base Sections
PBS * IBS

Allied Control Commission (ACC)
Allied Garrison Commander SARDINIA
British Districts
No 1 No 2 No 3

LEGEND:
---- Command
--- Co-ordination
* PBS furnished 5th Army with supplies for American units.
lization of certain AFHQ functions to General Alexander’s headquarters in ITALY, it became obvious that a continued divorce of the operational command from the administrative in the same geographical area was impracticable.

Therefore in the AFHQ draft and published directives of 19, 27, and 31 January; 10 February; and 4 March 1944; a new command relationship was established by which the personnel and staffs of Hq ACMF (AAI) and of FLAMBO were amalgamated into one headquarters under the command of General Alexander as GOC-in-C ACMF (later G-in-C AAI).

At the time that the transfer of command became effective on 26 February 1944, AFHQ Advanced Administrative Echelon (FLAMBO) was redesignated as ACMF Administrative Echelon (FLAMBO). However, by 9 March 1944 when Hq ACMF was redesignated as Hq AAI, this administrative group of FLAMBO was fully absorbed into Hq AAI and lost its individual identity. Major General Sir Brian A. Robertson (B) continued to serve as DCAO FLAMBO until 9 March 1944 when he became MGA of Hq AAI.

Before this change of command was carried out, the main functions of FLAMBO continued in effect. However, certain 1943 functions of FLAMBO (which are underscored below) were broadened in their scope during 1944 to include the specific responsibilities listed below in each case. These were:

a. To co-ordinate and control military administrative matters in ITALY.

41. AFHQ ltrs to the GOC-in-C ACMF dated 19, 27, 31 Jan; 10 Feb; and 4 Mar 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 55/7).
42. Hq ACMF Opn Instrn No 45, 25 Feb 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 31/11). Hq ACMF Adm Instrn No 1, 26 Feb 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 31/5).
43. AFHQ GO No 12, 9 Mar 44. Statement by Chief Clerk in Office of the CAO AFHQ, formerly with Hq AAI during 1944, 12 July 45.  722  
(1) To determine the level of POL products to be maintained for ground and air forces in ITALY.

(2) To determine policy for the utilization of Allied PWs (except Americans) who have escaped from the enemy.

b. To control and direct all British general administration on the mainland of ITALY.

(1) To determine the level of general supplies (reserve holdings) for British forces.

(2) To control the general administration of British personnel reinforcements, training depots, and schools.

c. To establish policies for Allied forces' relations with the Italian in accordance with instructions from AFHQ.

(1) To establish procedure for the allocation and procurement of local resources in ITALY.

(2) To establish rates of pay for all categories of Italian civilian labor employed by Allied forces.

44. AFHQ Adv Adm Ech Adm Instn No 22, 20 Jan 44
(G-3 AFHQ file: 2/2).

45. AFHQ Adv Adm Ech Adm Instn No 31, 21 Feb 44
(G-3 AFHQ file: 2/2).

46. AFHQ Adv Adm Ech Adm Instn No 20, 7 Jan 44
(G-3 AFHQ file: 2/2).

47. AFHQ Adv Adm Ech Adm Instn No 25, 4 Feb 44
(G-3 AFHQ file: 2/2).

48. AFHQ Adv Adm Ech Adm Instn No 26, 7 Feb 44
(G-3 AFHQ file: 2/2).

49. AFHQ Adv Adm Ech Adm Instn No 24, 24 Jan 44
(G-3 AFHQ file: 2/2).
(3) To formulate terms and conditions for the employment of Italian FWs in ITALY.

Besides these functions and responsibilities which dealt with long-range projects, FLAMBO was delegated authority on 2 January 1944 to direct the control program necessary to meet the threat to the Allied military forces of the civilian typhus epidemic in NAPLES. With the realization a few weeks later that this typhus outbreak would be limited to the civilians, the full control responsibility was passed on to AMG/ACC toward the end of January after the necessary administrative machinery had been established.

4. AFHQ Command Over AMG and ACC

The problem of AFHQ command over AMG and ACC, the two military civil affairs organizations in ITALY, proved a great deal more complex than over the Italian armed forces. When war-weary ITALY deposed Mussolini and began negotiations for an armistice, General Eisenhower sensed political and military advantages in allowing the Italians to administer their own country under Allied control rather than in imposing direct military government. But, though the Armistice of 8 September 1943 signaled the end of Italian

50. AFHQ Adv Adm Ech Adm Instn No 26, 11 Feb 44 (G-3 AFHQ file; 2/2).
51. AFHQ Cable No 22664, AFHQ to FLAMBO, 2 Jan 44 (CAO AFHQ file; 1004).
52. AFHQ Cable No 42672, MGS to FARGO (ACC), 25 Jan 44 (CAO AFHQ file; 1004).
53. NAF Cable No 266, Eisenhower to CCS, 26 July 43.
resistance, the anticipated quick occupation of most of ITALY and the establishment of an effective government to administer it, did not prove possible. Strong German forces occupied most of the peninsula and, bitterly contesting the Allied landing at SALERNO, made it clear that the Allies would have to fight their way north. In addition, while the King, General Badoglio (the Prime Minister), and a few other ministers escaped to set up a skeleton government at BRINDISI, the highly centralized national administration and archives remained securely in German hands in ROME. It appeared that until Badoglio could reach ROME and draw on the personnel and records there, he would be unable to form an effective government. Consequently AFHQ decided not to establish an Allied control commission until ROME was reached and a more complete Italian Government could be formed with which it could operate effectively. Instead a small Allied Military Mission was sent to BRINDISI to maintain liaison with the Italian 54 Government during the interim.

Operational necessity and the disruption of local administration during the early fighting in ITALY made it clear by that time that some form of direct military government would still be needed in forward areas as long as active operations continued. Therefore AFHQ decided in early October both to continue AMG in ITALY and to prepare for the ultimate establishment of a control commission. On 24 October 1943 AMG SICILY was divided into two parts: AMG 15th Army Group to establish mili-

54. AFHQ Instructions for the Military Mission, 12 Sep 43 (G-5 AFHQ file: 337-4-1 vol I). Min of Post-HUSKY Planning Committee Meeting No 7, 10 Sep 43 (G-5 AFHQ file: 337-4).
tary government in the combat zone and continue it as long as
the military situation might require; and Headquarters AMG,
directly under AFHQ, to govern static rear areas such as SICILY
and CALABRIA where military government was to be continued
only until the Italian Government could reach ROME and could
constitute itself effectively. At that time AFHQ would
activate the ACC, which would absorb Hq AMG, and turn over
to Italian administration all territory that operational
requirements would permit. AMG 15th Army Group was charged with
military government in the region north of the northern boundary
of the provinces of SALERNO, POTENZA, and BARI, while all south
of this boundary, except APULIA was under HQ AMG. What was
called King's ITALY, the four provinces of APULIA, was left
under Italian jurisdiction, but under the supervision of the
Allied Military Mission. In the case of SARDINIA, AFHQ con-
sidered that in view of its quick occupation it should be con-
sidered an armistice control situation. Consequently SARDINIA
was administered by an Italian High Commissioner appointed by
Badoglio under the supervision of an Allied Mission. The
latter was placed directly under AFHQ until it could be
transferred to the projected control commission. Thus in
October 1943 there existed no less than four distinct AFHQ
channels of command for civil affairs; to AMG 15th Army Group
for the Combat Zone, to HQ AMG for SICILY and southwestern
ITALY, to the Italian Government (through the Allied Mission)

55. AFHQ Adm Memos No 69, 18 Oct 43; and No 75, 8
Nov 43. Cable No 4141, AFHQ to 15 AG, 6 Oct 43.
56. AFHQ Ltr of Instruction on Allied Control over
SARDINIA, 28 Sep 43 (G-3 AFHQ file; 387.4-1 vol 1).
for APULIA, and finally through another Allied Mission for SARDINIA.

By early October 1943 the Italian fleet and airforce were already operating with the Allies, other Italian troops were performing service duties for us, and the Badoglio government's co-operation with the Allies seemed honest and sincere. For these reasons General Eisenhower recommended to the CCS that we recognize that ITALY was in fact fighting the Germans by granting her a status of co-belligerency.

The two Allied governments, through the CCS, accepted his proposal and decided to treat ITALY as a co-belligerent if she declared war. On 13 October the King of ITALY, finally convinced that only by this means could ITALY gain the confidence and support of the Allies, declared war on GERMANY.

Thus by this act ITALY was accepted as a co-belligerent, a status which made it difficult for the Allies to insist on their own military government throughout all liberated Italian territory. By mid-October, moreover, the increasing German resistance to the Allied advance northward up the peninsula made an early occupation of ROME seem ever more remote.

Therefore the Allied C-in-C determined on a policy of strengthening the Badoglio regime to the point where it could take over the administration of occupied ITALY and of establishing immediately a control commission to guide it.

57. SAC's Dispatch on Italian Campaign 3 Sep 43-
On 10 November 1943 the Allied Control Commission (ACC) for ITALY was officially constituted and the Allied Military Mission, which had previously conducted AFHQ's relations with the Italian Government, was absorbed into it. Since the Badoglio group at BRINDISI still consisted of only a few ministers, only a skeleton advanced headquarters of ACC, consisting of senior Allied personnel, was sent there; and most of the remaining personnel were assigned to Hq AMG at PALERMO to prepare for its eventual absorption into ACC.

The Allied governments recognized that, so long as active military operations continued in ITALY, the execution of Allied policy in that country must be left in the hands of the Allied C-in-C. Therefore the CCS appointed General Eisenhower ex-officio President of the ACC, and chose a senior American officer, Major General Kenyon W. Joyce, as Acting Deputy President to assume the detailed duties of the President. Hence, during this period of military operations in ITALY the ACC would be directly responsible to AFHQ, would channel its communications to LONDON and WASHINGTON through that headquarters, and would consist mostly of AFHQ military personnel. Relations between AMG and ACC, the two civil affairs organizations in the field, were to be co-ordinated by AFHQ, and the latter was to decide when territory should be transferred from direct control under AMG.

60. AFHQ Adm Memo No 74, 2 Nov 43.
61. Moscow Declaration on ITALY, 27 Oct 43 (G-5 AFHQ file: 091.1 vol II).
62. FAN Cables No 217, CCS to Eisenhower, 6 Sep 43, and No 248, 16 Oct 43; TAM Cable No 57, CCAC to AFHQ, 19 Oct 43.
to Italian administration under the ACC. The command channels from AFHQ to the various subordinate civil affairs organizations are shown on the next page.

The Commission's functions, as defined by the CCS Directive, were:

1. To enforce and execute the instrument of surrender under the orders and general directives of the Allied in C-in-C.

2. To insure that the conduct of the Italian Government conforms to the requirements of an Allied base of operations, especially transportation and communications.

3. To be the organ through which the policy of the United Nations toward the Italian Government is conducted and the relations with the Italian Government are handled.

Although the ACC consisted only of representatives of the two major Allies in the MEDITERRANEAN, the Allied authorities realized that some method would have to be devised to allow other interested Allied nations, notably RUSSIA, a voice in the control of ITALY. In addition, because ACC would be primarily military in character and under the Allied C-in-C, AFHQ believed it desirable to have some advisory body through which the political agencies of the Allied Governments could express their views. Upon British suggestion, the establishment of an Advisory Council for ITALY was decided upon at the Moscow Conference of October 1943. The Council was composed of representatives of the UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM, RUSSIA, the

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63. Ibid.
64. FAN Cable No 248, CCS to Eisenhower, 15 Oct 43.
AFHQ Adm Memo No 74, 2 Nov 43.
65. NAP Cable No 295, Eisenhower to CCS, 18 July 43.
66. The Council was based on a proposal of the Br Res Min at AFHQ memo, Whitely to Murphy, 15 Oct 43 (SGS AFHQ old file on Mil Govt). Terms of reference for the Council were agreed upon at MOSCOW and incorporated as Annex 3 of the secret protocol of the Conference, which became the CCS Directive to Gen Eisenhower (FAN Cable No 280, CCS to Eisenhower, 25 Nov 43).
CHANNELS OF COMMAND FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS
December 1943

Combined Chiefs of Staff

AFHQ

ACC

HQ AMG

HQ 15th Army Group

Allied Mission to SARDINIA

APULIA (King's ITALY)

Region I SICILY

Region II CALABRIA, SALERNO, LUCANIA

AMG 15th Army Group (Combat Zone)
French Committee of National Liberation, GREECE, and JUGOSLAVIA. Its function was to advise the respective governments on Italian non-military civil affairs problems. It also advised the Allied C-in-C in his capacity as President of the ACC on general policy connected with the work of control. For this purpose it maintained a close liaison with the Allied C-in-C and had the right to ask him for information or explanations on any matters relating to the Council's work.

In January 1944 the organization for civil affairs in Italy was extensively reorganized. Six months of practical experience had indicated that this organization with its numerous headquarters, was unwieldy and top-heavy. In order to economize on manpower and improve efficiency AFHQ consolidated AMG and ACC under one headquarters. On 24 January 1944 the Allied Control Commission assumed command over all military government areas in ITALY, and AMG Headquarters ACMF was abolished. HQ AMG, which was already practically merged with ACC, was formally abolished at the same time, although military government continued in rear areas until their restoration to the Italian Government. SARDINIA, too, was transferred from the direct control of AFHQ to that of ACC on 31 January 1944. By this series of changes all civil affairs in occupied ITALY were brought under one central authority, ACC.

67. PAG Cable No 280, CCS to Eisenhower, 26 Nov 43.
68. Memo MOS 322-17 on Org of ACC, 24 Mar 44.
69. AFHQ GO No 5, 24 Jan 44.
70. HQ AMG Adm Order No 6, 25 Jan 44. The first restoration of territory took place on 11 Feb 1944 (Itr Badoglio to Mason Macfarlane, 11 Feb 44 (SGS AFHQ file: 4GO-4 vol 15)).
71. AFHQ Adm Memo No 6, 31 Jan 44.
At the same time AFHQ eliminated the dual civil affairs responsibility created by having AMG Allied Central Mediterranean Force (ACMF) under General Alexander while ACC was directly under AFHQ. Since 15th Army Group was the field headquarters whose operations were most directly effected by the civil affairs policy for ITALY, AFHQ always had to consult General Alexander in any event before making any moves. Hence AFHQ felt that transfer at the same time of civil affairs responsibility in ITALY to Hq ACMF (AAI) would place it on the headquarters most directly concerned and eliminate the constant necessity for consultation between Hq ACMF (AAI) and AFHQ.

Since the Allied C-in-C, however, was responsible to the CCS as ex-officio President of the ACC, he required a formula which, while delegating general powers of direction to General Alexander as GOC-in-C ACMF (AAI), would insure that all high policy questions would continue to be referred to AFHQ. Consequently on 24 January 1944 the Allied C-in-C appointed General Alexander "representative in ITALY of the Allied C-in-C" to "act for and on his behalf carry out such functions of the ACC for ITALY as should be delegated to him from time to time by the President of the ACC."

On this date therefore the ACC assumed practical direction of all civil affairs in ITALY, except high policy matters, but the Allied C-in-C relinquished none of his powers. Final.

73. AFHQ Go Ne 5, 24 Jan 44.
authority on all matters remained with him.

AFHQ issued a directive to General Alexander which set the policy of leaving to Hq ACMF (AAI) as far as practicable all civil affairs problems arising in ITALY.

Certain matters, however, (the directive stated) will require reference to this Headquarters. This will be the case with matters which call for high political guidance, or raise issues not confined to ITALY. Civilian supply is another category where reference to this Headquarters will often be requisite, in view of the responsibility of the Theater Commander to decide, if need be, between conflicting needs. There will, moreover, be questions other than the foregoing which because of their importance, intrinsically or as precedents should be submitted to the commander on whom the final responsibility rests.

When it is found at Hq ACC that a particular matter should not be settled in the field and therefore is to be submitted to AFHQ, it will still be the duty of Hq ACC to do all that it properly may to facilitate the action to be taken at this Headquarters...

Matters concerning Civil Affairs in ITALY which arise within this headquarters, or are referred to it by headquarters outside the Hq ACMF (AAI), where that course seems desirable and proper, will be referred to Hq ACC for advice, action, or other appropriate disposition. However, in any matter where the final responsibility rests on the Allied Commander-in-Chief, it may seem desirable on grounds of convenience, urgency, or other dominant considerations to take action immediately at AFHQ.

The carrying out of this directive may at times involve concurrent action by Hq ACC and AFHQ in respect of the same type of matter. It is therefore especially important that each keep the other informed by appropriate measures of the action it is taking. Military Government Section, AFHQ, is the executive section and channel of communication on all matters arising out of military government and armistice control of liberated territory.

It is not practicable to set out a rigid list of matters on which action shall in all cases be taken by the GOC-in-C ACMF (AAI). The result would be an inflexible system, and this headquarters might thereby seem to preclude itself from acting on matters which, when
they arose, were found to call for action here. The object of the present directive, instead, is to enable the GOC-in-C ACMF (AAI), acting through the Civil Affairs Branch of Hq ACMF (AAI), to decide on the ground every question arising in ITALY which it is feasible and proper to settle there, while leaving AFHQ free to act on all matters where it is found that action must or should be taken here.\textsuperscript{74}

The new and simplified chain of civil affairs command is shown by the chart on the next page. Through this reorganization AFHQ divested itself of the detailed supervision of the work of control, while retaining final authority on all high policy matters.

5. Changes in the British Line of Communication

The organization of the British L of C continued to be in the form of a series of district headquarters under the command of AFHQ. Each district headquarters, in turn, was in command of a number of smaller static headquarters which were responsible for the military administration of specified areas. The British L of C in December 1943 consisted of Hq North Africa District, Hq No 1 District (SICILY), and Hq No 2 District (ITALY south of the army area exclusive of US GomZ). Although the districts were under the command of AFHQ for all purposes, the channel of communication for No 2 District was through AFHQ Advanced Administrative Echelon (FLAMBO). FLAMBO was also responsible for the co-ordination of demands for the maintenance of the British forces in ITALY and for the acceptance of ships into the ports of southern ITALY.

\textsuperscript{74} Directive from Allied C-in-C to Gen Alexander, 28 Jan 44. MGS memo to CofS AFHQ, 28 Jan 44 (G-5 AFHQ file: 322-17).
COMMAND CHANNELS FOR ALLIED CONTROL IN ITALY
January 1944

AFHQ

ACMF

ACC

ACC & AMC

Regions

on matters of high policy
Hq No 3 District was established in ITALY on 9 February 1944 in accordance with the British practice of introducing additional static headquarters in the L of C as the rear area of the army moved forward. This new district set up its headquarters at CASTELLAMMARE and relieved Hq No 2 District of administrative responsibility for the area north of CAPRI along the Campania regional boundary and in rear of the army area. Included in this territory were Hq No 57 Area (NAPLES) and Hq No 94 Sub-Area (SALERNO). Hq No 59 Area, which was under the command of 5th Army, was also placed under No 3 District for matters of British administration.

The official boundaries between the American Peninsular Base Section and the British No 2 and No 3 districts on 22 February are shown by the map on the next page.

Hq No 3 District was under the command of APHQ but communicated with Hq ACMF on all general staff matters and with FLAMBO on all administrative matters.

The responsibility for the operation of the ports of TORRE DEL GRECO, TORRE ANNUNZIATA, CASTELLAMMARE, and SALERNO remained with PBS although they were within the boundaries of No 3 District.

The reorganization of command in the Central MEDITERRANEAN was already under discussion at APHQ and, on the day after No 3 District had been established in

75. Hq ACMF Ops Instn No 39, 7 Feb 44.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid.
78. APHQ GO No 8, 22 Feb 44.
79. Hq ACMF Ops Instn No 39, 7 Feb 44.
80. Ibid.
ITALY, a directive was issued by the Chief of Staff to the
C-in-C ACMF (AAI). The following paragraphs are quoted from
this directive:

(1) As a result of additional responsibilities having been allocated to AFHQ and
in view of the desirability of having one Allied military authority responsible for direct
dealing with the Italian authorities, the following reorganisation of command will be ef-
fective as at a date to be agreed between your
headquarters and AFHQ.

(2) The area of your command is extended
to include ITALY, SICILY, and SARDINIA.

(3) The channel of communication for all
purposes, unless specially stated otherwise
in these instructions, is Hq ACMF (AAI) to
AFHQ.

(Appendix A)

(3) In principle, and unless specific-
ally reserved, the function previously per-
formed by AFHQ Adv/Adm Echelon as specified
in AFHQ Adm Memo No 67 in respect of co-or-di-
nation of international supplies passes to Hq
ACMF (AAI) as from the date on which it is
set up.

(4) All formations, districts, etc., un-
der command of Hq ACMF (AAI) will deal through
the normal channels with that headquarters on
all AG (British) matters. They will not deal
with AFHQ direct.

This directive came into effect on 26 February 1944
but without sufficient clarification, it seemed, of the transfer
of the command over the districts. A revised version, dated 4
March 1944, allowed no cause for ambiguity when it stated that
"No 1, No 2, and No 3 Districts will be under your command
for all purposes."

The result of this change of command was to leave

81. Directive, CofS AFHQ to C-in-C ACMF, 10 Feb 44 (G-3
AFHQ file: 55/7).
82. Revised Directive, CofS AFHQ to C-in-C ACMF, 4 Mar 44
(G-3 AFHQ file: 55/7).
83. Ibid. -- 738 --
AFHQ with direct command of only that part of the British L of C which was represented by Hq North Africa District. This District, however, was steadily losing its importance as a base because of the advance of the armies and the consequent liberation of ports in southern ITALY. The future of Hq North Africa District was discussed at a meeting held by the CAO on 10 May 1944, and it was agreed that, although the British plan aimed at concentrating around ALGIERS and BONE, the District Hq should continue for a time with sub-ordinate headquarters at ALGIERS, BONE, CONSTANTINE, and TUNIS. A chart of that part of the British L of C which came under the direct command of AFHQ in June 1944 is shown on the next page.

6. Summary of Commands of AFHQ and NATOUSA (December 1943—June 1944)

a. Supreme Allied Commander. Mediterranean Theater.

General DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (A) continued as Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces until 8 January 1944. On 10 December 1943, at the time of AFHQ assumption of command over GHQ MEF for certain operational areas, his designation was changed to Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediter-

84. Min of Mtg held at AFHQ, 10 May 44 (G-3 Org AFHQ file: HSD/198).
85. Ltr, GOC NA Dist to Q (Maint) AFHQ, 26 May 44 (G-3 Org AFHQ file: HSD/198).
86. NAF Cable No 583, AFHQ to CCS, 8 Jan 44.
In addition, he continued as Commanding General NATOUSA until 8 January 1944. General Sir HENRY MAITLAND WILSON (B) succeeded General Eisenhower as Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Theater on 8 January 1944.

On 9 March 1944 his title was changed to Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.

b. **Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater**

General the Honourable Sir HAROLD R. L. G. ALEXANDER (B) was Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, from 18 February 1943 to 8 January 1944. In addition to this, he was General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, 15th Army Group. His title was changed on 10 December 1943 to Deputy Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Theater. Lieutenant General JACOB L. DEVERS (A) succeeded General Alexander as Deputy Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Theater on 8 January 1944. On the same date General Devers assumed command of NATOUSA. The title of Deputy Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Theater, was changed on 9 March 1944 to Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.

c. **Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean**

Admiral Sir...
JOHN CUNNINGHAM (B) was Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean in 1944, having assumed command on 17 October 1943.

d. Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces. Air Chief Marshal Sir ARTHUR TEDDER (B) was Air Commander-in-Chief, MAC from 17 February 1943 until 15 January 1944. His designation as Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Air Command was changed on 20 December 1943 to Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces. Air Chief Marshal Tedder was succeeded by Lieutenant General IRA C. EAKER (A) who also became Commanding General, US Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theater of Operations.

e. General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, 15th Army Group (AAI). General, the Honourable Sir HAROLD R. L. G. ALEXANDER (B) continued in command of the 15th Army Group.

He was also Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces (later Deputy Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Theater) until 8 January 1944. His title was changed three times between December 1943 and June 1944:

(1) General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Allied Forces in ITALY (11 January 1944).

(2) General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Allied Central Mediterranean Forces (18 Jan-

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97. Naval War Diary (B) AFHQ, 23 Oct 43.
98. AFHQ GO/No 20, 17 Feb 43.
99. AFHQ GO/No 67, 20 Dec 43.
100. AAF/MTO/GO No 4, 15 Jan 44. WD Cable No 5814.
101. CCS Directive to Allied C-in-C (CCS 177/2/0), 23 Jan 43 (2-3 AFHQ file: 20/2.1).
102. AFHQ GO/No 21, 18 Feb 43; No 2; 8 Jan 44; No 12, 9 Mar 44.
103. AFHQ GO/No 3, 11 Jan 44.
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The C-in-C AAI continued to have the responsibility of being Allied Military Governor of all Italian territory occupied by the Allies.

f. **Air Officer Commanding, Balkan Air Force.** Air Vice Marshal WILLIAM ELLIOT (B) was appointed Air Officer commandling Balkan Air Force on 15 June 1944.

g. **Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Forces.** GHQ MEF was brought under AFHQ for certain operations on 10 December 1943. General Sir HENRY MAITLAND WILSON (B) was C-in-C MEF until he succeeded General Eisenhower as Allied Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean Theater on 8 January 1944. He was succeeded as C-in-C MEF by General Sir BERNARD C. T. PAGET (B).

h. **Deputy Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ Advanced Echelon (FLAMBO).** Major General Sir BRIAN H. ROBERTSON (B) continued to serve as DCAO FLAMBO under AFHQ until 9 March 1944 when he became MGA Hq AAI.

i. **North Africa District (B).** Major General E.P.
NARES (B) continued in command of North Africa District until 27 January 1944. Major General N. CLOWES (B) succeeded to this command on 2 February 1944.

j. No 1 District (B). Major General C.A. HEYDEMAN (B) continued in command of No 1 District. No 1 District was placed under Hq ACMF on 10 February 1944.

k. No 2 District (B). Major General A. A. B. DOWLER (B) continued to command No 2 District until he was succeeded by Major General E.P. NARES (B) on 27 January 1944. No 2 District was also placed under the command of Hq ACMF on 10 February 1944.

l. Commanding General, North African Theater of Operations US Army. (See above, Part III, Chapter XXI, Sections a and b.)

m. Deputy Theater Commander, North African Theater of Operations, US Army (CG Com Z NATOUSA). Major General EVERETT S. HUGHES (A) continued to serve as Deputy Theater Commander NATOUSA and CG Com Z NATOUSA until the former of these offices was abolished on 22 February 1944 and the latter was absorbed into SOS NATOUSA on the same date.


113. WO Auth 940/MS, 25 Jan 44.

114. WO Cable No 92339 MS 1, WO to AFHQ, 24 Nov 43 (D/MS AFHQ file: 826).

115. Ltr, AFHQ to GO C-in-C ACMF, 4 Mar 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 55/7).


117. Ltr, AFHQ to GO C-in-C ACMF, 4 Mar 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 55/7).

118. NATOUSA GO No 4, 12 Feb 43. NATOUSA ltr order, 22 Feb 44.
n. Commending General, Services of Supply (Com 2).

North African Theater of Operations, US Army. Major General THOMAS B. LARKIN (A) continued to serve as CG SOS NATOUSA and later assumed the duties of CG Com 2 NATOUSA when it came under SOS NATOUSA on 22 February 1944.

119: NATOUSA IGO No 6, 14 Feb 43. NATOUSA ltr order, 22 Feb 44.